Chapter XIV — The causes why very many more recent writers really defend proscribed purely mental restrictions. Fr. Sánchez disapproves, beforehand, the opinion of later Casuists. More recent writers' opinions concerning oaths confirmed by restrictions are more dangerous than the ancients' doctrine on the licit use of lying. St. Augustine's invectives against restrictions

I. The first and chief cause why very many more recent Casuists defend purely mental restrictions, proscribed by the Church, is an excessive, and unbridled, love toward the authors who taught purely mental restrictions. Before, however, I proceed further, I attest that I do not wish to carp at anyone as less obsequious toward the Apostolic See. I confess that all, in voice, and, as they themselves believe, in reality, detest purely mental restrictions in the sense condemned by the Church. To this end, then, pertains what I am about to say: that I may show that the aforesaid more recent writers, at the very same time that they condemn purely mental restrictions, approve them, as it seems to me — saving a better judgment, and due obedience toward these same authors. These excuses I most often premise, and perhaps to the disgust of some, since, in an age most inclined to calumny, a free and sincere explanation of the truth is turned into a fault — either of calumniating, or of promoting one's own advantage — which may this always be far from me, especially in a case where eternal life or death is at stake. But to the matter.

II. The chief cause of deception, then, is this: that later writers teach that the Supreme Pontiffs, Alexander VII and Innocent XI, condemned the propositions as they lie — that is, as their words sound — but not as they are in the Authors who taught them. For they wish that the aforesaid propositions were adulterated by their denouncers; or, insofar as they are found in the Authors from whom they were excerpted, that they be tempered by their own qualifications. Thus commonly teach Fr. Antoine, Fr. Cárdenas, Fr. La Croix, Fr. Sporer (tract. 3, on the Decalogue, ch. 1, sect. 1, n. 111, p. 128). It is certain, however, and most manifest, that the propositions condemned concerning mental restrictions are taught by Fr. Sánchez (Bk. III, on the Decalogue, ch. 6, n. 15, 19, and following) in that same obvious sense in which they are condemned, without any qualification, or gloss. Nevertheless, as I have hinted, more recent writers contend that they were not condemned as they are in Sánchez, in Sánchez's propositions. Let us hear Fr. Viva, in his commentaries on the proposition... 26 and 27, n. 1: "Both propositions seemed to be taught by very many first-rank Doctors, in Diana, Vol. II, tract. 15, resol. 25, and Vol. III, tract. 6, resol. 3, and in Sánchez, Bk. III, ch. 6, n. 15 and 19, and not a few cite as many as fifty Doctors in favor of both propositions. But, if the mind of most of these, along with Sánchez himself, is attentively inspected, and if attention is paid to the cases in which they teach these amphibologies to be lawful, and their foundations, it will clearly appear that they do not wish purely mental restrictions to be licit, which the Pontiff condemns as lies, but only restrictions not purely mental, or equivocations, and, at most, a material locution."

III. Resting on this fallacious doctrine, the Jansenists have, for many years past, vexed and disturbed the Church. And they too, outright, deny that the five propositions are condemned as they lie, but assert that they are found in Jansenius, and that he taught them in the condemned sense — most obstinately, and with fervor, they deny this. If this crafty escape of the Jansenists is execrated by Fr. Viva, and by all of us truly disapproved — why does he have recourse to it, so that Sánchez, with the other Casuists, may be defended? Whoever denies that the condemned propositions concerning mental restrictions are found in Sánchez, in the very terms, down to a single syllable, denies that the sun shines at midday. What flows from this doctrine of Fr. Viva's? The greatest, and most extreme, evil. For, while he denies that the condemned propositions are found in Sánchez, he defends the doctrine of Fr. Sánchez as immune from all censure. From this it is inferred that the Pontiff really condemned nothing — since purely mental restrictions, as Sánchez, with the other Theologians, teaches them, are not condemned. I ask, then: why is the Church so solicitous to prove that the five famous propositions are found in Jansenius, and are condemned in Jansenius's sense? At first glance it seems to matter little whether they are found in Jansenius, and whether they too are condemned, as they are found in the aforesaid Book of Jansenius, provided that, as they lie, they are rejected by all as condemned. But, although at first sight this seems so, if the matter is more deeply inspected, we shall find that a deadly poison lurks under this color. For, since the aforesaid propositions are really found in the Book of Jansenius, if they were not condemned as they are in that same Book, and in the sense which they present in that Book, the followers of Jansenius could freely teach, defend, and preach them. And, if it were objected to them that they are condemned, they would reply that they are condemned as they lie, not in Jansenius's sense; and that they would defend them in Jansenius's sense, not as they lie. And thus the whole pontifical institution would be futile, and the Supreme Pontiffs would have condemned nothing, and the deadly plague of a pernicious doctrine would soon infect the entire Church.

IV. All these evils follow from the doctrine of Fr. Viva, and of others, who defend that the Casuists' propositions are not condemned as they are found in Fr. Sánchez, in Fr. Tamburini, in Fr. Escobar, in Fr. Bauny, in Fr. Castropalao, in Fr. La Croix — since, though it is on the one hand most certain that the condemned propositions are taught by such Doctors, on the other hand the commentators teach that they are not condemned in the sense in which they are in these authors' Books; from which it follows that both the Casuists, and the commentators, freely whitewash purely mental restrictions, although they call them not purely mental, and defend all the cases which are governed by the doctrine of the condemned propositions. But, since we now handle a controversy of fact, which cannot easily be evaded, it is worth undertaking a labor, lest I incur the mark of prolixity. I ask, then, of Fr. Viva, whether any theologians ever taught purely mental restrictions, in the last degree of certainty, even though this might undergo some cavils. He will not dare to deny this. For the Pontiffs did not condemn the propositions defended by the Turks, the Indians, the Japanese; but those which Catholic Theologians upheld. Those purely mental restrictions, then, which Catholic Theologians taught, were condemned. But of these Theologians, no one taught them more openly than Sánchez himself, Tamburini, and others, from whose Books they were extracted. The doctrine of these Theologians, then, in this matter, is to be disapproved. But, this argumentation aside, so that it may become clear to all that what Fr. Viva writes is evidently false, the doctrine of one of the cited Authors must be transcribed here.

V. Fr. Thomas Sánchez (Bk. III, on the Decalogue, ch. 6, n. 11) proposes the question concerning restrictions not purely mental, and purely mental, in these words: "The later difficulty is, when there is danger, or is it unlawful, to use some amphibology in an oath, to signify some truth according to the swearer's own mind, but according to a different sense which the hearers accept — some Doctors, in this matter, hold that this lacks lying, and consequently is licit for a just cause, whenever the words used are, from their own signification, and the common use of hearers, or at least the use of the learned, ambiguous, and thus admit both senses; but not so, when they are not such, but are twisted to a true sense from some additional condition conceived in the swearer's mind: for they say this is always a lie, and consequently mortal perjury, in any event whatsoever, unless it is lawful to lie, etc." He reports the arguments of those who defend that purely mental restrictions are lies; then he proposes the first rule, for ambiguous words, concerning which there is no difficulty; this set aside, I transcribe the second.

VI. "The second rule is: Words can also be used without lying, although from their own signification they are not ambiguous, nor have that sense, if really, the circumstances of place, time, persons, and manner of questioning being attended to, they make that sense according to the questioner's intention, which the respondent conceives in his words." There you have restrictions not purely mental, when, that is, the words, though not ambiguous absolutely taken, nonetheless, from the circumstances of place, time, and person, take on a sense, and constitute an external restriction. This is established by examples, etc. In the following rule, however, which is third in order, he treats restrictions purely mental at greater length. And from this third rule, set out under n. 15, is extracted the proposition condemned as 26. This, then, must be transcribed.

VII. "The third rule is: Words can also be used without lying, although by their own signification they are not ambiguous, nor admit a true sense either of themselves, or from the circumstances occurring, but rather yield a true sense from something retained in the mind of the speaker, whatever that may be — as" (here begins the condemned proposition) "if someone, whether alone, or in the presence of others, whether questioned, or of his own accord, whether for the sake of recreation, or for any other purpose, swears that he did not do something which he really did, understanding within himself some other thing which he did not do, or some other way than that in which he did it, or whatever else true is added, he does not really lie, nor is he a perjurer." Here ends the condemned proposition.

VIII. Who is so shameless as to dare deny that the condemned proposition is contained in Sánchez? Or who could thrust upon us that Sánchez betrays another sense; nor can his doctrine be purged of this proposition, since not a single word can be found there by which it might be freed from error! Indeed, Sánchez prefixes a principle so false to the condemned proposition, that it excludes any interpretation whatsoever. For he establishes that words can be used, even if they are not ambiguous, nor from occurring circumstances, but from something added, retained in the mind of the speaker, whatever that may be. This principle prefixed, he presents an example, which is that if someone, whether alone, etc. Let Fr. Viva turn over, and turn over again, Sánchez's entire disputation: when he finds a word that tempers the error of the condemned doctrine, then I too will free Sánchez's doctrine from censure. Wherefore the sincerity of Fr. Cárdenas is to be praised, who, dissert. 19, ch. 1, candidly confesses that Sánchez taught the opinion of mental restriction, with several others. I do not approve, however, that this same Cárdenas afterward uses Sánchez's doctrine in explaining the aforesaid restrictions. Wherefore he must be read cautiously, as we shall warn below from Fr. La Croix.

IX. So far is it from being the case that the proposition condemned by Innocent XI, as it lies, differs in any way from the doctrine of Fr. Sánchez, that the error is recognized even more clearly and openly in his own words. For from those things which precede the condemned proposition, it is most evidently established that the discourse there concerns sheer, pure mental restriction, such that no room is left for any interpretation, or violence. From those things which follow the aforesaid proposition, it is likewise evidently gathered that Sánchez defends his purely mental restrictions, not in passing, but professedly, and at length: for he adduces those reasons, or rather paradoxes, into the open; and he himself, the case having been set out... , defends this condemned doctrine, which, if admitted, human society is entirely undone. First, he adduces various points drawn from the Books of sacred Scripture, which Cassian used to defend lies. Then he presents his own reasons, some of which I will transcribe here. Third, he says, it is proved: "Since to lie is to go against the mind, external words behave merely materially with respect to the reason of a lie, and it matters not at all whether they are true or false in themselves, but attention must be paid to the last mind alone... Is this, perhaps, the tempering by which the error of the condemned doctrine is corrected? Whenever the speaker does not have the intention of lying, this suffices, so that he does not lie, whether the words by which he expresses his conceptions be true or false." If this doctrine is admitted, what certainty shall we have in Scripture, in the Fathers, in pacts, in treaties, in commerce? By this same reasoning, not long ago, it was upheld that it is lawful to burn incense, to offer sacrifices, to slay victims, to erect temples and altars to idols. But let us review what follows: "Again, it is confirmed: since those external words, insofar as they are uttered by the swearer, signify not what others perceive, but what he himself wishes — although not adequately signifying, yet inadequately, in that they do not signify, and express, whatever the swearer has in mind. Fourth, if someone, with a loud voice, so that he might be perceived by bystanders, said something which, as it sounds, would be false, continuing with a lowered voice (not perceptible by others) an addition, by which the proposition would be rendered true, he would not lie; for the whole truth or falsity of a proposition contributes nothing at all to whether the whole, or only part, of it is perceived by others." The same reasoning holds if that addition is retained SOLELY IN THE MIND. Does this reasoning temper, or moderate, the laxity of the condemned doctrine? Is not that principle solid — concerning a lowered voice, not perceptible by others, which closes off that addition by which the proposition is rendered true, which he uses to defend the licit use of that restriction which is retained in his own mind? "Fifth, because it is lawful to use ambiguous words without lying, although, according to the express question, the words do not admit that sense in the external response, and expressly exclude all amphibology, conceiving another sense in the mind, as we shall say from almost everyone's mind in the last number: why, then, will it be a lie to use words in themselves not ambiguous, if from a condition retained in the mind they produce a true sense? Sixth, because a lie exists not only when someone intends to express in words what he does not have in mind, but also when he acts as if by deed, as St. Thomas teaches (II-II, q. 111, art. 1): 'Nor does he lie who does something, for example, directing his steps toward some part to which he does not intend to go; he does not wish to signify that he has the intention of going there, even though those who see this conceive it, but only wishes to conceal his intention of going elsewhere, as St. Thomas teaches, in that same article, ad 4.' Similarly, then, one does not lie who does not intend, by whatever words, to signify something that is not, but only intends to conceal some truth from the hearers, intending to say what is true according to his own sense."

X. These are the reasons by which Sánchez attempts to establish his own opinion concerning purely mental restrictions. Is there anything in any of these that mitigates the sense of the condemned proposition? I omit some, for the sake of brevity; but I pledge my faith that I have omitted not a single word that could temper, or mitigate, the aforesaid laxity. It is not opportune now to show how undeservedly, and by what a slender thread, he stretches St. Thomas to confirm his own opinion — whose words, which he has in the place cited, it suffices to transcribe: "A man lies in words, when he signifies what is not, but not when he keeps silent about what is, that at some time is; so too a man is likewise a dissembler, when by other signs of deed, or thing, he signifies something that is not, but not when he omits to signify what is."

XI. Nor shall I prolong my discourse to impugn these reasons of Sánchez's, since I have already done so above. I recount them now only for this: to show that this author really taught the propositions proscribed by the Church, and proved them by reasons which not only do not mitigate, but increase, the proscribed error. For if the intention of the speaker suffices to remove the malice of a lie; if external words behave merely materially with respect to the reason of a lie, and it matters not at all whether they are true or false — as this author contends — no one, indeed, unless excessively and impotently prejudiced by partisanship, would dare to excuse this author's doctrine from the Church's censure.

XII. I could further confirm what I have said, by transcribing Fr. Sánchez's responses to the reasons by which Cajetan, Sotus, and other Theologians disapprove purely mental restrictions; but these I omit for brevity's sake. Sánchez's Book lies open to all. Let anyone make trial for himself, if I have exposed anything less than sincerely. I transcribe only a few words from the response to the first argument of Cajetan, Sotus, and others, who inferred from purely mental restrictions countless absurdities, and the destruction of human commerce. Sánchez says, then, in the place cited: "Let those absurdities be admitted, which would indeed follow, if we said that this method may be used indifferently. Indeed, this is most useful for concealing many things which need to be concealed, and could not be concealed without a lie, unless this method were licit. For words ambiguous in themselves are not always to be found." The response, too, to the third argument confirms what I have proposed. "To the third it must be denied that this does not conform to the mind; for the mind does not intend to say what the words externally sound, but to utter them in the sense truly conceived in the mind."

XIII. See how manifestly Fr. Sánchez himself confutes his own adversaries. He candidly confesses that many things cannot be concealed by external amphibology alone. Wherefore, unless the method of purely mental restriction is licit, many things cannot be concealed without a lie. Why? Because words in themselves ambiguous are not always to be found — which is most true. It can be added that hearers most frequently reject ambiguous words, or press the respondent with so many questions that no room at all is left for external equivocation. Wherefore Fr. Sánchez concludes that the use of purely mental restriction must be admitted, nor need lying be feared: because the mind does not intend to say what the words externally sound, but according to the sense retained within the mind. He assigns sufficient causes for employing such restrictions, in the place cited, n. 19, in these words: "The just cause, however, of using these amphibologies is whenever it is necessary, or useful, for the safety of the body, honor, protecting family property; or for any other act of virtue, such that the concealment of truth is then judged expedient, and worthy of pursuit." This is the very proposition 27 condemned by Innocent XI, without the variation of a single syllable.

XIV. From all this, two things are most clearly gathered. First: since the Church condemns these propositions in that obvious sense which they present, and Fr. Sánchez teaches them in this same obvious sense which they present of themselves — for he has nothing in that whole disputation by which to correct the aforesaid doctrine; indeed the reasons he presents to defend the said propositions breathe still greater laxity — no one, then, unless he wishes to be blind at midday, can rightfully thrust upon us that these same propositions are condemned as they lie, but not as they are in the authors from whom they were excerpted, as Fr. Gabriel Daniel writes in the appendix to his dissertation on mental restriction, and as Fr. Viva, and others, confirm. Second: Fr. Sánchez himself confuted his adversaries — since, he says, external restrictions, or ambiguous words determinable by an external sign, do not always occur; therefore recourse must be had to purely internal restriction: and Fr. Viva himself uses this doctrine, as we have seen, for rustics, or men of less sharp wit. "When, however, a convenient equivocation, or external restriction, does not occur, if the cause is grave, rustics can, by the use of twofold knowledge easily at hand, conceal the truth." Do you see? When rustics, and consequently craftsmen, and other similarly common men, do not know how to form an equivocation, or an external restriction — all use that restriction, obvious to any common person — namely, of twofold knowledge, or "I do not know, so as to say it," "I do not know it as manifestable" — which could be said in fewer words: when equivocation or external restriction does not occur, use the internal one. And this will be plainer still, if it is noted that Fr. Viva excludes every external restriction: for he excludes equivocation, when a convenient equivocation does not occur; he likewise rejects an external restriction, which either through words in themselves ambiguous, or through words determined by external sign, or exterior circumstance, betray an internal sense. All these external locutions having been excluded, he has recourse to the use of internal knowledge, incommunicable and communicable, that is, to internal restriction, since he has already rejected the external as insufficient. But every sheerly internal restriction is proscribed. Therefore, etc. That this author should be proved to defend the propositions condemned by the Church seems to indicate nothing else than either simulation, or a will to detract from a man most deserving in Theology.

XV. You will object: To what end does so much effort tend, that Fr. Sánchez taught the proscribed opinions — for it matters nothing whether this or that author taught the proscribed opinions, provided the condemned doctrine is rejected. Response: I do not doubt that this can be objected by some less experienced in the theological faculty. But I ask of these: why is the Church so solicitous to show that the five propositions are found in Jansenius, and in Jansenius's own sense, to be condemned? Certainly for no other reason than that the proscribed doctrine, as found in the Book from which it was excerpted, might really be detested by the faithful; the condemnation would be futile, once it is admitted that the five proscribed propositions are not, as they babble, contained in Jansenius, at least in that sense in which they are proscribed: for then it would always be possible, as they babble, to hold that Jansenius's teaching is detested — and by this way they could, with impunity, instill Jansenius's infected doctrine into the minds of his followers. This evasion the Roman See wisely blocked, so that it might guard its faithful against the condemned doctrine. Now, if we approve this cunning path of proceeding in the Jansenists, why should it not equally be disapproved in others, in a similar cause? That the two propositions, namely 26 and 27, proscribed by Innocent XI, are found in the Book of Fr. Sánchez, has been most evidently demonstrated; and I do not know whether any similar fact could be more evidently proven. This established, the response is now clear: that I, not with the intent of detracting from Fr. Sánchez, but with the desire of freeing the faithful from the danger of embracing the proscribed doctrine, have shown that the propositions condemned by Sánchez are found in Fr. Sánchez's Book. I venerate Fr. Sánchez with the utmost deference, as a man most eminently versed in Theology and in the sacred Canons, in suspicion, piety, and probity of morals adorned; but I add that in this he innocently erred; I add, not that he erred alone, but that he erred with very many other, learned, and most weighty Theologians. He erred in defending an opinion which was then a common one, and perhaps a truly probable one. No fame, then, or honor, of so great a Theologian is diminished, because he taught an opinion which he himself reckoned probable, and which other Theologians upheld. To this, then, our cares are devoted: that we call back the faithful from the condemned doctrine — since, if readers, deceived by the interpretations of Fr. Viva, of Daniel, and of others, reduce to practice what Fr. Sánchez teaches concerning mental restrictions, they most certainly, as I indeed judge, embrace a doctrine proscribed by the Church; since it is most certain that the aforesaid propositions, condemned as they lie, are taught in the aforesaid Book without any correction. And... that this is truer than what we take away is clear from Fr. Viva himself, who, to defend that the proscribed propositions are not found in Fr. Sánchez, and in other authors cited by him, in the sense of the proscription, really teaches, as we have proved, the doctrine of purely mental restrictions.

XVI. What has finally compelled me to prolong my discourse is the great gravity of the cause we handle. If Augustine wrote two whole Books, so as to treat, as its dignity required, the controversy concerning the sole officious lie, which did not exceed the bounds of venial sin — certainly my prolixity will not be condemned, who am treating not merely of a lie, but of most grave perjury; not merely of a lie uttered for a neighbor's or one's own life, or the obtaining of eternal salvation, but of a lie, and of perjury perpetrated, for honor, for family goods — that is, for perishable wares to be guarded — a most grave cause we handle. Wherefore, with Augustine, I would say: if my question were concerning the sole officious lie, I would by no means have drawn out so long a discourse — especially if, according to Cassian's limits, men used a lie only in the extreme case of protecting human life: not that I approve a lie even in such an event (as Augustine says, Book Against Lying, ch. 18): "Human compensatory sins so disturb the soul, that they are even thought worthy of praise, and rather are said to have been rightly done." I would say to the adversaries: if you wish to employ mental restrictions for the sake of preserving human life, or for conferring sacred baptism on a dying faithful man, I would perhaps pass over them, though unwillingly, or would not be so vehemently moved. But, since at present we handle the cause of a lie confirmed by oath, all reason demands that we spare neither words nor prolixity, so as to persuade that perjuries, so far as can be done, are to be fled. I would say, then, with Augustine, in the Book cited, ch. 21: "Either, then, lies are to be avoided by right living, or confessed by repenting, but not to be increased by abounding, and dared and taught." But this seems fitting to one who thinks that whence relief may come to an endangered man, whatever lies of any kind may be chosen, provided only we obtain that no cause compel us to perjure ourselves, and to blaspheme. Let us judge these crimes at least equal to, or certainly not less than, debaucheries.

XVII. I close this chapter with other words of St. Augustine, which fit our own most unhappy times in a wondrous manner — in which not morals are bent to laws, but laws to morals. Not only are perjuries perpetrated; but, says Augustine in the cited Book, ch. 18, "there are found, in these matters, learned men, who even fix rules, and set bounds, of when one ought, and when one ought not, to perjure himself. O, whence come the fountains of tears? What shall we do? Whither shall we go? Where shall we hide ourselves from the wrath of truth, if we not only neglect to guard against it, but even dare, besides, to teach perjuries?" Let the assertors and defenders of lying see, then, at least what kind, or kinds, of lying they concede to be justifiable. At least let them grant that one must not lie in the worship of God; at least let them contain themselves from perjuries and blasphemies. At least, where the name of God, where God is witness, where the sacrament of God is interposed, where discourse of divine religion is uttered, or held — let no one lie, let no one praise it, let no one teach it, or command it.