Chapter XV — What equality legitimate commuters of vows ought to observe; what causes are required for a legitimate commutation

I. It remains now to explain what manner ought to be observed in the subrogation of matter, whether it be by one's own authority, or by legitimate authority. That no one can, by his own authority, commute his own vow into matter either inferior, or equal, or better, has already been shown. Now it must be explained what manner those who possess the faculty of commuting vows ought to observe. Of pure and simple commutation, in which nothing of dispensation is mixed, our present discussion is. For there are some who have both the faculty of dispensing and of commuting, such as the Supreme Pontiffs, Bishops, and regular Prelates with respect to their own subjects. These, while they commute vows, can mix in some element of dispensation; and thus they can commute vows into a lesser obligation, or matter. We speak, then, of those who can only commute vows, and, as is our opinion, are those who commute vows by force of the crusade bull, or of a jubilee, or of another privilege — who, unlike Confessors, whether Regular or Secular, having permission, can commute vows, but cannot dispense in them.

II. Question I. In the true commutation of vows, must the equality of matter be observed? Response: The first opinion maintains that it is lawful to commute a vow into a lesser matter — both because it is difficult and probable, giving rise to doubts and scruples, and disturbance of conscience, to touch precisely the point of equality; and therefore it is probable that anyone can commute his own vows into an equal... good, without needing to consult a superior — since otherwise this faculty would be granted in vain. This opinion is defended by Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 7, §3, n. 11), Diana (Part II, tract. 16, and in the Miscellanies), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 18, q. 12), where he also praises Sotus, Medina, Lessius, Toledo, Aragón, and others.

III. The other opinion, which is more common, and more probable, is that a pure commutation of vows ought to be made into morally equal matter. The reason is gathered from St. Thomas's teaching, given above. It has been said that commutation is a contract between him who commutes in God's name, and the one vowing. But any contract whatsoever demands equality. Therefore also the contract of exchange in the matter substituted for the first. This equality in commutation ought to consist in this: that the matter which is substituted equal the matter that was previously in this commutation — that is, that it be whole and integral, lest justice in it be violated. In any civil contract, does not a minister who conducts his master's business act rightly, if he abuses the power granted to him of exchanging the master's property, by receiving a lesser thing for a greater one? Privileges, and favors of Princes, do admit a broad interpretation, the legitimate sense of the words always being saved — but not to the detriment of justice's integrity. When the power of commuting is given, the faculty of dispensing is not thereby conferred. Commutation, being, as it were, a contract, by its own nature demands equality in the things to be exchanged; nor is there any foundation for interpreting the privilege of commutation more broadly — since, the equality of the things to be exchanged removed, the very nature of true commutation perishes. This opinion is defended by Paludanus (Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 4, art. 3), Rosella (s.v. Votum, n. 6), Sylvester (s.v. Votum, 4, q. 8, at the end), Sotus (Bk. VII, on justice, q. 4, art. 1), Cajetan (II-II, q. 88, art. 12), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 5, n. 4), Suárez (Bk. VI, ch. 14), Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 18, q. 11), Sayr (Clavis Regia, Bk. VI, ch. 12, n. 9), Layman (Bk. IV, tract. 4, ch. 8, n. 19), Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 2, punct. 10, n. 6), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 3, punct. 13, n. 139), Wigandt (tract. 10, exam. 9, n. 63).

IV. This equality, which the aforesaid authors demand, is not to be taken arithmetically, and mathematically, but morally — that is, as it is prudently and in good faith estimated. Nor indeed is the matter to be measured with excessive religious scrupulosity. And this too is observed in other contracts. Hence the first foundation of the contrary opinion collapses. As to what they say in the second place, we deny that opinion to be probable. For, even granting its probability, it does not follow from this that a legitimate commuter can substitute lesser matter in the commutation. But both the one vowing, in the case of matter evidently equal, as that opinion holds, and the Prelate, in the case of matter probably equal, ought to commute the vow.

V. Hence Patritius Sporer is not a little mistaken (tract. 3, on the 2nd precept, ch. 3, sect. 4, n. 122, where he cites his own authors), following Diana, Tamburini, and Gobat, teaching that commutation into lesser, and unequal, matter, can be made by one having the power — provided this inequality is not so great as to be sufficient for a dispensation belonging to another. He further contends that Sánchez, and others, commonly teach this. "Nor do Sánchez, and others commonly," says Sporer, "seem to wish anything else." But Sánchez, and other authors commonly, in express words, uphold our own opinion. Wherefore, that Sporer may somehow be excused, it must be said that he had read neither Sánchez, nor the others. For Sánchez indeed contends that, in the commutation of vows, that equality is not to be observed which is observed in other contracts — since, he says, no power of jurisdiction intervenes in this commutation, as in ours of old. Can, then, the ministers of masters, without power, commute contracts entered into by them? Not so, indeed, as in vows; but civil power is required there; spiritual power of jurisdiction is required here. For the rest, Sánchez, and other theologians, do require that equality in the commutation of vows which is commonly observed in contracts — as anyone reading the same author can confirm for himself.

VI. When the equality between the matter subject to the vow, and the matter to be made subject to the vow, is doubtful, there is room for commutation. Since, as has been said, mathematical equality is not required, but moral equality. When doubt occurs, and there is no certain inequality on one side or the other, the doubt must be laid aside, and, without excessive scrupulousness, or superstition, that equality which is observed by prudent men in good faith in other contracts must be observed. Consult what we shall say below.

VII. From this it is gathered that commutation into a lesser matter, without equality, is not free from mortal fault — since, as Sánchez says (loc. cit., n. 9), grave divine right is injured, and divine worship is gravely diminished. A greater or lesser inequality, however, must be weighed: for, if the inequality is slight, the one commuting will commit only a light fault. Wherefore, that he may securely provide for himself, one who commutes should always take care to exchange the vow for something better. For to attain exact equality is most difficult. When, moreover, it is God's cause that is being transacted, it seems better that the substituted good be greater, so that God's business may be more safely advanced — as Sánchez himself says in the place cited (n. 10).

VIII. Question II. Is a cause required for a licit and valid commutation? Response: Since commutation (as has been said) is a contract entered into between the one vowing, and God himself, so that it may be licitly and validly executed, a cause is required, as is gathered from St. Thomas (II-II, q. 88, art. 12), which we have demonstrated above.

IX. When, however, commutation is made into an evidently better good by a Prelate endowed with legitimate power, all concede that no cause is required. For the excess of the good to be substituted is reckoned a sufficient cause of commutation. We have denied that this can be done by the one vowing, since he has no faculty at all of commuting his own vows. This faculty, however, is present in the Prelate; therefore he can, even without any external cause, commute vows into a good which is evidently better. For then the two things necessary for commutation occur — namely, the increase of divine worship, and legitimate authority.

X. If the matter into which the commutation is to be made is evidently equal, or even probably better, authors commonly teach that commutation can be made by the Prelate even without cause; nor do I myself resist this — since, on the one hand, it is certain that no loss, or diminution, of divine worship then occurs; and, on the other hand, it is probable that an increase of that same divine worship is had.

XI. When the commutation is to be made into an equal matter, the Prelate ought to have some cause. For why, indeed, should the obligation of a vow be broken, with no benefit on the part of the one vowing, and no cause of greater worship existing on the part of God? Would this not... render that minister a very shrewd one indeed, who exchanged his master's contracts at pleasure without benefit to him? This too is common opinion.

XII. When the Supreme Pontiff, by jubilee, or crusade bull, or some other privilege, gives the faculty of commuting vows, no particular cause is required for the commutation to be valid and licit; it suffices only that the execution of those works, alms, prayers, and fasts, which are prescribed in the aforesaid bulls, be performed. For the Supreme Pontiff, in such events, imparts this faculty for the common good, and prescribes such works. It must be judged otherwise, however, when Prelates commute by force of ordinary power, or when regular Confessors commute by force of delegated power. Indeed, for their commutation, a cause is required by an even stronger right.

XIII. Question III. What cause is required when a vow is commuted into equal good? Response: The theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 3, punct. 16, n. 145, where they cite Cajetan, Prado, Sánchez, Diana, and others) teach that the mere petition of the one vowing suffices as cause for the aforesaid commutation — which Sánchez explains at greater length (Bk. IV, ch. 1, n. 23). Their reason is that this benignity, they say, redounds to God's honor. They concede that the commutation would be illicit, if the Prelate granted it at his own arbitrary pleasure; but not so, when he grants it to indulge the petition of the one vowing.

This opinion does not seem to me sufficiently consistent with itself. For these same authors admit that the very nature of commutation demands a cause, even when it is made into equal matter — which Sánchez especially proves (loc. cit., n. 6). That this cause, then, should consist universally in the mere petition of the one vowing seems altogether paradoxical. For the petition for a dispensation, and the cause either of dispensing or of commuting, are two distinct things. And if someone were to say, absolutely, that the mere petition for a privilege, and for any favor whatsoever, is itself a just cause for its grant, he would utter something quite unheard of.

XIV. We say, then, that, besides the petition of the one vowing, some other cause is required for the licit commutation of a vow into equal matter. It is not, however, necessary that it be a grave cause; but a light one suffices — because, since equal matter is substituted, divine worship is not diminished, but only the one vowing is lightly injured. For this reason a light cause suffices — say, some particular difficulty which impedes execution. So think Sylvester (s.v. Votum, 4), Rosella (s.v. Votum, 5, n. 6), Angles (s.v. Votum, 4, n. 10), Sotus (Bk. VII, on justice, q. 4, art. 3), Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 18, q. 3), Sayr (Clavis Regia, Bk. VI, ch. 12, n. 18), Vivaldus (Candelabrum Sacramentale, Part III, ch. 14, n. 15).

XV. Question IV. Is a commutation into an equal thing, made without cause, invalid? Response: Such a commutation is indeed illicit, but not therefore invalid. For justice is observed there, which demands equality. The Prelate only abuses the absolute power granted to him, in a light matter. For this reason, from the defect of this light cause, the aforesaid commutation does not become invalid.

XVI. Question V. Is the aforesaid commutation invalid, when the cause is entirely lacking? Response: All agree that a cause is required for a valid commutation, in which lesser matter, or obligation, is substituted for the prior obligation of the vow — and, indeed, the graver the matter, the graver the cause required; just as a greater cause is necessary for a dispensation, in which the bond of the vow is altogether dissolved, than for a commutation, in which the bond of the vow is not altogether dissolved, but one thing is substituted for another. Authors dispute, however, whether, just as the defect of a reasonable cause renders a dispensation invalid, so too does it render a commutation invalid. It has been said that a commutation into equal matter is valid, even if a cause is lacking. The controversy, then, is only about a commutation into a lesser good, made without cause.

XVII. That such a commutation is valid, not a few authors teach, this condition being added: that the one vowing is bound to supply the deficiency of the substituted matter, so that it may equal the prior matter. This opinion is defended by Sánchez (ch. 5), Bk. XVI, and others. Their reasons are these: that it is more lenient to deal with God than with men. Now civil exchanges between men are valid, even if made without cause, as is clear from the law "2," on the rescinding of sale. The same, then, must be said of the commutation of vows. Candido (disp. 25, art. 2, dub. 3, concl. 6 and 7), Diana (Part... n. 8) hold that a commutation into a lesser good, made with cause, is valid by a stronger right, provided the one vowing has the obligation of supplying the equality of the prior matter. It is added that a commutation into... according to all, agrees with the value of the matter: therefore even without a cause alone, the obligation will have some value.

XVIII. The contrary opinion, to which we adhere, is more common, and more probable. Since commutation is an act of spiritual jurisdiction, which, without a cause, is invalid, just as dispensation is, according to St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88, art. 12 — for it is not at all acceptable to God that vows uttered to him be relaxed without cause; since no power without a cause is granted for destruction, but for edification. Therefore, for the relaxation of vows to be valid, whether by dispensation, or by commutation, a reasonable cause ought to exist. For a Prelate, whether he dispenses vows, or commutes them, represents God, and bears his place; nor indeed, if without cause he granted his own commutation, would it be for edification, but wholly for destruction. This opinion is defended by Suárez (Bk. VI, on vows, ch. 19, n. 14), Prado (ch. 31, q. 15, n. 40), Ludovico López (Part I, ch. 1), Castropalao (disp. 2, punct. 17, n. 2), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 3, punct. 16, n. 148), and others.

XIX. The arguments of the contrary opinion are most easily answered. It is true that we ought to deal more gently with God than with men, but always with justice preserved. Civil exchanges are valid, even if made without cause, since laws are established, so that disputes and lawsuits may be avoided. But nowhere is it established for us that God has decreed the power in himself of relaxing vows to be granted without cause; rather, the opposite is established both by reason and by the Doctors. To the second, the consequence is denied — because, when a cause of commuting is present in the Prelate, all things required for the validity of the commutation concur. If, however, the Prelate falls short of what is just in the substitution of matter more than he should, he sins against equity — which does not impede the validity of the act. But when the cause is entirely lacking, the power too is lacking — since it was granted by God to be exercised for edification, which occurs only when a reasonable cause for commuting is present.

XX. From this it is gathered, by a stronger right, that no commutation of a vow into a lesser good, made by one's own authority, or by one who lacks jurisdiction, is valid — as is established from what has been said. Nor is Sánchez sufficiently consistent with himself, when, in ch. 5, n. 12, he contends that the aforesaid commutation is not altogether void — since, in the preceding chapters, he asserted that no commutation of a vow made without legitimate power is valid, even into an equal good, let alone into a lesser good. Wherefore one who commuted a vow into a lesser good ought first to fulfill the prior vow.

XXI. Question VI. What sin does a Prelate commit who, without a legitimate cause, commutes a vow into a lesser, or even an equal, good? Response: Suárez (Bk. VI, ch. 19, n. 14) teaches that this Prelate sins gravely, since he abuses the power granted to him. He likewise affirms, by a stronger right, this of one who, by his own authority, commutes a vow into an equal good — unless ignorance excuses him from fault. But when there would not be a notable diminution on the part of the substituted matter, but a moral equality would be preserved, I would not dare condemn the Prelate of mortal sin. He would indeed sin, since he would in some manner abuse the power granted to him. But it is difficult, in practice, to find so great a malice in the commutation of a vow, equal matter being substituted, that the commuting Prelate should be found guilty of mortal wrongdoing — both because it is difficult for no cause at all of such a commutation to occur, and because ignorance of it can easily diminish the fault. For he will commute, persuaded by a probable opinion, which, though it does not altogether excuse him, nonetheless extenuates his fault. Sánchez (loc. cit., ch. 2, n. 16) maintains that the one vowing, too, who by his own authority commutes his vow into an equal matter, does not exceed the bounds of venial fault, since it is an unfaithfulness in this, that the one vowing usurps to himself an authority. But I decline to subscribe to this opinion. For although there would be equality in the exchange of matter, there would nonetheless be an injury of right in the usurpation of power; which, as it seems to me, can in no way be called light.

XXII. Question VII. Is a dispensation mixed with commutation to be presumed, when... the commutation appears illegitimate, as being manifestly into a lesser matter?* Response: Some hold that a dispensation is not then to be presumed, when a learned man commutes the vow — since a learned man is presumed not to be ignorant of a matter so clear. If, however, it is not established that the one commuting is learned, as not infrequently happens, then they add that the commutation is to be held illegitimate — especially if it is certain that the Confessor commutes vows by force of a bull, or of a jubilee, by which only the faculty of commuting, not of dispensing, is granted. If he did not express by whose faculty he commuted, nor sought a cause for commuting, the commutation is to be presumed illegitimate — since, if he had dispensed, he would have sought a cause. On the contrary, if he examined the cause, and the one commuting was a Confessor from among the Regulars enjoying privileges, then a dispensation mixed with commutation is to be presumed. If, finally, all things being weighed, the matter remains doubtful, possession stands for the prior vow. Thus teaches Sánchez (loc. cit., n. 13). All these things are not proven to us. For it has already been shown above that regular Confessors do not at all enjoy the privilege of dispensing in vows. We confirm, then, that the first vow is to be kept, when doubt arises as to the validity of the commutation.