Chapter IV — On the doubtful vow. When the one vowing, in doubt, must fulfill it

I. Several difficulties requiring examination are contained in the proposed question. For the doubt regarding the matter of a vow can be manifold. First, you can doubt whether you made the vow, or not. Second, when you are certain that you made it, you can doubt whether you have fulfilled it; you can also doubt about the quantity of the thing promised by the vow. The more celebrated controversy among authors is whether, when the doubt concerns the very making of the vow, the one vowing is bound. And the resolution of this question depends on that never-sufficiently-lamented invention of Probabilism. Much would therefore need to be said here pertaining to that treatise, which, God granting, we shall handle according to its importance, yet within the limits of our own slight ability.

II. Before I approach the matter, I must first set forth the distinction between doubt and light suspicion, or scruple, that is, imprudent doubt. Our discussion here, then, does not concern doubt resting on no probable foundation, which is not a true doubt, but an imprudent suspicion of an anxious mind, or a scruple; and that this is to be rejected, all teach. Castropalao, Leander, the theologians of Salamanca, and other Probabilists soon to be cited, omit this distinction here, and speak absolutely of "doubt," in the sense of the true opinion; whereby a not inconsiderable disservice is done — since, when many inept and irrational doubts occupy the mind, and torment the conscience of certain scrupulous people, the less experienced reader easily persuades himself that the one vowing, doubtful about the making of the vow, is absolutely not bound.

III. Now, then, we speak not of empty doubts, not of scruples and suspicions, but of true doubt, which, on account of probable conjectures on either side, leaves the intellect so suspended and undecided that it cannot form a judgment on either side: it is concerning this true doubt, I say, that there is controversy among authors. Some teach that no one is bound to fulfill a vow whose very making the one vowing doubts. Sánchez (Bk. II, on Marriage, disp. 40, sect. 6, n. 14), López (Part I, Instructions, ch. 25), Henríquez (Bk. XI, ch. 11, n. 9), Egidio de Coninck (Bk. IV, ch. 1, n. 16), Suárez (Vol. V, disp. 34, dub. 10, n. 26), Malder (in III, I-II, q. 19, art. 7, disp. 87), Layman (Bk. II, tract. 1, ch. 5, §4, n. 31), Filliucci (tract. 21, ch. 4, n. 165), Del Bene (tract. 3, on conscience, dub. 3), Martínez de Prado (ch. 31, q. 5, §1), Medina (Bk. I, ch. 14, §7), Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 3, art. 2), Tamburini (Bk. II, ch. 3, §7, near the end, n. 2), Cardinal Diana (Vol. VIII, tract. 12, resol. 18), Sporer (tract. 1, preamble, ch. 1, §1, n. 145), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 1, n. 84), and Probabilists commonly, resting on the principle: "The condition of the possessor is the better one" — the one vowing is in possession of some liberty against the vow, since it is certain that a man is free, but doubtful whether he has bound himself by a vow.

IV. The contrary opinion is upheld by almost all the ancient theologians, and by all those, among more recent ones too, who have declared a righteous and just war on Probabilism. First, I will produce the testimonies of some holy Doctors. St. Thomas, in express words, teaches that in a doubtful vow the safer part is to be chosen (Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 1, qc. 2, ad 3): "If, however, he doubts how he behaved in vowing, he ought to take the safer way, lest he commit a wrong." St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, §5, before §6): "If, however, they doubt whether they intended to bind themselves, it must be said that, since one is in doubt whether one can, or cannot, fulfill it, it is safer to do so, lest that day be prolonged, or transferred to some other good thing." Likewise §10, near the end: "In the third case, however, when there is doubt, since one who exists in doubt whether he transgresses the vow, and consequently sins mortally, is bound to place himself in a safe position — namely, that he not transgress the vow." The reason for this is drawn by these Doctors from the sacred canons; for Pope Eugene I, in a certain decree (Bk. IV, tit. 1, on betrothal and marriage): "In matters that are doubtful, what we consider more certain, we ought to hold." And Innocent III (ch. Illud, on excommunicated Clerics): "In doubtful matters, the safer path is to be chosen." And Clement III (ch. Ad audientiam, on voluntary or accidental homicides), says: "In doubtful matters we ought to choose the safer opinion." Nearly all the more ancient theologians agree with these Fathers — the Summae of Rosella, Trovamala, Pisanella, Sylvestrina, Armilla, whose texts, when we treat of doubt, we shall give in their own express words, for all of them may be read at the source. I will now indicate some among the more recent ones. Vázquez (I-II, q. 1, art. 6, disp. 65, ch. 3, and disp. 66, ch. 1), Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 15, q. 4), Salas (unique treatise, sect. 17), Turrianus (q. 49, q. 2), Natalis Alexander (Bk. IV, art. 21, and disp. 66, ch. 2, q. 21, tract. 8, n. 162), Sayr (in Clavis Regia, Bk. I, ch. 12, n. 9 and 36), Luiz (Vol. II, disp. 25, q. 21, n. 6), Basile de Marriage (Bk. X, ch. 15, n. 3), Pérez (in Laurea Salmanticensis, cert. 10, dub. 1), Montefinos (I-II, disp. 29, q. 4, §3, n. 121), Pedro Cornejo (in St. Thomas, tract. 8, q. 19, disp. 4, ch. 1), Pontas (s.v. Votum, dub. 3, n. 6), Gonet (tract. 11, on the first precept of the Decalogue, q. 8, dub. 2, n. 1), Antoine (tract. on the virtue of religion, ch. 3, q. 5), and all the other rigorous Probabilorists.

V. The reason for this opinion rests entirely on the sacred canons, which prescribe that in doubtful matters the safer opinion is to be chosen. What of the fact that the very light of rational nature prescribes, in all matters of every kind — whether pertaining to obtaining bodily health or avoiding temporal loss, or acquiring goods — that the safer course be embraced in doubtful matters?

VI. The theologians of Salamanca, and Probabilists commonly, respond that the sacred canons, St. Thomas, and other Doctors, must be understood of practical doubt, but not of speculative doubt. A charming, and quite empty, response indeed! What, I ask you, is this "speculative doubt"? The canons, and the aforesaid Doctors, speak of a doubt of fact — namely, whether the vow was made or not. What speculation is there here? They speak of a doubtful conscience, which has probable reasons for asserting the making of the vow, and equal reasons for denying it — and it is therefore called doubtful because the mind cannot form a judgment on either side, since it hesitates because of equal reasons on either part. If you call this "speculative," all doubts will be speculative. They perhaps understand a "practical doubt" as that which occurs while one must act: for then the agent doubts practically, whenever, while acting, he doubts. But this speculation is vain, and quite ridiculous: for it is necessary that the agent always doubt whenever, while acting, the intellect, on account of equal reasons on either side, remains suspended.

VII. You are mistaken, they say. For there are given principles by which the doubt is laid aside, and a judgment is formed which is called "practically practical." By this judgment, which is also called the "reflex," the clouds of any doubt whatsoever are dispelled. What, I ask you, are such principles, which, the doubt having been dispelled, induce moral certainty? They are, they say, hidden in the depths of human liberty, which cannot be dislodged from its possession except by certainty — since the condition of the possessor is the better one. But this rule holds only in matters of justice, to avoid disputes and confusion in civil society, as jurists themselves, and the Doctors, explain. In other doubtful matters, however, that rule by no means holds — especially in the matter of eternal salvation, which must be preferred to human life, let alone liberty. But more on this invention in its proper place. For now let it suffice to have stated the true opinion concerning the doubtful vow alone.

VIII. I will only point out this: that the theologians of Salamanca (loc. cit., n. 144), following Diana, Trullench, Palao, and the other Probabilists, have descended into such laxity as to teach that the one vowing is free from the vow, even if, being in doubt, he leans more toward favoring the vow — since he has stronger reasons on this side — because, they say, although stronger reasons press in favor of the vow, if these are nonetheless not so efficacious as to generate a certain assent for that part, but still leave the matter doubtful, then the certain possession of the other side must outweigh that inequality, and a prudent judgment must pronounce in its favor.

IX. Two things here I would have you weigh carefully. The first is that, by the adversaries' own admission, our discussion concerns a doubt not light, empty, founded on scruples and inept conjectures, but resting on grave reasons on either side. The second is that, in the aforesaid doctrine, the whole deadly poison of Probabilism lies hidden. Even when stronger reasons press in favor of the vow's having been made, the one in doubt will still be free of the vow! Without doubt. Why? Because the certain possession of liberty can be dislodged from its place not by stronger, and weightier, reasons, but only by the most evident, and most invincible ones. But tell me, first of all: do these stronger reasons render the doubt merely speculative, and not practical? They incline the intellect, at least, more strongly in favor of the vow. The doubt, then, will be direct and practical, not merely reflex. Nothing could be clearer, or more significant, for the integrity of evangelical morals. Then, on what foundation do you assert that human liberty, in a doubtful contest, takes precedence over natural or divine right? For natural and divine right are, in fact, prior to the liberty of the one vowing; indeed, the liberty of the one vowing is born subject to natural and divine right, from which the vow shines forth in the obligation of payment. It is so, you say, when this divine right is really given. But when I doubt whether the vow was made, I doubt whether this divine right exists or not; and, on the other hand, I am certain that I was free from this right before making the vow. This is precisely what we are asking. Why do they wish, when contending at the tribunal of reason between divine right against liberty, and liberty against divine right, that the judgment ought to be given in favor of liberty, even when stronger reasons press in favor of divine right? Human laws, indeed, have established a rule to remove quarrels, lawsuits, and countless other evils — that, in the possession of estates, the condition of the possessor be the better one. But what book of the sacred Scriptures, what Council, what ecclesiastical decree has issued any canon establishing that, in matters pertaining to the business of eternal salvation, the condition of human liberty in possession takes precedence over divine right, when doubts, or disputes, occur on either side — indeed, even when stronger reasons press in favor of the vow, or of divine right? Let them produce a single Scripture, or a single Council, or some Father, or some Doctor of eminent name and authority, who, before the fifteenth century, taught that, in doubts where mortal sin is at issue, the condition of human liberty in possession is the better one. We, on the contrary, establish from Scripture, the canons, and the Fathers, that in doubtful ways the safer is to be chosen, and uncertainties abandoned, when certainties present themselves. But, to drive our adversaries to the wall, let me reduce that rule — "the condition of the possessor is the better one" — to our own case, so that it may be seen to be true even here: natural, or divine, law is itself the will of God, or God himself. God is the first possessor. The will, or liberty, [of man] is born subject to God. Whenever, then, there is doubt about possession, possession stands for God. Better, then, is the condition of him who possesses God, through his own law. See our History of Probabilism and Rigorism, Vol. II, diss. 3, where we have explained this argument at length. But more on this in its proper place.

X. Question I. Is one who is certain of the vow, but doubtful of its execution, bound to its execution? Response: The Probabilists themselves, whom we cited above in n. 3, answer affirmatively — since, they say, in that case the possession of the vow made is certain, but its execution is doubtful: therefore possession stands for the vow. So teach, as I said, Sánchez, Filliucci, Diana, Castropalao, Leander, the theologians of Salamanca, and almost all others. We add our own reason, drawn from the Fathers: that in doubtful matters the safer part is to be chosen.

XI. Question II. Is one who doubts the quantity of the thing promised — say, whether he vowed a hundred or fifty — bound to render a hundred? Response: Probabilists commonly deny this. For they say: if you doubt whether you vowed a hundred, or fifty, you are bound only to fifty; if you doubt whether the vow is perpetual, or for a year, you are bound only for a year; if you know that you promised entrance into religious life, and doubt whether you promised the laxer, or the stricter kind, you are bound only to the laxer — since the obligation is odious, and must be interpreted toward the more lenient side, so that it obliges less.

XII. The contrary opinion, which we embrace, is upheld by the theologians cited above (n. 4), and further by Navarrus (Bk. III, Consilia, on vows, consil. 20, act 18), resting on the most firm principle: that in doubtful matters the safer part is to be chosen. The reason, indeed, that the obligation is odious, and that laws are to be interpreted in the more lenient sense, is less consonant with the evangelical law, in the Probabilists' sense. For laws are to be interpreted, especially natural and divine ones, in the more lenient sense with respect to the soul, not to the flesh, and human appetites. With respect to the soul, however, the more lenient interpretation is that which places it in a place of safety, and leads it by the safer road to the port of eternal salvation — not that interpretation which, by loosening the reins further, and rendering it freer from the sweetest yoke of the evangelical law, exposes it to the dangers of eternal ruin. The one vowing, then, in the case proposed, is bound either to render a hundred, or to preserve perpetual chastity, so as to embrace the safer path; and the same, for the same reason, must be said of other similar cases in which the quantity, quality, or perpetuity of the vow is doubted. I will, however, propose some cases, so that you may attain a clearer understanding.

XIII. Question III. One who vowed to give the Church a chalice, and truly doubts of what material — silver, or gold — he had promised the chalice, is he bound to give a gold chalice, or a silver one? Response: Leander teaches, as a probable opinion (tract. 1, disp. 2, q. 3), that it would suffice in such a case to render a chalice of gilded bronze, or copper — since such a chalice too is suited to any divine use. This author, as usual, always adheres to the laxer opinions. The most common opinion, however, maintains that a golden, or at least a silver, chalice must be rendered, bronze or copper being excluded. This is the only difference among these authors: that some, such as Diana, Del Bene, Trullench, assert that it suffices for the cup to be silver, the rest being of bronze or copper. In this interpretation, however, the custom of that Church to which the chalice is promised to be offered must be considered. For if commonly the chalices of that Church are gold, or silver, the chalice must be gold, or silver, bronze or copper being excluded. So teach Azor (Bk. II, ch. 20, q. 10), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 6, n. 28), Villalobos (Vol. V, tract. 34, n. 54). And this is the more probable opinion.

XIV. Question IV. One who vowed not to approach a woman, but truly doubts whether this concerns fornicatory or conjugal approach — is he bound only to abstain from fornicatory intercourse? Response: Leander teaches (loc. cit., q. 11) — citing Sánchez, Del Bene, and others — that abstinence from fornicatory intercourse alone would suffice, and he judges this more probable on the basis of that principle: "possession stands for liberty." But this abuses the principle even by the Probabilists' own standards. For the one vowing is certain of the vow. Therefore, by these same Probabilists' own standards, it must be presumed that the vow was made according to the nature of its own act. Now the nature, or essential notion, of a vow is that it concerns matters which fall under counsels, or free matter — although, as we have explained above from St. Thomas, it can also concern necessary matter. Now abstinence from conjugal intercourse is a matter of counsel; from fornicatory intercourse, however, it is a matter of precept. The aforesaid vow, then, excludes both conjugal and fornicatory intercourse. This is also gathered from the chapter "Since it was pleasing" on gifts.

XV. Question V. Is one who doubts whether he made the vow before the age of seven, or before the perfect use of reason, bound to keep the vow? Response: Sotus denies this (Bk. VII, q. 3, art. 1), where he treats this doubt in passing, and to whom Palao, Del Bene, and Leander subscribe — who nonetheless says that the contrary opinion is most probable. It is surprising that he did not pronounce it less probable. We say, then, to this matter: he is bound. For it is established that the vow was made, and the excuse is doubtful. It should be added, moreover, that very few people make vows before the age of seven, or before the use of reason: therefore, if a vow was made, it must be presumed to have been made once the use of reason was complete. The more common opinion is defended by Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 1, n. 14), Luiz (opusc. 10, ch. 6), Suárez (Bk. IV, ch. 2, n. 10), Faustus (tract. on Religion, Bk. I, q. 26), Turrianus (in disp. 1, dub. 1), Malder (tract. 10, ch. 1, dub. 4), and several others.

XVI. Question VI. Is one who is certain of the promise made to someone, but doubtful of his intention to bind himself, bound to fulfill the vow? Response: Although Angles denies this (s.v. Ius, 5, n. 10), yet the common opinion, even among the Probabilists themselves, holds that the vow is made valid — since words uttered externally are certain and sure signs of intention; nor is anyone presumed to say what he does not feel; for, once a fact is proven, all things that naturally accompany it are presumed to have occurred. Hence, once profession is proven, the one professing is presumed to have had the legitimate age; and the burden of proof falls on the one who denies it.

XVII. Question VII. Is one who made a vow extorted by fear to be presumed, in doubtful cases, not to have had the intention of binding himself? Response: Sánchez affirms this (Bk. I, on Marriage, disp. 9, n. 11). But the most common opinion holds that the one vowing had the intention of binding himself — since to presume simulation in one vowing, or swearing, is a presumption of a crime; but no one is to be presumed guilty of a crime unless it is proven. Wherefore you favor the one vowing more, if you presume him bound by the vow, than if you absolve him from it — since you cannot absolve him from the vow unless you indicate that he sinned. So teach Sánchez, Suárez, Palao, Del Bene, Fagundez, Bonacina, Trullench, Leander, the theologians of Salamanca, and others commonly.

XVIII. Question VIII. If you doubt, in the aforesaid case, whether you used ambiguous, or restricted, words, are you bound by the vow, or oath? Response: That the vow does not bind in this case is affirmed by Suárez (Bk. II, ch. 33, n. 6), to whom Palao, Leander, Fagundez, Del Bene subscribe. For, they say, in this manner it is not presumed that a crime was committed, but rather it is presumed that there was a sufficient cause for prudent dissimulation. They add, however, that it is necessary for the one vowing to know the modes of equivocation and ambiguity, so that he can, with some foundation, doubt that he used such a locution. But, this opinion aside, we say that the one vowing is bound even in this case: both because in doubtful matters the safer part is to be chosen, and because no one is presumed to have spoken ambiguously, unless reasons occur by which this is proven.

XIX. Question IX. Is one who doubts whether he made a vow while asleep, drunk, or in a state of frenzy, to be presumed to have made his vow in a sound state of mind? Response: Leander teaches (tract. 1, disp. 13, q. 19) that the one vowing who truly doubts whether he vowed in the aforesaid circumstances is free from the vow — since then, he says, it is truly doubted whether there is a vow, or oath, or promise at all, since it is doubted concerning something essentially required for the nature of a vow; and in doubt, favor must be shown to liberty. This opinion is false, and lax beyond measure. Therefore, in fact, with the common opinion, it must be said that the aforesaid one vowing is bound by the vow — since presumption must be gathered from what commonly occurs. Now it very rarely happens that men make vows while drunk, asleep, or in a frenzy. Besides which, in doubtful matters the safer part is to be preferred. What if someone is certain that he made the vow while asleep, or drunk, but doubts whether the sleep, or drunkenness, or frenzy was full — that is, of such a degree as would remove the freedom necessary for a valid vow? Leander answers (loc. cit., q. 20) that the one vowing is absolutely not bound by the vow. But a distinction must be drawn. Absolutely speaking, the presumption favors the one vowing, since he is certain about the sleep, drunkenness, or frenzy: therefore the doubt, as inept, and resting on no valid foundation, is to be dismissed — just as is said of nocturnal pollution, which is not commonly presumed to have occurred with the full consent necessary for mortal sin. When, however, such reasons occur as would not allow the doubt to be prudently dismissed, then the rule presses: in doubtful matters, the safer part is to be chosen.

XX. Question X. Is one who, angry or disturbed, made a vow, and afterward doubts whether he had the necessary use of reason, bound by the vow — especially if, once his anger has subsided, he repents of the vow he made? Response: St. Antoninus discusses this question concerning vows made by angry persons (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, before §1): "Vows, however, which are made by women in childbirth, or in illness, or by men in whatever straits of their own, or of their family, or in disturbance — if they had this intention of binding themselves to God, thinking also of the cause which moved them to vow — namely, illness, or danger — and of the end — namely, the escape from danger, to avoid which they vowed — are to be held binding." The same is taught by St. Thomas. "If, however, they doubt whether they intended to bind themselves, it is safer that they fulfill it, according to Thomas. Note also that one who, angry at his father, or teacher, or drunk, vows, or swears, to enter religious life, is not bound — for what is done in the heat of anger ought to be reckoned as not done; which is true, if it happens so suddenly that he would not have done it after deliberation, and the judgment of reason, which does not require a great delay of time. But when, knowing what he swears, or vows, he does this, he is bound, unless he is excused by reason of a less than full deliberation — just as one who, inflamed by the heat of concupiscence, or having drunk well, though not drunk, swears to take a wife, is compelled to take her, unless he was altogether drunk." This assertion is confirmed by the following reason: just as deliberation is required for a vow, so too for a mortal sin; and although an angry, or drunk, person who kills a man is excused from the fullness of the sin, but not from its entirety, since it is still mortal, because he was not so beside himself as not to know what he was doing — even though he later repents of having done it — for to repent immediately of a sin argues well that it was not done from habit, but does not argue that it was not done from choice, although the judgment of reason was disturbed by passion. That deliberation of time, or age, then, which would suffice to bind oneself to the devil through mortal sin, suffices to bind oneself to God through a vow. It rarely happens, then, that anger, or some other disturbance, so clouds reason as to remove the liberty necessary and sufficient for sinning, and consequently for a valid vow. In doubt, then, of sufficient deliberation, it must be presumed that the necessary liberty was present. But if the doubt cannot be dismissed, then the rule must be observed: in doubt, the safer part is to be chosen. As for the second part of the question, authors commonly teach that repentance following the making of a vow is not an argument of insufficient deliberation — since it is not uncommon for men to repent even of things they did with great deliberation. Only from anger, then, or accompanying disturbance, from subsequent repentance, and other conjectures, can it sometimes be gathered that the one vowing was not perfectly master of himself, as authors commonly establish.

XXI. Question XI. When someone doubts whether the matter of the vow is dishonorable, or evil, is he bound to keep the vow? Authors commonly deny this. The theologians of Salamanca give the reason (n. 147): that the vow is not yet possessed, since there is doubt about what is necessary for its very essence. But this reasoning of "possession" is here futile. One who doubts the wickedness, or dishonorableness, of the matter is not bound to keep the vow, because he would sin by keeping it. For whoever undertakes a work about which he doubts whether it is good or evil, sins.

XXII. Question XII. When someone doubts about the condition of a vow, is he bound to fulfill the vow? Response: The theologians of Salamanca deny this (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 1, §1, n. 145), on account of that so often rejected fallacious rule: that the vow is not possessed until the condition has been fulfilled. Now, when the condition is doubted, the vow itself is doubted. But a doubtful vow does not oblige. We, on the contrary, say that in doubtful matters the safer part is to be chosen; and consequently that the aforesaid one in doubt is bound by the vow in the same way that one who doubts the vow itself is bound by it.