Chapter IV — Lax, or improbable, propositions are reviewed, which not a few Casuists teach

I. The sacred oath is, as it were, applied to the confirmation of the leagues, pacts, and commerce of men. To this sacrament, as though to the supreme and divine judge, men have recourse with the utmost submission, and both those contending in court, and those fighting in camp, and any men whatsoever, approach it, so that they may settle disputes, so that they may foster and confirm mutual friendship, so that they may put an end to controversies. He is held wicked who refuses to give credence to one swearing. No one, then, fails to see that an oath is to be interpreted in a strict sense — not only on account of the reverence owed to God, but also lest truth grow cheap among men, and be brought into peril and held of little worth, so that a refuge to which one might have recourse to gain victory be lost. No one fails to see that the rules to be handed down for the use of the oath ought to breathe sincerity without disguise, truth without equivocation, and candor without circumlocution. Hence it follows that those opinions of Casuists are to be rejected which involve the oath in ambiguities, which teach the use of amphibologies and equivocations in the use of oaths, which, finally, all too easily excuse the habit of swearing. Lest the reader be deceived by the allurements of these opinions, I have thought it fitting to weave together, according to my custom, at the beginning of this disputation, a review not of all, but of certain propositions only, which seem to relax the laws of the oath too much, and to set it before the eyes.

I. "Whatever words, even those containing an express oath, are used in swearing, the mind and the intention of swearing must always be attended to, so as to discern in the forum of conscience whether one has truly sworn, or not. For either one positively intends to invoke God as witness, or one positively did not wish to invoke God, or, being negatively disposed, or ignorant, one abstracts from the invocation of God. If the first, it is always certainly an oath. If the second, it is certainly not an oath in the forum of conscience, but only a lie, if he asserted something false. If the third, again it is not an oath, since God is not thereby invoked as witness — otherwise those who blurt out, at almost every word, their 'By God,' 'By the sacrament,' etc., would always be swearing, and would very often be perjuring themselves. Whence a Confessor, hearing a penitent accuse himself of having sworn falsely, ought not immediately to judge that he has perjured himself, but should ask whether he intended to invoke God as witness, and indeed of a falsehood. And he will very frequently discover that these were not perjuries, but only lies, to be judged according to their matter — sometimes officious, sometimes jesting, and thus venial." — Fr. Patritius Sporer, tract. 3, on the 2nd precept, ch. 1, sect. 1, n. 9, p. 103. Nor, when the swearer testifies that he did not intend to swear falsely, is faith to be placed in him; but he must be asked whether, when he affirmed "By God" that the matter was so, he intended to invoke God as witness, and indeed of a falsehood.

II. "By whatever words, even those clearly and unambiguously containing an oath, it is uttered — much more so, then, must attention always be paid in the forum of conscience to the intention of the swearer, if we wish to discover whether it is truly an oath. For either, whatever words are finally uttered, one intends, first, positively to invoke God, or, second, positively not to invoke him, or, third (whether because he does not advert to it, or because he does not know), he abstracts from such invocation — that is, he neither intends, nor does not intend, to invoke. This division seems adequate; for it contains contradictories, and precision itself. Now if the first, it will certainly be an oath, as is clear of itself. If the second, it will certainly not be an oath, as the Doctors commonly admit... For although I say, 'I swear by God,' if I do not wish, by these words, to implore God as witness of what I say, I certainly will not implore him, except materially, just as a parrot taught by its master would utter the same words. Certainly in Sicily common men swear 'Per Dio' at every other word. Who would say that these common men truly swear, since they themselves sometimes do not know what 'Per Dio' signifies? It seems, however, from its own notion, to signify 'by God.' Finally, if the third, likewise it will certainly not be an oath, since he does not invoke God. For since here he abstracts from invocation, it clearly appears that he does not exhibit invocation." — Thomas Tamburini, Bk. III, on the Decalogue, ch. 1, §3, n. 6, p. 78. Felix Potestas, Vol. I, Part II, on the 2nd precept of the Decalogue, ch. 2, n. 1555, p. 111 in my copy; see below, ch. 6.

III. "For the truth of an assertory oath, it is required, and it suffices, that the swearer prudently judge the matter to be so, and be led not by a light conjecture, but by a certain, or verisimilar, and probable one..." Tamburini, however, adds that no probability whatsoever suffices for swearing; but that which attains to moral certainty is necessary. But certainly any probability makes for this — that is, as we have often said, moral certainty common with the Church. Whence, as Palao well says, it will suffice, if he prudently judges, according to a probable reason, that it is so, so as to make for himself moral certainty. Leander of the Most Holy Sacrament, on the oath, disp. 7, q. 8, p. 48. It follows from this teaching that anyone may either affirm or deny the same matter by oath — a proposition which is contained among those condemned. See below, ch. 9.

IV. "I swear to you that I have not slept with your wife" — meaning by a vest [i.e., understanding "with" a garment called "vestis" rather than carnally]; "I do not have your money" — meaning, which I am willing to give you outright; "your husband, or wife, has not broken the laws of marriage" — meaning, manifestly; "I do not owe you a hundred" — meaning, in such a way that I cannot offset it against the hundred acts which you owe me. Response: it is licit to do this, as the same authors teach (namely, Lessius, Castropalao, Rebello, Bonacina), and it is taught everywhere, provided, however, one abstracts from the harm which this deceitful oath unjustly causes; even if one is not asked to swear, but offers to do so of his own accord." Thomas Tamburini, Bk. II, in explaining the Decalogue, ch. 2, §2, n. 1.

V. "One asked by a judge about a crime, which, at least under a probable opinion, he is not bound to reveal, can deny that he committed it, if only semi-full proof is given, understanding within himself that he is in prison, or [is not bound] to speak... Indeed, he can even offer himself to swear thus, when this is necessary." Antonio a Spiritu Santo, tract. on oaths, disp. 1, sect. 9, n. 53, p. 141.

VI. "A woman who has committed adultery can, under oath, deny that she committed it, understanding within herself that she is not bound to reveal it." The same author, ibid., n. 54, p. 143.

VII. "Merchants who cannot obtain a just price from buyers, unless they swear that their goods stand them at such-and-such a price, when in fact this is not so, can indeed swear that the goods stand them at such-and-such a price, understanding, with all expenses computed, or reckoning in the goods which they have at home, or which they bought elsewhere." Castropalao, tract. 14, disp. 1, punct. 7; Lessius, Bk. II, ch. 42, dub. 9, n. 4; Leander, tract. 1, disp. 45, q. 27; Candido, disp. 2, art. 3, dub. 14.

VIII. "The same must be said of buyers, who, so as not to be compelled to buy goods from merchants above the just price, affirm under oath that they bought the goods elsewhere at a lower price, or that they are offered to them at a lower price, so that the sellers may descend to a just, or the lowest, price — understanding, however, in mind, goods bought at a different time for a lower price within the just price." Candido, disp. 26, art. 4, dub. 14; Leander, tract. 1, disp. 45, q. 28; Palao, Bonacina, Rebello, and others in Leander. See below, Diss. 4, ch. 4, n. 12.

IX. "Even if the one asking wished to exclude every equivocation, and required an oath about the fact done, beyond an oath about the accusation, and demanded an oath to speak the truth sincerely without any equivocation, you can still swear an amphibological oath, with a mental restriction made — since you can understand that you will swear without equivocation, without your being able to have any restriction in mind. For this proposition [that you must swear without any restriction] cannot be taken so broadly, without it being unjust." Castropalao, tract. 14, disp. 5, punct. 7, n. 16, p. 111 in my copy; Leander, tract. 1, disp. 45, q. 37, and in these authors Sánchez, Bonacina, Suárez, Lessius, Trullench, Diana, and other theologians of this recent school. See below, Diss. 4, ch. 4, §15.

X. "Titius, who induces a witness to swear falsely, which the witness thinks is true, does not sin, even though Titius himself knows it to be false." Pedro Hurtado, Diana, Tancredo, in Tamburini, who considers this opinion probable, indeed safe in practice. Bk. II, ch. 1, disp. 2, q. 8, n. 7, p. 80. Fr. Matteo Moya, Vol. II, tract. 11, §6, n. 2, p. 116, called it probable; Tamburini, Diana, Leander, Hurtado, and other similar authors called it probable; Fr. Moya added an increase of safety. See Diss. 7, ch. 3, n. 35.

XI. "A culpably retained habit of swearing falsely, deliberately, or indifferently truly and falsely, is more probably not a sin of actual perjury, but is to be confessed as the very sin of the habit of perjury." Patritius Sporer, tract. 3, on the 2nd precept of the Decalogue, ch. 1, sect. 4, §5, n. 151, p. 226 in my copy, from Tamburini, Bk. III, ch. 1, n. 2. See Diss. 7, ch. 5, and others.

XII. "For it morally suffices to confess something less distinct concerning oneself, than to open it up plainly. He who has perjured himself from the impetus of a contrary habit, although deliberately, is to be judged to have offended less, than one who has done so with a recent, spontaneous mind, and freedom." Sporer, ibid.

XIII. "Absolution is therefore to be imparted to a penitent who is willing, and who proposes the cessation of sin, and who has no external occasion, however much he has become habituated to the sin." John Sánchez, in his Select Disputations, disp. 9, in Tamburini, Bk. III, ch. 1, §4, n. 3, p. 75. See Diss. 7, ch. 6.

XIV. "One who, from an inveterate habit, knowingly swears falsely — does it suffice to say, 'I once swore falsely,' or will it be necessary also to add that this was from a bad habit? I answer that it is not necessary... The same must be said, that I may say this once for this occasion, of an inveterate habit of fornicating, of blaspheming, and other similar things; for the reasoning is the same." Tamburini, Method for Expediting Confession, Bk. II, ch. 3, §3, n. 21, p. 109. See Diss. 7, ch. 6.

XV. "Understand, however, this teaching, provided that he does not, by a positive act, accept that depraved habit, but only, being negatively disposed, neglects, or despairs, of overcoming it — which indeed is not rare, and greatly to be noted by the Confessor, lest he vex, or greatly afflict, consciences." Patritius Sporer, loc. cit., n. 154. One who despairs of overcoming a habit of swearing is not to be vexed, or approved; for this often happens, because such persons are not to be urged to root out the aforesaid habit. Whether this doctrine savors of Jansenism, see Diss. 8, ch. 5.

XVI. "One, however, who has a habit both of swearing and of lying, but not of joining an oath to a lie, if, as often as he swears, he swears advertently, and takes care not to join a lie to the oath, is not bound, under mortal sin, to extirpate such a habit." Fr. Domenico Viva, Vol. I, Part 7, art. 7, n. 3, p. 86; several others teach the same. See Diss. 7, ch. 5.

XVII. Fr. Fernando Castropalao, Vol. III, tract. 14, disp. 1, punct. 7, n. 13: "If, indeed, an honest cause of concealing the truth intervenes, such as would be for the preservation of your health, or that of your family, your honor, your goods; or if it were fitting not to assent to one questioning unjustly, you commit no fault, swearing thus amphibologically. This holds true, however, if you are not asked to swear, but you offer yourself to swear — provided an honest cause intervenes."

XVIII. "Asked about a crime, which at least under a probable opinion you are not bound to reveal, either because you are not asked juridically, or because a harm to yourself would arise from revealing it, you can deny that you did it, understanding within yourself: 'in prison,' or 'so as to be bound to say it.'" The same author, ibid.

XIX. "Asked, even though not asked juridically, whether you promised marriage, from whose obligation, according to a probable opinion, you are free, you can swear that you did not promise it, understanding: 'so as to be bound.'" Ibid., n. 5.

XX. "One probably exempt from paying a toll can swear that he is not carrying such-and-such a thing, even though he is, understanding: 'so as to be bound to declare it for the toll.'" The same, ibid.

XXI. "Merchants who cannot obtain a just price from buyers, unless they swear that their goods stand them at such-and-such a price, can indeed swear that they stand them at such-and-such a price..." , since it does not in fact stand thus, understanding, all expenses computed; or with other goods which they have at home, or bought elsewhere." The same, ibid.

XXII. "Beyond what has been said above, it must be especially noted, that one who employs any of the aforesaid amphibologies ought at least to know, in general, that he can conceal the truth without a lie, by which he swears. It is not, however, necessary to know the particular manner by which the truth might be found. Wherefore, if he intends to swear in that sense in which a learned man would find the truth, and he knows that the truth can indeed be found, it will suffice for his excuse." The same, ibid.

XXIII. Fr. Domenico Viva, in his Commentary on the proscribed proposition 27 of Innocent XI: "When, however, no convenient equivocation, or external restriction, occurs, if the cause is grave, rustics can, by the use of their double knowledge, easily conceal the truth from one questioning — not with the intention of deceiving, but merely by permitting the deception."

XXIV. "A habitual perjurer, even if he has often promised and never amended, can be absolved, provided he has sorrow, and promises to amend." Fr. Torrecillas, Vol. I, Summa, tract. 3, disp. 1, ch. 2, sect. 3, n. 105. He praises Palao and Bonacina.

XXV. "Although words, considered in themselves, may not be equivocal, nonetheless, by reason of the circumstances of place, time, office, of the one questioning, and of the one responding, etc., a restriction, which would otherwise be purely mental, can become sensible, and excused from lying and perjury, and can become lawful with just cause for its use." The same, consult. 27, n. 134.

XXVI. "Indeed, it is not even necessary for the one swearing, or testifying, to recognize the specific manner by which he can conceal the truth. For it suffices, especially for the unlearned, that, although he uses denying words, he add in his mind, 'I wish to conceal the truth, without lying, or perjuring myself, in some way in which the Doctors teach this can be done.'" The same, ibid., n. 135; he cites Sánchez, Suárez, Castropalao, and others.

XXVII. "Similarly, it would be no more than a venial lie to say, 'I swear,' when one does not truly swear." Fr. Thomas Sánchez, Bk. III, n. 3.