Chapter VII — On the division of vows

I. We shall have occasion, when we discuss the number and multitude of vows made in the religious state, to say more on the division of vows. For the present we shall touch on only a few points. First, a vow is customarily divided into absolute, conditional, and penal. Then into solemn and simple. Third, into necessary and free, or common and particular, personal and mixed. Fourth, into affirmative and negative; perpetual and temporary; reserved and non-reserved; public and secret; express and tacit, or mental and vocal. These are the divisions you will find everywhere among all authors.

II. A vow is called absolute when you vow something free from any dependence on a condition. It is called conditional when some condition is attached to it, upon whose occurrence the obligation of fulfilling the vow arises — as if you say: "I vow chastity," "I vow two fasts on bread and water, if I recover," "if I escape from this danger." A vow is called penal when, in order to observe the thing promised, you add a penalty to be incurred — as if you say: "I vow the discipline [i.e. self-flagellation] to the point of shedding blood, if I gamble, if I enter that house full of snares." This vow is called conditional-penal. It differs from a purely conditional vow in this way: in the latter, the condition is not added as a penalty, but as a condition; in the former, the condition is added in the manner of a penalty.

III. Before I proceed further, a few things must be said about the various conditions that can be attached to vows. For some are general and necessary conditions; others are particular and free ones.

The general and necessary conditions, which are presupposed by their very nature, do not, by any means, constitute a conditional vow. Such are these: "if I live," "if it pleases God," "if my superior does not forbid it," "if the sun will rise tomorrow," as is held in the chapter Beata, dist. 26, q. 2. Likewise, a condition concerning the past or present does not render a vow conditional; rather it leaves it absolute, since it does not suspend anything, from the moment it is made, just as if no condition had been attached at all. The reason is that a condition, properly so called, suspends a contract in view of a future event; but a condition regarding the past, or the present, does not suspend anything — as if you say: "I vow a fast, if my father is dead," "if he is now alive": for once the truth of the condition is established, the obligation of the vow is not suspended, but is in full force, and binds the one vowing. So authors commonly teach. It could, however, sometimes be called a conditional vow with respect to the one vowing, if the knowledge of the outcome of the condition were future — and so the vow would then be bound up with the father's death, or life. But this is a disagreement among authors on words. An absolute vow is also called one made with the intention of suspending its execution to a future time — as if you say: "I vow to enter religious life, if my father should die, if I reach my twentieth year, if I complete my course of studies." For that particle "if," in these cases, conveys the same sense as "when." For you absolutely vow to embrace religious life at a determinate time. The theologians of Salamanca (loc. cit., punct. 3, n. 88) also defend as absolute a vow like this: "I promise to enter religious life, if my elder brother should have sons" — since, they say, you absolutely intend religious life, and do not prefer your brother's succession to it, but merely suspend its execution.

This opinion, however, seems to me false — whether we look at the very notion of a condition, as authors commonly do, or at the theologians of Salamanca themselves. For a condition is called that which suspends an act until it is itself posited. Now one who binds his entry into religious life to his brother's future — truly future, and uncertain, or contingent — succession, attaches his vow to a condition. Why, then, will it not be conditional? Wherefore Suárez (Bk. VI, ch. 21, n. 6), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 20, n. 83), and Pontius (Bk. VII, ch. 9, n. 18) rightly defend it as truly conditional.

IV. The theologians of Salamanca object: One who promises to enter religious life, if his elder brother should have sons, makes his vow out of an affection for religious life; nor does he prefer his brother's succession to the obligation of religious life, but merely postpones its execution; therefore the vow is absolute. They add, then, that if the one vowing says: "I promise to enter religious life, if I recover my health, if I escape from danger, if I fall into such-and-such a sin" — this vow would be conditional. Response: I do not see why this latter vow would be conditional, and the former absolute; rather, I judge the opposite to be true. For the reason given is shown to be false. Does not one who binds his entry into religious life to his brother's succession prefer his brother's succession to religious life? I ask: if his elder brother lacked sons, would the one vowing be bound to enter religious life? By no means, certainly — just as one who vowed in the second manner would not be bound, if the attached conditions should fail to occur. Truly, then, he prefers his brother's succession to religious life; for, his brother's succession failing, he does not intend to enter religious life.

V. A celebrated division of vows is into solemn and simple. A vow is called solemn which is made in the sight of the Church, and accepted by her; simple, which is made by a person as it were in private. Whether such vows differ in species, or only by divine or ecclesiastical law, according to the dignity of the religious state, has already been discussed above.

VI. A vow is called necessary — that which all make at baptism, renouncing the devil, and the pomps of the world; and this is called necessary because it concerns the observance of the evangelical law, necessary for salvation. It is not, however, properly called a vow, as we have already indicated above. A vow is called free which is spontaneously made concerning something not necessary for salvation — such as preserving chastity; or, if someone makes a vow concerning a thing that is already necessary, prescribed by precept, freely binding himself to it by a new bond of vow, which he could have omitted.

VII. Again, a vow is called either common or particular. Some, such as Bonacina, call "common" a vow made by a community, or by all its members; "particular" that which each individual makes at his own discretion. But authors commonly teach that "common" is the same as "necessary," and "particular" the same as "free" — and this is the true opinion.

VIII. A "real" vow is that whereby some external thing is offered to God; a "personal" vow, whereby an action, or omission, pertaining to the person is bound; a "mixed" vow, whereby both are promised — namely, both an external thing, such as alms, and an action affecting the one vowing, such as a pilgrimage, or fasting together with alms. So all agree. Likewise, all assert that a vow is called "affirmative" when something positive is pledged to be done — for example, alms; "negative," when something negative is promised — such as abstinence from meat, from gambling, from sin.

IX. A vow is called "perpetual" which lasts until the death of the one vowing — such as a vow to give alms every month for one's whole life; and this is called perpetual with respect to the bond of the obligation affecting the one vowing. It can, however, be perpetual in another way — namely, on the part of the matter, destined to endure after the death of the one vowing; such is a vow to build a monastery, or a hospital, in which Religious, or sick poor persons, are perpetually to be fed. A vow is also customarily called perpetual "of itself," and by the nature of the thing, when it was absolutely uttered — as when someone vows chastity, religious life, etc. — since, even though nothing express concerning perpetuity is stated, nonetheless, according to common understanding, perpetuity is understood of itself. It is called perpetual "by accident," however, when it does not, by its own nature, present this perpetuity, but it must be gathered from the intention, or words, of the one vowing. A vow is called "temporary" when it lasts for a certain, definite time — say, a vow to fast once a week for one year. All this is most common.

X. Vows are called "reserved" in which immediate and inferior Prelates lack the power of dispensing; such power is reserved to a higher Prelate alone. Those are called "not reserved" whose relaxation belongs even to immediate, and inferior, Prelates. An "express," or "formal," vow is one made in set formulas of words; a "tacit," or "virtual," or "implicit" vow is one made not by express words, but is inferred from other things — namely, when something is performed to which a vow is attached; such is the vow of chastity which subdeacons of the Catholic Church make upon receiving holy orders. A vow is called "public" which is made openly; "secret," which is made privately. All this is easy, and common ground among all.