Chapter I — On those who possess the use of reason

I. All who possess the use of reason, and freedom, can vow concerning those things which fall under their own dominion, as St. Thomas teaches, with all the theologians (II-II, q. 88, art. 8 and 5). Wherefore only those are excluded from making vows who are destitute of the use of reason — such as the insane, the demented, the drunk, those asleep, and children, before the light of reason has dawned upon them.

II. Moreover, although all endowed with reason can make vows, nonetheless, for them to be able to carry them into execution, dominion over the matter to be executed is required. Wherefore the vows of minors, before they reach the age of puberty, are made subject to a tacit condition... , that they cannot be invalidated by their parents — since firm agreements are not entered into with parents; for such vows, although those making them possess the use of reason, nonetheless lack dominion over their goods, since they are found constituted under the power of their parents. Therefore the vows of Religious, of sons, of servants, of wives, are invalid, unless the consent of the Prelate, the father, the master, the husband is added, when the vows made would redound to their prejudice.

III. Question I. Are vows made by Religious without the Superior's permission concerning matter of benefit, which disturbs neither jurisdiction nor rank in any way, valid? Response: There is great disagreement among authors on this matter. Angles (s.v. Votum, 2, n. 3), Rosella (s.v. Votum, 2, n. 14), Valentia (II-II, disp. 6, q. 6, punct. 6, n. 1), Caramuel (in the Rule of St. Benedict, n. 1698), Ferrarius (Vol. II, on the Prelate, q. 3, n. 3), and others, deny that such vows are valid. In favor of this opinion the authority of St. Thomas is adduced (II-II, q. 88, art. 8, ad 3), where he has this: "A religious subject, in the first place, is accustomed to act according to his profession under the Rule; and therefore, since it is fixed what a Religious can do with respect to his own actions, he is not occupied by the Superior for that time, since, however, no other time occurs when the Superior might not be able to occupy him with something, no vow is firm unless it is by the consent of the Superior — just as neither is the vow of a girl living in her father's house, unless it is with the father's consent; nor of a wife, unless it is with the husband's consent." For this same opinion is adduced the chapter Monacho, cause 20, q. 4: "A monk is not to vow without the consent of the Abbot. If, however, he should vow, the vow will have to be broken." Reasons too seem to support this same view. Since the solemn vow of religious life, just as it extinguishes all vows previously made, so too it impedes new ones from being made. Add to this that Religious, by virtue of their solemn vows, are subject to their Prelates not only as regards the matter promised, but also as regards the very will by which they promise. For the wills of Religious — whose willing and not-willing are alike — are constituted under the dominion of their Prelates.

IV. This opinion is not without its own probability. The contrary opinion, however, is more probable, which teaches that the vows of Religious which bring no detriment either to the jurisdiction of their superiors, or to the right administration of the religious order, and which do not concern matter forbidden by the Rule, but an honorable thing, and one of supererogation — such as vows to fast in honor of some Saint, to recite certain prayers, and the like — are valid. Since the thing promised by such vows is a good thing, and is not tainted by a better good, but consonant with it. There is no reason, then, why such vows should be reckoned invalid. The wills of subjects are subject to the dominion of the Prelates as regards those things which pertain to the government and administration of the religious order, such that they cannot promise to God, in other matters, what would be pleasing to them, but not to their Superiors, without their consent — this, they think, follows. Let me explain the matter more clearly. I admit that subjects are so subjected to their Prelates, that they can do or promise nothing useful to religious discipline against their will. And this is required for perfect government. But from this it follows only that the vows of Religious cannot be firm and stable without the authority of their Prelates — since, when the Prelates have taken cognizance of such vows, they can invalidate them; but so long as they do not come to their knowledge, they are valid, and subjects are bound to keep them, unless they are invalidated by the Prelates — for no vow is elicited except under a tacit condition, that is, unless the Superior does not object, or does not impede it, if such a case should occur. And this holds true against the contrary opinion, unless some special reason to the contrary occurred. The reasons that are adduced prove only that such vows are not firm and stable without the consent of the Prelate; but by no means do they show that they are not valid. As for the authority of St. Thomas, this indeed shows that the vow of a Religious must be firm — that is, indissoluble, when it has been elicited by the special authority of the Superior — for such vows always ought to bind, with either this express, or tacit, condition: "If the Superior does not object." This is what the Holy Doctor's own words sound. Although, then, the chapter Monacho is apocryphal, and of no weight, even were it legitimate, nothing could be elicited from it against our opinion. For it is there asserted that a vow made without the consent of the Superior must be broken — which we grant readily; but it by no means says that the vow is not valid, until it is invalidated by the Prelate.

The solemn vow of profession impedes any vows being made which disturb the exterior government and administration of religious life; but by no means does it impede vows being made which affect the one vowing alone, and this in the sense of the will of the government — that is, the will of the subjects is subject to the will of the Prelates, insofar as they might wish something that would bring harm to monastic discipline. What we have said holds true concerning vows; but subjects can, with even stronger right, make vows about internal acts of faith, hope, and charity, and similar things, from which nothing is subtracted. What we have established concerning Religious is to be applied to children still under paternal authority, to servants, and to wives, and to all those constituted under another's power. Indeed, none of these is bound to their master, husband, or parents by such tight bonds as Religious are to their Prelates. Their subjection presents a kind of servile slavery; but the obedience of Religious offers, more perfectly and nobly, a holocaust of their own free will. This opinion is taught by Cajetan (II-II, q. 88, art. 8, ad 3), Navarrus (in the Manual, ch. 12, n. 65), Ludovico López (Instructions, ch. 48), Medina (Summa, Bk. I, ch. 14, §6), Prado (ch. 31, q. 12, §4, n. 23), Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 15, n. 2), Sayr (in Clavis Regia, Bk. VI, ch. 5, n. 22), Corona Summa (Part III, tract. on vows, n. 6), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 2, n. 7), Bassaeus (Vol. I, s.v. Votum, 8, n. 12, and Vol. II, s.v. Votum, 1, n. 21), John of St. Thomas (II-II, q. 88, ch. 15, n. 6), Suárez (Vol. II, on Religion, Bk. III, disp. 20, art. 16), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 1, punct. 8), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 5, n. 3), Filliucci (tract. 26, ch. 6, n. 172), Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 17, q.... 16), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, n. 153), Leander (tract. 2, disp. 5), where he cites several others — namely, Sotus, Fagundez, Lessius, Aragón, Miranda, Portel, Peyrino, and Tamburini.

V. Question II. Are vows made by Religious against the Rule and Constitutions, or against the precepts of their Superiors, valid, even if there is no law or statute forbidding it, only a penalty? Response: All commonly affirm that such vows are null, even if only a penalty, and no fault, would be attached to their transgression. The reason is evident: for a vow concerning an evil thing — such as anything forbidden in whatever manner — is rejected by all who deal with vows, so that no vow can be validly made concerning matter already forbidden. If the matter were forbidden only to the extent that it could not be done without the Prelate's permission, then, permission obtained, the vow would be valid. Wherefore a Religious who desires to make such a vow ought to seek permission before he binds himself by the vow. There is likewise no vow at all concerning a forbidden matter, even if the one vowing is ignorant of the prohibition. Wherefore, once the prohibiting law is known, he is not bound to keep the vow which he was previously keeping through ignorance of the law; nor is he bound to seek permission. If the thing promised, when the vow was made, was permitted, and afterward comes to be forbidden, the bond of the vow is broken. When, however, the prohibition depends on the arbitrary will of the Superior, the one vowing is bound absolutely, and it is safer to seek permission before he makes any vow, or before he carries out a vow already made. Whence all these matters are to be left to the judgment of a prudent man, according to the circumstances. Indeed, not even vows made in another monastery, in which there was no prohibition, would bind, if the one vowing later transfers to another where the vow would be forbidden by the statutes of his own profession; nor is he bound to revoke a vow already made, or to abstain from making some vow, on account of the transgression of the statutes of his own profession — since the arbitrary undertaking of vows easily gives rise to it, that new obligations are contracted by those mocking, and evading, the proper observance of the Rule and the Constitutions of their profession. This must be gathered from the circumstances, and left to the judgment of a prudent man. All this is common ground concerning the observance of the Rule and Constitutions; vows already made, however, are valid, and oblige, until the Prelate has dispensed from them.

VI. Question III. Is a vow made by Prelates of Regulars, of giving alms, valid? Response: Prelates of Regulars are administrators of the goods of the Convent, in relation to the common good, both spiritual and temporal, of the religious order: they can not only lawfully disburse suitable alms, but are indeed bound to do so; for they have this faculty from the Convents. Convents of Regulars are, by evangelical precept, instituted for this end — that alms be distributed from what remains to them, since the faithful, subject to a tighter bond of more perfect charity than secular persons, have given their goods, so that, their own subsistence and clothing being kept modest, they may distribute to the poor — both because the profession of poverty, and evangelical perfection, binds them to a peculiar obligation. Prelates, moreover, are bound not only to distribute these goods to their subjects according to their varying need, but also to pay a pension attached to those goods for the disbursement of alms. The vows of these Prelates, then, concerning customary alms are valid. If, however, an urgent occasion for disbursing extraordinary, notable alms should arise, the Fathers of the Convents ought to be consulted, as common law prescribes.

VII. Question IV. Are vows of subjects of Regulars made without the permission of Prelates, to disburse something in alms from those goods which are for their own use, valid? Response: Sánchez, Suárez, Castropalao affirm this, whom Leander praises and follows (tract. 2, disp. 5, q. 9), on the grounds that such a vow is elicited under this tacit condition: "If the Superior should grant permission"; and therefore Religious who elicit such a vow are bound to seek permission, from the prescribed custom, unless it has been granted to them. We reject this opinion as false, and improbable. Since vows concerning matter not permitted to the will of the one vowing are null — but alms-giving is unbecoming to the religious state, according to the opinion of these Doctors. This is the recent, more common opinion. Regulars, they say, are subject to the power of a Superior, and are destitute of dominion over any temporal thing whatsoever. Null, then, are promises to distribute goods which are not their own, but another's. I have heard countless subtleties of the authors dissenting, all of which reduce to this: namely, that, although Regulars possess nothing, they nonetheless have the use of goods; and consequently, with the Prelate's permission added, they can lawfully distribute a suitable portion of them to the poor. Their vow, then, will be valid, made under the condition of obtaining the Prelate's consent. All this rests on the principle that the Prelate can validly grant subjects permission to use their goods for necessary sustenance and clothing; but it by no means extends to granting permission for the distribution of goods, since these goods pertain to the common patrimony, whose administrators are only the Prelate, and the officials. Besides which, the grant of such permission bears the mark of an evil: for it either fosters, or rather opens a path toward, private property, which, above all, is greatly to be watched against, both for the common good, spiritual and temporal, and utterly undermines the vow of poverty. The authors of the contrary opinion speak, in their hypothesis, as if Religious enjoy a private allowance of their own; granting this, they infer that they can bestow suitable alms on the poor. The consequence would be correct, if the hypothesis from which it is elicited were true. But we deny the consequence, since we judge the principle from which it is deduced to be false — concerning which, however,... we shall speak more fully in its own place. There we shall show that these authors falsely suppose that Religious can, in the same way that we shall show minors, servants, and wives agree, distribute alms — for Religious, besides the privation of dominion in which the latter also stand (subsistence and clothing excepted), lack even the use of goods, and their administration, by virtue of the Rules which they profess. But more on this elsewhere.

VIII. From this it is gathered that the opinion Leander gives (tract. 2, disp. 5, q. 10) is altogether false, as I indeed judge — for which he cites, and truly, Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 25, n. 15) — namely, that vows which Religious subjects would make to disburse alms from the goods of the Convent, over which they have no administration whatsoever, are valid. Such vows seem to me not only invalid, but even futile. For what could be madder than for someone to pledge those things which are in no way subject to his own power? For this reason I abstain from a more lengthy refutation. Suárez agrees with us (Bk. III, on vows, ch. 7, n. 3).

IX. Question V. Can the Church pass laws by which certain persons are declared unfit to make vows? Response: If the discussion concerns solemn vows, which regard the public discipline of the Church, there is no difficulty. For it is plain that before the completed fifteenth year no monastic profession exists. The controversy concerns simple vows, and above all those of internal acts. There are those who deny that the Church has such power over internal acts. It cannot, then, according to these authors, render men unfit, by reason of their prevailing authority, to elicit those vows by which they dedicate their interior acts to God: for such vows are of divine right, and concern a matter pleasing to God. Why, then, would they not oblige? For this opinion the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 1, punct. 7, n. 179) praise Cajetan (II-II, q. 88, art. 9, at the beginning); but he speaks ambiguously, and does not clearly teach this, but only says that the Church has greater power over a solemn vow than over a simple one — since the Church's statutes are within her power; but the interior movements of individual souls, in which a simple vow is perfected, are not so subject to the Church's power in the same way that exterior statutes and laws are. That interior acts of human liberty are not subject to the Church's power in the same manner as exterior ones — this is what Cajetan teaches. That the Church has greater power, as Cajetan says, over a solemn vow than over a simple one, is an evident matter. But that the Church can indirectly declare promises made even internally to God null, unless certain conditions are observed — Cajetan neither denies, nor asserts anything more. What repugnance, then, is there, that the Church should reject certain vows, even internal ones, though concerning a good thing, unless such-and-such conditions are observed — with which not being observed, the vows are null? For what reason is there that it should be denied that the Church can prescribe such conditions, with which some vows, even internal ones, must comply, and by which, not being observed, the vows become null? Therefore we say that the Church, a grave cause pressing, can... This opinion is taught by Suárez (Vol. II, on Religion, Bk. III, on vows, ch. 8, n. 8), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 24, n. 42), Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 15, punct. 19, n. 2), Torre (II-II, q. 88, art. 9, n. 2), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 1, punct. 7, n. 180).

X. Question VI. Can Bishops vow the abdication of the Episcopate, or entrance into religious life, without consulting the Supreme Pontiff? Response: The common opinion is negative — since such abdication is forbidden them by law, as is the chapter "Since long since," on renunciation, and the chapter "Unless," verse "Those," on Regulars, and the Royal Law, title 8, part 1. Since, then, both vows — both of abdicating the Episcopate, and of entering religious life — concern matter forbidden by the Church, Bishops are bound, before making the vow, to seek the counsel of the Supreme Pontiff. Whence, although such vows are not absolutely invalid, their execution nonetheless cannot be commanded, unless permission has first been obtained; which, if denied, the ones vowing will be free of the law of the vow.

XI. Question VII. Can Bishops, without consulting the Supreme Pontiff, vow a pilgrimage? Response: If the pilgrimage would take up only that much time as the Bishops can lawfully be absent from their Churches, it is certain that such a vow is valid — since no impediment of any kind is present. And in the hypothesis made, it is certain, and especially of Bishops, that they can lawfully be absent from their Churches, without needing to obtain permission from the Supreme Pontiff for that space of time — since a pilgrimage is, in its own nature, honorable, and does not entail harm to the Church. It must be judged otherwise, if the pilgrimage should require a longer span of time than that interval within which Bishops can lawfully be absent from their Churches for the pilgrimage's completion. We assert such a vow to be invalid, even if made under the condition of obtaining permission from the Supreme Pontiff. Since the residence of a Pastor is a matter of natural and divine right. A pilgrimage, then, which violates this natural and divine law, turns out to be evil. But a vow concerning an evil matter is unlawful, and null. This, some say, is true when the vow is made by a Bishop without the condition of seeking permission; but not so, this condition being added. But since a pilgrimage which compels a Bishop to be absent from his Church for a very long time is not, absolutely speaking, a sufficient reason for obtaining permission — nor are the Supreme Pontiffs accustomed to dispense Bishops from the bond of residence merely for the sake of a pilgrimage — such vows, as inept and invalid, are to be rejected. Conditional vows, however, are then said to be valid, when the condition is such as morally tends to occur — as, if a Religious elicits a vow to fast on such a day, to recite such prayers, if his Superior should consent, this is valid; since the superior's consent is an easy matter, and is commonly granted. But the condition of the Pontiff's permission for a pilgrimage which, over a long span of time, compels a Bishop to break that natural and divine bond of residing in his own Church, is scarcely morally possible. For the Supreme Pontiffs do not grant Bishops the faculty of being absent from their Churches for a long time, except for a most urgent cause of promoting the common good of the Church. A pilgrimage, however, undertaken under the title of a particular devotion, can never be a reason prevailing over the good of residence; nor consequently a fitting cause for which the Supreme Pontiffs would be able to grant such permission. Leander (tract. 2, disp. 5, q. 18) attempts to reconcile these two opinions in this way: if the pilgrimage is more pleasing to God than the Bishop's residence itself, the vow is valid; not so, if the Bishop's residence is more pleasing to God, and a greater good, than the pilgrimage itself.

We reject the former hypothesis as useless — since it can scarcely be conceived in what way a protracted pilgrimage could be better than residence; and it is therefore safer to pronounce absolutely that such vows are null, since they concern matter that is evil and unlawful, injuring the debt of episcopal residence. Moreover, if it can scarcely, if at all, happen that the good of the pilgrimage should prevail over the good of residence, there is no foundation at all for obtaining permission from the Supreme Pontiff for the execution of such a vow; and consequently the condition attached to the vow concerns something morally impossible. No such vow, then, is valid.

XII. Question VIII. Can Parish priests, or Beneficiaries bound by the bond of residence, vow religious life, and enter it, without consulting their own Bishop? Response: That they can, without consulting the Bishop, vow entrance into religious life is not something anyone calls into doubt. For Bishops cannot, without consulting the Supreme Pontiff, vow religious life, because this is forbidden them by a particular canon. But no law is found that forbids this to Parish priests, or other Clerics, who are subject to the debt of residence on account of some benefice. Not a few, however, whom Sánchez cites (Bk. IV, ch. 25, n. 38), contend that such vows cannot be carried out without consulting the Bishop. But the contrary... opinion is truer; indeed no law is found which forbids such entrance to the aforesaid persons. Since the chapter "He who," 18, on Regulars, decrees the seeking of permission only for Religious, and has not a word either of Parish priests, or of Clerics. Yet, by the law of propriety and courtesy, they would be bound to consult their own Bishop, before they carried out the vow.

XIII. It is customarily asked whether God, Christ the Lord, and the Angels can elicit vows. Response: It is established that a vow, properly received, is repugnant to God; for God cannot promise worship and homage to anyone. But that God can vow, and swear, in a less proper sense, there is no difficulty — since we have it from Scripture that God has many times sworn by himself. It is likewise certain that Christ the Lord could dedicate vows to God, as he could also pray. The only difficulty is whether, just as he really did pray, he also vowed. Suárez affirms this, though doubtfully (Bk. III, on vows, ch. 1, n. 3 and 6); but St. Thomas expressly denies it (II-II, q. 88, art. 4, ad 3): "It must be said that it did not befit Christ, according to himself, to vow — both because he was God, and also because, insofar as he was man, he had a will made firm in the good, existing, as it were, a comprehensor." All authors, both our own and outside our order, commonly write that wayfaring Angels could have vowed. That they did vow cannot be said. Whether they can vow in their heavenly homeland is an unnecessary inquiry, according to St. Thomas, since vows properly belong to wayfarers.