Question II: What the material object of hope is

All AGREE that the primary matter of this virtue is eternal Beatitude, as we saw in the definitions of hope adduced from S. Bonavent., and it is deduced from that text, Rom. 5: We glory in the hope of the glory, etc., and 1 ad Titum: according to the hope of eternal life, which God, who does not lie, has promised.

The question is therefore raised, whether formal beatitude, which is the vision of God, and love, and fruition; or rather objective beatitude, that is, God himself, be the object of this virtue.

The FIRST opinion is that Hope is concerned proximately with formal beatitude; with God, however, remotely, and accordingly that this virtue does not attain God immediately in himself. Thus Durandus, 3 dist. 26, quaest. 2; Palud., ibi, and other older authors, among whom S. Bonavent. is also renewed by many.

The SECOND opinion, diametrically opposite, is that Hope is concerned proximately with God; the vision, however, being a mere expository condition.

The THIRD opinion, the middle one, is that Hope is concerned with God and with Beatitude as referred to God. Thus D. Thom., prima secundae, quaest. 1, art. 3, ad 3; Becanus, cap. 17, quaest. 1; Poncius, disp. 31, quaest. 2; Coninchyus, disp. 19, dub. 3; Mastrius, disp. 6, de virtutibus Theol. quaest. 17, num. 442; Caspens., disp. 1, sect. 1, num. 3; Morandus, Tract. unic. quaest. 15; Tannerus, disp. 2, quaest. 1, dub. 1, num. 16; Valentia, disp. 2, quaest. 1, puncto 1, and other recent authors commonly; and this same is the will of those who say that God is the object just as beatitude is to be attained, so that we attain God immediately. Thus Scotus, 2 dist. 26 and 27; Gabriel, dist. 26; Almainus, Tract. 2, cap. 7; Suarez, de spe, disp. 1, sect. 3, num. 4; Fagundez, in primum praeceptum Decalogi, Lib. 1, cap. 31; Tannerus, disputatione 2, quaestione prima, dub. 1, num. 14; Fuliens., lib. 3, cap. 7.

This surely is the opinion of D. Bonavent. in corpore, as is clear to one reading.

I ASSERT first, with this opinion, that not the vision itself alone, but God also, is the material object of Hope.

It is PROVED from the authors alleged, with D. Bonav., ex 15 Genes., where God says to Abraham: I am your protector, and your reward exceeding great. Hence D. Augustine, 22 de civitate, cap. ultimo: The reward of virtue will be he himself, who gave the virtue, and who promised himself to it.

Isidore, Lib. 8, Ethymolog. cap. 2, however, seems to intimate this when he says: Hope is said, as it were, the foot of advancing toward God.

And D. Gregory, Lib. 10, moral. cap. 12, when he says: Hope in God rises the more solid, the graver the things you have borne for him — as the holy Doctor reports in Pharetra Lib. 2, cap. 24.

It is PROVED by the reason of D. Bonavent. given by Mastrius; for God, not only by reason of the vision, but also by reason of his intrinsic goodness, is our supreme good: Therefore, as such, love of concupiscence tends toward him; for he himself is given to us per se, and is joined to us, as is said Ioan. 14, Rom. 5, and this very thing is our greatest good.

It is confirmed by foundation 4: for the object of Hope is the same as that of delight, which succeeds hope, the thing already obtained; but the object of delight is God himself; for the will delights in the object known and possessed, as I showed in prima secundae, Tract. 1, disp. 2, quaest. 7.

It is confirmed secondly, because otherwise it would not be a Theological Virtue, since it would not attain God, as Mastrius infers from D. Bonavent., 3 dist. 26, art. 1, quaest. 3, and here at argument two, with the response.

I ASSERT secondly, that formal beatitude also enters into the reason of the object of this virtue.

It is PROVED first from S. Doct. at the places adduced of the Fathers, quaest. 1; he also brings forward many in Lib. 2, Pharetrae, cap. 24: D. Gregory, Lib. 6, moral. cap. 14, and Lib. 10, cap. 12; August., Lib 10, confess. cap. 43, and epist. 120; Bernard, Lib. de diligendo Deo, cap. 14.

It is PROVED secondly from D. Bonavent., by the reason which Morandus, Mastrius, and others use: for Hope tends toward its object because it is the good of those hoping; but it is the good of those hoping that the habit in beatitude, or beatitude itself, is a good for us: Therefore.

It is PROVED thirdly from S. Doct. at argument 3, with the response. The object is the same which we hope for and which we desire; but desire is of supernatural beatitude: Therefore so is Hope.

You will OBJECT. Love of concupiscence orders the thing loved to something else, as to an end; but to order God to another end is perverse: Therefore.

It is ANSWERED that what is loved with love of concupiscence need not be ordered to something else as to an end; but it suffices that it be willed for another; nor is it necessary that it be willed on account of that. Whence this love, by which we love God for ourselves, is good. Hence S. Augustine, manuali, cap. 10: Kindle in me, O Lord, your will, and your concupiscence, which is holy and good, and Psalm. 83: My soul longs and faints for the courts of the Lord.

The REASON is, because God is not compared as a lesser good, as something to be perfected; hence the reason of use, reproved by D. Augustine in Lib. 83, qq., quaest. 30 — Perverse is the love that uses what should be enjoyed — does not intervene; nor is our appetite ended in beatitude, but through the conjunction with the uncreated, whence finally the appetite terminates in God, as D. Bonav. acutely answers in primo, dist. 1, at the end of the cited quaest., and with him Arriaga, disp. 27, sect. 2; Mastrius, num. 448, with his Scotus, 3 dist. 26, quaest. unic.; Caspens., num. 5; and soon again, in setting out the third opinion of quaest. 1, I shall recall it: for Hope tends toward God as seen. Hence in the hymn Te Deum it is said: AEterna fac in gloria munerari, that is, with God.