Title XI: On a Sentence of Excommunication, Suspension, and Interdict

A judge who excommunicates, suspends, or interdicts shall do this in writing, shall write down the cause, and, when required, shall deliver a copy of the sentence within a month. One who acts contrary to this is suspended for a month from entrance into a church and from divine offices; that sentence shall be relaxed by the superior without difficulty, and its issuer shall be condemned in expenses and otherwise by a fitting punishment. If persons suspended in this manner celebrate as before, they are irregular and are not absolved by anyone other than the Pope. This states the point. Johannes Andreae.

Innocent IV, in the Council of Lyon.

Since excommunication is medicinal, not mortal, disciplining, not uprooting—provided, however, that the person against whom it has been rendered does not contemn it—the ecclesiastical judge shall cautiously take care that in rendering it he shows himself to pursue what belongs to one correcting and healing. Therefore, whoever excommunicates shall pronounce the excommunication in writing and shall expressly write down the cause of the excommunication for which the excommunication is pronounced. He shall be bound to deliver a copy of writing of this kind to the excommunicated person within a month, if he has been required; concerning which requisition we will a public instrument to be made or testimonial letters furnished and sealed with an authentic seal.

But if any judge is a rash violator of this constitution, he shall know himself suspended for one month from entrance into a church and from divine offices. The superior to whom recourse is made, relaxing the sentence itself without difficulty, shall condemn its issuer to the expenses and every loss of the excommunicated person and otherwise punish him with fitting correction, so that judges, with punishment teaching them, may learn how grave it is to fulminate sentences of excommunication without due maturity. And we will these same things to be observed in sentences of suspension and interdict. But all prelates and judges of churches shall beware lest they incur the aforesaid punishment of suspension, because, if it should happen that, while thus suspended, they execute divine offices as before, they will not escape irregularity according to the canonical sanctions, concerning which dispensation can be made only by the Supreme Pontiff.

One who seeks to be absolved as a precaution, showing that a sentence of excommunication rendered against him is null, shall be absolved notwithstanding anyone’s contradiction, unless it is said and proved within eight days that he was excommunicated for a manifest offense. One who proves that he was excommunicated after an appeal shall, while the proof is pending, be avoided in judicial proceedings, but not outside judgment. This states the point. Johannes Andreae.

The same, in the same council.

It is customarily called into doubt by some whether, when someone petitions to be absolved by a superior as a precaution, while asserting that the sentence of excommunication rendered against him is null, the gift of absolution ought to be extended to him without the obstacle of contradiction; and whether, before absolution of this kind, one who offers to prove in judgment that he was bound by excommunication after a lawful appeal, or that an intolerable error was patently expressed in the sentence, is to be avoided in other matters, except the article of that proof. Therefore, concerning the first doubt, we establish that this is to be observed: absolution shall not be denied to the petitioner, although the excommunicator or an adversary opposes himself in this, unless he says that the petitioner was excommunicated for a manifest offense. In that case, a term of eight days shall be granted to the one saying this, so that, if he proves what he opposes, the sentence shall not be relaxed unless sufficient amends are first furnished, or competent security for obeying the law if the offense is alleged to be doubtful.

But concerning the second question, we establish that one who is admitted to prove shall, while the article of proof is pending, meanwhile be avoided in the other things which he attempts as plaintiff in judicial proceedings. Outside judgment, however, he shall nevertheless be admitted in offices, postulations, elections, and other legitimate acts.

An excommunication rendered against those participating with excommunicated persons in speech and similar matters, without prior canonical warning, does not bind. Johannes Andreae.

The same, in the same council.

We establish that no judge shall presume, before canonical warning, to excommunicate by greater excommunication those participating in speech and other things with persons excommunicated by him, through which a participant is bound by lesser excommunication, without prejudice to constitutions lawfully promulgated against those who presume to participate in a condemned crime. But if, from speech and the other things through which a participant falls into lesser excommunication, the excommunicated person grows more obstinate, the judge will be able, after canonical warning, to condemn participants of this kind with a similar censure. Otherwise, an excommunication pronounced against participants shall not bind, and those pronouncing it will have cause to fear the lawful punishment.

Bishops incur no sentence of interdict or suspension unless they are expressly named in the sentence. This states the point. Johannes Andreae.

The same, in the same council.

Because it is dangerous for bishops and their superiors, on account of the execution of pontifical office which is frequently incumbent upon them, to incur by the fact itself a sentence of interdict or suspension in any case, we have deemed it necessary to establish with provident deliberation that bishops and other superior prelates shall not in any way incur the aforesaid sentence by the law itself on the occasion of any constitution, sentence, or mandate, unless express mention of bishops is made in them.

This decretal makes five statements. The first is that an archbishop shall not relax sentences rendered by subjects of his suffragans unless he has this by custom. The second is that a general sentence of an archbishop binds only his subjects. The third is that a sentence rendered by them for past or present faults, without prior warning, is unjust. The fourth is that they ought not to excommunicate for future faults, or for those already committed—namely, unless satisfaction is made—unless delay, fault, offense, or another just cause is present. The fifth is that a sentence of excommunication shall not be rendered against a corporate body or college, but against those who were culpable. Johannes Andreae.

The same.

The Roman Church. (And below:) Moreover, the Archbishop of Reims and his officials shall not, passing over the excommunicators themselves, relax sentences of interdict, suspension, or excommunication rendered by officials of archdeacons or by any others having jurisdiction against subjects of the suffragans of the Church of Reims, without prejudice to a contrary custom concerning this, if they have one. Furthermore, sentences of excommunication promulgated generally by the Archbishop of Reims and his officials bind only those subject to the jurisdiction of the same archbishop. But neither in particular nor in general shall they promulgate sentences of excommunication for past or present faults and offenses without prior competent warning; and if they presume to act contrary to this, they shall know those sentences to be unjust.

They shall also beware lest they presume to pronounce such sentences of excommunication, either particularly or generally, against anyone for future faults—namely, if they do such a thing—or even for faults already committed under this form, “if they have not made satisfaction concerning them within such a time,” unless delay in exhibiting satisfaction, or a fault or offense, has preceded, through which they are deservedly induced to enjoin satisfaction of this kind and to prohibit similar things in this manner, or unless another reasonable cause, which they shall express in the sentences themselves, is present. We entirely prohibit a sentence of excommunication from being pronounced against a corporate body or college, willing to avoid the danger to souls which could follow from this, since it would sometimes happen that innocent persons were ensnared by a sentence of this kind; but it shall be promulgated only against those of the college or corporate body who are established to have been culpable.

A prelate can defend himself against temporal power even with the spiritual sword, namely ecclesiastical censure. This states the point. Johannes Andreae.

The same, in the same council.

To the beloved son, the Dean of Orléans. (And below:) Moreover, since all laws and every body of law permit all persons to repel force with force and to defend themselves, it was certainly lawful for the dean himself, if the aforesaid bailiff presumed wrongfully to despoil him of his worldly goods or violently to occupy them, as is expressed above, to defend himself against that man’s violence and injury. And because sufficient temporal defense was perhaps not available to him against the man’s excessive power, he was also able to defend himself spiritually, namely by using the ecclesiastical sword, and on this account to have recourse to spiritual arms, which are proper to the Church, and to use them for his protection; especially since, after sentences of excommunication had been rendered against the said bailiff by the same dean for other causes, as the same dean asserted, the bailiff, as though provoked thereby, had, in contempt of those sentences, despoiled him of those same goods, and on this account the dean himself afterward rendered a sentence of interdict, defending himself as though with a spiritual sword against the injury and violence inflicted upon him by the same bailiff on the occasion of the aforesaid sentences and in contempt of them.

And indeed, since it is lawful for anyone to impart his aid to his neighbor or fellow person to repel an injury to him—and indeed, if he can and neglects to do so, he seems to support the person inflicting the injury and to be a participant in his fault—it was assuredly lawful for the dean himself to come to his own aid by his own assistance, and to protect his own temporal injury by his own spiritual defense, and thus in a certain manner to aid each sword, the temporal and the ecclesiastical, one with the other; especially because these two swords have been accustomed, when necessity requires, to support one another and very frequently to be exercised for the aid of the other by mutual assistance.

Archbishops cannot absolve those excommunicated by the subjects of their suffragans, but they can indeed absolve those excommunicated by the suffragans or their officials, if appeal has been made to them. This states the point. Johannes Andreae. — § 1. In cases in which he has jurisdiction, before cognizance of the cause an archbishop absolves an excommunicated person at the petition of a party or by virtue of his office, unless the person is said to have been excommunicated for a manifest offense or contumacy; and he gives examples of presumed and manifest contumacy. This states the point. Johannes Andreae. — § 2. An excommunication rendered after an appeal interposed for a probable cause is not immediately pronounced null; but relaxation as a precaution can be made, even before he begins to take cognizance of the truth of the cause. The same applies if it is said to have been rendered through an intolerable error and that error is probably defended to the contrary. Johannes Andreae. — § 3. If it is certain that the excommunication is just, remittal is made; if it is certain that it is unjust, it is not made. If it is doubtful, relaxation can be made, but it is more honorable to remit; nevertheless, the relaxation holds where the archbishop is judge, although remittal is not made. This states the point. Johannes Andreae. — § 4. In cases in which an archbishop can excommunicate, he can exact monetary amends if custom so holds. This states the point. Johannes Andreae. — § 5. It is summarized above in § “But if from a cause”; see there. — § 6. The summary is given above in § “But if from a cause”; see there.

The same.

To the venerable. (And below:) Moreover, it is not lawful for the Archbishop of Rouen or his official to impart the benefit of absolution to those excommunicated by archdeacons or other subjects of the suffragans of that archbishop, since they are judges neither of the excommunicators nor of the excommunicated; but they can absolve those excommunicated by the suffragans themselves or their officials, if an appeal has been made to them by the litigants themselves. But if neither party appeals, and either of them petitions to be absolved by the archbishop or his official from an excommunication rendered against him for the benefit of the other, or otherwise, without interposition of an appeal, lodges a complaint before them concerning the opposing party, he is not to be heard in this by them, since they are not his judges. But if the excommunicated person lodges before them a complaint concerning the suffragan, so that a penalty may be imposed upon him, and a complaint concerning an unjust excommunication with respect to his own interest, they certainly ought to hear him. It is otherwise, however, if he complains concerning the suffragan himself so that a sentence of this kind, promulgated against him by the suffragan for another person, may be relaxed, because it belongs not to the suffragan himself but to the person for whom the sentence was rendered to defend this cause. Nevertheless, if a suffragan, either outside judicial proceedings for the defense of his rights, or even in judicial proceedings while proceeding by virtue of his office—that is, by making an inquiry or doing something similar—excommunicates someone, in this case the suffragan himself is to be sued before the archbishop or his official, because it is in his interest to defend his cause.

§ 1. Furthermore, before they begin to hear the cause, an archbishop or his officials must always absolve, according to the form of the Church, those excommunicated by suffragans, in cases in which jurisdiction belongs to them; for example, if a sentence of excommunication was promulgated after a definitive sentence and an appeal was made to them, except in cases in which the laws prohibit an appeal after sentence. Similarly, if a suffragan outside judicial proceedings excommunicates someone for an offense against him or for the defense of his own right, and that person presents a complaint concerning this, he is first to be absolved according to the form of the Church, unless the suffragan offers to prove that he bound him with the bond of excommunication for a manifest offense. The same also applies if he constrains anyone by excommunication for presumed contumacy, namely because, after being cited, he did not appear at the term fixed for him. For if one so bound, having presented a complaint, petitions to be absolved by the archbishop—whether the suffragan proceeded by virtue of his office or an appeal was made to the archbishop himself before the definitive sentence—and the adversary alleges that he is not to be absolved and that access to judgment ought not to be opened to him unless he first reimburses the expenses and provides security that he will appear in judgment, while he himself answers that he ought not rightly to be deemed contumacious because, having been captured on the journey or detained by some other impediment, he was unable to appear at the term, then the benefit of absolution must immediately be bestowed upon him according to the form of the Church. It is otherwise, however, if he admits himself to be contumacious or if his contumacy is otherwise established, perhaps because he had foretold in court that he would by no means appear. For then, since the contumacy is manifest and the offense is deemed manifest, absolution is not to be bestowed upon him unless satisfaction for the expenses has first been made and security for standing in judgment has been furnished. And this same rule is to be observed in similar cases, as when someone is cited to a certain place and he alleges that it is not safe for him, and afterward the judge promulgates a sentence of excommunication against him because he did not prove this and did not appear. For then, if the excommunicated person appeals to the superior and before all else petitions to be absolved by him, since he wishes to prove before him that the place is not safe for him, he is without doubt to be heard in this, since his contumacy appears to be only presumed. But if the judge had pronounced that the place was suitable and safe and he had not appeared, and for that reason had excommunicated him, he ought afterward by no means to be heard concerning this unless he had appealed within ten days after the interlocutory sentence was rendered.

§ 2. But if someone appeals for a legitimate or probable cause—for example, because the place is not safe—and after an appeal of this kind is bound by excommunication, and it is thereafter established for the superior that appeal was made to him for such a cause, nevertheless he ought not immediately to pronounce the sentence of excommunication null, but he can relax it as a precaution according to the form of the Church.

§ 3. Indeed, if it is certain that the sentence of excommunication is just, as when it has been promulgated against someone because of a manifest transgression, the superior judge, unless there is danger in delay, must wholly remit the excommunicated person to the excommunicator and ought not to absolve him unless, after being requested, the excommunicator maliciously refuses to grant him the benefit of absolution. But if it is established that a sentence of this kind is unjust, the excommunicated person is by no means to be remitted to his excommunicator, but must at once be absolved without any difficulty. But if it is doubtful whether it is just or unjust, the superior, unless he defers to the excommunicator, can relax it according to the form of the Church, although he acts more honorably and fittingly if he defers to him in this case. But where it belongs to the superior to take cognizance of the excommunication, an absolution or relaxation made by him holds, although perhaps it is unjust, because, even if he absolves contrary to the right of the litigant, he nevertheless does not absolve contrary to the right of the constitution.

§ 4. Finally, from the subjects of a suffragan an archbishop can exact monetary amends according to the custom of the region in cases in which it is lawful for him to bind them with the bond of excommunication.

§ 5. An archbishop can also sometimes bestow the benefit of absolution as a precaution according to the form of the Church, as, for example, if it is asserted that an intolerable error was patently expressed in the sentence of excommunication—that is, that something is openly contained in it under the force of a precept or command which commonly, or in its kind, is a sin. Thus, for example, someone may say that he was excommunicated by a suffragan because he was giving alms to a poor person, or because he was doing some other thing that is good in itself, or because he was not performing that which in its own act is unlawful and wicked, and the suffragan himself may assert that for a worthy and reasonable cause, or for preserving or executing justice, he had prohibited or even enjoined this upon him. For then the archbishop can absolve him as a precaution.

§ 6. Similarly, if someone alleges that, after an appeal interposed for a legitimate cause, he was bound with the bond of excommunication in judicial proceedings or outside them before the definitive sentence, the archbishop, after this has been established for him, can bestow upon him the benefit of absolution as a precaution according to the form of the Church, even before he begins to take cognizance of the truth of the cause of appeal.

An ecclesiastical judge compels a lay judge to exclude excommunicated persons from judicial acts prohibited to them. This states the point. Johannes Andreae.

Alexander IV.

We decree that secular judges are to be compelled by ecclesiastical judges, through ecclesiastical censure after canonical admonition has first been given, to exclude excommunicated persons from acting, pleading, and testifying in their courts and judicial proceedings.

An excommunication rendered against participants does not hold unless they were admonished by name. And an admonition is called canonical when it has intervals of days, unless the necessity of the matter counsels otherwise. This states the point. Johannes Andreae.

Gregory X, in the general Council of Lyons.

The constitution of our predecessor Pope Innocent IV of happy memory, which prohibits those participating with excommunicated persons in that participation which induces only the lesser excommunication from being bound by the greater excommunication unless canonical admonition has first been given, decreeing that a sentence of excommunication otherwise promulgated does not hold, we declare, in order to remove every scruple of ambiguity, and decree that an admonition is canonical in this case only if, with the other requirements duly observed, it specifies by name those who are admonished. We also establish that, between the admonitions which the laws establish must precede in order that a sentence of excommunication be canonically promulgated, judges—whether they use three admonitions or one in place of all—are to observe suitable intervals of some days, unless the necessity of the matter counsels that they be regulated otherwise.

Relaxation as a precaution has no place in a general interdict. This states the point. Dominicus.

The same, in the same council.

By this general edict we declare that the benefit of relaxation as a precaution has no place whatsoever with respect to sentences of interdict promulgated generally against cities, castles, or any other places or lands.

First, with certain limitations, he excommunicates those who give license to offend in the persons or goods of themselves or their people those who exercise ecclesiastical censure against anyone, cause it to be exercised, or observe it. Second, at “By the same,” he extends the penalty to one who uses the license or does this on his own initiative. Third, at “But those who,” he aggravates the penalty. This states the point. Johannes Andreae.

The same, in the same council.

Whoever, because a sentence of excommunication, suspension, or interdict has been promulgated against kings, princes, barons, nobles, bailiffs, or any ministers of theirs, or against any others, gives anyone license to kill, capture, or otherwise burden in their persons or goods, or those of their people, those who rendered such sentences, those on whose occasion they were rendered, those observing the same sentences, or those unwilling to communicate with persons so excommunicated—unless they revoke that license while the matter remains intact, or, if the seizure of goods has proceeded on the occasion of that license, unless the goods seized are restored within a period of eight days or satisfaction is rendered for them—shall by that very fact incur a sentence of excommunication. By the same sentence also shall all those be bound who have dared to use the aforesaid license once given, or on their own initiative otherwise to commit any of the foregoing acts for whose commission we have prohibited license from being given. But those who remain in that sentence for a period of two months shall thereafter be unable to obtain the benefit of absolution from it except through the Apostolic See.

If a wrongdoer captured by a lay judge says that he is a cleric, cognizance of this matter belongs to the ecclesiastical judge. And if he is notoriously, or by public reputation or common estimation, held to be a cleric, remittal is made immediately. The same applies if he previously conducted himself as a cleric and was now apprehended in clerical habit. But if he previously conducted himself as a layman, although he was now apprehended in clerical habit, remittal will not be made until clerical status has been proved; but meanwhile the judge will proceed against him in no respect. This states the point. Johannes Andreae.

Boniface VIII.

If a lay judge detains a wrongdoer who has been captured, and the latter, saying that he is a cleric, petitions to be remitted to the ecclesiastical court, or that court itself claims him back as its cleric, while the judge denies that he is a cleric and, for this reason, that he is to be remitted at all, cognizance of a doubt of this kind—namely, whether the person claimed back is a cleric—shall belong to the ecclesiastical judge, because it concerns an ecclesiastical and spiritual matter, although the secular judge or another person whose interest is involved is to be summoned. And if it is notorious that the same wrongdoer is a cleric who ought to enjoy a privilege of this kind, he is immediately to be restored without any other cognizance; or if there is public reputation concerning this, or he was commonly held to be a cleric, he must be returned to the ecclesiastical court immediately, even before cognizance concerning his clerical status.

We judge the same to apply if the accused himself, not having publicly conducted himself as a layman before his apprehension, was apprehended in clerical habit, namely wearing the tonsure and clerical garments. For we ought to deem such a person a cleric until the contrary is established, just as legal authority has decreed concerning one who is in possession of freeborn status, if he is said by another to be a freedman, that not he but his adversary is bound by the necessity of proving it. For it is just that, until something else appears, a person of this kind be presumed from the habit which he wears to be such as the person whose habit he is shown to bear. For from the brand customarily impressed upon workers in the imperial workshops, a worker of those workshops who is hiding is recognized; and the guardians of waters, whom they call hydrophylaces, marked with the designation customarily impressed upon them, are manifest to all and are not held liable under the heading of compulsory service. And a person’s status is considered to be that in which he is apprehended, until the contrary is shown.

But we do not will this to be observed in the same way if, before his apprehension, he publicly conducted himself as a layman and was commonly held as such, although at the time of apprehension he was found in clerical habit. For then he is not to be restored until he has made proof of his clerical title, the burden of proving which rests upon him because of the presumption that arose against him from his prior wearing of lay habit; meanwhile, however, every proceeding of the judge against him is to cease entirely.

A suspension or interdict rendered against participants without canonical admonition first being given does not hold. This states the point. Johannes Andreae.

The same.

We command that the statute of Pope Gregory X, made in declaration of the Innocentian constitution which prohibits those participating with excommunicated persons in that participation which induces only the lesser excommunication from being bound by the greater excommunication without canonical admonition first being given, be inviolably observed in sentences of suspension and interdict which are frequently promulgated for participation of this kind by ordinaries or delegated judges, decreeing that those sentences do not hold when promulgated otherwise.

Through the negligence of one who does not prosecute an appeal at the due time, an excommunication rendered after it does not acquire validity; but he will then be able to be denounced and will have to be avoided until he proves the nullity of the sentence. This states the point. Johannes Andreae.

The same.

Although a sentence of excommunication promulgated after a legitimate appeal is not ratified or even made valid through the negligence of an appellant who fails to prosecute his appeal, nevertheless a person excommunicated by name, or specially and expressly, who asserts that a sentence of excommunication was rendered against him after a legitimate appeal, if he has not prosecuted that appeal as he ought within the time established by man or by law for prosecuting it, must, when that time has elapsed, be publicly announced as excommunicated, and must be avoided not only in judicial but also in extrajudicial acts and removed from legitimate acts, until he proves that he was excommunicated after a legitimate appeal, or otherwise proves the nullity of the sentence itself.

A prelate who causes a cleric not yet incorrigible to be captured and confined, even through laymen, is not excommunicated, nor are those who capture him. Second, it is stated that, if such a person gives sureties that he will obey the law, he ought not to be detained unless a just cause counsels it. This states the point. Johannes Andreae.

The same Boniface VIII.

If, because of transgressions committed, you cause clerics subject to your jurisdiction to be captured, even through laymen, and confine them in prison lest they flee, afterward to be chastised with the due penalty, we do not believe that you or those capturing them are bound by any excommunication, although it does not yet appear that they are incorrigible, since in these acts neither rashness nor injury can be detected unless in some other way one deliberately goes beyond due measure in them. You also ought not to detain the same clerics if they have given you surety that they will obey the law, unless the enormity of the transgression or another reasonable cause counsels that they be detained.

When the clergy are interdicted, the people are not interdicted, nor conversely. When a city is interdicted because of the offense of its lord, citizens who are not themselves interdicted hear divine offices outside it. When a people are interdicted, the individual persons of the people are understood to be interdicted. This states the point. Johannes Andreae.

The same.

If a sentence of interdict is rendered against the clergy, the people are not understood to be interdicted, unless something else is expressed in it, nor conversely. Hence, when one of them is interdicted, the other is lawfully admitted to divine offices. Moreover, when a city is interdicted because of the offense of its lord or ruler, its citizens who are not culpable—provided they have not themselves been interdicted in order that the lord or ruler may be punished in them—can lawfully attend divine offices outside it. But when the people of some land are marked by an interdict, the individual persons from that people who are established to be interdicted, lest the sentence lack effect—since the hearing of divine offices and reception of sacraments do not belong to the people as a corporate whole—ought not anywhere, excepting only the cases expressed by law, to hear divine offices or receive ecclesiastical sacraments.

When a city is interdicted, its suburbs and contiguous buildings are said to be interdicted. And when a church is interdicted, a contiguous chapel and contiguous cemetery are said to be interdicted. This states the point. Johannes Andreae.

The same.

If a city, castle, or town is subjected to an ecclesiastical interdict, we will that its suburbs and contiguous buildings be understood to be interdicted by that very fact. For although the aforesaid places otherwise appear to be bounded by the circuit of their walls, nevertheless in this case, lest the sentence of interdict be capable of being despised—which would happen if it were possible lawfully to celebrate as before in their suburbs or contiguous buildings—it is expedient that a broader interpretation be made. For a similar reason, if a church is placed under or subjected to interdict, it will be possible neither to celebrate in its chapel nor to bury in its cemetery when they are contiguous to that church; it is otherwise if they are not contiguous to it.

One who knowingly celebrates in a polluted church or in the presence of a person under the greater excommunication does not contract irregularity. Dominicus. — § 1. One who knowingly celebrates in an interdicted place in cases not permitted is irregular and ineligible. This states the point. Dominicus.

The same.

One who presumes knowingly to celebrate in a church polluted by the shedding of blood or semen, or in the presence of persons bound by the greater excommunication, although he acts rashly in this, nevertheless does not incur the snare of irregularity, since this is not expressed in the law.

§ 1. But one who knowingly celebrates in a place placed under interdict—unless he is privileged with respect to this, or it has been granted to him by law—incurs an irregularity from which he cannot be freed by anyone other than the Roman Pontiff, and he is rendered ineligible to such a degree that he ought not even to be admitted to elect with others.

During a time of interdict chrism can be prepared on the day of the Lord’s Supper. This states the point.

The same.

Since in baptism and confirmation, which may lawfully be administered not only to children but also to adults during a time of interdict because of the danger of delay, we use the anointing of chrism, there is no doubt that chrism can be prepared on the day of the Lord’s Supper, although the land is under interdict.

One suspended from entering a church who celebrates divine offices in it is irregular, and, if he dies impenitent while that suspension endures, he lacks ecclesiastical burial. And a suspension from entering a church or from office is not suspended through a subsequent appeal. This states the point. Dominicus.

The same.

A person to whom entry into a church is forbidden, since the celebration of divine offices in it is consequently deemed forbidden to him, is rendered irregular if, contrary to an interdict of this kind, he intrudes himself into divine offices there, acting in his office as before. Such a person also, if he dies while this interdict endures, ought not to be buried in a church or ecclesiastical cemetery unless he has repented. Indeed, just as an excommunication, so a suspension rendered from office or from entering a church, or its effect, is by no means suspended through a subsequent appeal.

A bishop absolves a religious who strikes a cleric in the case in which he would absolve a cleric. This states the point. Dominicus. — § 1. One who strikes a novice of a religious order incurs excommunication.

The same.

To a religious who has laid violent hands upon a secular cleric, lest under this pretext he have material for wandering abroad, the benefit of absolution can be granted by the bishop in the case in which it could be granted to a secular cleric if he had struck another cleric.

§ 1. Moreover, although one who enters a religious order cannot be deemed a religious in effect until he has made profession tacitly or expressly, nevertheless, if anyone lays violent hands upon him, he does not escape the bond of excommunication rendered by the canon.

One absolved because of danger of death or another impediment by a person by whom he otherwise could not be absolved, if, when the impediment ceases, he does not present himself, when he conveniently can, to the person by whom he otherwise ought to have been absolved, falls again into the same sentence. The same applies to an absolved person who is required to present himself before someone, if he does not do this. Johannes Andreae.

The same.

Those who, when they cannot have recourse for the benefit of absolution to the person by whom they otherwise ought by law to have been absolved, because of an imminent danger of death or another legitimate impediment, are absolved by another from a sentence of canon or man, if, after the danger or impediment of this kind has ceased, they scorn to present themselves, as soon as they conveniently can, to the person by whom they ought to have been absolved when these impediments had ceased, humbly to receive his command concerning those matters for which they had been excommunicated and to render satisfaction as justice counsels, we decree—lest they thus make sport of ecclesiastical censure—that they fall again into the same sentence by the law itself. We establish the same concerning those upon whom, when they obtain from the Apostolic See or its legates the benefit of absolution from any sentences, it is enjoined that they present themselves before their ordinaries or any other persons, to receive penance from them, and that they render suitable satisfaction to those who suffered the injury or to those to whom they are bound because of it, if they do not take care to fulfill these things as soon as they conveniently can.

If I ratify a striking committed against a cleric without my command but in my name, I am excommunicated; it is otherwise if it was not committed in my name. Johannes Andreae.

The same.

When someone without your command lays violent hands upon a cleric in your name, if you ratify this, you unquestionably incur the excommunication rendered by the canon, since ratification is carried back to the time of the act and ought to be equated with a command. But if that laying-on of hands was not done in your name, then, although you sin by ratifying it, you are nevertheless not on account of this bound by the bond of any excommunication, since someone cannot ratify that which was not done in his name.

During a time of interdict even the healthy are admitted to penance, unless they are excommunicated, who will be admitted only at the point of death, or unless they gave cause for the interdict, who will not be admitted unless they make satisfaction or give security according to their ability. Likewise, during that time masses are celebrated and other divine offices are performed in churches as before, under penalty of loss of distributions, but with the doors closed, in a low voice, without excommunicated and interdicted persons, and without the ringing of bells. And four times in the year they can celebrate in a loud voice, with bells and doors open, and, after excluding excommunicated persons, admit interdicted persons, yet in such a way that those because of whose transgression it was rendered do not approach the altar. In other matters the interdict is to be observed. And privileges granted to anyone beyond this have been revoked. This states the point. Johannes Andreae.

The same.

Holy Mother Church frequently and with deliberation reasonably ordains certain things which afterward, when the advantage of her subjects counsels it, she more deliberately and reasonably revokes or changes for the better. Indeed, it was long ago established by our predecessors that, in lands or places placed under ecclesiastical interdict, no divine offices are to be celebrated and no ecclesiastical sacraments administered, certain cases and sacraments excepted. But because from the rigor of statutes of this kind the people’s lack of devotion increases, heresies spring up, and innumerable dangers to souls arise, and due services are withdrawn from churches through no fault of theirs, after diligent deliberation concerning these matters with our brothers, we grant that, during a time of interdict rendered by man or by law, not only the dying but also the living, both the healthy and the infirm, may lawfully be admitted to penance—which, because of the proneness and readiness of human beings to sin, is supremely necessary—provided, however, that they have not been excommunicated; for we do not will that excommunicated persons be admitted to it except at the point of death.

Also, the benefit of penance is in no way to be granted to those because of whose fault, deceit, or fraud the sentence of interdict was rendered, or who provided aid, counsel, or favor for committing the offense on whose occasion the interdict itself was rendered, unless they have first made satisfaction for the offense itself, if they are such persons as are able to do so, or have given suitable security for making satisfaction; or, if they cannot make satisfaction or furnish security of this kind, unless they have sworn that, when they are able, they will make satisfaction, and that they will give counsel and aid and faithfully labor according to their ability so that satisfaction of this kind may be furnished by the person or persons who ought and are able to make it. And even then, with respect to these or others who have not at all offended in this matter, where a city or another place or a corporate body is under interdict, relaxation of the interdict is not to be made, but salutary penance alone is to be enjoined upon them.

We add, moreover, that every day in churches and monasteries masses are to be celebrated and other divine offices said as before, yet in a low voice and with the doors closed, with excommunicated and interdicted persons excluded and the bells also not rung. And both canons and clerics of churches in which daily distributions are given to those who attend the canonical hours, if they do not come to the aforesaid offices, shall lose those distributions, just as they would lose them if no interdict existed and they did not attend the divine offices.

But on the feasts of the Nativity of the Lord, Easter, Pentecost, and the Assumption of the Glorious Virgin, bells are to be rung and divine offices solemnly celebrated in a loud voice with the doors open, excommunicated persons being wholly excluded but interdicted persons admitted. Out of reverence for the said solemnities, and so that interdicted persons may more readily be inclined toward the grace of humility and a disposition for reconciliation, we permit them participation in divine offices on the aforesaid days, yet in such a way that those because of whose transgression an interdict of this kind was rendered are by no means to approach the altar. The other provisions established by our predecessors concerning the observance of interdicts are to remain in their force, notwithstanding any privileges granted by the Apostolic See, under any form or expression of words, to churches, monasteries, orders, religious institutes, or ecclesiastical persons, secular or regular, exempt and nonexempt. We will that such privileges avail no one against the tenor of this constitution, since it ought to suffice for all persons, both secular and regular, that during a time of interdict they celebrate on the aforesaid days in the manner set forth above.