Chapter — Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology

I. On the Nature of Censure

1084.

What is censure? It is a medicinal spiritual penalty by which a baptized man, delinquent and contumacious, is deprived by ecclesiastical power of the use of certain spiritual goods. Penalty: i.e., chiefly of the external forum. Therefore only those can impose censure who have jurisdiction in the external forum. Spiritual: because it consists in a certain removal of spiritual goods; it is from spiritual or ecclesiastical power; for a spiritual good; and obliging in conscience. Medicinal: for it is properly imposed for this end, as a medicine for preventing sins not yet admitted and curing those admitted, namely so that one may not sin, and if he has sinned may return to better fruit. C. Cum medicinalis 1, de Sent. exc., in VI.

Hence, in order that a censure truly be imposed by way of censure, and not generally by way of penalty, it is necessary that it not be imposed in perpetuity, nor at the discretion of the one imposing it, but it must be imposed simply, so that as soon as the guilty person has amended himself he can be absolved; for when the disease ceases, the medicine ceases. Baptized man: for one who has not been baptized is not subject to the power of the Church. But he must be capable of reason and a subject: for one who is incapable of fault is not liable to penalty; and the power of jurisdiction, of which censure is an act, is exercised only upon subjects.

He must also be some determinate person, and not a moral person, which can indeed be deprived of the rights by which it enjoys, but cannot be struck with penalties and censures so that it may repent, since it has only a moral existence. Yet the individual persons of a moral body can be punished with censures. Cf. Schmalzgrueber, n. 44-46. But Cardinals and Bishops are not liable to censures issued by the law itself unless they are expressly included, except for excommunication; likewise those not yet pubescent, except in the case of violation of the enclosure of nuns. C. Apostolicae Sedis. But by a special privilege legitimately introduced in the course of time, kings and queens cannot be bound by censure except by the Pope. By ecclesiastical power: for a penalty cannot be imposed except by one having power, and spiritual penalty pertains to spiritual power.

Of the use of certain spiritual goods: therefore censures do not take away the goods themselves, nor power or rights to them, but only the use of them from the guilty person, until he has returned to better fruit. C. Ex litteris 11, de Const. But it deprives him of the use of those goods which are in the power of the Church, such as public prayers, administration of the sacraments, offering of sacrifice, ecclesiastical burial, etc. Therefore it does not deprive him of merely internal goods, e.g., the sacramental character, the power of order, nor of proper and private goods, e.g., faith, hope, charity, etc. And if sometimes it deprives him of human intercourse, this is done only secondarily. E.M.

1085.

What is the division of censures? According to the various goods of whose use censure deprives one, it is threefold, namely excommunication, suspension, and interdict. Excommunication and interdict touch all; suspension touches only clerics. Excommunication has the force only of censure, or medicinal penalty. Therefore it cannot be imposed upon a moral person. C. Romana 5, de Sent. exc., in VI; Suarez, disp. 18, sec. 2, n. 3. But suspension and interdict can be imposed also by way of mere penalty, or in vindication of fault, and by way of mere privation, which holds even without fault, and therefore both the guilty and the innocent. Hence suspension and interdict can be imposed for a merely past delict which has no successive continuance, without any preceding threat or warning, without any expressed cause, in perpetuity, or for a determinate time, or at the good pleasure of the one who imposed it. Likewise they can be imposed upon moral persons, e.g., a chapter, a city, etc., and with respect to the innocent they have the nature of mere privation. Violation of a censure imposed by way of censure brings irregularity if a cleric violates it by exercising an order; not likewise one imposed by way of penalty, unless something else has been specially provided by law.

Some censures are issued by law; others by man. The former are imposed by way of law, the latter by way of mandate or sentence. An example of the former kind is the censures contained in the constitution Apostolicae Sedis, and the censures contained in episcopal statutes. An example of the latter is if a Bishop, without judicial process, issues a mandate, or if a judge, after judicial process has been instituted, issues a sentence against an abductor, that he restore the abducted person to liberty within three days, otherwise he incurs excommunication. Suarez, disp. 3, sec. 1, n. 2. A censure issued by law still perseveres after the death of the author; not likewise one issued by man. Yet one who incurs the latter is held by it everywhere until he is absolved from it. Episcopal censures issued in synod are held as censures by way of law and, when the Bishop has died, they endure; but those issued outside synod are held as censures by way of simple statute, and when the Bishop has died, they cease. L. 6.

Likewise some censures are latae sententiae; others are ferendae sententiae. They are latae sententiae if they are established as to be incurred by the very fact by which someone acts against the law. They are ferendae sententiae if they are to be inflicted by the sentence of a judge. Therefore censures are ferendae sententiae if the words of the law require the ministry of a judge, or the action of another, for incurring the censure, e.g., if it is said: it is prescribed under penalty of excommunication; he will be excommunicated, etc. But they are latae sententiae if the words of the law do not include a condemnatory sentence, or at least a declaratory sentence of the crime, e.g., one doing such things is by that very fact, by the law itself, excommunicated.

1086.

What is required on the part of sin for incurring censures? It is required that it be mortal, for censure is a very grave penalty which consequently presupposes mortal fault. Hence they must be imposed soberly and with great circumspection. Council of Trent, sess. 25, chap. 3, de Ref.; Benedict XIV, De Synodo, book 10, chap. 2. Therefore, unless there is question of some light censure, or at least one for a brief time, which is imposed because of light fault, censures of excommunication, suspension, and interdict, as they are ordinarily imposed, can in no way be imposed for light faults. L. 30; Schmalzgrueber, book 5, title 39, n. 59; Suarez, disp. 4, sec. 6, n. 12; Lugo, De Iustitia et Iure, disp. 16, n. 61; Lessius, book 2, chap. 12, n. 54; Sanchez, in Decal., book 7, chap. 21, nn. 28, 29.

The sin must be external; for the Church judges in the external forum, to which censures pertain, not in the internal forum. Not only must the sin be exterior, but also grave in the nature of the external act. Therefore one who is excused from grave fault either as regards the internal act or at least as regards the external act is also excused from censure. It must be a sin consummated by deed, because penal laws are of strict interpretation. Namely, the sin must be complete in its own genus according to the proper meaning of the words which are contained in the precept or law. Schmalzgrueber, l.c., n. 64. It is required that the sin not be merely past, because censure is a medicinal penalty, which therefore cannot be imposed on those who have already returned to better fruit. Merely past; for if a past delict, such as theft, detraction, etc., has a successive continuance, censure can be imposed because of it, once it has first been denounced to the guilty person, unless he obeys the mandate to restore what was taken away, to repair reputation, etc., within a definite time. Merely past: namely, if the censure is truly imposed by way of censure, or medicinal penalty, and not by way of mere vindictive penalty. Therefore a superior who wishes to punish some sin with censure must first threaten this censure. L. 54. Finally contumacy is required. For by censures contumacy against the law of the Church is punished, and indeed against the Church threatening censure to the contumacious. C. Pia 1, de Except., in VI; C. Statuimus 3, de Sent. exc., in VI. Contumacy is from despising; hence it is contempt of censure. Therefore for incurring censure it is necessary that the censure first have already been imposed, either by way of general law, or by particular precept at least denounced as to be incurred unless the precept is obeyed. Hence if someone withdraws from contumacy before he actually incurs the censure to be incurred once the effect has followed, he by no means incurs it afterwards when the effect follows. Withdraws from contumacy, namely by confession, or sorrow, or retraction of the will, and in the way in which he can he tries to impede the effect, although the revocation cannot become known to him to whom perhaps he gave the command or counsel. L. 31, 39, 40; book 7, nn. 368, 373; book 6, n. 600.

1087.

Is warning required beforehand for incurring censure? R. Affirmatively. The reason is that censure is imposed because of actual contumacy and disobedience. But one who has not been warned by the one imposing the censure is not rebellious and disobedient to him. Therefore. Hence among the doctors it is commonly received that a censure with no warning at all first given is regularly null. Now as regards a censure issued by law by way of law, or issued by man by way of mandate, the law itself and the mandate itself warn. Yet if the delict is occult, for declaring a censure incurred, citation of the guilty person is certainly needed; otherwise the sentence will be null and void. But if the censure is not contained in a law or mandate, then it is necessary to threaten it, or it is necessary to warn the guilty person, and indeed a threefold warning is needed, although this does not pertain to validity; or one for three, with the space of at least two days observed between them, or between this and the sentence the space of at least six days. But warning must be made to the guilty person before witnesses, and it is customarily and must be done in writing, but it is valid by living voice. Although a censure imposed without writing is valid, nevertheless, because this is grave, if it has been imposed orally, it is presumed to be penalty rather than censure.

If the censure has already been threatened by law, if indeed there is question of a censure ferendae sententiae, whether a new warning is needed is disputed: some affirm it, and it is more equitable, because censures of this kind are for the most part unknown; others deny it, and it is more probable, because the law itself warns sufficiently. C. Reprehensibilis 26, de Appellationib., etc.; C. Cum medicinalis 1, de Sent. excomm., in VI; L. 22, 51, 65, 317; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 21, a. 3.

1088.

Who can impose censures? By ordinary law, every and only ecclesiastical superior having ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the external or contentious forum can impose censure, whether ordinary or delegated, namely the Pope and a General Council with respect to all the faithful; Cardinals in the churches of their titles; Primates and Archbishops, both in their own dioceses and in the dioceses of suffragans during the time of visitation, and also when there is question of a case brought to their tribunal, because then they have jurisdiction over the suffragans; Bishops in their dioceses, provided they have been elected and confirmed, although not consecrated; Legates of the Apostolic See in the provinces of their legation; Vicars General of Bishops, for they constitute one tribunal with the Bishops themselves; the Chapter, when the see is vacant and before the election of the Capitular Vicar, who afterwards enjoys such power exclusively; abbots, generals, provincials, rectors, conventual priors, guardians, etc., of religious orders with respect to religious subject to themselves; and all those to whom that power is specially committed by delegation from the aforesaid persons.

Therefore by common law both lay persons and all women, even abbesses, are excluded from this power, both ordinary and delegated. Likewise parish priests, since they do not have ordinary jurisdiction in the external forum, but only administration for the right ordering of the parish, do not have this faculty. As regards delegated power, this ceases with the death of the one delegating, when there is question of a case of justice, unless the case has already been begun by the delegate at least through citation. But one delegated to impose censures cannot subdelegate another, unless he has had express permission from the one delegating, or unless he is delegated at least for any causes whatsoever, or by the Roman Pontiff. CC. Perniciosa 1, Cum ab Ecclesiarum 3, Pastoralis 11, sec. Praeterea, Conquerente 16, Grave gerimus 19, de Off. iud. ord.; C. Cum Episcopus 7, e.t., in VI; C. Transmissam 15, de Elect.; C. Si pro debilitate, de Off. Deleg.; CC. Cum in Ecclesiis 10, His quae 11, de Maior. et obed.; C. Ea quae final, de Statu Monach.; C. Quaerenti 20, de Verbor. signific.; C. Cum medicinalis 1, de Sent. exc., in VI; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 22, aa. 1, 2; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 3, 12-21, 40; Engel, nn. 12-15; Pichler, Ius Canonicum, book 5, title 39, nn. 4, 5; Lugo, Resp. Mor., book 6, disp. 6; E.M.

1089.

What is required so that an ecclesiastical superior can impose censures? It is required: 1. That he be possessed of reason; indeed that he have the intention of binding him against whom he imposes the censure. The reason is that to impose censure is an act of jurisdiction, which has its whole force from the interior will. 2. That he have jurisdiction free as regards its use. Hence an excommunicated, suspended, heretical, or schismatic Bishop cannot impose censures; the same is to be said of his vicar. Yet an occult heretic or excommunicated person validly imposes censures, although illicitly, because for the public good, unless he is to be avoided, the Church preserves jurisdiction for him. Indeed there are not lacking those, and it seems today the common opinion, who hold that even one publicly excommunicated validly imposes censures if he has not been denounced by name, or if he is not a public striker of a cleric from the Extravagant of Martin V, Ad evitanda, where it is sanctioned that a tolerated excommunicated person is not to be avoided in those things which pertain to public office, nor even by those who know this. L. 12; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 22, a. 3. 3. That the one imposing censure act freely, not under compulsion. But whether a censure imposed from grave fear is valid, some deny, others more truly affirm: because an act done from grave fear is of itself valid unless it is invalidated by special positive law. But a censure imposed from fear is not invalidated by positive law. Therefore. Schmalzgrueber, n. 23; L. 12; E.M.

1090.

Can a Bishop impose censures if he is outside the diocese? R. Negatively. For no one can exercise contentious jurisdiction in another's territory. Yet the following cases are excepted: 1. If the censure is imposed not by way of sentence, but by way of precept or statute, for preventing future crimes. 2. If the censure is imposed by way of sentence which nevertheless does not need cognizance of the case and judicial commotion, either because the contumacy is manifest, or because the case has already been known in his own territory. If it needs judicial commotion, it is necessary that permission be given by the Ordinary of the place and that the parties consent; for no one unwilling can be drawn outside his own territory. 3. If the Bishop has been unjustly expelled from his own territory, for then permission sought from the Ordinary of the place suffices, although not obtained. C. Novit 7, de Off. leg.; Clementine, single chapter, de For. comp.

1091.

Can a Bishop existing in his own diocese impose censure on a subject existing outside the diocese? A Bishop, existing in his own diocese, can bind by censures through sentence a subject existing in another diocese, both for a crime committed in his own diocese and also if the subject commits a delict outside the diocese, but there is question of a matter which is in it, as if clerics who do not come to the synod are excommunicated. Nor indeed does it stand in the way that citation cannot be made outside the territory; for then it suffices that the guilty person be cited in his own house or in a public place. Likewise if a Bishop by special precept prohibited some delict to someone under censure, the absent person incurs this censure. For the precept is personal. Therefore, since a subject outside the territory is bound by the precept, he is also bound by the censure. Thus St. Alphonsus, n. 23, who calls the denying opinion probable when someone commits a delict outside the territory of the one administering law, and adds: But it is certain from C. Ut animarum 2, de Const., in VI, that if the Bishop has previously given no precept to the subject under penalty of censure, he cannot punish him with censure if he commits a delict in another diocese. And the same must be said if he commits a delict in an exempt place, because in that place he remains as if he were in a place outside the diocese, from C. Cum Episcopus 7, de Off. ord., in VI; C. Volentes 1, de Priv., ibid.; Clementine Archiepiscopo 2, e.t.

Through sentence or special precept: for if the prohibition has been made by territorial statute, a censure imposed on delinquents does not affect one existing outside the territory of the one establishing the censure, as is expressly decided in C. Ut animarum 2, de Const., in VI. But regular prelates can bind their subjects with censures in whatever place they exist, because their jurisdiction is more personal than territorial. L. 20; Engel, n. 31; La Croix, book 7, n. 28; Pichler, Ius Canonicum, book 7, title 39, n. 6.

1092.

Can a Bishop bind by censure another's subject committing a delict in his diocese? Pilgrims probably, according to Lugo and others, do not incur censures issued by the special law of some place; for they are exempt from the very obligation of observing the laws of that place. But if there is question of censures issued by man through sentence, they can indeed be bound by censures by the Bishop of the place after they have committed a delict in that place by violating common law, and not only the law of his diocese, and after the Bishop has cited them, yet only if that common law prescribes or prohibits something under excommunication and other penalties to be inflicted by an ecclesiastical judge; for then by reason of the delict the pilgrim obtains the forum of the Bishop of that place in which he committed the delict. But if the Bishop himself by his own authority threatens excommunication against one violating the common law, e.g., stealing, not restoring, etc., the excommunication is null. For the immediate delict because of which excommunication is imposed is the contumacy and disobedience of a subject disobeying the Bishop who prohibits theft or prescribes restitution under censure. But the Bishop can neither command a pilgrim who is not a subject, nor consequently impose a special sentence on him as one not subject. Yet others, with Engel and La Croix, contradict this opinion, because just as laws can be imposed by which pilgrims are bound, e.g., concerning not carrying arms, so censure can be added to those laws, and such a pilgrim by reason of the delict becomes subject to such a Bishop. Hence at least he can, as an inhabitant and stranger, be restrained by censures by the office of the judge, C. final, de For. comp. La Croix, book 7, n. 32; Engel, nn. 35, 112; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 47-48; L. 19, 26, 27; book 6, n. 591; Lugo, Resp. Mor., book 6, disp. 22; Laymann, chap. 4, nn. 5, 6.

1093.

Can Bishops impose censures on regulars? R. Affirmatively, if they are not exempt; for then they are subject to episcopal laws and censures in plainly the same way as other clerics. Moreover, if they have the Bishop as their proper prelate, they can be bound by censures by him just as other regulars by their proper superiors. Sanchez, in Decal., book 6, chap. 1, n. 11; Schmalzgrueber, book 3, title 35, nn. 61, 62.

Affirmatively, if they are exempt and commit a delict concerning those things in which, by force of canons and Constitutions, they are subject to the jurisdiction of Bishops. And in such a case Bishops proceed not by ordinary but by delegated power. S.C.C., February 17, 1632; Benedict XIV, De Synodo, book 9, chap. 16, n. 5; book 7, chap. 41, n. 5; Barbosa, De Off. et Potest. Episc., part 3, alleg. 105, n. 14 ff. Negatively, if the discussion concerns those regulars who in this matter enjoy special exemption. For a twofold exemption of regulars, or immunity from the censures of Bishops, must be distinguished. The first proceeds from this, that regulars in certain things are exempt from the jurisdiction of Ordinaries, and therefore as regards these things they cannot be punished either by censures or by other penalties. Yet since in other things they are subject to Bishops, when they commit delicts in these matters they can be punished by them, even by censures. But the other proceeds from this, that certain regulars enjoy a special privilege, namely Mendicants and Religious of the Society of Jesus, so that they cannot be punished by Bishops with censures, although they can be punished with other penalties if they commit delicts in those very things in which they are subject to the Ordinaries of places. The case from the constitution Inscrutabili of Gregory XV is excepted, namely "if in churches of others, which are not of their orders, without the license of the Bishop; and in their own churches or those of their orders, without having sought his blessing, or while he contradicts, they presume to preach." Innocent X, Brief Cum sicut accepimus, May 14, 1653, declaring another case in the cited constitution Inscrutabili of Gregory XV, added a case, namely that of hearing confessions. A third case must also be added concerning the form and habit of sacred images from the constitution Sacramenta of Urban VIII, March 15, 1642.

1094.

Does ignorance excuse from incurring censure? Invincible ignorance, whether of fact, of law, or of penalty, i.e., of the censure attached, excuses from incurring it. For contumacy is lacking. Here forgetfulness and inadvertence operate the same as ignorance. Ignorance that is vincible and lightly culpable, or even gravely culpable if it is not crass or supine, also excuses from incurring censure; otherwise if it is crass and supine, from C. final, de Const., in VI, where it is said, "we do not wish the ignorant to be bound, when nevertheless their ignorance has not been crass or supine." But whether there is truly given gravely culpable ignorance which nevertheless is not crass or supine is disputed. Commonly they deny it; yet many affirm it, because for crass ignorance a certain highest negligence is required, and negligence can be gravely culpable although it is not the highest.

A fortiori affected ignorance, whether of fact, of law, or of penalty, does not excuse from incurring censure. Vincible ignorance that is gravely culpable, whether it is crass or supine, or, probably, even affected, excuses from incurring censure if in the Decree there is a clause: whoever does this knowingly, deliberately, rashly; whoever has presumed to do this, etc. For one who acts with ignorance of whatever kind surely does not act knowingly. And indeed, from the Holy Office, January 12, 1870, by these words, by rash daring, or from presumption, etc., it is signified that someone committed a delict not while compelled or ignorant, but prudently and knowingly; and moreover it ought not to be wondered that one devoid of every excuse is subject to censure. L. 43-45, 48.

1095.

Does grave fear excuse from censure? R. Affirmatively, unless nevertheless observance of the law is necessary for preserving the public good, or violation of it yields to contempt of faith, or of law, or of ecclesiastical power. The reason for the response is that one who commits a delict from fear sins rather from weakness of nature than from contumacy. The reason for the exception is that in the aforesaid cases the obligation even of human law does not cease.

1096.

Does an appeal legitimately interposed excuse from censure? R. Affirmatively, namely if it was interposed before the sentence, or after it indeed had been issued, but while the day from which, or the condition under which, it was issued, is pending. Likewise it ceases if, while the day or condition is pending, one ceases to be superior and the other ceases to be subject. But if the censure has already been issued absolutely, appeal does not suspend it, whence canonists say that the appeal is devolutive, not suspensive. Yet recourse to the Holy See is always given against its injustice. L. 63-65; Suarez, disp. 3, sec. 4, n. 10 ff.; sec. 5, n. 2; sec. 15, n. 18 ff.; Lugo, Resp. Mor., book 2, disp. 6.

1097.

Is one to be judged to have incurred censure who doubts whether he has incurred it? In a doubt of fact and in a doubt about the existence of the law, one is excused from incurring censure; not likewise in a doubt about the justice of the law, namely whether the censure is just. The first reason is that in doubt the condition of the possessor is better. But one who doubts whether by his act he has incurred censure possesses the right of using spiritual goods. Therefore he is not to be deprived of his right. Therefore. The second reason is that favors are to be enlarged and odious things restricted. Therefore a law inducing a doubtful penalty is to be taken in the more benign part; for penalty is odious. Therefore. The third reason is that in a doubt of justice, presumption favors the superior. When someone doubts whether he has been absolved from a censure which he incurred, in the external forum judgment must be made in favor of the censure, or bond, from C. Sicut 39, de Sent. exc., and therefore absolution must be sought. Likewise in the internal forum absolution must be sought, lest perhaps one become deprived of the goods of the Church. Lugo, De Poenit., disp. 20, n. 18; Sanchez, in Decal., book 1, chap. 10, nn. 55, 56; St. Thomas, Quodlibet 4, a. 14; L. 32, 39, 67, 68.

1098.

Is one bound by censure who knows it to be manifestly unjust? One is not bound by censure who knows it to be certainly unjust, whether because of a false presumption of fact, or because legal forms were omitted, or because the limits of jurisdiction were exceeded. Therefore he is not bound to observe it publicly, except by reason of scandal, if this is present. L. 68; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 21, a. 4; Laymann, chap. 6, nn. 2-4; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 89-94; Engel, nn. 103-113; Lugo, De Iustitia et Iure, disp. 37, n. 188.

1099.

Can someone be bound by several censures at the same time? Because of one and the same delict only one censure is incurred out of several perhaps imposed by one and the same legislator, namely that by which the others are eminently comprehended. Thus, e.g., those usurping goods pertaining to ecclesiastical persons by reason of their churches are bound only by the excommunication reserved to the Roman Pontiff, and not also by the Tridentine excommunication. Because of one and the same delict someone can indeed incur several censures imposed by different legislators, by the Bishop of the benefice and by the Bishop of domicile, by the Roman Pontiff and by the Ordinary of the place; e.g., if clerics violating the enclosure of nuns are punished by suspension in an episcopal Statute, they would also be liable to the excommunication simply reserved to the Roman Pontiff through the constitution Apostolicae Sedis. Because of the same delict repeated, and because of diverse delicts, someone can incur several censures, namely the same one several times, and several diverse ones, of the same or of a different nature. And here it must be noted that if the censure is reserved to the Pontiff, through this reservation the faculty of reserving the same censure to themselves then seems to have been taken away from inferior Prelates.

1100.

What is to be said generally about absolution from censures? "Absolution signifies an act of justice in which some case, or judgment, is terminated in favor of the guilty person.... But dispensation is an act of grace or mercy... by which something is relaxed from the common law in favor of someone." Thesaurus, De Poenis, part 1, chap. 20. For releasing a censure, absolution imparted by a legitimate judge or superior is necessary; and if the guilty person has ceased from his contumacy, justice itself requires that he be absolved from the censure.

And a censure cannot be released in another way, although satisfaction has already been made, if it was owed, and amendment has followed, except for censures imposed for a definite time: for when that has ended, they cease; and those which were imposed at the good pleasure of the one imposing them also cease when he has died, or when his right has been dissolved. This is established from C. Qua fronte 25, de Appell.; C. Ex litteris 11, de Const.; C. Cum desideres 15, de Sent. exc.; C. Relatum 37, ibid.; proposition 44 condemned by Alexander VII; L. 122. Absolution of this kind can be given by an ecclesiastical superior, or by his delegate, even if he is not a priest. And although the penalties of censure are especially of the external forum, absolution from them can nevertheless be given in the internal forum of conscience, as long as they have not been brought to the external forum; this is established by common doctrine and practice.

Absolution from censures, as removing an impediment, must be given first under grave obligation before absolution from sins; yet if it is given afterwards, it is valid; and if the penitent receiving this has not sinned gravely, the absolution from sins also is valid. But since it is not established that the penitent is bound by censure, it is prefaced only as a precaution. And from these things it is clear that absolution from censures is entirely distinct from absolution from sins, and one can stand without the other. St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 24, a. 2, ad 2; Laymann, chap. 7, n. 1; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 107, 111; E.M. 952.

1101.

Who can absolve from the various censures? From a censure, whether issued by man by way of precept or by particular sentence, or reserved by law, only these can absolve: 1. the one who imposed the censure; 2. his superior; 3. his successor; 4. another delegated by one of these. The reason is that it belongs to the one to absolve to whom it belongs to bind. L. 63; Laymann, chap. 7; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 85-93, 97; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 24, a. 1. A censure issued by man by way of precept or by particular sentence: for censures issued by man, but by way of statute or general sentence, according to the more probable opinion are equated with those issued by law which are not reserved. L. 73; Schmalzgrueber, 94; Engel, n. 124. From censures which are such less properly, namely those imposed until a certain day, in perpetuity, or at the good pleasure of the superior, only he or another having special faculty can absolve: since, although they are not expressly reserved, they are nevertheless implicitly reserved from their very nature. Cf. Suarez, disp. 29, sec. 1, n. 16.

Any confessor can absolve from censures issued by law and by no means reserved to the Pope or Bishop, both for the internal forum and for the external forum, C. Nuper 29, de Sent. exc.; formula of absolution in the Roman Ritual; Struggl, 29; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 24, a. 1; L. 69-71, 126, 322, 339; book 1, n. 191; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 95, 96. "Yet in order that someone can use the absolution publicly, it is necessary that it be publicly established.... But in order that it be judged publicly established, it is enough that it be publicly established that he was confessed... to one having power... provided that the satisfaction which was necessary has also been publicly exhibited." Suarez, disp. 7, sec. 5, n. 29.

For this is required, although the censure has not been juridically denounced, for preventing scandal, and so that it be established that he has withdrawn from his contumacy and has returned to obedience to the Church. Cf. Leo XIII, Monita pro Iubilaeo for the year 1900, Singulares, Kalends of November, 1899, sec. 8 ff.

From Trent, sess. 24, C. Liceat 6, and from the constitution Apostolicae Sedis, paragraph Firmam, Bishops can, in the forum of conscience, absolve from occult cases and censures reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, except those which are reserved in a special manner. The Capitular Vicar also enjoys this power, S.C.C., December 3, 1632. Bishops can also delegate this Tridentine faculty generally to some priest, provided that they expressly specify it; for special deputation is required from Trent. And they can absolve even pilgrims, since they become subjects by submitting themselves in the forum of conscience. But by this faculty Bishops cannot absolve from occult cases reserved by other Bishops. S.C.C., January 24, 1711; November 20, 1712; Benedict XIV, constitution Pias Christi, August 21, 1752.

But those cases are reputed occult which have not been proved in judgment and can still be concealed in the neighborhood in some way, as if it is known only to a few discreet persons, e.g., five or six, or if the fact appears doubtful. Probably a crime public in one place can be absolved by a Bishop in another place where it is occult, provided there is no fear that it will easily be made public where it is occult. Likewise an occult crime can be absolved by a Bishop, whether it is materially occult, because the committed delict is publicly unknown, or formally occult, namely because although the crime is known, nevertheless it is unknown that a censure is attached to it. L. 76, 78; book 1, appendix II, de Privil., n. 29 ff.; book 6, nn. 294, 593, 594.

That regular prelates by force of their privileges, as regards their subjects, 1. cannot absolve from censures imposed by the constitution Apostolicae Sedis, whether reserved in a special manner or simply to the Roman Pontiff; but 2. can absolve from censures reserved to Bishops, even if occult; and 3. as regards the faculty of the same prelates for absolving their subjects from censures reserved to the Roman Pontiff which are not contained in the aforesaid Constitution and which pertain to internal government, nothing has been innovated by the same Constitution; 4. regulars impeded from going to Rome cannot be absolved by their regular superiors from censures contained in that Constitution and reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, but must have recourse to the Holy See for the necessary faculties, was declared in the Holy Office, March 22, 1881. Synod of the Diocese of Ostia and Velletri, Rome, 1892, p. 122.

Those confessors who have the Pagella of the Sacred Penitentiary can also absolve from several censures, even reserved ones. Cf. the aforesaid Pagella.

Finally, as to who can absolve from papal cases and censures in the article of death and in the case of impediment from going to Rome, and how, cf. 773, 797, 799, 800.

1102.

What special circumstances of absolution from censures are to be noted? Various circumstances of absolution from censures to be noted are declared in the following propositions. An absent and unwilling person can be absolved from censures. For absolution from censures is not sacramental, but a mere relaxation of a bond imposed by the Church, which can also be pronounced upon the absent and unwilling. But this is not licit without grave cause. L. 117, 130; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 24, a. 2. One who is bound by several censures can be absolved from one, the others being left, because there is no necessary connection among them. C. Cum pro causa 27, de Sent. exc.; L. 118, 131; St. Thomas, q. 24, a. 3. Absolution extorted by force or grave fear unjustly inflicted is not valid, from C. single chapter, de His quae vi, etc., in VI; L. 119. The same is to be said if it is given by error concerning the motive cause. C. Offic. 42, de Sent. exc.; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 99, 100, 102; Thesaurus, De Poenis, part 1, chaps. 22-24.

1103.

Absolution cannot be given unless first, where there was need, the one to be absolved has repaired scandal, satisfied the injured party, or, if he cannot, has furnished suitable security, or unless he has sworn or promised that he will make satisfaction as soon as he can; and, if the crime is among the more atrocious, or there is question of striking clerics, that he will never relapse into it. But oath and pledge-security pertain to the external forum. As regards the internal forum, a simple and sincere promise suffices concerning making satisfaction, standing by the mandates of the Church, etc. C. Porro 7, de Sent. exc.; C. Per tuas 40, 10, 11, ibid.; C. Qua fronte 25, de Appell.; C. Odoardus 3, de Solut.; C. Ex parte 23, de Verb. sign.; Sacred Penitentiary, July 5, 1857. But when the Pontiff gives faculty of absolving "the party having been satisfied," whether this clause is always added as a condition sine qua non, some probably affirm, others probably deny. L. 121, 129; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 100, 101; Roman Ritual, de Absol. ab excomm.; the warnings cited at n. 1101.

1104.

Absolution can be given both absolutely and conditionally. Likewise absolution can be given with reincidentia, i.e., so that the absolved person, unless he performs something, for instance unless he has restored after such a time, falls back into the same censure by that very fact. Reincidentia is either by law or by man. It is by man only when it is added by the express will of the superior; but by law when it is contained in clear law. For we are in odious matters. Moreover the censure into which the absolved person is going to fall back is a new censure in number, although of the same species. Therefore reincidentia cannot be added to absolution except by one who has power of imposing censure, and it is not incurred without new fault and contumacy. L. 86, 87, 123-125; Laymann, chap. 7, n. 8; Lugo, De Poenit., disp. 20, nn. 213-214.

1105.

For validly absolving from censures, no determinate formula is prescribed in law. Therefore the will of the superior manifested by a sensible sign suffices, so that it becomes known to the other. Schmalzgrueber, n. 98. And although it can be given by the fact itself, speaking per se, nevertheless from the law it does not seem to be presumed that it was given thus. Cf. Clementine Si summus 4, de Sent. exc.; C. Si aliquando 41, e.t.; C. In praesentia 46, ibid.; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 77, 389; St. Raymond de Penyafort, Summa, book 3, de Sententiis Praecepti, etc., sec. 36. For licitly absolving in the sacramental forum, the formula must be used which is contained in the formula itself of sacramental absolution, and the same is used in the internal forum of conscience outside the sacrament. But in the external forum the formula prescribed in the Roman Ritual and Pontifical, and in C. A nobis 28, de Sent. exc., must be used. For solemn and public absolution, as described in the Ritual, the mandate of the Bishop is needed, who is accustomed to prescribe this only when there was scandal of the whole community; and the other solemnities of law must be observed.

And thus, if there is question of an enormous crime, before absolution the delinquent must swear, unless perhaps he is not yet pubescent, that he will not relapse further into such a crime. C. Ex tenore 10; C. De cetero 11, de Sent. exc.; Roman Ritual, de Absol. ab excomm. One who has power of absolving in the forum of conscience from a censure can do this also outside Confession, except in a jubilee, in which it must be given in the sacramental forum. Benedict XIV, constitution Inter praeteritos, sec. 63.

Absolution given in the external forum also benefits in the internal forum; given in the internal forum it benefits the tolerated even in the external forum, but it does not prevent action from being taken against them according to the norm of law; not likewise those to be avoided, when this is licit, as in a Jubilee and in the article of death. Benedict XIV, constitution Inter praeteritos, sec. 61. L. 70, 116, 126-129; book 6, n. 536; Laymann, part 2, chap. 6; Pichler, book 5, title 39, n. 13; Roman Ritual, de Absol. ab excomm.