Front matter — Concina, Theologia Christiana III
Contents (as printed)
¶1.
- INDEX of the Books, Dissertations, Chapters, Paragraphs, and Questions contained in this Tome (translated for this site from the Latin of the print (ed.); where a line repeats a heading or Question of the text in the same words, the English of the text is kept)
- BOOK THREE: ON THE DECALOGUE
- DISSERTATION I: On adoration, and the worship with which God and the Saints are to be honoured
- Proem — p. 1
- Chapter I. What adoration is; its division, and the precept, are explained — p. 2
- Chapter II. The worship of latria is owed to God alone, one and triune, and to Christ the Lord — p. 5
- Question I. Can Christ the Lord, as man, be adored with the adoration of latria? — p. 5
- Question I. Is the humanity of Christ, considered as abstracted from the divine Word, to be adored with the worship of latria? — p. 6
- Question III. Is it lawful in practice to adore the humanity of Christ with the adoration of dulia, on account of the created perfections with which it shines? — p. 6
- Question IV. Was the body of Christ, during the three days of his death, to be adored with the worship of latria? — p. 6
- Question V. Is the host elevated by the Priest in the Mass to be adored absolutely, or under an added condition? — p. 7
- Question VI. Is the flesh, or blood, which sometimes appears in a consecrated host by miracle, to be adored with the worship of latria? — p. 7
- Chapter III. On the worship with which the Cross of Christ, and the other instruments of his most sacred Passion, can and ought to be worshipped — p. 8
- Question I. Is the Cross of Christ to be adored with the worship of latria? — p. 8
- Question II. Are the other inanimate instruments of Christ's most sacred Passion, such as the nails, the lance, the cords, the scourges, the crown, the reed, the sponge, to be adored with the worship of latria? — p. 8
- Chapter IV. On the adoration owed to the Blessed Virgin Mary, the Angels, and the Saints — p. 10
- Chapter V. On the worship with which the images of the Most Holy Trinity, of Christ the Lord, and of the Saints are to be honoured — p. 16
- Chapter VI. On the worship of relics — p. 21
- Question I. What is meant by the term "relics"? — p. 22
- Question II. Is it lawful to adore the worms into which the bodies of the Saints decompose? — p. 22
- Question III. What certainty is required in order that relics be venerated as belonging to some particular Saint? — p. 23
- Question IV. Which relics may a bishop approve, so that they may be publicly exposed to worship? — p. 24
- Question V. Is it lawful to wear authentic relics suspended from the neck? — p. 24
- Question VI. Does one who steals sacred relics out of devotion sin? — p. 24
- Question VII. Is it lawful for a prince waging a just war to carry off relics from the cities he has taken, and transfer them elsewhere? — p. 25
- Question VIII. Is the sale and purchase of relics lawful? — p. 25
- Question IX. Is it a sin of simony to expose sacred relics to be viewed, so that more generous alms may thereby be offered? — p. 25
- Question X. Is any penalty established against thieves of relics? — p. 26
- Question XI. Is it lawful to venerate the wax Agnus Dei? — p. 27
- Question XII. Is it forbidden, under pain of excommunication, to paint, sell, or touch these Lambs? — p. 27
- Question XIII. What veneration is owed to priestly vestments, sacred vessels, and churches? — p. 28
- Question XIV. How may chalices, corporals, and other sacred things be touched by the laity? — p. 28
- Question XV. Can sacred things lawfully be converted to profane uses? — p. 29
- Question XVI. May sacred vessels, once broken, lawfully be sold? — p. 30
- Question XVII. Can profane things be transformed for sacred use? — p. 31
- DISSERTATION II: On the vices opposed to religion, or on superstition and its species
- Chapter I. Definition and division of superstition — p. 32
- Question I. What sin is superstition arising from an undue manner of worshipping God? — p. 34
- Question II. Is it a grave sin to mix profane and shameful things into divine offices? — p. 34
- Question III. Does one who proposes false relics for adoration, or preaches fabricated miracles, sin mortally? — p. 34
- Question IV. Is it a mortal sin to abstain from meat, and to fast, on a Sunday? — p. 34
- Chapter II. Several cases are brought under examination, in which it is declared whether superstition lies hidden — p. 35
- Chapter III. On idolatry, whose notion, and the gravity of its malice, are set forth — p. 38
- Chapter IV. What divination is, and how many its species are — p. 41
- Question I. What future things can demons foretell? — p. 41
- Question II. In what manner do demons teach their diviners? — p. 42
- Question III. Do diviners always invoke the help of demons by an explicit pact? — p. 42
- Question IV. Are all the aforesaid species of divination morally distinct, and to be explained in confession? — p. 44
- Question V. Does divination by an explicit pact with a demon differ in moral species from that carried out by a tacit pact? — p. 44
- Question VI. Is divination by a pact, whether explicit or tacit, a mortal crime? — p. 46
- Chapter V. On judicial astrology, or divination by the stars — p. 47
- Question I. Is it superstitious to divine free future events, not with certainty, but probably? — p. 48
- Question II. Is a prediction that is merely conjectural free of superstition? — p. 48
- Question III. Can astrologers lawfully predict a person's temperament, inclination, and bodily characteristics from the sign of his nativity? — p. 50
- Question IV. Is it lawful to ask that hidden treasures, underground waters, or corpses lying hidden beneath tombs be revealed by those who boast of knowledge of such things? — p. 51
- Question V. Are diviners bound to restore the price received for their divination? — p. 51
- Chapter VI. On divination by dreams — p. 53
- Question I. Is it lawful to divine the future by dreams? — p. 54
- Question II. Is the observation of natural dreams lawful? — p. 54
- Question III. Is it lawful to divine free future things from dreams? — p. 54
- Question IV. Does one who, on the occasion of dreams, orders his conduct and business, sin? — p. 55
- Question V. When dreams are borne out by events, are they then to be observed? — p. 55
- Chapter VII. On divination by augury, omens, and other such observations of external things — p. 56
- Question I. Is it lawful to foretell the future from the song, flight, and movement of birds? — p. 56
- Question II. Is it lawful to foretell future things from human words uttered by chance, or from other fortuitous events? — p. 57
- Question III. Is it superstition to foretell the future from the members of the human body? — p. 57
- Question IV. Do those sin gravely who consult the Egyptians, commonly called Gypsies, that they may announce good or bad fortune to them from the showing of the hands? — p. 58
- Chapter VIII. On divination carried out by the use of lots — p. 58
- Question I. Is it lawful to use divisory lots in the election to secular dignities? — p. 59
- Question II. Is the use of lots lawful in the election to ecclesiastical benefices? — p. 59
- Question III. Is an election to ecclesiastical benefices carried out by lot null, and not merely unlawful? — p. 60
- Question IV. Is the use of lots lawful for settling disputes over ecclesiastical property and benefices? — p. 60
- Question V. Is a consultative casting of lots lawful? — p. 62
- Question VI. Why do sleepers divine more than those who are awake? — p. 63
- Question VII. Why do fools and simpletons divine more easily than those endowed with sound mind? — p. 63
- Question VIII. Why do men close to death often divine the future? — p. 64
- Chapter IX. On vain observance — p. 65
- Chapter X. On natural magic and its effects — p. 68
- Question I. Is natural magic lawful? — p. 68
- Question II. By what reason and way may natural magic be distinguished from the superstitious kind? — p. 69
- Question III. When it is doubtful whether an effect proceeds from a natural cause or from a superstitious art, what is to be presumed? — p. 69
- Question IV. What is to be said of those called "healers"? — p. 71
- Question V. Is a charm ("ensalmus") to be reputed lawful? — p. 75
- Question VI. Is there a natural power by which someone can bewitch by a look alone? — p. 74
- Chapter XI. On superstitious magic, or on sorcery — p. 76
- Question I. Is it lawful to cure a sorcery by another sorcery? — p. 77
- Question II. Is it lawful to ask a sorcerer to remove a sorcery, when it is established for you that he can remove such a sorcery by lawful means? — p. 78
- Question III. Is it lawful to destroy the signs of sorcery? — p. 80
- Question IV. Must a sorcerer who has handed a demon a document signed with his own blood redeem it, in order to be able to do true penance? — p. 81
- Chapter XII. On witches, sorcerers, and "striges" — p. 82
- Question I. Why are women more given to sorcery than men? — p. 82
- Question II. Why do old women, rather than younger ones, devote themselves to enchantments and sorcery? — p. 83
- Question III. Why does God permit witches, or "striges," to harm infants and the young rather than adults? — p. 83
- Question IV. Are "striges" really carried from place to place, or does this movement occur only through a fantastic illusion? — p. 83
- Question V. Can a demon change witch-women, or men, into a cat, a weasel, a hare, or other beasts? — p. 85
- Question VI. Can demons bring witches through closed doors into houses and the bedchambers of their lovers? — p. 86
- Question VII. In what place are the gatherings of witches with demons celebrated, and what do they do at such gatherings? — p. 87
- Chapter XIII. On the penalties established against witches, sorcerers, and all who enter into some pact, explicit or tacit, with demons — p. 89
- Chapter I. Definition and division of superstition — p. 32
- DISSERTATION I: On adoration, and the worship with which God and the Saints are to be honoured
¶2.
- DISSERTATION III: On tempting God, on sacrilege, and on blasphemy
- Chapter I. What the tempting of God is — p. 91
- Question I. Is it a light fault to tempt God when the matter is light? — p. 92
- Question II. Does one tempt God who strives to make his innocence manifest by the trial of red-hot iron, or of boiling water? — p. 93
- Question III. Does one tempt God who, in order to convert a heretic, offers a miracle to be wrought by God in confirmation of Catholic truth? — p. 94
- Chapter II. On sacrilege, and its species — p. 95
- Chapter III. On blasphemy: what it is, and how many kinds there are — p. 99
- Chapter IV. On the gravity of blasphemy, and on blasphemies arising from habit and from anger — p. 101
- Question I. Is blasphemy, by its very kind, a mortal sin? — p. 101
- Question II. Is blasphemy the greatest of all sins? — p. 102
- Question III. Does one who blasphemes out of an inveterate custom and wicked habit sin? — p. 103
- Question IV. Does one who blasphemes inadvertently, and who is so habitually disposed that even were he to notice, he would still blaspheme, sin mortally? — p. 103
- Question V. Is blasphemy uttered in jest a deadly sin? — p. 104
- Chapter V. On the various formulas of blaspheming against God and the Saints — p. 105
- Question I. Are such expressions as these blasphemies: "I do not believe in God," "I deny God, the Cross, the Gospels, the sacraments, if it is not so"? — p. 106
- Question II. Is one who swears falsely a blasphemer? — p. 107
- Question III. Does one who, in a single fit of anger, utters several blasphemies, commit one sin, or several? — p. 107
- Chapter VI. On the penalties established against blasphemers, and on their judges — p. 107
- Question I. Is one who hears blasphemers bound to denounce them to a judge? — p. 108
- Question II. How ought a confessor to conduct himself with blasphemers? — p. 108
- Question III. What penance ought a confessor to impose on penitent blasphemers? — p. 109
- Question IV. Ought those held by a habit of blaspheming to be absolved before they have departed from the wicked habit? — p. 109
- Chapter I. What the tempting of God is — p. 91
- BOOK FOUR: ON THE DECALOGUE
- DISSERTATION I: On the vow
- Proem — p. 111
- Chapter I. The errors of the heretics against vows — p. 112
- Chapter II. Condemned opinions, and the laxer ones of certain more recent writers, are reviewed — p. 115
- Chapter III. The notion of the vow. What are its conditions, that it may be lawful and valid? — p. 117
- Question I. How much deliberation is required for a vow? — p. 119
- Question II. Must sudden vows be fulfilled? — p. 119
- Question III. Does one who rashly makes a vow of great moment sometimes commit a mortal sin? And is a vow made with such a sin valid? — p. 120
- Question IV. When a vow concerns a light matter, and obliges only under venial sin, does half-full deliberation suffice? — p. 121
- Question V. Does virtual deliberation, or liberty, suffice for a vow? — p. 121
- Question VI. Is a firm resolve a vow, or does it induce some obligation? — p. 122
- Question VII. Does the nature of a vow lie in a promise? And how does this promise differ from a resolve? — p. 123
- Question VIII. What resolve is required for a vow to be valid? — p. 123
- Chapter IV. The last part of the definition of a vow, "a promise made to God," is explained, that it may become plain in what sense vows are said to be made to the Saints and to Prelates — p. 126
- Chapter V. On the matter subject to a vow. The true meaning of the phrase "of a better good" is set forth. The vow not to marry is declared valid. The opinion of Leander and others, who teach that a vow of chastity becomes null on account of supervening temptations and falls, is refuted as lax and improbable — p. 129
- Question I. Can things prescribed by human or divine law be the matter of a vow? — p. 129
- Question II. Is the promise made at the reception of baptism, to renounce the devil and his pomps, a vow? — p. 130
- Question III. How is that phrase, "of a better good," to be understood? — p. 130
- Question IV. Is a vow concerning matter opposed to the counsels valid? — p. 131
- Question V. Is a vow to contract marriage valid? — p. 132
- Question VI. Does one who, tormented by the stings of concupiscence, vows to contract marriage, in order to avoid fornication and other acts of lust, vow validly? — p. 132
- Question VII. Can a married person, hindered from asking the debt by a vow, or incest, or spiritual kinship, ask it whenever he is agitated by vehement stings of the flesh, lest he be exposed to the danger of falling into grave sins of lust? — p. 135
- Question VIII. Is a vow of chastity, of religion, or of not marrying, made by one for whom marriage would be more salutary on account of incontinence, valid, and does it prevent marriage from being lawfully entered? Likewise, do such vows, once made, become null on account of supervening vexations of lust? — p. 136
- Question IX. Is a vow not to vow valid? — p. 146
- Question X. Is a vow not to seek a dispensation, commutation, or annulment valid? — p. 146
- Question XI. Can those who make a vow not to seek a commutation seek a dispensation, or an annulment? — p. 148
- Chapter VI. Indifferent, useless, vicious, and impossible things are not the matter of a vow. Various little questions are explained — p. 149
- Question I. Is a vow of a thing whose execution is a sin valid? — p. 149
- Question II. Is a vow to run bulls in honour of some Saint valid? — p. 153
- Question III. Is a vow whereby women vow not to comb their hair on such-and-such a day valid? — p. 154
- Question IV. Is a vow of nocturnal vigils, and of not going to sea, valid? — p. 154
- Question V. Is a vow concerning a good thing, made for a wicked end, valid? — p. 154
- Question VI. Is a vow to offer God a good gift on account of an evil effect already obtained, or to be obtained, valid? For example: "I vow to celebrate so many Masses, to give so many alms, if I come off victor from an unjust lawsuit, war, or game; if I obtain a benefice simoniacally; if I kill my brother, so as to acquire his inheritance; if I am not caught in theft or homicide; if I beget a son in adultery or concubinage" — p. 158
- Question VII. Is a vow of a good thing made for an indifferent end, and for the end of obtaining temporal things, valid? — p. 163
- Question VIII. What sin does one commit who promises by vow to God what is evil? — p. 164
- Question IX. Would one who made a vow to sin mortally, without the intention of fulfilling it, sin mortally? — p. 164
- Question X. Is an impossible thing the matter of a vow? — p. 165
- Question XI. Is a vow partly of an impossible thing, partly of a possible one, or of matter partly fit and partly unfit, valid? — p. 165
- Question XII. Is one who vowed to build a church, if he cannot build the whole, bound to build part of it, or to construct a chapel in another church, or to offer some other thing to the Church? — p. 165
- Question XIII. When a vow concerns mixed matter, partly good, and partly evil, to what is the one vowing bound? — p. 168
- Question XIV. Is a vow made disjunctively, one part of which is fit and the other unfit, valid; say, when you vow either religion or theft? — p. 168
- Question XV. Is a vow to go to Rome barefoot valid? — p. 169
- Question XVI. Is a vow not to gamble valid? — p. 169
- Question XVII. Is a vow never to sin valid? — p. 171
- Question XVIII. Is a vow to avoid all venial sins valid? — p. 172
- Question XIX. What is to be said of these two vows? — p. 174
- Chapter VII. On the distinction and multitude of vows — p. 175
- DISSERTATION II: How great the obligation of a vow is. On the doubtful vow, the indeterminate vow, the vow extorted by fear or error, the conditional vow, and the penal vow
- Chapter I. The obligation of a vow is set forth. To what virtue does it belong, religion, or another? Is there smallness of matter? And can this obligation pass to others? — p. 179
- Question I. Does the obligation of a vow pertain to the virtue of fidelity, or of religion; or also to that virtue to which the promised matter itself pertains? — p. 180
- Question II. Is it of greater merit to undertake some work to be done under the law of a vow, or without a vow? — p. 182
- Question III. Is there smallness of matter in a vow? — p. 183
- Question IV. Is the transgression of a vow mortal when the whole of its matter, though absolutely small, is omitted? — p. 184
- Question V. Can the one vowing bind himself gravely in light matter, or lightly in grave matter? — p. 186
- Question VI. Does a vow to avoid a venial sin oblige under mortal? — p. 190
- Question VII. Does one who violates several vows in light matter on the same day sin mortally? — p. 190
- Question VIII. Does one who vowed to recite one "Our Father" and "Hail Mary" daily for several years sin mortally if, over several years, he daily omits this prayer? — p. 193
- Chapter II. Can the obligation of a vow be fulfilled by others, and does it pass to heirs? — p. 195
- Question I. Do the vows of parents bind their children; and are vows made through a proxy binding? — p. 195
- Question II. Can, or must, the one vowing fulfil through another his personal vow, which he cannot fulfil himself? — p. 196
- Question III. Is one who, through his own fault, has become incapable of observing a personal vow, bound to fulfil it through another? — p. 196
- Question IV. Can real vows be fulfilled by another, even without the knowledge, and against the will, of the one vowing? — p. 197
- Question V. Is the one vowing, having become poor, bound, in order to fulfil a real vow, to ask his friends for money, or to take up a trade unbecoming his state, or to accept money offered him as a gift, so as to satisfy the vow? — p. 198
- Question VI. Does one who hands the promised thing to another satisfy the vow, if that other, having received it, omits to offer it? — p. 198
- Question VII. Can a mixed vow, consisting of personal and real elements, be fulfilled through another? — p. 199
- Question VIII. Is one who has become incapable of paying a vow bound to apply a compensation? — p. 199
- Question IX. Are heirs bound to the personal vows of testators? — p. 199
- Question X. Is an heir bound to pay the personal vows of the deceased, supposing the testator commands it of him? — p. 199
- Question XI. Can an heir, whether voluntary or necessary, be compelled, under penalty of forfeiting the inheritance, and of excommunication, to pay the real vows of the testator? — p. 200
- Question XII. If the testator does not impose on the heir the burden of paying his real vows, or if he expressly says he does not wish to bind his heir to those real vows, is the heir nonetheless bound to pay them? — p. 201
- Question XIII. Is an heir bound to pay real vows before entering upon the inheritance, or beyond the means of the inheritance, in the case where he has made no inventory, and has been declared liable to payment by the sentence of a judge, and condemned to it? — p. 201
- Question XIV. Is an heir bound, to the detriment of his legitimate portion, to pay the real vows of the testator? — p. 203
- Question XV. Can, and must, the heir, if he cannot do it himself, fulfil the testator's real vows through another; and can he obtain a commutation from a confessor? — p. 204
- Question XVI. Is a monastery, succeeding by hereditary right to the goods of a professed Religious, bound to pay the real vows which the professed had made in the world and had not paid? — p. 204
- Question XVII. In what order are real vows to be paid by the heir, compared with debts and legacies? — p. 206
- Question XVIII. If the testator is bound by several vows, and the inheritance is insufficient to pay them all, which ought the heir to pay? — p. 207
- Question XIX. When there are several heirs, is each one bound in solidum to pay the vows of the deceased? — p. 208
- Question XX. Is a donee bound to carry out the vows of the donor? — p. 208
- Question XXI. Is a legatee bound to fulfil the real vows of the one bequeathing? — p. 209
- Question XXII. When a Prince punishes the one vowing with the penalty of death for the crime of treason, and assigns his goods to the treasury, is the Prince, or the treasury, bound to pay the real vows of the one vowing? — p. 210
- Chapter III. On the time by which a vow must be fulfilled — p. 210
- Question I. When the one vowing has not assigned a time for the execution of the vow, by what time must he fulfil it? — p. 210
- Question II. Does a vow not fulfilled at the designated time cease to oblige? — p. 211
- Question III. Is the one vowing bound to anticipate the time designated for the vow's obligation? — p. 213
- Question IV. Is one who vowed to God to give a slave to a hospital, if he kills him, bound to substitute another? — p. 214
- Chapter IV. On the doubtful vow. When the one vowing, in doubt about the vow, must fulfil it — p. 215
- Chapter I. The obligation of a vow is set forth. To what virtue does it belong, religion, or another? Is there smallness of matter? And can this obligation pass to others? — p. 179
- DISSERTATION I: On the vow
¶3.
- Question I. Is one who is certain of the vow, but doubtful of its execution, bound to its execution? — p. 218
- Question II. Is one who doubts of the quantity of the thing promised, namely whether he vowed a hundred or fifty, bound to render a hundred? — p. 219
- Question III. Is one who vowed to give the Church a chalice, but doubts of what material, silver or gold, he promised the chalice, bound to give a gold chalice, or a silver one? — p. 219
- Question IV. Is one who vowed that he would not approach a woman, but doubts whether of fornicatory or conjugal approach, bound only to abstain from fornicatory intercourse? — p. 220
- Question V. Is one who doubts whether he made the vow before the age of seven, or the perfect use of reason, bound to keep the vow? — p. 220
- Question VI. Is one who is certain of the promise, but doubtful of his intention of binding himself, bound to fulfil the vow? — p. 220
- Question VII. Is one who made a vow extorted by fear to be presumed, in a doubtful case, not to have had the intention of binding himself? — p. 220
- Question VIII. If the one vowing doubts whether, in the aforesaid case, he used ambiguous words or a mental restriction, is he subject to the vow, or the oath? — p. 221
- Question IX. Is one who doubts whether he made a vow in time of sleep, drunkenness, or frenzy to be presumed to have made his vow in time of sound mind? — p. 221
- Question X. Is one who made a vow when angry or disturbed, if he afterward doubts whether he had the necessary use of reason, bound by the vow, especially if, his anger calmed, he repented of the vow made? — p. 222
- Question XI. When someone doubts whether the matter of the vow is dishonourable, or evil, is he bound to keep the vow? — p. 222
- Question XII. Is one who, in a conditional vow, doubts of the condition bound to fulfil the vow? — p. 223
- Chapter V. How are indeterminate vows to be interpreted? — p. 223
- Chapter VI. Several cases concerning vows indeterminate as to the quantity, or quality, of the matter are resolved — p. 226
- Question I. Is one who vowed abstinence from wine bound to abstain from beer, and other liquors pressed from wine? — p. 226
- Question II. Would one who vowed abstinence from wine for the end of temperance, and to deprive himself of the pleasure of that drink, sin mortally if he drank some wine? — p. 227
- Question III. Is one who vowed to fast bound to the ecclesiastical fast? — p. 229
- Question IV. Are you bound, by virtue of the aforesaid vow, to abstain from dairy products, at least in Lent? — p. 229
- Question V. Does one who vowed to fast, with no number of days prefixed, satisfy the vow by a single fast? — p. 230
- Question VI. Does one who vowed several fasts satisfy by fasting twice? — p. 230
- Question VII. Is one who vowed to fast for an entire month bound to keep the fast even on Sundays? — p. 230
- Question VIII. If someone vowed to fast on Sunday, would the vow be valid? — p. 230
- Question IX. Would one who vowed a fast to be carried out on bread and water violate the vow by drinking wine once; and, after a single drink of wine, may he drink wine more often without transgressing the vow? — p. 231
- Question X. Can one who vowed to fast on bread and water eat pastries, commonly macaroni? — p. 231
- Question XI. Is one who made a vow to fast on all Fridays or Saturdays through the year bound to fast also when the feast of the Lord's Nativity recurs on those days? — p. 232
- Question XII. How is one bound who made two contrary vows, say, of eating only bread on Friday, and of not eating bread on the vigil of some Saint, which sometimes falls on the same Friday? — p. 233
- Question XIII. Is one who vowed to recite the Rosary bound to recite it whole; and does he satisfy if he merely runs through it mentally? — p. 233
- Question XIV. Does one who vowed to hear Mass daily satisfy on feast days by hearing one? — p. 233
- Question XV. Is a girl who vowed virginity bound to keep it after the commission of a first shameful act? — p. 234
- Question XVI. Does one who vowed a pilgrimage absolutely satisfy by a pilgrimage on horseback? — p. 235
- Question XVII. Does one satisfy the aforesaid vow if he undertakes the pilgrimage hired for a fee, or compelled by fear, or for the sake of other business, or of curiosity? — p. 235
- Question XVIII. Is one who vows religion, or to receive holy orders, bound to keep chastity? — p. 235
- Question XIX. Is one who vowed alms, without determining the quantity or quality, bound to a large, or a small, quantity? — p. 236
- Question XX. One who vowed to God one of his silver vessels, or servants, or animals: what is he bound to render? — p. 236
- Question XXI. If you promised a determinate thing to one of two Churches, to which ought you to give it, in the case where you do not know to which you promised it? — p. 237
- Chapter VII. On vows extorted by error, or by fear — p. 238
- Question I. Does an error concerning the substance of the vow render the vow invalid? — p. 238
- Question II. From what is it to be gathered that circumstances are only an impelling cause, not the principal cause, of the vow; that is, that they do, or do not, redound to the substance of the object promised by the vow? — p. 240
- Question III. Is a vow extorted by fear valid? — p. 241
- Chapter VIII. On the conditional vow, and the penal vow — p. 244
- Question I. What are the general conditions which are found in every absolute vow, and what the particular ones which make a vow conditional? — p. 244
- Question II. What is a conditional vow, and does the particle "if" always make a vow conditional? — p. 244
- Question III. Is a vow under a condition of the present, of the past, or of a necessary or impossible future valid? — p. 245
- Question IV. Does a shameful condition against the substance of the vow make it void? — p. 245
- Question V. When does a vow under a future, contingent, honest, and possible condition oblige? Is it enough that part of the condition be fulfilled? And can any condition be added after the vow has been made? — p. 246
- Question VI. Is it enough that the conditions be fulfilled equivalently for the vow to oblige, or must they be fulfilled in their specific form? — p. 246
- Question VII. Does one sin against the vow who prevents the condition under which he made the vow from coming to pass? And must he await its coming to pass? — p. 247
- Question VIII. If the one vowing, by his own malice, impedes the aforesaid conditions that depend on another's will, is he bound by the vow, or does he remain free of it? — p. 248
- Question IX. What is a penal conditional vow; and is it valid? — p. 249
- Question X. When the transgression of a penal vow is free of fault from invincible ignorance, is the one vowing obliged to undergo the penalty attached to the transgression? — p. 250
- Question XI. Is one who commits a mortal sin against a vow, if he is forgetful of the vow, obliged to the penalty? — p. 250
- Question XII. In a double penal vow, if someone is absolved from the vow, is he absolved also from the penalty which he has not yet incurred? — p. 250
- Question XIII. Is one absolved from a vow considered absolved also from a penalty contracted in the transgression of the first vow? And in asking for a dispensation, must both vows be explained? — p. 250
- Question XIV. Is one who vowed to avoid something, say gambling, under such a penalty, bound to the penalty as often as he gambles? — p. 251
- Chapter IX. On the vow of assuming the religious state — p. 251
- § I. How the following vows are to be interpreted — p. 253
- Question I. What is to be said of this vow: "I promise to enter religion, unless God should decide otherwise concerning me"? — p. 253
- Question II. How is this vow to be explained: "I vow to enter this religious order, if I shall have entered any"? — p. 253
- Question III. Is this vow valid: "I vow that no person shall be an obstacle to me, so that I should not enter religion, or do some other thing"? — p. 254
- Question IV. Is one who made a vow of wishing to enter religion bound to enter it? — p. 254
- Question V. Is a vow of dying in religion a vow of religion? — p. 255
- Question VI. Does a vow of eremitic and solitary life induce an obligation? — p. 255
- § II. On the obligation of the vow of assuming the religious state — p. 255
- Question I. Does one who vowed religion absolutely fulfil the vow, if he assumes the habit of the Knights of St. James, of Calatrava, of Alcántara, and of Montesa? — p. 255
- Question II. Is a vow of religion at least fulfilled if the habit of the Knights of St. John is assumed? — p. 256
- Question III. Would such a vow at least be fulfilled by entrance into an order of military Clerics? — p. 256
- Question IV. Does one who vows religion satisfy the vow, if he enters a relaxed religious order? — p. 256
- Question V. Does one who vowed to enter a stricter religious order satisfy his obligation by entering a laxer one? — p. 258
- Question VI. Can one who vowed a stricter religious order, and professed in a laxer one, lawfully persevere in it? — p. 258
- Question VII. Does one satisfy the vow of entering a stricter religious order, if he enters a laxer one which has a pontifical privilege of receiving those who vowed the stricter? — p. 259
- Question VIII. What is one bound to perform who vowed religion indefinitely? — p. 259
- Question IX. Is one who vowed to enter this particular convent, if he suffers a refusal, bound to approach other monasteries? — p. 260
- Question X. Is one vowing who has once been legitimately rejected by a monastery, or religious order, bound to embrace it, if afterward invited by the same religious order, or monastery? — p. 260
- Question XI. Can a regular Prelate lawfully repel, with the same facility, one who is bound by a vow of religion, as one bound by no vow? — p. 261
- Question XII. Is one who vowed religion, that he might be a Cleric in it, free of the vow, if the religious order will not admit him except as a layman? — p. 261
- Question XIII. An illegitimate son, ignorant of the constitution of Sixtus V by which illegitimate sons are repelled from ranks and dignities, vows religion: once the constitution is known, is he bound to fulfil the vow? — p. 262
- Question XIV. Is one who vowed religion in the priestly state bound to learn grammar, when he is not admitted on account of his ignorance of it? — p. 262
- Question XV. One who, having made a vow of religion, contracts marriage, or, marriage contracted and consummated, vows religion: what must he do? — p. 263
- Question XVI. Does one who accepts the Episcopate fulfil a vow of religion? — p. 264
- § III. On the debt by which one who has vowed religion is bound to persevere in it — p. 264
- Question I. Does one who entered religion with the intention of leaving satisfy the vow? — p. 264
- Question II. Would one who entered religion with the intention of leaving, together with the resolve to pray God that he might change his heart, satisfy the vow? — p. 265
- Question III. One who made a vow of entering, and of leaving at once, or with the express intention of enjoying the liberty granted by law to Novices: to what is he bound? — p. 265
- Question IV. Does one who vowed religion absolutely, thinking nothing of perseverance or of departure, satisfy the vow if he enters religion and, the trial having been made, leaves without any cause, by the mere liberty granted to the other candidates who are free of a vow? — p. 266
- Question V. What are the just causes for withdrawing from religion? — p. 267
- Question VI. Is one who, beyond the vow of religion, vowed also perseverance in it, bound so to persevere that, if he happens to withdraw for just causes, he must enter it again? — p. 267
- Question VII. Is one bound by a vow of persevering in religion who has been expelled obliged to keep chastity while remaining in the world? — p. 268
- § IV. On the time by which the necessity of fulfilling the vow of religion presses — p. 268
- Question I. Does one bound by a vow of religion sin mortally if he defers his entrance for an entire year? — p. 269
- Question II. Is one who has defined a time for the execution of his vow bound to fulfil his vow within the interval of the prefixed time? — p. 269
- Question III. How ought the one vowing to conduct himself in the execution of the vow, if the defined time admits latitude? — p. 269
- Question IV. Is one who did not fulfil his vow at the designated time bound to fulfil it once that time has elapsed? — p. 269
- Question V. Is one who vowed religion for some particular end, or dependently on some condition, absolved from the obligation of the vow, if the end or the condition of the vow ceases? — p. 271
- Question VI. Does one bound by a conditional vow who spontaneously places impediments so that the condition may not come to pass escape free of the vow? — p. 271
¶4.
- DISSERTATION III: On those who can vow. On the cessation of vows on account of the cessation of the final cause, and the change of circumstances; and on their invalidation, dispensation, and commutation
- Chapter I. On those who can make vows — p. 274
- Question I. Are vows made by Religious without the Prelate's permission, concerning honest matter which in no way disturbs either jurisdiction or rank, valid? — p. 275
- Question II. Would vows be valid which Religious made concerning things forbidden either by the Rule and constitutions, or by the precept of superiors? — p. 277
- Question III. Is a vow made by Prelates of Regulars, of giving alms, valid? — p. 277
- Question IV. Are vows of subjects of Regulars, made without the Prelates' permission, to give something in alms from the goods granted them for their use, valid? — p. 278
- Question V. Can the Church pass laws by which certain persons are declared unfit to vow? — p. 279
- Question VI. Can Bishops vow the abdication of the Episcopate, or entrance into religion, without consulting the Supreme Pontiff? — p. 279
- Question VII. Can Bishops, without consulting the Supreme Pontiff, vow a pilgrimage? — p. 280
- Question VIII. Can Parish priests, or Beneficiaries bound by the bond of residence, vow religion and enter it without consulting their own Bishop? — p. 281
- It is customarily asked whether God, Christ the Lord, and the Angels can elicit vows — p. 281
- Chapter II. On the cessation of vows on account of the cessation of the final cause, and the change of circumstances — p. 282
- Question I. Does a vow, and an oath, cease when the moving cause ceases? — p. 282
- Question II. Does a vow cease when the proximate moving final cause ceases through the fault of the one vowing himself? — p. 283
- Question III. Does a notable change of circumstances, which renders the promised matter different, either in itself or according to common estimation, suffice to make the vow void? — p. 284
- Question IV. What change of matter is to be called notable, such that it can dissolve the bond of a vow? — p. 284
- Question V. Does that change in the thing promised make the vow void, which, had the one vowing known of it at the time he made the vow, would have kept him from the vow? — p. 285
- Question VI. A Religious, profession having been made, acquires a right to the royal crown: does he escape free of the bond of the vow? — p. 286
- Chapter III. On the invalidation of vows, and on those who possess the faculty of invalidating them — p. 287
- Question I. Is some cause required for the lawful invalidation of vows? — p. 287
- Question II. Is the faculty of invalidating vows of positive or of natural law? — p. 289
- Question III. To whom does the power of invalidating vows belong? — p. 290
- Question IV. Is a superior bound to know specifically the vows he is to invalidate? — p. 291
- Question V. Can a superior invalidate vows, the subjects resisting? — p. 291
- Chapter IV. On the power which Prelates of Regulars have to invalidate the vows of their subjects — p. 292
- Question I. Can internal vows of Regulars, which in no way disturb the government, nor the observance of religion, be invalidated by their Prelates? — p. 292
- Question II. Who are the Prelates who can invalidate these vows of subjects of Regulars? — p. 294
- Question III. Can Legates a latere, and the Congregations of Cardinals, invalidate the vows of Religious? — p. 294
- Question IV. Do Prelates, or secondary Superiors, whom they are accustomed to call Sub-priors, Vicars, Proctors, and, among Monks, Priors, and by other names, have this power of invalidating vows? — p. 294
- Question V. Can Abbesses, or Prioresses, invalidate the vows of their Nuns? — p. 295
- Question VI. Can Prelates of Regulars invalidate the vows of Novices? — p. 295
- Chapter V. Which vows of children can parents, guardians, and curators invalidate? — p. 296
- Question I. Can parents invalidate the vows of non-pubescent children? — p. 297
- Question II. Can parents invalidate the personal vows of children who have attained puberty? — p. 297
- Question III. Can the vows of non-pubescent children, once confirmed by the father, afterward be invalidated by the father? — p. 298
- Question IV. Are the real vows of pubescent children subject to paternal invalidation? — p. 299
- Question V. Can a father invalidate the real vows of children which concern goods of a military kind (castrensia)? — p. 299
- Question VI. Is the same to be said of vows made concerning adventitious goods? — p. 300
- Question VII. Can guardians and curators invalidate the vows of non-pubescent children and minors in the way in which fathers can invalidate the vows of their children? — p. 300
- Question VIII. Can a curator, given to an adult on account of the fault of prodigality, invalidate that same man's real vows? — p. 301
- Question IX. Does a mother have the power of invalidating the vows of her sons, or daughters? — p. 301
- Question X. The father dead, or far absent, can a mother annul the vows of her children, even if a grandfather, a guardian, or a curator of the children exists? — p. 302
- Question XI. Can a mother, the father dead, and a grandfather and guardian lacking, invalidate the vows of non-pubescent children? — p. 303
- Question XII. In default of parents, guardian, and curator, can grandfathers, grandmothers, and the other ascendants invalidate the vows of non-pubescent or minor children? — p. 303
- Question XIII. Can a guardian, curator, or mother invalidate the vows of non-pubescent children, puberty having passed, even after many years, as a father can? — p. 304
- Question XIV. Can masters of disciples, owners of servants, and masters of household staff invalidate personal vows made in childhood? — p. 304
- Chapter VI. On the vows of wives — p. 304
- Question I. Can a husband invalidate all the vows of his wife made after the marriage was contracted? — p. 304
- Question II. Can a husband invalidate the vows and oaths of his wife concerning commanded works? — p. 307
- Question III. Can a husband invalidate a vow of not asking the debt, made by his wife without his consent? — p. 307
- Question IV. Can a husband invalidate a vow of chastity which his wife made with his consent? — p. 307
- Question V. When each spouse, by mutual consent, vows or swears chastity, can the husband invalidate his wife's vow? — p. 307
- Question VI. If, after a vow of chastity made with deliberate and mutual consent, they have sacrilegiously performed the conjugal act, can the husband invalidate his wife's vow? — p. 307
- Question VII. When each spouse, by mutual consent, vows religion, can one alone, or both by mutual consent, invalidate that vow? — p. 308
- Question VIII. Can a husband invalidate vows which the wife made before the marriage was contracted, to be fulfilled, however, after the marriage was entered upon? — p. 308
- Question IX. Can a husband invalidate vows which the wife makes, to be fulfilled after the marriage is dissolved? — p. 308
- Question X. Can a wife invalidate any of her husband's vows? — p. 309
- Question XI. Can a wife invalidate a vow made by her husband not to ask the debt? — p. 309
- Question XII. Would the aforesaid vow of the husband be lawful and prudent? — p. 309
- Question XIII. Can a wife invalidate a vow which her husband made of wearing the habit of an Eremite, or of some religious order? — p. 310
- Question XIV. Can a wife invalidate her husband's vows of giving ample alms, of pouring out lengthy prayers, of keeping frequent fasts? — p. 310
- Question XV. Can a wife invalidate a vow of a long pilgrimage made by her husband? — p. 310
- Chapter VII. On the power of masters over the vows of servants — p. 311
- Chapter VIII. On the relaxation of vows by force of dispensation — p. 313
- Question I. Is there in the Church a faculty of dispensing from the obligation of vows, and of oaths? — p. 313
- Question II. With whom does this faculty of dispensing from the obligation of vows reside? — p. 314
- Question III. What is the dispensation of a vow? — p. 314
- Question IV. How is this removal of the bond effected? — p. 314
- Question V. Can one who possesses the faculty of dispensing vows also commute them? — p. 315
- Chapter IX. To whom, by ordinary right, does the power of dispensing in vows belong? — p. 316
- Chapter X. On the power of regular Prelates in dispensing the vows of their subjects — p. 318
- Question I. Can regular Prelates dispense in vows of their subjects made with the license of major Prelates? — p. 318
- Question II. Can regular Prelates dispense with their Novices in vows? — p. 318
- Question III. Can regular Prelates dispense with their subjects in a vow of passing to a stricter religious order? — p. 318
- Chapter XI. On the power of regular Confessors in dispensing the vows of secular persons — p. 320
- Chapter XII. On vows reserved to the Supreme Pontiff. The true interpretation of this reservation — p. 328
- Question I. Are oaths made to God, of chastity, of religion, and of the threefold pilgrimage, reserved to the Supreme Pontiff in the same manner as vows? — p. 330
- Question II. Can Bishops, and Prelates having quasi-episcopal jurisdiction, necessity pressing, dispense in the aforesaid five vows? — p. 330
- Question III. Is this reservation of vows to be interpreted broadly, or strictly? — p. 331
- Question IV. Would vows of chastity, or of religion, made with the express intention of binding oneself only under venial fault, be reserved to the Pontiff? — p. 331
- Question V. If the aforesaid vows were made out of fear, even light fear, would they be called reserved? — p. 332
- Question VI. If some such vow, or its reservation, is doubtful, must the vows be judged not reserved? — p. 332
- Question VII. Is a vow of not contracting marriage reserved? — p. 332
- Question VIII. Can a Bishop, by force of custom, grant the faculty of asking the conjugal debt to one who, bound by a vow of chastity, contracted marriage? — p. 332
- Question IX. Is a vow of conjugal chastity reserved? — p. 332
- Question X. Is a vow of an unapproved religious order reserved? — p. 333
- Question XI. How are the reserved vows of the threefold pilgrimage to be understood? — p. 333
- Question XII. Is a vow made with some circumstance reserved, which remains whole once the circumstance is omitted? — p. 333
- Question XIII. Is a disjunctive vow reserved? — p. 333
- Question XIV. Are the following vows reserved: "If I gamble, if I fall into sin, I vow chastity"; "If my father dies, I will enter religion"? — p. 334
- Question XV. When the Supreme Pontiff commutes a reserved vow, say of chastity, into another pious work, say a fast, is that work reserved? — p. 336
- Question XVI. When the aforesaid five vows are not reserved, because they fall short in some respect, of consent, or of condition, or of matter not entire, are they subject to the power of regular Confessors? — p. 336
- Question XVII. Can one who receives by a bull, or jubilee, the faculty of dispensing, or commuting, all vows relax even reserved ones? — p. 336
- Chapter XIII. For a valid and lawful dispensation a reasonable cause is necessary — p. 336
- Question I. When the cause for dispensing is doubtful, can the Prelate dispense? — p. 338
- Question II. Is a dispensation valid, sought and granted in good faith on both sides, when it is afterward discovered that the cause which both parties thought legitimate at the time of the petition and grant was in fact false and null? — p. 339
- Question III. What are the legitimate causes for granting dispensation? — p. 340
- Question IV. Is imperfect deliberation of the one vowing alone a sufficient cause for granting him dispensation? — p. 341
- Question V. Is imperfect deliberation arising from fear of death, of shipwreck, or of some other grave danger regularly sufficient for the dispensation of a vow? — p. 342
- Question VI. Does difficulty in the execution of a vow suffice for granting dispensation from the vow? — p. 342
- Question VII. Is doubt about a vow made a just cause for obtaining dispensation? — p. 343
- Chapter XIV. On the commutation of vows, and on those who have the faculty of commuting vows — p. 344
- Question I. Can anyone, by his own authority, commute his vow into an evidently better good? — p. 345
- Question II. Can one who vowed to enter one religious order, by his own authority, enter another equally good? — p. 350
- Question III. In things which are consumed by use, can one be substituted for another promised by vow? — p. 351
- Question IV. Can one who vowed to hand over a determinate son to religion offer another by his own authority? — p. 351
- Question V. Is a layman, or a married Cleric, capable of the jurisdiction of commuting vows? — p. 351
- Chapter XV. What equality legitimate commuters of vows ought to observe; and what causes are required, that the commutation be legitimate — p. 352
- Question I. In a mere commutation of vows, must the equality of matter be observed? — p. 352
- Question II. What cause is required for a lawful and valid commutation? — p. 354
- Question III. What cause is required when a vow is commuted into an equal good? — p. 355
- Question IV. Is a commutation into an equal thing, made without cause, invalid? — p. 355
- Question V. Is the commutation of a vow into a lesser good, without a reasonable cause, invalid? — p. 356
- Question VI. What sin does a Prelate commit who, without a legitimate cause, commutes a vow into a lesser, or an equal, good? — p. 357
- Question VII. Is a dispensation mixed with commutation to be presumed, when the commutation appears illegitimate, as being manifestly into a lesser thing? — p. 357
- Chapter XVI. On the commutation of vows by force of the jubilee, or of the crusade bull — p. 358
- Question I. Must this commutation be made within, or outside, confession? — p. 359
- Question II. Can a commutation into something less be made by force of the jubilee, or of the bull? — p. 359
- Question III. Can the vows of religion and of chastity be commuted by force of the jubilee, or of the bull, necessity pressing? — p. 359
- Question IV. Can a vow, or oath, of giving alms to a determinate Church, or poor person, be commuted after its acceptance by virtue of the jubilee, or of the crusade bull? — p. 359
- Question V. Can one who has once gained the jubilee obtain the commutation of vows after it? — p. 360
- Question VI. If someone, at the beginning of the week of a published jubilee, had his vows commuted with the intention of gaining the jubilee, but afterward, through negligence or forgetfulness, omitted the works necessary for receiving the jubilee, and so did not obtain it at all, does such a commutation stand? — p. 360
- Question VII. Does a Confessor sin who, being asked, refuses in the time of the jubilee to commute vows? — p. 361
- Chapter XVII. On returning to the prior matter after the commutation of a vow has been made, and accepted by the one vowing — p. 361
- Question I. When a vow is commuted into another matter, is the prior obligation extinguished? — p. 361
- Question II. When a commutation of a vow has been made, is the one vowing bound to carry out the prior matter, if the substituted matter has become impossible, or he himself has omitted to perform it through his own fault? — p. 361
- Question III. A commutation of a vow having been made, and accepted by the one vowing, is he free to return to the prior matter? — p. 362
- Chapter XVIII. Rules to be observed in the commutation of vows — p. 365
- Chapter I. On those who can make vows — p. 274
¶5.
- BOOK FIVE: ON THE DECALOGUE
- Preliminary Remarks — p. 370
- DISSERTATION I: On the oath
- Chapter I. What God commands, and what he forbids, by this second precept of the Decalogue, is explained — p. 372
- Chapter II. Several heretics condemn the sacred oath as unlawful. Their errors are reviewed. The oath is shown to be an honourable act, lawful for Christians, and a fruit of the virtue of religion, or latria — p. 373
- Chapter III. Propositions concerning the oath which the Church has proscribed are reviewed — p. 377
- Chapter IV. Lax, or improbable, propositions are reviewed, which not a few Casuists teach — p. 378
- Chapter V. What an oath is. Various formulas of swearing are explained — p. 383
- Chapter VI. Some further little questions concerning the formulas of oaths, especially this one, "By God," are resolved. Rules too are assigned for discerning oaths — p. 389
- Question I. Do men swear who everywhere say "Par Dios que sí," as the Spanish; "Par Diu," as the people of Friuli; "Per Dio," as the Italians; "Par Dio," as the Sicilians, all of which sound the same as "By God"? — p. 389
- Question II. Do those who everywhere take the name of God in vain, though they affirm or deny nothing, sin mortally? — p. 391
- Question III. Has this formula, "By my soul, by my conscience," greater force than this, "On my soul, on my conscience"? — p. 391
- Question IV. Does one swear who says, "I swear by my conscience," or "on my conscience"? — p. 392
- Question V. Would one swear who said, "By the life of my horse," "by the preservation of this tree," or of some other inanimate thing? — p. 392
- Question VI. If someone asked in this manner, "Do you swear to me by God that the matter is so?" and the one asked answered, "The matter is so," would he make an oath by so answering? — p. 393
- Question VII. Does one swear who uses these expressions: "I wish my word to be an oath," "let my word and promise be as certain as if it were an oath"? — p. 393
- Question VIII. Do such formulas as the people of Friuli have in common use, "Al Seugnuli sì," "Seugnuli sì," or "Seugneli nò," "Al Seugnuli sagri, iust, e potent," bear the true character of an oath? — p. 393
- Question IX. Is it lawful to swear by false gods; and does an oath made by them oblige Christians? — p. 394
- Question X. What is to be said of the following formulas: "May God do this to me," "may he add this," "may God never spare me, nor save me, nor defend me," "may I die an evil death," "may I not live until tomorrow," "may an evil Easter come upon me," "may I burn in hell," "may the devil carry me off to hell, if it is not so"? — p. 395
- Question XI. Do these other formulas contain an execratory oath: "May my ears be cut off, may my nose, head, arm be severed, if it is not so"? — p. 395
- Certain rules for practice — p. 395
- Chapter VII. The divisions of oaths are given; and whether all oaths are of the same species is explained — p. 398
- Chapter VIII. For an oath to be lawful, three conditions are necessary: truth, justice, and judgment. St. Thomas assigns several other rules of swearing — p. 405
- Chapter IX. What truth is required in an assertory oath. The defect of even the least truth in this oath is a mortal sin. Some little questions concerning the perjury of an assertory oath — p. 408
- Question I. Does one who swears falsely in the lightest matter sin mortally? — p. 408
- Question II. Does one who swears a doubtful matter as certain, or the contrary, sin mortally? — p. 409
- Question III. Does one sin mortally who swears something by hyperbole which, as it sounds, is not true? — p. 409
- Question IV. Is it lawful to swear something which you judge only probably to be true? — p. 410
- Question V. What certainty is required in order that someone may swear lawfully? — p. 411
- Question VI. What certainty is required for tendering an oath in judgment? — p. 413
- Question VII. What diligence is required in inquiring into the truth necessary for an oath? — p. 414
- Question VIII. Does one who is notably negligent in inquiring into the truth of the matter he swears sin mortally, even though it happens that the matter he swears is true? — p. 414
- Question IX. In order that students may lawfully swear that some fellow student attended the schools for the time required by the university for completing the course, is it enough that they have seen him commonly frequent the schools? — p. 414
- Question X. Is it lawful to persuade someone to swear a truth of which he himself is ignorant? — p. 414
- Chapter X. On the defect of justice and of judgment in an assertory oath. Some little questions are resolved — p. 416
- DISSERTATION II: On the promissory oath
- Chapter I. On the truth and judgment necessary in a promissory oath. Little questions of no small moment are examined — p. 419
- Question I. Is the defect of truth concerning the present in a promissory oath always a mortal sin? — p. 419
- Question II. Is the defect of the second truth to be judged grave; that is, does one who does not fulfil a thing promised and confirmed by oath, in grave matter, sin mortally? — p. 420
- Question III. Does one who does not fulfil a thing promised and confirmed by oath, in light matter, sin mortally? — p. 420
- Question IV. Would one sin mortally who promised something under oath with a doubtful intention of fulfilling it? — p. 427
- Question V. How are those oaths to be interpreted by which men commonly swear that they will not be the first to go in at a door, not the first to sit down, and the like? — p. 427
- Chapter II. On the justice necessary for a promissory oath — p. 428
- Question I. Does one who swears that he will fornicate, or perpetrate any other grave crime, sin mortally against the virtue of religion? — p. 428
- Question II. Does one who swears that he will commit some venial sin sin mortally? — p. 428
- Question III. Does one who swears that he will do something against the evangelical counsels, say, that he will not accept a prelacy, will not enter religion, and other things of that kind, sin mortally? — p. 429
- Chapter III. On the matter of a promissory oath, which induces an obligation — p. 430
- Chapter IV. What the obligation of a promissory oath is. It is compared with the obligation of a vow. What intention, or resolve, is required in a promissory oath. To swear without the intention of swearing is always a mortal sin — p. 433
- Question I. What intention, or resolve, is required in order that a promissory oath may induce an obligation? — p. 435
- Question II. Is it lawful to swear without the intention of swearing? — p. 436
- Question III. Does one who swears something false in grave matter without the intention of swearing sin mortally? — p. 437
- Question IV. Does one who swears something false in light matter without the intention of swearing sin mortally? — p. 437
- Question V. Does one who swears something true without the intention of swearing sin mortally? — p. 438
- Question VI. Does one who deliberately swears without the intention of swearing utter a true oath? — p. 439
- Question VII. Is one who swears something false from thoughtlessness guilty of perjury, and does he sin mortally? — p. 441
- Question VIII. Is one who swears without the intention of binding himself in fact bound? — p. 441
- Chapter I. On the truth and judgment necessary in a promissory oath. Little questions of no small moment are examined — p. 419
- DISSERTATION III: On the deceitful, equivocal, and amphibological oath; on mental restrictions, and on lying
- Preliminary Remarks — p. 443
- Chapter I. The errors of Plato, Origen, Hilary, John Chrysostom, Cassian, John Climacus, and Martin of Dumio concerning the lawful use of a lie in extreme necessity are reviewed — p. 445
- Chapter II. The authors who before Augustine's time declared war on lying are reviewed. After Augustine, none of the Catholics favoured lying — p. 449
- Chapter III. A compendious narration of everything that St. Augustine writes in his Book on Lying — p. 451
- Chapter IV. A compendium of the Book Against Lying, which St. Augustine wrote to Consentius — p. 458
- Chapter V. How opportune Augustine's teaching is for settling the controversy concerning the deceitful oath is made plain from certain propositions — p. 464
- Chapter VI. A historical narration of the doctrine which several more recent writers devised for concealing the truth. Purely mental restrictions, restrictions not purely mental, equivocations, amphibologies, and material locutions are reviewed — p. 467
- Chapter VII. The Supreme Pontiff Innocent XI condemned the principles of the aforesaid propositions. Later theologians devised new inventions by which to conceal the truth. A synopsis of their various doctrines, and of their various principles, is woven together — p. 472
- Chapter VIII. A comparison of the doctrine of certain more recent writers with the doctrine both of Cassian, to whom lies were lawful in extreme necessity, and of Augustine, who condemns lies in every event. The same cases, proposed by Augustine and by the recent writers, and resolved by contrary doctrine — p. 477
- Chapter IX. The doctrine of the more recent writers concerning purely mental restrictions is false, and rightly condemned by the Church — p. 481
- Chapter X. The opinion which asserts that words, by the common consent of the human commonwealth, signify nothing when they are employed to conceal a truth which cannot be made known without grave harm, is refuted as altogether improbable and false — p. 485
- Chapter XI. The response of Tamburini is refuted, whose assertion seems altogether laxer than the very proposition condemned concerning mental restrictions — p. 489
- Chapter XII. The opinion of Fr. Cattaneo, of Fr. La Croix, and of a few others, who compare a lie with a theft committed in extreme necessity, does not seem consonant with the teaching of the Church — p. 492
- Chapter XIII. The common opinion of very many more recent writers, which defends restrictions not purely mental by the help of communicable and incommunicable knowledge, useful and not useful for speaking, is brought under examination. It does not differ from the opinion of the authors who uphold purely mental restrictions — p. 499
- Chapter XIV. The causes why very many more recent writers in fact defend the proscribed purely mental restrictions. Fr. Sánchez disapproves beforehand the opinion of the later Casuists. The opinions of very many more recent writers on restrictions confirmed by oath are more dangerous than the ancients' doctrine on the lawful use of a lie. St. Augustine's invectives against restrictions confirmed by oath — p. 506
- Chapter XV. Further causes why very many more recent writers in fact teach purely mental restrictions, and consequently lies. The explanation by which Fr. La Croix interprets the condemned propositions is refuted. His judgment on Fr. Cárdenas is approved, and extended to other authors — p. 515
- Chapter XVI. Fr. Diego de la Fuente Hurtado upholds that purely mental restrictions are lawful for an honest cause, even after INNOCENT XI condemned these restrictions. Fr. Carlo Antonio Casnedi teaches that purely mental restrictions are not condemned — p. 522
- Chapter XVII. The opinion which seems to us true is proposed. Amphibology is lawful which, either by force of the words or by force of the circumstances, admits a double sense, both intelligible to the hearer. Not all truths can always be concealed by amphibologies. The error of very many more recent writers on this matter is made manifest. Various rules are assigned for the full understanding of the question, and for practice — p. 526
- Chapter XVIII. The texts of Sacred Scripture which the ancients put forward in defence of lies, and the recent writers in defence of mental restrictions, are expounded — p. 533
- Chapter XIX. Certain Gospel texts which are customarily brought forward in favour of mental restrictions are adduced and explained — p. 536
- Chapter XX. Some objections, drawn from reason, and from the examples and doctrine of the Saints, especially St. Raymond, and from the work of Annibaldus commonly ascribed to St. Thomas, are resolved — p. 543
- THE END