Chapter XI — The response of Tamburini is refuted, whose assertion seems altogether laxer than the very proposition condemned concerning mental restrictions

I. Thomas Tamburini (Bk. II, on the Decalogue, ch. 2, §2, n. 6) opposes to himself the most learned Cardinal Pallavicino, whom Cattaneo praises in favor of his own opinion, alleging him for the contrary opinion, which denies that words can be uttered so purely materially. Tamburini, then, objects to himself the authority of Pallavicino in these words: "But in this way you speak against the pact of the commonwealth, which was tacitly entered into among men in the constitution of language, that words be uttered significatively, not merely materially. Read Sforza Pallavicino in his Theology, Bk. III, disp. 2, n. 12, in Tancredo." "I respond," he says, "that such a pact was too speculatively devised by that most ingenious man. I add: granted that there was an agreement, that by those sounds men could open their own conceptions — yet I contend there was never a pact that they could not, whenever they wished, utter those sounds materially. Certainly infants utter them thus, thus do adults, when they begin to learn foreign languages; thus too writers, and typesetters, when they copy out, or print, the words of another language. Why, then, is not the same use permitted on other occasions, whenever it pleases a man?" Thus far Tamburini.

II. Authors who, before Innocent XI, defended mental restrictions in a locution whose words admit purely mental restriction, tempered the laxity of this opinion, with this added: that they taught no one could use the aforesaid restrictions, except for the cause of protecting one's own, or another's, life, honor, domestic goods, or something similar. Their teaching concerning a purely mental restriction was covered with a twofold veil: namely, that the use of mental restriction was licit only when both the words of the speech admit such a purely internal restriction, and a reasonable cause is present for employing the aforesaid restrictions in common speech. Nonetheless, this opinion was proscribed.

III. Tamburini, spurning such salves, first, against Sánchez, as we have seen above, establishes, in the place cited, n. 4, that one can restrict at will any sense whatsoever in the mind, even if the words do not admit such a restriction. This is the first degree of laxity which Tamburini adds to the condemned proposition. But what he adds afterward — that a man can utter words at will, materially, their signification stripped away, whenever it pleases him — transgresses the bounds of every laxity, and shudders at the very horror of both lying and mental restriction. For defenders of both lies and mental restrictions defended their licit use only under the pressure of the most grave necessity, or grave necessity according to a few, of which more below; but Tamburini, no limit observed, decrees that, whenever it pleases a man, it is lawful for him to use material words, or material lies, which is really the same thing. He excepts only the case in which such a material locution would inflict harm on one's neighbor, since this would be a pernicious lie — concerning which no Christian has ever doubted.

IV. But let us weigh Tamburini's reasons. Children utter words as material sounds — "The fool hath said in his heart" — it is clear from this reasoning: Words can be taken both as words, and as material sound, to signify conceptions. If, then, words are not employed to signify these, then let each one use them for a mere material sound, not for expressing the internal feelings of the mind, but for concealing truth. Thus others reason. But Tamburini, these small distinctions set aside, contends that neither the Author of nature, nor the human commonwealth, has imposed any burden of uttering words significatively; but, provided the words are understood according to their own material sound, he will be able to use them for another end. All this is confirmed, they say, by the fact that no one uses words unless it pleases him; the Prophet David reports likewise: for however words are taken, no one can use them for another end, unless they conform to that man's own mind. The same must be said of those who recite the words of others — as, typesetters uttering words of another language materially, adults learning foreign languages, and printers. They add, and, freely granted, that there was an agreement among men to utter words as signifying; but I contend, he says, that there was never a pact that they could not (whenever they wished) utter them materially.

V. So that we may begin with Tamburini's last words, this doctrine, as it seems to me, contains a manifest error. No law prescribes that words be signs representing the feelings of the mind? No pact, no law bids that words be used to signify anything? Man can use words at will, in common and serious speech, so that they signify nothing? I would believe that, if this doctrine of Tamburini's were brought to the tribunal of the Church, it would not escape immune from censure. Indeed, Cicero, Augustine, and Thomas condemned it, in the authorities cited in the preceding chapter, and again Augustine refutes it (Bk. I, On Christian Doctrine, ch. 2): "There are, however, other signs, whose whole use is in signifying, just as words are. For no one uses words, except for the sake of signifying something." If Tamburini had recalled this authority of Augustine's to examination, he would, without doubt, have rejected it as false. Would he not have replied: No one uses words, unless for the sake of signifying something? Do not typesetters, do not those learning foreign languages, use words which signify nothing? Augustine's teaching, then, is false. Thus Tamburini argues, whose doctrine we reject as most openly false. No one has used words, unless it pleased Tamburini, children, printers; and we embrace the Augustinian teaching.

VI. So that we may overturn, with no trouble, the objection of Tamburini, and of other writers, this must be observed, which is nevertheless open to anyone: that our present discourse concerns words used in common, and serious, speech, in which the internal secrets of the heart are mutually revealed. What could be more futile to object than what Tamburini objects concerning children, and printers printing the words of another language? Why did he not add that parrots utter not only words, but whole sentences? That magpies too, among brutes, emit the very sounds that men utter? What shall we say of other animals, which emit sounds that indicate, and manifest, internal feelings? A dog emits the sound of barking, and warns that the house is being invaded, or shows the hunger by which it labors. A lion roars, and indicates the ardor of its wrath. Who, however, would say that these brutes speak? The same must be said of children, and of adults learning foreign languages, who emit sounds, and yet do not speak: for our discourse concerns children not yet endowed with the light of reason. And adults, while learning foreign languages, insofar as they are learning, do not use... words as the instruments of that speech, in which secrets are to be manifested to one's neighbor. Certainly it is astonishing that such childish trifles, and such inept fabrications, could be thrust upon us by men who professed the theological science. For the question, indeed, concerns words used in human speech, in locutions by which men mutually, by way of question and response, disclose secrets to one another. In brief: the question concerns the speech of man as man, distinguished from brutes, and from Angels. Insofar as he is superior to brutes, he reasons, and communicates his secrets to others; insofar as he is inferior to Angels, he needs bodily instruments, by which alone he can manifest his thoughts to others. This being established, who would dare to thrust upon us that we can use words as a mere material and sensible sound, and as signifying nothing, in common speech? Should it be said otherwise, if words are taken as words? This distinction, applied to common and serious speech, is so futile, and so puerile, that it would be shameful to impugn it any further. Let us conclude, then, that the opinion of Tamburini, and of those who adhere to him, is far laxer than the very proposition condemned concerning mental restrictions, for the reasons adduced above.