Chapter III — On the time by which a vow must be fulfilled

I. I will dispatch the proposed question briefly, both because it is easy of resolution, and because more will need to be said concerning the religious state. Some points proper to this place will be resolved in the following questions.

II. Question I. When the one vowing has not assigned a time for the extent of the vow, by what time must he fulfill it? Response: One can make a vow with respect to time in two ways. First, it is certain, by constituting a time for its execution — as if you vow to enter religious life within a year, to keep a fast on all Fridays that occur while you live, and the like. Of this there is no difficulty: the one vowing is not bound to execute the vow, except upon the arrival of, or within, the time defined for the observance of the vow. Second, one can make a vow with no interval of time set at all — as if he vows to enter religious life, to distribute alms. And when a vow is made in this manner, the one vowing is bound to fulfill it as soon as he conveniently can. This is openly given (Deut. 23): "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the Lord thy God will require it. And if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin." This too is impressed upon us (Ecclesiastes 5): "If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it: for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him." All the Doctors teach this. St. Thomas (II-II, q. 88, art. 3, ad 3), Sylvester (s.v. Votum, 11, q. 6 and 5), Armilla (s.v. Votum, n. 5), Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 15, q. 10), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 14, n. 1), Suárez (ch. ult., n. 1), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 5), Layman (Bk. IV, tract. 4, ch. 3, n. 5, q. 4), Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 13), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 5, n. 128), Marín (tract. 9, disp. 3, sect. 4, n. 113), and all others. The reason is clear: the obligation of a vow arises from the promise made to God. This promise, however, obliges immediately; for since no time has been designated, if it does not oblige as soon as it can conveniently be fulfilled, it will never oblige at all, since no better reason can be assigned for this or that other time.

III. This, however, must be understood with some moderation, and is to be gathered from the intention of the one vowing, and from other circumstances. This is what we mean by "immediate" payment of a vow — as is said in the chapter "On solutions," where it is said that no fixed period of time is to be understood by "immediately," but only that the smallness of the delay in fulfilling this vow, and the reasonableness of the cause for omitting it in this manner, is to be assessed. If you vowed to enter religious life as soon as possible, you can defer it for some suitable time, so that you may become more robust for enduring the labors and burdens of religious life — though this rarely occurs, since anyone who embraces religious life, relying on God's help, and thus fortified, can bear all things. You can also defer your entrance until your parents' anger has calmed, so that you may assist them, if poor, or arrange your sister's marriage. One must, however, proceed prudently and cautiously in these matters, as all advise, lest, that is, there be danger of not fulfilling the vow at all. This too must be kept in mind: vows to enter religious life, to serve a hospital, and the like, are said to diminish with the delay of time — since the more you defer the entrance or execution, the less devoted you are toward it, and the less you serve God and the hospital. But those vows whose observance does not decrease on account of a delay of time admit a longer span of time as to execution — such as vows to make a pilgrimage to the House of Loreto, to distribute a hundred gold pieces in alms, and the like of this kind — since, whether you carry it out this year or next, you always render the same worship to God by their execution.

IV. But how much delay of time, in vows which diminish with delay, suffices to constitute a mortal sin, cannot easily be resolved. Some teach that the entrance into religious life can be deferred for a space of three years — which opinion, necessity aside, is certainly too lax. Castropalao's opinion seems reasonable (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 13, n. 7): that a delay of six months in entering religious life, or serving a hospital, is a notable quantity of time. But, if there is no danger, this must be gathered from the circumstances. For if the delay carries with it the danger of omitting the execution of the vow altogether, even a small quantity of time will constitute a grave fault; and if some reasons, though not so grave, arise, a greater delay can occur without grave fault. In sum, this is to be left to the judgment of prudent men.

V. Question II. Is a vow fulfilled once the assigned time has passed? Response: You can attach the execution of your vows to time in two ways. First, by establishing that the execution of the vow not be extended beyond the appointed time. Second, by intending to fulfill the vow made within a determined time. If the vow is made in the first manner, you are bound, even once the elapsed appointed time has passed, to fulfill the vow. For example: if you vowed to return to Peter the hundred you owe him within a month, once the month has passed, the debt of fulfilling the vow is not extinguished — since then the vow is absolute, and the designation of time is meant to spur on, or hasten, the observance of the vow. On the contrary, if you vowed in the second manner, once the prefixed time has passed, the obligation of the vow is extinguished — just as ecclesiastical precepts are extinguished in similar cases, such as fasting on the vigils of Saints' feasts, observing the four seasons, hearing Mass, and the like, when these are not fulfilled on the prescribed days — since in vows and precepts, time is assigned as the term of the obligation. Wherefore, once the term has elapsed, the obligation lapses.

VI. The difficulty, rather, turns on this: how is it to be gathered that a vow is bound to time in such a way that, once it has elapsed, its obligation is extinguished, when the intention of the one vowing is not clear? To this authors commonly answer that a vow is then to be judged bound to time, as the term within which its execution must be completed, and beyond which the obligation does not extend, when, according to the estimation of prudent men, some circumstance is affected by a special devotion to some Saint — for example, you vowed to fast on the vigil of some Saint; if you did not fast on that day, you are no longer bound to the fast. Others say the same: if you vowed to fast this month on all Fridays, in honor of the Passion of Christ, and on all Saturdays, in homage to the Blessed Virgin — since, they say, you vowed to fast on the Fridays and Saturdays of this month, not of another. So teach Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 14, n. 91), Bonacina (disp. 4, punct. 3, n. 6), Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 14, n. 3). But I would say that, when the express intention of the one vowing is not clear, it is more probable that, once the month has passed, the one vowing is bound to fast on the Fridays and Saturdays of the following month — since all Fridays, all Saturdays, throughout the whole year, are of the same character, and the Fridays and Saturdays of one month do not contain a special worship, nor a particular circumstance, which would found a correct presumption that the one vowing wished to designate that month as the term of the obligation to be extinguished within it. All the more so, since, for such a day to be said to be a term beyond which the vow does not oblige, such a day must have been principally prefixed by the one vowing. For if such a day was added less principally, it is certain that, once that day, week, or month has elapsed, the vow is still to be fulfilled. For example: you vowed to enter religious life on the feast day of some Saint, for whom you burn with special devotion — even if you do not enter religious life on the prefixed day, you are still bound to the entrance into religious life — since you did not attach that day as the principal motive of your entrance, but as something less principal, and as something exciting your devotion. No certain rule, however, can be assigned; but the intention of the one vowing must be consulted, and the circumstances examined.

VII. When it is doubtful whether a vow is attached to time as the term limiting the obligation, beyond which the vow does not oblige, or merely as an interval to spur on and hasten its execution, the more probable opinion, and one held commonly, teaches that the assigned time is to be judged as having been meant to spur on, not to end, the execution of the vow; and that, consequently, once the term has elapsed, the vow must still be fulfilled. Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 14, n. 38), Castropalao (tract. 15, punct. 14, n. 4), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 5, §1, n. 14), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 5, n. 132), and others commonly, against Diana, of which more below. Hence, if a vow is attached to time not on account of special devotion, but for some particular benefit of the one vowing, the omission of the vow must be made up at another time — as if someone vowed to confess every eighth day, to fast, or to perform some other good work, so as to obtain victory over temptations, and afterward omitted this once, similar cases must be made up in the following week, especially since the principal end of vowing such a thing every week presses on, and the obligation succeeds, once the time has passed, without an interruption of the perpetual vow. If, however, the vows were perpetual, and someone omitted them for one week, I would not oblige him to confess, or fast, twice in the following week.

VIII. What has been said must be understood equally of real, and of personal, vows — when, however, the express intention of the one vowing is clear. For even alms can be made in honor of some Saint, in memory of Christ's Passion, or the worship of the Blessed Virgin; and thus on Saturdays, Fridays, etc., such that, once these have passed, the obligation ceases — when, however, as I said, it can be gathered that the one vowing wished to bind himself in this way. For the rest, when the express intention of the one vowing is not clear, it must be said that real vows are not bound to time as a term extinguishing the obligation; but in these vows time is commonly set as a circumstance to hasten the execution of the vow; and consequently, once that time has passed, the obligation of the vow still presses, as the common opinion teaches. Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 14, n. 36), Vázquez (I-II, disp. 146, ch. 2), Bonacina (disp. 4, punct. 3, §1, n. 10), Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 14, n. 6), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 5, n. 131), and others.

IX. Question III. Is the one vowing bound to anticipate the time designated for the vow's obligation? Response: The most common opinion of authors is that the one vowing is not bound to anticipate the execution of the vow attached to such a day, as the term of fulfilling and ending the obligation — for example, if you vowed to fast on the vigil of St. Francis, and afterward foresaw that on that day you would not be able to keep the fast, you are by no means bound to anticipate the fast: for the obligation of a vow does not oblige beyond the intention of the one vowing. Now the one vowing, when he principally intends to show God worship by fasting determinately on the vigil of such a Saint, has already made it clear that he did not wish to bind himself to fasting outside that particular day. This is also evident in several ecclesiastical precepts. You cannot, on Sunday, hear Mass, recite the canonical hours the next day, fast in Lent — you are not bound to anticipate the observance of those precepts. If, however, the time designated for the execution of the vow admits of some latitude — such that it is not attached to a single day, but comprehends several days, or weeks, months, or years — then, if you foresee that at the end of the time designated for the execution of the vow you will be prevented from observing it, you are bound to anticipate its execution within that interval of time. For example: you vowed that you would fast within a year: if you foresee that you will not be suited to fulfilling your vows at the term of the designated interval of time — say, at the end of the month, or at the end of the year — you are bound to anticipate its execution: for you are not anticipating the time of the obligation, but a time unsuited for its execution. This is confirmed by the example of the Church's precepts. You foresee an impediment to hearing Mass around midday: you are bound to anticipate, and hear it in the morning, as all teach. You foresee an impediment to confessing once at the end of the year: you are bound to anticipate. St. Thomas (Bk. IV, dist. 38, art. 3, qc. 1, ad 7), Suárez (Bk. IV, ch. 12, n. 7), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 5, §1, n. 15), Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 13, n. 3), Reginaldus (Bk. XII, n. 236), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 24, q. 2), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 3, n. 34).

X. Question IV. Is one who vowed to give a slave to a hospital, if he should kill him, bound to substitute another? Response: Authors commonly deny this — since the sin committed against a vow is not against justice, which alone obliges to restitution, but only against religion; and by this reasoning Tamburini (Bk. III, ch. 16, §2, n. 13) resolves this case: Antonia vowed her entire dowry to God, as soon as she should recover it from the heirs of her deceased husband. She obtained half of it; the other half she gave in bad faith to her parents, although it was dedicated to God by vow. She is not bound, he says, to make up the difference; she only sinned against her vow. Certainly, if the principles of law are considered, only justice — that is, that justice which is called commutative — obliges to restitution. For the rest, I would scarcely absolve any of those who, by their own malice, subtract victims immolated to God, from the debt of substituting an equivalent for them. For although it is admitted that real vows do not oblige to restitution when they do not concern matters of justice, nevertheless, when real vows have been dedicated to God, and the victims subtracted from the debt of substituting them, if they carry with them such a deformity, and a certain injury to justice as would make it difficult for the one vowing to free himself from the payment of his vow through his own iniquity — this at least holds... —that a confessor ought at least to impose it as a burden of penance upon the sacrilegious violator.