Chapter VI — Some further little questions concerning oath formulas are resolved. Rules too are assigned for distinguishing what counts, or does not count, as an oath, especially concerning this formula: "By God"

I. The custom of swearing has become so familiar to men that not a few authors, since they cannot abolish the aforesaid custom, assert that what is absolutely an oath is not an oath — as will be plain from the following.

II. Question I. Do men who everywhere say, "Par Dios que sí," as the Spanish do; "Per Dio," as the Italians; "Par Dio," as the Sicilians; "Par Diu," as the people of Foligno — do these swear the same as if they had said, "By God"? Response: Patritius Sporer, tract. 3, on the 2nd precept of the Decalogue, ch. 1, sect. 1, n. 9, teaches that men, invoking God thus, if, when they utter the aforesaid words, they are negatively disposed (which is the same as if they had neither the intention of swearing, nor of not swearing), in no way swear — since God is not thereby invoked as witness. Here are his own words: "Again, it is not an oath, since God is not thereby invoked as witness — otherwise those who blurt out, at almost every word, their 'By God,' 'By the sacrament,' would always be swearing, and would very often be perjuring themselves. Whence a Confessor, hearing a penitent accuse himself of having sworn falsely, ought not immediately to judge that he has perjured himself, but should ask whether he intended to invoke God as witness, and indeed of a falsehood. And he will very frequently discover that these were not perjuries, but only lies, to be judged according to their matter — sometimes officious, sometimes jesting, and thus venial."

I would have you turn your mind to the reasoning which this author produces, to establish that those who swear by God do not swear — namely, that otherwise they would always be swearing, and would very often be perjuring themselves. Wherefore, so that we may not admit to this consequence, it must be said that they do not swear. This is a most familiar principle of many recent Casuists. Since men everywhere accept the interest that comes from money lent, they do not commit usury. Why? Because otherwise almost all would be stained with the taint of usury. They employ this reasoning most frequently. But the deduction and inference which this author draws is worthy of consideration. For he adds that, although the penitent accuses himself of a false oath, his own conscience thus dictating, the Confessor should not, for that reason, give him credence. Whence a Confessor, hearing a penitent accuse himself of having sworn falsely, ought not immediately to judge that he has perjured himself. That this was uttered by a theologian would scarcely be credible, were it not read in print. He concludes, finally, that, although swearers pronounce a falsehood, they commit, under the invocation of divine testimony, only a jesting, or officious, lie, according to the diversity of matter, and consequently sin only venially.

III. What would Chrysostom, what would Augustine, what would all the Fathers say, who inveigh so sharply against the custom of swearing? For those who swear from habit do not have an express intention of swearing, and think nothing at all of the oath. Sporer drank in this doctrine from Tamburini, and copies it out from him, one of his own masters. I do not think it beside the purpose to transcribe here Tamburini's own words too, so as to render readers more cautious of authors of this kind. Tamburini, then (Bk. III, on the Decalogue, ch. 1, §3, n. 6), writes this: "By whatever words, even those clearly and plainly containing God — much more, then, if uttered doubtfully — an oath is offered; it will always, and ever, in the forum of conscience, be necessary to attend to the intention of the swearer, if we wish to discover whether it is truly an oath. For either, whatever words are finally uttered, one intends, first, positively to invoke God, or, second, positively not to invoke, or, third (whether because he does not advert to it, or because he does not know it), he abstracts from such invocation — that is, he neither intends, nor does not intend, to invoke. This division seems adequate; for it contains contradictories, and precision itself. Now if the first, it will certainly be an oath, as is clear of itself. If the second, it will certainly not be an oath, as the Doctors commonly admit... For although I say, 'I swear by God,' if I do not wish, by these words, to implore God as witness of my saying, I certainly will not implore him, except quite materially — just as if a parrot, taught by its master, uttered the same words. Certainly in Sicily common men swear 'Par Dio' at every other word. Who would say that these common men truly swear, since they themselves sometimes do not know what 'Par Dio' signifies? It seems, however, from its own notion, to signify 'by God.' Finally, if the third, likewise it will certainly not be an oath, since he does not invoke God. For since here he abstracts from invocation, it clearly appears that he does not exhibit invocation."

Tamburini teaches two things here, of which one is most certainly false — namely, that a swearer, without the intention of swearing, does not swear; which proposition has been condemned by the Church, as we shall see below. The other — that a swearer, if he does not advert to the fact that he is swearing, or if he abstracts from the invocation of divine testimony, does not swear — is likewise altogether false, and full of scandal, in my judgment. But what we ought greatly to note is that Tamburini testifies that these propositions of his are commonly taught by the Doctors. For he praises Layman, who indeed, Bk. IV, tract. 3, ch. 1, n. 3, teaches them. He then cites also Suárez in his own favor (Bk. I, on oaths, ch. 1, n. 4), but falsely: for that distinguished theologian has nothing there that favors these opinions. As for the reason which Tamburini further alleges to confirm his propositions, it is the same as that which we just now produced from Sporer. "For the Sicilians swear," he says, "at every other word, 'Par Dio,' which sounds the same as 'By God.' Who, then, would say that they swear?" Is this not a valid reason! But he adds this: "For they are ignorant, or do not advert to, what 'Par Dio' means." Who are these who are ignorant of this? Christians, Catholics! Christian peoples, then, are ignorant of the knowledge of God concerning the second commandment of the Decalogue! But, while they pronounce the most holy name of God, as if parrots taught by a master, they utter it merely materially. The ignoble Sicilians, then, are parrots, in this matter! What, I ask, do their parish priests, and their teachers, teach them concerning this commandment: "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain"? Has this commandment become obsolete in Sicily?

This teaching of Tamburini's ill suits that nation of his, whose people excel in sharpness of wit; and, besides, it is far too shameful and defiled a doctrine for the Christian profession. And indeed, if, when we confirm our assertions by God, we do not utter an oath, for this sole reason — that we do not advert to the fact that we are swearing — by the same reasoning it will be permissible to excuse blasphemies, insults, curses, and every kind of crime. This doctrine of Tamburini's is taught, besides Sporer and Layman cited, by Felix Potestas (Vol. I, Part II, on the 2nd precept of the Decalogue, ch. 2, n. 1553), Lorenzo Pisani, in his Clodius Gideon, prop. 25, near the end, Leander (tract. 1, disp. 12, q. 11), and several others.

I reject, then, the doctrine and opinion which I have described from the cited authors, as false and improbable. For a fuller understanding of the question and its response, I say that those who confirm their assertions with these formulas, "Par Dio que sí," "Par Diu sì," "Par Deu no," "Per Dio," which is the same as saying "by God," truly swear; and, if they frequently use such formulas, they are engaged in the habit of swearing. If, however, someone, moved by sudden anger, or affected by weariness, uttered that "By God" — he would in no way be swearing, since he would be asserting or denying nothing; but he would nonetheless be taking the name of God in vain. Others, too, take it in vain who say "Di Dio," "To far Dio," asserting or denying nothing.

IV. Question II. Do those who everywhere take the name of God in vain, even though they assert or deny nothing, sin mortally? Response: One who, on the occasion of any anger, weariness, joy, or other disturbance, uses the name of God, exposes himself to the proximate danger of swearing, and of committing perjury. For it can scarcely happen that he does not pronounce that name in almost all the movements of his mind, and, an occasion of asserting or denying something being given, does not invoke that name. I hold, then, that those who continually name God gravely sin, not so much on account of the vain, continual, and scandal-laden invocation of God, as on account of the most grave and voluntary danger of perjury to which they expose themselves. Wherefore a prudent and pious Confessor should absolve none of those who everywhere use the name of God, unless they promise, and, the danger having been made known to them, really restrain their tongue from such vain and continual assumption of the divine name. And although, at the beginning, the Confessor may not detect a grave sin in the pronunciation of the divine name, he ought not, for that reason, to absolve the penitent, when he refuses to abstain from the continual pronunciation of the divine name, according to certain authors. From the negligence, indeed, of very many Confessors, and from the too-lax doctrine of certain authors, the sacrilegious custom of swearing not infrequently arises.

V. Question III. Do these formulas — "by my soul," "on my soul," "on my conscience" — have greater force than this formula, "on my conscience"? Response: I find no distinction at all between the aforesaid formulas, as regards the force of confirming assertions; and authors commonly hold the same. One swears, then, who says either "by my soul," or "on my soul" — since the soul is an excellent and illustrious work of God, in which, as in an image, the divine majesty shines forth by a special covenant. But one does not swear, as seems to me more probable, who says either "on my conscience," or "in my conscience" — since this formula of speaking, according to common understanding, yields this sense: "This is what my conscience feels, and dictates," "what I sense in my conscience," "what is suggested to me." So Suárez teaches, and the more common authors, Sotus, Ledesma, Fagundez, Lessius, Sánchez, and almost all more recent authors. Sylvester, Azor, Aragón, and others teach the opposite. For this reason, one ought to abstain from a similar manner of speaking. The most sacred formula, then, of swearing, will be more strictly guarded, and one's tongue watched more carefully for this reason.

VI. Question IV. Does one swear who says, "I swear on my conscience," or "in my conscience"? Response: Sánchez, Ledesma, Leander, and others deny this. I, however, with Sotus, Sylvester, Azor, Navarrus, and others, maintain that a man speaking thus swears. For that word "swear," by its own proper signification, suffices for an oath, unless drawn away from its meaning by some added word — as if someone said, "Swear by my nose," "by ten," etc. And, when someone swears by his own conscience, he betrays something most grave, and worthy of consideration. For when someone absolutely affirms something in his own conscience, he adds great force to his assertion. For one's own conscience, in common usage, is held to be a matter of very great weight. False, then, is what the adversaries allege — namely, that the word "conscience" draws that oath away from its native signification: rather, on the contrary, it more confirms this word in its own proper signification. And indeed, what seems to establish the matter is that the adversaries themselves admit that one who pronounces these words, "Swear by my own conscience," really swears, if he wished to swear expressly. For when someone says, "Swear by my conscience," he uses the word "swear" expressly, and, for this reason, wishes to say that he intends to swear, and to invoke as witness his own conscience: therefore he swears. Well then — can he, or that very person who uses the word, deny that he swears? If, then, one who merely affirms something on his own conscience is deemed not to swear, while, however, one who says "Swear by my conscience" similarly affirms something, in like manner one ought to hold that he swears — with the most weighty theologians cited. If, when one affirms something on his own faith, one does not swear, yet when one says, "Swear by my faith," it must be asserted that he swears, for the reason already assigned — the theologians of Salamanca themselves concede this, with others (tract. 17, ch. 2, punct. 3, n. 28).

VII. Question V. Would one swear who said, "by the life of my horse," "by the preservation of this tree," or of some other inanimate thing? Response: Leander proposes this same question under the same terms (tract. 1, disp. 3, q. 3): "By force of the words, this is an oath, unless it appears from the circumstances that they are said to avoid a true oath." Suárez teaches the same thing (ch. 13, n. 27), and Sánchez (n. 36). This I too do not deny; I only add that, by a stronger right, it must be said that one who swears by his own faith, when he says, "By my faith" [gives an oath]; only I add that, by a stronger right, one must say that one who swears "by the life of this horse," "of this tree, or stone, or other inanimate thing," utters an oath.

VIII. Question VI. If someone questioned in this manner: "Do you swear to me by God that the matter is so?" and the one questioned responded, "The matter is so" — would he utter an oath by so responding? Response: Sánchez (Bk. III, ch. 2, n. 23) teaches that he does not swear if he responded, "Yes," or merely nodded with his head; but he affirms that he does swear, if he responded, "The matter is so." This distinction seems to me fabricated and empty. For whether he responds to one questioning under oath, "The matter is so," or simply "yes," it comes to the same thing — since the response ought to correspond to the question, which seeks a response under oath. Wherefore, when he responds to such a question, he truly swears, all circumlocution being removed, unless it is gathered from the circumstances that the one responding wishes to decline the oath.

IX. Question VII. Does one swear who uses these expressions: "I wish my saying to be my oath," "let my saying and promise be as certain as if it were an oath"? Response: Layman proposes this formula of swearing, familiar to the Germans, and asserts and resolves thus: one speaking thus swears, if he has the intention of swearing, and as often as he utters these words before a judge exacting an oath, and finally when he pronounces the words deliberately and seriously — since, according to common estimation, they are taken for an oath. He adds, however, that the oath is not lacking, even should the intention of swearing be lacking: to this Patritius Sporer subscribes, n. 8. And, when the aforesaid words, according to the common understanding of the people, are taken for an oath, and the speaker utters them seriously and deliberately, the internal intention does not have the force of taking away from those words the meaning which they have according to common acceptance, as has been said above.

X. Question VIII. Do such formulas as the people of Friuli commonly use — "Al seugnuli si," or "Seugneli no"; "Al seugnuli sagri," which they prefer to their own dialect — present the true character of an oath? Response: Whatever author has treated the peculiar manner of asseveration, and the custom of oaths, among our own countrymen, I have thought it fitting to propose these formulas of the Friulians too. This much, however, I have been able to gather: that this formula, among such a people, presents a certain species of oath; for it seems that it could mean, by no one's leave [i.e., is uncertain in precise etymology], according to their dialect, "Al seugneli," or "segnuli," or "seugnuli," that it signifies the same as "by the Gospel"; and that it contains a certain reference to the Gospel, and to God himself, is established from the attributes in the last formula, "Al seugnuli sagri" [reading uncertain: possibly "sacred"], "e potenti," which seems to mean "by the sacred and just Gospel, and mighty, or 'potenti,'" or "by God the mighty" — which formula, that it contains a true oath, no one fails to see. The bare word "seugneli," however, does not contain an oath — for it does not, absolutely, by its own nature, signify "Gospel," even in that idiom, since this is properly called "Vangeli," or "Vagnek." But because that word "seugnuli" was, at the beginning, used for "Gospel" (for that idiom is indeed exotic to me), I have heard many of that region pronounce it, without, however, absolutely... using it in place of "Gospel." Perhaps some words, in the course of years, lose their ancestral signification — which is perhaps the case with the aforesaid word, which is a certain conglomeration formed from the Latin, Spanish, French, Lombard, and other tongues over an interval of time. It must be said, then, that this word, as pronounced, is ambiguous (so far as I, brought up in that language, can determine). The intention, then, of the one uttering it must be attended to. For I hold it established that very many pronounce that word without perceiving what it signifies. Only then, therefore, does this formula, "Al seugnuli," or "segnuli sì," contain an oath, when the one who uses it seriously intends to swear by it; not so, when those who pronounce it neither know how to swear in this manner, nor have this in mind, nor know that this word contains an oath: for really such a word, from itself, does not contain an oath. Let the Confessor, however, take care that the faithful, so far as they can, avoid this word, and restrain their tongue.

XI. Question IX. Does an oath made by Christians by swearing by false gods bind them? Response: It is already established, from what has been said, that one invoking any creatures whatsoever as an infallible testimony of truth utters a blasphemy. Whoever, then, would swear by false gods, invoking their testimony as a manifest argument of truth, would commit the sin of idolatry — since he would attribute to idols and creatures what he seeks from God alone. Hence God forbade the Jews to swear by false gods (Exodus 23): "Thou shalt not swear by the name of strange gods, neither shall it be heard out of thy mouth" — just as Christ, too, forbade swearing thus in the Gospel (Matthew 5): "Neither by heaven, for it is the throne of God; nor by the earth, for it is his footstool; nor by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King" — since the Jews were inclined toward the worship of heaven, and had fallen into idolatry. In no way, then, is it lawful to swear seriously by false gods. And when, sometimes, in jest, it is said, "by Jove," "by Mercury," "by the stone of Hercules," it is not an oath, but a certain jesting phrase, which, in common acceptance, asserts or denies nothing; and those who use it strive to avoid both assertion and negation. From this the second part of the question is clear. For, if there is no oath, no obligation whatsoever can follow from it. Only from erroneous conscience could there arise an obligation to fulfill the promise. Thus pagans, swearing by idols while worshipping them as true deities, were bound, by force of erroneous conscience, to fulfill oaths made. Similarly, if some Christians thought that an oath made by false gods was a true oath, they ought to observe it, until they laid aside their erring conscience, or error. In error, however, they would be excused; a promise confirmed by oath ought to be observed by Christians, not by force of the oath, but by force of human fidelity — all of which is most common ground.

XII. Question X. What is to be said of the following formulas: "May God do this to me," "may he add this," "may God never spare me, nor save me, nor defend me," "may I die an evil death," "may I not live until tomorrow," "may an evil Easter come upon me," "may the devil carry me off to hell, if it is not so"? Response: In the first formulas, in which the name of God is invoked, an oath is, without doubt, extracted, as an execratory one — just as it is contained among all the other truth-confirming formulas, when they are employed in confirmation. Indeed, whether the aforesaid formulas contain an execratory oath among themselves too...

XIII. Question XI. Do these other formulas — "may my ears be cut off, may my nose, head, or arm be severed, if it is not so" — have the force of an execratory oath? Response: Absolutely, and the rigor of the speech considered, such phrases can have the force of an execratory oath — for which reason God forbade this (Matthew 5): "Neither shalt thou swear by thy head." Nonetheless, as they are commonly uttered, they do not contain an oath. For men understand nothing less than swearing, when they commonly say — "Mi sian tagliate le orecchie, il naso, la testa, il braccio, se non è così" ["may my ears, my nose, my head, my arm be cut off, if it is not so"]. These formulas are also often uttered in another manner, namely: "Ci metto, scommetto la testa, le orecchie, il naso, il braccio, se non è così" ["I stake, I bet my head, my ears, my nose, my arm, if it is not so"]. Where it appears that God is in no way invoked as avenger, or as judge, to exact vengeance; but that these and similar expressions present a mere and bare pledge.

XIV. Although anyone can gather, from the resolutions of the many questions on which we have hitherto dwelt, when assertions are confirmed by oath, and how they are to be distinguished from simple assertions, so that a matter treated at greater length may be seen — it is nonetheless worth presenting a few general rules, by which the reader may be able to discern, in a single glance, as it were, which are oaths and which are not.

XV. First Rule. Doctors commonly teach, first of all, that in an oath, by whatever words it is conceived, the mind and the intention of the swearer must be attended to — since, they say, although someone invokes God, if he nonetheless does not have an express intention of swearing, he does not really swear. This rule, which Sánchez, Sporer, Tamburini, and many others impress above all others, is partly true, and partly false. It is indeed true that the mind, intention, and will of the swearer must be attended to; but not in the sense that the swearer is bound to conform his intention, or mind, and will to the words which he utters. Hence it is false, unless I am mistaken, the rule given by many more recent authors, insofar as they teach that an oath is lacking, on account of the defect of invocation of God, when they pronounce it, "by God," that the matter is so, and advert to it. For, when they pronounce that expression, and affirm through God that the matter is so, considering it with full deliberation, they are bound to conform their intention, or mind, and soul, to the words which they utter. For, since we are forbidden to take the name of God in vain, we are, at the same time, commanded to use and employ it with the greatest consideration, and to make our intention conform to those who invoke divine testimony. Wherefore the very defect of intention which more recent theologians press to excuse Christians who everywhere confirm their assertions through God, is itself a sin. When, then, a formula of words, by its own nature, expresses an oath — of which kind is that which expressly invokes divine testimony, "By God it is so," commonly "Per Dio sì," or "Par diu no," "God is my witness," and similar ones — it is an oath, even though the swearer does not have an express intention of swearing; which has already been demonstrated above, and will be shown more fully below, when we speak of the habit of swearing. Whether one who expressly invoked divine testimony, and at the same time did not wish expressly to swear, would really swear, I shall resolve below. The intention of swearing, however, is chiefly necessary when the words have an ambiguous and varying sense — of which kind are these: "in truth," "truly," "by my faith" — which can be understood of truth and human faith, or of divine faith, according to the swearer's diverse intention.

XVI. Second Rule. For an oath, an express invocation of divine testimony is not required, such that the word "swear" must be pronounced; but it suffices to say, "By God," "by the Virgin Mary." This word "swear," however, absolutely uttered with no other word added, is taken strictly, and is held as constituting an oath; commonly, however, those who swear are accustomed to add what they swear. If a word is added indicating that divine testimony is not invoked, that word "swear" does not draw an oath from its own signification. If something is added, however, denoting that God is called to witness, an oath is effected. Sometimes, although nothing is added, the word "swear" alone suffices for a true oath... . This, however, must be gathered from the circumstances — as, if one exacting an oath says, "Do you swear to me by the Gospel?" "Do you swear to me in due form?" and the other responds, "I swear."

XVII. Third Rule. Words which can be used in a twofold sense — such as these: "God sees what I do," "what I relate is Gospel," and other similar ones, which can be uttered either enunciatively or invocatively — we ought to interpret with respect to those who pronounce them. For if a man be of good character, and not at all accustomed to swearing, we ought to interpret that he uttered them enunciatively (unless the opposite is plainly evident). It must be judged otherwise of men habitually accustomed to swear.

XVIII. Fourth Rule. In ambiguous words, especially in those in which the divine majesty does not shine forth in any peculiar manner, the intention of the speaker must be attended to, along with the custom of the homeland, and other circumstances; and especially the character of the one uttering those words.

XIX. Final Rule. The rule which Christ himself handed down (Matthew 5) is always to be kept before one's eyes: "But let your speech be: yea, yea; no, no: and that which is over and above these, is of evil." This is to be fixed in memory: that whatever exceeds a simple affirmation or negation can proceed from evil, whether on the part of the speaker, or of the hearer — namely, from the evil disposition of mind, when nothing is added beyond a simple affirmation or negation. Wherefore we ought not only to abstain from ambiguous and equivocal words, which may or may not be taken for oaths, but also from certain corrupted words, such as "per Christa," "per Dia," "per Diana," "per Diobacco," and others of this kind, which, although they draw the word "swear" away from its genuine signification, nonetheless bear a certain affinity with an oath, and present a certain species of oath.

One must abstain, I say, from such things, both on account of the ease, or danger, of using true formulas of oaths for themselves, or of similar corrupted words, and on account of the scandal which is sometimes cast upon simple folk; and because Christ the Lord forbade adding anything beyond a "yes, yes; no, no," adding that whatever is added beyond this is of evil. Let this rule of Christ the Lord, then, always be before your eyes: for that which is more than this is of evil. Long before this, Ecclesiasticus (ch. 23) had handed down this to men: "Let not thy mouth be accustomed to swearing; for in it there is the word of sin." From all this it is gathered that those who, exclaiming, everywhere blurt out, "To far Dio," "Potenza di Dio," "Servo di Dio" ["by the power of God," "servant of God"], continually violate the second commandment of the Decalogue, taking the name of God in vain; and although they do not swear, but exclaim, moved either by weariness, or by admiration, or by some other disturbance of mind, they nonetheless sin, as has been said, both on account of the scandal, and on account of the vain naming of God, and on account of the ease, or danger, of slipping from the continual vain naming of God into a habit of swearing, and of perjuring oneself. Wherefore I never impart absolution to such persons, unless they promise, and, so far as they are able, strive to amend.