Chapter VIII — On the relaxation of vows by force of dispensation

I. Those matters which pertain to the force, nature, and notion of dispensation, having been discussed in passing in the book on laws, you will find there. Wherefore, setting all these aside now, I propose immediately the little questions to be resolved, which pertain directly to our present undertaking.

II. Question I. Does the Church possess the faculty of dispensing from the obligation of vows, and of oaths? Response: All Catholics commonly say yes; and this is drawn from Matthew 16: "To thee I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven; whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth, it shall be bound...", and Matthew 18: "Amen I say to you, whatsoever you shall bind upon earth, shall be bound also in heaven..." Since these words are general, and indefinite, whoever should attempt to restrict them, and narrow them down to certain debts only, to be relaxed, would do so wrongly. This assertion is also established from the chapter "On pilgrims," "It is not," and the chapter "From much," on vows and the redemption of vows. That this is so, the Angelic Doctor confirms by this reasoning (II-II, q. 88, art. 10): "One who vows, in a certain way, establishes a law for himself, binding himself to something which is, in itself, and for the most part, good. It can nonetheless happen that, in some case, it may be either simply evil, or useless, or an impediment to a greater good — which is against the very notion of that which falls under a vow. And therefore it is necessary..." that it be determined, in such a case, that the vow is not to be kept. And if indeed it is determined absolutely that some vow is not to be kept, this is called dispensation from the vow; but if, instead of what was to be kept, something else is imposed, it is called commutation of the vow. Whence it is a lesser thing to commute a vow than to dispense from it. Each, however, consists in the power of the Church."*

III. Question II. To whom does the faculty of dispensing from the obligation of vows belong? Response: This power resides with the Prelates of the Church. Which the Angelic Doctor declares in these words (II-II, q. 88, art. 12): "A vow is a promise made to God concerning something that is acceptable to God. What, however, is acceptable to him to whom the promise is made, depends on his own judgment. The Prelate, however, bears the person of God in the Church; and therefore the authority of the Prelate is required in the commutation, or dispensation, of vows, so that it may be determined, in the person of God, what is acceptable to God — according to that saying (2 Corinthians 2): 'For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned any thing, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ.' And he says pointedly 'for your sakes,' because every dispensation sought from a Prelate ought to be sought for the benefit of the subjects. Since, then, vows are made in homage to God, it is plain that Prelates can relax such vows — for the Prelates bear the person of God. Moreover, since he who bears the person of Christ can remit whatever has been promised in homage to himself, it follows that God, whose place the Prelate holds, can [dispense].

IV. This power is spiritual, and of jurisdiction, not of order. Wherefore a Bishop-elect, though not yet marked with sacred orders, can dispense in vows, provided he is confirmed; for the faculty of relaxing vows pertains only to ordinary jurisdiction, and to ecclesiastical persons — since this power looks to the exterior governance, and government, of the Church.

V. Question III. What is dispensation from a vow? Response: According to the common definition, it is the removal of the bond of a vow, made in God's name by one having spiritual jurisdiction, in the external forum, for some reasonable cause. The definition is clear enough that it needs no explanation.

VI. Question IV. How is this removal of the bond effected? Response: Theologians commonly dispute how this removal of the bond occurs. Many contend that the Pontiff, and the other Prelates, relax the very divine and natural right — which occurs, they say, when a superior recognizes that a vow is firm and ratified, and obligates even in this particular case, but nonetheless, for a grave cause, rescinds and removes such an obligation resting on natural right. For Sánchez (Bk. IV, Summa, ch. 37, n. 19) maintains that dispensation in a vow is a true relaxation of natural and divine right, which the vow used to oblige by. Since, indeed, the faculty of dispensing has been granted to the Church by Christ the Lord, of relaxing, in truth, the obligation of natural and divine right, not by human will, but by dispensing in general, so that this right does not oblige; but in the particular occurring case, relaxing its obligation for a just cause. This manner of speaking seems to me harsh, and unpleasant. For if ecclesiastical power can truly relax divine natural right, why not also the bonds of the sacraments? Why not, indeed, dissolve marriage itself? Which does not sound well to pious ears.

VII. We must adhere, then, to the teaching, and to the modest and cautious manner of speaking, which the Angelic Doctor uses (II-II, q. 88, art. 10, ad 3): "It must be said that, just as by natural right, and by divine precept, man is bound to fulfill a vow, so too he is bound, by the same right, to obey the law or command of his superiors. When, however, a dispensation is made in some human law, it does not happen that a human law is not obeyed — which would be against the law of nature, and the divine command; but it happens that this which was law is not law in this case. So too, by the authority of a dispensing superior, it happens that this which was contained under the vow is not contained, insofar as it is determined, in this case, that this is not fitting matter for a vow. And therefore, when the Prelate of the Church dispenses in a vow, he does not dispense in the precept of natural or divine law; but he determines that which fell under the obligation of human deliberation, which could not foresee everything." This doctrine is more cautious, safer, and truer. For the Angelic Doctor speaks according to the sense of the Fathers and of the Church herself, which he grasped better and more excellently than many later Casuists and theologians. But more on this in its proper place.

VIII. Question V. One who possesses the faculty of dispensing from vows — can he also commute them? Response: Our discussion is not about those Prelates who are endowed with ordinary power in dispensing vows — since there is no difficulty concerning them: for it is established that all these can both dispense and commute vows. Since commutation is a lesser thing than dispensation, whoever can dispense can, by a stronger right, commute. Dispensation pertains only to delegates, who, by virtue of a privilege granted by a superior, are furnished with the faculty of dispensing — as when the Supreme Pontiff grants a bull, a jubilee, or some other indult, to ministers of the sacrament of penance, of dispensing in vows. Some deny that the faculty of commuting can be inferred from the grant of dispensing. Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 43, n. 4 and 5), Valentia (I-II, disp. 6, q. 6, punct. 7), Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 10, q. 4), and others. They are led to this opinion by the fact that these faculties are of different kinds, and thus one is altogether disparate from the other, and the one is in no way comprehended under the other. Whence they conclude that one who grants one does not, by that very fact, grant the other.

IX. The contrary opinion, however, is more common, and more probable — since the principle on which that opinion rests lacks truth. Dispensation, and commutation, look entirely to the same relaxation of a vow; although dispensation is broader than commutation itself. Whence, then, do they gather that these things are disparate, and of a different kind? No other diversity, indeed, intervenes between these two faculties, except that dispensation is superior, and extends more widely; commutation, however, is inferior, and more limited. For the rest, they are within the same kind of relaxing a vow, with this sole difference: that dispensation relaxes more, commutation less. Now, from the rule of law, 34: "What is more, contains what is less, though not vice versa" — it holds that when the greater is granted, the lesser is also contained under the same kind. And this opinion is taught by Sotus (Bk. VII, on justice, q. 4, art. 3), Prado (ch. 31, q. 15, n. 48), Raphael de la Torre (II-II, q. 88, disp. 1, n. 7), Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 3, punct. 14, n. 4), Barbosa (on the power of the Bishop, Part II, alleg. 87, n. 11), Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 20, dub. 16, n. 103), Suárez (Bk. VI, ch. 12, n. 4), Layman (Bk. IV, tract. 4, ch. 8, n. 20), Diana (Part 5, tract. 5, misc. resol. 25), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 2, punct. 9, n. 11).