Chapter XIV — On the commutation of vows, and on those who have the faculty of commuting them

I. To commute is to substitute one thing for another, taking away the one, and substituting the other in its place. Wherefore the commutation of a vow cannot be defined thus: it takes away the bond, as dispensation does; but, the bond of the vow remaining, another matter is substituted, which succeeds in the place of the former; or, more clearly, another is subrogated in place of the first matter which succeeds in the place of it. Commutation of a vow, therefore, differs from invalidation, which is an act of a dominating power taking away all obligation, no cause even occurring, the matter being considered absolutely. It differs again from dispensation, as has been said above.

II. Commutation of a vow, then, is the commutation of one matter for another, under the same obligation of the vow, as has already been said. Commutation is an effect of spiritual jurisdiction. All those who can dispense in vows can also commute them, though not the reverse — which holds true not only of those who enjoy ordinary power, but also of those who are furnished with delegated power. That commutation is an act of jurisdiction, St. Thomas teaches (Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 4, qc. 4): "In the commutation of a vow, a certain contract is included, which cannot be perfected without the consent of both parties. Whence the alteration of a vow cannot be made unless the consent of him who bears the person of God on earth intervenes — namely, of the Prelate — unless perhaps one vow is included in another. And because the vow of religious life includes all other vows, both by reason of its perpetuity, and by reason of obedience, whereby a man hands over his own will to God, whereby he can be lord of all that is his own — therefore he who has made some temporal vow can, without seeking the dispensation of any Prelate, enter religious life, notwithstanding the preceding vow which would impede entrance into religious life."

III. Question I. Can anyone, by his own authority, commute his own vow into something evidently better? Response: Since there is no slight disagreement among authors on the question proposed, it is worth discussing these matters more accurately. And first, all agree that when what is better, or a greater good, is present in the promised matter, anyone can, by his own authority, alter his own vow. But this is not commutation, or substitution, of one matter for another; rather it is a more abundant payment — as if you had vowed to distribute a hundred gold pieces in alms, and you distribute two hundred. Similarly, if you had promised a hundred silver pieces, and you give a hundred gold pieces, this would not be a true commutation, but a more overflowing payment: the whole diversity is material, since gold is worth more than silver; and as regards the payment of the promised alms, no diversity at all is reckoned between gold and silver, since the latter is included in the former. When, moreover, a lesser good is included in a greater good, then it is not a true commutation, of which we are presently speaking, but, as we have said, a more perfect observance of the vow. This is gathered from the teaching of St. Thomas, who teaches that anyone can, by his own authority, commute any private vow whatsoever, even a reserved one, into a vow of religious life — since this comprehends all other particular vows, just as the universal contains particulars. For he says (II-II, q. 88, art. 12, ad 1): "It must be said that all other vows are of certain particular works; but through religious life a man dedicates his whole life to the service of God. The particular, however, is included in the universal. And therefore he who commutes a temporal service into the perpetual observance of religious life is not held guilty of a broken vow." The controversy, then, is about true commutation, in which one disparate matter is subrogated for another — as, if you vowed a fast, and commute it into alms; if you promised to recite the Office of the Blessed Virgin, and afterward recite several Rosaries instead. This is the true state of the question.

IV. The first opinion, which all the new Moralists uphold, affirms that anyone, whether layman or Ecclesiastic, man or woman, can, by his own authority, commute his vow into that which is evidently better. I abstain from listing authors, since, as I said, all more recent writers concede this opinion. Consult Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 49, n. 4), and the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 3, punct. 14, n. 132), where they cite many authors. They prove this, first, from the chapter "Scripturae," on vows: "He is not held guilty of a broken vow who is known to have commuted temporal service into the perpetual observance of religious life." And from the chapter "Licet," on Regulars, where it is decreed that, permission having been sought, though not obtained, it is lawful to transfer from a laxer to a stricter religious order. But the sole reason for that opinion is this: what is evidently better is more pleasing and acceptable to God. Now what is more pleasing to God cannot fail to please him. What, moreover, pleases God is lawful.

V. Therefore the commutation of a vow into something evidently better, made by the private authority of the one vowing, is lawful. For indeed, since the will of God is most upright, it cannot fail to accept what is really more good, and more perfect. When, then, it is evidently established that the substituted matter is, without any doubt, better, it does not seem to be doubted that the matter, less good, promised by vow, can be commuted into this better matter. Although it does not always please men what is better, but what is more convenient for them, we cannot suspect this of God; for he is borne, by his own rectitude, toward that which is truly better. And so, when it is evidently established for us that the matter substituted for the vow is better, it is likewise established for us of the consent of God himself, accepting that same matter. This is the sole foundation of this opinion; which, if the authority of more recent theologians is considered, appears not merely probable, but the most common, and most probable.

VI. St. Thomas teaches the second opinion, in express words (Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 4, last question, in the body): "Commutation is a certain contract, which cannot be perfected without the consent of both parties; and therefore it cannot be made without the consent of him who bears the person of God on earth." This teaching of St. Thomas is drawn from Scripture itself, where, in Leviticus 27, this is found: "But if the animal be such as may be sacrificed to the Lord, whosoever shall vow it shall be holy, and shall not be changed, that is, neither a better for a worse, nor a worse for a better. But if he change it, both the beast which was changed, and that for which it was changed, shall be consecrated to the Lord." This too is gathered from the chapter "Licet," on Regulars, where it is said that it is not lawful for a professed Religious to transfer from a laxer to a stricter Order, unless license has first been sought from the superior. This opinion is defended by St. Bonaventure (Supplement, Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 5, where, concerning the redemption and commutation of vows, verse "on the redemption of vows," letter d), Palacios (on IV, dist. 38, disp. 3, col. 27), Sylvester (s.v. Votum, 4, q. 7, dict. 2, where he also cites law 2, §"Si cert. petat," Bk. II, Institutes, "By what means obligations are dissolved," where one paying is not freed unless he pays what he owes, even though he pays something better). The more ancient Canonists too commonly favor this opinion — Innocent (chapter "Pervenit," n. unique, on the law of oaths), John Andreae there (n. 2), Hostiensis there, Antonio there (n. 5), Baldus there (n. 2), Ancharanus there (n. 1), the Abbot there (n. 2), Alexander de Nevo there (n. 1), Bellamera there (n. 2), Felinus there (n. 1), Henricus... (n. 7). This opinion seems to me more probable, both on account of the authority of the ancient theologians, and especially of the holy Thomas and Bonaventure, and on account of the force of the reasons. But before I put forward my reasons, it is worth recalling to mind the state of the question — namely, that our present discussion concerns true commutation, in which one matter, altogether of a different and disparate kind, is substituted for the first already promised by vow; which the theologians of Salamanca excellently note (n. ...). Many of those who are alleged for the contrary opinion by no means had this sense of the controversy clearly in view. For Henrique a San Ignacio, who subscribes to the contrary opinion, says (Bk. X, ch. 47, n. 364): the less good is contained in the greater good — as, if you promised a sheep, and you give an ox. But that this is not a true commutation of the vow, but a more perfect and abundant payment of it, has already been said. We are speaking, then, of those who have vowed fasts, and commute them into alms; or, on the contrary, who have vowed a pilgrimage, and commute it into prayers; and of other similar cases.

VII. The reasons for our opinion are proposed as follows. The commutation of a vow is an act of spiritual jurisdiction. But secular persons lack all spiritual jurisdiction; and ecclesiastical persons cannot exercise jurisdiction over themselves. They cannot, then, commute their own vows by their own authority. The first proposition is beyond dispute, being established by common consent of all the patrons of vows — since the theologians of Salamanca themselves say (n. 113): "Commutation is an act of spiritual jurisdiction, no less than dispensation." Wherefore, just as it is the common assertion that all those who, by ordinary right, can dispense in vows, of whom we have spoken, can also, by right, commute the same, so too is the second proposition manifest. The third, finally, necessarily follows from both.

VIII. This commutation, they say, is not an act of jurisdiction, but of prudence, and natural knowledge. But this is asserted gratuitously. Commutation, absolutely, by its own kind, and by its own nature, is asserted to be an act of jurisdiction; why not this one too? Is it because it is into better matter? What, if it were into inferior matter? It would be, they say, an act of jurisdiction. What, then, if it were into equal matter? Also, they answer. The value of matter, then, destroys jurisdiction; but the cheapness of the same generates it? Jurisdiction does not look directly to the matter, but to the bond of the promise; while equality or inequality of matter looks to justice. Moreover, while a vow is being commuted, the prior bond is dissolved, and another is substituted. Let me explain the matter more clearly. Several vows are said to be distinguished by genus, or species, on account of the specific distinction of matter — for instance, a vow of fasting is distinguished in species from a vow of alms, on account of the specific diversity of the matters. In a true commutation, then, of which we now treat, one vow is commuted into another. Therefore the first is rescinded, and another succeeds in its place. Now, if the rescission of a contract, or of a promise, is a spiritual contract, or spiritual act, it demands spiritual jurisdiction. This whole teaching is St. Thomas's: "Commutation is a certain contract, which cannot be perfected without the consent of both parties; and therefore it cannot be perfected without the consent of him who bears the person of God on earth — namely, of the Prelate — unless perhaps one vow is included in the other."

IX. By these few words the Angelic Doctor confirms our opinion, and dispels the equivocation of the contrary opinion. When one vow, he says, is included in another — namely, the lesser in the greater — then it is not true commutation, but a more perfect payment; as if someone vowed fifty, and gave a hundred. But when the vows are disparate, then a true and strict commutation occurs; nor is one vow included in the other, though it may be more perfect. Who would say that a vow of fasting is included in a vow of alms, or a vow of pilgrimage in a vow of wearing a hair-shirt, or of undergoing penances, or of contrition? For such vows, then, to be commuted, spiritual jurisdiction is required. And although it is evident that a vow of bestowing a thousand gold pieces in alms greatly outweighs a vow of one or another fast, this change cannot, nonetheless, be made without the jurisdiction, or authority, of him who bears the person of God.

X. Our opinion is confirmed by another reason, by which the contrary opinion is at the same time refuted. What is chiefly considered in a vow is that bond by which the one vowing is bound to offer God what he promised; nor is the thing promised so much esteemed, as the debt of giving it, and the fidelity of carrying it out. Such a bond, by which the one vowing is bound to God, is a more precious sacrifice than any victim whatsoever subject to the promise. For fidelity in fulfilling a promise is more pleasing to God than the price of any promised thing whatsoever. Just as, on the contrary, one who does not fulfill his vow is made guilty of a greater iniquity on account of the falsehood of breaking a promise made to God, than on account of the injustice of stealing from God the thing promised. But whoever, by his own authority, commutes a vow, breaks the promise, and thus becomes a liar. Illicitly, then, does he commute it.

XI. Thus, they say, it is, when we are not certain of the creditor's consent. But when the substituted matter is evidently better, we are certain of the consent of God himself, who, since his will is most upright, always accepts what is better. This response is overthrown by what we have said. Since what is more pleasing to God, and more acceptable, is to discharge a pledged faith, or to fulfill exactly a promise. But whoever commutes an already uttered vow does not discharge the faith given, but violates it.

The vow is not violated, you reply, since a better victim is substituted, and thus it is better fulfilled. I would wish to know how a vow could be violated, except by the change of matter. For there is no other way of breaking a promise, except by the subtraction, or change, of matter. If the matter is either altogether withdrawn, or diminished, both faith and justice are violated, which give rise to the debt of compensating for the thing withdrawn. If the matter is changed either into an equal, or into a better, good, the good remains whole and intact — the justice, that is, which looks to the equality of the thing; but the faith given on the part of the one promising is violated, and the right which the promisee acquired, that the promise made to him be kept, is violated.

Hence it is even more clearly apparent how feeble is the response given — namely, that we are certain of the consent of God himself in the substitution of a better thing. For we are certain that God wills that a promise made to him be kept for himself, and in no way changed, he not being consulted, however much better, and greater, a good is offered instead. This is the greatest good which is pleasing to God above any other precious victim, however great. Of this we are certain; not so of the others which are alleged.

XII. It should be added that the reasoning of the adversaries proves not only that one can commute his own vow into something better, but even into something equally good — which, however, the greater number of them deny, as may be seen in Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 49, n. 12). Since, if what is better is more pleasing to God, what is equally good ought equally to please God. Why, then, is God's consent presumed in a better good, but not in an equally good one? Sánchez says: it is more pleasing to God that a man persevere in his prior will, the promise once made having been supposed, when, in place of the prior matter, nothing more precious is subrogated, by which the withdrawal from the prior will offered to God might be compensated. We reply, however, that the mere increase of a greater tribute to be paid to God is not enough for the one vowing to be able lawfully to steal away a victim once offered to God by vow. For however much better, and more precious, the matter to be offered may be, it cannot bring it about that the one who does not offer the promised matter, or who does not fulfill the promise, is not a liar, and a violator of the faith given.

XIII. Finally, just as it is most difficult, and almost impossible, to know the equality between two moral goods, so it is likewise difficult to judge which is the better good, and which ought to be said to be more pleasing to God — since the greater value of things is by no means a sufficient foundation for inferring that it is more pleasing to God. For those things which seem better to us... are not always so before God. A gift of a thousand gold pieces in alms is judged by us to be better than a single day's fast; and yet the observance of the fast will perhaps be more pleasing to God than such a bestowal of alms.

XIV. Let us conclude, then, that no one can, by his own authority, commute his vow into another vow of a different kind — say, a vow of fasting into alms, however great; of pilgrimage into fasts, etc. Of this commutation, indeed, we have spoken thus far, and it is this one commutation that authors dispute, as the theologians of Salamanca clearly explain. And this must always be kept before one's eyes, lest it be confused with the true commutation of a vow, and lest, sometimes, a more perfect payment of the vow be mistaken for it, when you increase the promised thing within the same species.

XV. From this the solution to the arguments of the contrary opinion is clear. For the authority which is objected from the chapter "Scripturae," on vows, speaks of one who, bound by a private vow, embraces the state of religious life, which comprehends all vows, as the Angelic Doctor explains, who cites the same authority, as has been said (n. 3). The other text favors our own opinion; for it concerns a commutation within the same, as it were, genus of religious life; or the discussion in that text is of the more perfect observance of monastic profession: and yet even in this commutation, which is indeed true, license is prescribed to be sought, although, afterward, if it is unjustly denied, transfer to a stricter religious order is permitted. To the reasoning it is answered that to free the faith pledged to God in the prior vow is more acceptable and pleasing to God than any other matter, however much better. It should be added that we are certain that a promise made to God, which is supremely pleasing and acceptable, ought to be kept. But that a newly offered victim, or vow uttered anew, even though it appears to us evidently better, is more pleasing to God, especially in comparison with the observance of the prior vow, we cannot be certain.

XVI. From all this it is gathered, much more clearly, that no one can, by his own authority, commute his vow either into an equal, or into a lesser good. That a vow cannot be commuted into a lesser good, all concede; that it cannot be commuted into an equal good either, the more common opinion defends. They dispute, however, whether one would sin mortally who, by his own authority, commuted his own vow, either into a lesser, or into an equal, good. The theologians of Salamanca defend the affirmative opinion (tract. 17, ch. 3, punct. 14, n. 136). Since such a commutation, no legitimate authority intervening, is null. For the commutation of vows is an act of spiritual jurisdiction, which resides in the Prelates of the Church alone. Therefore an act without this jurisdiction is null. If it is null, the obligation of fulfilling the prior vow remains under grave fault, just as if no commutation had been made at all. For this opinion they cite Suárez, Palao, Prado, Azor, Raphael de la Torre — with whom we too agree.

XVII. Question II. Can one who vowed to give a determinate son to religious life, by his own authority, offer another instead? Response: St. Antoninus denies this (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, §8), Sylvester (s.v. Votum, 4, dict. 1, where he cites Petro de Palude). This is the more probable opinion. The reason is clear from what has been said.

XVIII. Question III. In things which are used up by consumption, can one be substituted for another, promised by vow? Response: Sánchez affirms this (loc. cit., n. 6), since it is not a moral change, as in wine, oil, and the like. If the change occurs within the same species — as if you vowed this wine, this wheat, this oil, and you substitute other oil for the first oil — I too think that no real change is found there. Although this scarcely occurs in practice. For either the prior wine, oil, wheat, etc., has perished, or it has not. If it has perished, the question ceases. If it survives, why should you need to change it? If, however, the change were into a different species — say, if wheat were to be substituted for wine, or wine for oil — then I would by no means grant such a change, since it would be a moral change. Nor do I see on what foundation Leander rested (q. 14), when he holds that, for a quantity of wine, the same quantity of oil could be substituted. This I would in no way grant. In things, however, which are not consumed by a single use, Sánchez, with Suárez, teaches that no change can be made — as, if you vowed a female slave, you do not satisfy by giving her value in money; nor, if you vowed money, do you fulfill the vow by giving a chalice instead — because these do not serve the same use, and one matter is more useful than the other; this cannot be.

XIX. Question IV. Can one who vowed to hand over a determinate son to religious life offer another by his own authority? Response: St. Antoninus denies this (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, §8), Sylvester (s.v. Votum, 4, dict. 1, where he cites Petro de Palude). This is the more probable opinion. The reason is clear from what has been said.

XX. Question V. Is a layman, or a married Cleric, capable of the jurisdiction of commuting vows? Response: The common and true opinion denies this, unless a pontifical dispensation is added. Women, too, are incapable of such spiritual jurisdiction. For this reason Abbesses cannot commute the vows of their Nuns, just as they cannot dispense with them either. Similarly, excommunicated Prelates who have been publicly denounced, or notorious strikers of Clerics, do not have the faculty of commuting vows. To those alone, then, belongs the power of commuting vows, who can dispense in them.