Question III: What the formal object of hope is

THREE opinions in this question as well are adduced from the holy Doctors cited above.

THE FIRST is, that beatitude is the formal object of Hope, as it is arduous. Henry, Richard, Durandus, Paludanus, D. Bonaventure and other ancients are alleged. Amicus follows it, disp. 19. sect. 1.

The SECOND opinion is, that the formal object of Hope is the aid of God's omnipotence, just as the testimony of the first truth is the formal object of faith. So Vasquez p. p. disp. 84. cap. 1. and disp. 139., whom Turrianus and Meracius follow, alleging D. Thom. qq. disp. quaest. de spe, art. 1. and here, art. 1. and 5.

The THIRD opinion is, that the object of Hope is God, as the highest good, lovable by the love of concupiscence, as it were for the lover's advantage; or that the formal object of Hope is objective beatitude, insofar as it is our good. So Scotus 3. dist. 26. quaest. unic. q. ad quaest., Suarez disp. 1. sect. 3., Coninchius, Arriaga as reported by Mastrius, Caspensis disp. 1. sect. 2. Mastrius loco cit., Morandus quaest. 15., Aragon quaest. cit. art. 2., Falsensis lib. 3. cap. 7., Tannerus disp. 2. quaest. 1. dub. 1. num. 19., who at n. 20. carps at the holy Doctor, whom he reports mutilated, as I shall say.

HERE I halt: for Vulpius disp. 50. art. 4. denies that this is Scotus's opinion, but holds that God, under the absolute aspect of the Deity, is the formal object of Hope; not, however, as he is a good for us. Vulpius was moved because Scotus, in the body of the text, proposes this Instance: if it be said that to desire a good for me varies the formal aspect of the object, because it changes the good of honesty into the useful good. He answers that it is false, because that condition, or circumstance, For whom, is not a condition of the object per se; indeed such a condition can be added upon the object, the formal aspect of the object standing.

For indeed Lichetus and Arretinus expound these words thus, that the act of Hope, which is to desire the infinite good, is terminated first, and immediately, to that good under its absolute formal aspect; not that the act is terminated to such a good as in itself, and for itself, but to it as a good for me; a good indeed superabundant, and ultimately perfecting me, but in that mode whereby an object can perfect a power; because it perfects not intrinsically, but only extrinsically. The reason of this is, that if the will willed that good only as convenient to itself, that volition would not be right; it would be an illicit mercenary love, which Lichetus declares, bringing forward a notable doctrine of Scotus ex 1. dist. 6. quaest. 2. inf. L., where he says that to desire a perfect act, whereby the object may be more loved in itself, comes from the affection of justice; because from the fact that I love something in itself, thence I will something in itself; and thus the good Angels could desire beatitude, so that possessing it they might love the Highest good more perfectly, and that act of concupiscence for beatitude would be meritorious, because it does not use by enjoying, but enjoys it, because the good it covets for itself it covets for this, that it may love that good in itself the more. Mastrius reports this at n. 459. from D. Bonaventure in 1. dist. 1. quaest. ult., and refutes the opinion of Vulpius n. 458., against D. Bonaventure here, in its foundations, in which he shows that the formal object of Hope is not the goodness of God as such, against Vulpius.

The opinion of the holy Doctor is, that the formal object of Hope is God, the good appetible by the love of concupiscence, not as a good, but as a great, arduous good awaited by us; yet to be attained by divine liberality, truth, and omnipotence upheld. So he explains himself in the body of the text.

Therefore of the three opinions which I referred to above, he gathers and reconciles the diversity; and the Moderns accordingly report the opinion of the Seraphic Doctor mutilated, which frequently happens, because they allege the holy Doctor from others, not read in the fountain. Amicus, however, seems more faithful in interpreting the Seraphic Doctor rightly.

I ASSERT first, against Vulpius, that the formal object of Hope is not God as a good.

IT IS PROVED from D. Bonaventure first. Distinct virtues ought to have distinct objects; but the Theological virtues are three distinct ones, as is had in 1 Corinthians 13: And now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three: but the greater of these is charity: Therefore their objects are distinct: But also Charity is borne toward God as a good: Therefore.

They answer that Hope regards the good, as good indeed, but future.

Against this St. Bonaventure says, that the good as future is loved by charity, much less merely desired.

I ASSERT second, that the formal object is rightly assigned by St. Bonaventure.

IT IS PROVED from him in the body of the text, that the aspect of the Arduous enters into the notion of the object. As the rational tends to the true, so the appetite to the good: but the appetite is divided into the concupiscible and the irascible; now the concupiscible is borne toward the good as good, and the irascible toward the good as arduous and great; but both powers had to be ordained to God: therefore, as the rational is perfected by Faith, and the concupiscible by Charity, so the irascible by Hope.

IT IS PROVED second from the holy Doctor. Of contraries there is the same account; but hope and fear are contraries: now fear regards an evil as exceeding its power; therefore also hope regards a good as superexcellent and arduous.

IT IS PROVED third, because the office of Hope is to raise up the soul, as is indicated Isa. 64. and 1 Corinth. 2.: The eye hath not seen, the ear hath not heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love him. Heb. 6. he says, That we may have the hope: entering in even within the veil; and chapter 11. Faith is defined: the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not.

This arduous object is expressed almost always in the Scriptures whenever they name Hope, namely amid many difficulties, oppositions, and assaults, almost beyond belief as insuperable; thus Iob. 14.: There is hope for a tree: if it be cut down, it will green again. This is read everywhere in the Psalms. If armies should stand together against me, in this will I trust. Psalm 26. In thee, O Lord, have I hoped, let me never be confounded, etc. Psalm 90. And I will show him my salvation. Rom. 8. We ourselves also groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption of the sons of God, the redemption of our body. For we are saved by hope. But hope that is seen is not hope: for what a man seeth, why doth he hope for? But if we hope for that which we see not, we wait for it with patience. Likewise the Spirit also helpeth our infirmity, etc. the Spirit himself asketh for us with unspeakable groanings. The holy Doctor often brings forward that of Rom. 5.: Tribulation worketh patience, and patience trial, and trial hope, and hope confoundeth not. He also brings forward in the body of the text that of Genes. 15.: I am thy reward exceeding great.

HENCE is solved the argument upon which Scotus, Mastrius, Caspensis, Suarez lay such weight: what is meant by the name Arduous. For I say that is meant the good as great and excellent, and to be obtained through many difficulties.

Caspensis, Suarez, and Mastrius object: For difficulties do not move to willing, but draw back; whereas Hope is a volition.

BUT they meet with a ready answer in the holy Doctor: for difficulty in a good is the object not of the concupiscible, but of the irascible, which rises up toward the impeded good, and toward removing obstacles; and Hope perfects the irascible.

There is also solved another objection of Suarez, Mastrius, and Caspensis, from Scotus dist. 26.: God, as good to me, is the object of some virtue, but not of charity; for this loves God for himself; not as a good to me; Nor does it belong to faith, as is evident; therefore to Hope.

IF Scotus and Mastrius had weighed their own remarkable doctrine reported above, they would have found that the love of concupiscence toward God does not change the object of the amity of friendship; for it tends to loving God for himself; and although it loves a good for itself, yet not on its own account; and so it pertains to the same charity; for he who loves one thing on account of another, loves with the same love, as the holy Doctor said, dist. 26. art. 2. quaest. 3. ad 3.

HENCE indeed the argument of St. Bonaventure presses the more: for the perfection of all the powers of the rational soul is necessary; but no other virtue is found perfecting the irascible in ordination to God besides Hope. For that Charity also regards the supernatural good matters nothing; for it does not regard it under this aspect, or under the aspect of the Arduous, but as a good; nor is it new that many habits should concur in one material object, and in our question all three Theological virtues regard God.

YOU HAVE also from what has been said, that the argument of Mastrius at num. 456. is feeble, by which with Coninchius he tries to show that the omnipotence, liberality, and fidelity of God do not pertain to the formal object, because that only looks to the formal object of the act of the will, which moves it to desire or shun some thing; but the aid of God does not move to beatitude: Therefore.

BUT since the object of Hope is beatitude as arduous, and the arduous does not move according to the adversaries, the divine power, liberality, and truth ought to excite and animate the pursuit of beatitude, as I shall soon say.

YOU WILL SAY with Tannerus: God is arduous even to Charity to attain. It is answered, that this belongs to the material object of Charity.