Chapter VI — Several cases concerning vows indeterminate as to the quantity, or quality, of the matter, are resolved

I. Since such cases of vows are exceedingly frequent, for the sake of greater usefulness and ease, having assigned the general principles by which a path is opened to their resolution, it is worth bringing individually to examination all the cases which Casuists commonly discuss, and resolving them according to our own principles. Were these not brought into dispute by the Casuists, we would pass over what follows.

II. Question I. Is one who vowed abstinence from wine bound to abstain also from beer, and other liquors extracted from wine? Response: First, all agree that this one vowing ought to abstain both from wine, and from an efficacious desire to drink wine — for a vow which prohibits an act, by the same reasoning forbids the desire for that same act.

III. As for beer, Cajetan teaches (II-II, q. 150, art. 1) that a vow to abstain from wine also comprehends beer — since it inebriates no less than wine. And certainly, if the one vowing made his vow of abstinence from wine in order to avoid the drunkenness he was accustomed to indulge in, he ought equally to abstain from beer as from wine; and Sánchez holds this true (Bk. IV, ch. 11, n. 44), when, however, the vow was absolutely about avoiding drunkenness, and wine was expressed in the vow only by way of example — otherwise, if he intended to avoid drunkenness, and did not take wine by way of example, but as a means to an end — since the end of a law does not fall under the law. But this is mere speculation, vain and arbitrary, which by no means occurs to the minds of those vowing. This aside, then, if the intention of the one vowing is to avoid drunkenness, this is the true opinion; if, however, the one vowing vowed abstinence from wine, so that, by this deprivation, and honest taste, he might deprive himself of this pleasure, and offer God this penance of his — then beer does not seem to be comprehended under "wine," although it too has the power of inebriating. Liquors, however, which are extracted from wine, such as distilled spirits, and similar things, are without doubt comprehended under "wine" — since they are the spirit of that same wine. Wherefore Fr. Claude La Croix (Bk. III, part 1, n. 455) is too lax, along with his own Gobat, in holding that the one vowing, even though he intended in his vow to avoid drunkenness, may take any other drinks fit to inebriate. When the one vowing wishes to avoid drunkenness, and promises abstinence from wine because this is the more usual, and more apt, drink for drunkenness — and then fills himself equally with distilled spirits and other liquors having the same power of inebriation as wine — his vow becomes a mockery. What does it matter whether you get drunk on common wine rather than distilled spirits, when in fact you do get drunk? Wherefore one who intends by his vow to avoid drunkenness ought to abstain from any drinks whatsoever that can induce it. Indeed, the drunkenness that proceeds from a drink of distilled wine, commonly called "aquavit," is worse, since it clouds the mind more than that which is caused by common wine. Is not such burning water, or distilled wine, the better portion of the wine itself? Are not all the spirits of that same wine, the dregs having been removed, preserved in this distilled wine? By such fabrications, indeed, laws are evaded, not explained.

IV. Question II. Would one who vowed abstinence from wine, for the sake of his own temperance, and so as to deprive himself of the pleasure of that drink, sin mortally if he drank any wine at all? Response: Fr. Castropalao teaches that one who vowed abstinence from wine ought to abstain from as much wine as a temperate man is accustomed to drink at a single meal, in order to sin mortally. Here are his own words (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 12, n. 21): "What of the vow to abstain from wine? It obliges under grave fault, unless that quantity of wine is drunk which would suffice for those who use wine temperately, for a single meal." Fr. Patritius Sporer, reporting this opinion of Castropalao's (tract. 3, on the precepts of the Decalogue, ch. 11, sect. 3, §2, n. 86, p. 358), delivers this judgment. Certainly it is too lax, even in the Germans' own sense, for Castropalao to require, for a single meal, that quantity which would suffice for some man using it temperately. Not only does Fr. Sporer absolutely pronounce this opinion lax, but he adds that it is lax even in the Germans' own sense, and is therefore most lax. While I was reading this in Fr. Sporer, I felt myself struck with a certain admiration — which, however, soon vanished, since he afterward approves, in the same very words, the opinion he here calls too lax (tract. preamble, ch. 5, sect. 2, §4, on vows, n. 30, p. 75) — with this one difference, that here he reports the aforesaid opinion from Sánchez, but above he attributed it to Castropalao — the good German not noticing that Castropalao had transcribed this opinion, word for word, from Sánchez. Here are Sporer's own words: "As to the quantity of wine drunk, some smallness of matter must certainly be admitted as excusing from mortal sin — and indeed a greater smallness than in the eating of meat. The judgment of Sánchez pleases me (Bk. IV, Moral Theology, ch. 11, n. 21), that for a mortal transgression of such a vow, or oath, only so much wine drunk is required as would suffice, in a single meal, for those commonly using wine temperately." Perhaps this opinion, delivered by Fr. Sánchez, who is one of his own Masters, carried somewhat more weight with Sporer than that of Fr. Castropalao. Be that as it may, what he once called too lax, even in the Germans' own sense, he now testifies pleases him as a safe rule of conscience.

V. Tamburini (on the Decalogue, Bk. III, ch. 15, §6, n. 13) pronounces Castropalao's and Sánchez's opinion too lax. Fr. Marín subscribes to Tamburini's judgment (tract. 9, disp. 3, sect. 2, n. 71). But Fr. Claude La Croix (Bk. III, part 1, ch. 3, dub. 4, n. 464) embraces the lax opinion of Fr. Sporer, Castropalao, Sánchez, and Diana.

VI. Perhaps the reader will marvel that I have exercised such rigorous criticism over a matter so light — but he will cease to marvel, if he ponders this a little to himself according to the principles of the Probabilists. Let him note, then, that five or six theologians, some of whom are classical among them, teach this opinion: therefore it is wonderfully probable. Now, from this probability, all the abolition of fasts follows. For if one bound by a vow of abstaining from wine should be obliged to drink only that much wine as would suffice to sin mortally, by the same reasoning, one bound to transgress a vow of not eating meat should be obliged to eat only that much meat as temperately living men are accustomed to eat in a single meal. For this reason, if someone were to keep, contrary to the Church's precept, half of the Lenten fasts, on a Friday, in comparison of a disparate quantity of wine, and meat, would eat that quantity of meat which temperate men are accustomed to eat, he would observe the vow — and by the same reasoning he would observe those fasts which flow from the rule of Sánchez, Castropalao, Diana, and La Croix, which now I dismiss. And although there may be some difference between wine and meat, still, if we compare that quantity of wine, which is sufficient matter, with the quantity of meat, there yet remains a quantity of meat sufficiently abundant. For let us suppose that four cups are the temperate drink of a single meal, and consequently the necessary matter for a sin against a vow of abstinence: three cups, or three parts of the wine, will be a small matter. If, from this measure of meat, we subtract a third part, and substitute a half; this done, the difference will be removed, and an equal absurdity will follow — namely, that one who vowed abstinence from meat, if he is a temperate man, and eats two pounds of meat at a single meal, will be able to eat almost one pound during the time of a fast either imposed on himself by vow, or by the Church's precept.

VII. One bound by a vow of not drinking wine can, all admit, if he is a priest, take both ablutions after Mass, and, if a layman, take a modest quantity of wine after his customary communion. That outside these cases too there is a smallness of matter is not to be doubted. Tamburini (in the place cited) says that one who drank once would not be condemned of mortal sin; but he who drank twice, or three times, would be. But a distinction must be drawn. For there are certain heavy drinkers who are accustomed to drain an entire jug in a single draught. These, drinking even once, would violate their vow, or precept. But Tamburini does not speak of these. I say only that no one bound by a vow or precept, of settled conscience, who drank one of the customary cups, would commit himself to so grave a risk of mortal sin — nor would I condemn him either. It is certain, however, that one bound by a vow of abstaining from wine sins, whenever, without necessity — and the case just recounted of a celebrant's ablutions or a communicant's customary sip set aside — he drinks. The quantity of the sin, however, has no fixed limits, just as the quantity of matter does not either. There is certainly a smallness of matter, and it is the half of a small cup. But if you go further, you commit yourself to the disputes, and consequently the dangers, of the Casuists — for some Casuists too rashly extend a fixed, and certain, measure of grave, or small, quantity.

VIII. Question III. Is one who vowed to fast bound to the ecclesiastical fast? Response: A vow is a private law, whose measure is the common law, when the intention of the one vowing does not determine otherwise. The one vowing, then, is bound to fast in the manner in which one fasts who keeps the ecclesiastical precept of fasting. So teach all. Several other points, however, are contained in the question proposed, which must be examined individually.

IX. Question IV. Are you bound, by virtue of the aforesaid vow, to abstain from dairy products, at least in Lent? Sánchez denies this, and with him Tamburini (Bk. III, ch. 15, §6, n. 11) and Leander (tract. 1, disp. 20, q. 4) — since, they say, it is probable enough that the Church's precept does not oblige, during Lent, to abstinence from dairy products. Therefore, since the one vowing bound himself to keep the fast in the manner in which it is instituted by the Church, he is not bound, by virtue of that vow, to abstain from eggs, and dairy products in Lent. If the one vowing promises a fast according to the norm of the ecclesiastical fast; and it is probable enough that the ecclesiastical fast does not impose abstinence from eggs and dairy products, it will suffice for the one vowing to abstain from eggs and dairy products. This opinion seems to me lax, and does not rest on this now-certain claim among these authors — that it is not evident that the custom of not obliging to abstinence from dairy products is sufficiently ecclesiastical; nor does it help to reply that the precept of fasting is one thing, another the precept imposing abstinence from dairy products, and that the one vowing intended the former, not the latter. An excellent speculation indeed! The one vowing fasting will then be able to eat meat: for the precept forbidding the eating of meat is altogether distinct from what fasting itself prescribes. But let us not heap up more arguments against an opinion which the more celebrated theologians disapprove. Córdoba (q. 168), Ludovico López (Part II, Instructions, on fasting, ch. 10), Azor (Part 7, Bk. VII, ch. 10, q. 6), Suárez (Bk. IV, ch. 7, n. 9), Castropalao (disp. 1, punct. 11, n. 18), and not a few others. The reason, however, is manifest: whoever vows fasting promises that fast which is observed in the Catholic Church, unless he expressly declares the opposite. But the fast of the Catholic Church conjoins, with a single measure, abstinence from dairy products in Lent. The one vowing, then, ought to keep the fast by virtue of his vow, in the manner of the other faithful. On the contrary, in fasts outside of Lent, he can fast according to the custom of his own country. If the custom of abstaining from dairy products prevails, he too will enjoy it; if the contrary custom prevails, he must observe the same. This is the true opinion, and the common one.

X. Question V. Does one who vowed to fast, with no number of days prefixed, satisfy the vow by a single day of fasting? Response: Since the interpretation of a vow, according to the common rule, ought to be lenient and in favour of the one vowing, I say that the one vowing satisfies the said indeterminate vow by the fast of one day. I add that a vow does not oblige except according to the intention of the one vowing. Now, whenever the one vowing, while he makes the vow, determines nothing, he reserves to himself that right which he enjoyed of defining his vow within certain limits, so that he may afterwards attach the determination which he did not add when he made the vow. It is the common opinion.

XI. Question VI. Does one who vowed several fasts satisfy by fasting twice? Response: Sánchez, Leander, and Prado affirm it, because the number two imports plurality. But if the propriety of words is to be attended to, plurality will scarcely be found to be signified by the number two. If someone should say: He committed several crimes; he performed several outstanding deeds; he sent several soldiers; he offered several gifts: who of sound mind would understand only two from these expressions? Certainly two constitute not the singular but the plural number, as is gathered from the rule Pluralis, on the rules of law, in the Sixth. Nevertheless, according to the common and exact manner of speaking, one who vowed several must be presumed to have vowed beyond the number two. Nor is it worth saying more about such imprudent vows.

XII. Question VII. Is one who vowed to fast for an entire month bound to keep the fast even on Sundays? Response: Layman affirms this (Bk. IV, tract. 8, ch. 11, n. 9), where he cites Bellarmine. But the contrary opinion, according to what has been said, is more probable, and seems most probable to me. For if the one vowing, when he vows to fast, is bound to carry out that fast which the Church prescribes — if, I say, in the quality of the fast, he ought to conform himself to the Church's custom — why not also as to time? For the Church deems it expedient, and fitting, that the fast be broken on Sundays. Wherefore, if someone bound himself by a vow to fast on the vigil of some Saint, and that vigil should fall on a Sunday, he ought to anticipate the fast, and carry it out on Saturday, as the common opinion holds. For greater clarity, however:

XIII. Question VIII. If someone vowed to fast on Sunday, would this vow be valid? Response: Suárez denies this (Bk. III, on vows, ch. 7, n. 21) — since the Catholic Church wished always to abstain from such fasting, as reproving the custom of certain ancient heretics, who fasted on Sundays. Sánchez concedes to Suárez's opinion, or leans strongly toward it (Bk. II, on the Decalogue, ch. 37, n. 13). But a distinction must be drawn. If some Catholic, led by a singular zeal of piety, made a vow to fast on Sundays, he would be guilty of a certain superstition, and would worship God with an undue worship. And this is what Suárez and Sánchez seem to intend. But if someone, in order to more strongly subdue his flesh and concupiscence, and bring it into subjection to the spirit, vowed continuous fasting, to be observed continually, even on all Sundays — scandal, or the astonishment of the faithful, being excluded — this would be a valid, and prudent vow. How many holy men have not kept continuous fasting, Sundays included! And this is the most common opinion, taught by St. Thomas (Bk. IV, dist. 15, q. 3, art. 3, qc. ult.), Azor (Bk. VII, ch. 26, q. 2), Lessius (Bk. IV, ch. 2, dub. 4), Bonacina, Trullench, Prado (ch. 31, q. 2, §1, from n. 103), and others. If, however, someone were to eat daily, forgoing fasting on each individual day, and then vowed to fast on all Sundays, and really did fast — I myself would certainly disapprove of this fasting, as a superstitious one; nor do I see how a similar fast could be defended. For the examples of the Saints show that fasts were kept by them not only on Sundays, but on individual days. For if someone wished to check his desires, and mortify the flesh, would he need the remedy of fasting only on Sundays?

XIV. Question IX. Would one who vowed a fast to be carried out on bread and water violate the vow by drinking wine once; and, after a single drink of wine, could he, without transgressing the vow, drink wine more often? Response: From what has already been said a little above, the answer to the first part of the question is clear. For we have said that there is a smallness of matter in this, as in other vows. Whence it is clear that one who drank a single small cup of wine would not break the vow of such a fast. To the second part, Sánchez answers (Bk. IV, ch. 11, n. 149) that he could drink more often, because it would be impossible for him further to observe that circumstance of the fast promised by vow. This opinion is lax, and the contrary opinion true. This is defended even by Fr. Castropalao himself (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 11) — since abstinence from wine is a burden undertaken by the one vowing for the whole day of the fast. Tamburini's distinction, however — that if the vow was about abstinence from wine, Sánchez's opinion would be true; but if it was about fasting on bread and water, this — I say, this distinction is one of those that do not come into the minds of those vowing when they make their vows. Wherefore the will of these vowers must be interpreted according to what commonly occurs. And because men, when they vow a fast on bread and water, vow abstinence for the entire day from wine, and other foods, therefore, since no one ought to reap advantage from his own iniquity, it does not follow that one who had already once drunk, by violating his vow, could without fault drink wine more often for the rest of the day.

XV. Question X. Can one who vowed to fast on bread and water eat pastries — commonly, macaroni? Response: Tamburini (Bk. III, on the Decalogue, ch. 15, §1, n. 10) teaches that one who vowed a fast on bread and water, if he eats edible paste — which the Italians call maccheroni, and vermicelli — violates his fast, especially if, while they are cooked, a little oil is poured in, and some sprigs of marjoram mixed in. For those who vow a fast on bread and water commonly promise that they will be content with bread and water. Leander (tract. 1, disp. 20, q. 17) grants that it is lawful for the one vowing to eat pastries and vermicelli cooked in water alone; not so, if they have any oil, or an infusion, or admixture, of marjoram sprigs. These are among those questions which the Casuists have devised in order to soften the observance of vows, and to come to the aid of feeble observers of vows. But, trifles aside, it must be said that the vow is observed by the use of common bread, and a drink of water. Those who eat vermicelli, pastries, or porridge depart, more or less, from the exact observance of the vow. When it happens that those who use these foods sin, or do not sin, mortally against the vow, cannot be absolutely defined. This only I say, as most certain: that, bread lacking, a man bound by such a vow can eat pastries, vermicelli, or porridge.

XVI. One bound by a vow of fasting on bread and water, if, on account of a weakness of his strength, he could not sustain himself on bread and water alone, may eat fish; and if he could not do this either, let him make use of dairy products; and if dairy products would not suffice, let him take meat, and observe chiefly that part of the fast which is consonant with his own strength. If he is so infirm that, according to what we shall say concerning the precept of fasting, he is altogether freed, he will nonetheless fulfill the fast at another time, according to what must likewise be said concerning an indeterminate fast as regards time.

XVII. Question XI. Is one who made a vow to fast on all Fridays and Saturdays throughout the year bound to fast even when the feast of the Lord's Nativity falls on one of these days? Response: Several authors deny that the one vowing is bound to fast on the day of the aforesaid solemnity — Molina (Vol. II, on justice, disp. 272), Azor (Bk. VII, ch. 20, q. 30), Diana (Part I, tract. 9, resol. 3), Tamburini (Bk. III, ch. 15, §5, n. 13). But the more common opinion, and, to me, the true one, maintains the contrary. The reason for this opinion is manifest: resting, as it does, on the very words of the chapter (final chapter, on the observance of fasting), where it is established that the Church exempts from abstinence from meat only Christians who are bound neither by vow, nor by regular observance. "Whoever," it says, "are bound neither by vow, nor by regular observance to the observance of fasting according to the custom of the general Church, if the Nativity feast should fall on a Friday, may eat meat on that day." The Church, then, excludes from this exemption those who are bound by vow, or regular observance. But, they say, the Church speaks of those who had expressly vowed to fast on the aforesaid solemnity; not so of others. This interpretation is arbitrary, empty, and rests on no foundation, even a plausible one — since the text is absolute, and universal. But we shall return to this discussion when we treat of the precept of fasting, whence it will be clear that those exempted are not all bound by regular observance on the day of the Lord's Nativity. This opinion is taught by Fr. Suárez (Bk. IV, ch. 20, n. 8), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 6, n. 3), Leander (tract. 2, disp. 20, q. 21), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 6, n. 159, §1).

XVIII. Question XII. How is one who made two contrary vows to be dealt with — say, of eating bread alone on Friday, and of not eating bread on the vigil of some Saint, which sometimes falls on that same day of the week? Response: Sylvester (s.v. Votum, q. 17), following St. Thomas, answers that, if both are possible, both must be observed; but if not both, then that must be observed which is judged better, and more pleasing to God. But if both are equal, then the first is to be observed. I would believe, nonetheless, that in the case reviewed, the one vowing ought to abstain from all food — provided his strength holds, and infirmity does not prevent it — since the second vow, of eating only bread, does not conflict absolutely with the first, but adds a greater abstinence — namely, from all food. Then, if both vows cannot be observed; then the second vow — namely, of eating, excluding bread — would be to be observed. If, however, the second vow were to eat, excluding bread, the first vow should be observed, both because it was the first, and because it is stricter.

XIX. Question XIII. Is one who vowed to recite the Rosary bound to recite it in full; or does he satisfy the vow if he merely runs through it mentally? Response: When the intention of the one vowing is not established, one who vows the Rosary satisfies the vow, if he recites a third part — since the faithful are commonly accustomed to recite the Rosary in this manner. And this is the common opinion — just as authors commonly also teach that it must be recited vocally, since this is the customary manner of reciting it. But if the one vowing were merely to run through it mentally, the theologians of Salamanca say (punct. 6, n. 136) that the vow can be fulfilled by the one vowing through contemplation alone, and they add that this can be done even if the one vowing does not have this custom. They cite Leander and Castropalao for the same opinion. In either case I judge this false — since the Rosary consists, essentially and properly, of two parts: namely, the contemplation of the mysteries of the life and Passion of Christ the Lord, and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer and the Angelic Salutation. These are the two parts constituting this special mode of prayer — namely, the Rosary. Whoever, then, vows the Rosary, vows that Rosary which is commonly recited in the Church — just as one who vows a fast promises the ecclesiastical fast, that is, to be observed according to the Church's custom, as all admit. The Rosary, then, consists of vocal prayer and mental contemplation. The one vowing, therefore, does not satisfy the vow by merely running through the Rosary in his mind. Wherefore I in no way consider the opinion of Leander and the theologians of Salamanca, who teach the contrary, to be probable. The one vowing would satisfy the vow, however, if he recited the Rosary alternately with someone else.

XX. Question XIV. Does one who vowed to hear Mass daily satisfy the vow on holy days by hearing one Mass? Response: The common opinion is that the one vowing satisfies the vow by hearing only one Mass on feast days — since the rational intention of the one vowing seems to be that he wishes to let no day pass without hearing Mass. Indeed, if a confessor, imposing a penance on a penitent, were to prescribe that he hear that very Mass which he is bound to hear by precept on a feast day, he would impose no penance at all on him — since a confessor must impose some penance on the penitent, according to the gravity of the crimes. But the one vowing makes his vow freely and spontaneously; and, since one can vow a thing already commanded, as we have said — hence, if someone vowed to hear Mass on a feast day, he is not presumed to have vowed another Mass beyond that which he is bound to by precept, unless he expressly declared that he vows two Masses. It does not hinder this, that a confessor imposing the hearing of Mass on a feast day does not enjoin that Mass which is of precept, but another — for a confessor's penance does not follow the same reasoning as one who satisfies an indeterminate vow by hearing one Mass. If, however, a confessor were to enjoin a penitent to hear Mass daily throughout the year, then, unless the contrary were established from the circumstances, the penitent would satisfy the burden imposed by the confessor even on feast days by hearing one Mass — since by hearing Mass on individual days, he satisfies the burden imposed by the confessor. Nor does it seem likely that a confessor, obliging a penitent for so long a time, would wish him to fulfill two precepts on feast days. The one vowing, however, is bound to hear Mass devoutly, and attentively, according to the universal custom of the faithful, while they hear Mass, so as to fulfill the precept.

XXI. Question XV. Is a girl who vowed virginity bound to preserve it after the commission of a first shameful act? Response: The Doctors commonly affirm this — since to vow virginity, by its own nature, indicates perpetuity, even though this is not expressed in the vow. It is otherwise, if the one vowing expressly intended to avoid only the first shameful act; for then a vow depends, in its own obligation, on the rational will of the one vowing. Wherefore, after the first shameful act, she would not then be bound, by virtue of the vow, to abstain from later acts. Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 21, n. 22), Suárez (Bk. IV, ch. 7, n. 9), Valentia (II-II, disp. 6, q. 6, punct. 4), Tamburini (Bk. III, ch. 15, §3, n. 2), Palao (disp. 1, punct. 12, n. 5), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 19, q. 8). This author, however, holds that, in a doubtful case, when it is not established whether the one vowing had this express intention, or not, it must be presumed in favor of the one vowing. But according to what has already been said, in doubtful matters the safer part is to be chosen.

XXII. Fr. Marín considers it probable that the one vowing virginity is not bound to chastity (tract. 9, disp. 12, sect. 1, n. 39), following Burghaber, case 66 — since virginity signifies only the integrity of the body. This opinion is too lax, and offends the common sense. For whoever vowed virginity, by a stronger right, pledged chastity as well; since virginity comprehends chastity. The same Marín adds, however (n. 40), following Moya, that a distinction must be drawn: if the one vowing recognized the difference between chastity and virginity, then she is bound to virginity partially — that is, to the mere external integrity of the flesh alone. If she did not recognize this, as commonly happens among girls, she is bound to total chastity. In doubt, however... however, it must be presumed that she recognized this difference, when she made the vow of virginity, and understood it to include the purity of both mind and body. We reject this opinion, then, as improbable. Our own opinion is defended by Felix Potestas himself (Vol. I, part 2, ch. 3, n. 1890).

XXIII. Question XVI. Does one who vowed a pilgrimage absolutely satisfy the vow by an equestrian pilgrimage? Response: The common answer is affirmative — since an equestrian pilgrimage is a true pilgrimage. And this holds true even if, at the time of the vow, he thought of a journey on foot; provided, however, he did not intend to bind himself specifically to this — since mere thought does not induce an obligation. Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 21), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 8, n. 16), Palao (disp. 1, punct. 12, n. 9), Tamburini (Bk. III, ch. 15, §5, n. 16), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 19, q. 9), Marín (loc. cit., n. 91).

XXIV. Question XVII. Does one satisfy the aforesaid vow, if, hired for a fee, or compelled by some other business, or out of mere curiosity, he undertakes the pilgrimage? Response: Sánchez denies this in all the circumstances reviewed — since one who made the vow promised God a free, pious, and religious action. But a pilgrimage undertaken for hire, or out of curiosity, or for some other business, is not a voluntary and religious pilgrimage; indeed, one undertaken for a fee is undertaken not by title of religion, but by a debt of justice. In these cases, then, the one vowing does not satisfy the vow. The contrary opinion is taught by Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 11, n. 10), Tamburini (Bk. III, ch. 15, §5, n. 5), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 19, q. 10) — since force applied does not remove liberty, though it diminishes it. Wherefore, though the one vowing is compelled extrinsically, he can nonetheless internally will the execution of his vow freely. In this case it seems certain to me that the one vowing satisfies his vow. If he afterward undertakes the journey for the sake of transacting some business, or out of curiosity, a distinction must be drawn. If the temporal business, or curiosity, is the sole end of the pilgrimage, without doubt they impede satisfaction of the vow; but if the one vowing intends to pursue both, I do not see why the one should impede the other. For it is certain that the obligation both of justice and of religion can fall upon the same matter — as, for example, if someone bound by a vow to say Mass daily can, on many days, accept a stipend for the application of the sacrifice, and thus fulfill both the obligation of religion and of justice at the same time. This opinion, which the cited authors defend, seems to me more probable in the sense I have explained.

XXV. Question XVIII. Is one who vows religious life, or to receive holy orders, bound to observe chastity? Response: Authors commonly answer that, by virtue of such a vow, he is not bound to chastity — since the matter of such a vow is not chastity, but the religious state, to which chastity is annexed. Just as a vow to receive holy orders has for its matter the ecclesiastical state, to which chastity is joined. Wherefore, that state having been abandoned, the one vowing would not be bound to chastity. If, however, he persists in such a state, he will be bound to chastity, not by virtue of the simple vow, but of the other, solemn vow. Cajetan (II-II, q. 88, art. 3), Suárez (Bk. IV, ch. 7, n. 15), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 19, q. 11, n. 8), Marín (tract. 9, disp. 3, sect. 2, n. 4), Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 12), and all commonly.

XXVI. Question XIX. Is one who vowed alms, without determining the quantity or quality, bound to a large, or a small, quantity? Response: The resolution is clear from what has already been said. For just as the one vowing, when he made the vow, could define both the quantity and the quality, so too, once the vow is made, he enjoys the same liberty, provided the matter of the vow, as often said elsewhere, offers difficulty. One who vowed alms absolutely, with no quantity or quality signified, can offer any quantity whatsoever, provided it is fitting and suited to the matter of the vow. The circumstances of place and time, however, must always be attended to. And when such vows are to be interpreted, the burden should be imposed on the one vowing as leniently as possible.

XXVII. Tamburini proposes this case (ch. 15, §6, on the vow of an indeterminate thing, n. 4): Someone vowed wine to the Capuchin Fathers, for the celebration of Masses, every day. The vow passed to his heirs, who, as is customary, forgetful of their father's piety, give wine of the lowest quality. Is it asked whether they fulfill the vow? Tamburini denies this, and rightly — since, even though the father absolutely vowed the wine for the celebration of Masses, such wine, according to the estimation of prudent men, ought to be, if not of the best, at least of moderately good quality. All the more so, since vile victims, and offerings of the lowest condition, are found reproved in Scripture.

XXVIII. Question XX. If someone vowed one of his silver vessels, or one of his servants, or one of his animals to God, what is he obliged to render? Response: Authors commonly teach that the one vowing can choose, and offer, whichever of the things promised he prefers; nor is he bound to the more precious vessel, or the better servant, when the contrary intention is not established. In similar cases, however, the mean, or a moderate quality, must be observed.

XXIX. What if, before you fulfill the vow, only one thing remains out of several you had, the others having been lost — say, one chalice remains to you, the others having been stolen; one servant, the others having died or been killed; one animal, the others having died or been slaughtered? Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 13, n. 19) and Molina (Vol. II, on justice, disp. 270) deny that the one vowing is bound to fulfill the vow — since the remaining chalice, or servant, is no more promised than those which perished. Why, then, should those that perished, perish for the one vowing, and none for God, since the vow was addressed to none in particular? It seems, rather, that the loss ought to be divided, and that half of the remaining chalice ought to be offered. The contrary opinion seems to me more probable, defended by Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 6, n. 24) and Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 12, n. 26). And the reason is sufficiently manifest: because, in the case reviewed, no chalice was determinately promised; rather, all were indeterminately subject to the vow — for you promised to give one chalice, one servant, out of all — that is, this one, or that one, until you come to the last. As for what the adversaries reply — that the remaining chalice is no more promised than those that perished — this is true, since all were promised under a disjunction.

XXX. Hence, if you promised to give the Church, under a disjunction, a chalice, or a servant, and, at the time of fulfilling the vow, one part should perish, you are bound to render the surviving part — as is established in the law "Stichus, or Pamphilus," on solutions; "Not indeed," on a certain place; the Royal Law, tit. 11, part 5. Since you were bound to give one of those two. But, one remaining, you can still fulfill the vow. You are bound, then. Some draw a distinction, and say: if your part perished through your own fault, you are bound to render the surviving part; if it did not perish through your own fault, nor were you in delay of rendering it, then they judge you free from the vow. The common opinion, however, teaches that you are bound to render either the surviving part, or the price, or value, of the thing that perished, even without your fault — from which, if the part perished without your fault, you acquire this privilege: that you are not bound to offer the surviving part; but either this, or the value of the other part which perished. This privilege is not enjoyed by one who has, through his own fault, allowed one of the parts disjunctively promised to God to perish. Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 22, n. 23), Palao (disp. 1, punct. 12, n. 28), Molina (Vol. II, on justice, disp. 270), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, punct. 6, §1, n. 142).

XXXI. Question XXI. If you promised a determinate thing to one of two Churches, to which are you bound to give it, in the case where you do not know to which you promised? Response: If, when you made the vow, you did not determine one Church over the other, but disjunctively to one or the other, then it is plain that you are free to offer the thing to whichever you prefer. If, however, you determined one of the two Churches, and afterward, having forgotten, do not know which it was, Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 13, n. 18) asserts that you can give the thing to whichever you wish — since, he says, the whole obligation of a vow arises from the will of the one vowing. When, then, the one vowing does not know to which of the two Churches he ought to render the promised gift, it will be within his own power to give it to whichever he prefers. For then neither Church has a determinate right to that thing; but the whole right lies with God, in whose honor the vow was made.

XXXII. The other opinion teaches that the one vowing, in this case, ought to divide the promised gift, and offer each Church its part in proportion to the doubt. Since it is certain that you promised the thing determinately to one Church. That you now do not know to which you promised does not remove the fact that the thing is owed to one of these Churches. Therefore, if, at your own discretion, you give it to one, you expose yourself to the danger of depriving, by its own right, the Church to which you determinately promised it. It will be safer, then, to divide the thing promised in proportion to the doubt, and thus fulfill the vow in the best way possible. Which of these two opinions is to be preferred, I confess I do not know. It must be gathered from the diversity of circumstances which redounds more to the worship of God.