Modesty

To pride is opposed humility, the virtue which occupies the mean between the two extremes of pride and pusillanimity or mean-spiritedness. The mean-spirited man refuses to take the place for which his talents fit him, and which God intends for him. He puts himself beneath his equals and inferiors to the detriment of his dignity and office; he is afraid to exercise the authority entrusted to him, and the public good suffers in consequence. Humility, on the other hand, keeps a man in his place both with respect to God and his fellow-men. It is grounded on the knowledge of God and of self; the humble man knows and acknowledges that he has nothing but what he has received from God, that he is utterly and entirely dependent on God every moment of his life, that if left to himself he will fall into the lowest depths of sin and degradation; and this knowledge causes him to think much of God and little, very little, of self. This is the virtue so much recommended by our divine Lord: “‘ Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart.’’¹

Pride leads to many other vices, among which are: presumption, ambition, vainglory, boasting, and hypocrisy.

(a) Presumption is the inclination and wish to undertake what is above one’s capacity. Ordinarily it is a venial sin, but it will be mortal if it is the occasion of serious harm to the cause of God or our neighbour.

(b) Ambition is the inordinate striving after dignities and honours. The inordinateness consists in striving after honours to which one has no just claim or greater than one’s due, or by unlawful modes and means, or with too great eagerness. Apart from such inordinateness it is not sinful to seek after honours and dignities, as these belong to the class of things that are in themselves indifferent; it is a meritorious act to seek with moderation after dignities and honours in order thereby to be able to do more for God and one’s fellow-men. “If a man desire the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work.”² Such an act belongs to the virtue of magnanimity. Ambition is commonly a venial sin, but it becomes mortal when it is the cause of serious harm, or when the means employed to attain its end are grievously sinful.

(c) Vainglory is the inordinate striving after the esteem and praise of men. It is not wrong but praiseworthy to seek after and preserve a good reputation, which, as Holy Scripture teaches, is better than great riches.³ But inordinateness, vanity, and sin come in when the esteem and praise of those men is sought whose esteem is not worth having, or when esteem is sought for what does not deserve esteem, or not so great as is sought after, or when glory is not referred to the proper end. It is usually a venial sin, but may become mortal in the same way as ambition.

(d) Boasting is the inordinate bragging about one’s own good qualities or gifts, or even about what is sinful. If the inordinate display is in action rather than in word it is called ostentation.

(e) Hypocrisy is the feigning of virtues and qualities that one does not possess.

¹ Matt. xi 29.

² 1 Tim. iii 1.

³ Prov. xxii 1.

Modesty, which as a subaltern species is divided into several lowest species, can be defined: a moral virtue inclining man to the moderation of those things whose restraint has moderate difficulty. And thus it is distinguished from temperance, meekness, and clemency, which restrain more difficult and more vehement passions (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 160, a. 1).¹

Now the things moderately difficult to restrain are: 1. movements of the soul toward some excellence, which humility moderates; 2. the desire of those things which pertain to knowledge, which studiosity moderates; 3. passions which are occupied around external movements of the body, both in serious matters and in playful matters, and which modesty of conduct and eutrapely moderate; 4. passions which regard the adornment of the body and the arrangement of external things, of which modesty of attire is the moderator (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 160, a. 2).²

We must speak of each.

¹ Cf. Billuart, diss. 7, a. 4; Salmanticenses, Arb. praed., n. 131 (p. 489).

² Cf. Billuart, diss. 7, a. 4; Salmanticenses, Arb. praed., n. 132 (p. 489).

Pudicity is chastity insofar as it moderates acts which are ordered to venereal things, such as looks, kisses, embraces, and immodest touches. "The name of pudicity," says St. Thomas, "is taken from shame; and therefore pudicity is properly concerned with those things about which men are affected by shame or are ashamed. But men are most ashamed concerning venereal things and the signs of venereal things, such as immodest looks, kisses, and touches. And because these, that is, signs, are more often detected, therefore pudicity regards such exterior signs more; but chastity regards rather the venereal commingling itself; and therefore pudicity is ordered to chastity, not as a virtue distinct from it, but as expressing a certain circumstance of chastity" (II-II, q. 151, a. 4).

There are twelve Fruits of the Holy Ghost enumerated by St. Paul (Gal. v, 22-23). (a) Some of these acts grow out of the indwelling Spirit, and are delightful to the spiritual taste because they perfect the agent in himself. Charity, joy, and peace indicate that the soul is rightly disposed as to what is good; patience and longsuffering, that it is not disturbed by evils. (b) Others of these Fruits give spiritual delight because they perfect the agent in his relations to his fellows. Good will and kindness show that one is well-disposed towards others; meekness and fidelity, that injury does not overcome him, or make him deceitful. (c) Still other Fruits are delightful because they order a man’s life rightly as to external actions or internal passions, such as modesty, continency, chastity.

The Parts of Temperance.—(a) The subjective parts or species of temperance are two, since there are two distinct objects of the virtue. These objects are the two delights of touch that are ruled by the virtue, namely, those associated with the nutritive and those associated with the generative function. The first subjective part of temperance includes abstemiousness as to food and sobriety as to drink; the second part includes chastity, as regards the principal sexual act (copulation), and decency or pudicity, as regards the secondary acts (kisses, touches, embraces, etc).

(b) The integral parts are also two, since there are two conditions for the perfect exercise of temperance. These conditions are the fear and avoidance of what is disgraceful (shamefacedness, reserve, or delicacy) and the love of what is honorable (virtue of propriety or refinement). Shamefacedness is a passion, but, as physical fearlessness is a disposition for moral courage, so is the fear of incurring reproach a preparation for virtue. Hence, this delicacy is a laudable passion, and is ascribed chiefly to temperance, whose opposite is chief among things disgraceful. Propriety is also assigned to temperance, because it is an attraction towards that which is spiritually good and beautiful, a habit most useful for temperance, which must subordinate the delightful to the good, the carnal to the spiritual.

(c) The potential parts of temperance are its minor or servant virtues. They resemble temperance inasmuch as their chief praise is in moderation, but they are inferior to it inasmuch as that which is moderated by them is less recalcitrant than the sexual or gustatory appetites. First among these potential parts are those whose task of moderating, while not of the greatest difficulty, is yet more than ordinarily difficult; and here we have continence, which calms a will agitated by immoderate passion, and meekness, which governs the passion of anger. Next among the potential parts are those whose task of moderating offers less or ordinary difficulty, because they keep in order matters less removed from reason. All the virtues of this second group are given the common name of modesty. They are reduced to four: humility and studiosity, which moderate the internal appetites of excellence and of learning respectively; modesty of bearing and modesty of living, which regulate respectively the external acts of the body and the external goods of food, drink, clothing, furnishings, etc.

Modesty.—Modesty should control not only the internal passions for excellence and learning, but also the external movements of the body (modesty of bearing) and the external use of corporal things (modesty of living). (a) Thus, modesty of bearing moderates the bodily actions, both in serious things (modest behavior) and in things playful (modest relaxation).

(b) Modesty of living makes one temperate in the use of the externals that serve life (modesty in style) and of the clothing one wears (modesty in dress).

Modest Behavior or Decorum.—(a) The Virtue.—The movements and gestures of the body should be regulated by reason, both because they are indications of one’s own character and disposition, and because they express one’s disposition towards those with whom one lives. Hence, they are not a matter of indifference, but reason demands that they be suitable both to oneself (i.e., to one’s sex, age, position, etc.) and to one’s neighbor (i.e., to the requirements of good social usage in each business or affair of life). Thus, virtuous decorum employs both sincerity, which makes one honestly respectful in act (2403), and affability, which makes one agreeable in the company of others (2421). That this is an important virtue for individuals and society is declared both by sacred and human authority. Ecclesiasticus (xix. 26, 27) calls attention to the importance for himself of a man’s looks, laughter and gait; St. Augustine says that there should be nothing offensive to others in one’s movements; and Aristotle mentions among the qualities of the high-minded man that he is sedate and dignified in demeanor.

(b) The Opposite Vices.—Modest behavior is offended by various vices of excess and defect. Thus, sincerity is offended by bluntness and affectation, self-respect by stiffness and servility, and consideration for others by flattery and rudeness.

Modesty in Style of Living and Dress.-(a) The Virtue.—External goods, such as dwellings and clothing, are necessary for body and soul, as a protection to health and decency; others, such as furnishings, decorations, ornaments, cars, radios, entertainments for guests, etc., are useful for convenience, beauty and the maintenance of one’s station. But one may be immoderate in the use of these goods, and hence there is need of a virtue to regulate their use, so that it may truthfully be in keeping with one’s position and be not offensive to others.

(b) The Sin of Excess.—This is committed when one’s style is extravagant according to the standards of the community, or when like Dives, clothed in purple and fine linen, one aims only at display or sensual gratification, or when one is too much preoccupied with externals (e.g., when too much time is spent before the mirror or too much money at the dressmaker’s). Dignitaries and the ministers of the altar are not guilty of excess in the pomp and splendor which the Church sanctions, since the honor is intended for their station and the divine worship they perform.

(c) The Sin of Defect.—This is committed when one’s mode of life is not up to the reasonable standard of one’s community, especially if this is due to negligence or itch for notoriety or disregard for decency. Examples are those who through carelessness go about unwashed or unshaven, who keep their quarters in a filthy and disorderly state, or who wear their clothing untidily; also females who dress in male attire, nudists who appear undressed in public places, and cynics who scorn the conventions of refined society. It is not sinful, however, but a virtuous act of temperance, to wear simpler and poorer garments from the spirit of mortification and humility (Heb., xi. 37). The clergy and religious, since they should be models of the penitential spirit, are to be praised, therefore, when they give an example of plainness and simplicity in personal style and dress.

Morality of Self-Beautification.—Is it wrong to beautify oneself in order to improve one’s looks or to win admiration?

(a) In itself there is no harm, especially for females, in using means to improve one’s looks, such as remedies for deformities, facial paints, powders and cosmetics, hair waves and dyes, and the like. But accidentally there could be sin (e.g., deception). A poor man would be a deceiver if he lived in great style to make a woman believe he was wealthy, and likewise a woman would be a deceiver if she used an artificial beauty to deceive a man about her age (see 2404).

(b) In itself also it is not sinful to desire that others approve one’s appearance and dress. Thus, a wife should strive to be attractive to her husband (I Cor., vii. 34), and modest ornamentation may be used to win a suitor (I Tim., ii. 9). It is mortally sinful, however, to attire oneself with the purpose or in a manner to arouse carnal temptation or to awaken sinful desire in others—for example, if one wishes to capture the sex love of others without marriage (Prov., vii. 10); it is venially sinful to groom oneself well from mere vanity, that is, from a silly ambition to be regarded as handsome and fashionable. By a Decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Council (January 12, 1930), parish-priests, parents, and teachers are admonished to oppose indecent female dress; and it is ordered that women and girls improperly dressed shall be excluded from Communion or even from church, and special services and sermons on decency are prescribed for December 8 of each year (see 1456, 1457).

Complements of the Virtue of Temperance.—(a) The Gift of the Holy Ghost that perfects temperance is fear of the Lord. The virtue of temperance makes one abstain from unlawful pleasures because to do so is reasonable; fear of the Lord inclines one to the same abstinence from reverence. The Gift of Fear looks first to the greatness of the Heavenly Father, before whom the nations are as a drop in the bucket and are counted as the smallest grain of the balance and the islands as but a little dust (Is., xl. 15); and in this respect it represses presumption and serves the virtue of hope (see 1041 sqq.). But secondarily it looks to the insignificance of every delight that is apart from God, and sees that these inferior joys are passing, insipid and bitter, like dust blown away by the wind, like a thin froth dispersed by the storm, like smoke scattered by the breeze (Wis., v. 15), like a sweet poison that turns to gall and destroys (Job, xx. 12 sqq.); and in this respect fear of God sustains temperance, which must regulate the cravings of the flesh and lower appetites. Fear of God, then, makes one fly from those things which chiefly allure one to offend Him, and hence the Psalmist (Ps. cxviii. 120) prays: “Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear.”

(b) The Beatitude that corresponds to the present Gift is the second: “Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted.” Those who have the fear of God perceive the true nature of illicit joys and the evil end that awaits those who chase after them. They prefer, then, to be sorrowful, that is, to deprive themselves of every wicked pleasure and love for the sake of the love of God in this life and the enjoyment of God in the life to come: “Your sorrow shall be changed into joy” (John, xx. 16).

(c) The fruits of fear of the Lord are modesty, continency and chastity. Like a good tree that produces a rich harvest of delightful fruits, filial reverence for God brings forth acts of virtue that have in them a delicious savor more enjoyable and more lasting than the fruits of the flesh. These goodly and pleasant fruits of the spirit of fear of God are modesty in words, deeds and external things, continency of the single and chastity of the married in thoughts and desires.

What is temperance, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? - R. To the first. Temperance is the virtue which moderates concupiscence and delight of sensible goods, especially in the delights of taste and touch, of which some regard conserving the individual, others conserving the species. Insensibility and intemperance are opposed to temperance. The former consists in this, that someone flees delight so much that he therefore omits even those things which are necessary for the conservation of nature. But the latter is the sin of excessive concupiscence. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 141 seqq.; Quodl. 12, a. 22.

R. To the second and third. The integral parts of temperance are shamefacedness and honorableness. Through shamefacedness someone flees shamefulness contrary to temperance. Through honorableness someone loves the beauty of temperance. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143; q. 144; q. 145.

The subjective parts of temperance are: Abstinence, which moderates delight in the use of foods and non-intoxicating drink; and gluttony is opposed to it, cf. 329. - Sobriety, which moderates delight in the use of drink able to intoxicate; and drunkenness is opposed to it, cf. 332. - Chastity, which moderates according to right reason the principal delight of coitus itself; and lust is opposed to it, cf. 325. Modesty, which moderates surrounding delights, for instance in kisses, touches, embraces, looks. Sometimes, however, one is put for the other. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 146 seqq.

The potential parts of temperance are: Continence, which contains man in the good of reason against the pleasures of touch, especially venereal pleasures; and incontinence is opposed to it, which impels toward those delights and yields to them. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 155, 156. Meekness, which moderates the passion of anger according to right reason; and anger is opposed to it by excess, cf. n. 341 seq.; by defect, lack of anger, which does not stir up anger when it is required by charity or justice, by correcting and punishing. It does not have malice diverse from that of the omitted office to be fulfilled from charity or justice. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 157, 158. Clemency, which is proper to Superiors, inclines one to impose lesser punishments than by right he could, because of kindness toward neighbor and the decorum of a Superior. Cruelty is opposed to it by excess, which from harshness of soul exacts punishments beyond measure; but by defect, excessive lenity, which mitigates punishments beyond measure or remits them altogether. Cruelty is distinguished from savagery, according to which someone in inflicting punishments does not consider any fault of the one who is punished, but only this, that he delights in the torment of men. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 157, 159.

Modesty, by which someone moderates his internal and external motions and the arrangement of his things, by a measure fitting to him. Hence under modesty the following four virtues are numbered. Humility, which moderates the motions of the soul toward lofty things, and inclines us to profess our lowliness by internal and external signs. To humility is opposed by excess pride, cf. n. 321 seq.; and by defect excessive abjection of self, which inclines to immoderate self-abjection. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 160 seqq. Studiousness, which moderates the zeal of knowing according to the dictate of right reason. To it by excess is opposed curiosity, by which someone is impelled to applying superfluous diligence of knowing, from affection for knowledge alone. But by defect negligence is opposed to it, by which someone omits to acquire owed knowledge. Curiosity and negligence per se are light, per accidens grave, for instance if the former impels you to extort a secret from another, the latter incites a confessor to omit the study of Moral Theology. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 166 seqq.

Modesty of manners, which moderates the external gestures and motions of the body according to the norm of reason, so that namely they agree with the person, both in himself and considered with all circumstances of things. To modesty of manners is opposed by excess petulance, by which a foreign mode is assumed, not agreeing with one's own condition, or an overly common mode is shown; but by defect rusticity of manners, which does not preserve a fitting mode. Each is per se light. A species of modesty of manners is eutrapelia, which imposes due mode on games and places. By excess and by defect one can also sin in play, by scurrility and excessive austerity. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 168. Modesty of dress moderates the arrangement of external things according to the prescription of reason. For it is fitting that in human society each one wear clothing convenient to his own condition. Likewise by excess and by defect one can sin in this matter, which per se is only light. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 169.

The end of the precept is charity, through which we are induced to loving God and neighbor. Among the vices opposed to temperance, adultery seems especially to be opposed to love of neighbor, and therefore it is chiefly prohibited by the precepts of the Decalogue not only in deed, but also in heart, the sixth and ninth. - But virtues annexed to the virtue of temperance, as to their effects, can likewise rightly regard charity toward God and neighbor; as, for example, from anger, which is opposed to meekness, someone proceeds to blaspheming God, or to killing a man. And thus a precept is also present concerning these virtues, implicitly in the Decalogue, explicitly in other places of Scripture. As to the integral parts of temperance, shamefacedness and honorableness, cf. 1 Cor. 14:40; 1 Tim. 2:9. As to the subjective parts, abstinence, sobriety, chastity, cf. Num. 6:3; 1 Pet. 5:8; Col. 3:5. As to the potential parts, continence, clemency, meekness, modesty, humility, cf. Ecclus. 10:31; 30:24; Col. 3:12; 2 Tim. 2:24. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 170. Therefore the various precepts of the Decalogue contain precepts of moral virtues. But in the first precept, I am the Lord thy God, the precepts of the theological virtues, faith, hope, charity, are also presuppositively and implicitly contained.

Is the same lawful for defending chastity? - It is lawful for a woman to defend herself by killing the invader of her modesty. Proof: 1. from the common opinion of theologians. 2. Because the woman uses her own natural right, by which it is lawful to repel force by force, and she is more bound to provide for herself than for the life of another; for she exposes herself to the danger of consenting to the act of sin by permitting herself to be oppressed. Besides, if it is lawful to kill an invader of goods, how much more an invader of modesty, since it is a good of a superior order? Hence, although a girl is not bound to kill the invader, but can conduct herself passively, because chastity is not lost unwillingly, nevertheless she is not obligated to do this, both because even material bodily integrity itself is a very great good, and because there is present the danger of shame, which is more grave than death for good women. C. L. 2367; L. 368, 386.

Note: Here theologians rightly observe that it is lawful for a girl not only to repel the aggression in the act in which she suffers it, but also afterward she can strike the aggressor with slaps, fists, a rod, staff, and similar blows minimally dangerous, so that thus she may show her displeasure and constancy, and the aggressor may more easily depart and not return. Moreover this, provided it is done immediately after the injury received and never for vengeance, is not only to be permitted, but also altogether to be counseled to women. Struggl 28; L. 386; Lugo d. 10, n. 196.

Is the aforesaid defense lawful, if it concerns others? - Some private person can defend the life, goods, and modesty of a neighbor, even by the killing of an unjust aggressor. Proof: 1. from the common opinion of theologians. 2. "Because just as the innocent neighbor himself can defend himself by killing the aggressor, so it is lawful to cooperate with him in a lawful thing which he himself can do, and to help him." Lugo de Iust. d. 10, n. 201; C. L. 2368; Struggl 29; L. 389, 391; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 60, a. 6 ad 2.

Note: Some private person; for it is certain that Princes, magistrates, and soldiers, who have been specially hired for the defense of citizens, are bound to this. C. L. 2371. These are bound even with danger of their own life, where the matter concerns turning away a public evil from citizens; but where the matter concerns only the life of some private person, they are not bound to protect it with so great an inconvenience. Can; for it is more probable, at least speaking generally, that he is by no means obligated to such defense of an innocent man with the killing of the unjust aggressor; and this both because the precept of charity does not seem to oblige in that case, since it is rather better to avoid the eternal death of the aggressor himself; and because in the killing of another, a grave inconvenience can never be avoided, for example, because of fear of enmities, or of public justice, or even because of the horror conceived in staining one's own hands with human blood. At least speaking generally; for make exception: 1. If the one invaded would be necessary for the public good, which each one is bound under grave obligation to care for. 2. If he is father, son, wife, or brother, whom piety itself obliges one altogether to protect.

If the matter concerns an invader of another's modesty, understand this provided that the woman does not furnish her consent to the invader, but positively resists him; otherwise to kill the invader would not be to repel force by force, since there is no injury where there is consent. Lessius, Sporer, and others make exception if the one attacked is very closely related to you; then, they say, before the deed you can still kill the invader, although the one attacked consents; for in that case you repel the injury which redounds upon you. L. 389-392.

You will resolve: To touch the genitals of brute animals is ordinarily only venial. But to produce these touches all the way to the emission of seed is probably mortal, because it is an action most vehemently exciting to venereal pleasure. Nevertheless, if someone did this from mere lightness and curiosity, and experienced that he was not moved venereally at all from it, he could not be condemned of mortal sin. Tamb. Explic. Dec. l. 7, c. 8, n. 5; Sporer de Matrim. n. 697; L. 419, 420. Touches of one's own body do not exceed venial sin when, venereal affection being excluded, they are had only in passing and from mere lightness or curiosity, because they are not very much incentives of lust. L. 419. Touches on the shameful parts of another person of the same sex, or neighboring parts, even over clothing, ordinarily are not excused from grave sin, unless perhaps they are done from petulance, jest, lightness, and in passing. L. 420.

It does not exceed venial sin to touch honorable parts, for example, fingers, hand, face, of a person of different sex, if these things are done from mere lightness, and no special danger of venereal pleasure is present by reason of the mode in which these touches are done. L. 415, 416, 417, 418. Touches on less honorable parts of a person of different sex, such as the chest, legs, arms, if they are done from mere lightness, curiosity, jest, etc., also do not exceed venial sin, always with the special danger of venereal pleasure excluded by reason of delay or mode in which these touches are done. And thus it is grave to press the foot of a young girl, to pinch the arm, and also to twist the finger, because of the proximate danger of carnal pleasure. L. 415, 430. Touches on base parts, that is, on the genital parts or those which are near them, of a person of different sex, had even for a brief time, whether they are done immediately or mediately, or over clothing, regularly cannot be excused from grave sin, because they contain the proximate danger of venereal pleasure. Nevertheless maidservants who touch the pudenda of infants while they clothe them probably are not to be accused of grave sin, even if from lightness or a certain curiosity; but otherwise, if this were done studiously and morosely, because of the proximate danger of venereal pleasure. L. 420, 430. As other incomplete acts, about which in the preceding numbers, so also touches are not evil from their intrinsic nature, as is clear from the reason constantly brought forward, but only extrinsically, namely because of the proximate danger of venereal pleasure, because of the proximate danger of consent in it. And indeed all these acts from their intrinsic nature do not pertain to lust or the venereal matter, which is contained only in coition, pollution, and carnal pleasure which disposes to these, or follows them in the genital parts; but they per se look to sensuality and modesty, as is clear from what has already been said above. Cf. 773. Therefore all the aforesaid touches are altogether lawful from proportionate necessity and utility. Hence physicians touching from necessity the pudenda of a person even of different sex do not sin, granted that per accidens they suffer involuntary pollution. Nor do they sin per se who touch themselves for wiping away the filth of the body, or for soothing itching, or for curing infirmities. Yet if the itching is tolerable, it is to be suggested that they abstain from touches insofar as they can without grave annoyance. Yet the confessor must use great discretion in these things. For doubts of this sort are accustomed to trouble especially persons of timid conscience. L. 417, 419, 420; H. A. n. 3; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 154, a. 4. Itching can come from infirmity, in which a physician is to be consulted. It can also come both in men and in women from uncleanness; for preventing and removing this, washings with common, simple water, or mixed with soap, suffice. Antonelli vol. 1, p. 2, on the 6th Precept of the Decalogue, c. 2.

9. "Feminine adornment," says St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 169, a. 2, "provokes men to lasciviousness, according to that saying of Prov. 7: Behold a woman meets him, prepared with the adornment of a harlot to deceive souls." But the same Holy Doctor soon shows in the same article that this very fact, that feminine adornment is provocative to lasciviousness, nevertheless is not imputable to fault unless it proceeds from a depraved intention.

Cajetan explains this very well in the Commentary on that place of St. Thomas. Moreover, Cajetan first distinguishes a fourfold adornment: "1. For the support of the body; and this is of necessity, and on account of this God made tunics for the first parents. 2. For honesty; and this too is of necessity on the part of the soul, as the first on the part of the body. For it is shameful for a rational animal to carry the private parts manifest, as natural shame testifies; and on account of this the first parents made perizomata for themselves, providing first for the soul rather than for the body. 3. For adornment either of honor or of beauty. And adornment of honor, although it is not altogether common, since those dead to the world are exempt from care of this adornment, can nevertheless by reason of ministry be common to all. But every apparatus which is made so that a man may proceed decently and according to state is adornment of honor. But right reason dictates this, that anyone, as befits him, proceed honorably in this life, in which external things are certain testimonies of internal things. But adornment of beauty seems almost proper to women, since it is fitting that they be loved as beautiful, in order to have or preserve well-disposed husbands."

Then, indeed, concerning this adornment of beauty, about which the whole controversy is, he immediately adds these things: "Since art imitates nature, and a beautiful woman by her own nature is provocative to desire of herself, hence it happens that feminine adornment according to itself is provocative to concupiscence or lasciviousness, insofar namely as it makes for the apparent beauty of the woman. But because nature surpasses art, and the natural beauty of woman is much more provocative to concupiscence of the woman than artificial beauty, therefore just as every natural beauty of a woman is without fault, so every artificial beauty is without fault according to itself, so that it is to be imputed to neither according to itself as fault that it is provocative to concupiscence of the woman. And on account of this both are explained in the text: both that feminine adornment is provocative of men to lasciviousness, and that to be provocative is not imputed to adornment as fault unless from another fault, for example from the intention of provoking." - St. Thomas, Quodl. 10, a. 14.

10. Corollaries. 1. There is per se no sin, whether grave or even light, in adornment, if the custom of the country and the condition of state are observed. Yet they sin mortally if they adorn themselves with the mind of provoking to lust; but only venially if from vanity, levity, or boasting.

2. Superfluous adornment beyond the custom of the country and the condition of state is per se a venial fault.

3. Yet women lawfully add something of adornment that they may please their husbands, lest occasion of sinning with others be given to them; likewise women lawfully add something of adornment that they may find a spouse.

4. Cosmetics will be mortal sin if they are applied for lasciviousness; venial if merely for feigning beauty; but no sin if for hiding some defect.

5. "Know," says Cajetan, l. c., "that to use another's hair for fitting adornment, not for lying that it is one's own, seems no less lawful than to use wool from sheep and linen from the earth. And because this adornment makes a woman truly beautiful before men, by supplying a defect of nature in her adornment, therefore this act does not seem properly to look to cosmetics."

6. "For women to uncover their hair, whom the Apostle also commands to veil the head, does not befit even married women. Yet in this case some could be excused from sin when this was not done from any vanity, but on account of a contrary custom, although such a custom is not laudable." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 169, a. 2. "To have the head uncovered and the hair curled according to introduced custom is either no sin, or only a venial sin... otherwise one must speak of those who would introduce the custom." Bouvier, Diss. in 6 dec. praec., de orn. mul., 5.

7. Women who wear garments so constricted that the form of the breast plainly appears, indeed also those who add to themselves fictitious swelling breasts, sin only venially if they do this merely from vanity, with danger of lust and scandal excluded. Craisson, Notiones circa 6 Dec. pr., C. 2, n. 233.

8. "Because the breast in some places is carried bare by women for the sake of comeliness, and through this is reduced to the adornment of beauty, adornment also having such a condition, namely of the uncovered breast according to the custom of the country, is not mortal according to itself... But where there is no custom, it would have to be inhibited and quickly rooted out lest it grow." Cajetan, l. c. In the Summa, v. Adornment, the same Cajetan has these things: "A disordered quality of adornment commonly introduces venial sin, if it is indecent and less chaste, as the adornment of women showing the middle of the breasts. Nevertheless, where the custom is already accustomed, it seems to be without sin." St. Alphonsus raises the question whether women showing their breasts for their adornment sin gravely, and responds: "When I performed the office of preacher, several times I strove strongly to reprove this pernicious usage; but since here I perform the office of Writer concerning moral science, I must say what I judge according to truth and what I have learned from the doctors. I do not deny, first, that those women who would introduce this custom somewhere would certainly sin gravely. I do not deny, secondly, that the denudation of the breast could be so immoderate that per se it could not be excused from grave scandal, as gravely provoking to lasciviousness. I say, thirdly, that if the denudation were not so immoderate, and somewhere a custom were present that women should thus go forth, it would indeed be reproved, but not altogether condemned of mortal sin. Thus most commonly." L. l. 2, n. 55. "A fortiori, those who uncover or lightly cover arms, neck, and shoulders according to the custom of the country do not gravely sin per se. But those who introduce such customs are judged by the cited authors to sin mortally." Bouvier, l. c., 8.

9. "Nakedness itself of the private parts according to itself is shameful and corruptive of modest souls... hence such a habit, that is, so thin or diaphanous that the whole woman would be seen, would introduce mortal sin. For there would be there a vicious provocation to lasciviousness from the very species of the action, by which a dressed woman offers herself as if naked to common eyes. Whence it is read of Blessed Barnabas that he cursed naked men and women." Cajetan, Commentary on St. Thomas, l. c.

10. "To put on garments of the other sex with intention or grave danger of lust, or with notable scandal, is a mortal sin, as is clear: from necessity, for example, for hiding oneself, or from lack of other garments, with scandal and danger excluded, it is no sin; if this is done from jest or from mere levity, and scandal and danger are absent, it is only a venial sin... By the same reason one must judge that those who use masks do not always sin mortally, namely if they act thus from jest or from levity, with scandal and danger excluded, especially when they do not change garments of their own sex, but only condition, as if a servant should appear in the garments of a master, or a girl in the adornment of a mistress." Bouvier, l. c., 6 and 7. - Diana, tract. 5, de scandalo, Resol. 11, 13, 63; Benedict XIV, de Syn., l. 11, c. 12.

11. Note as regards various persons who can cooperate with this adornment of women: 1. "He does not sin who sells ornaments to a girl who through them is going to solicit others to sin, which ornaments would be sold by another; thus Sanchez, Navarrus, Azor, Lessius, Bonacina, Diana, against Castro and others. The reason is partly because that sale is something indifferent and remotely related to sin; partly also because if the seller sinned, it would be because he does not impede the sin of his neighbor. But although he did not sell, he would not therefore impede it; for there would be another who would sell. Therefore by selling he would not sin." La-Croix, l. 2, n. 263.

2. Among the questions to be asked of tailors, St. Alphonsus, Prax. Confess., n. 60, also lists these: "Whether there would be for him a proximate occasion of sinning from receiving rules for well forming the garments of women through the measurement of their bodies, as it is commonly said, in pigliar la misura, or whether it would be from fitting garments to women, which cannot be done except with the handling of the women themselves; and whether this would be for the tailor a proximate occasion of falling into depraved delectations or desires, as not rarely happens to men of wicked conscience."

3. As regards barbers, the same Holy Doctor has these things, l. c., n. 62: "Let him be asked whether he arranges the hair of women, according to the wicked usage invented by Satan in this time. Ordinarily speaking, I think that this is for men a proximate occasion of sinning mortally by base delectations, or at least desires; whence I say that this is by no means to be permitted to anyone who has not had a contrary experience in himself. But if someone at any time, through a notable time, had experienced in an action of this kind that he remained immune from sin, he truly cannot be condemned of mortal sin; but, this notwithstanding, let the confessor not omit to remove him as much as he can from an office of this kind, which certainly contains danger in itself. Hence I do not wish to discuss another doubt, whether women can, or cannot, with a safe conscience call in men, that these arrange their hair. I hear that in several places they do this; and they confess and communicate; let them and their confessors see to it. At least let the confessor impose on them that they not use some younger man from whose actions they have perceived that he conducts himself maliciously. For the rest, I judge that women of purer conscience indeed will not use men, but will be content with women by whom the hair may be arranged in the better manner possible." But these things, as is clear, hold also for women who shave the beard of men and arrange their hair.

12. Note besides as regards the scandal which, by reason of such adornment, a woman can furnish to others: 1. that a woman who, from adornment even suitable to her state, probably foresees that someone in particular is going to fall mortally, is bound for a brief time to dismiss him, or to flee the sight of such a one. I said for a brief time, because for a long time it would be too grave for her. Whence if to omit that adornment even for a brief time would bring grave inconvenience to her, she is bound in no way, even for a brief time, to omit it.

2. But if the same thing were feared in particular from superfluous, vain, and unsuitable adornment (which to assume for the sake of vanity and pleasing others, so that she may appear beautiful and find a spouse more easily, other things being excluded, is only venial), per se speaking she would be bound to dismiss it altogether, even under mortal sin, because she has no right to that adornment, and on the other hand she is bound to avoid another's sin when she conveniently can. Whence, if grave inconvenience would follow from this, she would not be gravely obligated to omit that adornment either. Per se speaking; for since superfluous adornments, practically speaking, soon are turned into the custom of the country of women who are honorable, neither can it be said absolutely that such a woman has no right of following the custom of her country, nor is grave inconvenience lacking.

3. If a woman thinks that, not so in particular, but only in general, some will be scandalized in her, provided she does not intend their lasciviousness and is not pleased by it, although she is pleased that she be praised as beautiful, she does not seem to be bound to abstain from that adornment, even superfluous, under mortal sin, for example by coloring the face, etc. "The reason is both because it is scandal received rather than given, and that adornment and beauty provokes only to venial sin; and because it would be too grave for that sex, especially if she is seeking a husband, perpetually to abstain thus, since that occasion is universal and perpetual, and the more beautiful would never licitly go outdoors, since natural beauty harms more than artificial." Liguori, l. 2, n. 54.

94. Corollaries. 1. The special malice of pollution consists, as is clear from what has been said, in the vain effusion of semen against the order of nature. Therefore this sin differs in species from every impure touch, which indeed is followed by venereal pleasure, but not by any effusion of semen.

2. Voluntary pollution, for the sake of escaping any disease whatever, or the danger of death, is always a mortal sin. This is the most common doctrine of the doctors. It is entirely lawful, for the preservation of life and of the whole supposit, to cut off from a man some member, a hand or a foot. For no inconveniences ever lawfully follow from that cutting off; since the natural appetite vehemently abhors it as a most troublesome thing, men will not easily abuse that means and extend it beyond the case of extreme necessity. On the contrary, since pollution is a thing bringing great pleasure, to which nature itself inclines, the greatest danger is present lest, if it is ever lawful, men abuse it to the detriment of the species itself. And thus, for example, it is never lawful, not even in the case of extreme necessity, to violate the sacramental seal; because if this were lawful even in a most rare case, the sacrament of penance would be rendered hateful to the faithful, and they would be removed from it, to the greatest detriment of souls; just as, in fact, men are often deprived of the good of seeking counsel because they know that in some cases such a secret can be manifested. Sporer 640. 641.

"But if you object that it is sometimes expelled by nature, nothing is thereby concluded; for what is done by nature is not against nature, but by the author of nature; nor for that reason can it be lawfully done by us. Thus it is not against nature that one die from defect of strength; but it would be, if one for that reason wished to take away his strength from himself." Scavini. Cf. Gury, de Matr. et iur. n. 1315.

Lessius, De Iust. et iure, l. 4. c. 3. d. 14. n. 96., rightly says: Pollution "is a deadly sin, even if it is procured not for pleasure, but only for the sake of health or of mitigating temptation; both because temptation is not thus conquered, but yielded to and succumbed to; and because, if this is lawful, why did the saints undergo so much fasting and other austerities for taming the flesh? why was this combat held by the holy fathers to be the hardest and principal combat of the Christian man? finally, because, if one does not wish to use other aids, this work has indeed been granted as a remedy for concupiscence, but in legitimate marriage, not outside it; for a natural institution must not be perverted for an extrinsic and accidental end. Hence if anyone wishes to use this work for this end, he must enter marriage. It is confirmed, because the primary end of that work is offspring, and therefore it requires that state from which offspring can be received and rightly educated, which is marriage."

"For the same reason it is not even lawful for the sake of health, except in legitimate marriage. Nor is it an objection that it is lawful to draw blood for this end, and even to cut off a member, because these are instituted only for the good of the individual: for parts are for the good of the whole; hence we can dispose of them according as it is expedient for the health of the individual. But generation is only for the propagation of nature; hence we cannot use it except in that mode in which generation can follow."

3. To the simple malice of pollution other malices can be added by reason of circumstances, and this generally holds also for other species of lust, "for example, if a priest is polluted, sacrilege is added; if a married person, adultery; if with the desire of sinning with another person, a malice is added according to the quality of the person desired; likewise another malice is added if someone is polluted by delighting in an imaginary intercourse with some person, male or female, married or unmarried. Likewise another malice is added if he is polluted by the touches of another." L. 476.

95. Proposition 2. If the discussion is about pollution indirectly willed in its cause, he who without sufficient cause places an action from which he is going to suffer shameful motions, which nevertheless, although he foresees them, he does not intend, sins gravely, if that action is of itself mortal in the genus of lust and of itself gravely influences the pollution; he sins lightly, if that action is of itself venial in the genus of lust and of itself lightly influences the pollution; he does not sin in any way, if that action is of itself simply honorable and of itself has no influence on pollution. The reason is that, since the pollution is not willed in itself, but only in its cause, and therefore happens apart from every intention, it will be evil in the degree in which the cause itself is evil. Struggl, Tr. 7. q. 7. art. 1. n. 5.; L. 481. and following.

But a cause as such is evil according to the measure of the greater or lesser efficacy which of itself it has for the depraved effect. Moreover, pollution indirectly willed is also in itself, directly in the cause at least implicitly, truly willed, if without some other sufficient reason one wills a cause gravely influencing it of itself. For this shows a depraved affection of the will toward that pollution. But it is only permitted, if one wills its cause which of itself either in no way, or only lightly, influences it. For the cause then by its nature is not necessarily ordered to an effect of this kind, nor is the affection contained in that cause by necessary connection.

To the point are the things which Billuart has, Diss. V. art. 2. par. Confirmatur Conclusio. "If a man," he says, "were bound under mortal sin to avoid every action from which ordinarily a light venereal commotion follows, it would follow that one must condemn as mortal sin for the most part the non-necessary conversations of men with women, especially of young men with girls, familiar conversations, various recreations honest in themselves, in which flattering glances, soothing words, touches, kisses, embraces in honorable parts from friendship, play, lightness, very easily occur, since from these for the most part light venereal motions arise. But although these are to be avoided, nevertheless there are few, if any, who condemn them as mortal sin, where there is absent the danger of consent to venereal pleasure itself, nor is this the practice of confessors in the tribunal. Therefore."

Here also belong the things which Cajetan has apud Ithur., Cas. 18. n. 6., and apud Billuart, Diss. 6. art. 12. par. Confirm. Conc. He speaks of pollution arising from hearing confessions and says: "The voluntary indirectly, that is, because it is in the power of the will, is not imputed to the will except from the fact that it can and ought to act and does not act. In the proposed case this pollution does not fall under the voluntary except indirectly, namely because the will does not turn away from the hearing which is its cause. And although the will can, nevertheless it is not bound to turn away from such an act of hearing, thinking, and the like. Therefore this is not imputed to the will. The minor is declared. Because no artisan ought to omit the beginning and prosecution of his work because of defects consequent from the necessity of the matter; for someone would foolishly omit the construction of a saw or sword because they contract rust, on the ground that they are made of iron, and so with other things. But pollutions and stings of the flesh in the proposed case happen from the necessity of the matter, from the fact that the venereal matter is material to be purged, washed, disputed, preached, thought about; thence by a natural consequence follows commotion of the flesh, etc. Therefore a man ought not, on account of defects occurring from the necessity of venereal matter, to omit not only necessary, but useful thoughts, speeches, hearings, etc. For otherwise it would be necessary that either angels or very privileged men only should dispute, hear, etc., about such matters; the contrary of which ecclesiastical custom has, and reason teaches." Cf. also Elbel, de act. hum. n. 16.; Lessius l. 4. c. 3. dub. 14. n. 97-102.

33. You will resolve from all that has been said about the voluntary in the cause: 1.º “If the cause of pollution is gravely influencing it, and the man does not abstain from positing that cause or action, it is clear that the pollution is imputed unto sin, even if it was not intended, provided it was foreseen at least confusedly. But causes of this kind are without doubt all those which per se are grave faults in the genus of luxury, namely touches or looks upon the shameful parts of another’s or one’s own body with base and deliberate pleasure; the sight of human intercourse and lingering thoughts about venereal matters. Therefore all pollutions coming from these causes certainly are mortal sins. Thus S. Th. 2. 2. q. 154. a. 5, and others commonly. And then that base act, which is the cause of pollution, has special malice against nature, as Sanchez says, De Matr. l. 9. D. 45. n. 23, and all consent.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 482. Special malice, namely of the effect or pollution, which is a sin against nature, besides the proper malice which consists in the pleasure excited from a base object. Cf. Salmant., Theol. Schol., Tr. 13, D. 10, n. 274.

Gravely influencing: wherefore if the cause, whether by reason of itself or by reason of the disposition of the subject, does not gravely influence, grave fault is absent by reason of the pollution perhaps going to follow; since then it follows outside the intention and per accidens. Salmant., Theol. Mor., Tr. 26, C. 7, n. 41.

Per se they are grave faults: “the common and more probable opinion teaches that pollution is not mortal (namely in the cause), unless it comes from a cause per se mortal in the genus of luxury... The reason is that, since pollution is not willed except in the cause, it will be evil in that degree in which the cause itself is evil.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 484. — In the genus of luxury: whence “it is inferred that pollution is not mortal which happens outside the intention from causes illicit still mortally in another genus than luxury, for example from drunkenness, or from eating, excessively immoderate or on a forbidden day.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 484.

429. Principles. - I. Pollution directly and perfectly voluntary is always a mortal sin, so that it is never lawful to procure it. The reason is, 1. because pollution has intrinsic repugnance with nature, which has ordered the effusion of semen solely to generation ¹; 2. because if it were ever permitted, or prohibited only under venial sin, a habit of pollution would most easily be contracted because of the great proclivity of corrupted nature into lust, and therefore the order of nature would shortly be subverted; 3. it is clear from various texts of Sacred Scripture, for example 1 Cor. 6. 10: "Nor the effeminate... shall possess the kingdom of God"; 4. it is also clear from proposition 49 condemned by Innocent XI, which has itself thus: "Mollities is not prohibited by the law of nature; hence if God had not forbidden it, it would often be good..." - See St. Lig., n. 476.

¹ ** It is certainly important to know accurately in what the special malice of this sin resides, so that from this the Confessor may take some norm by which, concerning the questioning of penitents, he may more easily free himself from troublesome scruples. Therefore the proper notion of this sin ought to be sought from the character of a sin against nature. Concerning this, Filliuccius says generally thus (tr. 30, n. 137): "This sin is called against nature, because it is not only repugnant to the rational order - for this is common to any sin of lust, which is against reason and is repugnant to the rational order - but also because it is repugnant to the natural order of the venereal act in the human species; for the natural order of such an act ought to be of such a kind that from it the generation of a human being can follow; for this is its end. Therefore if it cannot follow, such an act will be against the natural order, and therefore will be called a sin against nature." But more briefly and more distinctly Elbel (part 4, conf. 9, n. 254) says of the special malice of this sin: "The reason is that human seed is ordered by nature to generation; therefore to pour it forth for another end (pleasure) is repugnant to the order of nature." Therefore, since this special malice consists in the vain effusion of semen against the order of nature, now it is clear why this sin differs in species from any immodest act which venereal pleasure indeed follows, but no effusion of semen; and therefore why the Confessor (with those cautions indeed which all the Doctors deservedly require) not imprudently asks about this as an object of a peculiar species.

But again, since this special disorder is placed in the vain effusion of semen, which was instituted by nature solely for conjugal copula so that offspring might be received from it, now the reason is clear why the Doctors judge differently about this baseness as regards those who either can emit no semen, or certainly not true semen. Hence what Sporer has (Theol. Sacr., p. 4, c. 2, n. 39) concerning the prepubescent: "If boys or girls, who cannot yet sow seed, touch themselves basely..., it is indeed a mortal sin; ... yet it seems to differ in species from true pollution, through which seed is sown, and in proper species it must be reduced to the immodesty of touch." Likewise Holzmann (part 2, tr. 2, n. 686): "If the prepubescent, whether boys or girls, try by immodest motion to elicit seed, when they cannot yet do so, they commit a sin diverse in species from true pollution, in reality pertaining to the immodesty of touch.... The reason is that... since they do not pour forth semen, they do not commit the sin of true pollution, but another diverse in species." Think the same thing of eunuchs deprived of seed apt for generation. Nor otherwise Babenstuber (tr. 5, disp. 7, art. 2, n. 71): "The prepubescent..., who try by immodest motion to pour forth seed, when they cannot yet do so, do indeed sin mortally...; nevertheless that sin of theirs differs in species from true and properly so-called pollution. The reason is that it belongs to the nature of true pollution to pour forth seed against the end of human generation; but in persons of this sort there is no effusion of seed. Therefore this sin in reality and properly pertains to the immodesty of touch.... What has been said of the prepubescent must also be understood of eunuchs. For in these there is no seed useful for generation." And Tamburini had gone before (De 2. Eccl. Praec., c. 17, n. 13), saying: "Those who from defect of age, or from another cause (such as the prepubescent, as also eunuchs), cannot by immodest motion pour forth seed, or pour forth useless seed, sin mortally...; but certainly this species of sin differs from true pollution, to which it belongs to throw forth seed against the end of generation; this throwing forth is not in the aforesaid persons of this sort; therefore the sin in the prepubescent is reduced in reality to immodest touch." From this, moreover, to the reasons which Doctors are accustomed wisely to bring forward why the Confessor must be most cautious in questioning penitents of this sort about this argument, this peremptory reason accedes: that as soon as they shall prudently have searched sufficiently whether these things were maliciously carried out, no place remains for further questions.

But from these things arises an occasion of almost the same question concerning the same sin, if there is question of women. For however theologians may introduce speech concerning female seed, and indeed for many causes, nevertheless when they then ask about its nature, they commonly have nothing except what is altogether uncertain. Let Bonacina stand for all (De Matr., q. 4, p. 6, n. 13), who writes: "According to the most probable opinion the seed of a woman concurs neither actively nor passively toward generation." And Sanchez (lib. 9, disp. 17, n. 9): "That female seed is not necessary, nor concurs actively toward generation, Galen, contrary to himself, Aristotle, Avicenna, Albertus M., Hugo Senensis, and many others teach, and the whole school of theologians with St. Thomas, 3, q. 31, art. 4, ad 3. This is clear from this, that, experience testifying, women wholly unwilling... conceive when receiving male seed; but then they by no means emit seed. Therefore since without that seed... generation follows," etc. But although the old followers of Scotus, as Sanchez suggests (l. c.), and then Elbel (part 4, conf. 9, n. 252), after Hippocrates thought that the seed of a woman concurs actively toward generation, nevertheless Elbel himself (ibid., n. 253) then confesses that today it is commonly denied by learned Physicians that true seed, or true testicles, are given in women, but rather ovaries filled with certain little things (by others they are called vesicles). Thus Georgius Francus in Paulus Zacchia, Quaest. medic. legal. From this, as from a hypothesis, the same one (l. c.) rightly concludes from the premised principles: "Whatever nevertheless may be about this matter, among theologians it remains certain and undoubted that it is as little permitted to women as to the prepubescent or eunuchs to provoke themselves to venery by their own touch or that of another." Now since the matter is now no longer uncertain or hypothetical, but certain and most thoroughly investigated among Physicians or those skilled in physiology, namely that what has been customarily called female seed is wholly diverse from the nature of true seed, and that no other end has been established by nature for humors of this sort than that they may make the work of marriage easier; from the principles posited before, a reason is supplied for gravely doubting whether as regards this matter one must now judge otherwise about women than we have already seen to be judged about the prepubescent or eunuchs. Whence it would follow that, since the Doctors have already been accustomed to bring forward other causes on account of which questions about any such female pollution are to be spared, much more now it would seem that they are to be spared, while it is now sufficiently clear that in women, however gravely they may sin, nevertheless there is not present the reason of that special malice which is proper to true and strictly so-called pollution. But concerning this whole matter let the more skilled judge.

II. Pollution indirectly, or voluntary only in the cause, is a grave sin whenever the proximate cause, that is, one per se directly and by its nature tending to pollution, for example lingering thoughts concerning very libidinous things, etc., is placed without just reason (Scav. - St. Lig., n. 482); but it is venial whenever the cause which is placed is only remote, or such that danger is joined to it per accidens or rarely. - Thus commonly. - The reason of each is evident. - St. Lig., n. 484.

III. Pollution indirectly voluntary lacks every sin whenever there is sufficient reason for placing its cause, consent or affection of the will into the consequent pleasure being removed. The reason is that where two effects follow from the same cause indifferent in itself, one evil and the other good or equivalent, it is lawful to place the cause by intending the good and permitting the evil ². But a greater reason is required for a greater danger. - Recall the things said concerning Human Acts, n. 9. - See St. Lig., n. 483.

² In these adjuncts neither ought the evil effect in reality to be called voluntary, nor will the agent properly be called its cause. For when there is question merely of the obligation of abstaining from some action by reason of an effect which follows besides the intention, the reason of causality is taken not from physical influence, but from moral influence, and therefore there is question of causality which induces the moral imputation of the effect that followed, so that causality sounds almost the same as something culpable. Therefore then someone will properly be said to be in the cause, when for this reason he was bound to abstain from the action, lest that effect should follow; but he will not be judged to be in the cause when he was not bound for this reason to abstain from the work, but exercised it licitly and according to his right. And in altogether this sense the effect is said to follow per accidens, not as if namely the effect itself does not spontaneously follow from some action, but because it cannot be imputed to the agent as to a moral cause; and by this very fact, when we say that the effect follows besides the intention, we already say that the effect is not voluntary, namely by that will to which it ought morally to be imputed.

431. • 3. Pollution which follows from touch, look, or gravely base reading is a mortal sin even when actual consent is removed, unless a just cause excuses. The reason is that then pollution is voluntary at least in the cause, since these things per se induce grave danger of pollution. But it will be only a venial sin if these things are lightly base, provided the pollution follows besides the intention of the agent and against his at least direct will; because then in these things there is not given a proximate danger of consent either into pollution or into venereal delight. Yet danger remote in itself can become proximate per accidens for someone by reason of his own weakness. - St. Lig., n. 482-485.

4. Every deliberate effusion of seed, however small, is pollution and therefore a mortal sin. - Lacroix, de Poenit., n. 1034. - Likewise it is mortal to acquiesce in the delight of pollution even for the briefest time, and even if it happens besides the intention and spontaneously from whatever cause. - St. Lig., n. 477. A fortiori if pollution begun is promoted by some effort.

5. He who caused pollution in another must explain in confession whether this person is sacred, related by blood, etc.; because he contracted the malice of sacrilege, or incest, etc. - St. Lig., n. 476.

6. It is not a sin per se to ride a horse for the sake of reasonable recreation, to lie in bed in a certain position, to take heating foods temperately, to speak with the other sex from an honorable cause, to serve the sick, to help them in baths, to exercise the surgical art, and similar things, although it is foreseen that pollution is going to follow per accidens, provided it is not intended, and there is a firm purpose of not assenting to it if it happens, and proximate danger of consent is absent. - St. Lig., n. 483.

1089. (A) Definition. Modesty is a virtue inclining man to preserve decorum in exterior things. - For man's exterior movements must be composed according to reason, insofar as they are subject to the command of the will; likewise clothing and bodily adornment ought to be ordered according to the laws of honorableness. The virtue of modesty performs both; the Greeks call it eutaxia and eutrapelia.

1090. (B) Various acts. (a) Therefore modesty first tempers the exterior movements of the body, so that nothing unbecoming is done.

The pagans wrote many things on this matter; among them Cicero:¹⁰ "Let posture, gait, sitting, reclining, countenance, eyes, and movement of the hands preserve that decorum. In these matters two things are especially to be fled: lest anything be effeminate or soft, and lest anything be harsh or rustic... Cleanliness is also to be employed, not offensive, nor too exquisite, only such as avoids boorish and inhuman negligence... The same rule must be observed in dress, in which, as in most things, moderation is best. But one must beware lest we use softer slownesses in walking... or in haste assume excessive swiftnesses, for when these happen the breath is moved, faces change, mouths are twisted, from which there is a great sign that constancy is not present... But in the voice let us follow two things, that it be clear, that it be pleasant."

¹⁰ Cicero, De officiis, I, 35-37.

Sacred writers likewise observe that from a man's exterior bearing his character is manifested:¹¹ "By the sight a man is known, and by the meeting of the countenance a sensible man is known; the attire of the body and the laughter of the teeth and the gait of a man declare concerning him."

¹¹ Eccli. 19:26-27.

But the Fathers hand down minute rules of modesty; among them St. Ambrose:¹² "Even in movement itself, gesture, and gait, modesty must be kept. For the habit of the mind is seen in the state of the body. Hence the hidden man of our heart is judged either lighter, or more boastful, or more troubled, or on the contrary more grave and constant and purer and more mature... There is also an approved gait, in which there is an appearance of authority and the weight of gravity, the trace of tranquility, yet in such a way that effort and affectation be absent, and the movement be pure and simple; for nothing feigned pleases... The voice itself should not be slack, not broken, sounding nothing feminine, such as many have been accustomed to imitate under the appearance of gravity, but preserving a certain form and rule and masculine substance. For this is to hold the beauty of living: to render to each sex and person what is fitting. This is the best order of gestures, this adornment accommodated to every action. But as I do not approve a somewhat soft and broken sound of voice or gesture of body, so neither do I approve what is boorish and rustic. Let us imitate nature: her image is the formula of discipline, the form of honorableness."

¹² St. Ambrose, De officiis, l. I, c. 18-19, P. L., XVI, 44-49.

In one word, in all movements of the body, whatever savors of affectation or rusticity must be avoided.

1091. (b) Modesty also moderates games, which are done for relaxing the mind.¹³ For since man, who for a long time applies himself to works, especially intellectual ones, is accustomed to experience fatigue, by which he is made unfit for labor, it is necessary that he restore his powers through rest and play. Yet in this some moderation is required, so that every excess may be avoided: first, whatever is base or harmful must be avoided; then, what is unbecoming in mode; nor must time be spent in prolonged games which ought to be spent on necessary things; likewise there are games which befit laymen, but not priests. Now the virtue which tempers these excesses is modesty, or eutrapely. Against it sin not only those who exceed, but also those who, unwilling ever to play, show themselves morose and difficult.

¹³ St. Francis de Sales, Introduction, p. III, ch. 31-32.

1092. (c) Finally modesty regards clothing and bodily adornment, and tends to this, that exterior equipment correspond to the person according to sex, state, place, time, and other circumstances of this kind. Thus those who are placed in dignities, or are richer, are clothed in more costly garments than others.

In this matter one sins by excess when adornment is beyond one's condition or received custom; when too much care and time are spent in adorning oneself, as happens to not a few women and to certain effeminate youths; when costly garments are deliberately worn for the sake of ostentation, on account of vain glory, for catching eyes and exciting admiration.

Yet garments should be clean, neat, and, according to each one's condition, decently and elegantly composed.¹

¹ St. Francis de Sales, Introduction, p. III, ch. 25.

On this occasion, it is asked whether it is lawful for women to adorn themselves so as to please men. - It is certainly unlawful to use lascivious adornment, which provokes others to lust: "And if indeed they adorn themselves with this intention, that they provoke others to concupiscence, they sin mortally; but if from a certain levity, or even from a certain vanity on account of a certain boasting, it is not always mortal sin, but sometimes venial."² - This intention being excluded, it is lawful for wives to adorn themselves so that they may please their husbands, and so foster conjugal love; the same is lawful for marriageable girls, so that they may more easily find a spouse. But those women who do not have husbands, nor wish to have them, cannot without sin desire to please men and to excite their concupiscence, since this is nothing other than to offer them an incentive to sin.

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 169, a. 2.

But some sin by defect, neglecting the care of the body, so that they give weariness or scandal to others; this is more unbecoming among those who, by force of office or duty, ought to enjoy the good esteem of others.

Therefore Christian men and women should cultivate simplicity and decorum at the same time, according to their state, not unmindful of these words of the Apostle:³ "In like manner women also in decent apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety, and not with plaited hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly attire; but as it becometh women professing godliness, with good works."

³ 1 Tim. 2:9.

1093. Let these few things concerning the cardinal virtues suffice for our purpose. If inquiry is made concerning their relative perfection, with St. Thomas⁴ we answer: "Among the other (that is, moral) virtues, prudence is the greatest, because it is the moderator of the others; and after this, justice, through which man is well disposed not only in himself, but toward another; and after this, fortitude, through which man, on account of good, despises dangers of death; and after this, temperance, through which man, on account of good, despises the greatest pleasures of bodily things." - Besides, since virtues of this kind are connected among themselves (n. 591), he who becomes perfect in one, by that very fact makes progress in the others; and thus the ascent from virtue to virtue is made easier.

⁴ St. Thomas, Quaestiones disputatae, De virtutibus, q. 5, a. 3.

20. I. In this place we are not treating of the moral virtue of chastity, but of the natural affection and sense of modesty, of which anthropologists undertake the analysis, while philosophers and theologians seek the higher reasons.

This is certain. Venereal appetite at once produces a certain shame and promises a certain happiness, so that it can be said of man: he is ashamed to manifest, indeed to some extent to do, that which delights most carnally. He blushes at that from which he rejoices! This affection, sufficiently strange at first sight, is shown to pertain to the nobility of human nature, so that contempt falls upon the person who has cast modesty aside. Modesty can therefore be described as a certain intimate hesitation and reluctance of the soul, which opposes to venereal appetite a certain difficulty to be overcome, whence it happens that consent is granted to it less openly and less promptly ¹.

¹ Thus Buchan and Ellis, in Moll, also think that sexual repugnance is signified by modesty at first.

Joubert ² describes the same thing beautifully, especially in the age of adolescence: "Modesty is one knows not what fear attached to our sensibility, which causes the soul, like the flower which is its image, to fold back and conceal itself within itself, so long as it is delicate and tender, at the slightest appearance of that which might wound it by impressions too vivid or by illuminations too premature."

² Pensées, pp. 80-83.

In truth, modesty signifies a restraint, rather than opposition, lest one proceed without consideration; it by no means extinguishes or diminishes carnal libido, but imposes a certain measure and rule upon it.

The elements by which the spontaneous affection or instinct of modesty is constituted or composed must be drawn chiefly from the mutual relations of the sexes, since modesty pertains to the order of sexual union.

Moreover, an anthropological investigation of modesty then reveals these things:

1. Sexual union requires a mutual surrender of bodies; hence, in the reluctance of modesty there is discerned a certain defense and guardianship of individual ownership.

2. The sexual parts are not very becoming in themselves and are found near the organs of the lowliest functions. Hence, in their first exposure, which is demanded by sexual commerce, a certain loss of esteem and enticement is to be feared. Consequently, natural timidity obtains some place in modesty.

3. A person's own estimation of himself also impels him not to surrender himself to just anyone as cheap merchandise, but to choose a worthy lover. Modesty therefore contains a certain care for one's own dignity.

4. And since whatever lies open to all becomes cheap, the difficulty first opposed also manifests a desire to increase the value of the thing afterwards conceded.

Thus the instinct of preservation, timidity, care for one's own dignity, and the desire for reputation and honor appear in the sense of modesty; and since these are natural or innate, the modesty resulting from them must likewise be called natural.

St. Thomas ³ demonstrates these two further causes of modesty in the mind, or higher part of man: the one, common to both sexes, namely, the vehemence by which the ardor of pleasure is accustomed to occupy and absorb the mind; the other, proper to the male sex, namely, that manifest rebellion of the flesh which obeys the command of reason only imperfectly, so that even against our will we experience various movements of the flesh.

³ Summa theol., II-II, q. 131, art. 4.

St. Augustine had already rendered this reason in these words: "Hence they were both naked and were not ashamed, namely, the first parents. For now, by natural shame, the rational soul is ashamed that in the flesh, into whose servitude it received the right of power, it cannot, through some weakness I know not what, bring it about that these members not be moved when it is unwilling and be moved when it is willing. Because of this, in every chaste person they are deservedly called the shameful parts, because against their mistress, the mind, as though they were of their own power, they are aroused as it pleases them; and the restraints of virtue have only this right over them, that they do not permit them to proceed to unclean and unlawful corruptions" ⁴.

⁴ De peccatorum meritis et remissione, book 2, chapter 22 (M. 44, 172-173).

Since, moreover, in fulfilling sexual appetite, a woman exercises the passive part, while a man rather sustains the role of the aggressor, a woman is more inclined to modesty than a man and, having laid modesty aside, she loses the special ornament and comeliness of her sex. Nature itself, by the manner in which it conceals the woman's shameful parts within the labia, seems to invite her to greater modesty.

These utilities of modesty at once disclose themselves. It causes sexual relations to be entered upon more cautiously, which contributes not a little to mutual happiness and man's social good; through the selection of persons it favors a better multiplication of the human race; it teaches man a certain victory over himself, whence he himself becomes stronger; and it provides for the dignity of man.

21. II. Sacred Scripture ascribes the first origin of clothing to modesty ⁵. Hence St. Augustine said most beautifully: "He who, clothed with grace, had nothing in his naked body of which he was ashamed, when stripped of grace perceived what he ought to cover" ⁶.

⁵ Compare Genesis 3:10-12.

⁶ Contra Iulianum Pelagianum, book 4, chapter 16, no. 82 (M. 44, 781).

Students of anthropology, however, dispute concerning this origin. Not a few today, with very little basis, deny that it is to be traced back to modesty. This tenet of theirs coheres sufficiently with the denial of a spiritual soul which is created immediately by God. For they hold no affection of the moral order to be primitive.

They nevertheless by no means call into controversy the assistance which clothing affords to modesty.

And in truth, clothing in itself diminishes sexual enticements. The natural sense of modesty seems to demand that at least the strictly sexual parts be covered by clothing. Certainly, a greater immediate power of attraction is present in extensive nudity than in the particular exposure of those parts; the latter rather inspires horror. But obscenity, immodest boldness itself, seems to invite toward libido as if psychologically, while care for covering the parts of the body inculcates and proclaims human dignity and the restraint to be imposed upon appetite, and thus indirectly restrains libido.

Clothing can nevertheless also increase enticements when by its elegance it supplies beauty, or when it turns the eyes toward the sexual organs or the forms of the body.

Moreover, in judging the quality of clothing, not only the power of direct seduction must be considered, but also the formal signification of boldness or modesty, to which signification many circumstances can contribute. Clothing which, in concrete circumstances, manifests wanton boldness is to be condemned, while we shall approve that which displays the sense of modesty in a reasonable manner.

Custom can do much here; it is one thing among civilized nations, another among barbarians, and even among civilized nations it possesses a real, though lesser, variety.

413. - Just as, after the introduction, we made the beginning of our discourse from the virtue of chastity, so may it be permitted us to reserve the end of this treatise for the same virtue.

To the many arts by which true lust prepares a way for itself, or, having already entered, dissembles itself, the virtue of Modesty is contrary, which we can call the bulwark of chastity.

Modesty, by its inclination, counsels us to avoid every signification of lust, and in looks, kisses, and touches to flee every suspect pleasure, but rather to manifest and profess chastity and continence.

It counsels us to perform this whether alone or before witnesses, because "we have been made a spectacle to angels and to men ¹."

¹ 1 Corinthians 4:9.

Modesty so pertains to chastity that it is not distinguished from it as a virtue ².

² II-II, question 151, article 4.

By the noble pursuit of it, all chastity is strengthened and angelic chastity is prepared.

— Modesty is the very virtue of chastity which, by its own inclination, persuades us to avoid every signification of lust, and, in looks, kisses, and touches, to flee every suspect pleasure, so that we may manifest and profess chastity and continence. It can be called chastity zealous for sincerity and security. By the noble zeal of modesty all chastity is strengthened; angelic chastity is prepared.

II. Various acts are called immodest which, by their very external species, are akin to lustful acts, but can be called ambiguous, because they can be exercised on account of an honest cause, or a suspect cause, or even a strictly lustful one. When they are exercised without a cause perfectly excusing them, they are opposed to modesty.

III. Because, in this matter, speech not rarely occurs concerning songs and obscene pictures, observe that not every nude thing can be called obscene. But commonly an alluring nude is called obscene; and it can be described: A shameful manifestation of the soul or solicitation in nudity. (Cf. De castitate, n. 180, 181.)

711. Modesty is taken in a twofold sense: 1. broadly, insofar as it moderates diverse passions in which some difficulty is found; and then it contains four species, namely, humility, studiousness, modesty of external movements, and modesty of attire. Modesty in this general sense is defined: "the virtue by which someone contains himself within the measure and limits of his state, talent, and fortune as regards both internal and external motions and the whole apparatus of his affairs."¹³⁹⁷ 2. In the strict sense modesty is a virtue inclining a man to preserve decorum in external things. We shall treat briefly the several species of modesty broadly taken.

¹³⁹⁷ Billuart, De temperantia diss. 7, a. 4.

717. Modesty in external things is a moral virtue inclining a man to preserve decorum in external things according to right reason. These external things are: a) movements of the body; b) games; c) clothing and ornaments of the body.

a) Modesty in the external movements of the body is very necessary for pleasant social intercourse. Whence St. Augustine admonishes: "In all your movements let nothing be done which offends the sight of anyone."¹⁴¹⁸ And it is deservedly said in Ecclesiasticus: "A man is known by his appearance, and a sensible man is known by the meeting of his countenance; the clothing of the body, and the laughter of the teeth, and the gait of a man declare concerning him."¹⁴¹⁹ Therefore writers, both sacred and profane, give many rules concerning the right ordering of the movements of the body. But especially to be avoided are affectation on the one hand and rusticity on the other.

b) Right modesty in games is equally necessary, lest someone be excessively addicted to games with scandal to others and damage to himself. The virtue moderating the right use of play is called eutrapely.¹⁴²⁰

c) Modesty in clothing and the adornment of the body avoids not only all indecency, but also every superfluity or deficiency. Against this modesty one sins:

1. By excess, when adornment, all the conditions of person, place, and time being considered, is either sought with excessive care or acquired at excessive expense. Not a few persons of each sex sin by such excess, who prodigally expend time, labor, and money in procuring excessive adornment. The quantity of sin in such excessive adornment must be weighed from many things: from the scandal arising, from the duties of state injured, and from the evil end intended. Let the confessor and preacher be cautious in admonishing the faithful concerning this matter, because he often exhorts altogether uselessly and causes laughter and indignation rather than a good effect. This indeed holds especially concerning the adornment of women. But if this adornment incites to lasciviousness, then assuredly it is to be sharply censured. Women can lawfully adorn themselves in order to increase their beauty, provided, however, that an honorable end is present and every scandal is absent. Ancient authors spoke more severely concerning cosmetics applied to the face. But apart from scandal and every evil end, there is no reason why cosmetics should be morally evil. A graver difficulty exists concerning the more or less extensive baring of the breast which women are accustomed to employ especially on certain occasions, for example, at great banquets and dances.¹⁴²¹

2. By defect, when someone does not employ due diligence in adornment and clothing.

Let these things said concerning the cardinal virtues suffice. He who desires to learn more should approach St. Thomas,¹⁴²² who, discoursing concerning their dignity, writes: "Among the other [moral] virtues prudence is the greatest, because it is the moderator of the others; and after this, justice, through which man bears himself well not only toward himself, but toward another; and after this, fortitude, through which man on account of the good despises the dangers of death; and after this, temperance, through which man on account of the good despises the greatest bodily pleasures."¹⁴²³

¹⁴¹⁸ Regula ad servos Dei (Migne, Patr. lat. 32, 1380).

¹⁴¹⁹ Ecclus. 19:26 ff.

¹⁴²⁰ Cf. above, n. 317, and S. theol. 2, 2, q. 168, a. 2.

¹⁴²¹ Cf. what was said above, I, n. 613, concerning the adornment of women.

¹⁴²² S. theol. 2, 2, qq. 47-170.

¹⁴²³ Quaest. disp. unic. de virtut. card., a. 3.

S. Th. II-II, q. 168.

1057. Modesty of manners (zedigheid, bescheidenheid) is the virtue tempering the external motions of the body according to the prescriptions of reason, or the virtue preserving decorum in external motions and gestures.

The matter is bodily motion and exterior gesture, presented to the senses, as gait, standing, sitting, motion of the head, contraction and relaxation of the face, movement of the members, voice, laughter, gaze. In these two things especially are to be avoided: that there be anything effeminate or soft, and that there be anything harsh and rustic.¹

¹ Cicero, De Officiis I, 128.

And indeed: the exterior motions of man are free and orderable by reason: for at the command of reason the exterior members are moved; but that which is subjected to the ordering of reason can be ordered well or badly. Therefore it is manifest that concerning the ordering of these motions a moral virtue is to be constituted (a. 1): insofar namely as they can be corrected by the command of reason (ad 2), and are signs of interior disposition (ad 1), which they presuppose (ad 3).²

² Which St. Ambrose describes splendidly, De Officiis I, c. 18-19.

1058. Various modesty. - Modesty imposes the moderation of congruity according to right reason upon external motions and gestures. But the ordering of these motions is considered as to two things: 1. in one way according to the fittingness of the person according to himself (decentia or adornment; voornaamheid); 2. in another way according to fittingness toward other persons, affairs, times, and places (good ordering; geregeldheid). Hence the office is to moderate gait, voice, speech... in such a way that they fit the person both in himself and as placed in such a place, time, and affair, that is, both with respect to the person acting and with respect to exterior things.

And so modesty does not consider exterior motions insofar as they express a relation of debt to another, but insofar as they are to be moderated so that man is well disposed in himself according to the condition of the person acting and the affairs to be performed. Yet because through these motions we live outwardly with others (to whom they can be burdensome and unpleasant), and motions also are for them certain signs of interior disposition, therefore if moderation of exterior motions of this sort is furnished so that someone exteriorly displays himself as he is interiorly, it will be regulatively and imperatively from the virtue of truth (to which simulation and hypocrisy are opposed); if so that he offend no one but on the contrary displays himself agreeable and suitable in society, it will be regulatively and imperatively from the virtue of affability (to which flattery is opposed by excess, quarreling by defect); nevertheless from both sides it is elicited by the virtue of modesty. From this it is clear that this virtue is very useful for social life, for a good name, and for the edification of neighbor.

1059. Sins opposed to modesty. - To modesty of manners by excess is opposed affectation (gezochtheid), petulance (courtly mannerism) or insolence, which exceeds the prescription of reason in exterior motions and gestures, for example, if someone exceeds the common mode too much, or assumes a foreign mode which does not fit his own condition, as a religious assuming courtly manners. By defect is opposed: rusticity of manners (boersheid, onbeschaafdheid).

Per se these are venial; per accidens they can be mortal by reason of the end, scandal, offense, grave harm, etc.

1060. Modesty in games. - Modesty is not only concerned generally with serious exterior motions and gestures, but also specially with playful and jesting matters. In the first case it is the virtue described above, and is called eutaxy (welgevoeglijkheid): a good disposition of the body; in the other case it obtains the name of eutrapely: pleasantness or urbanity which befits the mode of virtuously and holily indulging recreation; by others it is called austerity (deftigheid), because games rather are to be moderated so that excess may be avoided. Eutrapely can be defined: the virtue moderating man in the use of games (by deeds) and jests (by words), or the virtue moderating play lest it depart from the mean of reason by excess or defect.

Game generally is whatever saying or deed ordered to delight of soul; if it is a saying, it is called jest; if a deed, it is called game. And although someone alone can play, nevertheless, because it is for the most part exercised among many, it is defined as a contest of two or more undertaken for delight of soul. To this contest, lest it grow slack, a pact can be added that the prize yield to the victor, and this is the contract of game, concerning which it was said in the treatise on justice, n. 600.

Game is licit, indeed necessary. For since the power both of soul and body is finite, it follows that by length or vehemence of labor it is wearied, and as bodily weariness is relieved through rest of the body, so also animal weariness is relieved through rest of the soul. But rest of the soul is delectation, and it does not so much consist in cessation from every work, because the soul of one awake never ceases from every work. Therefore a remedy against weariness of soul must be applied through some delectation, the intention by which one had previously insisted upon the study of reason being interrupted. But the sayings or deeds in which delectation is sought, and through delectation the repair of powers, are called jests and games. Therefore it is licit, indeed necessary, for man sometimes to use jests and games, so that there can be sin in defect of playing.

But for it to be licit three things are required:

1. First and principally, that the aforesaid delectation not be sought in any operations or words shameful, or injurious, or harmful to neighbor, as infamy, unjust detriment of fortune, etc.

2. That through play the gravity of the soul not be totally dissolved, as happens in those who are delighted beyond the limits of reason;

3. That the game fit the person, time, and place, and that all circumstances which are required for a virtuous act be observed.

Hence eutrapely is said to be "from good turning, because namely it turns certain sayings or deeds well into solace" (a. 2).

1061. Vices in games. - The virtue of eutrapely moderates play lest it depart from the mean of reason by excess or defect. He sins by excess or superfluity who does not observe the three aforesaid conditions. The sin of itself is venial, as being only excess of a good or indifferent thing; yet per accidens it can be mortal in some joined species.

For game is superfluous in two ways insofar as it exceeds the rule of reason: 1. in one way from the species of actions which are assumed, if they are shameful, or contain irreverence toward God and sacred things (for example, if someone abuses the words of Scripture for jests), or are injurious and harmful to neighbor (infamy, unjust detriment of fortune), and then it is a mortal sin from its genus; 2. in another way according to defect of due circumstances, when someone uses play at undue times or in undue places, or also apart from the fittingness of the affair or person. And this is venial, unless because of the vehemence of affection toward play, whose delectation one prefers to the love of God, so that he does not shrink from using such games against the precept of God or of the Church: for thus he places his ultimate end in the delectation of game, and is ready to transgress a grave precept of God or the Church rather than abstain from play. This sin by excess is reduced to buffoonery or inept mirth (a. 3, and ad 2).

He sins by defect who shows himself morose and burdensome to others, displaying nothing delightful and impeding or not receiving the delights of others.

"Everything which is against reason in human affairs is vicious. But it is against reason that someone display himself burdensome to others, for example, when he displays nothing delightful, and also impedes the delights of others.... But those who are deficient in play neither themselves say anything laughable, and they are troublesome to those saying such things, because namely they do not receive the moderate games of others. And therefore such persons are vicious, and are called hard and rustic. But because play is useful on account of rest and delectation; and delectation and rest are not sought for themselves in human life, but on account of operation,... therefore defect of play is less vicious than super-excess of play" (a. 4).

1062. Remarks. - 1. Excess in play, insofar as delectation is sought too much in it, is against modesty and temperance; but insofar as it is too much rest from labor, it is a certain softness which is opposed to perseverance and fortitude.

2. From these things it can be inferred: "the office of actors, which is ordered to displaying solace to men, is not according to itself illicit..." (cf. a. 3, ad 3).

3. Concerning spectacles and dances theologians remark that these, according to themselves, that is, with depraved circumstances excluded, are not dishonorable, but morally indifferent, as pertaining to arts, games, and joyful recreations; nevertheless in practice they sometimes provide an occasion of sinning and become gravely dishonorable:

a) from a depraved, impious, or shameful end;

b) from grave danger of sinning mortally, for example, of perversion in faith or morals;

c) from grave scandal, whether direct, or even indirect, such as easily arises from depraved speech or words, gesture and touches, immodesty in clothing and other modes insufficiently honorable.

Concerning these they customarily treat more fully in pastoral theology.³

³ Thus in our little work: Questions on Various Categories of Penitents, c. III, q. 6: on Worldly Things.

C. As to looks, which are carefully to be distinguished from mere sight, and which move to libido less than touches do, because they are less material, yet therefore are dangerous:

1. Without necessity, to look lingeringly and deliberately either at the genitals of the other sex, or even the breasts of a woman altogether naked or covered with a transparent veil, or at a man and woman exercising copulation or immodest acts upon one another, or at persons polluting themselves, is ordinarily mortal, because it gravely moves to venereal pleasure. Make exception if it is done in passing or very remotely, or if the one looking is a cold old man or an infant.

2. Without just cause, to look at the less honorable parts of a person of different sex or at the coitus of animals, from curiosity or levity and without venereal affection, is ordinarily venial, especially if it is done in passing.

3. Without cause, to look at one's own genitals, from curiosity or levity and without venereal affection, is venial, especially if it is done in passing; likewise to look in this mode at the genitals of a person of the same sex, unless one were prone to sodomy, or unless a very beautiful adolescent were looked at lingeringly.

I say 1st. Pollution directly and perfectly voluntary is always a mortal sin, so that it is never licit to procure it. The reason is 1st. because this is drawn from the words of the Apostle, I Cor. vi, 10: "Nor the effeminate ... shall possess the kingdom of God"; 2nd. because pollution has intrinsic repugnance with nature, which has ordered the emission of semen solely to generation; 3rd. because if it were ever permitted, or prohibited only under venial matter, most easily, on account of so great a proclivity of corrupt nature toward lust, the habit of pollution would be contracted, and therefore the order of nature would shortly be subverted; 4th. because prop. 49 was condemned by Innocent XI, which has itself thus: "Mollities is not prohibited by the law of nature; whence, if God had not forbidden it, it would often be good. ..." - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 476. - Viva, on this proposition.

I say 2nd. Pollution indirectly or only in the cause voluntary is a grave sin whenever the proximate cause, and one tending by its own nature to pollution, e.g., lingering thoughts about very lustful things, is posited without just reason; but it is venial whenever the cause which is posited is only remote, or such that danger is joined to it by accident or rarely. The reason for each is easily gathered from those things which were said elsewhere concerning the indirectly voluntary. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 483 and 484.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. Every deliberate emission of semen, however small, is pollution and therefore a mortal sin. Likewise it is mortal to acquiesce in the pleasure of pollution, even for a very brief time, and although it happens beyond intention and spontaneously. A fortiori if pollution spontaneously begun is promoted by some effort. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 477. - Lacroix, de Paenit., n. 1034.

2nd. Pollution which follows from touch, gaze, or reading gravely base and posited without just cause, is a mortal sin even with actual consent excluded. The reason is that then the pollution is voluntary in the cause, since these things of themselves introduce grave danger of pollution. But the sin will be only venial if these things are lightly base, and the pollution follows beyond the intention of the agent. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 482 and following.

3rd. Nocturnal pollution lacks fault, because it does not arise from the free will, nor is any assent given to it, as is supposed; but neither does it indeed always denote a lustful mind, since it can come from many natural causes, e.g., from superfluity of nature, from weakness of the organs, or from disposition of the nerves. But it will be mortal or venial if before sleep it was caused and foreseen, according to the greater or lesser advertence and influence of the cause. Thus voluntary wicked thoughts, wicked conversations, and other things of this kind preceding sleep will easily render it mortal. But ordinarily intemperance in food or drink, etc., will make it only venial. Likewise nocturnal pollution which happens with imperfect will and liberty, as sometimes occurs in the half-asleep, ought not to be judged mortal; but it must be judged that no consent was present, or at most very imperfect consent, when ordinarily in the state of wakefulness it displeases; because judgment must be made according to ordinary contingencies. The same also must be held concerning nocturnal touches.

4th. Voluntary distillation, even only indirectly voluntary, if it is notable or occurs with notable stirring of the genital spirits, can be a mortal sin; because it is a grave disordering, and introduces proximate danger of pollution. But if it is small and without notable stirring, a distinction must be made: 1st. If it is directly voluntary, it cannot be excused from mortal sin; because any distillation whatsoever always, or for the most part, carries with itself stirring and some emission of semen. 2nd. But if it is only indirectly voluntary, it will easily be excused from every sin; because no more care is to be taken concerning such a flux than concerning the emission of any other excrement by which nature is accustomed to unload itself. - Thus expressly St. Alphonsus, n. 477.

5th. It is licit for someone suffering severe itching in the private parts to remove it by touch, even if pollution follows, provided that the itching arises from acrimony of the blood, as ordinarily happens, but not from ardor of lust. For if pollution then happens, with the danger of consent excluded, it happens by accident and therefore inculpably. For the rest, penitents are to be exhorted that, insofar as it can be done without grave trouble, they restrain themselves from touches of this kind. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 483.

Modesty is defined by St. Bonav. in the opusc. declaratorio term. Theologiz: Modesty is the virtue which by the shamefastness of honesty procures a pure and stable authority. The same in lib. 5. Compend. Theol. cap. 35.

This indeed is the virtue establishing moderation in human actions, especially the external manners of the body, whose three parts St. Thom. says it has, q. 143. art. unic., namely Good ordering, Ornament, and Austerity.

Good ordering establishes the measure in the external actions of the body; so that a thing either be done or not be done, or be done in that order in which it is expedient, as St. Thom. teaches, art. 1. By Ornament modesty affects things so that what is done be done comely. By Austerity, so that conversations with friends or others have a certain maturity which befits the person and the things themselves. Thus Valentia, disp. 9. quaest. 1. puncto 2.

The Holy Doctor proves and declares this, lib. 2. Phar. cap. 41., by the authorities of the Fathers. St. Ambrose, lib. 1. de offic. cap. 18.: Great is the virtue of modesty, which, though it be also somewhat more remiss of its own right, usurps nothing to itself, claims nothing for itself: And cap. 43.: In modesty especially are regarded and sought the tranquillity of the mind, the study of mildness, the grace of moderation, the care of honesty, the consideration of comeliness. St. Augustine, de vita beata, disp. 3.: Modesty is so called from measure, as temperance from temperature: where there is measure and temperature, nothing is more, and nothing less. See other things there.

To Titius, who applies himself to the study of moral theology, knowledge seems to be good, and therefore the desire for it seems unable to be bad. Theologians, however, seem to teach otherwise when they hand down that curiosity is sinful. Thus, according to them, the reading of an indecent book, inquiry by young people about sexual matters, and an indecent look are sins, at least venial, if they proceed from curiosity; but to inquire of the dead about truth out of curiosity is mortal. In order that he may resolve these difficulties, Titius asks:

1. What is curiosity, and in what does its malice consist?

2. Is the desire or pursuit of a good object always good?

3. Let satisfaction be given to Titius and his difficulties.

1. What is curiosity and in what does its malice consist ?

Curiosity, in the sense in which the word is used by theologians, is an inordinate desire of knowledge. As St. Thomas teaches (II-II, question 167, article 1), knowledge is good in itself, but it may be bad incidentally, as when it is the cause of pride. And although knowledge is good, yet the desire of knowledge may be inordinate and vicious. The desire of knowledge becomes vicious if the end for which it is sought is bad, as if one studies medicine in order to poison an enemy. Moreover, all knowledge is not equally important, and so a desire of knowing what is less useful is inordinate if it stands in the way of acquiring knowledge which is necessary. A law student who requires all his time to qualify for his examinations would do wrong if he spent two hours daily in learning Chinese. If the means taken to acquire knowledge are bad, the desire becomes inordinate. Thus, as St. Thomas says, it is unlawful to seek to know the future from demons. Fourthly, a desire of knowledge is inordinate if it leads one to try to learn what surpasses his powers.

2. Is the desire or pursuit of a good object always good?

No; in order that an action may be good, not only the object, but the end and all the circumstances must be good — good arises from an integral cause, evil from any defect whatsoever. The answer, too, is clear from what was said above.

3. The case. Titius, a theological student, thinks that as knowledge is good the desire of it can not be evil. This difficulty has been met already. It is clear that the desire of knowledge can be inordinate, and if it is inordinate, it is sinful. Theologians are right when they teach that curiosity is at least a venial sin and that it may be mortal. Thus the reading of an improper book out of curiosity, where there is not proximate danger of consenting to evil, is a venial sin; if the book is indecent and there is proximate danger of consenting to evil, it is mortal. Before the proper time youths should not think or talk about sexual matters, as thought and talk about such matters before the time leads to impurity. Hence to indulge curiosity about them in talk, look, or reading, is at least a venial sin, and it becomes mortal if the danger of consent be proximate. To seek to know occult matters by calling up the dead is specially forbidden in Holy Scripture, and is mortally sinful.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 218; Lessius, De Justitia, lib. iv, c. 4, n. 84.