Chapter XIII — For a valid and licit dispensation, a reasonable cause is necessary

I. Any relaxation of law, or of vows, must look to a good end, and the common good; for the power conferred on the one dispensing is for edification, in no way for destruction. Whenever, then, such power is used without a legitimate cause, it is not for the benefit of the Church, but to the harm of that same power. This is the voice of all the Fathers and theologians. It is worth adding a few points for a fuller explanation of this matter.

II. Alexander III (chapter "De peregrinantibus," Extra, on vows and the redemption of vows) has this: it depends on the judgment of the one who presides to consider more diligently the quality of the person, and the cause of the commutation — namely, whether on account of infirmity, or an abundance of riches, or some other probable cause; a better and more acceptable recompense to God being had regard to, and in accordance with it, he has thence the power to dispense.

III. St. Thomas gives an altogether angelic teaching, which all dispensers ought always to keep before their eyes. For he writes this (II-II, q. 88, art. 12, in the body): "A Prelate, in the Church, bears the person of God; and therefore, in the commutation, or dispensation, of vows, the authority of the Prelate is required, who determines, in the person of God, what is acceptable to God, according to that saying (2 Corinthians 2): 'And what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned any thing, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ.' And he says pointedly 'for your sakes,' because every dispensation sought from a Prelate ought to be made either for the honor of Christ, of whose person he dispenses, or for the benefit of the Church, which is his body." And in his reply to the second objection, he says: "Some have said that Prelates can therefore dispense in vows suddenly, because in any vow the will of the superior Prelate is conditionally included — just as it was said above, that in the vows of subjects (say, of a servant, or of a son), a condition is understood: 'if it should please the father,' or 'the master,' or 'unless they object'; and thus a subject could, without any remorse of conscience, omit his vow, whenever it were told to him by the Prelate. But this position rests on a false foundation. Since, whereas a Prelate is not a master, but a dispenser, and the power given him is spiritual, for edification, and not for destruction, as is clear (2 Corinthians 10) — just as a Prelate cannot command those things which are, in themselves, displeasing to God, namely, sins — so too he cannot forbid those things which are, in themselves, pleasing to God, namely, works of virtue. And therefore man is not simply able to vow those things which are according to himself pleasing to God. But it pertains to a Prelate to judge what is more virtuous, and more acceptable to God. And therefore, in manifest matters, the dispensation of a Prelate does not excuse from fault — as, for instance, if a Prelate should dispense someone in a vow of entering religious life, no apparent cause standing in the way. If, however, there were some apparent cause, by which the matter might be turned into doubt as to whether that which he vowed were manifestly unlawful, one is not, however, bound to have recourse to the judgment of the dispensing or commuting Prelate — since he does not bear the person of God — except perhaps in a case where he could not conveniently have recourse to a superior."

IV. St. Antoninus writes similar things, from Petro de Palude (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, §6): "Note also that there is a difference between the invalidation, and the dispensation, of a vow. For invalidation can be made without cause, so that a husband, invalidating at his own pleasure, does not sin, since he does no injury to anyone who uses his own right, nor could that vow stand by its own judgment, nor by the judgment of the wife, before the husband's judgment intervened. For invalidation only invalidates a vow at pleasure, by omitting the vow, since it was ineffective from the beginning. But dispensation in a vow is not made on account of the inefficacy of the vow, but for some other cause. Whence not only is authority required in the one dispensing, but also a cause on the part of the one dispensed — namely, necessity, or utility of him, or of the commonwealth, in every kind of dispensation, in every one dispensing, even in the Pope — since authority, or power, has been committed neither to Peter, nor to another, for destruction, but for edification: which is true in the case proposed, since the obligation of a vow rests on natural and divine right." Thus far St. Antoninus, from Petro de Palude. He himself, moreover, adds this from himself in the same place, §9. Note, thirdly, concerning the cause of dispensation, since in positive matters: "Thus I will, thus I command; let my will stand for reason" — because what pleases the Prince has the force of law, custom notwithstanding, although Isidore contradicts this, since law is that which consists in reason. But in those things which are of divine right, it is otherwise — Extra, on vows, chapter "Non est." And three things must be considered, as in the chapter "Magnae," namely: what is lawful, what is fitting, what is expedient. The cause, moreover, ought to be such that it is better to depart from the common law than to hold to it. It does not suffice that it be equally good; otherwise it will be a dissipation, and both sin — namely, the one dispensing, even the Pope, and the one with whom he dispenses, if he knows, save if it clearly appears that it is against the will of the Lord. Whence Hostiensis: the Pope sins, if he dispenses without cause.

V. Not only, then, is a dispensation illicit, but even invalid, if made without a reasonable cause, as the aforesaid holy men, together with theologians commonly, teach. And the general reason is this: an inferior does not have the power to dispense in the law of a superior. A superior, however, is not presumed to grant the faculty of dispensing in the law without a reasonable cause. For to what purpose would he have asked for such a law, if the guardians of that same law could, at their own arbitrary pleasure, exempt subjects from it? For it is said, in a fairly common proverb, that the power of Prelates to dispense in law is granted for edification, not for destruction. It would, however, be for destruction, if dispensation could be granted at whim.

VI. Question I. When the cause for dispensing is doubtful, can the Prelate dispense? Response: If the existence of the cause is doubted — namely, whether the cause of dispensing is present or not — then all admit there is no room for dispensation. Certainly the vow is, and cannot be dissolved on account of an uncertain cause. If, however, some certain cause exists, and it is only doubted whether it is sufficient, then dispensation can have a place there, as authors commonly teach; and this opinion seems to incline toward the apparent cause... — St. Thomas (II-II, q. 88, art. 12, ad 2): "If, however, there were some apparent cause, by which the matter might at least be turned into doubt, the dispensation of the dispensing or commuting Prelate could stand." The Angelic Doctor does not define whether the Prelate ought to use dispensation, or commutation, when doubt arises over a sufficient cause. Since, then, when the cause of dispensing is not manifest, commutation will have a place — namely, it will be better to commute the vow, provided the necessity of the one vowing is relieved without grave difficulty of commuting anew. But if the commutation itself would be inconvenient to the one vowing, then dispensation would seem to be granted, inclining rather to the milder part. Nor do I contradict the common opinion, that Prelates can, and ought, reasonably, in such cases, to look to the utility of the one vowing, and act in good faith both on the part of the one petitioning, and on the part of the one granting, so that no scandal or occasion of laxity be given.

VII. Question II. When a dispensation, granted for a cause which both parties, at the time of the petition and grant, deemed legitimate, is afterward discovered to be really false and null, is it valid? Response: The theologians of Salamanca, Sánchez, Lessius, Tamburini, Leander, Sporer, Roncaglia affirm this — since, they say, it is incredible that the mind either of the superior, or of God himself, should be otherwise. For thus scruples are avoided, and the deeds of Prelates remain firm. Sporer adds that it pertains to the divine benignity to confirm good deeds done in good faith. Thus these authors argue.

VIII. The contrary opinion, however, seems to me more probable, which Castropalao defends (disp. 2, punct. 9, n. 4), Basilio of León (Part I, tract. 15), Passerini (q. 187, art. 11), (Bk. III, on law, disp. ult., punct. 8, §15), Pietro La Croix (Bk. III, part 1, dub. 8, n. 735). All admit that a superior sins if he dispenses without a legitimate cause; the reason is manifest enough: for a valid dispensation requires a just cause, and grave matter requires this the more gravely, according to the gravity of the matter. Therefore, whenever this cause is lacking, the dispensation, too, must necessarily collapse. The antecedent — namely, that there is no dispensation, if there is no legitimate cause for dispensing — all, as I have said, concede, and the adversaries themselves establish it as certain in this very question we are examining. How, then, do they dare to deny that the dispensation is null, if it lacked a legitimate cause at the time of the grant, merely because both parties were free from any fault, so long as the cause was believed to be true? What else, indeed, can be gathered from this, except that both acted innocently, and that the good faith of the one dispensing, and of the petitioner, excuses from fault, so long as this good faith persists? But that a cause merely apparent, feigned, and not true, should be reputed true — far from it! Does it, then, pertain to the benignity of God to confirm an error? That it is consonant with divine goodness not to impute as guilt what is done in good faith, is true. But that it should be inferred from this that it also pertains to divine benignity to hold as firm and valid what rests on a false, indeed really false and null, foundation — this is repugnant to reason. This, surely, if it becomes the benignity of a Probabilist doctrine, does not become the goodness of God. But they insist that scruples are avoided, consciences soothed, and government made to proceed more happily, if it is said that the aforesaid dispensations are valid. What then? Nothing follows from this, except that they are the mere tricks and trifles customarily employed to expand and extend the laws in cases such as these. To dispel scruples, and to provide well for the tranquility of consciences, and for happy governance, we say that a dispensation sought in good faith, and granted, excuses from fault, so long as good faith persists. But once good faith is removed, and the falsity of the cause discovered, the law, or the vow, must be kept. What? Shall the possessor of goods in good faith, then, retain another's goods even against contrary principles, once the true and legitimate cause is discovered to be false? Whether afterward, once the falsity is discovered, the dispensation, granted not by malice, but ignorantly, on the part of the one dispensing, is valid, and whether the one dispensed can lawfully continue to use it, will be said in the cited treatise on laws. More on this in the treatise on laws.

IX. Question III. What are the legitimate causes for granting dispensation? Response: Before I assign the causes individually, I will preface a few general points, which authors commonly note must be observed in dispensation. The first is that it be lawful according to equity; the second, that it be fitting according to honorableness; and the third, that it be expedient according to utility. This too must be held as a universal and certain principle: namely, that the graver the vow, the graver a cause it requires for dispensation — such that there be a fitting proportion between the vow which is to be relaxed, and the cause of such relaxation. Vows of chastity, of religious life, of the threefold pilgrimage, of perpetual fasting, of disbursing vast alms, are most grave vows: therefore they require a grave cause for dispensation. Lesser, and more frequent, vows — such as wearing the habit of some Saint, visiting his image, undertaking a visit to some such sanctuary, and the like — since they are of lesser weight, a lesser cause too suffices for obtaining dispensation. The reason is evident: in vows of the former kind, the matter consecrated to God by vow yields greater worship. Now there is no foundation for presuming that God wishes to remit the payment of a grave tribute, when no urgent reason is present which would counsel such indulgence. Hence it is that common practice holds that an absolute dispensation is most rarely granted in the aforesaid vows; but almost all teach that commutation, or dispensation, is to be granted only integrally, and that it is not always to be inferred, that the Church, or the Pontiffs themselves, ought to intermix the power of commuting or dispensing whenever some evident cause of dispensing occurs. For the power in the Church of dispensing is never to be diminished morally; nay, an evident and just legitimate cause is always, as commonly required, to occur, so that a full and absolute dispensation may be granted... . Nor is absolute moral certainty always required in moral matters; and this can often not be had, but it suffices that the cause probably exist. It suffices, then, that the cause, all things having been seriously inspected, be recognized as expedient for the common good, and for the honest utility of the one vowing, so that the vow be relaxed.

X. Particular causes, however, which can suffice for granting dispensation, are: doubt about the vow made; imperfect deliberation in vowing; the most difficult execution of the same; the moral danger of frequently violating the vow, on account of the frailty of the man bound by the vow; likewise, if it was made on account of some fear, even light. Whenever any of these causes occurs, the Bishop can dispense.

XI. Question IV. Is imperfect deliberation of the one vowing, alone, a sufficient cause for granting him dispensation? Response: More recent authors commonly affirm this — since, they say, all authors, among the causes for granting dispensation, assign not only difficulty in the execution, but also excessive facility in vowing, and imperfect deliberation. Therefore, whenever one of these two causes occurs, dispensation can lawfully be granted. Cajetan (II-II, q. 88, art. 12, dub. 3), Sotus (Bk. VII, on justice, q. 1, art. 2), Prado (ch. 31, q. 14, n. 119), Castropalao (disp. 2, punct. 9, n. 7), Suárez (Bk. III, ch. 16, §4, n. 15), Sánchez (Bk. V, ch. 17, n. 8), Tamburini (Bk. IV, ch. 45, n. 28), Leander (tract. 17, q. 9), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 3, punct. 9, n. 122).

This opinion, however, is not proven to my satisfaction. For if the imperfect deliberation was so sudden, and so feeble, that it rendered the vow null, the question ceases. But if the vow remains valid, and no impediment stands in the way of its execution, why should it be relaxed? Whenever, then, to a vow validly made, though not with perfect deliberation, is added difficulty of execution, I grant that a fitting cause for dispensation is present; but if no peculiar, and grave, difficulty is added, I deny that mere lack of full deliberation alone is a sufficient cause for dispensing. You say, however, that authors enumerate, among the causes of dispensation, facility of vowing without perfect deliberation. We grant this; but we deny, at the same time, that they reasonably adduce such a cause. This opinion of ours is defended by Valentia (II-II, disp. 6, q. 6, punct. 7), Suárez (Bk. II, ch. 17, n. 14), Passerini (q. 187, art. 1, n. 744), where he cites others.

Wherefore, in practice, the utmost caution must be applied, when dispensation is sought on the sole ground of imperfect deliberation, or excessive facility in vowing. The nature of this imperfect deliberation must be weighed — whence it took its origin; the condition of the one vowing must also be considered; and, all things seriously weighed, either an absolute dispensation, or one mixed with commutation, can be imparted. For this reason, absolute dispensation ought not to be granted to the vows of pubescent children, merely on account of their feeble discretion, and tender age — since at that age they can have sufficient deliberation, and often do have it. When, however, some difficulty, or other impediment, is joined to such vows, then tender age renders dispensation easier, as Passerini excellently notes (loc. cit., n. 745).

XII. Question V. Is imperfect deliberation, arising from fear of death, of shipwreck, or of some other grave danger, regularly sufficient for the dispensation of a vow? Response: The theologians of Salamanca affirm this (n. 133), from Tamburini, and Tamburini from Castropalao; but he teaches the opposite in that very place cited by Tamburini — namely, tract. 15, disp. 11, punct. 9, n. 9 — where he says, in express words: "Fear of death conceived from shipwreck, illness, or some other cause not employed to extort a vow, does not regularly provide a sufficient cause of dispensation; for it frequently does not exclude mature deliberation." Tamburini himself, however (Bk. III, on the Decalogue, ch. 16, §4, n. 16), says: "Hence, if you vowed something on account of fear of death, shipwreck, etc., you can lawfully obtain dispensation; for although this fear is not induced so as to extort the vow, it nonetheless provides Sánchez and Castropalao a sufficient cause of dispensation — since a vow is customarily made in this manner with immature deliberation." Tamburini's opinion in reporting the views of authors on this matter is not regularly reliable; that of Castropalao is true. For the aforesaid authors say that a familiar defect of diligence is not necessary for a vow. For such fears do not, as a rule, remove the deliberation necessary for a vow. What of the fact that, if not all, certainly most vows are made on account of avoiding some evil, or obtaining some advantage? I would not deny, however, that sometimes the fear of imminent shipwreck, or of some other danger, so disturbs the mind as to impede perfect deliberation; and thus dispensation, whether absolute, or intermixed with commutation, the variety of circumstances being inspected, ought to be granted. The same must be said of a vow made from some vehement disturbance of anger, of grief, and the like. Such causes are not commonly sufficient causes for dispensation; sometimes, however, they can be.

XIII. Question VI. Does difficulty in the execution of a vow suffice for granting dispensation from the vow? Response: If the difficulty was not foreseen, but arose entirely after the vow was made, and is grave, it is the common opinion of authors that a just cause for dispensing the vow is then present — especially if some element of commutation is mixed in. If the difficulty was foreseen, Tamburini teaches that dispensation still has a place there (tit. n. 18). Sporer copies out Tamburini (sect. 3, n. 40), and the theologians of Salamanca follow (loc. cit., n. 124), all of whom affirm that foreseen difficulty, generally speaking, is a cause of legitimate dispensation. I, on the contrary, say that, generally speaking, it is not a cause of dispensation — although I would not deny that sometimes such circumstances can occur that, these being considered, dispensation ought to be granted. What these circumstances are, I shall now say. The reason which Tamburini, the theologians of Salamanca, Sporer, and others oppose is of no weight at all — namely, that, although the difficulty was foreseen, its execution nonetheless always adds some, even the slightest, further difficulty of its own. This indeed holds true. But it is likewise false that this, of its own kind, provides a cause for granting dispensation. For the execution of any promise whatsoever carries with it this inseparable difficulty. Who would deny that this difficulty of execution provides either a cause, or an occasion, for dissolving the bond of the thing promised? Wherefore Tamburini's exclamation — "O how often, by thought alone, we are deceived!" — either concludes nothing, or infers that all promises whatsoever ought to be rescinded.

XIV. It has been said, absolutely, that a foreseen difficulty is not, by its own nature, sufficient for granting dispensation — such that, if a difficulty added to the difficulty of fulfilling the vow can provide a sufficient cause of dispensing, it would be the danger of violating it. Circumstances, however, can occur which supply this danger, such that we rush headlong into every peril, though at the first encounter of it we grow pale, and turn our backs, and that great danger attached to it be grave. When difficulty is without danger, it does not suffice; nor does any danger of transgressing the vow once, or twice, suffice. There is, then, a sufficient cause of dispensing when the difficulty is such that, the condition of the person of the one vowing being considered, it carries with it a great danger of falling into the transgression of the vow. For this reason Alexander III (chapter "Veniens," concerning a Cleric who...) grants dispensation to one bound by a vow of chastity, on account of the danger to continence, which a woman... Soto (Bk. VII...), Suárez (Bk. VI, ch. 17, n. 12), Passerini (q. 187, art. 3), all commonly [teach the same]. A grave disturbance of conscience, too, supplies a fitting cause of dispensation, whether because it harms the health of body or mind, or because the one vowing is afflicted with frequent and grave scruples, such that the execution of the vow harms him more than it profits him.

XV. Question VII. Is doubt about a vow made a just cause for obtaining dispensation? Response: If the doubt concerns the sufficient and necessary intention both of vowing, and of binding oneself, then, since the existence of the vow is then uncertain, a foundation for granting dispensation is present. This you should understand as applying when the doubt is a true one, or, as some are accustomed to call it, a negative one. For if more probable reasons stood in favor of the vow, then the doubt would provide no cause for dispensing. Indeed, the doubt alone, unless something else is added, is not enough to dispense the vow, but only to commute it. Likewise, if it is doubtful whether the execution of the vow impedes a greater good, and divine worship, this renders the vow uncertain, and provides a cause of dispensation, as theologians commonly teach.

XVI. Finally, if the increase of the common good, or its harm, requires the relaxation of the vow, dispensation can be granted. Wherefore, to calm the tranquility of a province, or city, dispensation can be given to one bound by a vow of chastity; and the same is said of one who, on account of a vow of fasting, would be prevented from exercising lectures, or sermons, most useful to the city. Likewise, if it turns to the harm of a household — as if, from the absence of the one vowing, the family would suffer harm — dispensation from a vow of... chastity would be able... a grave lawsuit could be impeded with a man, if a grave vow... Wherefore, to preserve that illustrious family, dispensation could easily be granted in a vow of fasting, if some element of commutation is added. Finally, the greater spiritual good of the one vowing himself can be a sufficient cause of dispensing — for the end of a vow is the spiritual good of the one vowing. Whenever, then, the execution of the vow would impede the greater good of the one vowing, and its relaxation would confer upon him greater benefit, a sufficiently reasonable cause for dispensing would be present.

XVII. It is worth noting, at the end of this chapter, that although it is true that, a true and manifest cause existing, the superior can absolutely dispense in vows, such power very rarely occurs in fact, especially in the graver and perpetual vows. Hence the Apostolic See itself scarcely grants dispensation without some commutation. And all this is common ground. What, then, if a true and evident cause of dispensing absolutely exists — is the superior bound to dispense? Passerini affirms this (n. 750) — that he is sometimes bound, namely, when, all things having been weighed, he judges that it gravely conduces either to the common good, or to the private spiritual good of the one vowing.