Question — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Question First. On the Nature of Theological Hope
41. Definition. 1. Hope as a virtue, habitual hope, is defined: an infused supernatural habit by which man is disposed to expect with certainty, from the promise of God, eternal beatitude and the means necessary for it.
Theological hope as an act, actual hope, is defined: the certain expectation of future beatitude, to be obtained from the most faithful divine promise through the means ordained by God.
The name of hope is taken in various senses: for it signifies a. the expectation of a possible future good, whether sensible or suprasensible; b. the thing hoped for itself, as when it is said: awaiting the blessed hope,2 or: hope, that is beatitude, comes to us from merits; c. the cause and reason of hope, whether primary or secondary, as when it is said: Thou hast become my hope, O Lord, or if the Blessed Virgin is called our hope; d. both the habit and the act of the theological virtue.
- Hope is not an act of the intellect but of the will, consisting in a trustful expectation which is joined with certainty, or firmness and quiet, excluding inordinate fear lest we not obtain the hoped-for good.
a. The act of hope supposes and contains several acts: a. an act of love, love of concupiscence, by which God pleases us as our good and the object of our beatitude; for we cannot hope except for what pleases us as our good. b. An act of desire, by which the will is borne toward an absent good: for from love of a good by its nature there arises desire of it, if the beloved good is absent. c. From the divine promise we know that the attainment of the desired good is possible for us: for we cannot hope for a good which cannot be obtained by us, and at the same time we know that God, on account of His fidelity in preserving promises, cannot fail us; whence, toward that good, there arises an act of expectation and trust that we shall one day be made participants of it. Finally we understand that neither power nor will is lacking to God on His part for giving the promised goods, whence we are raised up to firm and certain expectation.
b. Therefore, because hope, looked at fully and adequately, contains several acts in itself, the formal object of hope so considered must also be called multiple: and indeed the formal object of love of concupiscence and of desire is God insofar as He is good to us, or the relative goodness of God; the motive of hope formally considered is the fidelity of God in fulfilling promises; the motive of the certainty and firmness which is inherent in trust is the omnipotence and mercy of God.
1 St. Thomas, II-II, qq. 17-22. St. Alphonsus, bk. 2, nn. 20-21. Suarez, De spe, disp. 1 and 2. Sporer-Bierbaum, Theologia moralis decalogalis, tract. 2, nn. 107-125. Reuter, Theologia moralis, II, nn. 56-70. Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theologicum morale, II, nn. 109-133. Lehmkuhl, Theologia moralis, I, nn. 305-313.
2 Tit. 2:13.
42. Hope joined with fear. Theological hope ought to be firm and certain, excluding all diffidence and hesitation, and nevertheless it has fear joined to it: with fear and trembling work out your salvation.1 Firmness is referred to the promise; fear to the attainment. The firmness and certainty of hope arises from the motive of hoping, which we have on the part of God, namely from certain knowledge that God can and wills to stand by all His promises, because He is omnipotent and merciful; and indeed the firmness of this knowledge is increased from the fact that God has already given such manifest arguments of His kindness and mercy toward us. The fear which is joined to hope has its origin on our part, because we know that the outcome of those things which we hope for can be frustrated because of our frailty. For God did not promise beatitude to us absolutely, but conditionally, namely dependently on our cooperation; now since with absolute certainty we cannot know whether the conditions are fulfilled on our part or not, there is always a reason for fear: for we cannot know with certainty whether we are worthy of love or hatred.2 Yet since we can attain eternal beatitude, provided we ourselves seriously will it, this fear ought to exclude on the one hand rash security, and on the other also faint-hearted anxiety.
1 Phil. 2:12. Cf. Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 9.
2 Eccl. 9:1.
43. Object of hope. a. The material object of hope is constituted by all the goods promised to us by God; and since these are of two kinds, a primary object is distinguished, which is God Himself insofar as He is our highest good and our objective beatitude, and a secondary object, which is constituted by all the means which, from God's ordination, are necessary and useful for obtaining that beatitude, namely habitual gifts, helps of grace, remission of sins, goods both spiritual and also temporal, and the special providence of God, which may turn evils away from us and procure goods for us.
b. The formal object of hope is the supreme fidelity of God promising, who can perform what He has promised, because He is omnipotent, and wills to perform what He has promised, because He is most benign. And as faith supposes revelation, so hope supposes the divine promise of those things which we hope for as a necessary condition.1
1 Others present the reason of hope and its formal object otherwise. Cf. Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie XXII (1898), p. 63 ff.: "Das Formalobjekt der Hoffnung."