Chapter VI — Indifferent, useless, or viciously impossible things are not the matter of a vow. Various little questions are explained

I. Let us begin with indifferent and vain things. All theologians agree that nothing useless, vain, or indifferent can be made subject to a vow. St. Thomas says (II-II, q. 88, art. 2, ad 3): "Vows truly made about useless things are more to be mocked than kept." If, however, someone did vow such useless things — as, for instance, that he would not enter the forum, would not mount a horse, would not speak with such a man, would not cut his nails or hair, and other such things which, in their own kind, are indifferent — he would sin only venially, in not observing them. Many things, however, which are in their own kind indifferent and useless, can, given circumstances, become fit and suitable matter for a vow. Entering such a house, mounting a horse, conversing with such a man, are, in themselves, indifferent matters. But if entering such a house carries with it the danger of meeting a woman who provokes to lust; if conversing with such a man provokes to wicked deeds; if mounting a horse is an occasion for evils — then, since vows made for an honorable end, concerning the avoidance of these matters, are made in such circumstances, they exist as entirely valid. In order, however, for things that are, by their own nature, indifferent to take on the character of honorableness and goodness, it is by no means sufficient that the one vowing, by his own arbitrary intention, direct them toward some good end. For this reason, no vow is made by which a woman promises not to spin, not to bake bread, not to sew on the Sabbath, and the like — since abstaining from this or that particular work is a vain matter; it is otherwise if she promised to abstain from all servile works, so as to be freer to devote herself to God. It is required, then, that some proportion appear, in the very matters intended by the one vowing, and that the matter to be vowed, its circumstances at least considered, really conduce in some way, at the time the vow is made, toward attaining that end. For if the matter to be made subject to a vow is not useful to the one vowing at the time the vow is made, but vain, or indifferent — even though it might be useful at some other time — the vow is null. Entering a house in which the danger of a woman provoking to lust is found is fit matter for a vow to avoid that dangerous house. If, all danger removed, such a vow were made, it would then be null — since at that time the matter would be indifferent, and consequently unsuited to a vow.

II. Question I. Is a vow of an act whose omission is a sin valid? Response: The discussion of such a little question seems superfluous. For who does not know that the matter of a vow must be honorable, lawful, and pleasing to God himself, to whom it is offered? St. Thomas proves this excellently (II-II, q. 88, art. 2). Now if the offering includes the guilt of sin, it can be neither lawful, nor pleasing and acceptable to God, who hates sin. All this is clear, and needs no elucidation. But certain objections are raised which present some difficulty; the question, then, is proposed so that they may be resolved.

III. You will object first: Jephthah vowed that he would sacrifice to the Lord whatever first came to meet him from his house, if he obtained victory over the Ammonites. And indeed, victory obtained, returning home, he sacrificed to the Lord his daughter, who had come out to meet him, as is recorded in Judges 11. And yet he is inscribed in the roll of the Saints by the Apostle Paul (Hebrews 11). It is false, then, that a vow concerning unlawful and forbidden matters is null.

IV. There are two principal responses by which this argument is customarily resolved. One is that of Lyra and other recent authors, who deny that Jephthah sacrificed his daughter to God by killing her body; rather, they teach that he consecrated her to God by a spiritual and civil death, insofar as he separated her from human company, and bound her to perpetual virginity — a consecration which, since it was irrevocable, can be called a death, just as the consecration of a field, of an animal, is called the "death" of the one offering it, and just as a man's death is called such. This they attempt to confirm as follows: I. Jephthah was a prudent man, versed in the law, and therefore, following the rite of the idolatrous peoples, his own... he lacked the counsel of the High Priest, whom he could have consulted. II. Jephthah made his vow through an inspiration of the Holy Spirit: for Scripture itself testifies that "the Spirit of the Lord came upon" him. And where we read in our Vulgate (Judges 11:40), "It became a custom in Israel... that the daughters of Israel gathered together once a year, and bewailed the daughter of Jephthah, four days in a year," the sacred Pagnino renders from the Hebrew: "that they went to speak with the daughter of Jephthah" — for the sake of joy alone, he says. They add that Jephthah could not have been ignorant of the law which reserved the privilege of sacrificing to the priests alone. These considerations of recent authors are plausible, and enjoy their own probability.

V. The other response is the truer one, and confirmed by the judgment of all the ancients, who teach that Jephthah really did kill his daughter. Ambrose (Bk. III, Against Jovinian), Chrysostom (Homily 14, to the people of Antioch), Theodoret (q. 19 on the Book of Judges), Jerome (ch. 13, and Bk. I, and Bk. IV, q. 49, on the Book of Judges), Augustine (q. 49 on the Book of Judges, near the end), St. Thomas (II-II, q. 88, art. 2, ad 3; Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 1, qc. 2), and, to speak briefly, all the ancients — Tertullian, Isidore, Peluliota, and Hispalensis, Justin Martyr — hold the same opinion; which is likewise conceded by weightier recent theologians — Tostatus, Sotus, Serrarius, Azor, and very many others whom I pass over.

VI. This response, that it was a true bodily killing, is clearly established from Scripture itself, which cannot be evaded without force done to it. For it is written thus (Judges 11:31 and following): "Whosoever shall first come forth out of the doors of my house... and shall meet me, when I return in peace from the children of Ammon, the same will I offer a holocaust to the Lord." Where here is even a trace of a spiritual consecration? He vowed to offer whatever first came to meet him from the doors of his house. Let us suppose an animal had come to meet him: would he have sacrificed it by a spiritual offering? Nor did he make two vows — one for the offering of an animal, another for the sacrifice of a human being. That single vow, then, which comprehended whatever, or whoever, first came out and met him, as a victim of sacrifice, was a vow of a true and bloody immolation. This is confirmed also by the fact that, at the time, no use of spiritual holocausts was in force, but only bloody sacrifices were offered.

VII. The arguments of the contrary opinion are easily answered. To the first, I say that Jephthah is indeed found to have been a man of good character, and prudent; nonetheless, he sinned. And why not? If God found sin even in his Angels, why not also in men, however well-behaved? His error was a sin of ignorance against the natural law, by which he was deceived into thinking that a bloody sacrifice of his own daughter would be acceptable to God. The occasion for his ignorance could well have been the example of Abraham, prepared to kill his son, and the rites of the neighboring nations, who sacrificed their sons and daughters. Deceived by these examples, he firmly persuaded himself that a human sacrifice would be most pleasing to God; and therefore neglected to take wise counsel. To the second, some reply that by "the Spirit of the Lord" is to be understood the spirit of fortitude, since it was with a courageous mind that he resolved to give battle. The Angelic Doctor says (loc. cit., ad 2): "Because his faith, his devotion, moved him to make the vow, he was moved by the Holy Spirit on account of the victory which he obtained; wherefore he is placed in the roll of the Saints, and because it is probable that he repented of his unjust deed, which nonetheless prefigured something good." To the third, it must be said that Jephthah's daughter did not ask that her death be postponed — which she was willing to undergo readily — but rather her unfruitful and sterile virginity, a sterility which the Hebrew women reckoned almost more bitter than death itself. And indeed, as Tostatus observes, if the sacrifice had been one of virginity alone, since it would have been perpetual, she would have devoted, not two months, but the whole span of her life to mourning. She mourned, then, only the two months preceding the day of her death. As for Pagnino's interpretation — though he is a most eminent man — we say that none of the ancient interpreters translates that text by the word "to speak with," but "to bewail." Even if we were willing to follow this translation, we would not therefore be compelled to depart from the true opinion. For it could be said that the daughters of Israel came each year to address Jephthah's daughter — not present in words, but absent, addressed in tears, by figures of apostrophe and personification. To the last point, I say that Jephthah, believing that sacrifices, contrary to the prescription of the law, could be offered by anyone, was mistaken.

VIII. You will object, second: A vow whereby someone promises not to sin except with a certain woman is valid. But in this vow, sin is included. It is false, then, that a vow concerning something unlawful and vicious is null. The first proposition is taught by Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 6, n. 21), in these words: "A vow made to God not to sin except with a certain woman is sometimes valid, sometimes void. It is valid if it were made with a view to preserving continence; it would exempt him from being very inclined to fornicate, either with respect to more frequent intercourse, or with which he binds himself to that end, so as to abstain from that woman — provided he did not know that he had made that vow out of love for her. But if the one vowing wished to abstain from all others on account of a base love of that woman, intending, if she should return his love, to bind himself with that end alone; it should be distinguished whether he had this bad end as the sole end of the promise, in which case the vow would be void; or whether, being enthralled by base love for that woman, and having tried it with her, he did not dare to include her in the vow explicitly, but confusedly, not knowing, out of love for her, that he had made that vow: thus the vow would be valid." You will exclaim, prudent reader, that such fantastical and ridiculous inventions are unworthy of being brought into Christian theology. I do not disagree. But since we are recounting inventions, we excuse ourselves for reporting them. Not only Sánchez, but others too, maintain that vow valid: Martínez de Prado (ch. 31, q. 2, §8, n. 102), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 4, §1, n. 2), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 5, n. 4), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 1, §4, n. 63).

IX. Response: All the authors I have listed, who follow Sánchez's opinion, maintain, along with him, that the aforesaid vow includes something good — namely, continence. For they contend that in such an offering the will to sin is not included; for if the will to sin were included, they themselves would admit that such a vow is null — which is enough to confirm the truth of the common opinion, namely, that any vow whatsoever concerning unlawful things is null. If, however, you ask what I myself think of this opinion, I candidly confess that it does not convince me. For this deliberation — not to sin except with a certain woman — includes, according to common understanding, the will to sin with that certain woman (for the exception confirms the contrary rule); or, if it does not include it, such hypotheses are vain, and unworthy of theological disputation — especially in matters of lust, where metaphysical distinctions are not so easily made. Would anyone actually make such a vow: "I vow that I will not sin except with such-and-such a woman"? In my own opinion, only casuists devise such hypotheses; for the common instincts of nature by no means permit men to dedicate such vows to God. For the aforesaid vow, "I vow that I will not sin except with such-and-such a woman," is exceedingly similar to this one: "I vow that I will not kill you except with such-and-such a sword." Who, then, would dare dedicate such vows to the Supreme Godhead?

X. You will object, third: If someone vowed immoderate vigils, fasts, and mortifications, or the like, he would either be bound to keep them, or would have to seek a dispensation. And yet things of this kind are unlawful, being contrary to the natural law of preserving one's life. Vows concerning unlawful things, then, are valid. Response: St. Thomas gives this answer (II-II, q. 88, art. 2, ad 3): "The mortification of one's own body, by vigils and fasts, is pleasing to God, provided it is done with due discretion — that is, so that concupiscence may be restrained, and nature not overburdened."

XI. Question II. Is a vow to run bulls in honor of some Saint valid? Response: Martínez de Prado affirms this (Vol. II, ch. 31, n. 30). In support of his position, he brings forward the Spanish custom. For the feasts of the Saints John the Baptist, James, and Anne are commonly celebrated with bull-runnings. If, then, a city made a vow to run, goad, and torment bulls in honor of some Saint, there does not appear to be any reason why that vow should not be valid.

XII. This opinion just reported is improbable, and false; it smacks of superstition, and is unworthy of being brought even into dispute by a theologian. For, as already indicated above, it is not enough, for some action to become a fit matter for a vow, that it be directed by the one vowing's intention toward a good end. If an action is not, by itself, good and holy and pleasing to God, it can in no way be made subject to a vow. Abstinence from food is, in itself, indifferent; but when directed toward restraining concupiscence, so that we may more readily serve God, it becomes a good action, and a fruit of the virtue of temperance. The running of bulls can scarcely be placed among indifferent works — for what, I ask, has the running of bulls to do with the sacred worship of the Saints? What of the fact that the Councils — the last Council of Toledo (act 3, decree 26), the last Council of Arles (act 5, part II, ch. 8) — and the Supreme Pontiffs, Pius V, in his constitution issued motu proprio, found in the Bull, Vol. II, Gregory XIII, and Clement VIII, as one may see in Quaranta (s.v. Tourneaments), forbid bull-runnings to be held on feast days? Prado answers that bull-runnings are indeed forbidden on feast days, but not on the days preceding or following them. What an excellent interpretation! It is scarcely credible that theologians, otherwise learned, as Prado assuredly is, could produce such fabrications — and yet they do produce them; and I recount them here, so that the reader may gather that the authority of recent writers, whoever they may be cited as, is not to be trusted without careful examination. I mention this so as to confirm what I have said many times, and must often repeat: that it is neither out of love for one religious order, nor out of hatred for another — whether Dominican, Carmelite, Jesuit, Franciscan, or of any Institute whatsoever — but solely out of a spirit of truth, that I refute the opinions of casuists which I judge lax, or utterly ridiculous.

XIII. What Prado further objects — that the Spaniards are accustomed to hold tournaments on the feast days of St. James, St. Anne, and others — is of no weight at all. For not all the customs of peoples can be sanctified. On the same days, men and women promiscuously attend theaters, and put on comedies. Will a vow to attend theaters, and frequent comedies, therefore be valid? The aforesaid vow, then, is in no way valid; indeed, the opinion defending it seems to us far too lax, and altogether improbable.

XIV. Question III. Is a vow whereby women vow not to comb their hair on such-and-such a day valid? Response: St. Thomas (Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 1, qc. 2, ad 2) answers that such vows of women are more matters of superstition than vows. "For these are certain relics of idolatry, according to which certain days and months were observed; and therefore they are to be reckoned not as vows, but as sins, for women who make them." Likewise null are vows to abstain from roasted meats on the feast of St. Lawrence. Valid, however, would be vows to abstain from all cooked food, to wear cheap and coarse clothing; and a vow could also be valid whereby women promise to wear white garments in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary, as a sign of special virginity, as Sánchez teaches (Bk. IV, ch. 7, n. 15), and Sotus approves (Bk. VII, q. 1, art. 3, near concl. 2). Unless, however, some special circumstance were present, I myself would pronounce no such vows valid concerning the wearing of garments differing only in color. But if to a difference of color is added coarseness and cheapness, I would maintain that they are altogether valid — since they then become instruments of penance and humility. Taken in the first way alone, they are merely something indifferent.

XV. Question IV. Is a vow of nocturnal vigils, and of not going to sea, valid? Response: This vow is, by its own nature, valid — since nocturnal vigils, in which the divine praises are celebrated, are pleasing to God. On account of the absurdities that sometimes followed from them in some places, they were forbidden; therefore, in those places, the vow would be null, being concerning a forbidden matter. A vow not to go to sea is, in its own kind, null, as is a vow not to ride, or not to enter such-and-such a house. If, however, circumstances arose requiring the avoidance of some particular danger which would ordinarily threaten the one vowing, then it could be valid, as authors commonly teach.

XVI. Question V. Is a vow concerning a good thing, made for a wicked end, valid? Response: Theologians commonly distinguish a twofold end here: one intrinsic to the thing promised, the other extrinsic to that same thing. The intrinsic end of the thing promised... is that which, by itself, flows from the very nature of the thing promised — as the compression [restraint] of concupiscence flows, by its own nature, from fasting, or the purging of conscience from sacramental penance. This end is also called, by another term, the "work's own end." The extrinsic end, which is also called the "end of the agent," has no natural connection with the thing promised, but is assigned to it by the one vowing — insofar as the one vowing chooses the promised thing, and the vow itself, as a means for attaining an end he has set for himself; as if someone vowed alms, in order to obtain some dignity, or vowed to enter religious life, in order to avoid shipwreck, and save his life from death. This is called the "end of the agent," or "of the one vowing." Again, one end is called the "moving final cause," another the "impelling," or "impulsive," cause. That is called the "moving" end without which you would in no way wish to be bound; the "impelling," or "impulsive" end, however, is that which spurs on a mind already moved and prepared to act, toward a swifter and more ready execution. This having been established, they commonly say that a vow of a good thing, taken up as an instrument, or means, for obtaining a wicked end, is invalid — since in that case the good thing is not offered to God as it is in itself, but as it conduces to the attainment of something wicked; as if you vowed alms, in order to obtain the ill use of some woman. If, however, the wicked end does not affect the thing promised, nor is it to be obtained through it, but is merely the end of the promise, or of the one making the promise — or, as Cajetan best explains (II-II, q. 88, art. 1), is an end of the very application of the promise, not of the promised work itself — then the vow is valid. If, for instance, you vowed to enter religious life so as to live more comfortably, the vow would be valid, since a more comfortable life is not the end of the thing promised, but of the one promising; for the one vowing does not thereby order his profession toward a more delicate life, but this more delicate life excites and applies the one vowing toward professing. The same must be said of one who would profess religious life to please some criminal. Such vows, says Cajetan, are good; but the application is diabolical. Wherefore those who vow in this manner undoubtedly sin. Cajetan is commonly followed by the Doctors, as you may see in the theologians of Salamanca, who cite Palao, Cándido, Navarrus, Sotus, Bonacina, Suárez, Toledo, Azor, Valentia, Prado. But I candidly confess, as it seems to me, that all speak somewhat obscurely on this matter, and the theologians of Salamanca themselves (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 2, §4, n. 65 and following) handle the matter just as confusedly and implicitly as the rest.

XVII. Such distinctions, then, by which it is established that a vow concerning a good thing is invalid when the evil end is the end of the thing promised, or of the vow itself dedicated; but valid, if the evil end is the end of the agent, or intended by the making of the vow; and further invalid, if the evil end of the vow is referred to God for the obtaining of the wicked end — such distinctions, I say, though absolutely true, and excellent in themselves, nonetheless produce obscurity and confusion when applied to discerning valid from invalid vows, unless explained much more clearly still. To do this, so far as lies in my power, I offer the following conclusions.

XVIII. A vow made for the sake of a wicked end, or for the attainment of a wicked end, is always evil, and void. This assertion can be denied by no one. For a vow taken in this way — namely, as an instrument for procuring a wicked end — is always evil. But what is evil cannot please God. This is confirmed, and more clearly established as follows: A vow is an act of religion. Now an act of religion must, by its very nature, arise from some motive of divine worship. But what arises from a wicked end proceeds in no way from religion, or from any motive of divine worship. A vow made for a wicked end, then, is void. All this is clear. Sotus explains the matter more clearly than all others (Bk. VII, q. 1, art. 3, dub. 2), whom Azor follows, though many others render the matter more entangled. I will quote Sotus's own words.

XIX. "If someone," he says, "made this offering: 'I vow to give alms for the sake of vainglory' — then the little word 'for the sake of' can modify either the word 'give,' or the word 'I vow.' And indeed, in the first way, the object itself of the vow is referred to, and directed toward, and depraved by, an evil end, by which the giving itself is contaminated; and such a vow is null. For to give for the sake of vainglory is an evil object. Second example: if someone says, 'I vow to become a priest, in order to obtain a benefice' — the preposition 'in order to' does not modify the thing, which is to become a priest, but the word 'I vow.' For once made a priest, or a soldier, he does not perform the works of his state — say, praying, celebrating Mass, obeying — for the sake of the wicked end, as one who gives alms for the sake of vainglory does; but he nonetheless became a priest for the sake of a wicked end. Such a vow, then, holds; for its object is a licit thing, and good — namely, to become a soldier, or a priest."

XX. This teaching, which Sotus expounds more clearly than others, still seems to me entangled. For if someone vowed to receive the priesthood in order to obtain a rich benefice, in the same way this vow would seem to me null, just as the vow of alms for vainglory. For although one made a priest does not order the act of praying, of celebrating Mass, and of sacrificing to a wicked end (which only proves that he, once duly ordained a priest, lawfully exercises his functions), nevertheless, if he chose that state itself as a means and instrument for obtaining a rich patrimony, then that state, which was the object of the vow, would have had a wicked end — since a spiritual thing, twisted toward obtaining a temporal thing, becomes an evil thing, just as alms given for vainglory. Sotus himself sensed this obvious difficulty, against which he raises this very argument against himself. "For a more penetrating understanding of the matter," he says, "it is argued: just as it is a sin to give alms for the sake of vainglory, and, with a corrupt end, to go to church — say, to solicit a girl — so too it is a sin to make a vow with an evil end. Therefore, just as a vow of the first kind is evil, because it concerns an evil object, so too a vow of the second kind is evil, since it has an evil end — and both are evil, so that neither holds."

XXI. He answers: "For the solution (he says), it must be carefully noted in the present matter — a point which is very likely to deceive a less attentive reader — that it is not universally true that every unlawful vow is evil, and therefore void; nor is this what we have asserted; but only this: that every vow concerning an evil object is void and null. We grant, then, that one who vows priesthood, or religious life, with an evil end, does indeed sin in vowing; nevertheless, because the vow has a good object (for even though the vow is referred to an evil end, the object is not thereby referred to that same end), the vow holds. The final consequence is therefore denied: 'The vow was made for an evil end; therefore it does not oblige' — as if it had an evil object; since the thing devoted to God is good, though dedicated for an evil end." Thus far Sotus, whom, as I said, the other theologians commonly follow.

XXII. This response does not convince me, unless it is explained more clearly. For, first, I do not consider "irritant" [void] every vow that is, in this phrase, "evil"; nor do I see how this could be denied by Sotus, or by any theologian. For what is evil is not a true act of religion; and every true vow is an act of religion, since, as has been said, the whole nature of a vow consists in this: that it be a thing pleasing to God. It follows, then, that no thing which displeases God can render a vow pleasing to God; therefore no evil vow can be valid. It is universally true, then, that every unlawful and evil vow is void. It is added, moreover, that every evil thing, whether grave or slight, is not pleasing to God; but no vow is pleasing to God unless it is a true act of religion; but no vow is a true act of religion, since it is not [pleasing to God]... [this needs to be resolved.]

XXIII. For Sotus's teaching to hold together, then, an explanation is needed. A wicked end can be considered with respect to a vow in two ways. First, as the primary moving and influencing cause, toward which the one vowing directs the vow itself, as the means by which the end is to be obtained in execution; and in this way the vow is always void and evil. For although the thing promised, or the object of the vow, is good, as they say, materially, it nonetheless becomes formally evil on account of the perversity of its ordering toward a wicked end. Second, a wicked end can be considered as what he calls a "concomitant" cause: and under this consideration it does not influence the vow at all; nor is the vow made for the sake of this wicked end; and therefore the vow itself is not thereby vitiated, or defiled, but is left in its own specific goodness. This end, however, which is concomitant with respect to the vow, is, with respect to the will of the one vowing, a final and influencing cause; and therefore it infects and defiles the one vowing. And this, indeed, is what Sotus meant to say. For although he had earlier said that not every evil and unlawful vow is void, he immediately adds that one who vows priesthood, or religious life, with a wicked end, does indeed sin in vowing; nevertheless, since the vow has a good object, the vow holds — holds, I say, if it is not ordered toward the wicked end as toward a final cause. For even alms is a good thing; and yet a vow concerning it, if directed toward vainglory as toward a final cause, is evil, and void. Nonetheless, just as a vow of alms, which you might make to give publicly before others, so that you might be seen, and gain some glory, would hold — because this vain glory only accompanies the vow, and does not vitiate it, since it does not influence it, but only defiles the one vowing — in exactly the same way, vows of religious life, of receiving holy orders, of baptism, and the like, are valid, when made in such a way that vain ends sometimes accompany them; since such ends are not moving and influencing causes with respect to the vow itself, but only influence the will of the one vowing, whom they infect. Such ends are not called, in the schools, "moving causes," but "impulsive causes," and are merely, as it were, conditions that render the making of the vow easier. Wherefore, although the one vowing sins in vowing, the vow is nonetheless valid, since it is good by reason of its object, a work pleasing to God, and proceeding from the virtue of religion. But a vow which is taken up in such a way that it becomes an instrument for attaining a wicked end is vitiated by that wicked end, and becomes evil, and consequently void. For it cannot be doubted that every vow which is unlawful and evil is empty and void. This is confirmed by the fact that, when we make a vow to procure some end, we truly pour out prayers to God, that he may grant us that end. But prayer, as commonly defined by theologians, is a petition for fitting things from God. Now we would commit a great irreverence toward God, if we asked of him something unbecoming to God. Whatever end, then, for the obtaining of which we pray to God irreverently, invalidates a vow. Wherefore vows to attend choir for the sake of gaining distributions, to receive holy orders for the sake of riches and rich revenues, are void, whenever such ends are the true moving causes; but not, if they are merely attracting circumstances.

XXIV. Question VI. Is a vow to offer God a good gift on account of an evil effect already obtained, or to be obtained, valid? For example: "I vow to celebrate so many Masses, to give so much in alms, if I emerge victorious from an unjust lawsuit, war, or game; if I obtain a benefice simoniacally; if I kill my brother, to acquire his inheritance; if I am not caught in theft or homicide; if I have a son by adultery or concubinage." Response: Authors disagree over the resolution of the proposed question, and approach its solution in several opposing ways. Sylvester (s.v. Votum, q. 2, dub. 3) and Navarrus teach that the vow is invalid if the condition is refused by the one vowing, but valid if the condition is desired. Suárez (Bk. II, on vows, ch. 5, n. 4) and Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 6, n. 13) teach that, supposing the will for war, and for access to a concubine, the vow is valid — that is, taking these as it were conditions — since, in this supposition, the vow is not ordered toward the war. Castropalao (disp. 1, punct. 8, §3) says the vow does not hold if the end is procured as intended to be obtained by the aforesaid means; but does hold, if the war and the access to the concubine are regarded merely as conditions. He then adds that it is truer to say that the aforesaid vows, made before receiving a son from adultery, or the victory obtained from war, do not hold; but that they do hold, if made after receiving the son, and the victory, as an act of thanksgiving. Cajetan (II-II, q. 88, art. 1) and Trovamala (s.v. Votum, 2, at the end) teach that it can indeed happen that the aforesaid vows are not ordered toward the evil, and are therefore not void. Sánchez (loc. cit.) affirms that this can sometimes occur, and consequently that vows are valid in many cases. The theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 2, §3, n. 69) pronounce absolutely that such vows are valid, and cite for this opinion Fagundez, Cándido, Lessius, Raphael de la Torre, Trullench, Bonacina, Layman, Suárez, Prado, Leander, Cajetan. But, as usual, not altogether sincerely: for several of the authors cited speak ambiguously, and under various hypotheses.

XXV. Setting aside the various opinions of theologians, I say: 1. The aforesaid vows, obtaining a future effect attached to a shameful condition, are invalid. This assertion seems to me certain, if we speak of these vows as they are commonly made, and in practice, by Christians. For when Christians vow alms, Masses, if they emerge victorious from a war, from an unjust duel, they really do direct the vow toward obtaining an unjust victory — that is, toward a wicked end, which, according to all, renders a vow null. Although, then, I would grant that, according to the metaphysical abstractions of certain theologians, indulging the sharpness of their most subtle speculations, the aforesaid vows would be valid, they are nonetheless null, as they are actually made. For in the present matter, our discussion must concern these vows, as they are actually conceived and made — not as they are proposed according to the arbitrary hypotheses which not a few casuists construct for themselves; since the matter is manifest, and the same to all minds. For one who says, "I vow alms, if I kill my brother, to acquire his inheritance," or, "if I am not caught in theft or homicide" — [these], I say, are the vows the theologians of Salamanca discuss, and men make them, and adopt them as the means by which theft, homicide, and fratricide may be more easily and successfully carried out. That Christians direct the authority of such vows toward a wicked end is established from the very words by which they dedicate their vows. These vows are altogether similar to those gifts which greedy men offer to Princes or great lords' ministers, to obtain a privilege of some kind, in this condition: "If we obtain the grace, favor, or privilege we seek from you; if we escape the penalty imposed for a committed homicide; if we are freed from prison; a hundred gold pieces, which we have deposited for your security with a trustworthy man, shall be yours." Who would deny that such gifts are aimed at getting these men what they most desire? And although they might use more pleasant phrases, and expressions more suited to justice and innocence, they would nonetheless not thereby deny that their attainment was the intended end of such gifts and privileges. The same must be said of those vowing the worship of God with such conditions attached. Why, then, would vows of theft, homicide, or unjust victory not likewise bind themselves to their conditions? Why should such men not, without doubt, therefore intend, as the end of their vow, the very things which they suppose, under theft, homicide, the slaying of a brother, a simoniacally obtained benefice — as an end to be attained through their vows? "It is not so," they say; "rather, they vow so that the vowers may emerge unharmed — which is a good thing; or they vow to God good gifts, pleasing to him, given the supposition of the theft, the homicide, the killing of the brother, the simoniacally obtained benefice." No one denies that alms is a good thing; and therefore, they say, his vow will be valid, whatever the conditions and effects he attaches to it at his own discretion, however bad — because, they say, it is not directed toward obtaining them. But I say again: such distinctions, and abstract hypotheses of casuists, are formed purely at will, and contrary to what any sensible person acknowledges to be evil. I affirm, rather, that men vowing do not idly attach their vows to the aforesaid conditions; for if they dedicated the alms to God without any relation to those conditions, they would offer the same conditions to God absolutely; whereas, having disregarded and utterly omitted the aforesaid conditions, they would completely refrain from making such vows. It remains, then, that the aforesaid vows, attached to wicked conditions in this way, are quite certainly void — as Sotus expressly writes (Bk. VII, q. 1, art. 3, dub. 1). Sánchez, however (Bk. IV, ch. 6, n. 17), and Cajetan, Trovamala, and Valentia say, most rightly, speaking morally, that it is scarcely possible that a man does not direct his vow toward such an evil. The same doctrine John Marín teaches (Vol. II, tract. 9, sect. 4, n. 4). Nor is what is objected of any weight — namely, that unjust stipulations made with men, for obtaining a thing, are valid by natural law. For, as Sotus says, a man can receive a shameful service from another man, and, in exchange, pay him a reward for it. But who would say that anyone can receive a shameful patronage from God, and dedicate a vow to him in exchange for it? These are the greatest absurdities.

XXVI. I say, 2. A vow dedicated to God as an act of thanksgiving for a shameful deed already done is invalid, and unbecoming to God. I conclude that this is certain to me, and is the common opinion, as Castropalao says (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 8, §1, n. 4), where he has this: "The more common opinion defends that this vow is invalid, and blasphemous. For to give thanks to God for a shameful deed is to represent God as the author and approver of that shamefulness, for whose attainment vows are paid to him" — which how horrendous this is, is plain enough. Wherefore it is not surprising that Leander dared to transcribe, from Filliucci (tract. 26, ch. 2, q. 6), in his own treatise 2, on vows, disp. 4, q. 31, these words: "I say, third, that a vow in an act of thanksgiving for a shameful deed already done is valid." He then explains Filliucci's conclusion in the sense of other authors' opinions, and yet the conclusion is exposed to scandal and blasphemy. And indeed, none of the theologians ever asserted that a vow in thanksgiving for a shameful deed is valid; but they dispute whether it is valid or invalid concerning the effect, or the outcome, of the shameful action. But it is quite amusing what Filliucci adds in that same place — namely, that Suárez teaches his opinion (Bk. II, on vows, ch. 5, n. 19), following Cajetan, when Suárez rather teaches the opposite, following Cajetan. Here are Suárez's own words: "Some do not like this opinion (namely, on the validity of the vow); they think this reasoning applies whether the victory has preceded, or is expected, which seems to be Cajetan's opinion." He judges this same opinion to be of the same malice: to make a vow in an act of thanksgiving, and to make one to obtain something. This too Leander himself notes. What displeases most, however, is that these collectors of cases, from the most eminent theologians such as Suárez, transcribe everything that can favor laxity, and then prudently restrict and limit the exceptions by which the aforesaid theologians limit their conclusions — often passing over in silence what they omit. Fr. Suárez, though he teaches that a vow of an effect resulting from a shameful action is valid, nonetheless attaches two necessary limitations to this assertion: one, that the effect consequent upon the unjust action can honestly and lawfully be retained; the other, that the act of thanksgiving be separated from the vow of the effect itself, as he adds, n. 22. Read this passage to confirm what I have just indicated: he prudently restricts this assertion with a twofold limitation. But although he speaks obscurely enough, it nonetheless contributes not a little to establishing that not a few of the theologians' opinions are reported truncated by the more recent collectors of cases, and that this is done in silence, when it ought necessarily to have been mentioned. And yet these casuistic patrons of theology do not blush to attribute such truncations to us, in the face of the plainest and most manifest truth.

XXVII. I say, 3. A vow made in an act of thanksgiving for victory from an unjust war, and likewise for gain from an unjust game, is invalid. The reason is most evident. Gain from unjust victory, and the acquisition of a kingdom through victory reported from an unjust war, are unjustly retained, and the malice of unjust possession persists in them. The consequence, and the truth of the assertion, is therefore plain. Fr. Castropalao (tract. 15, punct. 8, §1, n. 4) defends the contrary opinion, in these words: "This vow seems truer to be valid in itself; so Suárez expressly says (Vol. II, Bk. II, on vows, ch. 5, n. 19), because it is not to be judged that thanks are given for the unjust victory in the respect in which it was unjust, and proceeded from itself; but for that same victory, insofar as it proceeded from God, and, according to this reasoning, is something good and honorable. A vow, then, can be offered in its praise." Leander (disp. 4, q. 31) copies out this reasoning, but adds that if the victory admits of matter capable [of being retained] — that is, a good effect — [it is valid].

XXVIII. If this teaching of Castropalao's were true, there would be no crime, no wicked deed, for whose execution we could not dedicate a vow to God in an act of thanksgiving. Not only the action of an unjust victory, but all other wicked and criminal deeds proceed from man according to their whole malice, and from God according to the aspect in which they are physical entities. Therefore, if it is lawful to render thanks to God for an unjust victory — not in the respect in which it is unjust, but in the respect in which it proceeds from God — then, by the same reasoning, it will be lawful for us to offer God vows for adultery, for homicide, for theft — not in the respect in which these are evil, and are perpetrated by man, but in the respect in which they are physical entities, and proceed from God. But what I marvel at more is that he brings forward, in support of this opinion, the authority of Suárez — for he says: "So Suárez expressly says."

XXIX. So that you may have a second example of casuistic doctrine, I will transcribe it here as well. Suárez, then, in n. 19, cited by Castropalao, has these words in the same place, n. 22: "If, however, the King inflicts an unjust war, and, victory obtained, usurps a kingdom which he unjustly retains — but does last..." then I say a vow to offer thanks for such an unjust victory is invalid. For although the unjust action seems physically already finished, its effects, however, are impious; therefore the vow concerning them is likewise invalid. There, then, is Suárez's own text. It must be, then, that a good vow of thanksgiving, being pure, and good — as I would say — has no unjust perseverance, or other similar iniquity, mixed into it, in order to be valid.

XXX. For Castropalao to have been able to claim the patronage of Suárez in confirmation of his own opinion, he ought, with him, to have distinguished a twofold effect following from the victory — one to be justly retained, the other unjustly. He ought to have used the principles of Fr. Suárez, who teaches that a vow of thanksgiving is then valid, when it concerns a pure good, having no unjust perseverance, or other similar iniquity, mixed into it. Castropalao, on the contrary, maintains that a vow of thanksgiving is valid for the victory itself — not in the respect in which it was unjust, but for that victory insofar as it proceeded from God, not from an unjust cause. Whatever mitigation you add to this principle, in my own opinion, cannot in any way remedy it sufficiently. For it follows from this that no action is so shameful that a vow of thanksgiving cannot, as has been said, be dedicated to God for it, and any action, however impious, can be accepted, provided it is said to be a vow dedicated to God, and proceeding from a sinner. Wherefore, in excuse of this author, it must be said that, although his manner of speaking is entangled, and less cautious, he nonetheless wished to mean nothing else than that a vow dedicated to God is valid, not insofar as it concerns unjust victory, but insofar as it concerns the good effect consequent upon the unjust victory — say, a vow for safety secured from an unjust war. For this reason, the error is to be reckoned rather in his manner of speaking than in the matter itself.

XXXI. I say, 4. A vow made for a son conceived through concubinage, or for safety obtained from a duel, is valid. The object of this vow presupposes a shameful and criminal action, but the son himself, however conceived, and the health, or safety, however finally obtained, are things honorable and good, for which it is lawful to give thanks to God. This is the common opinion, defended by Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 1, art. 3, dub. 2), Marín (tract. 9, disp. 12, sect. 4, n. 58), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 6, n. 15), and all commonly, lest I waste time reviewing each one.

XXXII. Valid, too, is a vow to punish one's own crime; as if you say, "If I commit such a crime, I will give a hundred pounds in alms, I will renounce the world, I will fast," etc. — for such vows are works of penance, by which vengeance is taken for the iniquity committed. So all agree.

XXXIII. Question VII. Is a vow of a good thing made for an indifferent end, and for the end of obtaining a temporal thing, valid? Response: Speaking absolutely, the most common opinion teaches that a vow made for an indifferent end is void, and empty — since the end is vain. Now the end toward which a vow is ordered gives that vow its species. Therefore, if the end is vain, the vow directed toward such an end will likewise turn out vain. Wherefore a vow to fast, in order to save money, is null. On the contrary, if, for the sake of obtaining indifferent ends, you made a vow in an act of thanksgiving to God, the vow would then be valid — since in that case the end of the vow would not be an indifferent thing, but an act of thanksgiving, which is most excellent.

XXXIV. Likewise null is a vow made for the end of obtaining temporal things, if the one vowing stops at them, and does not raise his intention beyond them to some higher good end. When, then, the thing promised by the vow, or its matter, is directed toward the obtaining of temporal things as toward an end, the vow is void, for the reason already assigned: because moral acts take their species from their end. Wherefore, if the end is indifferent and vain, the actions aimed at that same end are likewise vain. If, however, we are speaking of vows which are commonly made in practice by Christians, for obtaining temporal things, these are valid — since such vows are commonly directed toward obtaining temporal goods from the infinite liberality of God himself, and often through the intercession of the Saints. In these vows, then, God, as the supreme and sole giver of all goods, is the ultimate end. Valid, then, will be vows of similar intentions, or ends. Not a few examples of such vows occur in Scripture. In Genesis 28, Jacob made a vow to God for a safe pilgrimage. In 1 Kings 1, Hannah dedicated a vow to God to obtain a son. In these, and similar vows, those who vow venerate God as the ultimate end of the vow; therefore vows of this kind are valid. This too is the most common opinion.

XXXV. Question VIII. What sin does one commit who vows an evil thing to God? Response: The evil which someone vows to God can be evil either on the part of the thing promised, insofar as the thing itself is evil in itself; or on the part of the end toward which the one vowing directs the thing, which, if evil, vitiates the vow. If the evil which is promised by the vow is mortally evil, the sin will be mortal. Indeed, if the one vowing not only promises God that he will do that evil thing, but truly holds the resolve to carry it out, he commits two mortal sins: one, because he offers God an evil thing, as if God found the wicked deed pleasing; the other, on account of the resolve to carry out that which is a mortal sin. But if the evil is only venial, one who vows such a thing will likewise commit only a venial fault, as authors commonly teach. It seems, nonetheless, that a distinction is called for. For either the one vowing, led by some ignorance, vows to God something venially evil — and then he sins only venially; or the one vowing really knows that the thing to be vowed is evil, and in no way pleasing to God, and nonetheless wishes to consecrate it to God by vow — and I too grant that, in this hypothesis, he sins mortally; and this is the more common opinion, taught by Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 6, n. 9), Bartolomeo a San Fausto (Bk. I, ch. 12), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 2), John of St. Thomas (II-II, disp. 29, art. 4), Leander (disp. 4, q. 36), Prado (ch. 31, q. 5, n. 10), Cajetan (s.v. Votum, §2), Raphael de la Torre (II-II, q. 88, art. 2, disp. 2), Castropalao (disp. 1, punct. 8, §3, n. 9), Suárez (Bk. II, ch. 4, n. 2), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 2, n. 71). These cite, for the contrary opinion, St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 30, ch. 4, §1). Leander too, who has taken upon himself the labor of correcting others' citations, cites St. Antoninus from Prado. But the second part of St. Antoninus's Summa is concluded in twelve titles altogether; the title in which he treats of vows is the eleventh, which is divided into only two chapters. But these matters are only touched on in passing. The reason for the common opinion, however, is self-evident. For one who deliberately offers God a thing he knows to be evil thereby gives, of himself, testimony that he considers God an approver of iniquity. But this smacks of blasphemy.

XXXVI. Question IX. Does one who makes a vow to sin mortally, without the intention of fulfilling it, sin mortally? Response: Without doubt he sins mortally, with a sacrilegious sin... — a sin of sacrilege, of irreverence toward God, and of falsehood against truth. The same must be said of one who so vows without the intention of binding himself, for the same reason. This is the common opinion.

XXXVII. Question X. Is an impossible thing the matter of a vow? Response: Something is called "impossible" in two ways: first, absolutely, and by its own nature; second, comparatively to a particular person — that is, one thing is impossible physically, and in itself; another, morally, and relative to this or that person. The matter of a vow must not only be possible physically, and absolutely, but must also be possible morally for the one vowing. For the one vowing must carry into execution what he promises. It is necessary, then, that the thing to be executed be subject to his own power. This is an evident matter, and there is no disagreement about it.

XXXVIII. Question XI. Is a vow concerning matter partly impossible, and partly possible, or fitting — that is, of matter partly suitable, and partly unsuitable — valid? Response: For the proposed question to be clearly resolved, it must be divided into parts. This much, first, is certain among all: that if the one vowing expressly, and with manifest intention, joined together the unsuitable matter and the suitable, to this end — that he did not wish to offer one without the other — the vow would be null; and the one vowing would sin, since he would absolutely promise an impossible thing, by this very fact that he did not wish to fulfill the possible part without the impossible. This too is certain: that if the matter promised by the vow is by its own nature divisible, one part of it in no way depending on another, then the vow is valid, and the one vowing is bound to fulfill the part of the vow that is suitable — and in this theologians commonly agree with St. Thomas, who says (II-II, q. 88, art. 3, ad 2): "If that which someone has vowed is rendered impossible through some fault of his own, he ought to do what he can, and have a ready will to do what he cannot." The matter is made clearer by examples. You vowed to distribute a hundred gold pieces in alms; you cannot give a hundred, but fifty: you are bound to give these fifty. You vowed chastity, and married a wife: you are bound not to request the debt. You vowed to fast for a month: you cannot fast except for fifteen days, or ten, or five, etc.: you must fast these few days. You cannot, in the fast you vowed, abstain from meat, but you can abstain from several courses: you must keep to a single meal — whatever Castropalao writes about this last example (disp. 1, punct. 8, §1, n. 10). Setting aside this last example, the common opinion — indeed, nearly all whom we have cited — teaches this. The difficulty turns on this: what matter is to be called "divisible." For the divisibility of some matter, and the possibility of separating one part from another, is evident, as is clear from the examples given. But some matter does not openly present this possible division and separation. What is to be said of such things dedicated to God by vow will be established from what follows.

XXXIX. Question XII. Is one who vowed to build a church, if he cannot build the whole, bound to build part of it, or to construct a chapel in another church, or to offer some other ecclesiastical gift? Response: Tamburini (Bk. III, on the Decalogue, ch. 15, §3, n. 1) says that such a vower is bound to nothing — since, he says, the matter is by its own nature indivisible. Otherwise, if the one vowing had expressly vowed the part, when he could not vow the whole — then, he says, he would be bound to the part. Sánchez teaches the same (Bk. IV, ch. 10, n. 7), Castropalao (disp. 1, punct. 8, n. 10), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 19, q. 32). The Fathers of Salamanca cite, for the contrary opinion, St. Thomas, and other weightier and more ancient theologians; then they conclude (punct. 2, §2, n. 77) that either part can be defended in speculation, in which the disputation could be carried on without loss of salvation — but that the opposite path is to be held in practice. But it must be said that these same most excellent Fathers, who elsewhere insist that they do not depart from St. Thomas by even a hair's breadth in the excellent course of scholastic theology, nonetheless not infrequently, in their other work of moral theology, depart from St. Thomas, and sometimes gather, and undertake to defend, laxer opinions.

XL. Setting these opinions aside, then, we say that one who has absolutely vowed to build a church is bound to build a part, when he cannot build the whole; and, if a part would be useless in some location, he ought to build a chapel, or something else, in some other church, which is dedicated to the worship of God. This opinion St. Thomas expressly teaches (Bk. IV, Sent., dist. 88, q. 1, art. 3, qc. 1, ad 1): "If someone vowed to build a church, which he afterward, poverty supervening, cannot complete, he is obliged from the vow to fulfill it. But he is bound in this in a twofold way: either he has become altogether unable, and then he is bound simply to what he vowed; or he has become unable to complete the whole, though not the part; and then he remains bound to that which he can do." Sylvester (s.v. Votum, 2, q. 1), Navarrus (ch. 12, n. 19), Prado (ch. 31, q. 2, §9, n. 218), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 4, n. 2), Fr. John Marín, whose work has been proscribed (tract. 9, disp. 12, sect. 8, n. 113), writes that this opinion of St. Thomas is to be understood in this sense: if it is clear that the express intention of the one vowing is to bind himself even divisibly, then he is bound to the part; otherwise, if this intention is not clear. This interpretation, which Sánchez also gave, is arbitrary, and supported by no principle. If the express intention of the one vowing were clear, there would be no room for dispute. But it should not be surprising that such authors should offer such interpretations, since they are consonant with their own principles; for they contend that a vow is to be interpreted in favor of the one vowing, especially in doubtful matters — which is disapproved by St. Thomas, as we shall see below. The theologians of Salamanca, however, expressly indicate the reason why they have departed from St. Thomas's opinion — for they say that the construction of a church, and of a chapel, are not morally of the same nature; and further, that a church is an individual body, unable to be divided into parts. Wherefore, if the very principle of the whole church becomes impossible, the one vowing is bound to nothing.

XLI. Setting aside, then, these interpretations, I assign this rule, which, though contrary to the rules of the more recent casuists, nonetheless seems more probable, and is drawn from St. Thomas himself: A part of a building, separated from the whole according to the judgment of prudent men, redounds to the honor of God, and is therefore to be built; otherwise, when the separated part does not redound to God's honor. Wherefore I do not absolutely approve what Bonacina says — namely, that this vower is bound to build part of the church, since perhaps others, seeing the beginning of the church, will be roused to complete the started building. I would certainly not advise the one vowing to commit his money to this chance outcome, nor do I judge that it would redound to the honor of God — since a part of the church there is of no use at all, unless the whole is completed. To begin this part in the mere hope that others, seeing the beginning, will complete the work, seems nothing other than to commit one's expenses to fortune, when no other foundations are at hand. In my rule, then, I have deliberately inserted the phrase "according to the judgment of prudent men." For, on the one hand, I would say that, according to the judgment of prudent men, the construction of part of a church would redound to the honor of God, when there are really other faithful ready, or morally certain or highly probable conjectures available, that others would be ready to lend their aid toward completing the construction. In this situation I would certainly grant that the one vowing is bound to the part, even though not to the whole; and this seems most consonant with the common sense of prudent piety and reason. Likewise, the one vowing would be bound to erect a chapel, or oratory, when he could do so, and when, according to the prudent estimators of Christian piety, the building of a chapel or oratory would redound to divine worship, and the benefit of the faithful. By what reasoning, then, do our adversaries grant that one vowing a hundred in alms is bound to fifty when he cannot give a hundred, yet must deny the same concerning one who vows to build a whole church, that he is bound to a part, or to a chapel, or oratory, when he cannot build the whole — provided prudent piety judges that the part, or the chapel, would redound to divine worship, and the benefit of Christians? It must be judged otherwise, when the execution of the part would be superfluous, and altogether useless. For example: you vowed a pilgrimage to the House of Loreto; you cannot make the whole journey; you are not bound to a part — since part of the journey is altogether unsuited to the end of the vow, just as we have said the construction of part of a church is unsuited, when there is no hope that others will complete the work begun.

XLII. The arguments of our adversaries collapse of their own accord. For what the theologians of Salamanca say — that a church and a chapel are not acts of the same nature — is quite ridiculous, since our discussion here is not about physical things, but moral ones. Now the same virtue of religion impels toward the building of a chapel, as of a church. Indeed, a chapel and a church are distinguished as a whole and a part. Yet within the same moral line, so to speak, both are found. Ten and a hundred pertain to a different species of number. Does it follow that one who cannot give a hundred should not give ten? Such speculations are vain and useless in the teaching of moral precepts. It is false that a whole church is an indivisible body. How many churches do we not see, day by day, begun, and not completed? I myself have seen not a few of which only the main chapel was built — in which, nonetheless, the worship of God is advanced, and no small spiritual profit of the faithful is gathered. False, too, is the rule of Sánchez and Marín — namely, that, absent an express intention of the one vowing, his obligation is not to be inferred. For since the intention of the one vowing is precisely what is expressed, no room is left for dispute. The obligation of the one vowing, then, must be gathered from his means, and from the condition of the thing promised by the vow. When, then, the execution of a part of the thing promised — namely, the worship of God, or the piety of the faithful — advances, according to pious and prudent estimators, the end of the one vowing, in the same kind as that toward which the one vowing is bound by the whole he promised, then the one vowing is bound, without doubt, to execute this part.

XLIII. Question XIII. When a vow concerns mixed matter, partly good, and partly evil, to what is the one vowing bound? Response: The matter of a vow can be mixed in several ways: either because one part is possible, the other impossible — and enough has been said of this; or because it is partly good and partly evil, as if you promised you would go to Rome, and give alms, or steal something from a monastery; or because of the end, the matter can be mixed, partly good, partly bad; as if you vow alms to help a poor person, and to acquire riches, without directing this toward God. I pass over many other cases. From what has been said, however, the answer to all is clear. For when the matter is partly suitable, and partly unsuitable, and the parts can, according to prudent estimators, be fulfilled separately, the vow is valid with respect to the suitable part — as if someone vows religious life, in which case the matter is partly suitable, partly indifferent, provided no express contrary intention of the one vowing is established, as has been said. When, according to two ends, one good, the other indifferent and unsuitable, the vow is valid, unless the contrary express intention of the one vowing is established.

XLIV. Question XIV. Is a disjunctive vow, one part of which is equally suitable, the other unsuitable — say, when someone vows either religious life, or theft — valid? Response: If the vow is truly disjunctive, such that the one vowing did not wish to bind himself determinately to one part or the other, but indifferently, or to either equally, the vow is, absolutely, null and void. For one who so vows, by virtue of such a vow, is no more bound to the suitable part than to the unsuitable. A vow, then, which must concern a determinate better good, is invalid. The same must be said when the disjunction falls upon a twofold end, one of which is unsuitable, the other suitable. Indeed, one who so vows sins. But such a case, under these terms, is a metaphysical one. For who, unless a fool, would dare to vow in such a way as to will neither part determinately? Or who is so impious as to vow part of a crime? Wherefore, in practice, such vows, which appear disjunctive, are only conditional — or rather, they are two vows: one void, since it concerns something vain, or evil; the other valid, since it concerns a better good. As, if someone, moved by anger, made this vow: "I vow to avenge the injury done to me, or to enter religious life" — this vow is not disjunctive, but is a conditional vow, that, unless he takes vengeance, he wishes to enter religious life — or rather, they are two vows: the first, absolute, of taking vengeance, which is void; the second, conditional, of embracing the religious state, which, the condition being fulfilled, obliges, since it concerns a better good. When, however, it is doubted whether such vows are disjunctive, or conditional, I say that they are to be judged valid with respect to the suitable part, provided the opposite is not established — as Fr. Marín (loc. cit., n. 128) holds — since no one is to be presumed wicked, unless it is proven; and one who elicited a disjunctive vow concerning a good thing, and an equally evil one, would be wicked, and sinning. But in the matter of vows, when doubts arise, the safer part is to be chosen, as I shall more fully show below, against this same Marín, and other recent casuists.

XLV. Question XV. Is a vow to visit Rome barefoot valid? Response: St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 1, §5) says: "A vow to go barefoot does not seem to bind much, since it is neither honorable, nor is it safe in the winter season, and therefore ought to be commuted" — that is, that he fulfill the vow properly clad. This vow, then, is valid, since the principal part of the vow is good; and therefore it holds, and only the accessory circumstance is evil, and therefore to be omitted. Navarrus holds the opposite (ch. 12, n. 39). But Sánchez upholds St. Antoninus's opinion (Bk. IV, ch. 10, n. 15), and Marín agrees with him (loc. cit., n. 119); and this opinion is the true one.

XLVI. Question XVI. Is a vow not to gamble valid? Response: The common opinion is that it is valid, since it truly concerns a better good. For gambling can be considered either as something fortuitous in respect to gain and loss, and as the source of evils — and then the vow is, without doubt, valid; or gambling is considered as a means of recreation, and of lightening the mind, undertaken according to the rules of moderate amusement; and your abstinence from gambling proceeds from a love of penance and mortification, and consequently your vow concerning it is one of a better good: therefore valid. But if it should happen that recreation of the mind would, in some case, be necessary for health, then the obligation of the vow would yield to such an occasion. Nor is it true, as Tamburini says (Bk. III, ch. 15, n. 3) — namely, that if gambling, recreation, or delicate food would, in a particular case, be more useful for your mind, vows to abstain from them would not be valid. This teaching, I say, does not seem true to me. For many make vows to abstain from meat, the use of which is sometimes necessary in a particular case; nor are their vows thereby rendered invalid. It must be said, then, that such vows do not oblige in a particular case — just as is said of any law, or precept. But it is wrongly inferred from this — that, because it does not oblige in a particular case, such vows become altogether invalid. When, then, the matter of the vow, considered absolutely, and the circumstances that commonly occur being weighed, concerns a better good, vows are always valid — even though special cases may arise in which the vow does not oblige. But it always remains valid; and, the special case removed, the obligation of the vow again presses in its observance.

XLVII. Given that a vow not to gamble is valid, several further points remain. And first, indeed, as to what one who vowed not to gamble is bound to. Fr. Gobat (tract. 21, n. 45) and Fr. Claude La Croix (Bk. III, part 1, n. 404) contend that, from the end of the vow, it must be gathered whether the one vowing intended to abstain from all card-playing absolutely, and whether you also vowed not to play through another. For, he says, if in your vow you intended to avoid the loss of your own money, you have excluded only immoderate gambling, both for another and for yourself; but moderate gambling for another, and for yourself, you have not excluded. He infers, therefore, that you can play through another, by giving him money, and watching, unless it is otherwise established from your intention.

I respond, then, that this opinion is scarcely, if at all, defended among Christian people of genuine piety and virtue, except by casuists in favor of the one vowing. But this opinion is false, in my judgment, on a twofold count. First, because doubtful vows are not to be interpreted in favor of the one vowing, but in the safer sense — of which more below. Second, because one who vowed not to gamble, according to common understanding, ought to abstain from all card-playing, unless he expressly indicated that he was distinguishing between moderate and immoderate gambling. For this reason all such rulings, or judgments, resolved by casuists, are to be interpreted in the safer sense. When, then, someone vows absolutely, thinking of card-games while making the vow, he ought, by virtue of the absolute vow, to abstain from every such game, if such a game is found to be forbidden by the sacred canons.

XLVIII. The cited author, Fr. Claude La Croix, in order to accommodate a vow not to gamble to the favor of the one vowing, invents a double distinction between moderate and immoderate gambling, which comes down, in the end, to the mind of the one vowing. For those who vow not to gamble — say, cards — must abstain, according to common understanding, from all card-playing, unless they excluded even moderate gambling by expressly including it in their vow. Second: because one who vowed not to gamble, immoderately, or in a perilous game — did you exclude gambling by yourself, and did you also vow not to gamble for another? For, he says, if by your vow you intended to avoid the loss of your own money, you excluded only immoderate gambling, both for yourself and for another; but for moderate gambling, you can play both for another, and through another, by handing him the money, and watching — unless it is otherwise established from your intention. To resort to such casuistic little distinctions could scarcely help but excite laughter among Christians endowed with genuine piety and virtue — unless it is expressly established that you distinguished thus, when you made the vow. I answer, then, that we ought to abstain from all card-playing by virtue of an absolute vow, since it is a private law — and thereupon that celebrated saying holds equally well: "Where the law does not distinguish, neither ought we to distinguish" — both because the matter promised by the vow, namely complete abstinence from gambling, contributes greatly to avoiding the countless dangers of sin, and, finally, because a vow is always to be interpreted in the safer sense. What La Croix says, moreover — that one who gambles through another does not gamble himself — is false. For one who gambles through another seems, in fact, to gamble himself.

In the place cited, La Croix goes on to teach, with Castropalao and Tamburini, that, having vowed not to gamble so as not to waste time, you may still play through another, even if you waste time watching. Did you hear that? Even if you waste time, you have not broken your vow; but if you play with your own hand, you have broken it! A most subtle, and wondrous, theology indeed! It is not worth dwelling longer to disprove such manifest laxity.

XLIX. "If I vowed," says Fr. La Croix (loc. cit., n. 454), "not to gamble, with the end of avoiding quarrels, blasphemies, oaths... it will be lawful to gamble through another, even though these inconveniences might be feared, since in reality you are not gambling." This opinion is most lax, since, besides the reasons already given, there is added the most frequent danger of blasphemies, oaths, and quarrels. And yet Fr. La Croix foists such monstrosities upon us as though they were certain rules of morals.

L. Question XVII. Is a vow never to sin mortally valid? Response: To answer this little question clearly, let us first set forth what is common ground. If the vow is to abstain from every mortal sin, it is a most valid vow — since it is not only concerning a better good, but is, by divine grace assisting, morally possible. For divine precepts are proportioned to all human weakness. If, however, the vow is absolute, excluding whatever sins, both mortal and venial, taken collectively, and it is clear from the express intention of the one vowing that this is his meaning, then the vow is null — since the matter of the vow, taken collectively, is morally impossible. Vowing, then, the avoidance of all sins, mortal and venial, taken collectively, under the mode of a single object, the vow is null for the reason given — since in this hypothesis the one vowing expressly excludes this division, when he expressly vows the whole matter collectively and undividedly. Nor does the rule hold here: "One who cannot do the whole must do part" — for the one vowing is the legislator, who can impose such obligations upon himself at will. And this is the common opinion, taught by Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 5, n. 10), Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 1, art. 3), John of St. Thomas (II-II, q. 88, disp. 29, art. 5), Sayrus (Bk. III, n. 12), Valentia (I-II, disp. 6, punct. 3), Aragón (II-II, q. 88, art. 2, dub. 2, concl. 4), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, punct. 2, §3, n. 82), Ledesma (tract. 10, ch. 2, concl. 3), Navarrus (ch. 12, n. 65), Toledo (Bk. IV, ch. 17, n. 12), and others.

LI. This aforesaid opinion, however, scarcely has any place in practice, since almost no one vowing includes, with express intention, both kinds of matter equally, under one mode — namely, both mortal and all venial sins together. For those vowing commonly intend to avoid all mortal sins, and venial ones as far as human frailty permits. For this reason such vows are valid; for to avoid all mortal sins is possible for anyone — and, as regards this part, the vow must be observed, according to that rule of law: "What cannot be done wholly is not to be entirely omitted." Wherefore such vows, when it is not clearly established of a contrary intention of the one vowing, are to be judged valid, since, when someone vows two separable things, according to the common estimation of prudent men, one of which is morally impossible, the vow is valid with respect to the possible part. This opinion Fr. Marín defends (tract. 9, disp. 12, sect. 1, n. 10), who cites Suárez (Bk. II, ch. 11, n. 31), Castropalao (punct. 8, n. 9), Gobat (tract. 21, n. 76). And this opinion is to be held even in doubt — since an act, when in doubt, is presumed to be done according to its nature, as the common axiom holds.

LII. If the vow is to avoid all sins divisively, whether mortal or venial, such that the one vowing does not determinately bind himself to either part, it is void — since, by virtue of such a vow, the one vowing wills the suitable part no more than the unsuitable, for the reason already given above. Likewise null is such a vow: "I vow to celebrate a Mass, or to be saved."

LIII. Question XVIII. Is a vow to avoid all venial sins valid? Response: To answer this little question clearly, we must first set forth what is common ground. Valid, then, is a vow to avoid some particular kind of sin venially — say, lying. This is morally possible, as Azor teaches (Bk. XI, ch. 13, q. 4), Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 41, n. 51), Suárez (Bk. II, ch. 3, n. 4), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 5, n. 18), Castropalao (punct. 8, n. 9), Marín (tract. 9, disp. 12, sect. 2, n. 12). Sánchez, however, maintains that a vow to avoid all venial sins in thoughts of lust, or in rash judgments, or in food and drink, or in idle words, is invalid — since, he says, it concerns something morally impossible. Others commonly teach the opposite. The disagreement is not so great that a lengthy disputation need be made of it. For practice, however, vows of this kind ought not to be advised. If, however, such vows have already been made, and torment the one vowing with scruples, a dispensation, or commutation, must be sought, so that the danger of sinning may be avoided.

LIV. The most common opinion, however, is that a vow to avoid all sins — not only collectively (which is certain among all), but even divisively — is null. For a vow concerning something morally impossible is null. Such is a vow to avoid all venial sins. For that man cannot avoid all venial sins is established by the authority of the Council of Trent, which says (session 6, canon 23): "If anyone shall say that a man once justified can, for his whole life, avoid all sins, even venial ones, without a special privilege of God, such as the Church holds concerning the Blessed Virgin: let him be anathema."

LV. There are those who maintain the opposite; and their arguments are considerably strong. For they say that this vow does not oblige to anything beyond what we are already bound to; since we are all bound to avoid all venial sins. A vow to avoid them, then, will be valid. This is confirmed. That vow does not oblige, in the second act, to something morally impossible, since it only obliges, in the second act, for this instant, and then for another, and so on successively. Now to avoid all venial sins at a determinate instant is not something morally impossible: therefore that vow obliges to the fulfillment of the thing promised in the manner in which it can be fulfilled. Thus one who vows to build a temple is not bound to build the whole temple today, but one part today, another tomorrow. In the same way, one who vows to avoid all venial sins is bound today to avoid today's, tomorrow tomorrow's. Moreover, for the same reason a vow obliges as law obliges; but law obliges to something possible in the second act; therefore so does a vow. For a vow is a private law, and a prudent man can impose upon himself a better, or more prudent, law than the divine law. For the love of that divine law in us is to be judged prudent, in wishing to execute it to the letter. Is it not, then, possible in the second act? Is it not difficult for a young man living in the world, beset on all sides by many allurements, not to sin mortally — and yet, if this is possible, why would it not be possible to avoid mortal sin venially [i.e., to avoid it in a lesser degree]? Is it not difficult for a Religious not to sin venially? Moreover, is not a vow to marry, for such a man, invalid, since it would impede the greater good of celibacy?

Is not, according to Sotus (Bk. IV, dist. 38), Azor, Sánchez, Castropalao, La Croix (n. 404), a vow to confess all one's venial sins valid — since it is understood of a confession of those which, with moderate diligence, come to memory? The same, then, must be said of the vow to avoid them. Finally, according to what has been said above, a vow of celibacy is valid, even when made by a frail man who has had experience of relapses — because he can absolutely contain himself, and it is by his own malice that he falls. Nor is the matter of a vow to be measured by the frailty and malice of the one vowing, but by the generic goodness, comparatively to a man instructed by the aids of divine grace. Wherefore it has been said that a vow of marriage, in such a man, is invalid, since it impedes the greater good of celibacy. These considerations, then, if they rightly prove the validity of the vow of celibacy, without doubt likewise establish the validity of a vow never to sin venially.

LVI. These arguments are specious, and, if the force of metaphysical reasoning is weighed, quite strong. But if they are brought back to the standard of the Councils, and of the Scriptures, they are weak, and feeble. The anathema of Trent is directed against those who assert that a man can, without special aid, avoid all venial sins in his whole life. Scripture testifies that God finds wickedness even in his Angels; and that no one is clean of stain. We ought to venerate, and carry out to the best of our strength, the divine law which forbids all venial sins; but we ought by no means to add another law to so sublime a law, one that increases and aggravates its weight. What burden human nature can bear, only its Supreme Maker knows; and therefore only he can prescribe a law concerning individuals. Nor does the parity hold between mortal sins and venial ones — since really well-behaved men, aided by the common graces of God, do avoid mortal sins; and no canon is repeated teaching that any man could carry out the avoidance of all mortal sins throughout his whole life, without a special privilege of divine grace, as is taught concerning venial sins. Celibacy, finally, is morally possible for any man, however frail, provided he wishes to employ the remedies which the Scriptures and the Fathers prescribe — the flight from women, from allurements, from wicked books, from scurrilous conversations, from spectacles, and, in short, from all the occasions which Christian prudence advises us to avoid. Nor is it enough to avoid the rocks; aids must be applied for preserving continence — frequent prayers, meditation on eternity, on hell, on paradise, on the Passion of Christ the Lord, fasts, mortifications, vigils — these are stronger remedies than marriage, which was instituted by God for the propagation of nature. But to keep a vow never to sin venially is not in man's power, however much effort he might apply; to avoid all venial sins depends on a special privilege of divine grace — which no man could prudently promise himself. This is a matter which no prudent man would say — that it is possible, however much effort he might apply, to avoid all venial sins throughout his whole life. Not to belabor the point: all these arguments, though defensible in metaphysical disputation, are nonetheless, in practice, neither to be advised, nor permitted — such vows requiring the special inspiration of the divine Godhead.

LVII. The vows reported of certain persons distinguished for piety, we maintain, were made from a special divine inspiration. St. Teresa's vow to always do whatever she understood to be more perfect is something far greater than a vow never to sin venially. The vow, too, which the most pious Fr. de la Colombière made — which is found prefixed to his printed sermons — is more sublime than a vow to avoid venial faults: for it is so excellent that, as often as I have read it, I have felt myself seized by a certain incredible awe, and have experienced myself drawn by a special feeling of veneration toward that pious man. Gobat also reports the vow of Fr. Louis de la Puente, made twenty years before his death, never to sin venially with deliberation — and other similar vows, which the history of monasticism supplies. All agree that these vows were made under the special guidance of the Spirit. And as for St. Teresa, Gregory XV asserts that her vow confirms this.

LVIII. Question XIX. What is to be said of these two vows? A mother recognizes that her unmarried daughter is pregnant. Foreseeing that her family will suffer infamy from her daughter's childbirth, she vows... not to marry any other than the one who had taken her virtue — since each of these young people's marital affection for the other had already intervened before the union of their bodies. Response: Fr. Comitoli proposes this case, and teaches that the mother's vow is impious — which is self-evident. For that vow has as its immediate end the death of her daughter, and of the child which ought to be born from her. To flee infamy is, in itself, good; but it becomes evil, if it is pursued by a wicked means — since the wickedness of the means infects even the best end, as is clear from what has been said. Although, then, avoiding the danger of infamy is a good thing, and celibacy too is good, the vow, in the case proposed, is nonetheless rendered wicked by the depravity of its means — namely, the desire for the daughter's death. The daughter's vow, however, whereby she promises the lover to whom she had pledged herself that, if he does not marry her, she will refuse marriage to any other, is likewise, without doubt, good — though the marriage itself, which she had not yet contracted, is not directly considered.