Question One: On the Formal Object of Hope

S. Th. II-II, q. 17, aa. 1 and 4; de Virt., q. 4, a. 1.

799. Thesis. The formal object of hope is the omnipotence of God giving aid. - The formal object of hope is that on account of which we hope for that which we hope. Moreover we hope for something because it seems to us possible of attainment; but something is possible to us in two ways, either through our own power or through the power or help of another. Hence by divine hope we hope on account of divine power or help. Now:

1. The divine power or help, that is, the attribute by which God assists us, is the aiding virtue of God, or God's very omnipotence insofar as it in fact gives aid to us. For if we ask someone: why do you hope for beatitude? he will rightly answer: because God is ready to assist us; and if we ask: by what does he assist us? he will answer: by his power. Hence the Scriptures constantly indicate as the motive of hope the help and strength of God (Gen. XV, 1; Ps. XVII, 3; LVI, 2; LXI, 7; CXVIII often; Is. XXVI, 4; II Kings XXII, 3; Prov. XVIII, 10; II Cor. IX, 8; Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 13).

2. Nevertheless, the omnipotence of God would not help us unless God were benign and merciful (good toward us). Hence the Scriptures sometimes found hope upon divine mercy (Ps. XII, 6; LI, 10; CXVIII).

3. Similarly we would not be certain, nor would we hope firmly that the power of God helps us, unless he had promised this and were faithful in his promises. Hence the Scriptures found the certitude of hope upon fidelity (Heb. X, 23; Tit. I, 2).

Hence it is said by theologians that the formal object of hope is aiding omnipotence, insofar as it supposes the benignity of God by which it is moved and commanded, and insofar as it supposes the fidelity by which he is bound to helping us. Nevertheless the ultimate and immediate motive of hope is only aiding omnipotence.

St. Thomas aptly says, Q. D. de Virt. 4, a. 1:

"It is possible for something to be had by someone in two ways: in one way through his own power; in another way through the help of another.... Thus therefore sometimes a man hopes to obtain something through his own power, sometimes through another's help.... And then it is necessary that the movement of hope be borne toward two objects, namely, toward the good to be obtained, and toward him on whose help he relies" ("The good which someone hopes to obtain," he says in II-II, q. 17, a. 4, "has the aspect of a final cause; but the help through which someone hopes to obtain that good has the aspect of an efficient cause"). "But man cannot obtain the supreme good, which is eternal beatitude, except through divine help... and therefore the hope of obtaining eternal life has two objects, namely, eternal life itself, which someone hopes for, and the divine help from which he hopes. Just as also faith has two objects, namely, the thing which it believes, and the first truth" (in speaking) "to which it corresponds. But faith does not have the nature of virtue except insofar as it adheres to the testimony of first truth.... Whence also hope has the nature of virtue from this very fact, that man adheres to the help of the divine power for attaining eternal life...."

800. Corollaries concerning various opinions not to be approved. - From what has been said, it is easily understood what must be judged concerning various opinions of theologians, who labor much in designating the divine attribute which performs the office of the formal object in hope.

a) Some simply say it is the omnipotence of God.¹ - But in order that we expect something from God, it is not enough that God can bear help to us for obtaining it; rather it is also required that he in fact bear it and help us. Hence the complete formal object is not omnipotence considered in itself and almost abstractly, but only insofar as it is in fact aiding.

¹ Thus several Thomists. The more eminent, however, indicate aiding omnipotence: thus Capreolus, Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Gonet, Gotti, Contenson, Billuart, the Salmanticenses; also recently Waffelaert and Billot.

b) Others hold that it is divine mercy.² - But although mercy moves God to bearing help, nevertheless it is not that by which he immediately helps us and assists us; rather this is his power. But if a merciful one wished to bear help, yet did not have the power for it, every hope would become impossible; on the contrary, if he could help without benignity and in fact did help, whether he helped from mercy or not, provided nevertheless he helped, hope would subsist equally.

² Thus preachers are accustomed to speak. Very many theologians place mercy and omnipotence in the same line, because by each God gives aid. Thus Vasquez, Turrianus, Meratius, Malderus, Schiffini. St. Bonaventure seems to speak in the same way, III Sent., d. 26, a. 1, q. 2. - But St. Thomas constantly assigns divine help, virtue, the power of another, and by name of God, as the motive of hope. Cf. for example, I-II, q. 40, a. 2, ad 1, and a. 7; II-II, q. 17, aa. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 ad 3, and 7; q. 18, a. 2; Q. D. de Virt. 4, aa. 1 and 4.

c) Others say that it is God's fidelity in promises.³ - But again fidelity is not that by which he immediately bears help to us, although it gives certitude and firmness to hope. But if the faithful God wished to execute his promises, yet did not have the power, hope would be impossible; on the contrary, even if God had promised nothing or were not faithful in promises, provided that with some probability it appeared likely that he would help by his power, there would be a sufficient foundation for hoping, although this hope would not be certain.

³ For this opinion Juanin is alleged by St. Alphonsus, Th. M. l. II, n. 21.

d) Others, especially the very recent with St. Alphonsus, hold that those three together constitute the formal object.⁴ - But these do not solve the knot of the question, nor do they touch it. For 1. of each habit, just as of each act, there is only one formal object and proximate motive; hence it is impossible that these three concur equally principally for the motive of hope. Moreover 2. if one formal object is constituted from these three, it must still be shown how they concur into one, which the aforesaid authors do not sufficiently, or even in any way, indicate; moreover this cannot happen otherwise than in the mode indicated above, insofar as the mercy of God moves omnipotence to aid, and this is altogether certain from his fidelity.

⁴ St. Alphonsus, ibid. Lorea seems first to have defended this, whom Ripalda, Kilber, and many moderns followed: Theologia Mechliniensis, Haine, Bouquillon, Lehmkuhl, Genicot, Noldin, Aertnijs, Tanquerey, Vermeersch.

It remains, therefore, that aiding omnipotence alone, which is commanded by the mercy of God and executes his fidelity, is the formal object and immediate motive of hope: namely, mercy and fidelity are rather the reason why omnipotence helps than why we hope. - Or these two are also necessary to hope as a preamble, just as motives of credibility are a preamble of faith; but they are not the motive of hope itself.

e) Finally, others do not indicate a divine attribute as the formal object of hope, but speak too soberly by assigning only divine help.⁵ - Yet this is not to be understood as the created help of grace: for that is something which we hope for, and pertains to the material object; - and otherwise nothing created can be the motive of a theological or divine virtue (cf. n. 669). It remains, therefore, that the help is understood as uncreated, and this again is nothing other than aiding omnipotence (q. 18, a. 4, ad 2; q. 17, a. 6, ad 3).

⁵ Thus several of the ancients.

But if he also makes mention of divine piety or mercy, this is rather rare and accessory to power (II-II, q. 18, a. 4, ad 2 and 3; de Virt., q. 4, a. 1), nor can it be opposed to his general theory concerning the motive of hope, namely, that the motive of hope is that by which something becomes possible, whether by one's own or another's virtue. Therefore do not conclude from these that according to St. Thomas mercy as well as power pertains to the motive of hope; rather understand that he sometimes also adds piety, because in some way, although remotely, it concurs for founding hope.

801. The proper motive of hope is not God as our supreme good. - Scotus teaches, whom Suarez follows, that the motive of hope is God insofar as he is our supreme good,⁶ or the goodness of God relative to us,⁷ that is, the infinite perfection of God insofar as, possessed by us, it perfectly quiets our appetite and completes all our desires. - This indeed is the motive of the love of concupiscence and of desire, which are necessarily presupposed to hope (as a preamble) and are virtually included in it; for we covet and desire God because to possess him is good and delightful to us. But this is not the motive of the act which is proper to hope, and which adds, beyond desire, the expectation of beatitude which is had with difficulty. For what is obtained with difficulty, nevertheless we hope for on account of the power of him from whom we are able to obtain it.

⁶ Thus Scotus, in III Sent., d. 26; Suarez, de Spe, disp. 1, sect. 3; Granados, Arriaga, Coninck, Wiggers, Harent. Cf. Ballerini, Opus theol. mor. II, de Spe, nn. 4 and 5; Schiffini, o. c., d. 5, sect. 3; Billot, o. c., th. 26.

⁷ The goodness of God toward us and his goodness relative to us should not be confused: the latter is the aptitude or capacity of quieting our appetite, insofar as God is our supreme good, possessed by whom nothing to be desired remains; but the former is the infinite propensity and inclination of God to diffuse his perfection and to communicate it to us.

802. Secondary motives of hope. - The power of God alone is the principal efficient cause which leads us to beatitude; hence from him alone as from the principal cause or the first moving cause can we hope. But God uses creatures as instruments by which he helps us in some way toward beatitude. Therefore from creatures, as from secondary and instrumental causes acting under God, we can hope for some aid for obtaining goods ordered to beatitude.

In this way: 1. we hope on account of the merits of Christ, our head, in view of which God promised eternal life and helps toward it (Council of Trent, sess. 6, cc. 3 and 7); in addition, by their virtue all things must be asked from God;

2. we hope on account of the prayers and merits of the Saints, especially of the Blessed Virgin Mary, mediatrix; indeed, on account of the prayers and helps of men dwelling on earth, and therefore we ask something from them;

3. we hope for our own merits, insofar as they are made from grace and are gifts of God; not indeed because in this way they are the motive of hoping, but because they are dispositions required so that we may arrive at eternal life (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 16, can. 26).

Nevertheless the power of God alone is the formal object of hope: for the merits of Christ, of the Saints, or of the one hoping himself do not help us, nor therefore move us to hoping, except dependently upon the very omnipotence of God, which uses them and from which they have efficacy, and which remains the foundation upon which our hope rests.