Chapter VI — On the vows of wives

I. Question I. Can a husband invalidate all vows which his wife makes after the contracting of marriage? Response: The first opinion denies this, and is defended by St. Antoninus (Part I, tit. 1, ch. 22, §6), Sylvius (II-II, q. 88, art. 9, near the end), Sylvester (s.v. Votum, 5, q. 1), Grassis (Part I, decis., Bk. II, ch. 19, n. 8), Valentia (I-II, disp. 6, q. 6, punct. 6), Navarrus (ch. 12, n. 65), Sayr (Bk. VI, ch. 5, n. 8), Layman (Bk. IV, tract. 4, ch. 5, n. 12), Suárez (Bk. III, ch. 6, n. 26, and Bk. VI, ch. 4, n. 2), Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 17, q. 12), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 7, §2, n. 12), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 35, n. 2), and others. The reason for this opinion is valid enough. A husband can invalidate those vows which concern matters subject to his power; for a wife is not subject to her husband in all things, but only in those which regard the marriage, the education of children, and the governance of the household. Therefore only those vows can a husband invalidate which are repugnant to this subjection, and to the administration of goods, and disturb this order... ; but not others, which in no way disturb those which we have reviewed. This is confirmed by the fact that a wife's subjection to her husband arises from the contract and sacrament of matrimony. This, moreover, induces not a total subjection, but only that which is necessary for this end, or which conduces to it. Therefore the husband can only rescind those vows which stand in the way of this end.

II. The contrary opinion is taught by no fewer authors. Sotus (on justice and law, Bk. VII, art. 4, dub. 1, concl. 1), Prado (ch. 31, q. 13, n. 93), Raphael de la Torre (II-II, q. 88, art. 9, disp. 4, q. 5), Candido (disp. 25, art. 11), Aragón (II-II, q. 88, art. 1, dub. 5), Sánchez (on marriage, disp. 39, n. 8), Fagundez (Bk. II, ch. 38, n. 2), Villalobos (Vol. II, tract. 34, diff. 21, n. 4), Ledesma (on marriage, q. 64, art. 1), Diana (Part III, tract. 4, resol. 20), Leander (tract. 16, q. 127), Tamburini (Bk. III, ch. 16, §3, n. 48), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 2, punct. 6, n. 58).

III. This opinion is established, first, by the authority of Sacred Scripture. St. Paul (Ephesians 5:22): "Let women be subject to their husbands, as to the Lord: because the husband is the head of the wife, as Christ is the head of the Church... but as the Church is subject to Christ, so also let the wives be to their husbands in all things." Just as, then, all the members of the body depend on the head, and the Church is subject to Christ in all things, so the wife will be subject to her husband in all things. This is confirmed from the chapter "He was not willing," and the chapter "Manifest," cause 45, q. 5, from St. Augustine, and from the final chapter there, from St. Ambrose, on Paradise, ch. 10, where this is found: "It is most evident that a Religious is subject to his Prelate, as regards his own operations, according to the profession of the Rule, so that no vow of abstinence, or of religious conversation, may be advanced by him without the Prelate's license" — just as, indeed, neither is the vow of a girl living in her father's house, unless it is with the father's consent — nor of a wife, unless it is with her husband's consent, valid. And thus also the husband can invalidate all his wife's vows, whether real or personal. Since, although the subjection of a Religious to his Prelate is of a different order from the subjection of a wife to her husband, both subjections nonetheless admit an equal amplitude, and are for the fostering of mutual love.

IV. Each opinion is probable. And if the two opinions are compared with one another, it scarcely appears to me which prevails. I incline, nonetheless, toward the first, which, all things weighed, seems to me more probable — indeed, as regards certain vows, it does not have room, which the Treatise does not have... What is expedient for the tranquil governance of the household between spouses, God... [this text is corrupted/garbled here in the OCR — the argument concerns why a Prelate can invalidate all a Religious's vows, since no time exists in which the Superior might not occupy him, whereas a husband's rights over his wife are narrower]. Finally St. Thomas (II-II, q. 88, art. 9, ad 3) teaches the same...

The second opinion seems to me false. For the theologians of Salamanca, with the other authors cited, teach for that opinion that a husband can dissolve all, and whatever, vows made by his wife, whether personal or real, no differently than (as they say) a Prelate can invalidate all the vows of his subjects. This assertion is false; for the real vows which wives make concerning their paraphernalia can in no way be invalidated by the husband. Since, over the paraphernalia of a wife, which are goods outside the dowry, the husband has no dominion at all. The wife, then, can vow, and distribute, these at her own pleasure. As to this point, then, the opinion of these authors is indeed false.

V. The same must absolutely be said of personal vows which in no way directly interfere with the mutual duty of the spouses — such as vows concerning certain prayers to be recited (provided, however, they are not too lengthy, nor such as would disturb conversation with the husband), concerning the rejection of superfluous and vain adornment, concerning the avoidance of spectacles and dances, concerning the avoidance of second marriages, if she should survive her husband, concerning entrance into a Monastery, and the like. Since these are in no way inconvenient, or harmful, either to the mutual love of the spouses, or to the governance of the household, or to the education of children. This opinion, besides those cited in n. 1, is defended by Natalis Alexander (Bk. IV, on the Decalogue, art. 24), La Croix (Bk. III, part 1, art. 1, n. 493), Antoine (tract. on the virtues, 2nd precept, ch. 3, n. 90), Felix Potestas (Vol. I, part 2, ch. 3, n. 1780), Patritius Sporer (tract. 3, on the 1st precept of the Decalogue, ch. 3, sect. 2, §2, n. 27), Francisco Schmalzgrueber (Vol. IV), and several others.

VI. The arguments of the contrary opinion are easily solved. The text of the Apostle Paul establishes only that wives are subject to husbands in all those matters which concern external governance, and mutual love. The canonical text, too, speaks of vows of abstinence, of religious conversation, and the like, as can be seen from the same words, as anyone who reads can confirm. St. Thomas too speaks of vows contrary to the exterior governance of the household. For, speaking of a Religious, he says that, since a Prelate can prescribe something to him at any hour whatsoever, therefore no vow of his is valid, unless it is ratified by the Prelate. To the reasoning it is answered that, by virtue of marriage, a woman is subject to her husband in all those matters which concern conjugal rights, but not in others. For fostering marital love, it suffices that the wife can do nothing without consulting her husband, from among those things which could disturb this love, and the matrimonial estate. The parallel drawn from the religious state suffers from falsity. For whence, indeed, do the theologians of Salamanca gather that the subjection of a wife to her husband is of the same amplitude, and equal extension, as the subjection of a Religious to his Prelate? A wife has dominion over her paraphernal goods; and can administer, and distribute, and disburse the same. Who would say that the same is granted to a Religious? Not only, then, is the subjection of a Religious to his Prelate of a different, but of a higher order and greater amplitude, than that of a wife to her husband, as has been more fully discussed elsewhere.

VII. Question II. Can a husband invalidate the vows and oaths of his wife concerning commanded works? Response: According to our opinion, a husband cannot invalidate his wife's vows concerning hearing Mass, keeping the fast, not lying, not fornicating, making confession, and the like. The reason is clear from what has been said.

VIII. Question III. Can a husband invalidate a vow of not requesting the marital debt, made by his wife without his consent? Response: The more common, and more probable, opinion denies this — since, as regards the right of requesting and rendering the conjugal debt, husband and wife are equal; for, as regards this particular act, the husband is not the head of the wife, as Durandus excellently notes (Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 1, n. 5). It should nonetheless be counseled that the wife abstain from this vow — since, if not directly, it nonetheless in some way conduces to diminishing conjugal benevolence, and mutual love. For if the husband perceives that his wife is bound by such a vow, his affection toward her is somewhat estranged.

IX. Question IV. Can a husband invalidate a vow of chastity which his wife made with his consent? Response: Leander affirms this, defending it as more probable (tract. 1, disp. 16, q. 130), where he praises, for the same opinion, Sánchez, Diana, Sotus, Ledesma, and others. But according to the principles we have set forth above, this opinion seems to us not at all probable. For if a husband cannot, without consulting her, dissolve a vow of chastity made by his wife, how much less will he be able to invalidate a vow which he has already once approved! Whence, I ask, or from what right is it drawn, that a husband can retract a consent once deliberately given? In whatever other matters this retraction would be unjust — why not in the case of a vow as well?

X. Question V. When each spouse, by mutual consent, vows or swears chastity, can a husband invalidate his wife's vow? Response: Certainly he cannot — since each has, by mutual consent, yielded his own right; therefore neither has any further power of revoking a promise deliberately made to God, any more than in other promises.

XI. Question VI. If, after a vow of chastity made with deliberate and mutual consent, the spouses have carnally and sacrilegiously come together, can the husband invalidate his wife's vow? Response: Sánchez affirms this (on the Decalogue, Bk. IV, ch. 34, n. 37), Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 2, punct. 6, n. 6), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 16, q. 132). This opinion seems to me false, and improbable. Nor do these authors seem consistent with themselves. They subscribed to the preceding little question, that spouses cannot dissolve a vow of chastity made by mutual consent. Then they now teach that the husband can dissolve it, once the sacrilegious union has been carried out. Shall these spouses, then, reap an advantage from their own iniquity? So long as they lead a celibate life, they cannot break the vow; and, the vow once violated, will the husband have the right, or faculty, of invalidating the vow? But, say the theologians of Salamanca (n. 59), whose supporters accede to this opinion, this mutually-consented contract... can be dissolved by mutual consent. This would be true, if the contract concerned only the contracting parties themselves. But this contract has been made perfect through a vow dedicated to God, and is thereby consecrated; and therefore no liberty remains to the spouses of rescinding it. The spouses, indeed, have, by virtue of mutual consent, the liberty of vowing; but once the mutual consent has been given through a vow, they no longer have the liberty of revoking it, even if they should mutually consent to do so.

XII. What if the spouses merely granted each other license to vow, without specifying the kind of vow? Then it would have to be judged otherwise. For license, by its own nature, savors neither of perpetuity, nor is it irrevocable. One who grants a license is always presumed to have granted it subject to revocation at will. The license, then, being withdrawn, the husband could invalidate his wife's vow. It must be noted, however, that if the spouses, with deliberate mind, mutually granted each other license for eliciting a perpetual vow of chastity, or for vowing chastity absolutely, with no condition attached, then they could no longer revoke the license, or consent already given — as we have already taught above — for the general reason that it is no longer within the free faculty of the one consenting to retract deliberate consents once given, in whatever matter.

XIII. Question VII. When each spouse, by mutual consent, vows religious life, can either one alone, or both together by mutual consent, invalidate this vow? Response: Neither one alone, nor both together, can dissolve the aforesaid vow. For this vow includes perpetual continence, and the dissolution of the marriage as regards the marriage bed. The same must be said, when, by mutual consent, one vows religious life, the other chastity. This is the most common opinion, and true.

XIV. Question VIII. Can a husband invalidate vows which his wife made before the contracted marriage, to be fulfilled, however, after marriage has been entered into? Response: The more common, and more probable, opinion denies this — since these vows, considering the time when they were made, were free of every condition, and thus are absolute vows. The husband, then, has no power at all over their validity; but he can only suspend them, insofar as they would be inconvenient to the conjugal duty. The same must be said of vows made at the time of a legitimate divorce: if the spouses are mutually reconciled, the husband can by no means invalidate such vows, but only suspend them — since, when the wife made them, she was free from the law, and from the power, of her husband.

XV. Question IX. Can a husband invalidate vows which the wife makes, to be fulfilled after the marriage has been dissolved? Response: Leander, Tamburini, and several others whom they cite affirm this. But the negative opinion is more common, and more probable. For here the vows in no way interfere with matrimonial right; nor does the husband have any dominion, after death, over that woman who was once joined to him by the bond of marriage. And although the vow is made at a time when the wife is subject to her husband, yet, as regards this matter, she is by no means subject to him, as is established from what has been said. If, the first husband having died, the wife passes to a second marriage, the second husband will be able to invalidate all the vows which the first husband could have invalidated, provided they were not confirmed during the period of widowhood.

XVI. Question X. Can a wife invalidate any of her husband's vows? Response: Sotus, Ledesma, Azor, and others deny this. The common opinion maintains that a wife can rescind those vows of her husband which are repugnant to matrimonial right. The cited authors, denying this faculty to the wife of invalidating her husband's vows, differ from the common opinion only in words — especially Sotus, who, in Bk. VII, on justice, q. 3, art. 1, verse "Extra hanc materiam," discusses this matter. For he decides that vows which a husband makes to the prejudice of the wife's rights are null, and therefore do not need invalidation. From this it is established (whatever the truth of this opinion may be) that authors commonly agree that a husband, without consulting his wife, cannot make vows to the detriment of the conjugal duty. The cited authors refuse to grant the wife the faculty of invalidating her husband's vows, on the grounds that she is subject to him as to a head. But this, if examined closely, is no obstacle. The man is head of the woman, and her master. This, however, in no way prevents the wife from retaining dominion over certain goods. Is not the wife mistress of her paraphernal goods? But by how much greater a right does she enjoy the conjugal matter itself? In this right the spouses are equal; nor, as regards this, is the man the head, or master, of the woman. Wherefore whatever vows made by the husband, if they interfere with the matrimonial duty, the wife can invalidate. St. Thomas excepted, in his own time, a vow of pilgrimage to Jerusalem in aid of the Holy Land — since, he says (Bk. IV, dist. 31, art. 4, ad 1), the wife ought to be willing to remain continent for a time, in aid of the necessity of the universal Church. The same would now have to be said, if a similar reason of public utility should occur, whether temporal or ecclesiastical — such as the defense of the homeland, or a war against those attacking religion. Other vows likewise, which do no harm to matrimonial right, the wife cannot invalidate.

XVII. Question XI. Can a wife invalidate a vow made by her husband not to request the debt? Response: Layman, Trullench, Henríquez, and others affirm this — since wives would be compelled, contrary to the modesty implanted by nature, always to request the debt themselves. But this reasoning is too feeble. Since a wife has no right at all to oblige her husband to request the debt. She cannot oblige him to request it, but only to render it. It suffices that the husband always be ready to pay it when asked. Although, then, he be bound by a vow such that he cannot request it (to which, indeed, he is not otherwise bound), he must nonetheless always be ready, and prompt, to render it, whenever requested. This opinion is true, and several defend it. Such vows, however, are to be discouraged both for husbands and for wives.

XVIII. Question XII. Would the aforesaid vow of a husband be lawful, a prudent man foreseeing? Response: For the most part, and almost always, it would not be lawful, and this vow would be quite burdensome; since it would expose the wife to too great a danger of violating it, and of sinning, since she would have to lie in another bed without her spouse's consent. For the rest, such a close cohabitation could perhaps present this danger.

XIX. Question XIII. Can a wife invalidate a vow which the husband has made of taking up the habit of an Eremite, or of some religious order? Response: Authors commonly affirm this — since such a vow prejudices the wife: for the assumption of the habit brings horror, and diminishes conjugal love; indeed, it paves the way to a separation of hearts. Neither spouse, then, can, without the other's consent, change from lay habit into the habit of an Eremite, whether religious, of St. Francis, St. Dominic, etc., nor make a vow of commuting it; and if such a vow has been made, either has the right to invalidate it.

XX. Question XIV. Can a wife invalidate her husband's vows of disbursing ample alms, of pouring out lengthy prayers, of undertaking frequent fasts? Response: Since the husband has the absolute administration of the household, and of all domestic goods, it is plain that the wife cannot dissolve the aforesaid vow of alms, even if it should redound to the detriment of the family, if such a vow touched the wife's own goods; on this score there would be no harm, nor would it need invalidation — just as, likewise, there would be none, if it damaged justice, by squandering goods. For vows, like oaths, are not bonds of iniquity. Vows, however, of prayers and of fasts so frequent that they would weaken the husband's body, and render him unfit for rendering the debt, the wife ought to invalidate, as harmful to matrimonial right.

XXI. Question XV. Can a wife invalidate a vow of a long pilgrimage made by her husband? Response: The common opinion affirms this — since it would be to the wife's prejudice, as has been said above. A vow of pilgrimage to Jerusalem, or a similar one, made for the temporary public good, is excepted. Concerning the pilgrimage to Jerusalem, this is held in the chapter "From many," verse "In so great," and the chapter "Which, concerning this," on vows. It must be judged otherwise, if the vow were made for the sake of merely arbitrary devotion, as would now be the case. For now the husband would not enjoy the benefit of that canon — since there is now no cause of going to Jerusalem for the sake of recovering the public good. Although, even then, when husbands used to make such a vow for the Holy Land, theologians disputed whether a husband could lawfully fulfill the vow in person, when the wife did not wish to accompany him, and was very young, and, being absent from her husband, remained exposed to the danger of incontinence. Many denied that the husband could fulfill the vow then, since by the law of nature he is bound to satisfy the debt previously contracted. But now there is no occasion for disputing this. It has been said above, and we say again, that the wife is bound to continence for the sake of some grave public good to be defended, or lost good to be recovered. But these cases occur most rarely; and therefore we abstain from a more lengthy discussion.

XXII. Vows made by a husband before marriage can be suspended by the wife, if they are repugnant to matrimonial right; they cannot, however, be invalidated. Those which were made after marriage, with the express license and deliberate consent of the wife, cannot be invalidated — whatever others may say.