Chapter II — Can the obligation of a vow be fulfilled by others, or does it pass to one's heirs?

I. It is certain among all that personal vows must be fulfilled by the one vowing alone, and that they bind him alone. Nor should even real vows be fulfilled by others, except those who would succeed to the goods of the one vowing. The reason is evident: personal vows affect the person himself; and they are therefore called "personal," because they must be fulfilled by that very person — such are fasts, bodily mortifications, pilgrimages, and the like.

II. Question I. Do the vows of parents bind their children; and are vows made through a proxy binding? Response: The vows of parents in no way bind their children — since vows must be free, and must proceed from the will of the one vowing himself. The vows of parents are sometimes said to bind their children, insofar, that is, as the children consent to those same vows, and ratify them: in which sense the texts are to be understood and interpreted which speak of a son bound to a monastery by his parents' devotion, as recounted, for instance, in the chapter on this topic — for Pope Celestine III declared, in a certain decree, that this holds when it is duly approved and confirmed by the son. The son's mere silence, and taciturnity, is by no means sufficient for this consent truly to be held; besides mere negative consent, the son's express ratification and confirmation of the vow is required. The vows of parents are nonetheless not useless, since they aim at this: that they may do their part to bring it about that their children embrace and accept the vow. Vows made through a proxy hold, and bind the principal, or the one commissioning them, just as if made by himself — since one who acts through another acts, in effect, himself. And on this there is no disagreement among authors.

III. Question II. Can, or must, the one vowing fulfill his personal vow through another, when he cannot fulfill it himself? Response: The most common opinion teaches that the one vowing who cannot fulfill his personal vow himself is neither bound, nor indeed able, to carry it out through another. That he is not bound is clear: for a personal vow concerns the one vowing's own action; such a vow, therefore, does not bind to the act of another. That he likewise cannot do so is also established: for, if the one vowing can fulfill the vow himself, he cannot fulfill it through another; but if he cannot fulfill it himself, neither can he through another — since then he would not be doing what he promised; and, once rendered incapable of personal execution, every obligation ceases. So teach Paludanus (Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 3, art. 3), Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 2, art. 2), Suárez (Bk. IV, ch. 10, n. 2), Sánchez (Bk. II, ch. 15, n. 3), Navarrus (ch. 12, n. 44), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 4, §3), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 14), and others commonly.

IV. Question III. Is one who, through his own fault, has become incapable of observing a personal vow, bound to fulfill it through another? Response: Although a personal vow cannot, strictly speaking, be fulfilled through another, as has been said, nonetheless St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, §5) says: "If, however, he made a vow of devotion to go, an impediment supervening, he is not bound to go, or to send another, unless perhaps he was in default; and this happens when, being able, he was unwilling." This same opinion is held by Angles (s.v. Votum, 3, n. 7), Richard (Bk. IV, dist. 38, art. 4, q. 1, ad 1), the Carthusian (in Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 2, §4). It is asked; and it seems to be gathered from Scripture — for in Deuteronomy 23 we read: "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the Lord thy God will require it. And if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin." It also seems to be inferred from St. Thomas's teaching (II-II, q. 88, art. 3, ad 3), where he establishes that one who has become incapable through his own fault must do penance for the past sin, and have a prompt will to do what he can. And indeed it is safer, since one's own fault preceded, to apply some compensation.

V. The contrary opinion is more common, defended by Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 12, n. 17), where he cites several authors — Navarrus, Valentia, Sylvester; he also cites St. Thomas, who, though he does not expressly teach the former opinion, does not defend the contrary either, but merely lays down principles that are opposed to it. Rather, reason seems to press harder here. For personal vows so affect the person of the one vowing that, incapacity supervening, the vow yields. From the fact, however, that this incapacity arises from the fault of the one vowing, only this follows: that the one vowing is then bound to repent of the past sin, as the Angelic Doctor says; but it in no way follows that the one vowing owes it to fulfill it through another. Reason does indeed seem to persuade this. Nonetheless, in order that a more sincere penance for the sin committed may appear, and so that the one vowing may in some way compensate for his unfaithfulness toward God, he ought, in so weighty a matter, to choose the safer part.

VI. What if the one vowing, before he made the personal vow, was certain that he would never be able to fulfill it? Sylvester (s.v. Votum, 2, q. 10), Angles (s.v. Votum, 3, n. 7), Navarrus (ch. 12, n. 26), Sayr (in Clavis Regia, Bk. VI, ch. 7, dub. 5), Layman (Bk. IV, tract. 4, ch. 3, q. 5), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 12, n. 13, where he cites the Abbot, ch. Licet, on vows) teach that, in this case, he is bound to fulfill it through another. Since a vow concerning matter impossible for the one vowing himself is null, as we have said. When, then, the one vowing had this impossibility already known to him, it must be prudently presumed that he made his vow to be fulfilled through another — otherwise we would pronounce him a fool. The opposite is taught by Suárez, Trullench, Azor, Bonacina, Prado, Raphael de la Torre, Leander, and others. But the first opinion seems more probable.

VII. Question IV. Can real vows be fulfilled by another, even without the knowledge, or unwillingly, of the one vowing? Response: This little question contains three parts. First, that a real vow can be fulfilled by another, the most common opinion teaches — since the execution of a real vow lies in the obligation, or exhibition, of a thing promised — say, a chalice, a vestment, furniture, or any other thing. This, however, can be performed equally by another as by the one vowing. The second part, too — namely, that this real vow can be fulfilled by another, in the name of the one vowing, without that person's knowledge — is commonly maintained: since then the thing promised is really exhibited in the name of the one vowing; and nothing else is lacking except the consent of the one vowing, which is present through subsequent ratification. If, however, the one vowing were not merely ignorant, but also unwilling, then the more common opinion holds that the vow can in no way be fulfilled by another — and rightly: since, to satisfy either a vow or a precept, an intention of satisfying is required; but where there is coercion, there is no free resolve. Bonacina, however (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 4, §3), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 14, n. 1), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 25, q. 13) add that the vow, once fulfilled, though the one vowing was unwilling, holds valid, if the one vowing afterward ratifies the execution of the vow.

This opinion, however, does not convince me at all. For if, while the vow is being fulfilled, the one vowing resists, then certainly the execution of the vow is invalid on account of the resistance of the one vowing, or on account of the lack of a positive will, which the adversaries themselves necessarily require. But what is once invalid does not become valid through subsequent acts. The consent of the one vowing, then — whether real, or presumed — is necessary while the vow is being fulfilled. In the case supposed, not only is there no consent, but there is dissent: the vow, then, is not fulfilled. For a future, or subsequent, consent presupposes no execution of the vow at all; therefore it cannot render it valid. All this is quite true, if the force of the argument is considered. If, however, the thing promised has really been offered, and the one vowing detests his past omission and resistance, and shows a consent so efficacious that, had the thing promised not been offered, he would really offer it — then I would not compel him to a new offering, but only to penance for his past omission.

VIII. Question V. Is the one vowing, having become poor, bound to ask his friends for money, or to take up a trade unbecoming his state, or to accept money offered him as a gift, in order to fulfill a real vow? Response: The common opinion teaches that the one vowing is not bound to ask money from friends, nor to beg alms, nor to take up a trade contrary to his own state, in order to fulfill his vow — since he is reasonably presumed not to have wished to bind himself with so great a burden. It must be judged otherwise, however, if he was accustomed to live by the profit of some trade: for then that trade would not be unbecoming to his state. He is, however, bound to accept money, or an inheritance, offered to him as a gift, by which he could fulfill his own vow.

IX. Question VI. Does one who offers the promised thing to another satisfy the vow, if that other omits to offer it? For example: you vowed the celebration of ten Masses. You give alms to another priest, so that he might celebrate them. He fails to celebrate the Masses. Have you satisfied your vow? Response: Suárez affirms this (Bk. IV, ch. 10, n. 9), Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 15, n. 6), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 25, q. 12): you have sufficiently satisfied your vow. They say the vow was not to have the Masses actually celebrated, but to procure their celebration by the customary means. Likewise: you vowed to send someone to visit the thresholds of the Apostles. You agreed with him on the price. He, having received his stipend, failed to fulfill the vow. You remain free, they say, from the obligation — since for your part you performed the work promised. So teach the aforesaid authors. I do not dare absolutely disapprove this opinion; but it presents a difficulty to me: that the one vowing must do everything he can to fulfill his vow, as the Angelic Doctor teaches (II-II, q. 88, art. 3, ad 2). When, then, the one vowing perceives that his vow has not really been fulfilled, even though on account of another's wickedness, it seems he would still be bound to fulfill it, if he can do so without grave inconvenience. Certainly one who pays a debt through another is bound to a new payment, if the one to whom he gave the money for payment kept it for himself. And although this debt is to be paid from the virtue of justice, and a vow from that of religion, the disparity is nonetheless not so great that an argument could not rightly be made from one to the other, concluding that a similarly grave obligation applies in both cases. I add, moreover, that the aforesaid opinion has a place, when the one vowing had employed all moral diligence to choose an upright, faithful, and well-behaved man, so far as he himself could know, to fulfill the vow. But if he had been negligent in this choice, I would press him to fulfill the vow — for such a matter ought to be entrusted not to just anyone, but only to a most trustworthy man, just as money too is handed over to creditors not by anyone, but only by a man of trusted good faith.

X. Question VII. When a vow is mixed, consisting of both personal and real elements, can it be fulfilled through another? Response: Authors agree that a vow which is both personal and real cannot be fulfilled by another insofar as it is personal, for the reason assigned above; but that, insofar as it is real, it not only can, but must, be fulfilled by another, as has likewise been said above concerning a real vow. If, however, that real element in the vow is something truly accessory, which necessarily follows the principal element, as an instrument by which it is carried into execution, then there is no obligation to fulfill this real vow. For example: you vowed a pilgrimage to Loreto; you have fallen ill, so that you cannot undertake it: you are not bound to spend the sums that would have been necessary for the journey — say, to distribute money to the poor, or to give it in honor of the Blessed Virgin, and her sacred house. You are, however, not bound to this. If, however, you had vowed both the pilgrimage, and alms to be offered at that Church, you are bound to offer only the alms. If you have provided this, you have discharged your obligation well enough. If, however, having become incapable of the pilgrimage, you are bound to send another, you are bound to send the alms through another as well. Suárez (Bk. IV, ch. 20, n. 19 and following), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 15, n. 15), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 4, §3, n. 6), Castropalao (punct. 15), Bonacina (disp. 24, q. 14), and all commonly.

XI. Question VIII. Is one who has become incapable of paying a vow bound to apply some compensation? Response: Sylvester (s.v. Votum, 1, n. 55), Reginaldus (Bk. XVIII, q. 6), Suárez, Bonacina (disp. 4, punct. 4, §3, n. 7), and others commonly answer that he is not bound — since the one vowing is not presumed to have bound himself to this; and the Church herself does not oblige the faithful to compensate for a precept which they cannot fulfill. I myself would draw a distinction. If the incapacity arises without the fault of the one vowing, he is not bound to make use of compensation. But if the one vowing has, through his own fault, rendered himself incapable of executing the vow, I would, beyond penance for the past sin, oblige him to a fitting compensation. For no one ought to profit from his own iniquity.

XII. Question IX. Are heirs bound to the personal vows of testators? Response: Heirs, whether voluntary or necessary, are in no way bound to fulfill the personal vows of testators — since, as we have often said, such vows affect the person, and not the inheritance. So all agree.

XIII. Question X. Is an heir bound to pay the personal vows of the deceased, if the testator prescribed this to him? Response: That an heir is not bound to the personal vows of the deceased, since personal vows affect the person, and cease with his death, is certain, for the reason already indicated more than once. But whether, given the supposition that the testator prescribed absolutely, expressly commanding, that the heir should pay them, the heir would still not be bound — Leander (tract. 1, disp. 25, q. 12) answers, and cites Suárez, Raphael de la Torre, and Castropalao. But Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 16, n. 1) draws a distinction, and rightly, between a necessary heir and a voluntary heir. A necessary heir is bound to pay neither the real, nor the personal, vows of the testator, insofar as he is a necessary heir, unless he expressly accepts this condition of paying — for it pertains to justice for a necessary heir to fulfill obligations imposed by the testator under precept. A voluntary heir, however, if he accepts the inheritance with this express condition, is bound out of gratitude, in the case where he does not expressly refuse this condition. But if the testator absolutely prescribed the discharge of the vow, and, by that very fact, the heir accepts the inheritance, I do not see why a voluntary heir should not be bound. Here, however, you should note that the aforesaid authors distinguish, and note that a real vow's obligation differs from that of a personal one — namely, that real vows really can be fulfilled by another, but not personal ones. Wherefore, when we say that the heir is bound, we do not mean that he fulfills the personal vow of the testator, but that he owes it as an obligation of a certain kind of debt akin to a real vow, since the testator, in this respect, established this personal vow of his as a kind of pension imposed upon his heir. This I have said so that you should not think that we assert here that personal vows can really be fulfilled by another, or that the heir does not, properly speaking, fulfill his own vows, but the testator's — but rather that, freely accepting his inheritance, he freely undertakes to pay to himself...

XIV. Question XI. Can an heir, whether voluntary or necessary, be compelled, under penalty of forfeiting the inheritance, and of excommunication, to discharge the real vows of the testator? Response: All affirm that the heir, whether voluntary or necessary, is bound to discharge the real vows of the testator — since, the deceased having made the vow, he necessarily pledged his goods for its payment. Whoever succeeds, then, to the goods of the deceased must also succeed to the obligations attached to the inheritance — which is to be understood provided the obligations do not exceed the value of the inheritance. For, as to those goods to which a necessary heir necessarily succeeds — since they were not absolutely subject to the dominion of the testator — the testator cannot burden them. Wherefore an heir necessarily succeeds only to those real vows of the testator which do not damage his own legitimate portion, or those goods which are owed to him by right. That an heir can be compelled, under the penalties both of forfeiture of the inheritance, and of excommunication, to discharge the real vows of the deceased, is likewise certain among authors — although there is some disagreement as to excommunication, which Hostiensis, Zabarella, and John Andreae would have inflicted only when the heir had promised to fulfill the testator's vows, and had not afterward stood by his promises. Others commonly — namely, Sánchez, Sylvester, Bonacina, Palacios, Trullench, Leander — teach that the heir can be compelled, absolutely, under either penalty, without any distinction — which, if the cause is grave, I do not see why it should be called into controversy.

XV. Question XII. If the testator does not impose upon the heir the burden of discharging his real vows, or if he expressly says he does not wish his heir to be bound to them, is the heir nonetheless bound to discharge those real vows? Response: In both cases the heir is bound to discharge the testator's real vows. And in the first case this is clear; for real vows, contracted with God, affect the inheritance itself, and are a burden accompanying it, and a debt owed alongside it. Wherefore, just as other debts must be paid by the heir, so too must these. What, then, of the case in which the testator expressly says in his will that he does not wish the heir to be bound to fulfill the aforesaid real vows? Response: This same reasoning establishes that the heir is bound, once, that is, the testator has burdened his goods, he can no longer, by any means, exempt the heir from this obligation of paying the debts. For the testator can indeed exempt the inheritance from the burdens with which he himself burdened it toward men; but he cannot free it from those burdens by which he bound himself to God through vows. Whence, whoever wishes to enter into such an inheritance must pay all the debts to which it is liable. This, however, is to be understood when the vow was absolutely made, and contracted for no [limited] time. For if the vow were conditional — as if the testator had vowed to build a church for the Church, with the express condition that this obligation should apply only while he lived — then, upon his death, all obligation ceases, and the heir would be bound to nothing. All this is common ground. Suárez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 25), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 15, n. 18), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 5, §2, n. 8), Prado (ch. 31, q. 9, n. 15), Sayr (Bk. VI, ch. 12, n. 5, and disp. 25, q. 9), Navarrus (ch. 12, n. 51), Layman (Bk. IV, tract. 4, ch. 3, q. 6, n. 12), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 6), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 4, §5, n. 123), Castropalao (disp. 1, punct. 16, n. 3), Marín (tract. 9, disp. 3, sect. 5, n. 147). And note that the heir is bound to fulfill the testator's real vows not by virtue of religion — since he did not himself make the vows — but by a debt of justice, by reason of the inheritance accepted.

XVI. Question XIII. Is an heir bound to discharge real vows before entering upon the inheritance, or beyond the value of the inheritance, in the case where he has made no inventory, and has, by the judge's sentence, been declared liable and condemned to their discharge? Response: The heir is bound to discharge the testator's real vows neither before entering upon the inheritance, nor beyond its value, so long as it has not been accepted — all so teach. The disagreement is whether, once the inheritance has been accepted, and confession of the inventory omitted, the heir is bound beyond the value of the deceased's inheritance. For the affirmative opinion, Leander (loc. cit., q. 12) cites St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, §5, at the end). But the holy Bishop says not a word there about the inventory, or about payment beyond the value of the inheritance, but only says that the heir is bound to discharge the aforesaid vows when he himself had promised, and had bound himself, not by reason of the inheritance, but absolutely: for then he would be bound, even if he did not enter upon the inheritance. But Leander is to be excused, since he transcribed such a citation from Sánchez, who likewise cites St. Antoninus for the aforesaid opinion. Leander also cites Paludanus, Menchaca, Covarrubias, Velasco, Molina, Gregorio López, in his gloss on the law "On the Right of Deliberating," where it is established that an heir who does not make an inventory is bound to discharge debts beyond the value of the inheritance. But the more common opinion is the contrary — namely, that the heir is not bound beyond the value of the inheritance, even having omitted the inventory, to discharge, in the internal forum, either vows or legacies, or debts — provided, that is, that the inventory was not omitted in fraud. For the law which prescribes an inventory is enacted in penalty for the heir's negligence, or rests on a presumption of fraud. Wherefore, even after the judge's sentence, it seems to me more likely that, in the internal forum, the heir is not bound to discharge vows, legacies, and real debts beyond the value of the inheritance, whenever he has omitted to make the inventory without any fraud, or gravely culpable negligence.

XVII. To grasp this more clearly, it is worth noting, with Vázquez (I-II, q. 97, art. 4, disp. 163, ch. ult., n. 6), a twofold law resting on presumption. One is that which the legislator enacts because he presumes that what he forbids occurs in individual cases — and such is the presumption on which the Pope rests (ch. 15, on betrothal), where it is established that marriage is presumed to have followed upon betrothal when intercourse followed the betrothal — since he presumes that in individual cases such intercourse is exercised with marital affection, and such a law obliges in conscience in any case. The other is that on which the legislator does not presume that something similar occurs in individual cases; but the legislator prudently judges that frauds, evils, and harms commonly arise from some matter to the detriment of the common good; and therefore he establishes a general law, by which he forbids the cause, or occasion, of frauds and evils. This presumption is the foundation of every such law. Now when the presumption is of this latter kind, the law does not cease to oblige merely because, in one or another particular case, the presumption is false; but only when it is false for the most part. For when the reason of the law fails in one or another particular case, the law does not fail, but continues to oblige; otherwise, when it fails in general. This teaching, which Sánchez draws from Vázquez, seems to me quite probable. But it is subject to a very grave difficulty: namely, how it is to be gathered when a legislator presumes evil to occur in individual cases, and, resting on this presumption, enacts a law that fails when the presumption of fraud fails in a particular case; and when he absolutely forbids the matter, as a common and frequent cause of absurdities. This distinction is not so easy to discern, nor is it for just anyone to determine it. Otherwise, anyone could easily interpret a law as having been enacted for particular cases, not absolutely, and therefore claim not to be bound by the law in his own case, since in this case he is far removed from fraud.

XVIII. For the rest, that this teaching sometimes has a place, seems to me probable enough, especially in the matter under discussion — such that an heir, even after the judge's sentence, is not bound to discharge real vows beyond the value of the inheritance, when, without any fraud or fault, he omitted to make an inventory. Understand this of a fault apt to give rise to injustice. And for this opinion he cites Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 15, n. 37), Tostatus (ch. 30, q. 98), Sylvester (s.v. Votum, 2, q. 11), and he cites many others who teach that this doctrine has a place universally, in any matter whatsoever. Bartolus, Paludanus, John Andreae, Hostiensis, Felinus, Antonio Gómez, and others cited. Vega, Rodríguez, the theologians of Salamanca, Bonacina, and Leander. The reason is that a sentence which rests on a false presumption does not oblige, just as the law itself does not. Wherefore, just as the law does not oblige, so too neither does the judge's sentence.

XIX. Question XIV. Is an heir bound, to the detriment of his legitimate portion, to discharge the real vows of the testator? Response: Not a few affirm that he is bound. Navarrus (Bk. III, Consilia, tit. 4, n. 3), López, Rodríguez, Córdoba, and others cited by Sánchez (Bk. VI, on Marriage, disp. 36, and in his Summa, Bk. IV, ch. 15, n. 38), on the grounds that they contend that the debts of the testator are to be drawn from the whole mass of the inheritance, not only from that part concerning which the testator was free to dispose; therefore real vows are to be drawn out in the same manner. Sylvester (s.v. Votum, 2, q. 11) seems to incline to this opinion, insofar as he says that a son burdened in his legitimate portion can obtain a dispensation — which supposes such an obligation.

XX. The most common, and true, opinion is that the heir is not bound, to the detriment of his legitimate portion, to discharge real vows — indeed, not even any debts of the testator, which is manifest. For the legitimate portion of children is owed to them not merely by favor, but by right, as the laws establish. It is therefore true that the debts of the deceased are to be drawn from the whole mass of the inheritance, but only from that part concerning which the testator had the right to dispose. And although it is admitted that the testator, while living, could diminish the legitimate portion of the living by vows, and other pious alms; it does not follow from this that he could burden that same legitimate portion at his death. The reason is that the father, while living, has dominion over the legitimate portion; not so after death — since with death all dominion ceases. Covarrubias, Gregorio López, Angles, Rodríguez, Sánchez, Layman, Bonacina, Castropalao, Trullench, Sayr, Leander, Martínez de Prado, Antonio Gómez, the theologians of Salamanca, Marín, and commonly all recent authors.

XXI. Question XV. Can, or must, the heir, if he cannot fulfill the testator's real vows himself, fulfill them through another? Can he obtain a commutation from a confessor? Response: Just as the one vowing can fulfill his real vows through another, so too can the heir; indeed, since the heir cannot fulfill it himself, he is bound to do so through another. Hence, if the testator had vowed to go, or to send, someone to aid in a war against the enemies of the faith, the heir can send another in his place — indeed, he is bound to send one, if he himself cannot go. Nor, however, is he bound to the expenses which the one vowing would have incurred; for the heir is bound out of justice, and not, like the one vowing, out of religion, to discharge the deceased's real vow — wherefore, just as, if the testator had deliberated to take three or four servants for his sole retinue and company, the heir is not bound to this; but only to make such expenses as are reckoned necessary for carrying out the vow, and the principal end of the one vowing. Nor can a confessor commute such real vows of the deceased; for just as a confessor cannot commute other contracts to which the heir is liable, so too he cannot commute real vows which the heir, not spontaneously, but by contract, is bound to discharge.

XXII. Question XVI. Is a monastery, succeeding by hereditary right to the goods of a professed Religious, bound to discharge the real vows which the professed had made in the world, and not yet fulfilled? Response: The proposed question can bear several senses; we must therefore draw a distinction. First, if the monastery is constituted heir on account of the one vowing's death, there is no doubt that it is bound to discharge the vows. If, however, the monastery is made heir by title of that same person's profession, then Sánchez, Bonacina, Castropalao, La Croix, Marín, and others draw a distinction, and resolve as follows. If the vows were accepted by the one for whose benefit the vows were made (for example: Paul, before entering religious life, vows to donate a chalice to a church, and promises it to the parish priest, who accepts in the Church's name), then the monastery is bound; otherwise, if the promise had not been made by the one vowing — for then, even if the parish priest had accepted of his own accord, this acceptance, made without the promise of the one vowing, would not induce a debt of justice... If, however, the vows were not accepted, the Monastery is not bound to discharge them. So teach Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 15, n. 32), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 5, §2, n. 5), Castropalao (disp. 1, punct. 16, n. 5), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 15), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 25, q. 15 and 17), La Croix (Bk. III, part 1, n. 478), Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 41, n. 66), Marín (tract. 9, disp. 3, sect. 5, n. 153) — because, they say, all vows, both personal, as all admit, and real, are extinguished by solemn profession in an approved religious order. Such vows, they say, are extinguished not by commutation, nor by relaxation, but by a most perfect payment, such as the perpetual consecration of the whole of the one vowing, made to God through profession. The aforesaid Doctors maintain that this same opinion of theirs holds true even if the one vowing had expressly declared that his real vows are not extinguished by his profession, but are to be discharged by the Monastery as his heir — from which, however, Bonacina dissents (disp. 4, punct. 2, §2, n. 3).

XXIII. It cannot be denied that the aforesaid opinion, which teaches that the real vows of the one vowing are extinguished by his solemn profession, is absolutely probable, when the one vowing does not object, for the reason given — namely, on account of the sublime sacrifice of monastic profession, which is of such worth that it can extinguish any debt whatsoever. St. Antoninus, however, defends the contrary opinion (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, §8); and this opinion seems truer to me, for this reason which I assign: the proper and unique victim of the sacrifice of religious profession is the person of the one vowing, and all things affecting that person. Wherefore it is excellently inferred that all personal vows are extinguished by such profession. But temporal things, which were under the dominion of the one vowing, are something extraneous to the profession itself; for these goods in no way pertain to the profession, but affect the inheritance of the one vowing — just as personal vows affect the person.

XXIV. I say, then, first, that it is more likely that the Monastery, which has been constituted heir through the profession of the one vowing, is bound to the real vows of the professed one vowing — since these real vows accompany the inheritance, which was thus burdened, rightfully, by its owner. Therefore, so long as the owner himself does not remove this burden, it remains attached to his inheritance. By his religious profession, the one vowing removes, or discharges, every debt affecting his own person, since he consecrates his whole self to God; but by no means does his inheritance, by virtue of such a profession, get released from the burdens attached to it — since such an inheritance is something distinct from the profession itself, as has been said above.

XXV. I say, second: when the one vowing, before making his profession, openly declares that he wishes his real vows to be fulfilled by the Monastery constituted as his heir, then the Monastery is bound to discharge them. This second conclusion seems to me not only more probable, but the only true one. It is defended, as I said, by Bonacina (loc. cit.), and — what has more weight — by St. Antoninus (loc. cit.) and Paludanus (Bk. IV, dist. 88, art. 3, n. 15, concl. 3). The reason is clear from what has been said: since these real vows affect the inheritance, which is something extraneous to the profession, and in no way comprehended within it. It should be added: when the one professing expressly declares that he does not wish his real vows to be extinguished by his own inheritance, it can be said, by this same reasoning, that they really are extinguished. For, says Sánchez (loc. cit.), following Sylvester (s.v. Votum, 4, q. 7, n. 3), whether one about to profess declares this intention of his before the instant of profession, or at the very instant of profession, or after the instant of that same profession. If after profession has been made, then it is certain that the vow is null, since after profession all vows are null. If, however, at the instant of profession, they are held as vows made after profession. If, however, the Novice declares this will of his before the instant of profession, then, upon the profession supervening, the vow already remains discharged.

This is the reasoning which Sánchez, following Sylvester, proposes. But this reasoning, in light of what has been said, collapses, and is futile: since it only proves that personal vows made before profession are extinguished, but not real ones. Moreover, the will by which the Novice, before profession, institutes the Monastery, or some other person, as his heir, is valid; and that inheritance devolves by right to whomever the Novice appointed his own heir. Why, then, could he not impose some burden upon it, or confirm the burden already attached to such an inheritance? Why? I ask: could not a Novice, before his profession, burden his own inheritance with some legacy or vow? Could a supervening profession cancel free pious legacies? Could it not cancel real vows? Not, therefore, real vows either, as far as the discharge of a real pension is concerned. I ask: could not a Novice, before his profession, vow, and really give, a chalice, or some other gift, or alms, to a Church, or to a poor person, from his own inheritance? Who would deny this? Why, then, could he not declare that he wishes a vow already made to be fulfilled by his heir? Not to belabor the point: just as a Novice, before profession, can burden his inheritance with other pensions, so too he can burden it with the discharge of real vows to be made by his heir — and, just as an heir is bound to discharge other legacies and real debts, so too he would be bound to discharge real vows, whether the heir be a Monastery, or a secular man, or family. Although, then, several recent authors, following one another, hold the opposite view, the reasoning, nonetheless, in my own judgment, establishes that our own opinion is true, and the contrary casuistic opinion false.

XXVI. Question XVII. In what order should the heir discharge real vows, compared with debts, and legacies? Response: This little question has many parts, each of which must be explained. And first, it is certain among all that the payment of debts arising from justice must precede any vows or legacies. For one who is bound to another cannot offer God victims taken from another's property. For it is said (Ecclesiasticus 34): "The offerings of him that offereth of the substance of the poor are as one that killeth the son in the presence of his father." And (cause 17, q. 4): from Augustine it is said: "He who wishes, having disinherited his son, to make the Church his heir, seeks another who will accept it — but, God being favorable, he will find no one." Thus Augustine. The payment of vows, however, precedes legacies — since vows bind the one vowing, but not legacies, which the testator freely established. First, then, real vows are to be discharged, and after that, legacies.

XXVII. Question XVIII. If the testator was bound by several vows, and the inheritance is insufficient to discharge them all, which ones must the heir discharge? Response: Tiraquellus, Angelo Gómez, Gutiérrez, and others whom Sánchez cites, Sylvester, Gregorio López, maintain that they are to be discharged pro rata — that is, in proportion to the inheritance, or the free portion, distributed among all the vows, so that something is discharged from each vow. But the common opinion teaches that the graver vows are to be preferred to the others — since the heir represents the person of the deceased, and succeeds in his place, and consequently in his obligation; but the one vowing was bound to discharge first the vows concerning the graver matter: therefore so is the heir. If, however, it is doubtful which vow is of greater weight, then the vow made earlier is to be discharged first. Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 14, n. 2), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 25, q. 12), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 5, §2, n. 21), Castropalao (disp. 1, punct. 16, n. 14), the theologians of Salamanca (n. 158), Marín (tract. 9, disp. 3, sect. 5). To the argument of the contrary opinion, it is answered by denying the consequence: namely, that when the inheritance is not sufficient to discharge all the vows, they must therefore be discharged pro rata. And the difference is that the heir represents the person of the one vowing, and is bound to preserve the same order which the one vowing himself was bound to observe: for the one vowing was bound to discharge first the graver vow; so, then, must the heir do likewise.

XXVIII. But if there are several vows, and it is not clear which was made earlier, Bonacina, Marín, Leander maintain that the heir can choose which he prefers — and the reason is that, as Sánchez admits, the one vowing himself, given the doubt as to which was the better good, and as to priority in time, could choose whatever he preferred: therefore the heir too, who, as Sánchez admits, represents the person of the one vowing, and succeeds to his obligation, can do the same. And although the heir is bound out of justice to the payment of the vows, this does not change the order of payment, but only presses more urgently for payment: and it does not permit the heir to seek either dispensation or commutation of the vows, as the one vowing could, who was bound only by the title of religion. This opinion seems to me both more probable and truer, especially since the pro rata payment of vows often does not redound so much to God's glory and the benefit of one's neighbor as the entire payment of one or another vow, which the heir prudently chooses to discharge. If the vows were to build some pious edifice, to offer some notable gift, to erect an altar, and the like, and were paid only pro rata, nothing could be brought to completion. Wherefore I judge it altogether probable and true that, especially in such cases, the heir, like the one vowing, can choose the discharge of the vows in the case supposed — provided the heir acts in good faith, and selects for discharge those vows which redound to God's greater glory.

XXIX. Question XIX. When several persons become heirs, is each one bound in solidum to discharge the debts of the deceased? Response: No one is bound in solidum, except insofar as he is heir. Therefore, since each is heir only in part, he is bound to discharge the vows only for that part — but he will have a right of action to recover the corresponding part from the other heirs. This is the most common opinion. Two points, however, must be added. First, if the thing promised to God is in the possession of one of the heirs, then he alone will be bound in solidum. Second, if the other heirs refuse to pay, each one is bound in solidum — provided the part of the inheritance suffices — since the heir is not bound, as has been said, to the testator's vows from his own resources. But the inheritance, in whatever part of it, is liable to discharge legacies, debts, and vows, and the whole of it is bound. Therefore, when one heir refuses to pay, another is bound. Castropalao believes this holds true, however, only when the heirs refuse to pay out of malice; not so, if they omit payment through incapacity. But it seems to me that the argument adduced is conclusive in both cases. Since the fact that each part of the inheritance is bound to the discharge of the vows depends neither on the malice, nor on the poverty, of the heirs, but on the very institution of the testator, or on a certain contract arising naturally between the testator and the heir. Nor does it help to answer that this part is not bound entirely to the discharge of debts, but jointly with the other part — for this is true absolutely speaking: since, as we have said, each of the heirs is bound absolutely to pay pro rata; but on the hypothesis that the co-heirs are unwilling to pay, whether out of malice, or are unable to pay through incapacity, then the whole part of the inheritance becomes liable to the discharge of the vows. So it seems to me more likely, against Leander and Castropalao.

XXX. Question XX. Is a donee bound to carry out the donor's vows? Response: Authors commonly answer that he is not bound — since the donor really retains, even after the vow, dominion over the thing promised to God, and can transfer it to another. The donee, then, is not bound to discharge the said vows, even if the donor should become incapable. He is not bound by reason of the thing received, which, as we have said, was really subject to the donor's dominion; nor is he bound on account of an unlawful acceptance, since this acceptance is contrary only to religion, not to justice, which alone founds the debt of restitution. Nor can such a debt arise from any tacit pact, or contract, entered into with the donor — since this only holds true in the case of heirs; for the laws so provide, because the heir represents the person of the testator who made the vow; the donee, however, in no way represents the person of the donor. All this seems true in strict rigor, as one may reason absolutely from the laws. But for the rest, what donee, mindful of his own salvation, would wish to retain for himself victims already once offered to God? For although this would not be theft — since those goods were owed to God not from justice, but from religion — nevertheless it is sacrilege, and the donee would be cooperating in the donor's sin. Therefore I would not absolve a donee from the discharge of the vow in the absence of an inheritance. Consider this: Peter gave to the poor, or rather to God, by vow, what he had. The donor, therefore, cannot give what is not his own — that is, what he has consecrated to God by vow. Dominion over that thing he retains, but a dominion burdened with the debt of rendering that same thing to God. The debt, you say, is one of religion, not of justice: this is true. But what follows from this? You will sin, then, if not against justice, at least against religion, by retaining goods consecrated to God. Let each consult the light of nature, all casuistic subtleties set aside; and no one well-behaved, and a sincere worshipper of the Christian religion, will feel that he can, with a safe conscience, retain what he knows to have been previously consecrated to God by the donor with a religious rite.

XXXI. Question XXI. Is a legatee bound to fulfill the real vows of the one bequeathing? Response: According to common opinion, the legatee is bound to discharge the real vows of the one bequeathing. The reason for the difference, say Castropalao, Leander, Sánchez, and others, is that the donee acquires dominion over the thing donated on account of its delivery to him; which, though unlawful, is nonetheless valid and firm in the line of justice, even though contrary to religion. But the legatee must acquire dominion over the legacy from the value of the promise made in the will; which, if it is null — as it is null, being matter contrary to a vow, since then it is a promise concerning something unlawful — the legacy perishes: for the legatee obtains the legacy through the promise, which, if it concerns something unlawful, is null. But it is unlawful for the one bequeathing to promise to another what he had already consecrated to God. The donee acquires dominion over the donated thing through its real delivery, and acceptance, which, although unlawful, is valid, and therefore of full worth. So, in these very words, Castropalao. The difference is stated more clearly. In the aforesaid case, the difference lies in this: the one bequeathing promises to a man what he had already consecrated to God. However true this distinction may be, I myself, in practice, would oblige both the donee and the legatee, in the absence of sufficient inheritance, to discharge the real vows which affect all the goods of the one bequeathing, or of the testator. I do not deny, however — indeed, I admit — that the legatee is bound by a stronger title. Hence, if the legatee obtains the specific thing promised to God, he is bound to hand the thing over to God, since no legacy of the one bequeathing was valid concerning a thing already consecrated to God. If, however, the thing bequeathed in specie was not consecrated to God, and the inheritance is not sufficient to fulfill his vows, the legacy collapses, and consequently is null. For, as the aforesaid authors reason quite well, either the testator, when he instituted the legacy, foresaw that his inheritance would suffice for both the vows and the legacy; or he did not foresee this. If he foresaw it, and the inheritance really does suffice, the legacy is not null. If, however, the testator believed his inheritance sufficient, and in this he was mistaken, this institution of the legacy is nonetheless not entirely null; but an estimate of the value of the thing promised to God will be granted, says Sánchez, into the legatee's hand, and the heir will pay the value to that same legatee, so that the promised thing may be rendered to God.

XXXII. Question XXII. When a Prince, on account of the crime of treason, condemns the one vowing to the full penalty, and consigns his goods to the treasury, is the Prince, or the treasury, bound to discharge the real vows of the one vowing? Response: The affirmative answer is already gathered from what has been said — since these real vows affect the goods. The treasury can, by right, take only those goods which are free of burdens belonging to the one vowing. Just as, then, the treasury is bound to pay the real debts and legacies, so too the real vows of the condemned rebel. This is also established from the law "Those who cannot" and from the law "It is said," with the Gloss. Sánchez, Layman, Gobat, Sporer commonly teach this; and the matter is self-evident.