Chapter III — The notion of the vow, and the conditions required for it to be lawful and valid

I. Before I present the notion, or definition, of a vow, I set forth first the various meanings of this word. The name "votum" derives from the verb vovere, "to vow." Now to vow is the same as to promise — not to anyone, but to God or to the Saints. "To promise," "to pledge," "to engage" are words by which we disclose to men, or to God, the desires of our mind, and bind ourselves. "To vow," however, properly signifies to promise something to God, since a vow is an act of religion, by which we worship God. The word "votum" is also often taken for "desire" ["wish"]. Hence those who obtain their desires are called "compotes voti" ["having attained their wish"]. "To make vows" (vota facere) not infrequently means the same as to pray, or to wish; and pious desires are called "vota," and are sometimes even used for the very resolve of the will. From these various meanings, we must now establish the genuine notion of the vow, which shall be the subject of the disputation to follow.

II. St. Raymond (in his Summa, Bk. I, on vows) gives this definition of a vow: "A vow is a deliberate promise made to God concerning a better good." This definition differs little from that which theologians commonly give, following St. Thomas (II-II, q. 88), which is as follows: "A vow is a deliberate and spontaneous promise made to God concerning a better good." Five conditions are commonly assigned to a vow. The first is deliberation, whereby the intellect weighs and considers the burden to be undertaken. The second is the resolve, or the will to promise, to bind oneself, and to carry out the promise. The third is the promise itself, which is customarily called a certain practical utterance of the intellect. The fourth, that this promise be made to God, to whom alone, as will be said below, vows properly so called are made. The fifth, that it be a promise concerning a better good — that is, concerning a matter pleasing to God, or a good of supererogation, which is not commanded — if a vow is taken strictly and properly. Although, as will be said below, a vow can also be made concerning a commanded thing, insofar as the commanded thing is constituted, by the one vowing, as matter of religion; and under this title, it can be called a better good, or a work of supererogation. But, as I said, when we come below to discuss the matter of a vow, this condition will be more fully explained from St. Thomas.

III. The conditions indicated must be explained. And first it must be noted that no words or signs at all are required for a vow to be complete, as the Angelic Doctor teaches (loc. cit.), and St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2). "It is not necessary," he says, "for the promise to be expressed in words; but it suffices to have promised in the heart." For that reason, words, signs, or nods, by which the internal feelings of the mind are made known, are necessary for a promise made to a man — because man does not see what is in the heart, as God does. Wherefore a human promise, to be accepted, needs words or signs; a vow made to God does not. This, however, is said so that we may explain the nature of a vow. In practice, however, it will always be advisable, both for firmer memory and for a clearer declaration of the vow, to express the vow in words — as David is read to have done (Ps. 65): "I will pay thee my vows, which my lips have uttered."

IV. Theologians dispute, not without difficulty, in which act — of the intellect, or of the will — the essence of the vow consists. We will free ourselves from this difficulty briefly. All agree that several acts, both of the will and of the intellect, are required beforehand for a vow. If you look to the essence of the vow, it consists in a practical act of the intellect. For a vow is a private law, whereby someone binds himself to God to do something; and orders and directs what he imposes on himself to be done, to God's honor and glory. Now to direct, and to order, is an act of the commanding intellect; yet it carries with it the resolve of the will. How the resolve of the will, which moves, precedes the very acts of the intellect, will be discussed elsewhere, when the internal acts come to be outlined.

V. Question I. How much deliberation is required for a vow? Response: All, to a man, affirm that deliberation is necessary for making a vow. But since deliberation, or freedom of action, can be imperfect and only half-complete, or, on the other hand, perfect and full, the question here is which of these is required for a vow. The most common opinion is that full and perfect deliberation is required. This perfect deliberation consists in the one vowing being fully master of himself — that is, that he advert to, and know, what he is promising. For this perfect and full deliberation, a long and lengthy discussion of all the surrounding circumstances is by no means necessary. Nor does this perfect deliberation suffer from any disturbance or agitation of mind whatsoever — only from that which clouds the mind, and removes the light of reason. Otherwise, if any agitation of mind at all removed the necessary deliberation, very few vows would be found valid — since very many vows are made either in a spirit of devotion, or under the vehement impulse of some desire, or of anger, or of fear — all of which, though occasions, are nonetheless not the cause of the vow's invalidity. That freedom, then, which suffices for committing a sin, or for completing a contract, or some other grave business, is not doubted to suffice also for making a vow. Deliberation, then, can be considered in two ways: as it is opposed to a sudden impulse — which they call the "first movement" — and as it implies a serious discussion of all the means which might either advance or delay the deliberated matter. Deliberation taken in the first sense is necessary for a vow; not so in the second.

VI. Question II. Must sudden, hasty vows be fulfilled? Response: Vows, even if made suddenly, are valid, since, as has been said, they flow from a deliberate will. Such vows, however, are marked by imprudence. But if they are valid, they undoubtedly induce an obligation. Such a sudden making of a vow, moreover, gives just cause to seek either a dispensation, or a commutation. That someone, having made a vow, immediately repents of it, does not thereby prove the vow invalid — since it is not uncommon for many things to displease us as soon as they are done, even though conceived and carried out with full deliberation. If, however, the vow proceeded from some vehement disturbance, whether of anger or of fear, and the one vowing immediately repented of it, this would be no slight argument that the vow was invalid. No precise rule, however, can be assigned. For deliberation is an internal act, and can only be gathered from external signs. From various conjectures and circumstances, then, such vows are to be declared valid, or invalid. One rule alone is certain: that vows should be made only with great weighing and discussion. For they are private laws, which, before being enacted, ought to be brought to a severe examination of all the circumstances. Wherefore we say, with the most common opinion of theologians, that those who make vows of great import with only slight consideration sin, at least venially. For the greater the burden to be undertaken, the more mature the consideration, the more serious the discussion, and the more prudent the deliberation required. Hence it is said (Ecclesiasticus 5): "It displeaseth God, and a foolish promise." A promise is called foolish which lacks prudence and deliberation.

VII. Question III. Does one who rashly makes a vow of great import sometimes commit a mortal sin? And is a vow made with such a sin valid? Response: The gravity of any inconsideration is taken from the greater or lesser importance of the matter to be undertaken. A vow, by its very kind, is a grave matter entered into with God. It can become light on account of the lightness of the matter. But if the matter is grave, it will always be most grave. It will therefore be culpable to omit, more or less, the due consideration, according as the vow made will have been of greater or lesser importance. That a mortal sin should ever occur here, however, I would say, in my own opinion, is never the case. Sánchez, Suárez, and Lessius maintain that a mortal sin does occur, when the one vowing, taught by experience, foresees that he will transgress the vow he is making without due consideration. This opinion is rejected by the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 1, §2, n. 13), on the grounds that the danger of transgressing a vow arises equally when a vow is made with perfect deliberation. For one who vows precipitately exposes himself, on account of his own frailty, to the danger of promising impossible or unlawful things. For to promise such things to God is a grave sin. It will therefore likewise be a grave sin to expose oneself to the danger of promising similar things. They add, however, that a mortal sin can occur when one exposes himself to this danger by vowing without consultation and precipitately, foreseeing such a danger.

VIII. I judge both the first and the second opinion to be false. Do not all agree that perfect and full deliberation is required for a vow? One who vows precipitately, with only half-complete deliberation, vows nothing. If the lack of full deliberation excuses from the vow, it will, with even greater reason, excuse from the aforesaid danger. What then? Will deliberation be imperfect with respect to the vow, but full with respect to the danger? These are paradoxical claims. For one who, with full light and deliberate will, foresees the danger, also sees what he is vowing. But if the inconsideration is such as to impede freedom and full deliberation, the one vowing vows nothing at all. How, then, can it be true, as the theologians of Salamanca say, that the one vowing exposes himself to the danger of promising unlawful or impossible things — if, indeed, he vows nothing, and promises nothing, on account of the lack of the necessary and full deliberation? He sins, then, only venially, on account of the lack of due consideration and reflection — a crime of mere imprudence, which does not exceed the bounds of venial malice. Men are, therefore, to be dissuaded from such vows, and instructed that, before making vows, they should give more serious thought to their own strength, inclinations, circumstances, and state in life. As for the second point — that one who, after experience of a violated vow, vows the same thing again, even with full deliberation, sins mortally, even though nothing prevents him from fulfilling the vow to God — this is likewise clear to be false. For such a vower always makes his vow with the intention of showing God worship, in order to restrain himself from vice. It is, therefore, solely a crime of imprudence and inconsideration, which does not exceed the bounds of venial malice.

IX. Question IV. When a vow is valid, and the one vowing is bound to fulfill it, does nothing prevent that vow from proceeding from some fit of anger, fear, or other passion, as if from an occasion, and consequently occurring with some accompanying half-deliberate fault? Response: This is affirmed, since such a fault neither removes the deliberation necessary for the vow, nor infects the vow itself.

X. Question V. Does full deliberation suffice for any vow, even one concerning a slight matter, or is virtual deliberation sufficient? Response: Some affirm, among whom the theologians of Salamanca are counted (loc. cit., n. 15), citing St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, notab. 6), that a sudden vow does not oblige to a perfect sin, nor to a perfect good. This, however, is false: for regardless of how the matter stands, I answer that full deliberation is required for any vow, however slight the matter, and that half-complete deliberation does not suffice. For any vow whatsoever is a private law, whose nature the magnitude or smallness of the matter in no way alters. Such a vow, by its very nature, obliges gravely. Even granting (the opposite of which we shall show below) that, by reason of a slight matter, it induces only a light obligation, this in no way prevents it from being a true law — and a private law, by its very nature, requires perfect deliberation. A venial sin (as the previous argument runs) can be committed by only half-complete deliberation, because the act is, by its own kind, imperfect in the moral order; but any vow whatsoever, whatever its matter, whether great or small, demands, in the order of religion, perfect deliberation, or actual freedom — this consideration removed, whatever else is perfect [would not matter]. But this author establishes no reason from this at all. In another part of his little work, he shows little regard for authority.

XI. Question VI. Does a firm resolve, or any kind of simple willing, constitute a vow? Response: Some canonists teach that a resolve alone suffices for a vow. The common opinion of theologians and canonists is the contrary — since a resolve is nothing other than the will to do something; a resolve is indeed a prerequisite for a vow, but the nature of the vow does not consist in it. Concerning the second part of the question, there is not a single unanimous opinion among theologians. What all agree on is that the violation of no resolve, however efficacious and firm, is a mortal sin. There is dispute about venial fault. Not a few — Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 41, dub. 4), Angles (s.v. Votum, n. 1), Prado, Raphael de la Torre (II-II, q. 88, art. 1, disp. 7) — hold that no fault at all is committed in the violation of a resolve, since the very nature of a resolve indicates that it obliges no one, and it remains free for anyone to alter their plan at will. For in those things which men impose on themselves, their freedom always remains, so that they can, according to their own choice, change their resolve. This teaching follows St. Thomas here, art. 1, ad 1: "Those who propose to do something have not yet begun to do it, but only intend to do it in the future; whereas one who promises has already begun, in a certain way, to show that he will fulfill what he promises — just as one who puts his hand to the plough has already begun to plough, even though he has not yet finished the ploughing." This opinion of St. Thomas's is very frequently invoked by the Fathers in support of a vow's resolve. Whenever Augustine indicates the violation of a vow, he calls it a falling away from resolve — a "transgression," as he says. In the same way Bernard and Gregory speak. That the breaking of a resolve is not free of venial fault is held by other Fathers, who cite that saying of St. Bernard (Epistle 9): "Whoever has made a good resolve to do something has made it unlawful for himself not to do what he could have done." This opinion of St. Thomas's is used to argue for an inconstancy, a levity, and, so to speak, an unfaithfulness. That it is false is denied, however. Nay, I myself judge that some fault does occur, if someone, without any cause, departs from a good resolve — not indeed on the ground that he thereby violates the obligation, which we have said does not exist, of the resolve; but on account of that general principle: that not to advance in the way of the Lord is to fall behind. Everyone, then, ought to take care to carry out what he has resolved, unless reasons arise that suggest the contrary. And although this is not a binding law, nor does it bind the debt of fidelity, such a change can with great difficulty be cleared of the taint of inconstancy and fickleness on the part of the one changing. And to this extent, perhaps, we can in no way condemn the first opinion; and in this sense we by no means reject it.

XII. Question VII. Does the essence of a vow consist in the use of the word "promise" — and does what has been promised differ from a resolve carried out? Response: The most common opinion of theologians holds that a vow consists precisely in the falling due of a promise made to God. The reason is drawn from Scripture itself, which describes a vow through the term "promise." For it is said (Deut. 23): "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it... thou shalt do according as thou hast promised." Likewise (Ecclesiastes 5): "If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it: for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him" — and further on: "it is much better not to vow, than after a vow not to perform the things promised." A vow, then, is explained by Scripture through the term "promise." All alike affirm this. For this distinction to become clearer, however, the notions of both must be set forth. A promise is customarily defined thus: "An act by which someone intends to do something, his own obligation having been undertaken toward another." This definition explains the common meaning, or nature, of a promise. For the promise of a vow is a particular act by which someone binds himself to render something to the worship of God; a resolve, however, as is commonly said, proceeds from a deliberation to do something; or, as this common definition explains, a resolve proceeds from the deliberation of the thing to be done; a promise, from the deliberation of accepting an obligation, and imposing it upon oneself. Theologians dispute to which power of the soul a promise pertains. Fr. Suárez (Bk. I, ch. 13) treats this question at great length, which we judge it best to pass over, since it appears to us of no great importance. We say only, following St. Thomas (II-II, q. 88, art. 1), that a promise pertains to the intellect — for it is a practical utterance, or command, by which a man directs himself toward God, or by which he binds himself to him. For through a vow, which consists in a promise, a man raises himself up toward God. Now to direct and to order pertains to the intellect, not to the will — whatever Suárez may assert to the contrary, following Scotus, whose objections I now pass over in silence, since they are not of such weight that I ought to spend more time examining them.

XIII. Question VIII. What resolve is required for a vow to be valid? Response: All, to a man, admit the necessity of a resolve for the validity of a vow. The disagreement concerns only the quality of the resolve, or of the intention and deliberation. For the resolve of the one vowing can be considered in different ways. First, if he has a deliberate resolve to promise, and to bind himself (in other words, to promise and to vow), and has a deliberate mind not to vow. Second, if someone has the resolve to vow, and to bind himself, but at the same time has a deliberate will not to carry out the promise. In a third way, the one vowing can be considered insofar as he has the intention, or resolve, to promise and to fulfill the promise, but without the intention of binding himself.

XIV. The common opinion is that one who vows in the first manner makes no vow at all, since he only wishes to trifle with words. In confirmation of this opinion, the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 1, §3, n. 14) adduce this authority of St. Thomas, from Bk. IV of the Sentences, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 1, qc. 1, ad 1: "A promise made only in words, and in the heart, to God, is not a vow." This authority of St. Thomas is, however, cited only in part, and does not express the Doctor's true mind; for the Angelic Doctor immediately adds: "Yet man can be sufficiently compelled to promise by a certain interpretive coercion... although he can be compelled simply to an exterior promise, as also to other exterior acts of the will, he cannot, however, be compelled to an interior promise." The opinion of St. Thomas, then, is that if someone, under compulsion, uttered the exterior words that express a vow, he would make no vow at all — since a compelled exterior promise, if the one vowing lacks the positive will to promise, is a mockery, and a mere shadow of a promise. But if someone had a positive, deliberate mind to promise, and, with this deliberate will, spontaneously and freely uttered the words of a vow — even though, with another intention, he did not wish to bind himself — it seems to us probable that such a person does make a vow; because that internal, efficacious intention, or resolve, contains a vow, and necessarily carries with it the will to bind oneself. For whoever, seriously and with a deliberate mind, with no one compelling him, utters the words of a vow, freely wills and deliberately promises — or deliberately makes a vow. As for the intention which would elicit the opposite — namely, that by which the one vowing refuses to bind himself — whether it can prevail against that former, efficacious intention, I leave to be disputed by others, since this is more a discussion for the author's own scrutiny; I abstain from it here. This much I will add for practical purposes: that one who, with a deliberate mind, without any interior resolve, would utter the words of a vow, could not, in the opinion of all, I think, be excused from any fault whatsoever. For if a mocking and deceitful promise made to men is not free of fault, how much more vicious will a promise full of deceit and guile, made to God, be?

XV. Those who vow in the second manner — namely, with the intention of promising, and of binding themselves, but with the will not to fulfill the promise — although Valentia (Vol. III, II-II, disp. 6, q. 6, punct. 1) says that such vowers do not make a vow, the most common opinion is that they do elicit a true vow; since the essence of a vow is completed by a voluntary promise, made with both the intention to promise and the intention to bind oneself. A vow is a private law, which is enacted by the legislator with the will to bind, without the will to carry out [immediately]. It can, quite well, be asked. But the latter — the resolve not to fulfill — is not efficacious, and cannot nullify the first two elements — of promising and of binding oneself, that is, the very practical command by which the vow is commanded, and directed toward the worship of God. Wherefore one who promises marriage, or who receives holy orders, with the will to act against them, validly contracts marriage, and validly receives holy orders... receives holy orders — even though he did not have the will to fulfill what he promised; nevertheless he is bound to fulfill his promises. But such cases scarcely arise in practice.

XVI. You will object: St. Thomas says that a promise proceeds from a resolve, and the will to fulfill the promise constitutes the essence of the promise. If, then, the resolve to act is lacking, the promise itself is lacking. What more is there to say? If someone promised a man something, and immediately added that he had no intention of fulfilling it, would he not be held a mocker, not a true promiser?

XVII. Response: St. Thomas, when he says that a promise proceeds from the resolve to make the promise, is speaking of a perfect promise; and when he says that three things are required for a vow — deliberation, resolve, and promise — he is speaking of a vow according to the regular and common norm of vowing. But when some condition is lacking which pertains neither to the essence of the vow, nor of the promise, the vow is not destroyed, but remains merely imperfect. Now the condition of fulfilling what is promised, or vowed, in no way pertains to the nature of either the promise or the vow; it is external and incidental to it, and therefore cannot destroy the vow. What is added, then, is beside the point. To be sure, if someone promised, and immediately added that he refused to fulfill the promise, he would not be a true promiser, but a mocker. But if he promised sincerely and deliberately, as we are now discussing, he would be compelled to hold to his promises, and to fulfill them.

XVIII. One who vows in the third manner is bound by the vow. For one who vows and promises with a sincere and deliberate mind really wills all those things which are necessarily included in the vow and promise itself. Now in a true vow and promise is included the obligation of carrying out the thing promised. In the same way that someone deliberately wills some cause, by that same will he necessarily wills to attain that cause's effect. Can one who deliberately commits a rape reject vengeance? This opinion is upheld by Sotus (Bk. 7, q. 1, art. 1), Suárez (Bk. I, ch. 3, n. 7), Azor (Part I, Bk. XI, ch. 13, q. 9), Sánchez (II-II, q. 88, art. 1), Aragón, Prado (Vol. II, ch. 31, q. 1), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 1, n. 27), Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 41, n. 12), Trullench (dub. 1, n. 6), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 1, §6, n. 24), and many others. Sotus (q. ult.) and Valentia (disp. 1, punct. 1) argue the contrary, on the grounds that whoever attaches a condition contrary to the substance of a contract renders that contract void. Moreover, a vow is a private law, which does not oblige beyond the legislator's intention.

This question is much ado about nothing, and to be dismissed among trifles: for either the hypothesis is chimerical, or it is true. For, granting the premise that someone really wishes to vow and promise — indeed, that he really does vow and promise, admitting, I say, this true and sincere will, which has already broken forth into the act of vowing and promising — the later will is a mere velleity, which cannot override the former, efficacious will. Since, moreover, it can scarcely, if at all, be conceived that a man, master of himself, should sincerely and with deliberate mind wish to vow and promise, while simultaneously wishing not to bind himself, we pass over this question as an empty one.