Index of Subjects (as printed)

The print's "Index of things and words contained in this Tome", translated for this site from the Latin (ed.). Each statement is followed by the page and the paragraph number of the print; each is a link to the paragraph.

A

Adoration (Adoratio). Adoration is the act by which one subjects oneself to another in testimony of his excellence, p. 2, n. 1. — One kind is of latria, another of dulia, another of hyperdulia, ibid. — One is internal, another external, ibid., n. 2. — One is absolute, another relative, ibid., n. 3. — Another is that shown to creatures on account of natural gifts and dignities, p. 3, n. 4. — There is a natural and divine precept of worshipping God by internal and external acts, ibid., n. 5. — That precept, as negative, obliges always and for always; as affirmative, at set times, p. 4, n. 6. — The lax doctrine of Tamburini and of certain more recent writers is rejected, ibid. — The worship of latria is owed to God alone, one and triune, and to Christ the Lord, p. 5, n. 1 ff. — Christ the Lord as man can be adored with the adoration of latria, ibid., n. 3. — But the humanity of Christ, as abstracted from the divine Word, is not to be adored with the adoration of latria, p. 6, n. 4. — In practice it is lawful to adore the humanity of Christ with the adoration of dulia on account of its created perfections, ibid., n. 5. — The body of Christ during the three days of his death was to be adored with the worship of latria, ibid., n. 6. — It is lawful to adore absolutely the host elevated by the Priest in the Mass, p. 7, n. 7. — The flesh, or blood, which sometimes appears in a consecrated host by miracle, is to be adored with the worship of latria, ibid., n. 8. — The Cross of Christ is to be adored with the worship of latria, p. 8, n. 1. — As also the other instruments of Christ's Passion, ibid., n. 2. — Objections are resolved, p. 9, n. 3 ff. — The Blessed Virgin is to be worshipped with the worship of hyperdulia, but the Angels and Saints with the worship of dulia, p. 10 f., n. 1 ff. — The objections and calumnies of the heterodox are blown away, p. 11 ff., n. 3 ff. — Men or women who have died with the reputation of holiness, but are not yet beatified or canonized, cannot be honoured with public worship, but only with private, p. 14, n. 11. — The use of images of the Trinity, of Christ the Lord, and of the Saints is lawful and pious, p. 16 f., n. 1 ff. — Their adoration also is lawful and pious, whatever the heretics may babble, p. 18 f., n. 4 ff. — With respect to the community of the faithful there is a precept of the use of sacred images, which can incidentally press upon individuals, p. 20, n. 9. — The same holds of their adoration, ibid., n. 10. — The relics of the Saints are worthy of adoration, p. 21 f., n. 1 ff. — Namely, the same adoration with which the persons whose relics they are are worshipped, p. 22, n. 4. — What such relics are is indicated, ibid., n. 5. — It is not lawful to adore the worms into which the bodies of the Saints decompose, ibid., n. 6 f. — Moral certainty is required, and suffices, for relics to be venerated as particles of some Saint, p. 23, n. 9. — That they may be exposed to public worship, the Bishop can approve only the relics of someone Beatified, or of a canonized Saint, p. 24, n. 10. — It is lawful to wear authentic relics suspended from the neck, ibid., n. 11. — In this all irreverence must be avoided, ibid. — One who steals relics from a Catholic commits a sacrilegious theft, ibid., n. 12. — Not even in a just war is it lawful for a Prince to carry off relics from the cities he has taken, and transfer them elsewhere, p. 25, n. 13. — The sale and purchase of relics is not lawful, ibid., n. 14. — They may, however, be bought from unbelievers for a price paid, ibid. — One who exposes sacred relics to be viewed principally so that more generous alms may thence be offered sins gravely, ibid. ; p. 26, n. 5 [=15] ff. — Thieves of relics who take them from any sacred places whatever are punished with the penalty of excommunication, ibid., n. 17. — It is lawful to venerate the wax Agnus Dei, p. 27, n. 18. — Those who paint them with colours and vermilion are excommunicated, ibid., n. 19. — It is lawful to take a price for their material, ibid. — They may be devoutly touched and kissed even by laymen, ibid. — Veneration is owed to priestly vestments, sacred vessels, and churches, p. 28, n. 20. — Consecrated chalices cannot be touched by laymen without venial sin, except by those of the Religious Orders that have privileges, ibid., n. 21. — Laymen of the same Orders may also touch corporals and purificators, while they serve in the sacristy, p. 29, n. 22. — Sacred things, so long as they keep their form, cannot be converted to profane uses, ibid., n. 23. — The lax opinion of Fr. Dicastillo concerning sacred vestments is rejected, ibid., n. 24. — These cannot be converted to profane uses even after their form is lost, p. 30, n. 25. — Sacred vessels, after they are broken, may be sold, if nothing appears in them but the common material of gold and silver, ibid., n. 36 [=26]. — Profane things, brought to the due form, may be converted to sacred use, p. 31, n. 27.

Equivocation (Aequivocatio). See: Lying.

Amphibology (Amphibologia). See: Lying.

Annibaldus (Annibaldus). Annibaldus, in the work commonly ascribed to St. Thomas, in no way favours lying, p. 546, n. 8.

Astrology, judicial (Astrologia iudiciaria). Judicial astrology, by which one divines contingent future things from the motion of the stars, the aspect of the planets, and so forth, the sterility of the land, men's diseases, and so forth, as probably to follow, is not superstitious, p. 47, n. 2. — Genethliac astrology, that of elections, and that of fabricated images, is superstitious, and forbidden by Sixtus V, p. 48, n. 3. — To divine free future things, though not with certainty but only probably, is superstitious, ibid., n. 4. — A merely conjectural prediction is not free of superstition, ibid., n. 5 ff. — Astrologers cannot lawfully predict temperament, inclination, and bodily characteristics from the sign of nativity, p. 50, n. 8 f. — Those who consult astrologers that they may reveal to them some hidden crime sin most gravely, p. 51, n. 10. — It is lawful to ask that underground waters, but not treasures or corpses lying hidden beneath tombs, be revealed by diviners, ibid., n. 11. — Astrologers, or diviners, who foretell things that escape natural knowledge are bound to restore the price received for the divination, ibid., n. 12. — The lax and monstrous doctrine of Fr. Sánchez is reported and disapproved, ibid., n. 13 f. See: Divination.

Augustine, St. (S. Augustinus). St. Augustine recounts wonderful prodigies of nature, p. 70, n. 5.

B

Bauny, Étienne (Bauni (P. Stephanus)). Fr. Étienne Bauny wrongly teaches that to call God to witness to a light lie is only a light sin, p. 408, n. 2. — This proposition is condemned by Innocent XI, ibid.

Benedict XIV (Benedictus XIV). Benedict XIV is praised for his immortal work On the Beatification and Canonization of the Servants of God, p. 15, n. 11.

Blasphemy (Blasphemia). Blasphemy is a derogation of the divine goodness, either by attributing to God what he does not have and cannot have, or by removing from him what he cannot lack, p. 99, n. 1. — It can derogate from the divine goodness in three ways, ibid., n. 2. — One kind is heretical, another simple, p. 100, n. 3. — One is against God, another against the Saints, ibid., n. 4. — That against God more probably differs in species from that against the Saints, ibid., n. 5 ff. — In confession it must be explained whether it was against God, against the Virgin, or against the Saints, p. 101, n. 7. — It is by its kind a mortal sin, ibid., n. 1 ff. — Perfect blasphemy is the greatest crime of all, p. 102, n. 3 ff. — Those sin who blaspheme out of an inveterate custom and a wicked habit, p. 103, n. 4 ff. — Tamburini's most lax opinion is disapproved, ibid. — One who, from a habit not retracted by penance, utters blasphemous words even thoughtlessly is guilty of blasphemy, ibid. ; p. 104, n. 7 ff. — Blasphemy uttered in jest is a mortal sin, ibid., n. 10 f. — The laxity of Leander, who imputes it to St. Thomas and to Navarre, is disapproved, p. 105, n. 12. — Various formulas of blaspheming against God and the Saints are reported, ibid. ; p. 106, n. 1 ff. — These expressions are blasphemies: "I do not believe in God," "I deny God, the Cross, the Gospels, the Sacraments, if it is not so", ibid., n. 3. — To say "May God perish, if it is not so" is blasphemy, ibid. — But not to say "By the life of God it is so," "God lives", ibid. — It is more probably blasphemy to say "This is as true as the Gospel, as that Christ was born of the Virgin", p. 107, n. 3. — These are heretical blasphemies: "By the body of God the Father," "By his beard," "By the wings of the Holy Spirit", ibid. — One who swears falsely is not a blasphemer, ibid., n. 4. — One who in a single fit of anger, adverting each time, utters several blasphemies commits several sins, ibid., n. 5. — The old law, the civil law, and the canon law have established several penalties against blasphemers, ibid., n. 1. — One who hears blasphemers ought to denounce them to a judge, p. 108, n. 2. — Simple blasphemies, unless reserved by some Bishop, can be absolved by a simple Confessor, ibid., n. 3. — As also blasphemy that is only outwardly heretical, by a regular Confessor, p. 109, n. 6. — A Confessor ought to enjoin a most grave penance on blasphemers, by the decree of the Lateran Council, ibid., n. 7. — The laxity of the more recent Probabilists, who say that decree has fallen into disuse, is disapproved, ibid. — Absolution is to be deferred for habitual blasphemers until they have fulfilled the remedies prescribed by the Confessor, ibid. ; p. 110, n. 6. — The laxity of Leander and of the recent Probabilists is disapproved, ibid. — The penances rightly imposed on them by Fr. Comitolus are praised, ibid., n. 7.

Bonacina (Bonacina). Bonacina teaches lax propositions concerning lying, p. 471, n. 17.

C

Cabala (Cabala). See: Divination.

Caramuel (Caramuel). Caramuel shrewdly, and for the best of reasons, sets himself against mental restrictions, p. 530, n. 9.

Cárdenas, Juan de (Cardenas (P. Ioannes de)). Fr. Juan de Cárdenas is to be read with caution in what he has on certain propositions condemned by Innocent XI, p. 520, n. 12.

Casnedi, Carlo Antonio (Casnedi (P. Carolus Antonius)). Fr. Carlo Antonio Casnedi upholds that purely mental restrictions are not condemned, p. 524 ff., n. 10 ff. — He favours the Jansenists, p. 525, n. 12.

Castropalao, Fernando (Castropalaus (P. Ferdinandus)). Fr. Fernando Castropalao wrongly defends that a vow made in thanksgiving on account of an unjust thing is valid, p. 161, n. 27. — He is attacked, and at the same time it is shown that Suárez is wrongly alleged by him in his own favour, p. 162, n. 28 ff. — He laxly excuses from mortal sin one who, after a vow to abstain from wine, drinks only as much wine as a temperate man is accustomed to drink at one meal, p. 227, n. 4. — He teaches lax propositions concerning the oath, p. 380, n. 7 ; p. 410, n. 5.

Casuists (Casuistae). Their outcry, with which they trumpet that the words of their fellows which inspire horror at their laxity are not sincerely reported, is turned back upon themselves, p. 497 f., n. 14. See: Propositions, condemned; Propositions, lax.

Cattaneo, Ambrogio (Cattaneus (P. Ambrosius)). Fr. Ambrogio Cattaneo embraces the doctrine of material locutions, p. 476, n. 9 f. — He says this suffices to tear up all difficulties, ibid. — But it is shown to be improbable and false, p. 485 ff., n. 1 ff. — His opinion, comparing a lie with a theft committed in extreme necessity, is opposed to the doctrine of the Church, p. 492 ff., n. 1 ff. — It is wrongly defended by an anonymous confrère, the text of St. Thomas being cut short, p. 497 f., n. 13 f. — As also by false interpretations of the condemned propositions, p. 518 ff., n. 8 f.

Celladei (Celladei). See: Elizalde, Miguel de.

Wax Lambs (Agnus Dei) (Cerei Agni). See: Adoration.

Certainty, moral (Certitudo moralis). Moral certainty ought to exclude every prudent doubt, p. 412, n. 7. — That certainty is wrongly explained by the probabilist Casuists, p. 410, n. 5 ; p. 412, n. 8.

Cicero (Cicero). Cicero assigns the causes why sleepers divine, p. 63, n. 12.

Clergy of France (Clerus Gallicanus). The Clergy of France condemned the proposition by which it was asserted that the Patriarchs, the Prophets, the Angels, and Christ himself used equivocations, or amphibologies, and restrictions, p. 541, n. 15.

La Colombière, Claude de (Columbier (P. de la)). The piety of Fr. de la Colombière is praised, p. 174, n. 57.

Comitolus, Paulus (Comitolus (P. Paulus)). Fr. Paulus Comitolus rightly and prudently enjoined penances on habitual blasphemers, p. 110, n. 7.

Commutation of vows (Commutatio voti). The commutation of a vow is the substitution of one thing for another, p. 344, n. 1. — Those who can dispense can also commute vows, ibid., n. 2. — One who has vowed cannot by his own authority commute his vow even into something evidently better, p. 346 ff., n. 5 ff. — The objections are answered, ibid. — One who by his own authority commuted his vow into a lesser or an equal good would sin mortally, p. 350, n. 16. — One who vowed to enter one religious order cannot by his own authority enter another equally good, ibid., n. 17. — In things which are consumed by use, one cannot be substituted for another promised by vow unless it is within the same species, p. 351, n. 18. — Much less in speaking of things which are not consumed by use, ibid. — One who vowed to hand over a determinate son to religion cannot by his own authority substitute another, ibid., n. 19. — Neither a layman nor a married Cleric is capable of the jurisdiction of commuting vows, except by dispensation of the Pope, ibid., n. 20. — Vows are more probably to be commuted into morally equal matter, p. 352, n. 3 f. — Sporer's lax opinion is disapproved, p. 353, n. 5. — When the equality is doubtful, commutation has place, p. 354, n. 6. — A commutation into a lesser matter, and without due equality, is not free of mortal fault, ibid., n. 7. — A commutation into something evidently better, made by a Prelate endowed with the power, requires no cause, ibid., n. 9. — As also one into something evidently equal, and at the same time probably better, ibid., n. 10. — A Prelate cannot make it into an equal thing except with some cause, ibid., n. 11. — If the commutation is made by virtue of the jubilee, of the crusade bull, or of another pontifical privilege, the execution of the works prescribed in it suffices without a cause, p. 355, n. 12. — For a commutation to be made into an equal good, the petition of the one vowing alone does not suffice, ibid., n. 13. — But it is required that there be a cause, at least a light one, ibid., n. 14. — Otherwise the commutation, though valid, would yet be unlawful, ibid., n. 15. — But if it is made into a lesser good without a reasonable cause, it is null, p. 356, n. 18 ff. — Much more if it is made by one's own authority, p. 357, n. 20. — One who commutes a vow into a lesser, or an equal, good without a reasonable cause sins only venially, unless the diminution of the thing substituted for the vow is notable, ibid., n. 21. — But one who so commuted his vow for himself would sin mortally, ibid. — When a commutation appears illegitimate, as being manifestly into a lesser thing, it is not to be presumed that the commutation was mixed with a dispensation, ibid., n. 22. — Commutation is broader in the jubilee than in the Crusade bull, p. 358, n. 1. — The vows of chastity and of religion excepted both in that bull and in the jubilee are perfect and absolute vows, ibid., n. 2. — Commutation can be made both within and outside confession, p. 359, n. 3. — Not, however, into something less, ibid., n. 4. — The vows of religion and of chastity cannot be commuted by force of the jubilee or of the bull, even when necessity presses, ibid., n. 5. — As neither can a vow and oath of giving alms to a determinate Church, or poor person, after its acceptance, ibid., n. 6. — One who has once gained the jubilee can obtain the commutation of vows after it, p. 360, n. 7. — A commutation obtained at the beginning of the jubilee stands even if the enjoined works are afterward omitted through negligence, ibid., n. 8. — But one who culpably omits them sins mortally, ibid. — A Confessor who, asked in the time of the jubilee, refuses without just cause to commute vows sins, p. 361, n. 9. — When a vow is commuted into another matter, the prior obligation is not extinguished, but changed, ibid., n. 1. — A commutation of the vow having been made, the one vowing is not bound to carry out the prior matter if the substituted matter has become impossible, ibid., n. 2. — He is bound to it, however, even after the defined time has elapsed, if it can be fulfilled, ibid. — After a commutation made into something better, and accepted, the one vowing cannot return to the former matter, p. 362, n. 6. — The same holds after a commutation made into an equal thing, p. 364, n. 7. — In the commutation of a vow only the matter promised by the vow is to be regarded; but in dispensation, the bond of the promise also, p. 365, n. 2. — This is explained, ibid. — The greater or lesser dignity of the matter is to be judged both from the excellence of the virtue whose fruit it is, and from the circumstances, ibid., n. 3. — This is explained, ibid. — In any vow, the end, the quality, and the dignity are chiefly to be considered, p. 366, n. 4. — The difficulty of carrying out a vow is to be considered also from this, that such difficulty increases merit, ibid., n. 5. — This is explained, ibid. — Though it is fitting, it is not necessary that a personal vow be commuted into a personal one, and a real into a real, p. 367, n. 6. — In the commutation of conditional vows, it is to be considered how contingent the coming of the condition is, when they are to be commuted into absolute ones, ibid., n. 7. — This is explained, ibid. — In any commutation of vows, the frailty of the one vowing is always to be regarded, and care must be taken that he be not too heavily burdened, or remain exposed to the danger of sinning, p. 368, n. 8. — This is explained, and illustrated by examples, ibid. ; ibid., n. 9. — In a pilgrimage it is to be considered whether the journey is on foot or not, ibid., n. 10. — The manner of commuting a vow of entering the Dominican Order is assigned, from Medina, ibid., n. 11. — As also of a vow not to marry, and of receiving the priesthood, p. 369, n. 12 ff.

D

Daniel, Gabriel (Daniel (P. Gabriel)). Fr. Gabriel Daniel wrongly contends that Innocent XI condemned the propositions as they lie, not as they stand in the books of the authors from whom they were excerpted, p. 472, n. 1. — In this way he favours the doctrine of the Jansenists on the five propositions, ibid.

Dicastillo, Juan (Dicastillus (P. Ioannes)). Fr. Juan Dicastillo laxly teaches that it is lawful to use sacred vestments within the church for honest comedies, p. 29 f., n. 24.

Dispensation of vows (Dispensatio in voto). A dispensation in a vow can be granted by the Church, p. 313, n. 1. — Such a faculty resides with the Prelates of the Church, p. 314, n. 3. — And it is of spiritual jurisdiction, not of order, ibid., n. 4. — It is the removal of the bond of a vow, made in the name of God by one having spiritual jurisdiction in the external forum, for a reasonable cause, ibid., n. 5. — Such removal is rightly explained by St. Thomas, ibid., n. 7. — One who can dispense can more probably also commute, p. 315, n. 9. — This power can be delegated to all Priests, and to Clerics initiated by the tonsure, provided they are not married, p. 316, n. 2. — Not, however, to married ones, unless it is delegated by the Supreme Pontiff himself, ibid. — Those to whom this power belongs by ordinary right are reviewed, ibid., n. 3. — Vows made by a community can for a cause be dispensed by the Bishop; but the successors of the community are not bound by force of the vow, but by the precept of the Bishop, who can dispense them, ibid., n. 4. — One who can grant a dispensation from a vow more probably cannot apply this privilege to himself, but must have recourse for it to his superiors, p. 317, n. 6. — Regular Prelates can dispense in their subjects' vows made with the license of the major Prelates, p. 318, n. 2. — As also with their Novices, ibid., n. 3. — Not, however, with their subjects in a vow of passing to a stricter religious order, if they are in a laxer one, that is, one collapsed from regular discipline in substantial matters, ibid., n. 4 ; p. 319, n. 5. — Nor in solemn vows, and those which affect the state of their own religious order, ibid., n. 6. — The many privileges alleged by many to prove the faculty of Regulars to dispense in all vows of seculars not reserved to the Supreme Pontiff do not stand, p. 320 ff., n. 2 ff. — They are reviewed, and attacked, ibid. — The opinion granting such privileges to Regulars is altogether false, p. 325 ff., n. 16 ff. — This is shown, ibid. — The Salmanticenses also falsely teach that Regulars can dispense in any vows whatever with Religious, even of another Order, by force of the privileges of Eugene IV and Sixtus IV, p. 327, n. 24. — Only five vows are reserved to the Pontiff: namely, the vows of perpetual chastity and of religion, and of the threefold pilgrimage, to Jerusalem, to Rome, and to Compostela, p. 328, n. 1 ff. — Objections drawn from St. Thomas are resolved, p. 329, n. 4 f. — Oaths made to God concerning these things are more probably reserved to the Pontiff equally with vows, p. 330, n. 6. — Bishops, and Prelates having quasi-episcopal jurisdiction, can dispense in the five aforesaid vows when necessity presses, ibid., n. 7. — This is declared, ibid. — The Salmanticenses and Crousers wrongly ascribe the same privilege to all Prelates, ibid., n. 8. — In the cases in which Bishops can dispense, the dispensation ought not to exceed the limits of the necessity, p. 331, n. 9. — They can dispense as above, even if a pontifical Legate or Nuncio is in the province, unless these have power over the said vows specially delegated by the Pontiff, ibid., n. 10. — The reservation of vows is to be interpreted strictly, ibid., n. 11. — And for vows to be reserved, they must be absolute, certain, express, and perfect, ibid. — Vows to which someone intended to bind himself only under venial sin would not be reserved to the Pontiff, ibid., n. 12. — Or if they were made out of fear, even light fear, p. 332, n. 13. — If some such vow, or its reservation, is doubtful, it is to be judged in favour of non-reservation, ibid., n. 14. — A vow of not contracting marriage is not reserved, ibid., n. 15. — A Bishop can, by force of custom, grant the faculty of asking the conjugal debt to one who, bound by a vow of chastity, contracted marriage, ibid., n. 16. — A vow of conjugal chastity is not reserved, ibid., n. 17. — Nor a vow of an unapproved religious order, p. 333, n. 18. — Vows of the threefold pilgrimage are reserved when they were made out of devotion, not in general, but toward the aforesaid places, ibid., n. 19. — A vow made with some circumstance is also reserved, if it remains whole when that circumstance is omitted, ibid., n. 20. — A disjunctive vow, while the choice remains open, is not reserved, ibid., n. 21. — It is otherwise once the one vowing has afterward chosen the reserved part, ibid. — A vow of entering religion if one's father dies is reserved, p. 334, n. 22. — Truly conditional vows, and penal ones too, are reserved once the condition is fulfilled, p. 335, n. 24. — The pious work into which a reserved vow is commuted is not reserved, p. 336, n. 25. — When the aforesaid vows are not reserved on some head, regular Prelates can commute them, ibid., n. 26. — One who receives by a bull, or jubilee, the faculty of dispensing, or commuting, all vows cannot relax even reserved ones, unless the faculty over them is expressed, ibid., n. 27. — For a valid and lawful dispensation a reasonable cause is necessary, ibid., n. 1 ; p. 337 ff., n. 2 ff. — In doubt of the existence of a cause for dispensing, the Prelate cannot dispense, p. 338, n. 6. — If the cause is certain, and it is doubtful whether it is sufficient, it will be better to commute the vow, ibid. — A dispensation given in good faith, both on the side of the one asking and of the one granting, for a cause afterward found false and null, is more probably null, p. 339, n. 8. — That a dispensation may be lawfully imparted, three things are required: that it be lawful according to equity; that it be becoming according to honesty; that it be expedient according to utility, p. 340, n. 9. — For particular causes occurring, the Bishop can dispense, p. 341, n. 10. — They are reviewed, ibid. — Imperfect deliberation of the one vowing alone is not a sufficient cause for granting him a dispensation, p. 341, n. 11. — Even if it arises from fear of death, of shipwreck, or of some other grave danger, p. 342, n. 12. — A grave difficulty in carrying out the vow, not foreseen before the vow, suffices for granting its dispensation, ibid., n. 13. — But if it was foreseen, it regularly does not suffice, ibid. ; p. 343, n. 14. — In a negative doubt about a vow made, there is a just cause for dispensing; not, however, if there are more probable reasons for the vow, ibid., n. 15. — For the increase of the common good, or to avoid its harm, a dispensation can be granted, ibid., n. 16. — A cause adequate for dispensing a vow absolutely rarely occurs, p. 344, n. 17.

Divination (Divinatio). What divination is is set forth, and its species are indicated, p. 41, n. 1 f. — Demons can foretell those future things which depend wholly on natural causes, ibid., n. 3. — Demons teach their diviners in many ways, p. 42, n. 4. — Diviners invoke the help of demons sometimes by an explicit, sometimes by a tacit pact, ibid. ; p. 43, n. 5 ff. — This is explained, ibid. — Divination by an explicit pact with a demon does not differ in moral species from that carried out by a tacit pact, p. 44, n. 11. — Yet on account of the aggravating circumstance, and because other sins commonly accompany this one, it is to be explained in confession, ibid. ; p. 45, n. 12. — It is a mortal crime, whether it is by an explicit or a tacit pact, p. 46, n. 13. — Those who rather often use the cabala for the sake of a jest sin gravely, ibid. — Natural divination by the stars, though for the most part vain, is yet lawful, p. 47, n. 1. — It is lawful to divine the future by dreams sent by God, p. 54, n. 4. — Whether they are sent by God or by a demon is difficult to know, ibid. — They are to be made known to a prudent Confessor, ibid. — The observation of natural dreams is lawful, ibid., n. 5. — To divine free future things from dreams is a grave crime, ibid., n. 6. — One who, on the occasion of dreams, prudently orders his conduct and business does not sin, p. 55, n. 7. — This is explained, ibid. — Even if dreams are borne out by events, they are not to be observed, ibid., n. 8. — From the song, flight, and movement of birds it is lawful to foretell future things which depend on natural causes, p. 56, n. 2. — But not free contingent ones, p. 57, n. 3. — Nor future things from human words uttered by chance, or from other fortuitous events, ibid., n. 4. — Natural physiognomy is lawful, ibid. ; p. 58, n. 5. — But to divine free contingent future things from astrological physiognomy is superstitious, ibid. — Those who seriously consult the Egyptians, commonly called Gypsies, that they may announce good or bad fortune to them from the showing of the hands, sin mortally, p. 58, n. 6. — Divination by the use of lots is of three kinds: divisory, consultative, and divinatory, p. 58 f., n. 1. — This is explained, ibid. — Divisory lots are lawful, p. 59, n. 2. — In the election to secular dignities it is lawful to use divisory lots, ibid., n. 3. — Not, however, in the election to ecclesiastical benefices, ibid. ; p. 60, n. 4. — An election to those benefices carried out by lot is unlawful, but not null, ibid., n. 5. — The casting of lots to settle disputes over property and ecclesiastical benefices is lawful if it is done by public authority; otherwise if by private, ibid. ; p. 61, n. 6 f. — A consultative casting of lots, in which the effect is expected from a demon, is superstitious, p. 62, n. 8. — But it is lawful when the knowledge of a future event is implored from God, ibid., n. 9. — Four conditions required for this are reviewed, ibid. — Divination made by the use of duels, of red-hot iron, and of boiling water is unlawful, ibid., n. 11. — Sleepers divine more than those who are awake, p. 63, n. 12. — The causes are assigned, ibid. — Fools and simpletons divine more easily than those endowed with sound mind, ibid., n. 13. — The causes are assigned, ibid. — Men near to death divine the future, p. 64, n. 14. — As, according to St. Augustine, do those raving with a burning fever, ibid., n. 15. — The notory art, the observance of remedies for health, as also of future events, is unlawful, p. 55 [=65] ff., n. 1 ff. — This is explained and shown, ibid. See: Astrology, judicial.

E

Elizalde, Miguel de (Elizalde (P. Michael, vulgo Celladei)). Fr. Miguel de Elizalde (commonly "Celladei") says that the Casuists' distinction between the doctrine of the Fathers teaching in the schools and that by which they preach in the churches is the chief origin of the present laxity, p. 480, n. 7.

F

Fascination (Fascinatio). See: Magic.

Francolino, Baldassarre (Francolinus (P. Balthassar)). Fr. Baldassarre Francolino falsely writes that our Casuists write from the doctrine of the Fathers where the Fathers have gone before, and from a doctrine not contrary to the Fathers where the Fathers have not gone before, p. 479 f., n. 7. — The distinction he places between the Fathers teaching in the schools and the same preaching from the pulpit is the origin of laxity, ibid. — That distinction lessens the authority of the Fathers, and favours the Lutherans and Calvinists, ibid.

Fuente Hurtado, Diego de la (Fuente Hurtado (P. Didacus de la)). Fr. Diego de la Fuente Hurtado upholds purely mental restrictions even after their condemnation, p. 522 ff. — His doctrine is reported and disapproved, ibid. — He offers the Jansenists a handle for eluding pontifical decrees, p. 524, n. 8. — He rashly attributes the doctrine of purely mental restrictions to Sts. Augustine, Thomas, and Gregory, ibid., n. 9.

G

Gobat, Georg (Gobat (P. Georgius)). Fr. Georg Gobat teaches a lax proposition concerning the vow, p. 170, n. 47.

Grotius, Hugo (Grotius (Hugo)). Hugo Grotius wrongly contends that the promissory oath is not lawful, p. 419, n. 1.

H

Heir (Heres). Whether an heir is bound to pay the vows of the testator. See: Vow.

Hesselius, Joannes (Hesselius (Ioannes)). Joannes Hesselius of Louvain wrongly contends that it is by no means lawful to destroy the signs of sorcery, p. 80, n. 9.

I

Idolatry (Idololatria). Idolatry is a particular species of superstition, and a grave crime, p. 38 ff., n. 1 ff.

Images, sacred (Imagines sacrae). See: Adoration.

Invalidation of vows (Irritatio voti). The invalidation of a vow is its removal, made by one who holds dominative power, p. 287, n. 1. — For such an invalidation to be valid, some cause is required, ibid., n. 3. — But for it to be lawful, there are two opinions, each true in its own sense, ibid. ; p. 288, n. 4 f. — The faculty of invalidating vows is more probably of natural law, p. 289, n. 7 f. — The Supreme Pontiff cannot invalidate whatever vows a father, guardian, prelate, and master can, p. 290, n. 10. — Bishops can invalidate the vows of Nuns subject to them, but not of those not subject, nor of exempt Regulars, nor of Clerics not their own, and much less of laymen, p. 291, n. 11. — Only those can invalidate vows directly who have dominative power over the persons subject to them, ibid., n. 12. — This is illustrated by examples, ibid. — To act prudently, a superior is bound to know specifically the vows to be invalidated, ibid., n. 13. — He can invalidate them even against the subjects' will, ibid., n. 14. — Even internal vows of Regulars, which in no way disturb the government nor the observance of religion, can be invalidated by their Prelates, p. 292 f., n. 3. — The objections are answered, p. 293, n. 4. — Those vows are excepted which constitute a state, and the vow of passing to a stricter religious order, p. 294, n. 5. — The Prelates able to invalidate the vows of subjects of Regulars are enumerated, ibid., n. 6. — Neither Legates a latere nor the Congregations of Cardinals can invalidate the vows of Religious, ibid., n. 7. — When the chief Prelates are present, the secondary ones have no right of invalidating vows, ibid., n. 8. — Abbesses, or Prioresses, can invalidate the vows of their Nuns, p. 295, n. 9. — Regular Prelates cannot invalidate the vows of Novices, ibid., n. 10. — Parents can invalidate the vows of non-pubescent children, p. 297, n. 2. — Not, however, the personal vows of children who have attained puberty, if these do not hinder the government of the household; otherwise he can, ibid., n. 3. — Vows made by children who are wards, and confirmed by them at puberty, cannot be invalidated, except as above, p. 298, n. 4. — The vows of non-pubescent children once confirmed by the father more probably cannot afterward be invalidated by him, ibid., n. 6. — Vows made by natural and illegitimate children can be invalidated by the father, unless they have been placed under a guardian or curator, p. 299, n. 7. — The real vows of pubescent children can be invalidated by the father, ibid., n. 8. — Not, however, if those vows concern goods of a military kind (castrensia), ibid., n. 9. — Or adventitious goods, of which they have the administration, p. 300, n. 10. — As neither a vow of going to Rome, if it is necessary to go there to obtain absolution from an excommunication, ibid., n. 11. — Guardians and Curators can invalidate the vows of non-pubescent children and minors as fathers can, ibid., n. 13. — A curator given to an adult on account of the fault of prodigality can invalidate his real vows, p. 301, n. 15. — A mother, the husband being present or living, cannot invalidate the vows of the children, p. 302, n. 19. — Nor when he is dead or far absent, if a grandfather, guardian, or curator of the children exists, ibid., n. 20. — She can, however, when all these are lacking, p. 303, n. 21. — Not, however, the real vows of pubescent children, ibid., n. 22. — In default of parents, a grandfather and grandmother can invalidate those vows which a mother can, ibid., n. 23. — Masters of disciples, owners of servants, and masters of household staff cannot invalidate personal vows made in childhood, p. 304, n. 25. — A husband can more probably invalidate only those vows of his wife made after the marriage was contracted which regard the marriage, the education of the children, the administration of goods, and the government of the household, ibid., n. 1 ; p. 305 f., n. 2 ff. — He cannot invalidate the vows and oaths of his wife concerning commanded works, p. 307, n. 7. — Nor can he more probably invalidate a vow of not asking the debt made by his wife without his consent, ibid., n. 8. — Nor a vow of chastity which the wife made with his consent, ibid., n. 9. — Or which both made by mutual consent, ibid., n. 10. — Even if they have afterward sacrilegiously performed the conjugal act, ibid., n. 11. — It would be otherwise if the spouses only granted each other leave to vow, without the kind of vow being specified, p. 308, n. 12. — When each spouse by mutual consent vows religion, one alone cannot, nor can both by mutual consent, invalidate that vow, ibid., n. 13. — Vows which the wife made before the marriage was contracted, but to be fulfilled after the marriage was entered upon, the husband cannot invalidate, but only suspend, inasmuch as they are inconvenient to the marital office, ibid., n. 14. — Vows which the wife makes, to be fulfilled after the marriage is dissolved, the husband more probably cannot invalidate, ibid., n. 15. — A wife can invalidate those vows of her husband which are repugnant to the matrimonial right, p. 309, n. 16. — A wife cannot invalidate a vow made by her husband not to ask the debt, ibid., n. 17. — Such a vow would for the most part, and almost always, be unlawful, ibid., n. 18. — A wife can invalidate a vow which her husband made of wearing the habit of an Eremite, or of some religious order, p. 310, n. 19. — Not, however, a vow of giving ample alms and of pouring out lengthy prayers, ibid., n. 20. — She can invalidate a vow of keeping frequent fasts which would make the husband unfit to render the debt, ibid. — As also a vow of a long pilgrimage, ibid., n. 21. — She cannot, however, invalidate vows of the husband made before the marriage, but only suspend them, p. 311, n. 22. — Masters of household servants cannot invalidate their vows, but only suspend them, inasmuch as they hinder the service owed to them, p. 312, n. 1. — If the servants are truly slaves, the masters can invalidate vows that hinder the service owed to them; otherwise not, ibid., n. 4. — Not, however, vows of chastity and the like, ibid., n. 6. — The same is to be said of sons of a family who have slaves as goods belonging to their military peculium, p. 313, n. 7.

Oath (Iuramentum). Several heretics have condemned the oath as unlawful, p. 375, n. 1. — And this relying, as they think, on Scripture and on reason, p. 374, n. 2. — But it is a truth of faith that not every oath is forbidden, or unlawful, for Christians, ibid., n. 3 ff. — The arguments of the heretics are answered, p. 375 ff., n. 5 ff. — An oath is the invocation of the divine name to give credence to an assertion, or to confirm a promise, p. 383, n. 1. — This is explained, ibid., n. 3 ff. — The various formulas of swearing are reduced to three classes, p. 384, n. 7. — They are explained, and their force is laid bare by many examples, p. 385 ff., n. 8 ff. — Various ways of speaking that sound the same as "By God" are reviewed; and it is shown, chiefly against Sporer and Tamburini, that they are true oaths, p. 389 ff., n. 1 ff. — Those who everywhere take the name of God in vain, though they affirm or deny nothing, sin gravely, p. 391, n. 4. — These formulas, "By my soul," "On my soul," imply an oath; but not these, "By my conscience," "On my conscience", p. 391, n. 5. — One swears who says, "I swear by my conscience", p. 392, n. 6. — As does one who says, "I swear by the life of this horse," or by the preservation of an inanimate thing, ibid., n. 7. — One who, asked thus, "Do you swear to me by God that the matter is so?", answers "The matter is so," swears, p. 393, n. 8. — One swears who uses expressions taken for an oath according to common estimation, ibid., n. 9. — In an ambiguous matter, the intention of the one uttering it is to be attended to, ibid., n. 10. — It is not lawful to swear by false gods; nor does such an oath oblige, p. 394, n. 11. — Some formulas containing an execratory oath are reviewed, p. 395, n. 12. — They are to be weighed as they are commonly uttered, ibid., n. 13. — In an oath, the mind and intention of the one swearing are to be attended to, ibid., n. 15. — But if the formula of words by its own nature expresses an oath, it is an oath, even when the intention of swearing is lacking, ibid. — For an oath the word "I swear" is not required; an express invocation of the divine testimony suffices, p. 396, n. 16. — Words which can be used in a double sense are to be interpreted with regard to those who pronounce them, ibid., n. 17. — So too ambiguous words; as also they are to be interpreted from the circumstances, p. 397, n. 18. — That divine rule is explained: "But let your speech be Yea, yea; No, no", ibid., n. 19. — The division of oaths is to be taken from the side of the thing sworn, and from the manner of swearing, p. 398, n. 1. — On the side of the matter, the oath is divided into assertory and promissory, ibid., n. 2. — An assertory oath is that by which God is invoked in confirmation of a truth, either present or past, ibid. — A promissory oath is that by which one confirms the promise of a future thing, so as to make the other more secure, ibid. — Both are explained, ibid. — The promissory is divided into absolute, and confirmatory, which is also called a sworn vow, ibid. — One who violates a vow sworn to God sins both against the vow and against the oath, ibid. — On the side of the manner of swearing, the oath is divided into attesting and execratory, p. 399, n. 3. — This is explained by examples, ibid. — One oath is simple, another solemn, p. 400, n. 4. — Several rites of the Jews for the use of the oath are reported, ibid. — Various rites for solemn oaths are prescribed in civil and canon law, ibid., n. 5. — A solemn oath is either verbal, made by words alone, or judicial, which is taken in judgments, ibid., n. 6 ; p. 401, n. 7. — The judicial is either of calumny, ibid., n. 7. — Or of malice, p. 402, n. 8. — Or suppletory, ibid. — Another is "in litem," another necessary, another voluntary, ibid., n. 9 ff. — The suppletory oath is to be tendered to the defendant, not to the plaintiff, in a doubtful case, p. 403, n. 12. — And indeed only in the gravest necessity, ibid., n. 13. — There is no place for the suppletory oath in criminal cases in which a corporal penalty is to be inflicted on the defendant, ibid., n. 14. — The aforesaid oaths are all of the same species, p. 404, n. 16. — Not seldom, however, they contain another malice too, as of blasphemy and so forth, ibid., n. 19. — That an oath be lawful, three conditions are required: truth, justice, and judgment, p. 405 ff., n. 1 ff. — This is explained, ibid. — Six cases are assigned in which an oath is not only free of fault, but even has the merit of virtue, p. 407, n. 4. — The truth required in an assertory oath need not be such in the thing; it suffices that it be thought such, p. 408, n. 1. — One who swears falsely in the lightest matter sins mortally, ibid., n. 2. — The opposite proposition of Fr. Bauny is condemned by Innocent XI, ibid. — One who swears a doubtful matter as certain, or the contrary, sins mortally, p. 409, n. 3. — One who swears by hyperbole something which, as it sounds, is not true, swears unlawfully, ibid., n. 4. — It is not lawful to swear something which you judge only probably to be true, p. 410 f., n. 5. — The lax opinions of Leander, Sánchez, and others are disapproved, ibid. — That someone may lawfully swear, moral certainty is necessary, which excludes every prudent doubt, p. 412, n. 7. — Moral certainty is wrongly explained by the Casuists, ibid., n. 8. — No one, whether in judgment or out of it, can swear as absolutely true a thing which he has heard only from a single trustworthy witness, p. 413, n. 9. — The norm of the diligence required in inquiring into the truth necessary for an oath ought to be, not the nature of the thing sworn, but the supreme gravity and dignity of the oath, p. 414, n. 10. — One who is notably negligent in inquiring into the truth of the thing he swears sins mortally, even if it happens to be true, ibid., n. 11. — That students may lawfully swear that a fellow student attended the schools for the time required by the university, it is enough that they know he commonly heard the lectures, p. 415, n. 12. — Tamburini's tangled doctrine, taken from Hurtado, is disapproved, ibid. — It is not lawful to persuade someone to swear a truth of which he himself is ignorant, ibid., n. 13. — The defect of justice in an assertory oath is more probably a mortal sin when the assertion of the one swearing is a mortal sin; otherwise not, p. 416, n. 3. — But the defect of judgment is light, if it is only in weighing the necessity of swearing, p. 418, n. 5. — But if it is in the inquiry into the truth, it will be grave or light according as the negligence was grave or light, ibid. — Grotius wrongly contends that the promissory oath is not lawful, p. 419, n. 1. — In it too truth, judgment, and justice are required, ibid. — In a promissory oath the defect of present truth is always a mortal sin, ibid., n. 2. — One who does not fulfil a thing promised and confirmed by oath in grave matter sins mortally, p. 420, n. 3. — The same holds even if the matter is light, p. 421 ff., n. 5 ff. — The failure to carry out such an oath brings in a falsity not material, but formal, p. 423, n. 9. — The objections of the adversaries are answered, p. 425 f., n. 12 ff. — One who promised something under oath with a doubtful intention of fulfilling it would sin mortally, p. 427, n. 16. — Oaths by which men commonly swear that they will, or will not, do something are to be interpreted according to the common sense in which they are taken, ibid., n. 17. — One who swears that he will fornicate, or perpetrate some grave crime, sins mortally against religion, p. 428, n. 2. — He more probably sins so too if the crime is light, ibid., n. 4 f. — One who swears that he will do something against the evangelical counsels sins only venially, p. 429, n. 6. — The matter of an oath must be lawful, possible, and good, p. 430, n. 1. — This is explained, ibid., n. 2 ff. — If an indifferent matter is sworn for an honest end, or for the benefit of one's neighbour, the oath obliges, p. 431, n. 6. — In a liberal promise, and in one sworn of contracting marriage, the condition "unless I choose a better state" is always included, p. 432, n. 8. — An oath concerning an unlawful thing needs no relaxation, ibid., n. 9. — Two objections drawn from canon law are answered, ibid. — Absolutely speaking, the obligation of a vow is greater than that of an oath, p. 434, n. 6. — It is not lawful to swear without the intention of swearing, p. 436 f., n. 9 f. — Fr. Tamburini's doctrine is disapproved as a condemned doctrine; and so is the explanation of it which Fr. Viva offers, ibid. — One who swears something false in grave matter without the intention of swearing sins mortally, p. 437, n. 11. — As also in light matter, ibid., n. 12 f. — Fr. Viva seems wrongly to defend the opposite as probable, ibid. — One who swears something true without the intention of swearing sins mortally, even if he swears in light matter, p. 439, n. 16. — One who deliberately swears, for example "By God it is so," utters a true oath, even if he has the intention of not swearing, ibid., n. 17. — An objection is satisfied, p. 440, n. 18. — One who swears something false by a slip of the tongue is not guilty of perjury, nor does he sin mortally; otherwise if from a wicked habit, p. 441, n. 19. — One who swears without the intention of binding himself is more probably in fact bound, p. 442, n. 21.

L

La Croix, Claude (La Croix (P. Claudius)). Fr. Claude La Croix teaches a lax proposition concerning the vow, p. 117, n. 8. — And other lax ones on the same, p. 170 f., n. 47 ff. — He laxly teaches that one who omits the whole Rosary promised by vow sins only lightly, p. 183, n. 13. — He laxly teaches that one who vows abstinence from wine to avoid drunkenness may take any other drinks apt to inebriate, p. 226, n. 3. — His doctrine and Fr. Cattaneo's, comparing a lie with a theft committed in extreme necessity, is opposed to the doctrine of the Church, p. 492 ff., n. 1 ff. — His doctrine of mental restrictions falls back into that which teaches that the danger of losing life is a cause able to make a purely mental restriction not purely mental, p. 504, n. 14. — And into that which teaches that a lie in grave necessity is not a lie, and so is lawful, p. 505, n. 15. — His interpretation of the condemned amphibologies is reported and disapproved, p. 517 f., n. 7 ff. — His method of writing opens the way to excessive laxity, p. 520, n. 12.

Leander of the Most Holy Sacrament (Leander a SS. Sacramento). Leander of the Most Holy Sacrament most laxly teaches that one who blasphemes from an inveterate custom does not sin, p. 103, n. 6. — Another horrible laxity of the same on this, ibid., n. 7. — He wrongly calls on St. Augustine as patron in defence of his laxity, ibid., n. 8. — Another laxity of the same, which he falsely imputes to Navarre and to St. Thomas, is disapproved, p. 105, n. 12. — He praises Amadeus Guimenius, full of laxities, errors, and impostures, p. 107, n. 5. — Another laxity of the same, and of the recent Probabilists, on absolving habitual blasphemers at once, is disapproved, p. 109 f., n. 6. — Other lax propositions of the same on the vow, p. 116 f., n. 3 and 5 ; p. 136 f., n. 17 ff. — And on the oath, p. 379 f., n. 3 and 8 ; p. 410, n. 5.

M

Magic (Magia). Natural magic, by which certain wonderful and unusual things are done, is lawful, p. 68, n. 1 f. — Natural and superstitious magic can be distinguished by three signs, p. 69, n. 3. — They are reviewed, ibid. — In doubt whether an effect proceeds from a natural cause or from a superstitious art, one must abstain from procuring it, ibid. ; p. 70, n. 4 f. — The equivocation of the Salmanticenses, who wrongly fit the doctrine of St. Thomas to the question, is exposed, ibid. — That there are "healers," so called, who heal diseases not by natural power but by a grace freely given by God, is more probably not the case, p. 71 f., n. 6 ff. — Their superstition can be discerned by several signs, p. 73, n. 10. — They are reviewed, ibid. — An invocative charm (ensalmus) is lawful, but not a constitutive one, ibid., n. 11. — Both are explained, ibid. — One fascination is vulgar, another physical, or natural, p. 74, n. 12. — That there is a natural one is more probable, ibid., n. 14. — The vulgar is superstitious, p. 75, n. 15.

Sorcery (Maleficium). One sorcery is poisonous, another amatory, p. 76, n. 1. — The Church proposes remedies for expelling these, p. 77, n. 2. — The remedies proposed by the Philosophers against amatory sorcery are vain and full of superstition, ibid. — Yet the use of natural remedies is useful, ibid. — It is not lawful to ask the dissolution of a sorcery from a sorcerer, even one ready to do it, ibid., n. 3. — The objections are satisfied, p. 78, n. 4. — It is lawful to ask a sorcerer to take away a sorcery, if it is established that he can do it by lawful means, ibid. ; p. 79, n. 5 ff. — It is lawful to destroy the signs of sorcery, p. 80, n. 8. — Hesselius's opposite opinion is disapproved, ibid., n. 9. — A sorcerer who handed a demon a document signed with his own blood is not bound to redeem it in order to do true penance, p. 81, n. 10. — Money, whether genuine or counterfeit, obtained by the demon's art, must altogether be thrown away, ibid. — Women given to sorcery are called some "lamiae," some "sagae," some "striges", p. 81, n. 1. — This is explained, ibid. — Women are more given to sorcery than men, for several causes, ibid., n. 2. — These causes are reviewed, ibid. — Two reasons are assigned why old women rather than younger ones devote themselves to enchantments and sorcery, p. 83, n. 3. — A solid reason why God permits lamiae, or striges, to harm infants and the young rather than adults, ibid., n. 4. — Striges can in fact be carried from place to place by the help of the demon, ibid. ; p. 84, n. 5. — This rarely happens, ibid. — Little faith, too, is to be given to women in these matters, ibid., n. 6. — Luther and his followers wrongly accuse Catholics of giving credence to some transports of this kind, p. 85, n. 7. — The Council of Ancyra does not favour them, ibid. — Witch-women, or men, can by no means be changed by the demon into a cat, a weasel, a hare, or other beasts, ibid. ; p. 86, n. 8 f. — Only the senses of those who see, and of the witches, can be changed by him, ibid., n. 10. — Demons cannot bring witches through closed doors into houses and the bedchambers of their lovers, ibid., n. 11. — The place is assigned in which the gathering of witches with demons is held, and what they do at such meetings, ibid., n. 12. — Intercourse of demons with women does in fact happen, p. 87 f., n. 13. — The usual objections of the adversaries are washed away, p. 88, n. 14. — Human and divine laws decree that sorcerers be punished, p. 89, n. 1. — They are in fact excommunicated by the law, ibid., n. 2. — They are to be denounced to the Inquisitors, ibid.

Marín, Juan (Marin (P. Ioannes)). Fr. Juan Marín teaches a lax proposition concerning the vow, p. 117, n. 7. — He laxly teaches that one who vows virginity is not bound to chastity, p. 234, n. 22.

Martínez de Prado, Juan (Martinez de Prado (Ioannes)). Juan Martínez de Prado teaches a lax proposition concerning the vow, p. 116, n. 4. — And another, p. 153, n. 11 f.

Lying (Mendacium). Plato, and some Fathers of the Church, taught that a lie is lawful when a most grave cause presses, p. 445 ff., n. 1 ff. — Their testimonies are reported, ibid. — Chrysostom was not free of this error, p. 446, n. 5. — Such an opinion was common in St. Augustine's time, p. 448, n. 8. — It is wrongly proved hence by the heretics that the Fathers are of no authority, ibid., n. 9. — Before, or around, Augustine's time, several authors declared war on lying, p. 449 f., n. 1 ff. — They are reviewed, ibid. — All that St. Augustine writes on lying is narrated compendiously, p. 451 ff., n. 1 ff. — All that the same holy Doctor wrote to Consentius against lying is likewise narrated compendiously, p. 458 ff., n. 1 ff. — In that book all lies are expressly routed, ibid. — Augustine's doctrine is most opportune for settling the controversy over the deceitful oath, against the doctrine of very many more recent writers on equivocations and mental restrictions, p. 464 ff., n. 1 ff. — Their doctrine is either the same as, or worse than, that which St. Augustine disapproved, ibid. — The doctrine devised by very many more recent writers for concealing the truth is narrated historically, p. 467, n. 1. — A synopsis is given of this doctrine, contained in various lax propositions of Thomas Sánchez and of Tamburini, p. 468 ff., n. 2 ff. — Innocent XI condemned the principles of the aforesaid propositions when he condemned mental restrictions, p. 472, n. 1. — That this Pontiff condemned only the propositions as they lie, and not as they stand in the books of the authors from which they were excerpted, Fr. Gabriel Daniel wrongly asserts, ibid. — After mental restrictions were condemned, very many more recent writers took refuge in the distinction of purely and not purely mental restrictions, as also in amphibological and equivocal words, p. 473, n. 3 ff. — This is explained, ibid. — Not a few others, in communicable and incommunicable knowledge, p. 474, n. 5. — Others, finally, in locutions employed materially, that is, with the intention of signifying nothing, ibid., n. 6. — The doctrine of Fr. Tanner and of Fr. Stoz is explained, p. 475, n. 7. — And the doctrine of Fr. La Croix, especially with respect to a Confessor questioned about a matter he holds under the seal, ibid., n. 8. — Fr. Ambrogio Cattaneo extends this doctrine to cases not only grave, but to avoiding any notable inconvenience whatever, p. 476, n. 9 f. — Yet the doctrine of these more recent writers is the same as the doctrine of Cassian, who would have lies lawful in extreme necessity, p. 477, n. 1 ff. — And it is opposed to the doctrine of St. Augustine, who condemns lies in every event, ibid. — This is shown by a comparison of the cases proposed by the same Augustine and by the more recent writers, and resolved by contrary doctrine, ibid. — The doctrine of the more recent writers on purely mental restrictions is false, and rightly condemned by the Church, p. 481 ff., n. 1 ff. — The objections are answered, p. 483 f., n. 6 ff. — It is improbable and false that words, by the common law of the commonwealth, signify nothing if they are employed to conceal a truth which cannot be made known without grave harm, p. 485 ff., n. 1 ff. — That law was unknown to all the ancients, ibid., n. 2. — The opinion of Tamburini, who says that a man may at will utter words materially, is laxer than the very proposition condemned concerning mental restrictions, p. 489 ff., n. 1 ff. — The opinion of Fr. Cattaneo, of Fr. La Croix, and of others, comparing a lie with a theft committed in extreme necessity, is opposed to the doctrine of the Church, p. 492 ff., n. 1 ff. — The common opinion of very many more recent writers, which defends restrictions not purely mental by the help of communicable and incommunicable knowledge, useful and not useful for speaking, is brought under examination, p. 499 ff., n. 1 ff. — It is shown not to differ from the opinion of those who uphold purely mental restrictions, ibid. — What Fr. Viva has published on it is attacked, ibid. — His doctrine falls back into the condemned proposition, p. 502 f., n. 9 ff. — The causes are reviewed why very many more recent writers in fact defend the proscribed purely mental restrictions, p. 506 f., n. 1 f. — The doctrines of Fr. Sánchez are reported and disapproved, together with the defence of him that Fr. Viva offers, ibid. ; p. 508 ff., n. 5 ff. — Very many more recent writers in fact teach mental restrictions because they wrongly put life before truth, p. 515, n. 1. — When the use of mental restriction is rejected as unlawful, it is wrongly inferred that some precepts of God are impossible, ibid., n. 2. — St. Augustine's doctrine is shown, p. 516, n. 3 f. — The single and peculiar case of Confessors is wrongly confused with other cases, ibid., n. 5 f. — It is false that the condemned propositions were not condemned as they stand in the authors, p. 517, n. 7. — Extraordinary senses are wrongly fastened on the aforesaid propositions, in which it is contended that they were condemned, ibid. ; p. 518 ff., n. 8 ff. — The senses attributed to them by Fr. La Croix and by the anonymous defender of Fr. Cattaneo are reported and disapproved, ibid. — Fr. Moya, Fr. Cárdenas, Sporer, and very many other more recent writers are on that account to be read with caution, p. 520 f., n. 12. — Purely mental restrictions are not lawful even for an honest cause, but are pure lies, p. 522 ff., n. 1 ff. — Fr. Diego de la Fuente Hurtado upholds them after the propositions condemned by Innocent XI, and Fr. Casnedi teaches that they are not condemned, ibid. — Their doctrines are reported and disapproved, ibid. — An amphibology which, either by force of the words or of the circumstances, admits a double sense, both intelligible to the hearer, is not a lie, but is lawful, p. 526 ff., n. 1 ff. — This amphibology does not always occur, or suffice to conceal the truth, especially when the questioner presses that we speak without equivocation, p. 528 ff., n. 8 ff. — Secrets which cannot be revealed without sin must therefore be concealed by another way, ibid. — Nine rules to be observed are assigned, p. 531 f., n. 10 ff. — The texts of Scripture which the ancients put forward in defence of lies, and the more recent writers in defence of mental restrictions, are expounded, p. 533 ff., n. 1 ff. — Some Gospel texts are wrongly brought forward in favour of mental restrictions, p. 536 ff., n. 1 ff. — This is shown by the explanation of all of them, ibid. — And likewise by the solution of the objections drawn from reason, and from the examples and doctrine of the Saints, p. 543 ff., n. 1 ff.

Molinos, Miguel de (Molinos (Michael)). Miguel de Molinos taught two errors concerning the vow, afterwards condemned by Innocent XI, p. 115, n. 1.

Moya, Mateo de (Moya (P. Matthaeus)). Fr. Mateo de Moya, who first spread lax opinions under the mask of Amadeus Guimenius, afterwards coined them anew under the splendid colour of probability, p. 145, n. 30. — He contends by an empty distinction that one who vows virginity is not always bound to chastity, p. 234, n. 22. — He teaches a lax proposition concerning the oath, p. 380, n. 10. — Fr. La Croix rightly warns that he is to be read with caution, p. 520, n. 12.

O

Opinion (Opinio). See: Propositions, condemned; Propositions, lax.

Orsi, Giuseppe Agostino (Orsi (P. Ioseph Augustinus)). The works of Fr. Giuseppe Agostino Orsi are praised, p. 444 ; p. 497, n. 13.

P

Probabilists (Probabilistae). The Probabilists, whether the Church condemns lax propositions full of scandal or does not, have escapes by which to defend them, p. 526, n. 13.

Probability (Probabilitas). Not every probability makes moral certainty, as Leander wrongly contends, p. 410, n. 5. — Probability does not suffice for swearing, ibid.

Propositions, condemned (Propositiones damnatae). The condemned propositions contained in this work. On the habitual sinner, p. 110, n. 6. — On the vow, p. 115, n. 1. — On the oath, p. 373, n. 1 ; p. 377, n. 1 ; p. 408, n. 2 ; p. 410, n. 5 ; p. 436, n. 9.

Propositions, lax (Propositiones laxae). The lax propositions concerning the vow contained in this work, p. 116 ff., n. 2 ff. — On these and other lax propositions. See: Bauny, Étienne; Bonacina; Casnedi, Carlo Antonio; Cattaneo, Ambrogio; Castropalao, Fernando; Daniel, Gabriel; Dicastillo, Juan; Francolino, Baldassarre; Fuente Hurtado, Diego de la; Gobat, Georg; La Croix, Claude; Leander of the Most Holy Sacrament; Marín, Juan; Martínez de Prado, Juan; Moya, Mateo de; Sánchez, Tomás; Sporer, Patritius; Tamburini, Tommaso; Torrecilla, Martín de; Viva, Domenico.

La Puente, Luis de (Puente (P. de la)). Fr. Luis de la Puente's vow never to sin venially deliberately was made by a special leading of the Holy Spirit, p. 174, n. 57.

R

Raymond of Peñafort, St. (S. Raymundus de Pennafort). St. Raymond of Peñafort in his Summa does not favour lying, p. 545, n. 7. — These words, "to go against the mind," are taken by him for these others, "to go against conscience", ibid.

Religion, the religious state (Religio). Religion, or the religious state which one professes, is a thing praiseworthy and full of merit, p. 251, n. 1. — One who vows it ought to apply every diligence to enter it, ibid., n. 2. — So one who vows, if he hopes to be received into it by making his vow known, is bound to make it known to the Prelate, ibid. — This vow is explained: "I promise to enter religion, unless God should decide otherwise concerning me", p. 253, n. 1. — And this other: "I vow to enter this religious order, if I shall have entered any", ibid., n. 2. — A vow by which one vows that no person shall be an obstacle to him, so that he should not enter religion, is valid, p. 254, n. 3. — Whether one who made a vow of wishing to enter religion is bound to enter it depends on the intention of the one vowing, ibid., n. 4. — A vow of dying in religion is equivalent to a vow of religion, p. 255, n. 5. — A vow of eremitic and solitary life induces an obligation, ibid., n. 6. — One who vows religion absolutely does not fulfil the vow if he assumes the habit of the Knights of St. James, of Calatrava, of Alcántara, of Montesa, and of St. John, ibid., n. 1 ; p. 256, n. 2. — He would fulfil it by entering an order of military Clerics, ibid., n. 3. — He would not fulfil it if he entered a relaxed religious order, ibid., n. 4. — A relaxed religious order is one that fails in substantial matters, ibid., n. 5. — This is explained, ibid. ; p. 257, n. 6 f. — One who vows to enter a stricter religious order does not satisfy by entering a laxer one, ibid., n. 8. — Nor can he lawfully persevere in the laxer, if he has professed in it, p. 258, n. 9. — No religious order collapsed in substantial matters has the privilege of receiving those who vowed a stricter one, p. 259, n. 10. — What one who vowed religion indefinitely ought to perform is assigned, ibid., n. 11. — One who vows to enter this determinate convent, if he suffers a refusal, is bound to approach other monasteries, unless he was moved by a special reason to vow so, p. 260, n. 12. — One rejected for ever, if invited again by the religious order, is more probably free of the vow, p. 261, n. 14. — He is not free of it if, the petition being made, the religious order asks for time to deliberate, ibid. — One bound by a vow can be repelled by a regular Prelate with the same facility as one not bound, ibid., n. 15. — One who vowed religion that he might be a Cleric in it is free of the vow, if the religious order will not admit him except as a layman, ibid., n. 16. — An illegitimate son who, ignorant of the constitution of Sixtus V by which illegitimate sons are repelled from ranks and dignities, vows religion, seems to be bound to the vow once the constitution is known, p. 262, n. 17. — One who vowed religion in the priestly state is bound to learn grammar, that he may be admitted to it, ibid., n. 18. — One who, having made a vow of religion, contracts marriage can still, and ought to, abstain for two months from asking and rendering the debt, and enter religion, ibid., n. 19. — The marriage consummated, he can render and ask, ibid. — If such a vow follows the marriage, he can render, and ask, ibid. — A vow of religion is not fulfilled by accepting the Episcopate, p. 264, n. 20. — One who enters religion with the intention of leaving does not satisfy the vow, ibid., n. 2. — Even if he entered together with the resolve of praying God that he might change his heart, p. 265, n. 3. — A vow of entering it, and of leaving it at once, is null, ibid., n. 4. — One who vows to enter it with the liberty granted by law to Novices can leave once the trial is made, ibid. — He does not, however, satisfy the vow if, the trial made, he leaves without any cause, p. 266, n. 5 f. — The just causes for withdrawing from religion are reviewed, p. 267, n. 7. — One who, beyond religion, vows also perseverance in it cannot leave it except on account of evident inability to profess, or of his expulsion from the religious order, ibid., n. 8. — If, however, he leaves otherwise, he is not bound to keep chastity in the world, unless he vowed this too, at the same time and principally, p. 268, n. 9. — One who vows entrance into religion is bound to enter it as soon as he conveniently can, ibid., n. 1. — If, an opportunity being given, he defers it beyond half a year, he sins mortally, p. 269, n. 2. — If he cannot fulfil this vow at the time prefixed for himself, and foresees it, he is not bound to anticipate that time, ibid., n. 3. — Unless the defined time admits latitude, p. 270, n. 4. — If the designated time runs out, he is still bound once it has elapsed, ibid., n. 5. — It would be otherwise with a vow of fasting fixed to a day, ibid. — If the end of a vow of religion was the whole and only cause of vowing it, you are not bound by the vow once that end ceases; otherwise you are bound, p. 271, n. 6. — The same holds of the condition under which the vow was made, ibid. — One who spontaneously places impediments so that the condition under which he vowed religion may not come to pass is not exempted from fulfilling the vow, ibid. ; p. 272, n. 7 ff. — Vows of Religious made without the Prelate's permission, concerning honest matter which disturbs neither jurisdiction nor the religious order, are valid, p. 275 f., n. 4. — It is otherwise if they concerned things forbidden either by the Rule, or by the precept of Superiors, p. 277, n. 5. — A vow made by Prelates of Regulars of giving alms is valid, ibid., n. 6. — Vows of subjects of Regulars, made without the Prelates' permission, of giving something in alms from the goods granted them for their use, are not, however, valid, p. 278, n. 7 f. — A Religious, profession having been made, does not escape free of the bond of the vow on account of a right he acquires to the royal crown, p. 286, n. 11 [=9]. See: Invalidation of vows.

Relics of the Saints (Reliquiae Sanctorum). See: Adoration.

Reservation of vows (Reservatio votorum). See: Dispensation of vows.

Mental restrictions (Restrictiones mentales). See: Lying.

S

Sacrilege (Sacrilegium). Sacrilege is the violation of a sacred thing, p. 95, n. 1. — It is threefold: one by which a sacred person, another by which a sacred place, another by which sacred things are violated, ibid., n. 2. — This division, from St. Thomas, is into the lowest, or atomic, species, p. 96, n. 3. — The sacrileges contained in the violation of sacred persons are reviewed, ibid., n. 4. — Likewise those contained in the violation of a sacred place, ibid., n. 5. — One who, outside a sacred place, has the will to kill in a sacred place contracts the malice of sacrilege, p. 97, n. 6. — But not one who in a sacred place deliberates, for example, about fornicating in a place not sacred, ibid. — Sacred things are divided into four degrees, ibid., n. 7. — To abuse the words of Sacred Scripture is sacrilege, p. 98, n. 8. — The decree of Trent against this abuse is reported, ibid. — Sacrilege can be committed even by omission, ibid., n. 9. — This is explained by examples, ibid. — The omission of the reception or administration of the sacraments at the due time is more probably not sacrilegious, ibid., n. 10. — Sacrilege is by its kind deadly, p. 99, n. 11. — It can be light on account of the smallness of the matter, or of inadvertence, ibid., n. 11. — The penalties established against the sacrilegious are some pecuniary, others spiritual, ibid., n. 12.

Salmanticenses (Salmanticenses). In a doubt about the honesty of an action, the Salmanticenses wrongly apply another doctrine of St. Thomas, p. 69 f., n. 4. — They wrongly allege St. Antoninus and Sylvester, p. 129, n. 2.

Sánchez, Tomás (Sanchez (P. Thomas)). Fr. Tomás Sánchez laxly and monstrously teaches that what is received for divination need not be restored, provided the diviner used the devil's art, p. 51, n. 13 f. — He laxly teaches that things we know by a merely probable conjecture can be sworn as true, p. 410 f., n. 5. — He teaches many lax propositions, and some condemned ones, concerning equivocations and mental restrictions, p. 468 ff., n. 2 ff. — They are reviewed, ibid. ; p. 509 ff., n. 9 ff. — Fr. Sánchez is proved to be, with just cause, the author of propositions 27 and 28 condemned by Innocent XI, p. 512 f., n. 15 f.

Dreams (Somnia). Their various kinds, and four causes, p. 53, n. 1 f. See: Divination.

Lots (Sortes). See: Divination.

Sporer, Patritius (Sporer (P. Patritius)). Fr. Patritius Sporer teaches a lax proposition concerning the vow, p. 116, n. 2. — And another on the observance of the vow, p. 135, n. 2 [=12]. — Likewise another, p. 183, n. 13. — He laxly excuses from mortal sin one who vows abstinence from wine, unless he drinks as much wine as a temperate man is accustomed to drink at one meal, p. 227, n. 4. — In this he expressly contradicts himself, ibid. — He teaches a lax proposition on the commutation of a vow, p. 353, n. 5. — And on the oath, p. 378 f., n. 1, 11, and 15. — And another, p. 389, n. 2. — He is to be read with caution on account of the condemned doctrines which he praises in others and copies from them, p. 521, n. 12.

Religious state (Status religiosus). See: Religion, the religious state.

Superstition (Superstitio). What superstition is, and its division, is set forth, p. 32 f., n. 1 ff. — From an undue manner of worshipping God it is a grave sin, p. 34, n. 5. — To mix profane and shameful things into the divine office is a grave sin; but light, if they are only vain, ibid., n. 6. — One who proposes false relics for adoration, or preaches false miracles, sins gravely, ibid., n. 7. — One who fasts on Sunday only to restrain the flesh and the senses does not sin, ibid., n. 8. — Several common cases in which superstition lies hidden are reported, p. 35 ff., n. 1 ff. See: Divination.

T

Tamburini, Tommaso (Tamburinus). Tamburini laxly teaches that the precept of adoring God of itself and directly never obliges, p. 4, n. 6. — He most laxly teaches that one who blasphemes from an inveterate custom does not sin, p. 103, n. 5 f. — He laxly teaches that one who omits the whole Rosary promised by vow sins only lightly, p. 183, n. 13. — A want of diligence in reporting the opinions of authors is familiar to him, p. 342, n. 12. — He teaches lax propositions concerning the oath, p. 379 f., n. 2, 4, and 14. — And another, p. 390, n. 2. — And another, from Hurtado, p. 415, n. 12. — And another, condemned, on one who swears without the intention of swearing, p. 436, n. 9. — And other lax ones likewise on the oath, p. 470 f., n. 15 f. — He laxly teaches that a man may at his pleasure utter words materially, that is, stripped of all signification, p. 489, n. 1. — This doctrine is laxer than the condemned one on mental restrictions, ibid., n. 2 ff.

Tempting God (Tentatio Dei). The tempting of God is an inordinate trial of some divine perfection, by words or deeds, p. 9 [=91], n. 1. — One kind is express, another tacit, ibid., n. 2. — It is by its kind a grave sin, p. 92, n. 3. — To tempt God even when the matter is light is more probably mortal, ibid., n. 4. — One who strives to make his innocence manifest by the trial of red-hot iron, or of boiling water, tempts God, p. 93, n. 5. — The examples usually adduced are answered, ibid. — One who, to convert a heretic, offers a miracle to be wrought by God in confirmation of Catholic truth tempts God, p. 94, n. 6. — Express and tacit tempting of God are not two distinct sins, ibid., n. 7. — In confession it must be disclosed whether the tempting of God was express or tacit, ibid.

Torrecilla, Martín de (Torrecilla). Torrecilla teaches lax propositions concerning the oath, p. 382 f., n. 24 ff.

V

Wyclif, John (Wicleffus). Wyclif wrongly asserts that oaths made to strengthen human contracts and civil dealings are unlawful, p. 373, n. 1. — This proposition is condemned in the Council of Constance, ibid.

Viva, Domenico (Viva (P. Dominicus)). Fr. Domenico Viva teaches lax propositions concerning the oath, p. 381 f., n. 16 and 23. — He wrongly denies to Tamburini the condemned proposition on one who swears without the intention of swearing, p. 436, n. 9. — He is to be read with caution in his exposition of the condemned propositions, ibid. — He does not depart from the sense of proposition 25 condemned by Innocent XI, ibid. — He seems wrongly to defend as probably lawful swearing something false in light matter without the intention of swearing, p. 437, n. 12. — He defends restriction not purely mental by the use of a twofold knowledge, communicable and incommunicable, p. 500, n. 4. — And he extends it to all men when a grave cause presses, p. 501 f., n. 5 ff. — And to rustics, when no convenient external restriction occurs, ibid. — Such a doctrine falls back into the very proposition proscribed, p. 502, n. 9. — He wrongly contends that the propositions condemned on mental restrictions were condemned only in their obvious sense, and not as they stand in their authors, p. 506, n. 2. — This doctrine favours Jansenism, and is shown to be false, p. 507 ff., n. 3 ff. — His commentaries on the condemned propositions are to be read with caution, p. 520 f., n. 12.

Wolff, Christian (Wolfius (Christianus)). Christian Wolff, a Lutheran, wrongly denies that an oath produces a new obligation of performing something to the one to whom one swears, p. 433 f., n. 3.

Vow (Votum). The Lamperians, Wyclif, Luther, and Calvin condemned the vow, p. 112, n. 1. — A vow of abstaining from wine is not made by us as though some holiness lay beneath wine, as Calvin slanders, ibid., n. 2. — Other ravings of Calvin about the vow are reported, and turned back upon him, p. 113, n. 3 ff. — A vow can rightly be made both for a defined time and for ever, p. 114, n. 5. — This is shown from the Scriptures and by reasons against Calvin and Luther, p. 114, n. 5. — The condemned, and some lax, propositions on the vow are reviewed, p. 115 ff., n. 1 ff. — A vow is a deliberate promise made to God of a better thing, p. 118, n. 2 ; ibid., n. 3 ff. — Full and perfect deliberation is necessary for a vow, p. 119, n. 5. — If these are present, even sudden vows must be fulfilled, ibid., n. 6. — One who hastily makes a vow of great moment sins venially, p. 120, n. 7 f. — The Salmanticenses are attacked, ibid. — A vow made deliberately, though hastily, is valid, ibid. — For no vow, though in the lightest matter, does half-full deliberation suffice, p. 121, n. 9. — Virtual deliberation, or liberty, suffices for a vow, ibid., n. 10. — A resolve, though firm, is not a vow, and induces no obligation, p. 122, n. 1 [=11]. — The Fathers often use "vow" for "resolve", ibid. — The nature of a vow lies in the promise, p. 123, n. 1 [=12]. — How it differs from a resolve is explained, ibid. — The resolve of the one vowing can be considered in different ways, ibid., n. 13. — One who vows with the intention of vowing, and of binding himself, is bound by the vow, though he has at the same time the will of not carrying out the promise, p. 124, n. 15. — The same holds, though he had at the same time no intention of binding himself, p. 125, n. 18. — Vows made in honour of the Saints are valid, p. 126 ff., n. 1 f. — This is explained, and at the same time Erasmus, Luther, and Calvin are attacked, ibid. — The vows we pronounce to the Saints are properly made to God alone, p. 128, n. 6. — All those things which are commanded by divine or ecclesiastical law can be the matter of a vow, p. 129, n. 2 f. — The promise made at the reception of baptism, to renounce the devil and his pomps, is not a vow except in a broad sense, p. 130, n. 4. — For a vow to be of a better good, it suffices that it be such compared with the contrary omission of the same vow, ibid., n. 5. — Things opposed to the evangelical counsels are not fit matter for vows, p. 131, n. 6. — In some circumstances a work which, speaking absolutely, is opposed to them is in fact not opposed, ibid. — A vow of contracting marriage, speaking of itself, is not valid, p. 132, n. 7. — This is explained, ibid. — One who, agitated by the stings of concupiscence, vows marriage to avoid fornication and other acts of lust, more probably does not vow validly, ibid. ; p. 133, n. 8 ff. — The arguments of the contrary opinion are resolved, p. 134, n. 11. — A married person hindered from asking the debt by a vow (as by incest, or spiritual kinship) cannot ask the debt even if he is agitated by vehement stings of the flesh, lest he fall into grave sins of lust, p. 135, n. 12 f. — Sporer's opposite lax opinion is attacked, as also another of his much like it, ibid. ; p. 136, n. 15 f. — Vows of chastity, of religion, or of not marrying, made by those for whom it is more salutary on account of incontinence to enter marriage, are valid, and oblige even after supervening vexations of lust, ibid. ; p. 137 ff., n. 17 ff. — The opposite opinion of Leander, Moya, Fr. La Croix, and others is shaken out and attacked, ibid. — Vexations of lust can best be overcome by other means than marriage, ibid. — A vow not to vow is invalid, p. 146, n. 32. — A vow not to seek a dispensation, commutation, or invalidation is valid; it does not, however, oblige when it is more useful to the soul to seek them, p. 147, n. 34. — Whether those who vow not to seek a commutation may seek a dispensation, or an invalidation, is to be gathered from the intention of the one vowing, p. 148, n. 35. — Indifferent things are not the matter of a vow, p. 149, n. 1. — A vow of a thing whose execution is a sin is invalid, ibid. ; p. 150 ff. — The objection drawn from Jephthah's vow is answered, as are other objections, ibid. — A vow of running bulls in honour of some Saint is not valid, p. 153, n. 11 ff. — The opposite opinion of Martínez de Prado, improbable and false, is rejected, ibid. — A vow of women not to comb their hair on such-and-such a day, and similar vows, are invalid, p. 154, n. 14. — A vow of nocturnal vigils is valid; not, however, one of not going to sea, ibid., n. 15. — A vow made for a wicked end, or for the attainment of a wicked end, is always evil and void, p. 156 f., n. 18 ff. — Soto's doctrine is explained, p. 157, n. 23. — A vow of offering God a good gift for a future effect attached to a shameful condition is invalid, p. 159 f., n. 25. — A vow pronounced in thanksgiving to God for a shameful act already done is invalid, p. 160, n. 26. — As also a vow made in thanksgiving for victory in an unjust war, and for gain from an unjust game, p. 161, n. 27 ff. — The lax opinion of Castropalao, who wrongly cites Suárez in his favour, is refuted, ibid. — A vow made for a son received from a concubine is valid, as also for safety brought back from a duel, p. 163, n. 31. — As also a vow of punishing one's own crime, ibid., n. 32. — And also a vow for an indifferent end, if it is made in thanksgiving to God, ibid., n. 33. — A vow for the end of obtaining temporal things is null, if the one vowing stops in them, ibid., n. 34. — It is valid if it is directed to obtaining temporal goods from the liberality of God, as is commonly done, ibid. — One who vows to God what is evil sins now gravely, now lightly, p. 164, n. 35. — One who makes a vow to sin mortally, even without the intention of fulfilling it, sins mortally, ibid., n. 36. — The matter of a vow must be not only physically, but also morally possible, p. 165, n. 37. — A vow partly of a possible thing, partly of an impossible, is valid in the possible part, unless the one vowing intended the conjunction of both, ibid., n. 38. — A vow of a divisible thing must be fulfilled in the part which can be fulfilled, ibid. — One who vows to build a church, and cannot build the whole, is bound to build a part, unless the part is useless: and if so, he is bound to build a chapel in another church, or something else for the worship of God, p. 166 f., n. 39 f. — The objections of the Salmanticenses are answered, p. 167, n. 42. — A vow of matter partly good, partly evil, must be fulfilled in the good part, unless the one vowing intended otherwise, p. 168, n. 43. — One who makes a disjunctive vow, one part of which is fit and the other unfit, in practice makes a double vow, one valid, the other void, ibid., n. 44. — A vow of going to Rome barefoot obliges to its substance, though not to its manner, p. 169, n. 45. — A vow not to gamble is valid, ibid., n. 46. — A vow not to gamble excludes even moderate play, and play done through another, p. 170, n. 47 ff. — The opposite lax opinion of Gobat, La Croix, and others is attacked, ibid. — A vow never to sin mortally is valid; not, however, one of avoiding all venial sins collectively, p. 171, n. 50. — In practice, those who vow to avoid all mortal and venial sins understand it so far as human frailty permits, ibid., n. 51. — A vow of avoiding all sins distributively, either mortal or venial, is null, p. 172, n. 52. — A vow of avoiding some kind of venial sin is valid, ibid., n. 53. — Not, however, one of avoiding all venial sins, even distributively, ibid., n. 54. — The reasons of the opposite opinion are reported, p. 173, n. 55. — And refuted, ibid., n. 56. — St. Teresa's vow never to sin venially was by divine instinct, p. 174, n. 57. — As also the vow of Fr. de la Colombière and of Fr. Luis de la Puente, ibid. — The vow of a mother who learns that her unmarried daughter is pregnant, and promises the Blessed Virgin a thousand coins if, to avoid infamy, she dies before the birth, is impious, ibid., n. 58. — A daughter's vow not to marry another unless she marries him by whom she was violated, and who had promised her marriage before their union, is valid, ibid. — A vow is divided into absolute, conditional, and penal, p. 175, n. 1. — Some conditions customarily attached to vows are reported, ibid., n. 3. — This vow, "I promise to enter religion, if my elder brother has had children," is not conditional, as the Salmanticenses would have it, but absolute, ibid. ; p. 176, n. 4. — A vow is divided into solemn and simple, necessary, common, particular, real, and perpetual, p. 177, n. 5 ff. — One is reserved, another not; one express, another implicit; one public, another occult, p. 178, n. 10. — That a vow induces an obligation is a truth of faith, p. 179, n. 1. — The obligation of a vow pertains to the virtue of fidelity, or of religion, but not to that virtue to which the promised matter belongs, p. 180 f., n. 2 ff. — This is shown, and an objection is satisfied, ibid. — It is of greater merit to undertake some work to be carried out under the law of a vow than without a vow, p. 182, n. 8 ff. — The obligation of a vow is by its own nature grave, p. 183, n. 12. — One who omits to fulfil a light part of the matter promised by vow sins venially, ibid., n. 13. — To omit a whole Rosary would not be light matter, as La Croix, Tamburini, and Sporer laxly teach, ibid. — The transgression of a vow whose whole matter, being absolutely small, is omitted, is only venial, p. 185, n. 15 f. — In practice, however, chiefly by reason of the ends of the one vowing, it scarcely happens without mortal sin, ibid. — The one vowing cannot bind himself gravely in light matter, p. 186, n. 17. — And more probably not lightly in grave matter, ibid. ; p. 187, n. 18 f. — The opposite reasons are refuted, ibid. ; p. 188 ff., n. 20 ff. — A vow to avoid a venial sin obliges under mortal, p. 190, n. 25. — One who violates several vows in light matter on the same day sins mortally, p. 190 ff., n. 26 ff. — The opposite lax opinions of Fr. La Croix and of Castropalao are refuted, ibid. — One who vowed to recite one "Our Father" and "Hail Mary" daily for several years sins mortally if he daily omits this prayer for several years, p. 193 f., n. 31 ff. — When a vow in fact attaches to the day, and when not, is assigned, p. 194, n. 32. — The vows of parents do not bind the children, p. 195, n. 2. — The one vowing is not bound, nor can he, to fulfil through another his personal vow, which he himself cannot fulfil, p. 196, n. 3. — One who has become unable through his own fault to observe a personal vow is not bound to fulfil it through another, ibid., n. 5. — As neither is one who before the vow was certain that he would never be able to fulfil it, p. 197, n. 6. — Real vows can be fulfilled through another, even without the knowledge of the one vowing, but not against his will, p. 197, n. 7. — One who has become poor is not bound to ask money of his friends in order to fulfil his vow, p. 198, n. 8. — One who gives the promised thing to another, who then omits to offer the thing received to whom he owes it, satisfies the vow, if he applied all moral diligence to give it to an upright man, ibid., n. 9. — A mixed vow, consisting of personal and real elements, can be fulfilled through another, not as personal, but as real, p. 199, n. 10. — One who has become unable to pay a vow without fault is not bound to apply a compensation, ibid., n. 11. — Heirs are not bound to the personal vows of testators, ibid., n. 12. — An heir is bound to pay the personal vows of the deceased, supposing the testator commands it of him, if he is a voluntary heir; not, however, if a necessary one, ibid., n. 13. — Either heir can be compelled, under penalty of privation of the inheritance and of excommunication, to pay the real vows of the testator, p. 200, n. 14. — Those vows are to be paid even if this burden was not imposed on the heir by the testator, or if he was unwilling to bind his heir to them, p. 201, n. 15. — Not, however, before entering upon the inheritance, nor, in the internal forum, beyond the means of the inheritance, though the heir be condemned to it by a judge for having omitted the inventory, ibid., n. 26 [=16]. — Law resting on presumption is twofold, p. 202, n. 17. — Yet the omission of the inventory must have been without fault to be apt to give rise to an injustice, p. 203, n. 18. — An heir is not bound, to the detriment of his legitimate portion, to pay the real vows, nor any debts of the testator, ibid., n. 20 [=19]. — An heir, if he cannot do it himself, can and must fulfil the real vows of the testator through another, p. 204, n. 21. — They cannot be commuted by a Confessor, ibid. — A monastery made heir by the profession of the one vowing is bound to the real vows of the professed, p. 205, n. 24. — Likewise when the one vowing, before profession, willed that they be fulfilled by the monastery left as heir, ibid., n. 25. — Real vows are to be paid before legacies, p. 206, n. 26. — Vows of greater moment are to be preferred to others, if the inheritance is insufficient to pay them all, p. 207, n. 27. — If there are several vows, and it is not established which was made first, the heir may choose those which please him more, ibid., n. 28. — If there are several heirs, each is bound to pay the testator's vows insofar as he is heir, p. 208, n. 29. — A donee is not strictly bound to carry out the vows of the donor, ibid., n. 30. — Yet he ought to carry them out out of religion, ibid. — A legatee is bound to fulfil the real vows of the one bequeathing, p. 209, n. 31. — The Prince, or the treasury, is bound to pay the real vows of the one vowing, p. 210, n. 32. — The one vowing ought to fulfil the vow as soon as he conveniently can, ibid., n. 33 [=2]. — This is explained, p. 211, n. 3 f. — A vow not fulfilled at the designated time you are bound to fulfil, unless it was bound to the time, ibid., n. 5. — A rule is handed down for knowing when it was so bound, p. 212, n. 6. — In doubt whether it was so bound, it is still to be fulfilled once the time has elapsed, p. 213, n. 7. — In real vows the time is set to urge the execution of the vow, ibid., n. 8. — The one vowing is not bound to anticipate the designated time, ibid., n. 9. — This is explained, ibid. — One who by his own malice withdraws a thing promised to God by vow is scarcely to be absolved except with the duty of substituting as much, if he can, ibid. — The one vowing is bound to fulfil a vow of whose making he doubts, p. 216, n. 4. — The opposite answer, from practical and speculative doubt, is rejected, p. 217, n. 6. — The rule "The condition of the possessor is the better" does not stand in the way, ibid., n. 7. — The laxity of the Salmanticenses, who free from fulfilling the vow even one in doubt who leans rather in favour of the vow, is rejected, ibid., n. 8 ff. — One certain of the vow, and doubtful of its execution, is bound to the execution, p. 228 [=218], n. 10. — One doubting whether he promised fifty or a hundred by vow is bound to a hundred, p. 219, n. 12 [=11]. — One who vowed to give the Church a chalice, but doubts whether a silver, gold, or other one, ought to give a silver or a gold one, bronze or copper being excluded, p. 119 [=219], n. 13. — One who vowed that he would not approach a woman, but doubts whether of fornicatory or conjugal approach, is bound only to abstain from the fornicatory, p. 210 [=220], n. 14. — One who doubts whether he made the vow before the age of seven is bound to keep the vow, ibid., n. 15. — As is one certain of the promise who doubts whether he had the intention of binding himself, ibid., n. 16. — One who made a vow extorted by fear ought in doubt to be presumed to have had the intention of binding himself, ibid., n. 17. — And he is bound to keep the vow, even though he doubts whether in the aforesaid case he used an amphibology or a mental restriction, p. 221, n. 18. — One doubting whether he made the vow in sleep or drunkenness ought to presume he made it in a time of sound mind, ibid., n. 19. — One making a vow when angry or disturbed, though once his anger is calmed he repents of the vow, is still bound by the vow, p. 222, n. 20. — As he is bound too while he doubts whether the matter of the vow is dishonourable or evil, ibid., n. 21. — If the intention of the one vowing is not established, the vow is to be interpreted in the more lenient sense, p. 223, n. 2. — This is explained, ibid. — A vow indefinite both as to quantity and as to quality is valid, p. 224, n. 3 f. — A vow is to be restricted according to the nature of the act, or contract, upon which it falls, ibid., n. 5. — A vow obliges, like an oath, while the things promised remain in the same state, p. 225, n. 6. — A vow, or oath, turning to another's detriment is to be restricted, so that it does no harm to another, ibid., n. 7. — One who vowed abstinence from wine to deprive himself of such a pleasure is not bound to abstain from beer; he is, however, bound if he vowed it to avoid drunkenness, p. 226, n. 3 [=2]. — The lax opinion of Fr. La Croix is disapproved, ibid. — For one who vows abstinence from wine for the end of temperance to sin mortally, it is not necessary that he drink as much wine as a temperate man is accustomed to drink at one meal, p. 227, n. 4 f. — The lax opinion of Castropalao, and of Sporer, who expressly contradicts himself, is reported, ibid. — As also that of La Croix, ibid., n. 5. — Their opinion is attacked, p. 228, n. 6. — In that vow there is smallness of matter, whose limits it is dangerous to assign, ibid., n. 7. — One who vowed to fast is bound to abstain from dairy products, at least in Lent, p. 229, n. 9. — One who vows to fast, with no number of days prefixed, satisfies the vow by fasting a single day, p. 230, n. 10. — One who vowed several fasts is to be presumed to have vowed them beyond the number two, ibid., n. 11. — One who vowed to fast for a whole month is more probably not bound to fast on Sundays, ibid., n. 12. — If someone vowed to fast on Sunday to tame his flesh and concupiscence, the vow is valid, ibid., n. 13. — One who vows a fast on bread and water violates the vow by drinking wine once, p. 231, n. 14. — It having been so violated, he cannot drink wine again and often on the day of the fast, ibid. — One who vows as above cannot eat pastries, commonly macaroni and vermicelli, ibid., n. 15. — One who vows as above, and cannot keep the vow, may break it, but as little as he can, p. 232, n. 16. — One who vowed to fast on all Fridays or Saturdays through the year is bound to fast also when the feast of the Lord's Nativity recurs on those days, ibid., n. 17. — One who makes two contrary vows ought to keep that which is better and more pleasing to God, p. 233, n. 18. — One who vowed to recite the Rosary satisfies if he recites a third part of it, unless something else is established of his intention, ibid., n. 19. — He does not, however, satisfy by reciting it only mentally, ibid. — One who vowed to hear Mass daily satisfies on holy days by hearing one, ibid., n. 20. — A girl who vowed virginity is bound to keep it after committing a first shameful act, unless she expressly intended to avoid only this, p. 234, n. 21. — One who vows virginity is bound to chastity, whatever Fr. Marín and Fr. Moya laxly say, ibid., n. 22. — One who vowed a pilgrimage absolutely satisfies by a pilgrimage on horseback, p. 235, n. 23. — Even if he undertakes the pilgrimage hired for a fee, or compelled by fear, or for the sake of other business, ibid., n. 24. — One who vows religion, or to receive sacred orders, is not bound to chastity by force of such a vow, ibid., n. 25. — One who vowed alms without determining the quantity: the quantity must be measured from the circumstances, p. 236, n. 26. — One who vowed wine for Masses to be celebrated is bound to give wine of at least moderately good quality, ibid., n. 27. — One who vowed to God one [printed "vinum"] of his silver vessels, or servants, or animals, may choose whichever he prefers, ibid., n. 28. — If only one of these things remains before the fulfilment of the vow, the one that remains is to be given, ibid. ; p. 237, n. 29 and 30. — If you promised a determinate thing to one of two Churches, but do not know to which you promised it, you may give it to whichever you prefer, ibid., n. 31. — It will be safer, however, to divide the thing between both Churches in proportion to the doubt, ibid., n. 32. — An error concerning the substance of the vow renders the vow invalid, p. 238, n. 2. — If you vowed some religious order, thinking the eating of meat lawful in it, when in fact it is not, you are still bound to enter it, or at least another, ibid. ; p. 239, n. 3. — An error concerning the end of the vow renders the vow invalid, ibid., n. 4. — Understand this if it concerns the intrinsic end, but not one extrinsic to the vow, or the occasional cause of the vow, ibid. ; p. 240, n. 5. — A rule is assigned for discerning whether circumstances belong to the substance of the vow or not, ibid., n. 6. — If, all things considered, it is doubtful whether they so belong, one must stand for the vow, ibid., n. 7. — A vow extorted by fear, whether from within, or from without even when brought to bear to extort the vow, is valid, p. 241 ff., n. 8 ff. — And indeed even by ecclesiastical law, the solemn vow excepted, p. 242 f., n. 10 ff. — The general conditions of an absolute vow, and the particular ones making a vow conditional, are assigned, p. 244, n. 2. — The particle "if" does not always make a vow conditional, ibid., n. 3. — A shameful condition against the substance of the vow makes it void, p. 245, n. 5. — A vow under a condition obliges once the whole of the condition is fulfilled, p. 246, n. 6. — No condition can be added to a vow once made, ibid. — For a vow to oblige, it is enough that its conditions be fulfilled equivalently, ibid., n. 7 f. — One who hinders the condition of his vow that does not depend on himself sins against the vow, p. 247, n. 9. — The one vowing is bound to await the coming of such a condition; nor can he hinder it by force, fraud, or entreaties, ibid. — If he does hinder it, he is still bound by the vow, p. 248 f., n. 10 f. — A penal vow is valid, p. 249, n. 12. — The transgression of a penal vow from invincible ignorance is free of fault; nor is any penalty to be undergone on its account, p. 250, n. 13. — One committing a mortal sin against a vow is not bound to the penalty if he is invincibly forgetful of the vow; otherwise if vincibly, ibid., n. 14. — If someone is absolved from a double penal vow, he is absolved also from the penalty which he has not yet incurred, ibid., n. 15. — Otherwise if he has already incurred it, ibid., n. 16. — In the petition for a dispensation both vows must be explained, ibid. — One who vowed to avoid, for example, gambling under such a penalty incurs it only once by gambling, p. 251, n. 17. — A vow cannot be made except by one endowed with reason, and concerning things which fall under the dominion of the one vowing, p. 274, n. 1 f. — The Church can pass laws by which some persons are rendered unfit to vow, p. 279, n. 9. — Bishops cannot vow the abdication of the Episcopate, or entrance into religion, without consulting the Supreme Pontiff, ibid., n. 10. — Nor likewise, without consulting him, a pilgrimage beyond the time for which they may be absent from their Churches, p. 280, n. 11. — Parish priests, or beneficiaries bound by the bond of residence, can vow religion, and enter it, without consulting the Bishop, p. 281, n. 12. — God cannot vow, ibid., n. 13. — Christ the Lord, and the Angels while wayfarers, could make vows, ibid. — A vow ceases to oblige when the whole proximate moving cause ceases, p. 282, n. 2. — The moving final cause is either proximate or remote; and the proximate is either motive or impulsive, ibid., n. 3. — A vow ceases when the proximate moving final cause ceases through the fault of the one vowing, p. 283, n. 4. — But it seems that the vow must be satisfied equivalently, ibid. — The bond of a vow is loosed by a notable change of things, p. 285, n. 5. — It is explained what change is to be called notable, ibid., n. 6. — A change in the thing promised, such that had the one vowing known it at the time the vow was made he would have abstained from the vow, more probably does not take away the bond of the vow, p. 285, n. 8. See: Commutation of vows; Dispensation of vows; Invalidation of vows; Religion, the religious state.