Nature of the Religious State

WE learn from the Gospels that, besides the ordinary way of the Commandments to be followed by all who wish to save their souls, our Lord proposed the way of perfection to the select few who wished to follow him more closely.¹1 This way of perfection consists in renouncing the goods of this world and the cares of family life, and following our Lord’s example of perfect obedience to the will of our heavenly Father. From the first ages of the Christian Church there were many who accepted our Lord’s invitation and lived in voluntary poverty and chastity. Comparatively few historical documents of the earliest centuries of the Christian era have survived, but we find traces of a body of ascetics and virgins to whom a place of special honour was assigned in the Church. At first they seem to have lived in the bosom of their families, but soon they fled to the deserts of Egypt, Syria, and Palestine, and for guidance and encouragement put themselves under the rule of some experienced hermit. Nothing was then wanting to the essence of the religious state except vows and a rule. When the counsels of perfection began to be practised under vow cannot be determined exactly; the first formal religious rules are the work of St Basil and St Benedict. Thus in its essence the religious state has been instituted by Jesus Christ, and, as historically evolved under the guidance of his Church, it may be defined as a fixed and stable way of life approved by the Church for the faithful who, under a certain rule and a common way of living, wish to aim at perfection by the observance of the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, with the entire surrender of one’s self to God. Thus those who devote themselves to works of piety and charity without vows, or with only private vows, are not in the religious state, nor are they technically called religious. They want the necessary stability. This stability is given by the profession of public vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, the chief of the counsels of the Gospel, by which a person renounces the attractions of this world which draw so many away from God, in order to give himself wholly and entirely without let or hindrance to the love and service of God. The Church has always watched over and fostered the practice of religious life. In the thirteenth century there was danger of the great variety of religious orders causing confusion, and the Fourth Council of the Lateran forbade any new orders to be founded. The practical effect of this law was to prohibit new orders without the approbation of the Holy See. It is still in force as regards orders with solemn vows, which cannot be founded without the special approbation of the Pope. According to the new Code, bishops, but not Vicars Capitular or Vicars General, can found religious congregations with simple vows, but they are forbidden to found them or allow them to be founded without consulting the Holy See. If there is question of founding tertiaries living in common, the leave is also required of the General of the first order to which the tertiaries are to be affiliated (Can. 492).

A religious congregation founded by a bishop may in process of time acquire houses in other dioceses, but it remains diocesan and is wholly subject to the local Ordinaries, according to law, until it obtains a decree of the Holy See in praise of its end and scope, or one of formal approbation.

The end of religious life is perfect union with God, in which man’s perfection consists, and this union the religious disposes himself for by the constant practice of works of sublime charity and of renunciation of all that could be an obstacle to charity. Thus the religious state is the state of perfection; not that religious are supposed to be already perfect, but because perfection of Christian charity is the end aimed at, and suitable means are furnished therein for obtaining that end.

¹ Matt. xix.

The special obligations under which a religious lies follow from the nature of the religious state which we have described. Inasmuch as he devotes himself to the service of God in religion, he must do nothing that would endanger his perseverance or cause him to be dismissed from the order. He is especially bound to observe his vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, which he has voluntarily made to God, and in which the essence of religious life and the chief means of practising perfection consist. He is bound to keep the rule which he takes for his guide in life by the very fact of entering into the order which he has chosen as well as by ecclesiastical law (Can. 593). The obligation imposed by the rule is not the same in all religious orders. In some it binds under sin like the precepts of the superior. The rules of the Dominicans, Jesuits, and of most of the-modern congregations, of themselves, speaking generally, do not bind under sin. Particular precepts are sometimes inserted in the rule, and these of course are to be observed under sin like any other precepts of obedience. Apart from these the rule is rather a guide of conduct in religious life, and an indication as to how the superior should govern his subjects, than a rigid code of law binding under pain of sin. However, divines point out that frequently violations of such a rule will be sinful, not precisely because they are infractions of the rule, but because there will frequently be something defective in them as moral acts. If the silence which the rule prescribes is broken without just cause, the act will be sinful on account of the motive which led to it, the scandal which it causes, and its tendency to loosen the bonds of religious discipline. Formal contempt of the rule, by which a religious refuses to be guided by it, and wishes to show his independence, is mortally sinful, because it is directly contrary to his religious profession.

I. Notion. The religious state is "a stable manner of living in common by which the faithful, besides the common precepts, also undertake the evangelical counsels to be observed through vows of obedience, chastity, and poverty" (can. 487). It is said:

1. A stable manner of living. For a state involves a certain immobility or firmness, that is, a manner of living not easily changeable (St. Thomas 2-2, q. 183, article 1).

2. In common, that is, in a society. Hence eremitical life or a private profession of the counsels now does not suffice for the religious state. Nevertheless it is not required that life be spent in a community; for a bond with the other members and dependence upon a Superior suffices. Hence a religious bishop and an exclaustrated religious remain in the religious state (can. 627-629; 638 and 639).

3. The evangelical counsels, that is, the counsels of obedience, chastity, and poverty. Namely, the religious state is ordered to perfection, and not to common but to higher perfection; hence it ought to exclude the things which are an impediment to the said perfection, which are comprehended in these words: "All that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh and the concupiscence of the eyes and the pride of life."¹ Now the concupiscence of the flesh is healed through chastity, the concupiscence of the eyes through poverty, and the pride of life through obedience. The aforesaid are called simply the evangelical counsels, because not only are they commended in the Gospel like many other things, but they are also universal means which by their nature remove all impediments to evangelical perfection.

4. To be observed through vows. For state and stability demand obligation; but there is required an obligation arising from a vow, that is, from a promise made to God, because an obligation of this kind corresponds to the nature of the religious state, by which someone devotes himself to God (St. Thomas 2-2, q. 186, article 6). There are required - which is understood rather than expressed by can. 487 - vows emitted in some religion, and therefore public vows accepted in the name of the Church (can. 488, 1st, and 572). For no one would admit that the Church recognizes as religious those who do not belong to some religion. But it is not required that the vows be solemn or perpetual; temporary vows suffice, though to be renewed after the time has elapsed (can. 488, 1st); in that case sufficient stability is had.

Moreover, in fact ecclesiastical approval is required for the religious state. For the religious state, as has been noted, is not had except in some religion; but every religion must be approved by ecclesiastical authority (can. 488, 1st). It is disputed, however, whether an approval of this kind is required from the nature of the thing, or from ecclesiastical law alone. Now it must be said that it is required from ecclesiastical law alone. For the religious state from the nature of the thing says only the profession of the evangelical counsels through vows; but ecclesiastical approval does not enter into this profession. The Church merely recognizes what already exists. But the approval of the Bishop according to the norm of can. 492, § 1, concerning which below, suffices. The reason is that these societies are indicated even by the Code itself (can. 488, 3rd) by the name of religion, and the members of these societies are called religious (can. 488, 7th); wherefore the canons, whenever they speak of religious, also understand the members of these societies, unless the contrary is expressly established.

¹ 1 John II, 16.

II. The end of the religious state is Christian perfection (can. 488, 1st; St. Thomas 2-2, q. 186, article 2). But perfection consists:

1. Essentially in charity; for "each thing is said to be perfect insofar as it attains its proper end, which is the ultimate perfection of the thing. But charity is what unites us to God, who is the ultimate end of the human mind, because he who abides in charity abides in God and God in him, as is said in 1 John 4; and therefore according to charity especially is the perfection of the Christian life considered" (St. Thomas 2-2, q. 184, article 1). But perfection consists in charity "principally indeed according to love of God, but secondarily according to love of neighbor" (St. Thomas 2-2, q. 184, article 3).

2. Accidentally and instrumentally perfection consists in other virtues, or in the observance of the precepts of other virtues, and in the observance of the counsels, namely insofar as "precepts other than the precepts of charity are ordered to removing those things which are contrary to charity, with which, namely, charity cannot exist; but the counsels are ordered to removing impediments of the act of charity, which nevertheless are not contrary to charity, such as marriage, occupation with secular business, and other things of this kind" (St. Thomas, loc. cit.).

Corollary I. Bishops are said to be in the state of perfection because in a special way they have bound themselves to perfection, not indeed by emitting vows which correspond to the three evangelical counsels, but by assuming the pastoral office, by which they have entered a bond of itself perpetual with their church; for through this, says St. Thomas, they have publicly and perpetually bound themselves to obey that supreme counsel of charity, even of giving their life for their sheep (2-2, q. 184, articles 5 and 7). But they are said to be in the state of acquired perfection, or rather of perfection to be exercised, because of the excellent exercise of charity toward neighbor in the pastoral office. Religious are said to be in the state of perfection to be acquired according to these words of St. Thomas: "It is manifest, however, that for one who works toward an end, it is not of necessity fitting that he has already attained the end, but it is required that by some way he tend toward the end; and therefore he who assumes the state of religion is not bound to have perfect charity, but he is bound to tend to this and to devote effort so that he may have perfect charity" (2-2, q. 186, article 2).

Corollary II. Perfection, as is clear, can also be had without the state of perfection, for example among simple faithful; but a tepid religious, although he is in the state of perfection, is in no way perfect.

III. Institution. The religious state according to its substance was instituted immediately by Christ Himself, and thus it is deservedly said to be of divine law, not commanding, but counseling. And indeed Christ is deservedly said to have instituted religion immediately, if He exhorted to the three evangelical counsels and to their being confirmed by vow; for by these the substance of the religious state is constituted. But that this took place is clear: with regard to poverty, from Matt. XIX, 29; 16 sq., and Luke XIV, 26; with regard to chastity, from Matt. XIX, 12, and 1 Cor. VII, 25 sq.; with regard to the three counsels, from those words by which Christ invites to perfection the young man who until then had lived the state of common life: "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven, and come, follow me." Namely, by these words poverty and obedience are directly commended, but chastity implicitly, because without it strict imitation of Christ would be impossible. Besides, Christ counsels a stable manner of acting;¹ this demands obligation, and one founded on a vow (n. 1211). Therefore Christ implicitly also exhorted to vows.

¹ Mark X, 17 sq.; Luke IX, 57 sq.; XVIII, 18 sq.

IV. The excellence of the religious state follows from what has been said, and is proved by the praises of the holy Fathers and of other doctors and holy men.

It should also be noted that, according to the common opinion of doctors, the religious state can never fully fail in the Church because of her mark of sanctity; wherefore not even the Roman Pontiff himself could totally suppress all religious families at once.

Therefore can. 487 deservedly declares that the religious state is to be held in honor by all.

I. Notion. A religion is: A society approved by legitimate ecclesiastical authority, in which the members, according to the proper laws of the society itself, pronounce public vows, perpetual or temporary, though to be renewed after the time has elapsed, and thus tend to evangelical perfection (can. 488, 1st).

II. Division. Religions are divided:

1. By reason of vows, into Orders and religious Congregations, or simply Congregations. An Order is a religion in which solemn vows are pronounced. A religious Congregation is a religion in which vows that are only simple, whether perpetual or temporary, are emitted (can. 488, 2nd).

2. By reason of dependence, into exempt and non-exempt. An exempt religion is a religion, whether of solemn or simple vows, withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the local Ordinary. A non-exempt religion is subject to the jurisdiction of the Ordinary (can. 488, 2nd).

3. By reason of approval, into religions of pontifical right and of diocesan right. The former are those which have obtained either approval or at least a decree of praise from the Apostolic See. The latter are those which, erected by Ordinaries, have not yet obtained this decree of praise (can. 488, 3rd).

4. By reason of members, into clerical and lay. A clerical religion is one whose members for the most part¹ are advanced to the priesthood. A lay religion is one which consists uniquely or at least chiefly of lay members (can. 488, 4th).

5. By reason of the principal work, into contemplative, active, and mixed, according as they are principally devoted to contemplation (Carthusians, Trappists, etc.), to the corporal works of mercy (Camillians, Brothers of St. John of God, etc.), or to teaching and preaching (Friars Preachers, Friars Minor, Society of Jesus, Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, etc.). Now "those religions hold the highest grade which are ordered to teaching and preaching" (St. Thomas 2-2, q. 188, article 6); "for just as it is greater to illuminate than only to shine, so it is greater to hand on to others the things contemplated than only to contemplate" (St. Thomas, loc. cit.). "But those which are ordered to contemplation hold the second grade; the third is of those which are occupied with external actions" (St. Thomas, loc. cit.).

"But in each of these grades preeminence can be considered according as one religion is ordered to a higher act in the same genus; just as among works of the active life it is preferable to redeem captives than to receive guests; and in works of the contemplative life, prayer is preferable to reading. Preeminence can also be considered if one of them is ordered to more of these things than another; or if it has statutes more suitable for attaining the proposed end" (St. Thomas, loc. cit.).

Note 1. Diversity of religions provides better: 1st, for the necessity and utility of the Church; 2nd, for the increase of members.²

Note 2. "To pass from one religion to another, unless on account of great utility or necessity, is not praiseworthy; both because from this those who are left behind are usually scandalized, and also because someone progresses more easily in the religion to which he is accustomed than in one to which he is not accustomed, other things being equal" (St. Thomas q. 189, article 8).

¹ It is said thus because in a religion of priests and lay members, the former are commonly more numerous. Nevertheless it suffices that the class of laymen be subordinated to the other; hence the Sacred Congregation of Religious has already recognized as clerical a religion in which laymen were more numerous (Vermeersch, Epitome, 4th ed., n. 542).

² The errors of the Synod of Pistoia concerning the multiplicity of religions were condemned by Pius VI in the Constitution Auctorem fidei, 28 August 1794.

III. Subsidiary notions. In order that the things which pertain to the law of religious may be better understood, it is pleasing to add the notions which the Code in can. 488, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th places first, and which regard: 1st, houses; 2nd, provinces; 3rd, members of religions; 4th, Superiors. Now:

1. A religious house is called a house of some religion in general; a regular house is a house of an Order; a formed house is called a religious house in which at least six professed religious dwell, of whom, if there is question of a clerical religion, at least four are priests (can. 488, 5th).

2. By the name of province is understood the union of several religious houses joined together among themselves under the same Superior, constituting part of the same religion (can. 488, 6th).

3. Under the name of religious come those who have pronounced vows in some religion; under the name of religious of simple vows, those who are in a religious Congregation; of regulars, those who are in an Order; of sisters, religious women of simple vows; of nuns, religious women of solemn vows, or, unless something else is clear from the nature of the thing or from the context of the discussion, religious women whose vows from the institute are solemn but for some places by prescription of the Apostolic See are simple (can. 488, 7th). To nuns pertain Carmelite religious women, Poor Clares, religious women of the Most Holy Redeemer (Redemptoristines), etc.

4. Under the name of major Superiors come: the Abbot Primate, the Abbot Superior of a monastic Congregation, the Abbot of a monastery sui iuris, even if belonging to a monastic Congregation, the supreme Moderator of a religion, the provincial Superior, their vicars, and others having power after the manner of provincials (can. 488, 8th); likewise probably the superior and superiorissa of a house which is sui iuris (cf. can. 504).

IV. Solemnity of vows. 1. A solemn vow is had only when the Church recognizes it as such (can. 1308, § 2).

2. A solemn vow renders acts contrary to the vow, if they are capable of being invalidated, illicit and invalid; a simple vow renders them illicit only, but not invalid, unless something else has been expressly provided (can. 579). Thus, for example, the solemn vow of poverty renders religious incapable of having ownership of goods, whether direct or beneficial, namely independently of Superiors; the solemn vow of chastity renders a marriage to be contracted invalid (can. 1073), and besides dissolves a ratified non-consummated marriage (can. 1119).

3. A solemn vow does not differ from a simple one in such a way that, if it has been violated, the circumstance of solemnity must of itself be expressed in confession. Accidentally, on account of the incapacity annexed, a new sin can arise. Besides, merit of itself is equal; but accidentally, on account of the incapacitating force, greater merit can be had in solemn profession, just as, conversely, in simple profession, for example on account of the greater liberality by which someone hands himself over to an Institute which is not so strictly obliged toward him as he is toward the Institute, or because of greater dependence in common life, and so forth; moreover the merit of a vow of perseverance can be added.

4. A solemn vow as such, or the solemnity of a vow, is an institute of merely ecclesiastical law; this seems altogether to have to be admitted, considering the sole chapter De voto, III, 15, in the Sext; Gregory XIII, Constitution Quanto fructuosius;¹ Constitution Ascendente Domino.² Cf. also can. 636.

5. It is disputed in what precisely the nature of solemnity consists.

According to some, it is placed in ceremonies and external rites. But solemn vows can be emitted without ceremonies and rites, as formerly in tacit profession.

According to others, in certain juridic effects. But the aforesaid effects can be removed from solemn vows, as was done for the Regulars of Belgium and Holland.

According to others, in a more perfect handing over of oneself, at least of the body, together with its acceptance made by the Church in the name of God; or, as others refine this opinion, in the conjunction of vows with a more perfect handing over of oneself, together with acceptance by the Church, both perpetual on either side and indissoluble by the ordinary way.³ I said at least of the body, because in the vow of chastity annexed to sacred order, only a more perfect handing over of the body has place. But the solemnity of a vow is an institute of merely ecclesiastical law, as we said under IV; and with that doctrine the opinion just set out is joined with difficulty.

According to others, in a more perfect and of itself immutable handing over, together with a force incapacitating the person for certain moral effects. But to this opinion the same objections are opposed as to the immediately preceding opinion.

According to others, in a special authenticity of vows, or in a certain special extrinsic juridic quality annexed by the Church to certain vows, to which by the ordinary way there has been added the force of invalidating acts contrary to the vows, if they are capable of being invalidated. But this special authenticity or special quality should not be taken for publicity only, but for greater notability or inviolability. This opinion, since serious difficulties do not seem to stand in its way, is preferred.

¹ February 1583.

² 25 May 1584.

³ According to the supporters of this opinion, a person bound by solemn vows is like a thing consecrated to God; but a person bound by simple vows is like a blessed thing.

Cooperation in Religious Activities.—A third danger of making external profession of a false religion is cooperation in activities whose tendency or principles are erroneous (see 944). Cooperation in a false religion is of two kinds, immediate and mediate. (a) Cooperation is immediate, when one takes a part in an act of a false religion itself (e.g., by worshipping an idol). This kind of cooperation was discussed above, as participation or communication (see 956-975). (b) Cooperation is mediate, when one takes part, not in an act of a false religion, but in some other act which is a preparation for a help to the act of a false religion. This is the kind of cooperation we are now considering.

Mediate cooperation is of various kinds. (a) It is proximate or remote, according as the preparation or help afforded to false religion is near to or far from the religious act. Thus, to make ready the lights, incense, flowers, etc. in front of an idol is proximate cooperation; to give money to an idolatrous priest or bonze is remote cooperation. (b) Mediate cooperation is material or formal, according as the intention of the cooperator is to share in or help error itself, or merely to help those who are in error, while disapproving of their error. Thus, if one prepares a pagan temple for worship or contributes money towards its maintenance because one’s sympathies are with its idolatry, one’s cooperation is formal; if one does these things only in order to make a living or to show friendship to an individual pagan, one’s cooperation is material. It is clear that formal cooperation is a grave sin against faith, and hence we shall speak now only of material cooperation.

The principles governing the lawfulness of material cooperation will be treated at length below in their proper place among the sins opposed to charity. But since, on account of the mixed conditions of society today, there are innumerable cases of material cooperation in religion, it will be useful to state in advance in this place the principles bearing on material cooperation and their application to cases on religion and worship. The principles are the same as those given for an act that has two effects, one good and the other bad. Hence, material cooperation is not lawful, except when the following conditions are present:

(a) The action of him who cooperates must be good in itself or at least indifferent, for of course, if it is evil, it is not lawful. Thus, if a person were to give to one pagan temple objects he had stolen from another temple, his action would be intrinsically sinful on account of the theft. Similarly, if a person were to contribute to a collection list as “sympathizer” with a school for the propagation of atheism or as “beneficiary” from the sacrifices to be offered an idol, his act would be intrinsically sinful as being a promotion of error or superstition, even though he were not really a sympathizer with atheism or a believer in idols.

(b) The intention of him who cooperates must be good; for, if he wills to help a false religion, he is guilty of formal cooperation; if he wills some other wrong end, he is guilty of some other species of sin. Thus, if one who does not believe in idolatry contributes to it on account of sympathy with anti-Christian movements, he is guilty of enmity to the truth.

(c) There must be a reason for the cooperation proportionate to the gravity of the sin which will be committed by others, to the proximity and necessity of the cooperation, and to the obligation which one has of preventing the sin of others. Examples: To contribute to a sect which plots the downfall of legitimate authority is never lawful, for there is no reason of temporal or private good that can be a compensation for the destruction of the public good. To contribute to the building of a Mohammedan mosque does not require so serious a reason as to contribute to the building of a pagan temple, for mosques are not used for idolatry. A graver reason is needed to justify ringing the bell or ushering the people to their seats for a service of false worship than to justify sweeping and dusting the temple the day before the service, for in the former case the cooperation is closer. A greater reason is required to build a house of false worship, when there is no one else to build it, than when there are many others who will gladly build it if one refuses, for in the former case one’s cooperation is so necessary that without it the false worship cannot take place, but not so in the latter case. A much more serious reason would be required to justify parents conducting their children to a place of false worship than would be required to justify a public chauffeur in taking passengers thither; for the parents have a special duty to guard the religion of their children.

The above principles on mediate cooperation are clear enough, but it is frequently very difficult to apply them on account of the uncertainty as to whether or not a particular act of cooperation is indifferent in itself, or whether a particular reason for cooperation is sufficient. But the following rules will help:

(a) An act is indifferent or good, when it does not tend to evil from its very nature or the circumstances, but has purposes that are not bad. It is bad when either intrinsically (i.e., from its nature) or extrinsically (i.e., from circumstances) it tends necessarily to evil. Examples: A derisory image of Christ and the manual of an obscene cult are intrinsically evil, inasmuch as they necessarily convey error or immorality. To draw up plans for a temple of idolaters in a Christian country would have the appearance of favoring the propagation of idolatry; to work on the construction of a temple in a pagan country where the lending of one’s labor is regarded as a sign of acceptance of paganism, to help build a meeting house for a sect that plots the overthrow of government or religion—all these acts are indifferent in themselves (for one may also draw plans and put up walls for good or indifferent purposes), but from the circumstances they are evil in the cases given.

(b) Reasons for cooperation may be ranked as great, greater and greatest according to the kinds of goods that are at stake, and their sufficiency or insufficiency may be determined by measuring them with the gravity of the cooperation that is given. Great reasons are: fear of serious suffering, or of the wrath of husband or other superior, or of loss of an opportunity to make a considerable profit. Greater reasons are: fear of loss of position, or of notable detriment to reputation or fortune, or of severe imprisonment. Among the greatest reasons for cooperation in the worship of a false religion are the following: danger of loss of life or limb, of perpetual imprisonment, of great dishonor, of loss of all one’s earthly possessions, of disturbance of the public peace.

Cases of cooperation in false religion that occur most frequently are: (a) contributions made to schools, churches, institutions; (b) labor given to buildings and objects of worship or instruction; (c) labor given to acts of worship or instruction.

Contributions to false worship are unlawful, even apart from scandal, danger of perversion, and the bad intention of the cooperator in the following cases:

(a) When on account of circumstances the contributions are signs of sympathy with religious errors. Examples: Titus gives many stipends for Masses to a schismatical priest. Balbus, when asked, contributes liberally to a fund for the building of a hall under the auspices of atheists. Caius, without being asked, gives a small donation towards the erection of a pagan temple. Claudius sends in a subscription to the treasury of a political organization whose purpose is anti-religious, and promises to support their ticket.

(b) Contributions, even though they manifest no sympathy with religious error, are unlawful, when there is no reason for the cooperation, or only an insufficient reason. Examples: Caius contributes to a pagan temple for no other reason than that he has not the heart to refuse anyone. Titus advertises constantly in an antireligious paper in order to help his business (cfr. 1530).

If there is no bad intention on the part of the contributor, and if the danger of scandal or perversion is excluded, contributions are permitted under the following conditions, of which both must be present:

(a) The contribution must not be a mark of sympathy with religious error. This condition will be fulfilled more readily in countries of mixed religion, where Catholics and non-Catholics have been long associated together, and where non-Catholic denominations are engaged in many things other than the preaching of their doctrines, such as works of benevolence. Example: Balbus contributes at times to the building or maintenance of Protestant orphan asylums, hospitals, and schools, in a locality where these institutions are open to all and a contribution is not regarded as a sign of agreement with sectarian purposes.

(b) There must be a sufficient reason for making the contribution, such as the common good or great private necessity. Examples: Claudius contributes to the building of a non-Catholic church, in order that Catholics may thus obtain exclusive use of a church till then used by Catholics and non-Catholics alike. Titus buys tickets for bazaars, lawn fetes, oyster suppers, dances, picnics and other entertainments held for the benefit of non-Catholic churches, since, if he does not do this, he will lose trade and his business will be injured.

The building of houses of false worship, the production and sale of articles used in false worship, are unlawful also in two cases:

(a) when, on account of circumstances, they are a mark of approval of the false worship. Examples: Christians of Japan were forbidden by the Church to cooperate in the erection of altars or temples to idols, even if threatened with death or exile, and the reason of the prohibition seems to have been in each instance that such work was looked on and demanded as a profession of faith in paganism. Similarly, the construction of non-Catholic edifices in a Catholic country, of a pagan temple in a Christian country, or of an atheistic hall, would be signs of approbation of error. It is difficult to see how one who sells idols to those who request them for purposes of idolatry does not show favor to false worship, although he might be excused if, under threat of great harm, he delivered them with a protest that he was acting under compulsion;

(b) when there is no reason, or no sufficient reason, for cooperation with false worship. Example: Balbus helps to build non-Catholic places of worship for no other reason than that he is asked to do so, or that he receives good pay.

Building non-Catholic temples or furnishing the appurtenances of worship, scandal and other evil being avoided, are lawful under two conditions as above:

(a) the work must not be regarded as a sign of approval of false worship. Examples: The Church has permitted Christians to assist in the construction of Mohammedan mosques, when this was done unwillingly by them and under compulsion. The manufacture of statues of Buddha or of other idols is not a sign that one approves of idolatry, because these objects have legitimate uses, such as adornment of palaces or art galleries. Similarly, the production and distribution of emblems of a non-Catholic sect or secret society is regarded as being in itself an indifferent sect, on account of the various uses to which such objects may be put;

(b) there must be a reason sufficiently grave for doing this kind of work. Hence, a greater reason is needed to build a pagan temple than a Mohammedan mosque, and graver reason to build a mosque than an heretical place of worship; likewise, greater reason is required to cooperate as architect than as hirer and supervisor of labor, greater reason to cooperate as supervisor of labor than as stonecutter, bricklayer, etc.; greater reason is required to justify selling than making idols; greater reason to justify selling altar cloths and breads for the Lord’s Supper than for selling pews and stained glass windows. Examples: Since lights, benches, bells, tables, cloths, etc., are not necessarily intended for direct use in acts of worship, a sufficient reason for selling them to non-Catholic churches is the profit that will be made. But, since vestments and chalices pertain directly to worship, a more serious reason is required for selling them than business gains.

Making the preparations for non-Catholic services is unlawful in the two cases given above, that is, when there is approval or insufficient reason. (a) If the work manifests an approval of the services, it is unlawful. Such positions as sexton, sacristan, usher, beadle, church-warden, and trustee, imply recognition of the worship or membership in the congregation, although the same does not seem to be true of membership in the civil corporation of a church, nor of external offices such as janitor, caretaker, and attorney. Examples: Balba, an Anglican who is sick, wishes her minister to bring her communion. She asks her nurse, Titia, who is a Catholic, to telephone the minister to bring communion, and also directs Titia to prepare an altar and assist the minister on his arrival by lighting the candles, making responses, etc. Titia may not consent, for such immediate cooperation would mean approval of and participation in Anglican rites. Claudius, a Catholic, is hired by the minister of a Protestant church to take care of the yard and garden about the church and parsonage. Sometimes the minister asks Claudius to play the chimes in his church tower which call the people to the services. The gardening work is indifferent, but the playing of the chimes seems at least an unlawful cooperation, since it is an invitation to non-Catholic worship.

(b) If there is no sufficient reason for the work, it is unlawful. Examples: Gaia, a Catholic, acts as scrubwoman and cleaner in a schismatical church for no other reason than friendship for members of the altar society. On certain feast days her husband, Caius, a Catholic, takes pilgrims to the schismatical church in a bus, only because he makes considerable profit.

Making preparations for non-Catholic services, scandal and other danger being avoided, is lawful when the two conditions given above are present. (a) Hence, the preparations must contain no indication of approval of the services. Examples: If Titia, the nurse mentioned in the previous paragraph, called in an Anglican nurse to receive and fulfill the orders of Balba, she would show that she did not herself approve of the rites, and her act would be indifferent in itself. If she could not avoid telephoning the minister without serious consequences, it would not be unlawful for her to tell him that Balba wished him to call. She might even in great necessity prepare the table herself, but could take no part in the rite. The acts of telling the minister that a visit from him was desired and of preparing the table would not be, in the circumstances, approving of the rite that followed. If Claudius mentioned in the foregoing paragraph wound up the clock in the church tower, or rang the bell at certain times to indicate the hour of the day, his acts would be indifferent, since they have no necessary reference to worship.

(b) There must be a reason sufficiently grave for engaging in the work that prepares for the services. Examples: If Caia mentioned in the preceding paragraph were in great poverty and could find no other employment, this would be a sufficient reason for her cooperation. Likewise, if her husband drove a bus that carried passengers to whatever destination they desired, and he could not refuse to let them off at the church without being dismissed or causing other like inconveniences, he would have sufficient reason for his cooperation.

Scandal resembles solicitation and complicity, since like them it exercises an evil influence on others; but it is not identical with them.

(a) Thus, solicitation influences another to evil by counsel, persuasion, command, or invitation; scandal may influence to evil either in these ways or by mere example. Again, solicitation does not necessarily intend the fall of another into guilt, as does scandal. Thus, one may solicit another to get drunk who had already determined to get drunk, or one may persuade another that drunkenness is no sin, and then solicit him to drunkenness. But, if one who intends the demoralization and corruption of his neighbor solicits him to drunkenness, solicitation is joined with scandal.

(b) Complicity or cooperation influences another to evil by helping him in the commission of sin; scandal influences him to evil by suggesting that he commit sin. Example: Titus, an elderly man, gets drunk or praises drunkards in the presence of Balbus, a youth. Influenced by these acts and words, Balbus tells his acquaintance Claudius that he intends to get drunk, and Claudius supplies him with the intoxicants. Titus is guilty of scandal, Claudius of cooperation.

The Duties of Persons Engaged to Marry.—We shall speak first of the duty of entering into a nuptial engagement, and next of the duties which engagement imposes.

(a) Per se, there is no obligation for an individual to marry, for the need of marriage is not a personal but a social one, and social duties do not all fall upon each particular person. Each person must take necessary food, for without it the individual perishes, and eating is thus an individual duty; but each person need not be a soldier, or farmer, or builder, or merchant, or married; for it suffices that these offices be fulfilled, one by one individual, another by another. Indeed, if marriage is an impediment to a more urgent good of the common welfare (e.g., perilous public service incompatible with married life), or of private good (e.g., the duty of maintaining parents, the wish to remain single because one feels oneself unsuited for marriage or called to continence), marriage should not be chosen.

(b) Per accidens, there is sometimes a duty of marrying on account of public or private necessity. Thus, if the community is depopulated by race-suicide, the public good should move suitable persons to marry in order to assist the birth rate; for, if those are considered slackers who refuse their service or money in war time when the nation is threatened with death from without, are not those also culpable who will not assist a community threatened with extinction from within? Marriage is also obligatory on those who feel that they are unable to live continently, and will be lost unless they marry (I Cor., vii. 9). In case of seduction, marriage is a form of restitution to the injured girl, but since forced marriages are usually unhappy, the injury should be atoned for in some other way if the seducer does not care for the girl or is not desirable himself (see 1803).

What is the religious state? - The religious state, considered as regards its intrinsic essence, is defined: A stable institute of life, approved by the Church for the faithful, who under a certain rule and common manner of living wish to tend to perfection through the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, with a handing over of themselves made to God and accepted by him. Therefore religious do not necessarily belong either to the hierarchy of jurisdiction or to the hierarchy of order; but they are, or can be, simple faithful in the Church, and therefore of either sex. - Suarez, de Relig. tr. 7, l. 2, c. 1, n. 1.

Their state is a state of perfection. There is indeed a twofold state of life: one of common life, which intends nothing other than the observance of the commandments of God; another of perfection, which adds the observance of the counsels. The perfection of Christian life is in charity. "Each thing is said to be perfect insofar as it attains its proper end, which is the ultimate perfection of the thing. But charity is that which unites us to God, who is the ultimate end of the human mind." St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 184, a. 1. Therefore the perfection which constitutes the state of perfection, distinct from the state of common life, is the perfection of charity.

Moreover a threefold perfection of charity can be considered. The first is absolute, by which "God is loved as much as he is lovable, and such perfection is not possible for any creature, but belongs to God alone." Another, by which "the affection according to its whole power always actually tends toward God; and such perfection is not possible on the way, but will be in the fatherland." The third, by which "those things are excluded which are repugnant to the motion of love toward God.... And such perfection can be had in this life. And this in two ways: in one way insofar as from the affection of man is excluded everything which is contrary to charity, such as mortal sin; and without such perfection charity cannot exist, whence it is of the necessity of salvation; in another way insofar as from the affection of man is excluded not only that which is contrary to charity, but also everything which impedes the affection of the mind from being totally directed to God, without which perfection charity can exist." St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 184, a. 2. Hence precepts pertain to that former charity; counsels to this latter.

Therefore that perfection of charity is certainly not in merely essential charity, but in a certain peculiar superabundance of charity, which surpasses the common and necessary charity of Christians. But this excess of charity is not situated in some one or several transitory acts of charity, even if they are of great or greatest intensity; but in such charity, in preparation of soul and habitual disposition, that a man is proximately prepared and disposed to act easily and ordinarily according to the precepts and counsels of God. St. Thomas q. 184, a. 2, 3, 4. And thus the same Angelic Doctor, q. 186, a. 1 ad 4, says: "The state of religion is principally instituted for acquiring perfection through certain exercises by which the impediments of perfect charity are removed." And a. 2: "He who assumes the state of Religion ... is held to tend to this and to give labor to it, that he may have perfect charity."

Now the state of perfection is twofold: one is the state of acquired perfection, another of perfection to be acquired. The former is proper to Bishops, the latter to religious. Indeed the state of Bishops is the state of exercising charity in a more notable grade, and of moving others to it by chosen works of zeal. But the state of perfection to be acquired is one thing incomplete or begun, another complete. For the former the three principal evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience are not required; but some counsel is sufficient, whether it is one of those three principal ones or another, for the counsels are very many in number. But for the latter the three evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience are required and suffice, to be observed from obligation; and consequently they must be confirmed by vow. For by these three vows almost all impediments of charity are removed. But the religious state is the complete state of perfection to be acquired. - St. Thomas q. 184, a. 4-8; q. 186, a. 3-7; Quodl. 3, a. 17; Quodl. 4, a. 24; Quodl. 5, a. 19.

Those three vows, although nevertheless of themselves they ought to be perpetual, for this is required by the very nature of the state; by no means is it required from the intrinsic nature of the thing that they be solemn, but it is enough that they be simple. This is openly established from the Constitution Quanto fructuosius of Gregory XIII, 1583, and Ascendente Domino, 8 Kalends of June 1584, where it is established that those who have emitted the three simple vows in the Society of Jesus are truly and properly religious. Moreover Leo XIII, Decree of March 16, 1886, established that knights of the Teutonic Order continue to become true religious, but emit only simple vows.

The solemnity of vows is from the disposition of the Church; hence it is a certain force added to them, of constituting one as religious properly and strictly such from canonical institution, and of making certain acts of a religious, concerning the matter of the same vows, void or at least voidable, and of dissolving ratified marriage, and of rendering the vows themselves altogether firm and stable. And that force is absolute, and not merely relative to a certain time, or until the religious, free from vows, is dismissed. Hence for the solemnity of vows it is not sufficient that there be just any force of producing the aforesaid effects; but that force must be absolute, i.e., so perpetual and immutable that neither the religious nor even the religion itself can suspend or remove that force and the vow itself. But it is by no means required, as is clear, that that force of the vow and the vow itself cannot be removed by the Roman Pontiff; for that force is of ecclesiastical law, and therefore the Pope can dispense both from the effect of the solemnity of vows, while solemn vows remain, Decree of the S. C. of Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, July 31, 1878, and from the solemn vows themselves. Therefore the solemnity of a vow is in its complete dependence on and subjection to the Supreme Pontiff, in the full acceptance and approval of the Church as regards the being of the vow, its force, and the said canonical effects. And thus Busembaum, l. 3, n. 195, says a solemn vow "is that which is accepted as such by the Church.... But simple is every vow which does not have such solemnity," namely such acceptance of the Church as regards the aforesaid canonical effects. And the S. Penitentiary in the year 1820 declared: "a solemn vow is that which is accepted as such by the Church, and renders the one vowing perpetually and immovably incapable of contracting marriage and of acquiring or retaining dominions of things." "And this is," says Cajetan on 2. 2, q. 88, a. 7, "what Boniface VIII determined in the Sixth, saying that the solemnity of a vow was found by the institution of the Church alone." And St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 189, a. 5: "The vow of religion is twofold. One is simple, which consists in the promise alone made to God, which proceeds from interior deliberation of the mind, and this vow has efficacy from divine law.... But another is the solemn vow, which makes a monk or religious; and this indeed is subjected to the ordering of the Church because of the solemnity which it has annexed," a solemnity not extrinsic from extrinsic ceremonies, but intrinsic by reason of the object insofar as it extends broadly, and of the immobility of the vow itself. And from this ordering of the Church the Angelic Doctor immediately repeats that a vow made before puberty "does not have its effect, so that it makes the one professing already to be religious," and consequently that it is not solemn, "however much someone may have full use of reason, or be capable of fraud, namely because the Church regards that which is in the majority of cases." Therefore the solemnity of a vow is not from the nature itself of the vow, but from the constitution alone of the Church, accepting and approving the vow, and by that acceptance and approval implicitly blessing the person and perfectly, totally, and stably consecrating him in order to observe chastity, obedience, and poverty, in the profession of a certain rule, "by which through renunciation of the world and of one's own will someone assumes the state of perfection, and totally subjects himself to divine service." St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 83, a. 7. "The solemnity of a vow consists in a certain spiritual blessing and consecration, which is done through the ministry of the Church; therefore the solemnization of a vow falls under the disposition of the Church." St. Thomas l. c. a. 9; C. Quod votum un. de Vot. et vot. red. in 6. - St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 88, a. 7, 9; q. 133, a. 1; q. 134, a. 4, 5; q. 186. Cf. here vol. 1, n. 571.

Hence a distinction is especially had between Religion properly and strictly said, according to canonical institution, and a religious Congregation. For by Religions properly and strictly said are to be understood institutes which have the essence of the religious state with solemn vows; but by Religious Congregations are to be understood institutes which have the essence of the religious state, but with simple vows only, approved however by the Holy See, and so approved that the vows which are emitted in such a Congregation are not private vows, but public, i.e., are accepted by someone in the name of the Congregation or of the Apostolic See, whence they are said to be made into his hands. Otherwise it is not a religious Congregation, but a secular one. Benedict XIV, Brief Quo magis, December 18, 1742; S. C. Bishops and Regulars, August 11, 1889; Enchiridion Morale 248, ed. 4, p. 224.

By this pronouncing of the three vows, with attention to their nature, there is had a total handing over of oneself to God, St. Thomas q. 186, a. 7, a. 6 ad 2; yet this is accepted not immediately by God himself, but by some man in his name. And thus it was always judged by the Fathers that the religious state is a donation and handing over of oneself made to God. But God, "according to ordinary providence, does not receive a peculiar care of governing a private person immediately by himself, nor does he need these sensible things, so that he may use them immediately and without the intervention of secondary causes. And therefore a donation thus made to God either would be vain and idle, or as if tempting God by demanding immediate governance from him: and for this reason it does not please him, nor is it accepted immediately by him." Suarez, de Relig. l. 2, c. 4, n. 7, 8. By the acceptance and approval of these vows on the part of the Church, a blessing and consecration of the person is implicitly had, whence the person becomes sacred, i.e., irrevocably devoted to God. And then the vows are solemn. St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 184, a. 4. - And if the acceptance on the part of the Church is not for every effect of the aforesaid vows, but only for some, and therefore the vows are not solemn but simple, then there is not had a blessing and consecration of the person, but a certain simple blessing, which does not devote the person to God so immovably. Hence a dismissed person is ordinarily accustomed also to be dispensed from vows, and ceases to be dedicated to God. - Consequently, as by the profession of solemn vows a certain handing over and donation of oneself is had, so by simple vows a simple promise is had. St. Thomas Quodl. 3, a. 17, 18; Quodl. 8, a. 10; Quodl. 10, a. 11.

Hence it is entirely clear that the approval of the Church is needed for the religious state in the face of the Church. But the Church no longer approves eremitical life in the religious state, but common life under a certain rule and under certain constitutions. C. fin. de rel. dom.; C. un. e. t. in 6; Benedict XIV, Notification 105, n. 59 ff.; St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 188, a. 8; E. M.

248 bis. The approval required, for Orders of solemn vows, is the approval of the Supreme Pontiff; for Institutes of simple vows, the approval is first of the Bishops and then of the S. C. of Religious, as can be seen in the Norms edited for institutes of this kind by the S. C. Bishops and Regulars, June 28, 1901. - The approval of New Institutes and of their Constitutions is now done according to the Particular Norms established by the S. C. of Religious, March 24, 1914. "No Bishop or Ordinary of any place, unless the license of the Apostolic See has been had by letters, is to found a new Sodality (Religious) of either sex, or permit one to be founded in his Diocese." Pius X, Motu Proprio, July 16, 1906.

The Constitution of Supreme Pontiff Leo XIII Conditae a Christo Ecclesiae, 6 Ides of December 1900, and the Norms of the S. C. Bishops and Regulars, June 28, 1901, constitute the current Law according to which the Holy See is accustomed to approve New Institutes of simple Vows, for women and for men. At present they are accustomed to be approved only with simple vows, by a threefold Decree: of Praise, of Approval of the Institute, and of definitive Approval of the Constitutions. Regularly Religious Institutes without their own habit, and whose members do not live in Community, are not approved by the Holy See. Yet there are not lacking some Institutes approved by the Holy See without a special habit, and whose members, some live in Community and others outside Community.

From this approval of the Church, finally, depends the truly religious state and religious order or religion. To the point Benedict XIV, C. Quamvis iusto, Pridie Kalends of May 1749, § 13: "For if," he says, "for the essence of the truly religious state it is required that religion or an order in a state of this kind be established by the confirmation of the Apostolic See, according to canonical sanctions, concerning which in C. un. de Relig. dom. in 6, and it is not sufficient to have obtained merely from the same Apostolic See the approval and confirmation of rules which some society of men or women has prescribed for itself to be observed; if the vows of poverty, obedience, and chastity emitted by the English Virgins according to the form of the rules approved by Clement XI cannot be said to be joined with express or tacit profession in some order approved by the Apostolic See in the state of true religion, as is stated above, it is clearly evident both that the state of the English Virgins is not the state of true religion, and that the vows which are made by them must be judged at most simple vows, but not solemn ones, according to the paths of the Decretal of Pope Boniface VIII, which alone exists under the title de Voto et voti redempt. in 6." Cf. ib. § 14. Hence it is clear that religious vows are solemnized through the very profession of a rule fully approved by the Apostolic See in the state of true or strict religion.

Third Orders: Tertiaries, some are religious, living in community; others are secular, living in the world. As Confraternities imitate chapters and collegiate bodies of churches, so these secular third orders imitate religious congregations. Religious of solemn and simple vows cannot be enrolled in these secular Third Orders. S. C. Indulg., July 16, 1887; January 31, 1893. And the faithful regularly can be enrolled in only one Third Order. S. C. Indulg., June 21, 1893. Secular Tertiaries do not enjoy communication of privileges and indulgences with Regulars of the first and second Order, and with other Tertiaries. S. C. Indulg., July 18, 1902. But Tertiaries living in community, and bound by simple vows, legitimately aggregated to Orders, enjoy the indulgences of the first and second Order. S. C. Indulg., August 28, 1903. - Secular Third Orders have precedence in processions above any Sodalities whatsoever, provided they proceed collegially, in their proper habit, and under the cross.

You will resolve: From the profession of the religious state there results a reciprocal obligation between the religious and the community, namely by which not only is the religious held to remain in the order and to live in it according to his own rule and constitutions, but the order in turn is held not to cast him out without a just cause. The reason is that "a religious becomes a member of one mystical body, which is the religion itself; but this cannot be done except through mutual union between the whole and the part; and that union, since it is moral, is made through mutual obligation." Suarez, de Relig. l. 2, c. 4, n. 10.

A religious, by force of his profession, is not held to be perfect, but is held under grave obligation to devote himself in some way to perfection. St. Thomas q. 186, a. 1. But he must tend to perfection primarily through the essential means of the religious state, namely through observance of the three vows, poverty, chastity, and obedience; secondarily through accidental means, namely through the proper rules of the order, at least by not despising those helps. St. Thomas q. 186, a. 2, 7. Hence he sins gravely who firmly resolves not to tend to perfection, or in no way to care about it. And against this obligation of tending to perfection he does not sin gravely who only sometimes would sin gravely, but would not be habitually so disposed that he does not attend to it.

But whether a religious sins gravely who intends to observe only the commands under grave obligation, and as for the others, resolves to transgress them all, or not to care about them, is disputed. The first opinion probably affirms it, because a religious of this kind no longer tends to perfection. The second opinion, however, more common and more probable, denies it. The reason is that the obligation of tending to perfection is from religious profession, which consists in vows. From vows there is not a grave obligation of observing all things, but all things which gravely regard the vows themselves.

But to profess a rule, or according to a rule, is not to vow to observe all things which are in the rule, but to oblige oneself to regular life, against which nothing is gravely contrary except only that which is gravely against a grave precept expressed in the rule. But contempt of both is directly contrary to the profession of perfection and of regular life. L. 11; St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 186, a. 9; Quodl. 1, a. 20; Sanchez, in Decal. l. 6, c. 5, n. 5.

Therefore he also sins gravely who transgresses rules, even those obliging only to venial fault, or to none, from formal contempt, namely when he transgresses them with the mind of not being subject to them, or to the precepts of prelates. But otherwise if he transgresses them led by concupiscence, or because he thinks they are not necessary for salvation, or if he judges that they are not commanded under grave obligation. - Therefore to transgress rules in matters of small matter, even from custom, of itself does not exceed venial sin. Of itself, for it can be grave by reason of scandal, or if it were gravely pernicious to Religion by inducing others by bad example to laxity of the rule, or by reason of proximate danger of sinning gravely in some particular case, and if from it he were constituted in such a state that he must be expelled as incorrigible. St. Thomas q. 186, a. 9. - Yet not rarely there is no sin in transgression of rules, because rules do not oblige under fault, and the religious either places the act without advertence, or indeed places it with advertence, but from a just and reasonable motive. L. 10; Trent s. 25, c. 1, 22 de Reg.; E. M. - Ferraris v. Religiones Regulares et Militares.

Does the Rule always oblige and how? - Whether there is an obligation of observing the Rule, and how great it is, is ordinarily explained in the Rule itself. If nothing is determined in it, custom is to be attended to, which is the best interpreter of laws. Moreover no obligation is to be imposed unless it is certainly established concerning it. But sometimes in the Rule and in the Constitutions a grave obligation is imposed; sometimes only a light obligation of observing them; and sometimes there is had only an obligation of accepting or executing a penalty. If some Rule or Constitution contains no such obligation, then that Rule or Constitution is not properly a law or statute, but a mere counsel, by which a certain determined manner of perfection is proposed, to which the religious ought to aspire. Sanchez, in Decal. l. 6, c. 4, n. 9.

Hence in Rules and Constitutions prescriptions are to be distinguished from spiritual documents, which are often contained in them. - And although the Rules of Religious Institutes of themselves do not always oblige to sin, nevertheless sometimes of themselves and by accident they can oblige by force of the virtue of obedience; but they always oblige by force of a higher natural law, unless they present themselves as mere counsels. Practically speaking, however, in their transgression some fault is rarely absent. Rules of this kind are now customarily called Constitutions. Cf. Cases of Conscience, ed. 6, vol. 2, App. XI.

Besides the Rules, all Religious are evidently held to observe the laws of the Church with great submission. Several Apostolic Constitutions and Decrees gathered into one concerning the discipline of Regulars are to be read by the same Regulars at public table or in Chapter at stated times. But it is most highly commended to Bishops that they effectively spread among Religious Families and also diocesan Institutes the knowledge of the Decrees of the Holy See which regard religious life. S. C. of Religious, July 3, 1910.

Do religious, dispersed by force, remain bound by the obligations of religious life? - R. In the affirmative. For they remain true religious. Hence they are by no means to be judged released from their solemn vows; yet by reason of the peculiar condition in which they are found, some modification is to be attended to as regards obedience and poverty, for as regards chastity there can be no difficulty.

As regards obedience, from the accident of the suppression of the religion, the professed do not become seculars, nor are they released from vows, by which they still remain bound; but only it is permitted to them by the Sacred Congregation to live in the world and in the habit of a secular cleric, nevertheless carrying inwardly something proper to the regular habit, under the obedience and jurisdiction of the Ordinary. Yet they always remain subject to their own superiors. As regards poverty, dispersed regulars can licitly and validly procure for themselves useful or necessary things, but by no means superfluous ones, have money with them, and enter various contracts of buying, selling, and donation. For religious can do all these things from the license and deputation of prelates; moreover in the case of dispersion a deputation of this kind is rightly presumed. For then each one, by the fact itself, is deputed as if steward of himself, at least for all cases in which recourse to a superior cannot be had. L. 65 Note; Cardinal De Luca, Works tom. 14, Annot. ad S. Conc. Trid. disc. 36, n. 1-4; de Regul. p. 1, disc. 28, n. 16; E. M.

Does a religious promoted to a parish or episcopate remain bound by the obligations of religious life? - R. To the first: In the affirmative, and therefore he is held to wear the habit of the religion and to observe the rule in all things which can stand with his office, unless a contrary legitimate custom excuses. But if he acquires anything from the parochial office, he acquires it for the parish. - The Superior of a religious Order cannot exercise the office of pastor. S. C. Regular Discipline, May 28, 1715; Ferraris v. Parochus, art. 2, n. 85.

R. To the second: In the affirmative, according to the form of the Constitution Custodes of Benedict XIII, S. C. Bishops and Regulars, May 6, 1864. He is indeed held by the vow of obedience, but to the Roman Pontiff alone. He is also held by the vow of poverty; but first, after confirmation, he becomes capable of dominion and recovers rights of succession, even those which he had renounced, which are deferred to him after promotion; second, he does not acquire for himself, but for his cathedral church; and titular Bishops must distribute these things into pious works. Therefore he can neither dispose of these acquired goods by legacy, nor make a testament concerning them. Yet he can use and enjoy them, and dispose of his revenues among the living, as secular Bishops do. Likewise he is held by the Rules, but only by those which, in his judgment, are not repugnant to episcopal dignity and office. Yet he must wear the habit, at least as regards color, as before, and he can use the form which secular Bishops use. - Those promoted to the Cardinalate are judged to have the same law. C. Statutum est 1, causa 18, q. 1; C. Clerici 15 de Vita et hon. cler.; Ferraris v. Episcopus, a. 7; Suarez tom. 4, tr. 8, l. 3, c. 17, n. 5; c. 18, n. 4; L. 4; Lugo de Iust. et Iur. d. 3, n. 232, 233; Resp. Mor. l. 5, d. 1, 12; St. Thomas 2. 2, q. 185, a. 8; E. M.

Do apostates and fugitives remain bound by the same obligations? - R. In the affirmative, for they are released by no obligation legitimately. - If these and those acquire anything, when they have died it belongs by right of spoil to the Apostolic Camera. Gregory XIII, C. Officii nostri, January 27, 1577. - Lugo, de Iust. et Iur. d. 3, n. 235; Resp. Mor. l. 4, d. 37; Ferraris v. Apostasia, n. 21 ff.; L. 80, 82.

For apostasy from an Order or Institute, unless the Religious has returned within three months; and for flight from a Monastery, taking a woman with him, "the penalty of expulsion or dismissal is judged as if brought by law." S. C. of Religious, May 16, 1911.

Are those cast out and dismissed free from the said obligations? What about those secularized? - R. To the first: In the affirmative as regards merely regular observances; for by sentence, separated from religious life, they are no longer bound by the observances proper to religious life. Religious solemnly professed, not yet initiated in sacred orders, who are cast out or return to the world from Indult of the Holy See, are also released from the burden of the breviary. Cf. n. 112. - R. In the negative as regards vows, if it is a question of those solemnly professed; for by ejection they by no means cease. Hence they are held under grave obligation to amend themselves. Those cast out must walk in clerical habit and tonsure and be subject to the Ordinary of the place, also by force of the vow of obedience. Urban VIII, Decree de Apost. et eiect., 1624. They cannot make a testament, and whatever they acquire, by right of spoil, when they have died, pertains to the Apostolic Camera, excepting those things which they have preserved or acquired from goods of the religion. Gregory XIII, C. Officii nostri, 1577. In the meantime they have administration and use of goods, nor is it inspected how they expend them; but they can claim no dominion for themselves. St. Pius V, C. Grave nobis, May 26, 1560. - R. In the affirmative as regards vows, if it is a question of simple vows. For those dismissed and cast out are ordinarily accustomed also to be dispensed from simple vows, either by their own superiors, if they have such faculty, or by the Holy See. Bishops in France can dispense nuns of the ancient orders, who emit only simple vows, while the vow of chastity remains firm. S. Penitentiary, December 23, 1835. - Innocent XII, July 24, 1674; L. 79 ff.; St. Thomas Quodl. 12, a. 36; Ferraris v. Eiicere; Benedict XIV, de Syn. l. 13, c. 11, n. 19, 20; L. 142; E. M. "All Religious constituted in sacred orders, expelled or dismissed, remain perpetually suspended.... Clerics not in sacred orders are prohibited from ascending to higher orders. But all who have been expelled or dismissed, even if they have truly amended themselves, will not be able to be admitted to their own or another Order or Congregation without special license of the Holy See." S. C. of Religious, May 16, 1911.

R. To the second: Secularization contains the faculty for a Religious of living in the world. He is still held by vows. He is held, by force of the vow of obedience, to obey the Ordinary of the place. S. C. of Religious, September 1, 1912. He can make honest and licit expenses; but he does not acquire dominion of those things which are given to him. Hence he cannot dispose of them, and when he has died, they pass to the Camera of spoils. Nor indeed can he obtain ecclesiastical benefices without a new Indult.

Indults of perpetual or temporary secularization, or of relaxation of perpetual vows, or even only of temporary vows, or of the oath of perseverance, or of certain particular promises, granted to priests and clerics constituted in sacred orders, are always understood with the following clauses, even if not expressed, dispensation from which is reserved to the Holy See, namely: They are forbidden, without a new and special indult of the Holy See: 1. any office, and, as regards those who are habilitated for benefices, any benefice in cathedral basilicas; 2. any teaching office and office in major and minor clerical seminaries and other Institutes in which clerics are educated, as well as in Universities and Institutes which enjoy apostolic privilege of conferring academic degrees in philosophy, theology, and canon law; 3. any office or function whatsoever in episcopal Curias; 4. the office of Visitor and Moderator of Religious houses of either sex, even if it is a question of merely diocesan congregations; 5. habitual domicile in places where there exists a convent or religious house of the Province or Mission to which the secularized priest or cleric, or the one released from perpetual vows, as above, was enrolled. S. C. of Religious, June 15, 1909.

136. • Besides the way of the commandments, by which all men ought to tend toward obtaining eternal salvation, there is given the way of counsels or of special perfection, which is merely of counsel, and is proposed only to a few selected by God Himself, who, bidding farewell to the world, lead life in monasteries.

Christ Himself teaches us this twofold way in many places of the Gospel; for example, Matt. 19:17, He says to the young man inquiring about the way of salvation: "If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments." And v. 21: "If you wish to be perfect, go, sell what you have, and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; and come, follow me."

There is also a certain third way, midway between each of the preceding two, namely the way of chastity, or of continence preserved in the world.

Hence a threefold class of men is established by reason of the means proposed for attaining God, or a threefold state of life, namely 1º the state of matrimony; 2º of celibacy; 3º of religious life. Hence also a threefold grade of perfection; for celibacy, as St. Paul declared and the Council of Trent defined, is more perfect than the matrimonial state; but religious life is, as is plain, the most perfect of all. The sacerdotal state, although in dignity it is the most excellent of all, nevertheless, by reason of perfection, falls far short of religious life. But just as God is wonderful in His saints, so also is He wonderful in the various modes by which He promotes them to sanctity.

We must treat 1º of the nature of the religious state; 2º of religious vocation; 3º of the obligations of Religious by force of vows; 4º of the privileges of Regulars; to which there will be added an Appendix concerning the condition of Religious in France.

137. • The religious state is a stable institute of life approved by the Church for the faithful who, under a certain rule and common mode of living, wish to tend toward perfection by the three perpetual vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience.

I said 1º a stable institute of life; because the Religious by the three vows of religion devotes himself in perpetuity to God.

I said 2º approved by the Church; for since the religious state is a certain sacred community, it ought to be instituted by spiritual power. Formerly indeed this approval was conceded by any Bishop for his own diocese; but afterwards it was established in the Lateran Council under Innocent III that no new Religion be introduced unless it had been approved by the Supreme Pontiff. - St. Ligorius, bk. 4, n. 5.

I said 3º who... wish to tend toward perfection; for a religious, by force of his Profession, is held under grave obligation to study in some way for perfection by the observance of the vows; because by force of his Profession he is held to will to preserve his state, which is a state of perfection. But a Religious is not held by force of his Profession to be perfect, but only to study for perfection. - Thus all.

138. Resolutions. - 1º Solemn vows are not required for the essence of Religion, but simple vows suffice. For all the conditions necessary for the substance of Religion are had even in simple vows, since through them a man can perpetually bind himself to God in an Order approved by the Church ¹. It is established moreover from the Bull of Gregory XIII, Ascendente Domino, in which the Pontiff declared that those also are true Religious in the Society of Jesus who have emitted only simple vows. 2º Those are Religious who in an approved Religion, according to a certain rule, emit the three essential vows. But on the contrary, those who, although they emit these three vows and lead life in common, nevertheless do not profess a rule approved by the Apostolic See, are not Religious properly so called. Hence various Congregations of men or of pious women approved only by the Bishop do not constitute Orders strictly religious. Nevertheless those who in Congregations of this sort emit simple vows and live under a common rule and dependence on a Superior can enjoy the same merit before God as Religious properly so called, since they exhibit the same denial of self to the Lord. But we note that, from today's practice, the Apostolic See does not approve new religious Institutes as Orders properly so called with profession of solemn vows, but only as religious Congregations, or, more strictly from the manner of speaking of the Holy See, as secular Congregations, with simple vows, to which therefore the privileges conceded to solemn vows do not belong per se. - See Analecta I.P.

¹ ** An Order approved by the Church is here distinguished from religious Congregations, which, as the Author warns below, are also called secular. Therefore what Gregory XIII defined concerning the Scholastics of the Society of Jesus, that they are true Religious although they have emitted only simple vows, seems certainly to have to be said also of those who, from the recent disposition of Our Most Holy Lord Pope Pius IX, remain bound for some years only by simple vows in religious Orders before they emit solemn profession.

3º Those are not Religious who, having emitted a vow of perpetual poverty and chastity, vow obedience to a Confessor or Bishop. The reason is that by force of this vow they are not subjected to Superiors.

4º From the Decree of Pius IX, promulgated by the encyclical letters of the Sacred Congregation of Regulars given to the Superiors of Religious Orders on 19 March 1857, all Religious of those Orders in which solemn vows are emitted, in the future, the novitiate having been completed, emit only simple vows, at least for a triennium; then they are admitted to solemn vows if they are found worthy by their Superiors. But for just causes solemn Profession will also be able to be deferred longer, though not beyond the completed age of 25 years. - See Analecta I.P., series 2, col. 2954.

But from the declarations of the Sacred Congregation of Regulars given on 23 February 1859, etc., and pertaining to the aforesaid decree, the simple vows about which there is question are perpetual on the part of the one vowing, and dispensation from them is reserved to the Supreme Pontiff. Yet on the part of the Order they can be dissolved through dismissal of the Professed, so that, dismissal having been given, by that very fact the professed become free from every bond of the said vows. But no one will be able to be dismissed on account of infirmity arising after Profession of simple vows ². For the rest, the professed of these vows become participants in all the graces and privileges which the solemnly Professed enjoy in the same Order. - See Analecta I.P., 24 Sept. 1859, col. 4891.

² ** Others extend a law of this sort more broadly, so that, unless some fault intervenes, he cannot be cast out for any other cause.

139. Questions. - QUESTION 1º. What things are required for the validity of Profession?

Resp. The following conditions are required:

1º Aptitude of the one vowing, namely that he has entirely completed the sixteenth year of his age; that he has spent at least a whole year of Novitiate with the religious habit ³; that he has no impediment which, from statutes confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff, is judged substantial.

³ ** Understand this according as the Constitutions of each Order require or do not require it, or also according as the circumstances of times or places demand or allow.

2º Consent and express or tacit acceptance of the Prelate of the Order, or of the Chapter, where it is required. But error concerning the substance, both on the part of the one professing and of the one admitting, makes the Profession invalid.

3º Liberty of the one vowing, that is, that the Profession be made spontaneously, grave fear being excluded, or even reverential fear joined with importunate requests more often repeated, blandishments, command, or grave offense or indignation long continued of blood relatives. - St. Ligorius, n. 7, and de Matr., n. 1056 ⁴.

⁴ ** Concerning reverential fear St. Alphonsus more clearly says thus (bk. 4, n. 7): Profession should be made spontaneously, with grave fear not compelling, such as would be... Likewise reverential fear, not indeed by itself, but with the importunity of requests, blandishments, and command often repeated acceding, or grave offense, or indignation long continued of blood relatives, with threats also of denying support if he departs from Religion. For these things individually, or certainly joined together, with the condition of a rude, timid man considered, can instill just fear and invalidate profession, as Laymann with others, etc.

140. • QUESTION 2º. To what is the Bishop held as to girls about to enter Religion?

Resp. He is held under grave obligation, from the statute of the Council of Trent, to explore by himself, or, if he himself is impeded, through a Vicar or deputy, the will of those girls, both before the reception of the habit and before Profession. Nevertheless the omission of one of the two examinations would not be regarded as grave. For the rest, the Profession would not be invalid if each examination were omitted, provided the girls were free in emitting Profession. An examination of this sort is required even if the monastery which the girl is about to enter is exempt from episcopal jurisdiction; because the Bishop then acts as one delegated by the Holy See for this. - St. Ligorius, n. 4.

QUESTION 3º. Is the integrity of the year of Novitiate required for validity?

Resp. Affirmative, so that in a leap year the lapse of the day which is to be added must be awaited. Thus the Sacred Congregation of the Council of Trent expressly declared. But the time of Novitiate begins from the moment of reception of the habit ⁵.

⁵ ** This can have force with those Orders which use a peculiar habit. For example, the Society of Jesus, which by force of its Constitutions does not use any proper habit, is not held by this law.

141. • QUESTION 4º. Does interruption of the Novitiate harm the validity of Profession?

Resp. Affirmative. It is established from the decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Council, which established that a Novice who had departed from the monastery in order to enter another Religion, and, after only two hours had been spent in another convent, repenting of the deed had returned, was held to begin the year of probation again.

QUESTION 5º. When is the year of probation judged to be interrupted?

Resp. 1º It is judged to be interrupted chiefly 1º whenever the Novice goes out from the monastery without permission with the intention of not returning, even if he immediately returns, as is established from what has just been said; 2º whenever he is dismissed absolutely by the Superiors and is then admitted again; 3º if he departs by private authority in order to enter another house or another province even of the same Order.

Resp. 2º But the Novitiate is not judged to be interrupted 1º if the Novice is sick in the house, even for a notable time, although he can by no means be present at the exercises of the Novices; 2º if, compelled by violence, he departs from the house; 3º if, with permission accepted, he turns aside to parents or others for a brief time for the sake of recovering health or conducting business; 4º if he is dismissed by false accusation, and afterwards, when the truth has been known, is admitted again; 5º if he makes a journey ordered by his Superiors, because then he remains under their dependence. - There are several other doubtful cases, which can be seen apud the authors.

142. • QUESTION 6º. By what means is a Religious held to tend toward perfection?

Resp. 1º He is held to tend primarily through the essential means of the religious state, namely through observance of the three vows, poverty, chastity, and obedience. For if he does not observe these at least for the most part, he can be called Religious only in name and habit, but not in reality ⁶.

⁶ ** Understand this as to the manner of life; for as to the state he both is and must be called Religious also in reality.

Resp. 2º He is held to tend secondarily also through accidental means, namely through the proper Rules of the Order, at least by not contemning those helps. But then a Religious is judged to omit the rules from contempt when he transgresses them with the intention of not being subject to them or to his Prelates; or if he holds them as vain ⁷. - St. Ligorius, n. 10. - Laymann. - Busembaum. - Sanchez. - Lessius, etc.

⁷ ** To hold rules as vain does not always imply contempt of the true name. It is surely one thing to contemn the authority of the one commanding, another to hold of little account the thing prescribed as if useless or imprudent, etc. In the former case you have truly formal contempt, but not likewise in the latter. Make sure that you have this before your eyes for rightly understanding also those things which are read in the following Question 7.

143. • QUESTION 7º. When does a Religious sin gravely against the precept of tending toward perfection?

Resp. In this he gravely offends: 1º if he violates the vows very often in a grave matter, as is plain; because he omits the means essential for observing this obligation, and consequently altogether necessary. - Thus all. 2º If he transgresses the rules generally from contempt, as was just said. But otherwise, if he violates them led by concupiscence, or because he thinks that they are not necessary for him for salvation, or if he thinks that they are not prescribed under grave obligation. For to transgress rules in matters of slight moment, even from custom, contempt being excluded, does not exceed venial sin. - Thus expressly St. Ligorius, n. 10, with St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, and others commonly.

Yet there are not lacking those who contend that a Religious sins gravely against the obligation of tending toward perfection if he frequently, or at least for the most part, violates the rules; because they are efficacious means, although secondary, for directing a Religious in the way of perfection. But the prior opinion, which is common, appears truer, provided the omission of the rules does not lead into grave and frequent violation of the vows ⁸.

⁸ ** I think it rarely happens that that relaxation of soul in observing lighter rules, even directly voluntary, is from this title alone a mortal sin; because that negligence, speaking per se, is only a remote disposition, unless some peculiar circumstances accede which in some matter consummate a proximate occasion. Thus Suarez (De Relig., tr. VIII, bk. 1, ch. 4, n. 18). See also Card. De Lugo (De Poenit., disp. 15, nn. 49-50).

144. • QUESTION 8º. Does a Religious sin gravely who intends to observe only commandments obliging under grave obligation, and to care in no way about the rest?

Resp. There is a twofold probable opinion:

I. The first opinion affirms absolutely, because the very purpose of not caring about the rules, even those not prescribing under sin, is virtual contempt of the same. - Lacroix, bk. 4, n. 57. - Elbel. - Sylvius, etc.

II. The second opinion denies. The reason is that by the very fact that the Religious wishes to fulfill those many things which oblige under grave obligation, he already tends toward perfection, since he wishes to fulfill many things which, with respect to others, do not oblige, but are mere counsels. - Thus Sanchez. - Salmanticenses, etc. And St. Ligorius, n. 10, calls this opinion the more common and more probable.

For the rest, St. Ligorius, n. 11, rightly notes that a Religious so disposed can be in grave danger of sinning mortally from other heads, for example, by reason of the danger of transgressing the vows, or of inflicting grave harm upon Religion as to discipline, etc.

145. • QUESTION 9º. Whether and to what extent does a rule taken distributively, or with individual rules attended to in particular, oblige under sin?

Resp. In most Orders, the rule, speaking generally and per se, does not oblige under sin, not even venial sin. This is established from the constitutions themselves of various Orders and from the common interpretation of Theologians. Orders are to be excepted in which the constitutions expressly establish the opposite.

1. Petrus and Paulus dispute between themselves concerning the more recent Institutes of Sisters. Petrus affirms that they are truly religious, as are Dominican nuns and Poor Clares. For nothing else is required for the true essence of the religious state than the profession of religious vows, in an Institute approved by the Church. Paulus, on the contrary, affirms that they are nothing except pious women. For they have often been so called by the Sacred Penitentiary itself, 26 November 1852. Indeed, for very many years the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars did not wish them to be called Religiosae, but Sisters. Moreover, these modern Institutes are wholly lacking solemn vows, without which the essence of the religious state cannot be had. Finally, the Church has never approved these more recent Institutes, but only tolerated them.

Question. 1. What is the Religious State? — 2. What is to be said in the case?

R. To the first. The religious state, considered as to its essence, is: A stable institute of life, approved by the Church for the faithful, who under a certain rule and common manner of living wish to tend to perfection through the three perpetual vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, with a handing over of oneself made to God and accepted by Him.

The religious state, namely, taken strictly. For “it must be supposed,” says Suarez, “according to the common usage of the Church, that the religious state, as if by antonomasia and in strict signification, is called the perfect state of monks or regulars, who totally consecrate and hand over themselves to God, by emitting the three vows concerning the three principal counsels, poverty, chastity, and obedience. Nevertheless, in a certain broader or more general meaning, the state of religion comprehends under itself other manners of living, in which men voluntarily offer themselves to divine worship and service, by obligating themselves to some observance of the counsels. And thus it comprehends, not only proper and complete religious, but also continent persons, who by the vow of chastity alone bind themselves specially to God. For thus the interpreters of canon law, in the rubric de Regularibus, teach that the name of religious or regular, taken strictly, signifies him who has professed the three substantial vows in an approved religion; but broadly it comprehends all who by some vow and special manner of living are consecrated to the service of God.” De Rel., tr. 7, bk. 2, c. 1, n. 1; Bouix, de I. Reg., t. 1, p. 47.

A stable institute of life. For firmness or stability pertains to the essence of a state.

Approved by the Church. For it is of the essence of the religious state that it not be prohibited by the Church. And indeed it is of the essence of the religious state that it be a state of perfection. But as soon as it is prohibited, it is no longer a state of perfection, but rather of rebellion. Now there exists a law of the Church prohibiting the beginning and entrance of any religion not approved. Hence, by the very fact that a religious institute has not been approved by the Church, it must be held as prohibited by her, and therefore wholly invalid, namely lacking the essence of the religious state. This approval can be given only by the Apostolic See, as is clear from Canon Law. But today it has been introduced by custom that various Congregations are instituted by the approval of the Bishop alone, which afterwards are praised and approved by the Church, first by a Decree of praise, then by a Decree of approval of the Institute, and by a Decree of approval of the Constitutions; and consequently these Congregations, if the other requisites are not lacking, can be held as containing those things which pertain to the intrinsic essence of the religious state.

To the intrinsic essence; for, in order that there be had the religious state or true religion in the Church, or in order that there be had the religious state according to canonical institution, it is not enough that the Institute be approved by the Church and at the same time the rules or Constitutions of the Institute be approved by the same Church; but it is required that the Institute be approved by the Church, and by that approval be constituted in the state of true religion, or of a religious order. “For if,” says Benedict XIV, Constitution Quamvis iusto, prid. Kal. May 1749, § 13, “for the essence of the truly religious state it is required that a religion or order be established in such a state by confirmation of the Apostolic See, according to the canonical sanctions concerning which in c. un., de Relig. dom., in 6, nor does it suffice to have obtained from the same Apostolic See only approval and confirmation of the rules which some society of men or women has prescribed for itself to observe; if the vows of poverty, obedience, and chastity emitted by the English Virgins according to the form of the rules approved by Clement XI cannot be said to be joined with express or tacit profession in some order approved by the Apostolic See in the state of true religion, as is said above, it clearly appears both that the state of the English Virgins is not the state of true religion, and that the vows which are made by them must be judged at most simple vows, not solemn, according to the paths of the Decretal of Pope Boniface VIII, which alone exists under the title de Voto et voti redempt. in 6.” Cf. ibid., § 14.

Wherefore there is one and another approval of the Church in this matter. There is a certain inferior approval, by which an Institute is approved as an Institute of Clerics or Sisters, as a Pious Society, as a Religious Congregation. There is a fuller and more solemn approval by which an Institute is approved as a Religious Order, as a true Religion.

For the faithful; for religious neither necessarily pertain to the hierarchy of jurisdiction, nor to the hierarchy of order, but are, or can be, simple faithful in the Church, and therefore of either sex.

Under a certain rule; for the manner and grade of observing the evangelical counsels can be various, and this is determined by the rule.

And common manner of living. For although, if only the nature of the religious state is considered, common life does not pertain to its essence, nevertheless today common life is required by the Church, namely under one common head and under one approved rule. Cf. Bouix, pt. 2, s. 1, c. 2, par. 2, prop. 10.

Wish to tend to perfection. There is indeed a twofold state of life. One is of common life, which intends nothing other than the observance of the commandments of God; the other is of perfection, which adds the observance of the counsels. But perfection is in charity. For the perfection of any thing is had from the fact that it attains its proper end. The end of man is God, to whom we are united by charity. Now to exclude those things which are repugnant to charity, namely mortal sins, pertains to the state of common life. But to exclude those things which impede man from adhering totally to God pertains to the state of perfection. The former is proper to essential charity; the latter, to the perfection of charity. Wherefore the perfection of which there is question here is not in essential charity as such, but in a certain peculiar grade of charity which surpasses the common charity of Christians. But this grade does not consist in some one or some transitory acts of charity, even if they are of great or greatest intensity, but in a mind so habitually prepared that man is proximately disposed to act easily and ordinarily according to the precepts and counsels of God, obstacles having been removed, so that he tends totally to God.

Tends. For the state of perfection is twofold: one is the state of perfection acquired; the other of perfection to be acquired. The former is proper to Bishops; the latter to religious. Bouix, pt. 1, s. 1.

Through the three perpetual vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. For the state of perfection to be acquired is twofold: one incomplete or begun, the other complete. For the former the three principal evangelical counsels are not required; but some counsel suffices, whether it is one of those three principal ones, or another, for the counsels are very many in number. But for the latter the three evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience are required and suffice. For through these three counsels all impediments of charity are removed, so that the affection of the mind is directed totally to God. But the religious state, strictly so called, is the complete state of perfection to be acquired. Now those counsels to be observed, in order that a state, and therefore stability, be had, must be strengthened by a vow, and that of itself perpetual.

Now, although those three vows must of themselves be perpetual, for this is required by the very nature of a state, nevertheless it is by no means truly required of itself that they be solemn, but it is enough that they be simple. This is openly clear from the Constitutions of Gregory XIII, Quanto fructuosius and Ascendente Domino, where it is established that those who in the Society of Jesus have emitted the three simple vows are true and proper religious.

The solemnity of vows is nothing other than a certain force added to them by the disposition of the Church, of constituting a religious properly and strictly such according to canonical institution, and of making certain acts of the religious concerning the matter of the same vows invalid or at least voidable, and of rendering the vows themselves wholly firm and stable. And that force is absolute, and not merely relative to the time during which the religious, free from the vows, is not dismissed by his superiors. Hence for the solemnity of vows not just any force of producing the aforesaid effects suffices; but that force must be absolute, that is, so perpetual and immutable that neither the religious nor even the religion itself can suspend or remove that force. But it is by no means required that that force cannot be removed by the Roman Pontiff; for that force is of ecclesiastical law, and therefore the Pope can dispense both from the effect of the solemnity of vows, the solemn vows remaining, and from the solemn vows themselves, and indeed validly, although no reasonable cause is present, with which, if it accedes, he will also dispense licitly. Bouix, t., p. 444 ff.; Decree of the Sacred Congregations for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, 31 July 1878; Revue des Sciences Ecclésiastiques, 1879, p. 191.

Wherefore Busembaum very well says, bk. 3, n. 195, that a solemn vow “is that which is accepted as such by the Church. ... But simple is every other one, which does not have such solemnity.” Therefore a solemn vow is a vow which has this annexed force; a simple vow is one which lacks that force. Consequently the solemnity of a vow is an all-embracing dependence and subjection and plenary approval and confirmation of the vow made by the Church herself, or by the Supreme Pontiff, as to the being of the vow, as to its force of constituting in the Church a truly religious state, and as to the other aforesaid effects of invalidation.

And hence it appears why the Church does not approve in the state of true Religion, or as Religions or truly religious Orders, except Institutes which have solemn vows. For these perfectly display the nature of state and the nature of perfection, since through them man altogether totally and immovably tends to God and adheres to Him. But since this is wanting in simple vows from the limited acceptance of the Church herself, namely not to all the aforesaid effects, therefore Institutes with only simple vows, but not solemn vows, are approved by the same Church as Pious Institutes and also as Religious Congregations, but not as true Religions and true Religious Orders. Indeed, the essence or substance of the state of perfection, and consequently of the religious state, is also found in these Institutes, but in an inferior grade, as compared with true Religions and Religious Orders. Hence the pupils of these Institutes are truly and properly religious, but less strictly than the pupils of true Religions and Orders. Less strictly, namely as regards the very essence of the religious state, and as regards canonical institution. But in order that there be had a Religious Congregation, it is not enough that the vows have been approved by the Apostolic See; but they must be approved in such a way that the vows which are emitted in such a Congregation are accepted by someone in the name of the Congregation or of the Apostolic See.

For in order to have a formal Religion of solemn vows, or to have a true Religious Congregation of simple vows, it is altogether required that the vows emitted in it be not private, but public, accepted in the name of the Church by a legitimate Superior. S. C. EE. et RR., 11 August 1889. If the vows are only private and accepted by no one, there is had only a pious Sodality, S. C. EE. et RR., 11 August 1889, or a secular Congregation, such as therefore is the Congregation of the Mission, Alexander VII, Brief Ex Commissa, 22 September 1655. I. M. 248.

With a handing over of oneself made to God. In the pronouncing of the three vows, considering their nature, there is had a total handing over of oneself to God. But this handing over of oneself, if the vows are solemn, is far more perfect and is truly a certain handing over and donation of oneself. But if the vows are simple, that handing over is less perfect, and is not an altogether total handing over of oneself; and since it is not altogether firm and immovable, it is rather a simple promise. Through the former handing over of oneself, made by authority of the Church, there is had a certain consecration of the person devoted and bound to God; but through the latter promise there is had rather a simple blessing of the person.

And accepted by Him; namely accepted by God through the Church and through proper superiors, because from the approval of the Church they receive this power and authority through the canonical approval itself of the Institute; “because God, according to ordinary providence, does not undertake the peculiar care of governing a private person immediately by Himself, nor does He need these sensible things so as to use them immediately and without the intervention of secondary causes. And therefore a donation thus made to God would either be vain and idle, or as if tempting God by demanding immediate rule from Him; and for that reason it does not please Him, nor is it immediately accepted by Him.” Suarez, de Relig., bk. 2, c. 4, nn. 7, 8; Bouix, pt. 1, s. 2.

R. To the second. That which Petrus says concerning the Sisters of the more recent Institutes, that they are true religious, taken simply, is simply true. For they themselves judge themselves to be such; all Bishops judge them to be such, as is clear from their testimonial letters for the approval of these Institutes; and the Supreme Pontiff himself holds them as such, as is gathered from several Briefs of Approval, in which those Sisters are praised and approved as Religious. But Petrus seems to say and signify more. For he says that they are true Religious, as are Dominican nuns and Poor Clares. And this is false, since Dominican nuns and Poor Clares are not only truly, but also strictly Religious; for they have solemn vows, and consequently their Institute has been constituted and confirmed by the Church, as a Religion or Order in the truly and strictly Religious state, by the Approval of the Apostolic See. More recent Institutes, on the contrary, since they have only simple vows, are by no means approved and established by the Church in the state of strict and true Religion, although they are approved as Religious Institutes. That is, the Sisters of these Institutes are indeed Religious, but in an inferior grade, not in that superior and nobler grade in which nuns are truly and strictly religious. To the reason added by Petrus, the answer is that, in order that the essence of the religious state be had in some way, the profession of religious vows in an Institute approved by the Church indeed suffices; but for the essence of the religious state true and strictly such, there is altogether required the solemn profession of religious vows in an Institute approved by the Church in the state of true and strict Religion or Order.

But it is altogether false what Paulus says, that the Sisters of the more recent Institutes are nothing except pious women, and in no way are religious. When the Sacred Penitentiary, 26 November 1852, and at other times, called them pious women, it declared its mind more than sufficiently by denying of them that they were nuns strictly such, since they did not emit solemn vows. By that expression “pious women” it wished to deny this only, by no means that they were not even true religious. And if for several years the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars denied to these Sisters the denomination Religious, it did this only so as to deny them the character of Religious true and strictly such. Later, however, when the signification of the words had been better established, to these modern Institutes was conceded that denomination of Religious Institutes, and to their pupils the denomination Religious men and Religious women. And by the Decree of 11 August 1889, the Sacred Congregation openly recognizes in these modern Institutes true Religious Congregations, expressly distinguishing in the same Decree between formal Religions of solemn vows and true Religious Congregations of simple vows. Therefore without solemn vows there is not had the essence of the strictly religious state; but with merely simple vows the essence of the truly religious state is indeed had. Here note that that word “truly” is sometimes for increasing and restricting the signification, and is equivalent to “strictly,” as in the cited Constitution of Benedict XIV; sometimes it is merely for determining the correct signification, as in the cited Decree. Finally, it is altogether false that the Church does not approve these more recent Institutes but merely tolerates them, as is openly clear from the same cited Decree, and as is proved by the very fact of the various Decrees of Approval, first by praising and then by positively approving.

2. “Cunegunda, a nun, determined with firm mind to avoid all mortal sins, but no venial sin. Nor does she make it a matter of conscience not to induce another companion to lie venially.

Question. 1. Whether for religious there is an obligation of tending to perfection? — 2. Does Cunegunda sin mortally in each case?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 249. — To the second. In the first case, they affirm who, with Sanchez, bk. 1, in decalog., c. 5, and Bonacina, de peccatis, q. 3, p. 5, n. 13, contend that the will of committing, as the thing and occasion may allow, all venial sins, is not free from mortal sin. Many others deny this with Cajetan, Sylvester, Granados, Palão, Machado; to whom I myself willingly subscribe, led especially by this reason, that to commit in fact whatever venial sins occur is not mortal sin. And it pleases me to confirm this by the authority of St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 4: all the venial sins in the world cannot have so much guilt as one mortal sin, which is precisely to say that even all venial sins do not make one mortal sin, nor are they equivalent to it. Therefore to will to commit them all is neither mortal, nor equivalent to mortal. The consequence holds, because the malice of the act is taken from the object; therefore, if to commit them all in fact, or to avoid none, does not involve mortal malice, neither does the will of committing them all, or of avoiding none, involve it.

Master Petrus de Tapia, Archbishop of Seville, says that the mortal malice which he contends a will of this kind involves must be drawn, not from the object, which he himself also admits is not infected according to itself with mortal gravity, but from the proximate danger of sinning lethally, which he judges to be contained in that universal will. Truly, either actually to commit all venial sins, precisely according to itself, brings with it such a proximate danger of sinning lethally, and then actually to commit all venial sins will be mortal, which is false, and the adversary himself denies it; or, precisely according to itself, it does not bring such a danger, and then neither can the will of committing them bring it, since an act morally takes its species from the object.

Convinced by this reason, others contend that venial sins so proximately dispose to mortal sins, that he who brings his mind to multiplying venial sins must be judged altogether to will to sin mortally. This response I undertake briefly to refute under multiple heads. And first, if we consult St. Thomas, cited q. 88, in one case alone can that which is venial from its genus become mortal: namely insofar as an end is constituted in it, or insofar as it is referred to mortal sin as to an end. But the will of committing all sins, but only venial sins, with the exclusion of all mortal sins, is borne toward venial sins insofar as these are contained within the limits of venial sins; so that consequently it neither constitutes in them the notion of an end, nor refers them to mortal sins. Therefore venial sins do not pass into mortal sin from that intention alone.

To these things, yield to me: where do you place that formal and proximate danger? Namely, in the collection of all venial sins? But all cannot be committed by one person. Namely, in some from the collection of all? But among some of these there is none which, if it is venial, would according to itself cast one sinning venially into this destructive danger. Besides, if all according to themselves imply this danger, then we are bound to avoid some of them, otherwise we would sin mortally; from which this other thing absurdly, yet necessarily, follows: that for eternal salvation it is not enough if someone observes all precepts obliging under mortal sin, but it is further required that he also observe those which oblige under venial sin. For all are bound under grave obligation to that which according to itself is necessary for avoiding mortal sins; therefore, if the avoidance of all venial sins is necessary in itself for avoiding mortal sin, all are bound to avoid some venial sin in order to attain eternal salvation. But if you say that this holds true by reason of danger, it remains that you define what venial sin in species someone can commit without falling into this danger, lest, if you affirm that by any venial sin in species one falls into this danger, you must swallow this absurdity: all venial sins, each and every one, by reason of this danger, are so many mortal sins.

I certainly think thus: as long as malice is confined within the bounds of light sin, it less affects and less strikes the mind of him whom the malice of the object is accustomed strongly to urge and terrify when it transcends to grave sin, so that consequently there can stand together both the will of committing all sins that are only venial and the detestation of any mortal sin whatever. Thus it is not wonderful if we know several who are little or not at all solicitous about avoiding venial sins, yet shudder at the very name of mortal sin, much less flee its sight; whence they can join in the same seat of the will the intention of avoiding all mortal sins with the intention of committing all venial sins.

For answering objections, diligently observe first that these two things fight against each other: that a sin bring with it a formal danger, or a proximate danger, of sinning mortally, and that it be contained within the bounds of venial sin. Wherefore, if Cunegunda in the collection of venial sins apprehended some sin as bringing such danger with it, or if in practice she doubted whether it could bring this danger, she would without doubt sin mortally; and that intention of avoiding all mortal sins would destroy itself, just as it would destroy itself if she apprehended that this very intention of committing all venial sins induced a formal and proximate danger of sinning mortally. Observe moreover that, in order that that intention truly exclude every mortal sin, it ought to be such that she does not will to commit those venial sins which, if they are increased in number, grow into mortal sin, either by reason of matter, as several light thefts which, multiplied, finally constitute grave matter of theft, or by reason of effect, as moderate draughts of wine which, more often repeated, bring grave harm to health and cause drunkenness.

Finally, observe principally that a nun, by reason of her state, ought to tend toward perfection; nevertheless she is not therefore bound under mortal sin to avoid venial faults. For she sufficiently tends toward the perfection of her state if, besides the precepts gravely obliging every Christian, she also observes those things which gravely bind a religious under a special title. For it cannot happen that she observes the grave precepts which are either contained in the rule, or imposed by superiors, and by which she has bound herself by the bond of vows, without aspiring to the perfection proper to the religious state as much as is enough for avoiding mortal sin. And just as the other faithful, who also ought to aspire to the perfection proper to a Christian, are not said to sin gravely against an obligation of this kind as long as they commit only venial sins, so also religious, as long as they commit only venial sins, cannot be said to offend gravely against the perfection of their proper state. I would not deny that it can happen that those things which are judged venial in a secular person become mortal in a religious, indeed also in any ecclesiastic who ought to go before others by example, by reason of scandal; and thus certain scurrilous words and indecent trifles, which in the mouth of seculars lightly offend pious ears, in the mouth of a religious, or of anyone else dedicated to God by a special title, can easily in a certain way become blasphemies, which gravely strike the ears of hearers, not without great contempt and disgrace of the religious and ecclesiastical state. But if Cunegunda decided to commit sins of that kind, she would splendidly deceive herself if she thought that she willed no mortal sin.

Meanwhile let the priest inculcate this again and again to Cunegunda: that venial sins, although remotely, nevertheless certainly dispose to mortal sins, so that it is altogether to be feared lest venial sins little by little pave the way by which she may finally be hurled into the abyss of eternal damnation. “He who despises small things will fall little by little,” Ecclesiasticus 19. “Those who rush into the greatest things begin from the smallest,” St. Bernard. “Let him beware the fever of venial sins who wishes to avoid the death of graver sins.” Through venial sins the fervor of charity is diminished; and although God denies to no one, as long as he has lived both physically and morally, when the precept urges, sufficient graces by which, if he wills, he may be saved through fulfillment of the precept, nevertheless in punishment even of venial sins He can deny efficacious graces. Hence it happens that, although he can, he does not will to be saved, since, succumbing to the weight of some grave temptation, he finally falls into mortal sin, to be assigned to eternal punishments. If the priest places these things before Cunegunda’s eyes, she, the grace of God breathing upon her, will extend the will of avoiding mortal sins to venial sins, placing her eternal salvation more and more in safety.

Coming to the later case, Master Corradus, pt. 1, Respons., Response 89, § Sequitur, with Master Soto as guide, teaches that it is graver to induce someone to one venial sin than to commit homicide, because it is a greater damage and a greater loss to commit one venial sin than is the death of the body; for which reason it is said that one must not sin venially even for the life of the whole world. Therefore, in the judgment of Master Corradus, Cunegunda, who induced her companion to lie lightly, is guilty of mortal sin. But I pronounce that she is to be absolved from mortal sin, with the Angelic teacher as guide, who, treating of scandal in II-II, q. 43, teaches in express words thus: If active scandal is per se, for example, when someone intends to lead another to sin, if indeed he intends to induce his neighbor to sin venially through an act of venial sin, it is a venial sin. I do not see what could be said more clearly against Corradus for Cunegunda.

But what if she did not induce the companion to that light lie in just any way, but with the direct design that the companion herself suffer that ruin which results from a light lie? Not even then would she sin mortally, according to the opinion of St. Thomas in IV, dist. 38, q. 2, a. 2, q. 3, where, treating of formal scandal, namely the special sin by which one intends to scandalize another, or by which one intends the harm of one’s neighbor, he openly teaches that he sins only venially who intends to induce another to some venial sin. This seems hard to Father Vasquez, who judges that an intention of this kind of the spiritual ruin of one’s neighbor, however light it is posited, is a mortal sin contrary to charity; and in this sense he thinks the opinion of Corradus and Soto true, because spiritual damage, if it is directly intended, gives a special malice to the act, and there is no doubt that this damage is greater than any temporal evil. Thus Father Vasquez, whose reasoning I cannot approve; because damage to one’s neighbor, if it is grave, infects the act with mortal malice not only when it is directly intended, but also when it is indirectly intended, as no one denies. And therefore he becomes guilty of mortal fault who, compelled by no necessity, shoots an arrow at a wild beast, even if he does not directly intend it, provided he foresees that from it the killing of his neighbor, or some other grave evil, will follow. Wherefore either let Vasquez affirm with Corradus that he sins mortally against charity who in any way induces his neighbor into venial sin, from which spiritual ruin is certainly going to follow; or let him deny with the Angelic Doctor that he sins mortally who directly intends that spiritual ruin. It is added that the reason on which Father Vasquez relies, if it proves anything, proves that it is a mortal sin against charity, by which each one ought to love himself more than his neighbor; I say, that it is a mortal sin if someone himself sins venially, willing also in himself the light spiritual ruin which follows venial sin, and which certainly does not cease to be greater than any temporal damage from the fact that each one intends it for himself rather than for another. But the consequence seems absurd; therefore the principle from which it follows is also absurd.

But is not spiritual damage, if it is directly intended, a thing which gives the act a special malice? Either grave or light, I concede; necessarily grave, I deny, with St. Thomas openly supporting us. But is not the damage inflicted by venial fault truly greater than any other temporal loss?

Father Sanchez (de Matrim., bk. 1, disp. 5, n. 25), with whom Fagundez agreed (in Eccles. Praecept., precept 1, bk. 3, c. 8, n. 18), responds that, in judging the gravity of damage, spiritual is not to be compared with temporal, or temporal with spiritual, but spiritual with spiritual, and temporal with temporal. But that response, although true, does not remove the difficulty, unless an efficacious reason is given why spiritual damage ought not be compared with temporal, so that from that comparison we may weigh its gravity. Therefore this reason seems to me to be that the spiritual ruin inflicted on the soul by venial sin is free, since it could altogether be avoided by the very person who freely allows himself to be induced into venial sin, and furthermore can easily be repaired. Hence it is not wonderful if, although it is of a superior order and in itself a graver evil, nevertheless it is estimated less in relation to the subject than the evil of homicide, which is not free to the neighbor and is altogether irreparable. And truly, if the difficulty taken from the reason of greater evil in itself ought to terrify us, it would be a greater sin, even without express and direct intention of spiritual loss, to induce someone to venial sin than to kill, because the former is a greater detriment than killing; and it would be a greater sin to lie venially than to amputate one’s own hand or another member of the body, which no one would say. Therefore let it stand that Cunegunda, in the species of the case, the nature of the thing being considered, did indeed sin, but venially, not mortally.

Unless perhaps accidentally she induced the companion to lie through an act of mortal sin, as if from hatred toward God or toward the companion herself, or if from envy of the perfection to which the companion was applying herself more zealously, she induced her by force or deceit to commit this or any other venial sin. For just as in the matter of money it can happen that a theft in itself most light, of one iulius, becomes a mortal sin by reason of grave harm inflicted upon a very poor man; and in the matter of reputation, although falsely to impute to someone that he is vain or a liar is light, it can become mortal by reason of infamy derived upon a religious man of good reputation and known probity; so, according to Cardinal de Lugo (de Iust. et Iur., disp. 9, sect. 2, n. 20), if you induce a perfect and holy man by force or deceit into venial sins, by reason of the harm which you bring, you can be made guilty of mortal fault.

I admit that he whom you would induce to venial sin does not sin gravely; but neither does he sin gravely who throws his money into a river. Yet truly you would sin gravely if by force or deceit you induced him to throw his money into a river. Therefore, although Cunegunda’s companion would not sin gravely in the case, you badly conclude from this that neither would Cunegunda sin gravely, when by force or deceit she would cast down, unwilling, from the state of most excellent perfection to which the companion is applying herself. Let priests take care to keep this doctrine before their eyes, so that they show themselves severe judges with those who are accustomed craftily to draw young people outstanding in purity and integrity of morals into vain and impure conversations; and even if I unwillingly permit that such conversations can be free from mortal fault, so that they are only venial, nevertheless “this very thing,” says the cited Lugo, “is a grave harm which is inflicted upon these young people in that state and purity of life.” And with stronger right and reason I would extend this to those who have undertaken the charge of imbuing young people of this kind with piety and doctrine.” Ithur., case 35; I. M. 249, 250.

— "The religious state is a stable manner of living in common, by which the faithful, besides the common precepts, also undertake evangelical counsels to be observed through vows of obedience, chastity, and poverty" (c. 487).

State, in this place, is understood as a stable condition of a Christian person in the Church. In order for a condition of this kind to be had, those things must be procured which are required both by the nature of the matter and by the positive will of the legislator. From the very definition of the Code it is clear that today, for the essence of the religious state, three vows are necessary, which the Code numbers with the order of excellence preserved, that is, obedience, chastity, and poverty; and besides, life in common. The condition of vows is demanded almost from the nature of the matter; life in common, from present ecclesiastical discipline. Life in common is chiefly constituted by subjection to the same rule or form of living and to the same Superiors. The community of roof and table itself varies, for various professions, within certain limits defined by Constitutions and also by common law. For today, with the cause of studies excepted, a stay outside the cloister beyond six months is withdrawn from the judgment of Superiors and requires permission of the Holy See (c. 606, §2). Yet if there is question of a religion of diocesan law, the Ordinary of the place seems able to permit this, since from c. 638 he has power for conceding an indult of exclaustration. Complete stability is contained of itself only in perpetual vows. Yet the Code did not demand perpetuity in the definition of the religious state, because temporary vows also of themselves are emitted with the intention of perseverance even unto death. Besides the three substantial vows, others are joined with religious profession in many Institutes: such as the vow of stability, of mission, of teaching children, of serving the sick, of redeeming captives, of observing strict abstinence. Through the substantial vows religious profess that observance of the evangelical counsels which is required of them. For these counsels are directed to all the faithful in some measure; they are part of the Christian way of conceiving and conducting life.

In order that some state distinguish the faithful, it must be recognized by public authority. By today's law, positive and formal approval is necessary for every religious institute, since from c. 492, §1, the bishop cannot even permit any one to be founded without the Holy See having been consulted. Therefore ecclesiastical approval is today to be placed among the conditions of the religious state.

— The author of the religious state, according to those things which its nature requires, is Christ the Lord. For He gave the counsels which from Him are called evangelical; He, by the words and figures which He used, indicated that firmness which is obtained by vows. Think, for example, of the likeness of the castrated, in Matt. 19, 12: "There are eunuchs... who have castrated themselves for the kingdom of heaven." He conferred power and office upon the Church for ordering the religious state. He, by example and words, exhorted men to follow more perfect things. Therefore that the religious state is of divine law, not commanding but counseling, "this is," says Suarez, De relig., tr. 9, l. 3, c. 2, n. 3, "the opinion of all Catholics rightly thinking."

— A work of counsel is strictly an action considered not so much as good and meritorious in itself, but as useful unto an end; more broadly it signifies a good work, not commanded, better than its opposite or than its non-evil negation. Cf. I, n. 232.

Moreover the evangelical counsel of poverty was expressly given by the Lord to the young man who had questioned Him concerning perfection: "If thou wilt be perfect, sell what thou hast and give to the poor" (St. Matt. 19, 21). The counsel of perfect continence is easily drawn from the place alleged above concerning eunuchs, to which the Lord subjoined these things: "He who can take, let him take"; and we have St. Paul as the genuine interpreter of the mind of the Lord, 1 Cor. 7. Finally, the counsel of obedience is contained virtually in those pursuits of humility and abnegation which are commended in the Gospel: for religious obedience is the most fitting means for following these things; but more formally it is given by the very example of perfect obedience by which Christ perpetually denied His human will in order that He might embrace the divine, "made," according to the words of the Apostle, "obedient unto death, even the death of the cross" (Phil. 2, 8). The same Apostle again, having interpreted the mind of the Lord, exhorts us thus: "For let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus." Now religious seek this by their own proper obedience, that even in particular matters, concerning which there is no precept or clear indication, by following the will of a Superior they may more certainly adhere to the divine will. For by his office and by the power which proximately or remotely proceeds authoritatively from Christ sending the apostles, the legitimate Superior makes the things which he commands, if before they were indifferent, the only good things and therefore things willed by God; the things which he desires to be done are rightly presumed to be desired in the name of God. And by perpetual accommodation to the will of the Superior, the religious observes an order of life which, approved by the Church, is shown to be acceptable to God.

— I. "The religious state is a stable manner of living in common, by which the faithful, besides the common precepts, also undertake evangelical counsels to be observed through vows of obedience, chastity, and poverty" (c. 487).

As state, it says a stable and approved condition in the Church. It is stable through vows at least temporary, with the intention of further perseverance. Life in common is had chiefly through subjection to the same Superiors, according to the same rule, and through some community of roof and table. Through the three vows which are called substantial, and to which others not rarely accede, religious profess the observance of the evangelical counsels required of them.

II. The author of the religious state is Christ, through the counsels, through exhortation to perfection, through the power given to the Church, so that the religious state must be said to be of divine law, not commanding but counseling.

III. A work of counsel is strictly an action useful unto an end; more broadly, a good work not commanded, better than its opposite or its non-evil negation. The three are proved to be evangelical counsels.

— I. What a Religion Is, and of How Many Kinds. Today any religious Institute is called by the common name of Religion. But a Religion is of pontifical law if it has obtained from the Apostolic See either a decree of approval or at least of praise; of diocesan law, if it has been constituted by episcopal authority. In the Code, a clerical religion is said to be a religion whose greater part of members are increased by the priesthood; the others are lay.

Yet that criterion does not seem to suffice for removing every doubt, as when the whole internal hierarchy is in the hands of priests, or there is a twofold order of religious, clerics and laymen, and the class of clerics is judged chief. Will you say, in cases of this kind, that the clerical nature of the religion is impeded by the numerical plurality of laymen?

Of religions of pontifical law, some have solemn vows: they are called Orders, and their members, after vows, are regulars; others have only simple vows: they are called religious Congregations or Congregations, and their members, after vows, are religious or religious of simple vows. Thus among men. But religious women of simple vows are called sisters, while by the name of nuns are designated both religious women of solemn vows and religious women whose vows are solemn from the institute, but, from the prescription of the Apostolic See, are simple in certain places.

Of religions of pontifical law, some are exempt, others are not: the former are withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Ordinary of the place. Religions of solemn vows are of themselves exempt. But over nuns who would of themselves pronounce solemn vows, yet in reality are admitted to simple vows alone, the bishops of Belgium and France preserve a greater authority than responses of the Holy See and custom have attributed to them after the French disturbance. Cf. response of the Sacred Congregation of Religious, May 22, 1919 (A. A. S., XI, p. 210).

— On Diocesan Religions. Although bishops can found a religious Congregation, they are prohibited from doing this without the Holy See having been consulted. And aggregation to a religion of the First Order is necessary so that there can be a religion of Tertiaries. A diocesan religion spread through several dioceses is subject to the various Ordinaries in whose territory it subsists, so that laws can be changed only by their common consent, with the points which were subjected to the Apostolic See always saved.

But once founded, a religion can no longer be suppressed except by the Holy See (cc. 492-495).

— Hierarchical Structure. 1. Most religions of men today are constituted in such a way that under one common supreme authority, each is composed of various houses, which themselves again coalesce into provinces. Hence, among internal powers, there is a certain supreme one which usually belongs to the general chapter or congregation. There is also general governance, committed to a Superior or Provost, or Minister General, to whom some Council or general Definitory is present. Provinces are governed by a provincial Superior, to whom provincial consultors or definitors are for help. But the provincial Congregation, which is sometimes convoked, in most religions by no means has parts to be fulfilled in the provinces similar to the parts which belong to the general congregation for the whole religion. It often happens that it merely expresses votes and deputes delegates to the general chapter. Finally, over individual houses there is placed a true local Superior, a Rector, Prior, or Guardian, who is helped by his own counselors.

Yet older religions, of monastic or even canonical form, lack this collegial unity. Individual monasteries are governed by a prelate or abbot, of his own right, whom the chapter of the monastery assists. Yet so that they might enjoy the privilege of exemption, which was no longer granted to separated monasteries, most monasteries came together into monastic congregations, over which a certain Abbot General presides. But his power is not to be compared with the power of the Superior General of more recent religions. And of some mixed genus are the Cluniac and Cistercian Congregations, which, besides the stable unity of the monastery over which its own abbot presides, form a true universal body under a General. Leo XIII introduced among the Benedictines an Abbot Primate of the whole Order, with some defined power.

2. For a long time cloister itself prohibited religious women from imitating the collegial system of religions of men. Wherefore individual houses even of the Poor Clares, Colettines, and Teresians are of their own right. Not long ago a certain Union of Ursulines, the Roman Union, obtained from the Holy See a form of cloister so mitigated that solemn vows could be reconciled with collegial form. The more received Institutes of women, which are devoted to various works of charity and are not bound by pontifical cloister, have been accustomed to be hierarchically constituted. Yet more often than among men, the residences even of Sisters are individually of their own right.

3. Now Superiors General and provincials, or those having equivalent power, and not only the Abbot Primate and Abbot Superior of a monastic Congregation, but also Abbots of monasteries of their own right, are in law Major Superiors; and if they pertain to an exempt clerical religion, they are addressed by the name of Ordinaries, but not Ordinaries of the place.

— II. The residences of religious are called by the generic name of religious houses; a regular house is the house of an Order. A formed house designates a religious house "in which at least six professed religious dwell, of whom, if there is question of a clerical religion, at least four are priests" (c. 488, 5).

Usage also has it that the word monastery is rather reserved to houses of monks and nuns; the word convent, now more general, is more proper for houses of mendicants, while more recent religions not rarely, according to the various destination of the house, call their houses novitiate, college, residence, etc.

— III. The erection of a religious house, whether formed or not formed, requires, if it is exempt or situated in places subject to the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide, the good pleasure of the Apostolic See and the written consent of the Ordinary of the place. In other cases, the permission of this Ordinary suffices (c. 497, §1). Yet a house of novitiate must be approved by the Holy See if there is question of a religion of pontifical law.

The constitution of the house having been obtained, a clerical religion can annex a public church or oratory to the house, in such a way nevertheless that the definite place of the public oratory is to be approved by the Ordinary of the place; and, with the conditions attached in the faculty itself saved, any religion is permitted to exercise its own works (cc. 497, §2 and 1162, §4).

But the erection of a school, hospice, or similar separate building demands the written permission of the Ordinary: which permission suffices (c. 497, §3).

— The suppression of an exempt religious house requires apostolic good pleasure; the house of a Congregation of pontifical law but not exempt can be suppressed by the supreme moderator, with the Ordinary of the place consenting; the house of a Congregation of diocesan law, by the authority of the Ordinary of the place alone, the moderator of the Congregation having been heard, but with the right of recurring in suspensive effect to the Apostolic See saved. Yet if there is question of the only house of the Congregation, apostolic good pleasure is required: for once a Congregation has been founded, it cannot be extinguished except by the authority of the Holy See (cc. 493 and 498).

— I. Religious institutes are called by the common name religions. Having obtained a decree of praise, they are of pontifical law; the rest are of diocesan law; but today bishops are forbidden to found or approve religions without the Holy See having been consulted. Spread into various dioceses, a diocesan religion is equally subject to the individual Ordinaries. And, once founded, it cannot be suppressed without the Holy See.

Religions are clerical or lay; Orders, with solemn vows, or Congregations, exempt or not. Men are called regulars or religious; religious women are sisters or nuns.

Most institutes today coalesce from various houses, indeed also from provinces, so that the supreme Moderator, provincial Moderator, who are called Major Superiors, and local Moderator are to be distinguished. The very abbot of a monastery of his own right, and any independent Superior, is also a Major Superior. A Major Superior of an exempt clerical religion is called an Ordinary, yet not an Ordinary of the place.

II. The house of an Order is specially called regular; a formed house requires at least six professed, of whom four are priests, if there is question of a clerical religion.

The erection of a house, even not formed, demands, if it is exempt or in places subject to Propaganda Fide, the good pleasure of the Apostolic See and the written consent of the Ordinary of the place, whose consent suffices for other houses. A house of novitiate, if there is question of a pontifical religion, must always be approved by the Holy See.

A religious house is suppressed, if exempt, with apostolic good pleasure acceding; if of pontifical law, by the supreme moderator, with the Ordinary of the place consenting; if diocesan, by the authority of the Ordinary of the place, the moderator of the Congregation having been heard.

— I. 1. All religions are subject to the power, even dominative, of the Roman Pontiff; diocesan religions are also subject to bishops or quasi-bishops. As we were saying just now, n. 104, the supreme internal power is in the hands of the general or abbatial chapter; but governance is in the hands of Superiors with their Counselors. Yet these are not Superiors. More recent religions are accustomed to be administered by Superiors of a threefold grade: general, provincial, local. But in houses of their own right, such as monasteries of older religions, the Superior of the house is at the same time quasi-general. Counselors assist Superiors; their consultative vote must be sought in some affairs, their deliberative vote in other affairs of greater moment.

2. A Superior General and an independent Superior are elected by the chapter or congregation; in which election, besides their own Constitutions, the norms of common law must be observed. The mode of designating other Superiors varies: generally they are constituted by the Superior General and his council.

3. Merely local Superiors cannot be constituted for a time beyond a triennium; yet they can be confirmed once, if the constitutions bear this, but not twice immediately in the same house.

Major Superiors are of themselves temporary; yet they can be perpetual, or constituted for life. Yet in new religions of women, perpetual Superioresses will not be admitted.

4. Superiors General of religions of pontifical law must present a quinquennial report to the Holy See;⁽¹⁾ but all must promote the execution of decrees of the Holy See.

5. Religious houses are visited both by their own Major Superiors and by the Ordinary of the place, within the limits established by law.

6. Every religion of men of pontifical law must have a Procurator General who treats the affairs of the religion before the Holy See. Of itself the Procurator General must reside in Rome and pertain to the religion which he represents.

II. Concerning the governance of confessors, cf. what is to be said concerning the sacrament of penance. For lay religions not exempt, the Ordinary of the place designates the chaplain and approves preachers; for exempt clerical religions, the regular Superior provides; his negligence is supplied by the Ordinary (c. 530).

⁽¹⁾ The formula recently prepared is found in A. A. S., XIV, 101 or Periodica, XI, p. 18 ff.

— III. For temporal administration, oeconomi are to be constituted, whom the law requires to be distinct from Major Superiors; it desires them to be distinct from the local Superior (c. 516, §§2-4). Administration of goods is made according to the norm of the constitutions; yet the investment of money which constitutes the dowry of religious women requires the previous consent of the Ordinary of the place. The same Ordinary exercises greater power over houses of diocesan law and over houses of nuns than over other houses of pontifical law. In alienations of goods, the rules of common law must be observed, and the Superior needs the consent of his chapter or Council. And if there is question of alienating precious things or other things whose value exceeds the sum of thirty thousand francs or lire, the contract is null without antecedent apostolic good pleasure. The same good pleasure is necessary for contracting debts beyond the same sum (c. 534).

— I. The supreme power is in the general chapter; administration is in the hands of Superiors. Counselors assist these, with a voice sometimes deliberative, sometimes consultative. Temporal administration is made by oeconomi. In alienations, the solemnities of law are to be observed. A Superior General or quasi-General, that is, independent, is elected by the chapter; the rest sometimes by the chapter, generally by the Superior General and his council. A local Superior cannot be constituted beyond a triennium, or be confirmed immediately in the same convent for more than another triennium.

Congregations of pontifical law must, through the Superior General, present a quinquennial report to the Holy See; and institutes of men must have a Procurator General of their religion in the City. All Superiors must promote the execution of decrees of the Holy See.

Houses are visited by their own Superiors; and, within the limits of law, by the Ordinary of the place.

Concerning confessors, cf. the treatise on the Sacrament of Penance.

— 1. Juridical Liberty. By both divine and ecclesiastical law, any Catholic detained by no impediment can be received among religious (cf. c. 538).

2. Vocation. Leaving aside opinions concerning a special interior instinct, which God indeed can give but which is by no means necessary, suitability for bearing the burdens of religion and a right intention of serving God in religion suffice for lawful entrance, which of itself also is to be advised, since the profession of the counsels is of itself to be preferred to the mere profession of the precepts. But the firmer the will, led by a supernatural motive, shows itself, and the more manifest the suitability is, the clearer is the divine vocation. Nor is present sanctity or justice of the person demanded, since religion is a school for acquiring perfection. Yet here a distinction must be made between religions as such and certain religions. For those which exercise apostolic ministries suppose in the candidate a fairly proximate hope of blameless life. And because now life in common is required for every approved religion, the vocation to religious profession is less universal than the vocation to private observance of the evangelical counsels. Moreover these inculcate to all the faithful by what spirit life must be lived.

But vocation explained thus is truly divine, because, as outstanding testimonies of the Fathers confirm, it must be attributed to the power of the Holy Spirit that someone, the enticements of the world having been overcome, dedicates himself wholly to divine service.

Although, however, it is of itself entire for the faithful person to obey God inviting and embrace the religion of the counsels, or to be content with the religion of the precepts, the same option is not left to counselors. For these are bound by a grave obligation to advise that which is better. And Christ Himself, when He said to the young man whom He loved, "If thou wilt be perfect," would not have permitted His apostles and disciples to offer opposite counsels. For He did not send them to correct His sayings, but, as witnesses of Him (Luke 24, 48; Acts 1, 8), and having obtained mercy that they might be faithful (1 Cor. 7, 25), to teach to observe whatsoever He had commanded them (Matt. 28, 20). And since there is question of the whole manner of life, it is already objectively grave that someone rashly assume or fulfill the office of counselor in this matter.

— Postulancy (cc. 539-541). All women and all lay brothers, before they are enrolled among novices, must, by common law, in a religion where vows are perpetual, spend at least six whole months in postulancy; in religions of temporary vows, one must stand by the constitutions concerning this matter. But the Major Superior can prolong the prescribed time of postulancy, yet not beyond another semester.

Concerning the mode and place of postulancy, the Code defines nothing besides these things: a. that it be made under the special care of an approved religious, in a house where observance flourishes; b. that postulants wear modest dress different from that of novices; c. that aspirants to be nuns observe the law of cloister, yet not under censure; d. that before the novitiate, for at least eight whole days, they be occupied with spiritual exercises.

— Impediments to Entrance into the Novitiate. With special prescriptions of the constitutions saved besides, from common law, c. 542:

The following are admitted invalidly to the novitiate:

Those who have adhered to a non-Catholic sect, that is, from the authentic declaration, those who, apostates from the Catholic faith, have given their name to a heretical or schismatic sect (Response, October 16, 1919); those who do not have the age required for the novitiate, that is, who have not completed the fifteenth year of age (c. 555, 1); "those who enter religion induced by force, grave fear, or fraud, or whom the Superior receives induced in the same way." Just fear is not here distinguished from unjust, neither in the candidate, who seems never able to be coerced justly, nor in the Superior; "a spouse, during marriage"; "those who are bound, or have been bound, by the bond of religious profession," no distinction being made of temporary or perpetual profession, in the same or in another religion; "those to whom a penalty is imminent on account of a grave delict committed, concerning which they have been accused or can be accused." Therefore the impediment does not affect those who, although guilty, are subject to no serious danger of accusation in another forum, canonical or civil; "a bishop, whether residential or titular, even if he has only been designated by the Roman Pontiff." Therefore he is already impeded who, not yet consecrated or preconized in consistory, has received authentic notice of his pontifical nomination or designation; "clerics who, from an institute of the Holy See, are held by oath to devote their work to the good of their diocese or of missions, for the time during which the obligation of the oath perdures."

Since an institute of the Holy See signifies something more special than a canon of the Code, and clerics in sacred orders, from c. 542, 2 itself, must merely consult the Ordinary of the place so that they give their name to religion altogether lawfully, there is not question here of clerics who, ordained by title of the service of the diocese, had to make from c. 981, §1 an oath concerning perpetual service of the diocese. It must be said otherwise concerning the oath of mission, since the very formula, received until now, excludes religious life assumed without the good pleasure of the Holy See. But chiefly are understood resident students of certain colleges of the City, for example of the German-Hungarian College, who promised temporary service of three years in the northern parts of Europe, with the option of religious life expressly denied to them during that space.

— The following are admitted illicitly but validly:

"Clerics constituted in sacred orders, without the Ordinary of the place having been consulted, or with the same contradicting, from the fact that their departure would yield to grave detriment of souls which otherwise could by no means be avoided." Therefore of itself positive permission is not necessary; consultation suffices. Yet if from their departure there remains grave detriment of souls which cannot otherwise be avoided, then the contradiction of the Ordinary will make entrance illicit for them, but not invalid.

Can a cleric licitly remain in the novitiate who entered it illicitly? We judge that the matter depends on this: whether the matter is still sufficiently whole and the permanent necessity can be met by departure, or on the contrary, departure has now been made less useful, a prevailing advantage stands in its way, and the Ordinary himself, abstaining from contradiction, perhaps tacitly assents. And it seems likely to happen that, the Ordinary protesting, the matter will be referred to the Holy See to be decided. Clerics who are not in sacred orders are not obliged to consult the Ordinary, but natural equity of itself demands that he, having courteously been made more certain concerning the plan, have the occasion of giving prudent counsel.

"Those burdened by debt, who are not able to pay."

Because by that sanction the law of Sixtus V Cum de omnibus, §§4 and 5 (1587), tempered by the Constitution of Clement VIII In suprema (1602), is confirmed, the canon admits the same interpretation, so that there is question of those who owe to a certain and definite creditor, by onerous title, those things which they have hope that, remaining in the world, they can pay. Indeed those were excused from that law who without grave fault had been reduced to these straits. But attention will also have to be paid to infamy of fact, if any is incurred, and account will have to be had of civil sanctions concerning debtors. Cf. Tamburini, De iure abbatum, III, d. 69, 3, n. 11.

"Those subject to rendering an account or involved in other secular business, from which the religion could fear lawsuits and troubles."

There is question of those who, by private or public cause, must render account of temporal administration, for example of guardianship, on account of which notable troubles hang over them. Therefore not only lawsuits and troubles which would be made against the religion are to be considered here; for religion also has not a little to fear from lawsuits and troubles made against its members.

"Sons who must assist parents, that is, father or mother, grandfather or grandmother, constituted in grave necessity, and parents whose work is necessary for feeding or educating children."

Sons must assist parents who in the world would have the means of providing, of which they are deprived in religion. On account of the same cause they would have to bid farewell to the novitiate. After profession the strict obligation of departing, at least for a time, having obtained, for example, an indult of exclaustration, urges only him who cannot otherwise provide for the extreme and indubitable necessity of parents.

What the Code sanctions concerning grave necessity of parents seems to have to be said concerning extreme necessity of brothers and sisters.

"Those destined to the priesthood in religion, from which nevertheless they are removed by irregularity or another canonical impediment."

The canon is to be understood of those irregularities and impediments which of themselves will remain at the time of ordination, or are not taken away by the privilege of religion before ordination, for example by profession. Otherwise, from c. 987, 5, as many as, being destined to the priesthood, had not yet completed ordinary military service would have to be repelled from religion. But for the irregular and impeded, dispensation must be obtained before the novitiate, contrary to what Rev. Fr. Fanfani thinks, De iure religiosorum, n. 150. For there is no cause why we should violate the clear disposition of law by a distinction to which the general words of the canon are repugnant and which takes away free judgment from the Holy See.

"Orientals in Latin religions, without permission given in writing by the Sacred Congregation for the Oriental Church."

— Aspirants must present testimony of baptism and confirmation.

If they were in a seminary, college, or postulancy or novitiate of another religion, sworn testimonial letters are required from the rector of the seminary or college, the Ordinary of the place having been heard, or given by the Major Superior of the religion, according as the seminary or college belongs to the Ordinary or to the religion. And they must report for what cause the aspirants were dismissed or departed spontaneously.

If sworn letters cannot be had, even with the Ordinary or supreme Moderator intervening, the matter is to be referred to the Sacred Congregation of Religious (cc. 544, 545 and decree of the Sacred Congregation of Religious, November 21, 1919). Accurate information concerning character and morals is to be taken.

For men, besides, testimonial letters of the Ordinary of origin are necessary, that is, of the place where, when the aspirant was born, the father, or, failing him, the mother, had domicile or quasi-domicile; and of the Ordinaries in whose diocese or quasi-diocese, "after the completed 14th year of age, they have stayed beyond a morally continuous year, with every contrary privilege removed" (c. 544, §2).

All testimonial letters are to be given gratuitously within three months from their requisition.

— Aspirants to be nuns, from common law itself, but other religious women according as is prescribed by the constitutions, must bring the dowry defined by constitutions or custom.

That dowry is to be handed over before the reception of the habit, or at least its handing-over is to be made secure in a valid civil form; it is to be invested prudently and fruitfully in a mode approved by the Ordinary of the place and the regular Superior, if there is one; and by the death of a religious woman who has emitted at least temporary vows, it is irrevocably acquired by the religion. If there is question of a religion of pontifical law, the dowry cannot be condoned, not even in part, without an indult of the Holy See, which is accustomed to be granted for a certain number of cases, or use of a faculty made to an Apostolic Legate.

At least two months before the novitiate, the Ordinary of the place must be admonished by the Superioress, so that by himself or through a delegate he may explore the will of the aspirant.

— The novitiate (cc. 553-571), in the mode prescribed by the constitutions, generally begins with the reception of the habit; but for validity it must be made at least for one whole and continuous year in a legitimate house of novitiate, that is, if there is question of a religion of pontifical law, in a house which has been erected with permission of the Holy See. But the year is completed only when the day of the same number and month on which it was begun a year before has been completed, so that the first day of entrance is not computed. But the novitiate is interrupted if the novice, dismissed or spontaneously bidding farewell to the religion, has gone out from the house, or has been absent beyond thirty days, continuous or not continuous, for any cause whatsoever. If he has been absent beyond fifteen days, for validity it is required and suffices that those days be supplied. Besides, in cc. 558 and 564, the Code prescribes distinct probation for lay brothers and for other novices, so that a novitiate made for one class is useless for the other.

Novices enjoy the privileges of their religion, and after death have a right to the same suffrages as the professed.

In religious Congregations, novices must freely make a testament during the novitiate, which after profession they will be able to change, unless the matter urges, only with permission of the Holy See.

Before the first profession of vows, the novice must, for the whole time by which he will be bound by simple vows, cede the administration of his goods to whomever he prefers, and, unless the constitutions bear otherwise, freely dispose concerning their use and usufruct. This cession and disposition can also be supplied or completed after vows; it can also be changed with due permission; and by departure from religion it ceases to have force. But during the novitiate the novice cannot validly bind his goods or in any way renounce them, as also benefices.

For at least eight solid days, the novice must send spiritual exercises before the vows to be pronounced.

But before the first temporary profession is made, and then before perpetual profession, the Superioress of religious women must admonish the Ordinary of the place at least two months beforehand, so that by himself or through a delegate he may explore the conscious and free will of the religious woman (c. 552, §2).

— I. Various Notions and Divisions. Profession is distinguished as simple and solemn, which differs from the former in conditions and effects. But solemn vows are those which are recognized by the Church as such (c. 1308); these are vows plainly authentic. The greater firmness and efficacy which is connected with them bring it about that one solemnly professed is judged more perfectly consecrated to God, more fully deputed by the Church to professing the religion of the counsels.

Simple profession is either temporary or perpetual. In any religion of perpetual vows, for validity of perpetual profession, the novice must, in the very house of novitiate, send before perpetual vows a profession of simple vows to be valid for a triennium, or, if the age required for perpetual profession is farther away, until that age, "unless the constitutions require annual professions." The legitimate Superior can prolong that time for individual religious for a just cause, for example for six months, for a year, for two years, indeed for three, but not beyond (c. 574).

Yet to not a few Institutes it has already been conceded that perpetual profession be prepared by temporary vows for six years.

That temporary profession is to be made in the very house of novitiate.

But no profession before the age of sixteen completed years can validly be made; perpetual profession requires the twenty-first year completed.

Profession is not valid unless it is express, unless the legitimate Superior has admitted to it, and unless it is received by the legitimate Superior, by himself or through another. Cf. c. 572. Wherefore, in institutes of pontifical law, no priest of himself is to be delegated by the Ordinary of the place to receive profession or assist at it. Yet reception by the Ordinary or his delegate can be prescribed by Constitutions.

— II. Admission to the Novitiate and to Profession. But to admit to the novitiate and to professions belongs to Major Superiors with the suffrage of the chapter or council, which is deliberative for the first temporary profession, consultative for perpetual profession (cc. 543 and 575). For other temporary professions, the constitutions are to be observed. The space of vows having elapsed, these are to be renewed immediately, on the very day recurring on which they were made, with consideration of the hour neglected. Yet Superiors are given the faculty of anticipating, not beyond a month, the renewal of temporary vows; but when the time of temporary profession has passed, the religious is either to be admitted to perpetual profession or is to be dismissed (cc. 575 and 577).

— III. Effects of Profession. 1. All professed enjoy the privileges and spiritual graces of their religion, and, after death, have a right to the same suffrages; and they are held by the same obligation of religious discipline. Yet where there is an obligation of choir, with an express disposition of the constitutions saved, temporary profession does not impose private recitation of the office.

Likewise, with an express disposition of the constitutions saved, the professed of temporary vows lack active and passive voice; but the time prescribed for acquiring it is computed from first profession. "After a year from any religious profession, parochial benefices are vacant; after three years, the rest" (c. 584).

2. Simple profession, with special law saved, renders acts contrary to the vows illicit, not invalid, and leaves to the professed temporal goods with the capacity of acquiring others; in religious Congregations, the professed are forbidden to abdicate the ownership of their goods by gratuitous title.

"But whatever the professed acquires by his own industry or by reason of religion, he acquires for the religion" (c. 580, §2).

3. Within sixty days before solemn profession, with special indults of the Holy See saved, one simply professed must renounce all goods which he actually has, to whomever he prefers, under condition of profession to follow; after solemn profession, care is to be taken, according as opportunity exists, that the abdication be made firm civilly; but goods which afterward come to the professed yield to the religion, if this is capable of possessing; in an Order incapable, they are acquired in ownership for the Holy See. But acts contrary to the vows, if they are capable of being annulled, are made invalidly by those solemnly professed.

4. One professed from perpetual vows by the law itself loses the proper diocese which he had in the world (c. 585).

— I. Any Catholic not impeded can be received among religious; and suitability with a right intention suffices for lawful entrance, so that one willing, especially if the will is firm, may judge himself divinely called.

But in a religion with perpetual vows, all lay brothers and all women must be proved in postulancy before the novitiate for at least six months, and be occupied with spiritual exercises for eight whole days.

From common law itself, the following are invalidly admitted to the novitiate: those who, apostates from the Catholic faith, have given their name to a non-Catholic sect; those who are not yet fifteen years old; those who, induced by force, grave fear, or fraud, enter religion, or whom the Superior receives induced in the same way; a spouse; those who are bound or have been bound by the bond of religious profession; those to whom a penalty is imminent on account of a grave delict; a bishop, even titular and merely designated by the Pontiff; clerics for the time during which, from an institute of the Holy See, they are held by a contrary oath. Illicitly admitted are: clerics in sacred orders, without the Ordinary of the place having been consulted; those burdened by debt; those subject to rendering account; sons necessary to parents and parents necessary to children; those destined to the priesthood, from which they are barred by irregularity or canonical impediment; Orientals in Latin religions without written permission of the Sacred Congregation for the Oriental Church.

Besides, they must bring testimony of baptism and confirmation; and have testimonial letters, sometimes sworn, which the law requires.

Aspirants to be nuns, but other religious women according as is required by the constitutions, must furnish a fixed dowry, inalienable and to be invested prudently, in a mode approved by the Ordinary of the place and the regular Superior. Two months before the novitiate, before first profession, and before perpetual profession, the Ordinary must be admonished by the Superioress, so that by himself or through another he may explore the conscious and free will of the aspirant or religious woman.

II. For validity, the novitiate must be made at least for one whole and continuous year in a legitimate house of novitiate. Absence beyond thirty days, just as departure from the house after dismissal or after the spontaneous plan of bidding farewell, interrupts it. Absence beyond fifteen days is to be supplied.

Novices enjoy the privileges and, after death, the suffrages of the institute. Before profession, they must cede the administration of their goods; and dispose concerning the usufruct and use, insofar as the constitutions permit this. During the novitiate they cannot bind goods or renounce them. In a religious Congregation they must make a testament.

III. The professed make vows, some simple, which are temporary or perpetual; with a peculiar privilege saved, temporary vows for at least three years must be put before perpetual vows. The Superior can prolong that time for a just cause, yet in such a way that temporary vows do not persevere beyond six years. Others emit vows which are accepted by the Church as solemn. First profession must be made in the novitiate itself; but none is valid unless it is express, unless the legitimate Superior has admitted the novice to it, and unless it is received by the legitimate Superior, by himself or through another. The one receiving can be the Ordinary himself, if the Constitutions so bear. Major Superiors admit to the novitiate and to professions, with the suffrage of the chapter or council, and this deliberative for first temporary profession. Renewal of temporary vows can be anticipated by one month; but it cannot be deferred.

All professed are held by the same obligation of observing discipline, with an express disposition of the Constitutions saved; those temporary do not have to recite the canonical hours privately from common law; they keep their goods, with the capacity of acquiring others, with benefices excepted, which are vacant after three years, indeed after one year if they were parochial. In religious Congregations, they are forbidden to abdicate their goods by gratuitous title. Within sixty days before solemn profession, the professed must renounce all goods under condition of the profession to follow; goods which afterward come to them yield to the religion, or, in an incapable Order, to the Holy See. Whatever any professed acquires by his own industry or by reason of religion, he acquires for the religion.

But the professed from perpetual vows lose their own diocese.

— 1. The societies of which there is question here, in Title XVII, Part 2, Book 2 of the Code, are constituted by four notes: a) life in common; b) governance of Superiors; c) approved Constitutions; d) study of imitating religious. In what manner? Unless we are mistaken, insofar as they too pursue perfection.

The Code does not treat under this title of Societies which lack any one of these notes; rather, these are governed by the titles concerning associations of laymen.

2. The dispositions of the Code come back to this: that it subjects those societies to several canons concerning Religious and besides to their own constitutions. But they participate in the law of religious in the erection and suppression of the society, provinces, and houses; in governance; in the administration of goods; in impediments of entrance; in obligations; in passage; in dismissal; and in penalties.

— These privileges seem to be alleged:

I. Communication of privileges, which nuns enjoy with respect to the regular Order, but not, at least for the future, various religions among themselves.

II. Privileges of clerics, which laymen themselves and novices enjoy.

III. Exemption from the jurisdiction of the Ordinary, which regulars with their houses and churches enjoy of themselves.

IV. Use of indults by which the local Ordinary takes away or tempers the obligation of common law for the territory.

V. Questing permitted to truly mendicant regulars, by the license alone of Superiors in the diocese where they have a house.

VI. Use of Pontificals and conferral of tonsure and minor orders conceded to abbots blessed for governance, and various faculties of dispensing conceded to Superiors by common law or peculiar indults.

Appendix. Societies which, without the customary public vows, lead common life so that they may imitate religious, participate in the law of religious in several matters, as in the erection and suppression of the society, provinces, and houses, in governance, in the administration of goods, in impediments of entrance, in obligations, in passage, in dismissal, and in penalties.

624. 1. St. Paul admonishes: "Above all things have charity, which is the bond of perfection";¹⁵³ for charity is the form of all the virtues, orders them to the supernatural end, and gives to them their proper notion of meriting eternal life. On account of this reason also our spiritual perfection depends upon the habit of charity, and the more perfect the degree of charity in a man is, the greater is his spiritual perfection. Wherefore St. Augustine says fittingly: "Charity begun is justice begun, charity advanced is justice advanced, great charity is great justice, perfect charity is perfect justice."¹⁵⁴ According to St. Thomas, the perfection of charity in this earthly life is exercised by man in two ways, namely in the first way, "that he appoint his zeal to having leisure for God and divine things, other things being passed over, except so far as the necessity of the present life requires; and this is the perfection of charity which is possible in the way; nevertheless it is not common to all having charity. In another way so that someone habitually places his whole heart in God, namely in such a way that he thinks or wills nothing which is contrary to divine love; and this is the perfection common to all having charity."¹⁵⁵ Therefore according to St. Thomas there are two grades of charity: the first common to all having sanctifying grace; the second belongs only to those who pass over all worldly things, insofar as is possible, and with all their powers devote themselves to divine things.

2. Charity, as an infused virtue, cannot be increased from our acts except through an increase of sanctifying grace, which we merit by our acts. Nevertheless, by our acts we can also remove impediments of charity and thus increase it indirectly. This indeed happens in this way. Manifold disordered cupidity prevents man from adhering to God with all his powers. Hence man is bound by repeated acts gradually to restrain that cupidity, and the more disordered cupidity has been subdued, the greater is the perfection of charity. Hence St. Thomas¹⁵⁶ says: "Perfection is considered as to this, that those things are excluded which are repugnant to the movement of love into God, as Augustine says in the book 83 Questions, q. 36, that the poison of charity is cupidity, perfection is no cupidity." But the acts by which passions are mortified and virtues are exercised pertain to the perfection of charity, not because they constitute it formally, but because they are commanded by charity and eliminate all opposed impediments. Therefore it cannot be concluded absolutely that those saints who exercised greater mortifications had greater charity and sanctity.

3. Whoever has a permanent disposition of loving God above all things and of committing no mortal sin can rightly be said to be in the state of perfection, because every permanent and stable disposition can be called a state. Nevertheless, under the state of perfection theologians are accustomed to understand something else, namely a certain kind of life in which the three evangelical counsels and a certain Rule approved by the Supreme Pontiffs are observed. But first of all it must be noted that the state of perfection accepted in this sense is not the same as perfection itself; for someone living outside that state can be most perfect; and conversely someone living in the state of perfection can be most imperfect, indeed even dwell in the state of mortal sin. Nevertheless this state is deservedly called the state of perfection, because a) its members are bound by profession to tend toward perfection and because b) they ought to employ the best means for attaining this perfection. For the obstacles of charity are disordered cupidity 1. of one's own excellence, 2. of carnal delights, and 3. of material goods. Furthermore this threefold cupidity is most efficaciously mortified by the vows of obedience, chastity, and poverty; and these three vows are perfectly observed in the state of religion according to Rules approved by the Supreme Pontiffs. Hence also the history of all ages proves that the most splendid examples of sanctity have shone forth in religious orders.

¹⁵³ Col. 3, 14.

¹⁵⁴ De nat. et grat. c. 70 (Migne, Patr. lat. 44, 290).

¹⁵⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 24, a. 8.

¹⁵⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 184, a. 2.

1148. • The religious state is a stable mode of living in common of the faithful, tending under a certain rule to the perfection of Christian charity, the three substantial vows of perpetual chastity, poverty, and obedience having been emitted, approved by the Church with solemnity attributed to the vows. Thus, from the Law today in force in the Church, De Angelis.¹

1149. Corollaries. - I. The religious state according to itself and as to its substance was immediately handed down and instituted by Christ the Lord; for He Himself is the author of religious perfection, handing down the evangelical counsels.

This state in the Church is necessary as to the said substance, because she herself must be holy also by external and public sanctity, since sanctity is one of the notes by which she is discerned from false churches. But this public sanctity cannot shine without profession of the evangelical counsels. - But it is not necessary if it is considered as to peculiar forms by which it is determined to a certain Rule and Institute.

Whence as to substance the religious state is of divine law counseling; as to forms it is of ecclesiastical law.

II. For the essence of the religious state there is required some cause inducing permanence or firmness; otherwise it would not be a state. This cause of firmness is the vow. But for the essence of the religious state, considered by divine law alone, solemn vows are not required, but simple vows suffice. For all conditions necessary for the substance of Religion are also had in simple vows, and "the solemnity of the vow by the constitution of the Church alone" (according to De Angelis¹ a little before the middle of the eleventh century, as he argues from Cause 27. q. 1. Can. 40) "was invented" (cap. unic. L. III. T. XV. in 6°). This is also clear from the Bull of Gregory XIII Ascendente Domino, of the year 1584.

III. Although solemnity of vows is necessary for the religious state today even from the law of the Church, nevertheless already from the time of the Council of Trent another stable mode of living was introduced into the Church, which would include the three substantial vows, but would lack solemnity of vows, since in it simple vows were emitted, and it came under the name Congregation. Indeed another also supervened, which would not indeed have the essence of the religious state required by Christ, yet would imitate its form and retain something from it, namely only the vow of chastity, or the three vows, but temporary, or a similar mode of living without any vows; whence the former are called Congregations properly religious, the latter Congregations improperly religious (De Angelis L. III. T. XXXI. 6°). Religious Congregations are neither held by the laws nor enjoy the privileges of Regulars strictly so called, unless either the former were specially imposed on them or the latter were granted to them.

Therefore it is clear in what sense Congregations properly religious must be called such by ecclesiastical law, and in what sense not.

2128. Three things must briefly be weighed, namely the notion, origin, and distinction of the RELIGIOUS STATE.

DEFINITION. In general, State is a certain condition of life in which someone persists perpetually, or for a time. - Of this kind is the state of innocence, the state of fallen nature, the state of grace, the state of sin, the ecclesiastical state, the lay state, etc.

In a stricter manner, STATE is an immovable condition of life by which someone is firmly bound to another. Immovable absolutely, or movable only with difficulty; for state signifies persistence and a certain stability. - A state of this kind is THREEFOLD: episcopal, religious, and conjugal. For Bishops are obliged to service of their Church; Religious to divine service; married persons to mutual service. The two prior states are spiritual; and the first of them is the state of perfection acquired, the second of perfection to be acquired, but the third is a secular state.²

Now then,

The RELIGIOUS STATE is incomplete or complete, namely according as it is taken in a broad or strict sense.

The INCOMPLETE religious state, and taken in the broader sense, is the state of the faithful tending to the perfection of divine charity. - Under this definition not a few Institutes called Religious improperly are comprehended, as will be clear from the things to be said.

The COMPLETE religious state, and strictly so called, is defined: A stable manner of living by which one tends to the perfection of divine charity through the three perpetual vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, under a rule of common life approved by the Church.³

It is said 1. a stable manner of living; otherwise it would not be a state properly so called, as we have already noted.

It is said 2. by which one tends to the perfection of divine charity; for the end of the religious state is CHARITY, not indeed that common charity which belongs also to imperfect Christians who are in the state of grace, but that eminent charity by which someone is proximately disposed to act easily and ordinarily according to the precepts and counsels of God,⁴ namely in imitation of Christ the Lord saying (John 8:29): I always do those things which are pleasing to Him (cf. n. 467, III, and 690).

It is said 3. through the three perpetual vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience; because, according to all theologians, a complete religious state is not understood unless it makes one tend completely and permanently to perfection. But indeed, that a human being tend completely to perfection, it is required both that he remove from the midst all things which forestall this perfection, namely the concupiscence of the eyes, the concupiscence of the flesh, and the pride of life, and that he offer to God in perpetuity as a holocaust all that he has, namely external and internal goods, body and soul. But each is done, as is clear, through the observance of the three evangelical counsels, namely of voluntary poverty, chastity, and obedience. Then, that he tend permanently and firmly to perfection, a VOW is required; for since the prementioned perfection is of free election, scarcely any other means of stability can be thought of than a perpetual vow, which, from the virtue of religion, establishes a truly perseverable law.⁵

Hence, those are not Religious properly so called who indeed observe the three evangelical counsels, but who have pronounced no vow concerning them; nor those who have vowed only one or two of the three; nor those who have vowed all three, but only for a time. - Suarez indeed dissents,⁶ teaching that with the vow of conjugal chastity alone there can exist a religious state properly so called, so that the essence of the religious state remains in the case in which the Supreme Pontiff should dispense someone, in part, from the solemn vow of chastity, with the faculty of using matrimony already contracted, or of contracting future matrimony. But Doctors more commonly oppose this doctrine.⁷

It is said 4. under a rule of common life. And in this consists the accidental or secondary element by which the religious state is constituted. - For although the three vows by which the observance of the evangelical counsels is promised, accepted in the name of God by someone having power for this, suffice of themselves for the essence of the religious state, nevertheless, considering present ecclesiastical law, that state does not exist before the Church except in common or cenobitic life, under one head and under one rule which fittingly conduces to pursuing perfection.

Hence: "Those are not Religious who, after the vow of perpetual poverty and chastity has been made, vow obedience to a confessor or Bishop;⁸ nor are Hermits reputed such, unless they have a common prelate and rule with other members of the same Institute, according to the present custom of the Church."

It is said 5. approved by the Church, namely by the Holy See, to which today the matter is reserved, as being of greater moment. For although this approbation is not of itself of the essence of the religious state, as most theologians think against some, nevertheless it is required from ecclesiastical law. In antiquity indeed, for founding religious Institutes, e.g. of St. Basil, St. Augustine, St. Benedict, etc., the express institution and approbation of the proper Bishops sufficed, the Roman Pontiff not opposing but rather commending; but in the Fourth Lateran Council,⁹ and then in the Council of Lyons,¹⁰ it was established that a new Order could not be introduced, nor the habit taken in it, unless it had been expressly approved by the Supreme Pontiff.

Now the approbation of the Church imports two things, namely judgment concerning the honorableness and utility of the Order or rule, and power conceded to Superiors of receiving Candidates to the habit and profession, and of performing the other things which are according to the Rule or Institute.¹¹

Hence: 1. Those are not Religious properly so called who, although they emit the three vows and lead life in common, nevertheless do not profess a rule approved by the Holy See; such are the pupils of various Congregations which Bishops have instituted by their own authority alone. Although their merit before God can be plainly the same as the merit of the others who are properly Religious, since they exhibit to the Lord the same abnegation of themselves.

2. An Institute which would be reproved or prohibited by the Holy See would by that very fact be void and would exclude the essence of the religious state. For it would no longer be a state of perfection, but rather a state of rebellion, since God can never hold as accepted what the Church disapproves.

2129. Questions. QUESTION 1. What is the difference between SOLEMN and SIMPLE vows, and do simple vows SUFFICE for the essence of the state of religion?

Resp. 1. Authors do not agree concerning the difference which intervenes between solemn vows and simple vows. According to the opinion of St. Thomas,¹² Bellarmine, etc., which St. Alphonsus teaches as the more probable,¹³ the solemnity of the vow of chastity is from ecclesiastical law as regards the rite, i.e. the form essentially required that it be held by the Church as solemn, but from positive divine law as regards the essence and effect, i.e. of invalidating matrimony. The reason is, "because in a simple vow the body is promised only to God, but in a solemn vow through the legitimate acceptance of Prelates, the body is besides handed over to God." These are the words of St. Alphonsus.¹⁴ And a similar reason can be adduced for the vow of poverty and obedience.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the contrary opinion seems today to have become the more common among canonists. Philip de Angelis testifies to this,¹⁶ saying: "This is the canonical doctrine, that solemnity is not intrinsic or essential to vows, so that the simple and solemn vow differ in species; but that it is extrinsic and accidental to vows, proceeding from the disposition of the Church." And a demonstration having been added from various documents, the distinguished Canonist concludes "that the SOLEMNITY of the three vows consists in the force added to them by the disposition of the Church, of making void, or at least voidable, certain acts contrary to the accidental perfection of the vows of a Religious." But whether this opinion is also intrinsically more probable, let others judge. Cf. the things to be said in n. 2156, 2160, 2176.

Resp. 2. "For the essence of Religion solemn vows are not required. The reason is that those who in the Society of Jesus make simple vows are true Religious, as Gregory XIII defined in the Bull Ascendente Domino."¹⁷ And Benedict XIV writes: "By the authority of the Roman Pontiff it can be brought about that that also is a true Religion in which only simple vows are emitted."¹⁸

Nor does it stand in the way that the bond of solemn vows is greater; because, as Suarez rightly observes,¹⁹ greater and lesser do not vary species. And indeed, although simple vows do not induce of themselves, as solemn vows do, inability for matrimony, incapacity of dominion, and absolute or immutable stability, nevertheless they render matrimony illicit in perpetuity, strip the one vowing of every independent use and every arbitrary disposition of temporal things, which is the same as if the Religious possessed nothing at all; finally, they induce sufficient stability, while it is established that the professed can never withdraw by his own will, and the Order ought not to dismiss him except for a grave and just cause.²⁰

QUESTION 2. Whether for the essence of the religious state strictly taken, there is required a HANDING OVER OF ONESELF made to God and ACCEPTED in the name of God by some human being?

Resp. Affirmatively, according to the common opinion of authors. For the religious state properly so called has always been held in the Church of God as a true handing over or donation, by which a human being wholly binds himself to God, namely by abdicating that natural right which each one, the precepts being observed, has of disposing of himself and his things according to his will. And although the aforesaid handing over is customarily joined to the very emission of vows, nevertheless it is something different from the vows, which is superadded to them. For a vow, by its nature, is nothing except a promise, by force of which not the dominion of the thing itself, but only a right to having it, is conferred; but a handing over which is legitimately accepted in the name of God by someone is a true and perfect donation, which effects that the thing or person offered is irrevocably transferred under the dominion of the one accepting.

But that an acceptance of this kind is necessary is gathered from this, that through a donation of goods, right is not yet transferred to another unless the donation is accepted by the donee, as we saw in the Treatise on Contracts (n. 1063 sqq.). "But indeed a handing over or donation, although it can immediately be made in view of God, nevertheless is not accepted by Him, nor is it pleasing to Him, unless it is made to some human being by whom it can be accepted or repudiated, and who acquires a right over the thing handed over for using it or for commanding it and for bearing care of it. The reason of this is that God, according to His ordinary providence, does not assume the peculiar care of governing a private person immediately by Himself, nor does He need sensible things, so that He may use them immediately and without the intervention of secondary causes. And therefore a donation thus made to God would either be vain and odious, or as though tempting God by demanding immediate governance from Him; and for that reason it is not pleasing to Him, nor is it immediately accepted by Him."²¹

2130. From these things you will gather: 1. Vows which are made to God alone and are accepted by no one do not induce the essence of the Religious State. - And hence it was why Pope Alexander VII, in the Constitution Ex commissa issued on 22 Sept. 1655 in favor of the Congregation of the Mission, or Lazarists, which, although it intended to emit three vows, and these perpetual, nevertheless did not wish to be numbered among religious Orders, established these things most worthy of note, namely: "that, in the emission of their vows, no one be present who accepts them in the name of the Congregation, or in Our name and in the name of the Roman Pontiff existing for the time ... And that the said Congregation not on this account be judged among the number of religious Orders, but be of the body of the secular clergy." But unless the Pontiff had added this clause, the Congregation of the Lazarists would not be secular, but properly religious, namely having the essence and truth of the Religious State.²²

2. The handing over of oneself, concerning which we have spoken, does not necessarily presuppose the emission of solemn vows. And this is confirmed from the Bull Ascendente Domino of Gregory XIII, § 18, where the Pontiff notes: "that the three vows of the Society, i.e. of Scholastics, although simple, have been admitted by this See as substantial vows of Religion, and that those emitting them are truly constituted in the State of religion, since by them they dedicate and actually hand over themselves to the Society, and bind themselves to divine service in it."

3. On the part of the Order there can be some acceptance, without for that reason a reciprocal obligation arising between it and the Religious. - To the point, Schmalzgruber speaks thus:²³ "It must be said that, for someone to be truly and properly a Religious, it suffices if at least on the part of the one vowing there is given the obligation of remaining perpetually in Religion, although Religion does not have in turn the absolute obligation of retaining him perpetually." - And this is confirmed by the example of the Society of Jesus, in which "Scholastics bind themselves by vows to remain perpetually in the Order; but the Society reserves to itself the power of dismissing them, if this seems more expedient to it."²⁴

2131. • Some writers have taught that the religious State is of merely ecclesiastical institution, and consequently belongs in no way to the essence or integrity of the Church. Thus especially the Innovators, most hostile to Religious, against whom we establish the following:

Principles. I. The religious State, AS TO SUBSTANCE, although not as to accidental forms, was instituted by Christ the Lord; whence it must be said to be of DIVINE LAW, not commanding but COUNSELING.

"This," says Suarez,¹ "is the opinion of all Catholics who think rightly" (cf. n. 133). And in truth Christ must be called the author of the religious State as to substance, if He Himself is the author of religious perfection, to be acquired through the observance of poverty, chastity, and obedience; for the whole matter or substance of the religious State consists in this. Now then, that the matter is so is clear from the three oracles of the Lord; the first of which is: "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven" (Matt. 19:21); - the second: "And there are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven. He who can take, let him take it" (ibid. 19:12); and the Apostle explains the mind of the Savior (1 Cor. 7); - finally the third: "If anyone wishes to come after Me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily, and follow Me" (Luke 9:23); which same counsel of obedience was given also in these words: "And come, follow Me" (Matt. 19:21).

The same is proved from the Holy Fathers; for they, Suarez bearing witness,² commonly teach that the state of Christians was distributed by Christ into two orders: into the order of those professing the common life of the commandments, i.e. the conjugal or secular life; and into the order of those professing the higher and angelic life of the more sublime counsels, i.e. the religious life. - And this was the life which the Apostles professed, as St. Thomas testifies,³ writing: "The Apostles are understood to have vowed the things pertaining to the state of perfection, when, having left all things, they followed Christ."

From these things you will gather: 1. Although the Pope, as Vicar of God, can dispense in the vows of Religion, he nevertheless cannot effect that someone be at once a Religious and loosed from the substantial vows; because these belong to the essence of the religious State divinely instituted.⁴

2. No Authority on earth is able to abolish the religious State without by that very fact wounding divine right.⁵

2132. II. The religious State is, as to substance, connatural to the Church and so NECESSARY that it must be said to belong to her integrity. - This is drawn not only from the evangelical words, but from the very nature of the Church. For Christ implanted in His Church the property and note of sanctity, namely so that she would be adorned not only with internal sanctity through sanctifying grace and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, but that she would shine also with external and public sanctity, by which she could easily be discerned from all false and spurious religions. Now then, this note of Sanctity comprises not only the exercise of those virtues which suffice for attaining salvation, but also the observance of the counsels and public profession, or the religious State. - Another argument can be taken from the necessity of evangelical workers; for St. Alphonsus⁶ does not hesitate to assert that Bishops and parish priests are unequal to supplying all the spiritual necessities of peoples. Hence, if God did not send to them other priests by whom they might be helped, He would not have sufficiently provided for His Church.

Hence: 1. In every age Religious have existed in the Church, although perhaps they were bound by no peculiar and common discipline during the first two centuries.

2. The religious State is indefectible in the Church, although some Order or Congregation in particular can fail.⁷

Note. The Ascetical writers discuss the EXCELLENCE of the religious State.⁸

2133. • For the greater decorum and utility of the Church, various religious Orders have been raised up by God, which for that reason can be divided into various species.

I. By reason of their PECULIAR END, Religious are said to be contemplative, who principally tend to their own sanctification through prayer and solitude; - active, who principally apply themselves to works of charity toward the neighbor; - mixed, who with equal zeal tend to attaining both ends.⁹

The CONTEMPLATIVE life excels the ACTIVE, according to that word of Christ the Lord: Mary has chosen the best part. But the MIXED LIFE is most perfect, in which a Religious so gives himself to contemplation that, from the fullness of this, those things flow forth which through doctrine and other spiritual offices he expends in helping neighbors. For just as it is more excellent both to shine and to illuminate: so it is more excellent to join action with contemplation, and from charity to pour out into others, for procuring their salvation, the things which are drawn in contemplation. This was the life of the Apostles and of our Lord Jesus Christ Himself, than which none more perfect can be thought.¹⁰

2134. II. By reason of VOWS, they are divided into Religions, into religious Congregations, and into Religious Institutes.

1. A Religion, or religious Order, in the canonical and stricter sense, is constituted by solemn vows alone, so that only those who emit vows of this kind are strictly to be called Regulars.

2. For a religious Congregation there is required and suffices the essence of the religious State with simple vows, as is clear from what was said in n. 2129, q. 1. The members of such Congregations are sometimes comprehended under the name of Religious in Pontifical documents.

3. The word religious Institute extends more broadly than religious Congregation; for it is extended even to those modes of living which imitate the religious State without vows, e.g. the Oratory of St. Philip Neri.¹¹

From these things the manner of SPEAKING of the Supreme Pontiffs becomes clear, who name religious Institutes with simple vows sometimes religious Congregations, religious families, etc.; sometimes secular Congregations, according as they use those words either in the natural sense or in the canonical sense. - But the canons by which the common law of Regulars is constituted suppose and regard Religions properly so called, so that neither the laws nor the privileges given to Regulars belong of themselves to Institutes of simple vows.

2135. III. By reason of the Rule, there are FOUR principal SPECIES of Orders, according as they follow the rule of St. Basil, or of St. Augustine, or of St. Benedict, or of St. Francis. Most founders of religious Orders have embraced one of these four, with peculiar statutes added, by which each might direct his Institute more fittingly to its proper end.

2136. • Note. Religious Orders strictly so called, in which SOLEMN vows are emitted, are reduced to these supreme species:

1. MONASTIC Orders, which, by force of their own institute, are not ordered to the ministries of clerics, but profess in the first place a contemplative and solitary life. - Of this kind are: Basilians, Cassinese, Camaldolese, Vallumbrosans, Cistercians, Trappists, Olivetans, Sylvestrines, Hieronymites, Carthusians, Antonians, etc.

2. CLERICAL Orders, which by their own institute are held to spiritual ministries, to which they are deputed by ecclesiastical ordination. Such are: Canons Regular, e.g. of the Lateran Basilica, and Clerks Regular, e.g. Theatines, Barnabites, Somaschans, Jesuits, Minor Clerks, Ministers of the Sick, Clerks of the Mother of God, and of the Pious Schools.

3. MENDICANT Orders, under which name are comprehended those to whom, from the rule or constitutions approved by the Apostolic See, it is forbidden to have revenues and possessions in common, although they have them by dispensation of the Pontiff, as today, from Trent, sess. 25, de Regul. cap. 3, a dispensation is made with all Mendicants, except the Minors of the Observance and Capuchins. - Wherefore, to the Orders of Mendicants belong the four more ancient Orders of St. Dominic, the Minors, the Hermits of St. Augustine, and the Carmelites, of whom mention is made in cap. unic. § sane, de Relig. domibus in 6; and besides these the Orders of the Servants of Mary, of the Minims of St. Francis of Paola, of St. Jerome, as St. Pius V declared in Constit. 35a Romanus Pontifex, and 48a Apostolicae Sedis; the Society of Jesus, from the Bull Dum indefessae. Likewise, the Trinitarians reformed by Blessed J. B. of the Conception (Paul V, 15 Dec. 1609); the Mercedarians (Benedict XIII, 8 July 1725); the Discalced Carmelites (Clement VIII, 20 Aug. 1603), etc.¹²

4. MILITARY Orders, as the Knights of St. John and the Teutonic Knights, who are ordered to military service for the defense of the Church against Infidels and other enemies of the same.

5. HOSPITALLER Orders, e.g. St. John of God, who from the scope of the Institute are ordered to the exercise of hospitality, as regards the reception of pilgrims, care of the sick, etc.¹³

NB. To various Orders, especially those of St. Francis, St. Dominic, and the Blessed Virgin Mary of Mount Carmel, are joined Tertiaries, who live either in common under a rule, or privately in the world. - Concerning the Third Order of St. Francis of Assisi, see the Constitution of the Most Holy Pope Leo XIII, Misericors Dei Filius, issued on 30 May 1883.¹⁴

The religious state, or a stable manner of living in common, by which the faithful, besides the common precepts, also undertake the evangelical counsels to be observed through vows of obedience, chastity, and poverty, is to be held in honor by all (Can. 487).

In the canons which follow, there come under the name:

1st. Of religion, a society approved by legitimate ecclesiastical authority, in which the members, according to the proper laws of the society itself, pronounce public vows, perpetual or temporary, yet to be renewed when the time has elapsed, and in this way tend toward evangelical perfection;

2nd. Of Order, a religion in which solemn vows are pronounced; of monastic Congregation, the union of several monasteries of their own right among themselves under the same Superior; of exempt religion, a religion, whether of solemn or simple vows, withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the local Ordinary; of religious Congregation, or simply Congregation, a religion in which vows only simple, whether perpetual or temporary, are emitted;

3rd. Of religion of pontifical right, a religion which has obtained either approval or at least a decree of praise from the Apostolic See; of diocesan right, a religion which, erected by Ordinaries, has not yet obtained this decree of praise;

4th. Of clerical religion, a religion of which most members are advanced to the priesthood; otherwise it is lay;

5th. Of religious house, a house of some religion in general; of regular house, a house of an Order; of formed house, a religious house in which at least six professed religious dwell, of whom, if there is question of a clerical religion, at least four are priests;

6th. Of province, the union of several religious houses among themselves under the same Superior, constituting a part of the same religion;

7th. Of religious, those who have pronounced vows in some religion; of religious of simple vows, those who have pronounced vows in a religious Congregation; of regulars, those who have pronounced vows in an Order; of sisters, religious women of simple vows; of nuns, religious women of solemn vows or, unless something else is established from the nature of the matter or from the context of speech, religious women whose vows from their institute are solemn, but for some places by prescription of the Apostolic See are simple;

8th. Of major Superiors, the Abbot Primate, Abbot Superior of a monastic Congregation, Abbot of a monastery of its own right, even if belonging to a monastic Congregation, the supreme Moderator of a religion, provincial Superior, the vicars of these, and others having power after the manner of provincials (Can. 488).

Canon 489 is of the highest moment:

The rules and particular constitutions of individual religions, not contrary to the canons of this Code, keep their force; but those which are opposed to them are abrogated (Can. 489).

§1. Bishops, but not the Capitular Vicar or Vicar General, can found religious Congregations; but let them not found them, nor permit them to be founded, without consulting the Apostolic See; but if there is question of tertiaries living in common, it is moreover required that they be aggregated to their religion by the supreme Moderator of the first Order.

§2. A Congregation of diocesan right, although in course of time spread through several dioceses, nevertheless, so long as it lacks the testimony of pontifical approval or praise, remains diocesan, wholly subject to the jurisdiction of the Ordinaries according to the norm of law.

§3. Neither the name nor the habit of a religion already constituted can be assumed by those who do not legitimately belong to it, or by a new religion (Can. 492).¹

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1088, n. 7.

Question 1. Who can be admitted into religion?

Resp. Any Catholic can be admitted into religion who is detained by no legitimate impediment, is moved by a right intention, and is suitable for bearing the burdens of religion (Can. 538).

Therefore immunity from obstacles, right intention, and suitability for carrying burdens are required for admission. The necessity of these three is established from the very nature of the matter of which there is question.

Question 2. What is the law concerning postulancy according to the new Code?

Resp. §1. In religions of perpetual vows all women and, if there is question of a religion of men, lay brothers, before they are admitted to the novitiate, must complete a postulancy for at least six full months; but in religions of temporary vows, as regards the necessity and time of postulancy, one must stand by the constitutions.

§2. The major Superior can extend the prescribed time of postulancy, yet not beyond another six months (Can. 539).

§1. The postulancy must be completed either in the house of novitiate or in another house of the religion in which discipline is accurately observed according to the constitutions, under the special care of an approved religious.

§2. Let postulants wear modest clothing and clothing different from the clothing of novices.

§3. In monasteries of nuns, aspirants, while they are completing the postulancy, are held by the law of enclosure (Can. 540).

Before they begin the novitiate, postulants should attend to spiritual exercises for at least eight full days; and, according to the prudent judgment of the confessor, they should make beforehand a general confession of their past life (Can. 541).

Thus a distinction is made between religions of perpetual vows and religions of temporary vows: in these latter one must stand by the constitutions, both as regards the necessity and as regards the duration of postulancy; in the former, women and lay brothers are held to make a postulancy of six months. The major Superior can extend this time, but not beyond another six months.

The postulancy must be made either in the novitiate or in another house where discipline flourishes under the care of an approved religious. The garments are to be modest, different from the clothing of the novitiate. In monasteries of nuns, aspirants are held by the law of enclosure. Before the novitiate, postulants should complete spiritual exercises through eight solid days and, at the judgment of the confessor, make a general confession.

Question 3. Who are admitted to the novitiate invalidly, and who illicitly?

Resp. With the prescription of can. 539-541 remaining firm, and other prescriptions in the proper constitutions of each religion:

1st. They are admitted to the novitiate invalidly:

Those who have adhered to a non-Catholic sect;

Those who do not have the age required for novitiate;

Those who enter religion induced by force, grave fear, or fraud, or whom the Superior, induced in the same way, receives;

A spouse, while the marriage lasts;

Those who are bound, or have been bound, by the bond of religious profession;

Those upon whom a penalty is impending because of a grave delict committed, concerning which they have been accused or can be accused;

A Bishop, whether residential or titular, even if he has only been designated by the Roman Pontiff;

Clerics who, from an institute of the Holy See, are bound by oath to devote their work to the good of their diocese or of the missions, for that time for which the obligation of the oath endures.

2nd. They are admitted illicitly, but validly:

Clerics constituted in sacred orders, without consulting the local Ordinary, or with the same Ordinary contradicting because their departure would turn to grave detriment of souls, which cannot be avoided otherwise;

Those burdened with debt who are not able to pay;

Those liable to render an account, or entangled in other secular business, from which the religion could fear lawsuits and troubles;

Children who must assist parents, that is, father or mother, grandfather or grandmother, placed in grave necessity, and parents whose work is necessary for feeding or educating children;

Those destined for the priesthood in religion, but from which they are removed by irregularity or another canonical impediment;

Orientals in Latin religions without permission given in writing by the Sacred Congregation for the Oriental Church (Can. 542).

Invalidity arises first from the fact that someone previously adhered to some non-Catholic sect. In the new Code, non-Catholics are called either baptized or not baptized: baptized outside the Catholic Church and adhering to some sect; baptized in the Catholic Church and afterwards defecting from it and adhering to some sect; baptized nowhere but adhering to some sect, for example of Quakers, Unitarians.

The words of canon 542, those who have adhered to a non-Catholic sect, are not to be understood concerning those who, moved by the grace of God, have come to the Church from heresy or schism in which they were born, but concerning those who have defected from the faith and adhered to a non-Catholic sect. Thus C. A. C. C. A. I., 16 Oct. 1919.

Question 4. With whom is the right of admitting to the novitiate and to profession?

Resp. The right of admitting to the novitiate and to subsequent religious profession, both temporary and perpetual, belongs to the major Superiors with the vote of the Council or Chapter, according to the peculiar constitutions of each religion (Can. 543).

Question 5. What testimony must aspirants present?

Resp. §1. In any religion, all aspirants, before they are admitted, must present testimony of received baptism and confirmation.

§2. Male aspirants must moreover present testimonial letters from the Ordinary of origin and of each place in which, after completing the fourteenth year of age, they have stayed beyond a morally continuous year, any contrary privilege being removed.

§3. If there is question of admitting those who have been in a Seminary, college, or the postulancy or novitiate of another religion, testimonial letters are moreover required, given for the different cases by the rector of the Seminary or college, after the local Ordinary has been heard, or by the major Superior of the religion.

§4. For clerics to be admitted, besides the testimony of ordination, testimonial letters of the Ordinaries in whose dioceses after ordination they have dwelt beyond a morally continuous year suffice, with the prescription of §3 being safe.

§5. For a professed religious transferring to another religion by apostolic indult, the testimony of the major Superior of the prior religion is sufficient.

§6. Besides these testimonies required by law, Superiors to whom the right belongs of enrolling aspirants into religion can also require other things which seem necessary or suitable to them for this end.

§7. Finally, let women not be received unless accurate investigations concerning their character and morals have been made beforehand, with the prescription of §3 remaining firm (Can. 544).

§1. Those who must give testimonial letters from the prescription of law should give them not to the aspirants themselves, but to the religious Superiors gratuitously within the space of three months from their requisition, closed with a seal and, if there is question of those who have been in a Seminary, college, or the postulancy or novitiate of another religion, confirmed by the oath of the Superior.

§2. If for grave reasons they have judged that they cannot answer these, let them explain the causes to the Apostolic See within the same time.

§3. If they have replied that the aspirant is not sufficiently known to them, the religious Superior should supply by another accurate investigation and a trustworthy report; but if they have replied nothing, the requesting Superior should inform the Holy See of the response not received.

§4. In their testimonial letters, after they have instituted diligent investigation, even through secret information, they must report, their conscience being gravely burdened concerning the truth of the things set forth, concerning the aspirant's birth, morals, talent, life, reputation, condition, knowledge; whether he has been investigated, whether he is entangled by some censure, irregularity, or other canonical impediment, whether his own family needs his help, and finally, if there is question of those who have been in a Seminary, college, or the postulancy or novitiate of another religion, for what cause they were dismissed or departed of their own accord (Can. 545).

Question 6. When does the novitiate begin, and what is required for its validity?

Resp. The novitiate begins with the reception of the habit, or in another manner prescribed in the constitutions (Can. 553).

§1. Besides the other things enumerated in can. 542 for the validity of the novitiate, in order to be valid the novitiate must be completed:

1st. After completion of at least the fifteenth year of age;

2nd. Through an entire and continuous year;¹

3rd. In the house of novitiate.

§2. If a longer time is prescribed for the novitiate in the constitutions, it is not required for the validity of profession, unless something else is expressly said in the same constitutions (Can. 555).

The novitiate begins in the manner prescribed in the religion; for validity it must be completed after the fifteenth year is completed, in the house of novitiate, through an entire and continuous year. Without these three, or without any one of them, the novitiate is not validly completed; the minimum age is the completed fifteenth year; the house of residence is the house of novitiate; the minimum and necessary time is one complete and continuous year.

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1111, n. 53.

Question 7. What is to be said concerning interruption of the novitiate?

Resp. §1. The novitiate is interrupted, so that it must be begun anew and completed, if the novice, dismissed by the Superior, has left the house, or has deserted the house without his permission, not intending to return, or has remained outside the house, even intending to return, beyond thirty days, whether continuous or not continuous, for any cause whatsoever, even with the permission of Superiors.

§2. If the novice has remained beyond fifteen, but not beyond thirty, days, even not continuous, outside the enclosure of the house under obedience to the Superior, with the permission of Superiors or compelled by force, for the validity of the novitiate it is necessary and sufficient to make up the days spent in this way; if not beyond fifteen days, the supplement can be prescribed by Superiors, but is not necessary for validity.

§3. Let Superiors not impart permission to remain outside the enclosure of the novitiate except from a just and grave cause.

§4. If a novice is transferred by Superiors into another house of novitiate of the same religion, the novitiate is not interrupted (Can. 556).¹

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1088, n. 8.

Question 8. What is required for the validity of profession?

Resp. §1. For the validity of any religious profession it is required that:

1st. The one about to emit it have the legitimate age according to the norm of can. 573;

2nd. A legitimate Superior admit him to profession according to the constitutions;

3rd. A valid novitiate according to the norm of can. 555 have preceded;

4th. The profession be emitted without force or grave fear or fraud;

5th. It be expressed;

6th. It be received by a legitimate Superior according to the constitutions, by himself or through another.

§2. But for the validity of perpetual profession, whether solemn or simple, it is moreover required that temporary simple profession according to the norm of can. 574 have preceded (Can. 572).

Question 9. What age is required for profession?

Resp. Anyone about to emit religious profession must have completed the sixteenth year of age, if there is question of temporary profession; the twenty-first, if of perpetual, whether solemn or simple (Can. 573).

When the sixteenth year of age has not been completed, no profession is valid for which that completed year is required, if namely there is question of temporary profession; but if of perpetual, whether simple or solemn, the twenty-first year, and indeed completed, is required.

Question 10. When the novitiate has been completed, must the novice immediately be admitted to profession?

Resp. §2. When the novitiate has been completed, if he is judged suitable, the novice is to be admitted to profession; otherwise he is to be dismissed. If doubt remains whether he is suitable, the time of probation can be prolonged by the major Superiors, yet not beyond six months (Can. 571).

Question 11. Must temporary simple profession always be placed before solemn and perpetual profession?

Resp. §1. In any Order both of men and of women, and in any Congregation which has perpetual vows, after the novitiate has been completed, the novice, in the house of novitiate itself, must place before perpetual vows, whether solemn or simple, with the prescription of can. 634 being safe, a profession of simple vows to last for three years, or for a longer time if the age required for perpetual profession is farther distant, unless the constitutions require annual professions.

§2. The legitimate Superior can prolong this time, after temporary profession has been renewed by the religious, yet not beyond another three years (Can. 574).

Question 12. When the time of temporary profession has been completed, what must be done?

Resp. §1. When the time of temporary profession has been completed, the religious, according to the norm of can. 637, either emits perpetual profession, solemn or simple according to the constitutions, or returns to the world; but also, during the time of temporary profession, if he is not held worthy to pronounce perpetual vows, he can be dismissed by the legitimate Superior according to the norm of can. 647 (Can. 575).

The highest care of the Church is in saving the liberty of the subject vowing, lest they unwillingly lead the religious life.

Question 13. When the time for which the vows were pronounced has elapsed, must renewal be made immediately?

Resp. No delay is to be interposed to the renewal of vows, when the time for which they were pronounced has elapsed. Indeed, Superiors have the faculty of permitting that the renewal be anticipated for some time, yet not beyond a month. Cf. Can. 577.

Question 14. Do those professed by temporary simple vows enjoy the privileges, etc., and are they held to the obligations of others professed by perpetual and solemn vows?

Resp. Those professed by temporary vows, of whom in can. 574:

1st. Enjoy the same indulgences, privileges, and spiritual graces by which those professed by solemn vows or those professed by perpetual simple vows rejoice; and if they are overtaken by death, they have a right to the same suffrages;

2nd. They are held by the same obligation of observing the rules and constitutions; but where the obligation of choir flourishes, they are not bound by the law of reciting the divine office privately, unless they are constituted in sacred orders or the constitutions expressly prescribe something else;

3rd. They lack active and passive voice, unless something else is expressly provided in the constitutions; but the time prescribed for enjoying active and passive voice, the constitutions being silent, is computed from first profession (Can. 578).

Question 15. To what is the Bishop held with regard to girls about to enter religion?

Resp. The Superioress must inform the local Ordinary, at least two months before, concerning the approaching admission to the novitiate and to profession, both temporary and perpetual, whether solemn or simple. The local Ordinary, or if he is absent or impeded, a deputed priest, at least thirty days before the novitiate and before profession as above, should examine the will of the aspirant, whether she has been coerced or seduced, whether she knows what she is doing; if it is established concerning her pious and free will, then the aspirant can be admitted to the novitiate or the novice to profession. Cf. Can. 552; S. C. de Religiosis, 19 Jan., 1909. The Church wills that it be authentically established that the aspirant was not coerced, and that she understands what she is doing; only then is it lawful to admit her to the novitiate or to profession, when both the liberty and the knowledge of the aspirant are plainly evident.

Question 16. How does profession affect acts contrary to the vows?

Resp. Simple profession, whether temporary or perpetual, renders acts contrary to the vows illicit, but not invalid, unless something else has been expressly provided; but solemn profession, if they are irritative, renders them also invalid (Can. 579).

We have an example of the former in relation to those who, for example, in some religious congregation with simple vows only, although perpetual, enter marriage without dispensation: the marriage is valid, although surely a most grave sin; but if a Scholastic of the Society of Jesus with his simple perpetual vows did the same thing, the marriage would be invalid. Cf. Const. Ascendente Domino, Greg. XIII.

Question 17. By what means and under what obligation is a Religious held to tend toward perfection?

Resp. He is held to tend primarily through the essential means of the religious state, namely through the observance of the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. And since the obligation of tending to perfection is grave by force of the state in which he is found, he will sin gravely if in a grave matter he infringes those vows. But secondarily he is held to tend toward perfection also through accidental means, namely through the proper rules of the Order; and he will sin gravely if he infringes them from formal contempt, namely by spurning their authority as such and their known wisdom. It is otherwise, however, if he violates them, led by concupiscence, or because he thinks they are not necessary for him unto salvation, or if he thinks that they are not commanded under grave obligation. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 10.

Question 18. Does a Religious sin gravely who intends to observe only commands obliging under grave obligation, and to care nothing for the rest?

Resp. Negatively, more probably; and the reason is that by this very fact, that the Religious wills to fulfill those several things which oblige under grave obligation, he already tends toward perfection, since he wills to fulfill several things which, with respect to others, do not oblige but are merely of counsel. St. Alphonsus calls this opinion the more common and more probable; nevertheless he warns that a Religious disposed in this way can be in grave danger of sinning mortally from other heads, for example, by reason of the danger of transgressing the vows or of bringing grave damage upon the Religion as regards discipline, etc. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 10 and seq. - Bouix, de Regul., vol. 2, pp. 550 and 551.

Question 19. Whether, or how far, does a rule oblige under sin, taken distributively, or considering individual rules in particular?

Resp. In very many Orders the rule, generally speaking and of itself, does not oblige under sin, not even venial sin. This is established from the constitutions themselves of various Orders and from the common interpretation of theologians. Those Orders are to be excepted in which the constitutions expressly establish the opposite. I said 1st, generally speaking, because whatever things fall under vows or express precepts of Superiors are not without fault, and indeed grave fault according to the gravity of the matter, as we shall say below concerning vows. - I said 2nd, of itself, because theologians teach that transgression of the rule very rarely is free from all fault because of extrinsic reasons, since almost always there will be some fault by reason of negligence, concupiscence, scandal, laziness, or any other disordered movement. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

Question 20. To what is a novice held in relation to the cession of administration of goods and to a testament?

Resp. §1. Before profession of simple vows, whether temporary or perpetual, the novice must, for the whole time for which he will be bound by simple vows, cede the administration of his goods to whom he prefers and, unless the constitutions provide otherwise, freely dispose concerning their use and usufruct.

§2. That cession and disposition, if it was omitted because of lack of goods and these afterwards came, or if it was made and afterwards other goods by any title came, is to be made or repeated according to the norms established in §1, notwithstanding simple profession emitted.

§3. A novice in a religious Congregation, before profession of temporary vows, should freely make a testament concerning goods present or perhaps to come (Can. 569).

The whole novitiate is to be completed in the habit which the constitutions prescribe for novices, unless special circumstances of places require something else (Can. 557).

Although marriage is according to the right of nature, and at times was deservedly commanded by God to some, nevertheless from the right of nature there is no obligation properly so called, made either to individuals or to the community, of procuring offspring.

I. What we state in the first place was denied by the ancient heretics, namely certain of the Gnostics and the Manichaeans, who, as we have already observed in the preface, approved indeed the mingling of flesh, but said that the generation of offspring and the perpetual obligation of one to the other were evil, brought in by Satan. There will again be a place for disputing about these in Thesis VII. To them are added those more recent pseudo-philosophers who acknowledge no other legitimate nuptials except those which genial love has brought together, to endure as long as that love survives; for in reality they take away the covenants of nuptials and deny that these are from the right of nature. But no sane man fails to understand that marriage is according to the right of nature. That certainly is according to the right of nature whose principles are in nature itself and which, for attaining a certain end for which nature itself supplies the powers, is either counseled or required by nature itself. Now the principles of marital union are in nature itself: that is, the diverse sexes ordered to each other, and in the mingling of both the native force of producing offspring. But for the production of offspring and its right education, which nature requires, there is either required, or, to say now at least the minimum, since we shall dispute about this later, there is at least fitting, the mutual obligation of man and woman to stable union; and in this Marriage consists. Besides, to speak of this bond itself in itself, it must be said to be according to the right of nature if it is conformed to the principles of natural law; but such is this union. For friendship and society founded on a mutual communication of power, of which each party is capable, for the mutual communication of goods and mutual consolation and help, is approved by the same natural law by which there is approved both friendship and society generally among all, and especially that friendship and society whose seed and principle has been sown by nature itself. But the stability of union is the perfection of friendship according to the same law; therefore the conjugal bond is according to nature. Indeed, that cannot fail to be according to the right of nature which the author of nature instituted for a natural work, such as the propagation of the human family. But that God instituted marriage from the beginning is clear from Genesis II compared with Matthew XIX, testimonies which we shall explain afterward. Cf. canon 1, session XXIV, Council of Trent. But lest we dwell too long on a matter very clear in itself, the consensus of the human race is also a reason for proving this; for although passions might suggest something else, nevertheless when the human race made laws, it approved that union between man and woman which either truly was marriage or had some appearance of marriage.

II. But because not everything that is according to the right of nature is commanded, the question follows whether marriage and the use of marriage in the procreation of offspring is a thing commanded. That marriage was commanded to the first human beings, Adam and Eve, is certain; for God himself joined them and willed them to be husband and wife. But the question is properly about the use of marriage for the procreation of offspring, or about the propagation of offspring itself to be procured, in an honorable way, of course: whether those first authors of the whole race, and also the rest who followed, were therefore ordered by a true precept to procure it; whether the precept affects individuals or at least the community of men; and whether, if it is not a positive divine precept, it is at least natural.

Therefore appeal is made to the words of the Lord (Gen. I, 28): "Increase" (פרו, fructify, bear fruit, so that the act of copulation is thereby signified), "and multiply and fill the earth," said to the first parents. These words seem to contain a divine precept issued not only to those first human beings, who surely could not alone, by offspring received, fill the earth, but also indefinitely to their descendants, who were contained virtually in that first pair. Therefore the question concerns the sense of these words of the Lord.

We judge that this question must be answered thus: by those words is signified the intention of the end which God appointed for himself in the creation of the first male and the first female; this manifestation of an end in itself does not have the force of a precept, but accidentally it also exercised the force of a precept toward those first human beings and perhaps their children, as long as and insofar as they were situated in a condition similar to that of the first parents. This is proved, first, because those words "Increase and multiply" were said in the same way as the words immediately following: "and subdue it," the earth, "and have dominion over the fish of the sea and the birds of heaven and all living things which move upon the earth." But these do not express a precept, but a certain destination of men according to the dignity implanted from the beginning, whether by the natural order or beyond the order of nature. Indeed, the same words "Increase and multiply" were also said to living things in Genesis I, 22; but then the natural destination of these things, or the intention of God creating them distinct according to their kind, was signified. Thus also Cornelius a Lapide on this place. Likewise Chrysostom, homilies X and XXVI, takes these not as a command but as a blessing of God.

This is proved, second. The manifestation of some end intended by God, which is not essential to man and can be obtained without obligation imposed on man, does not in itself assume the account of a precept, unless from elsewhere it is clear that an obligation is generated. This is evident, because if that end can be obtained without obligation imposed on man, the will of God to obligate is not yet established merely by that end having been manifested; and where this is lacking, there is no precept. But in the words of the Lord we have the manifestation of an end which, first, is not essential to man; for offspring is not necessary to man in order that he be, or in order that he be perfect and blessed. Generation is indeed necessary to future men in order that they be; but these in themselves have no right to be, nor can the question now be about them, for we are speaking of those on whom a precept is imposed, and of this sort certainly are not those who do not yet exist. Now, second, in order that this end be obtained, the cooperation of men is indeed necessary, but it is not necessary that they be obligated. For they are sufficiently borne toward it by the propensity of nature, so that in a multitude of men it is morally impossible that there not be many who will it. These things being posited, what need is there, I ask, of a precept?

It is proved, third. We have said that a manifestation of an end of this kind does not in itself assume the account of a precept unless from elsewhere it is clear that an obligation is generated. This, moreover, first had place for the first parents, who were the one pair from which the human race could proceed. If they, indeed, had been unwilling to devote effort to generation, it would have been over with the end intended by God when he created them male and female and united them in marriage. Nor can it be said: even if they were not obligated, there would have been no fear lest generation follow; for what wonder would it be that two should consent to continence? To continence even the first parents could have been moved after sin, lest they procreate an unhappy stock subject to sin. Do you think that those first two human beings would have acted rightly if they had decreed this? Did this obligation then also exist for others? We suppose that Adam and Eve left several children, whom they were able to bring forth in so long a span of life, and that from these many other children arose.

Now, when they were very many, while natural propensity exercised its force, it was, as we said, morally impossible that many would not devote effort to generation; and therefore a precept concerning this matter was superfluous. And even if few had procreated children, this one thing would have followed: that the human race would have been propagated over the whole earth later. But this would not have been unfitting; for God had not signified that he intended the human race to be multiplied quickly. But when from the beginning they were few, or if this happened later also, so that it would not be morally impossible for all, from the choice of the will, to abstain from generation, they would have been situated in the same condition as the first parents. Therefore, lest the human race fail, an obligation pressed them to devote effort to generation; and this obligation in itself affected not all distributively but disjunctively, for it was enough to preserve the human race, since full multiplication was not immediately to be pursued. But the diverse circumstances in which those men were situated could determine those who would satisfy this obligation. Outside this case I do not see the necessity of any precept; for if men are very many, it is morally impossible, even without any obligation, that all, indeed that many of them, cease from generation. Thus, therefore, we understand a precept issued by the Creator concerning this matter: that a beginning be made for human generation, and provision be made lest the human family cease. The rest did not fall under the precept.

IV. And let these things have been said concerning the obligation which someone might wish to have existed before the subsequent increase of men, which nature can rightly demand. But once that increase had been obtained, and even, if you wish, after some space of time, was there some law of God commanding the conservation or continuation of the human family? Certainly I do not know whether appeal is rightly made to that law issued in creation which we have just weighed. For we hold as certain that at some time this whole human race on earth will cease, but we do not know when and how God has determined this. Therefore, if you have regard only to the account of that primitive law, by what argument will you establish that the human race occupying the whole earth is bound by divine precept to procreate its successors? The end has already been obtained in multiplication. Procreation continued without end is not intended by God. Of course, if no one generates, shortly afterward the human race will cease; but in itself this can be one of the ways by which this human race will at last depart from the earth, although it belongs entirely to God, anticipating, to impose another end. You will say that the human family, as long as it lives, ought to observe that command: "Increase and multiply." But Augustine did not perceive such a necessity by force of those words. When the objection of certain persons was proposed to him in this very question, "If all wished to preserve continence, the human race would cease," he responds: "Would that all wished it"; for thus, as he himself says, the number of the elect would be filled more quickly (On the Good of Marriage, chapter X). And indeed, provided that the act is not evil in itself, since that divine will concerning the continuation of the human race for that determinate age is not certain, why would sin be admitted by ceasing universally from generation?

But even if not by force of that divine will expressed by the words "Increase and multiply," still at least by force of another will, namely concerning the future advent of the Redeemer, was it not necessary that men, until he should come, devote effort to generation? It was certainly necessary; but for this there was no need of any precept. First, indeed, it can be said that the promise of the Messiah was made on the supposition of the foreseen future propagation of the human race by force of natural inclination, just as the promise of the sacrifice of the cross was made on the supposition of the foreseen evil will of those who would crucify Christ. Indeed, in order that the truth of the promise concerning Christ to come at a certain age might remain firm, these two elements were sufficient: on the part of men, a certain natural inclination to generation; but on the part of God, a certain gentle and efficacious providence which would moderate the free affections of men. These, however, in themselves abstract from a precept; therefore there was no need of any precept. Nevertheless, at that time, because of the very expectation of the Messiah to come in the flesh, it happened that those from whose family he was to arise were more inclined to procreate offspring. But the others from the Jewish people were borne into nuptials "by a love not only legitimate but holy," because this was the mode of propagating and conserving the people of God and the true worshippers of God, since then one people proceeding carnally from Abraham was guarding the true religion instituted by God. But it is false that in that age nuptials were commanded to individuals; for nowhere does this mandate exist. For what Augustine, On the Good of Marriage, chapter 22, reports from Deuteronomy XXV, 5-10, as it seems, that he was cursed in the law who did not raise up seed in Israel, is not expressed in the law in this way, nor is there any law made for individuals concerning nuptials. Rather, it is a law concerning taking the wife of a brother left without children; and this law indeed did not obligate the brother of the deceased unwillingly, except if he wished to possess the goods of the deceased by right of inheritance.

V. And these things said thus far concerning a divine precept are valid whether you speak of a precept made to individuals, or at least to the community. But because we have spoken of a divine precept insofar as it is positive and is distinguished from the natural, it certainly can happen that someone observes that we have in some way played or wasted labor in the demonstration of this matter; for the words of the Lord are an expression of natural right, and this truly commands the procreation of offspring. But on the contrary we reply with two points. First, the words of the Lord, if they express a precept, about which matter we have already spoken, express a precept formally divine, and only foundationally natural. Second, no natural precept properly so called exists, either for individuals or for the community, concerning the propagation of offspring.

The first of these, as you see, depends on the second. For if there is no precept from nature itself, that is, if nature in itself does not require that this be furnished by men, it will follow that if a precept is asserted, it arises immediately from the free will of God, with only a certain natural capacity or propensity supposed; but this is a precept formally divine, and only foundationally natural. Therefore we prove the second, of which that will be the necessary consequent.

Therefore, as regards the second, men can be considered both as individuals separately and in community. We affirm, a) first, that individuals are not obligated, or that nature does not require from them that they attend to the procreation of children. For if there were in individuals any obligation by natural right to procreate, it would have to be derived from the end, which is the procreation of children; for from that end those who press this obligation derive it. But the other ends of marriage can plainly be compensated and surpassed by other goods. Yet from that end there is, by natural right, no exigency and obligation of procreating in individuals. For an active capacity for it is not a sufficient reason of moral obligation. Propensity, if there is any, is free rather than necessary; and therefore that propensity to having children is not found in all. But naturally there is present a disposition, which is nothing but the active capacity we have mentioned. The good itself, which is offspring, if it is compared to individuals, is not for them the more excellent good which they can attain, but on the contrary it impedes goods more excellent both for individuals and, through them, for the community. For the more excellent good for man is that in which his perfection is chiefly situated; of this sort is the study and contemplation of truth, the exercise of charity toward God and neighbor, from which the greatest benefits redound to society. Yet the full and at least excellent attainment of these goods is impeded by the care of children. But the good of offspring, that is, its procreation, if it is compared with the offspring itself, is certainly an immense good for it and the principle of the rest; but before offspring exists, since it has no right, what obligation can there be toward it? Besides, we have seen that the state of continence is more perfect than the state of marriage, in which effort is given to generation; and this would also be so in the state of pure nature. But the right of nature cannot obligate men to that which is more imperfect with the loss of what is more perfect.

b) Nor by the right of nature is there any obligation of procreating children imposed on the community of men. For besides the things already said, which are also valid here, observe that the community cannot be obligated to this act insofar as it is a community; for this is an act which can be posited only by individuals, namely by pairs made one flesh from male and female, and insofar as they are such. Therefore the natural obligation which is called that of the community will come back to this: that some persons disjunctively from the community, either these or those, are obligated. But what sort of obligation is this, which can affect men only one by one, and yet from which individuals are immune? Do we not see in this matter the very same thing that happens in several other offices of society? For in society there must be farmers, physicians, teachers, artisans, etc. Is there need of any natural law morally obligating, in order that such men exist in society? The diverse natural disposition in individuals, the variety of occasions, advantage, profit, praise, and honor, which offer themselves for different things only in different conditions, are more than sufficient that there never be lacking those who perform those offices. Likewise, if it is necessary for the community that successors exist, which indeed is rather the good of future society than of present society, unlike the other offices enumerated, the propensity to nuptials, which unfolds itself in so many, in suitable circumstances, of which there is abundant supply, will effect that there is never lacking a generation of men succeeding a declining generation. Therefore in this matter we see only a certain instinct of nature, which besides is more vehement than the others, so that it needs restraint rather than impulse; by it nature, and the author of nature, sweetly obtains what he intends.

VI. But you will say: does not nature require her own continual propagation and the perpetual conservation of human society? Moreover, are not men, either taken distributively or at least disjunctively, bound by a true moral obligation to that which nature requires of them and which they can furnish only in a human and free manner? We concede this latter, but we deny the former: namely, that nature requires continual propagation from men. For nature first requires in individuals, and then in society, but by reason of individuals, in whom alone nature itself inheres, that which is necessary for them in order that they be and be well, so far as is needed for the ultimate end. But generation is not necessary for those in whom nature inheres, nor for existing society, but for future society, which nevertheless now can exercise no right. Therefore it is false that nature requires it; but nature confers the power and also the propensity. But if the author of nature wills a certain perennial series of generations, he knows by what modes he may use this inclination and the affections of men for attaining this end without any moral law.

Yet you will insist: no one would blame a king who, in certain circumstances, lest society be diminished and lest suitable men be lacking for certain offices, commands procreation; but he would make this law by the right of nature; therefore the right of nature commands procreation to society.

I answer: granting the antecedent, about which we do not wish to dispute, we deny the consequence. Namely, in order that a law issued by the community be just, there is no need that the very same thing which the positive law commands already be commanded by nature itself; rather it is enough that it be consonant with nature, and that nature teach that it is fitting in those circumstances.

I have published four volumes upon this argument, of which the first is entitled Historico-Apologetic Commentary, and so forth; the other, Apostolico-Monastic Discipline. Against this Apostolico-Monastic Discipline two volumes came forth: one entitled The Vindication of Regulars; the other marked with this epigraph, The Cloistered Life. These two little books, truly famous and full of erroneous comments, fables, and jeers, I ground down and utterly shattered in the work entitled A Defence of the Decrees of the Council of Trent, distributed into two volumes, and published by the command of the most wise Pontiff Benedict XIV. From these I shall cull a few things.

I. QUESTION I. What is the religious state? ANSWER. It is a way of arriving more easily at evangelical perfection. From the virtue of Religion, which is eminent among the moral virtues, this sacred state draws its name; and therefore it is called religious. It brings with it stability and immobility. That it may be such, it requires an approbation made by the Church, as is had from the Fourth Lateran Council, chapter Nimia. Necessary also is the profession of three vows according to some one of the rules approved by the Apostolic See. Hence individual Orders have their own proper rule and constitutions, to whose norm they compose the religious state.

II. QUESTION II. Whether Religious are bound under a grave precept to tend to perfection? ANSWER. This question needs perspicuous explication. All Christians, whether lay or ecclesiastical, whether secular or cloistered, are bound by a precept of aspiring to perfection. Perhaps to the unskilled this truth will be impassable. Let them know therefore that this perfection of which our discourse now is, is set in charity, as the Gospel and all the Fathers teach. Hence St. Thomas, II-II, q. 186, art. 2, describes the religious state as being a certain discipline or exercise of arriving at perfection. For that Religious might more easily and expeditiously attain this goal, they vow the three evangelical counsels, to which the rest are reduced. These three vows are instruments and as it were the wheels of the chariot which pave the way for attaining this prize. All the evangelical precepts are necessary means; the counsels are free instruments ordained to the precept of charity. This precept is the end and goal of all the precepts and counsels. Neither in the counsels therefore, nor in the other mandates, but in charity alone is evangelical perfection set, to which under precept all, both Christians and religious men, are bound to aspire. When Christ said Be you therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect, Matthew 5, he intoned this not to monks, not to the cloistered, but addressed utterly the whole human race, since then there were neither monks nor cloistered.

III. With a gross error therefore are those Christians wrapped about who, reckoning this evangelical perfection to be something of supererogation and of counsel, and to belong only to religious men, attempt nothing for the attaining of it. Charity here separates the soul from the love of the world and of those things which are in the world, and joins it to God. And the more the soul is separated from the concupiscence of the flesh, from the concupiscence of the eyes, and from the pride of life, as St. John says, 1 epistle, chapter 2, the more intimately is it coupled to God. To this union with God all Christians are bound by precept. Therefore all Christians are obliged to tend to the perfection of charity. This only is the difference, that Christians are bound to run to perfection by the way of the precepts alone; but religious men, that they might more easily address that same goal, have embraced also the evangelical counsels, and by three solemn vows have imposed the same upon themselves to be observed.

IV. Christians therefore must needs be vigilant in observing the precepts, which enjoin a study of prayer, custody of the senses, compression of the flesh, equity, and purity of heart: because these and all the other mandates are, as has been said, necessary instruments for arriving at the perfection of charity, or union with God. And because this union is greater and more intense in one and less in another, therefore one becomes more perfect than another.

V. On the contrary religious men, besides these precepts, are bound to observe the three vows and their own rule and constitutions, which the holy Patriarchs, the divine Godhead breathing upon them, prescribed as means which help and more easily conduce to the goal set before them.

VI. Whence, you will say, can we gather that men, whether Christians or religious, fulfil this precept of aspiring to perfection? Christians who vigilantly abstain from vain pomps, from luxury, from display, from the occasions of violating the precepts of the Decalogue; who apply themselves to the study of prayer; who preserve justice and equity, and attribute to each what is his; who do to others what they would wish done to themselves; who fulfil the duties of their own state: these give signs that they walk by the way of evangelical perfection.

VII. If Christians themselves must fulfil the duties of their own state and the offices of ruling a family, of educating sons, of providing necessaries for their household, and all the rest; how much more are religious men bound to execute the duties, vows, rites, statutes, and laws of their own Religion? But whence can it be gathered that religious men bestow their labour with a sincere mind upon the study of perfection? Perhaps from the observance of silence, from assiduity of prayer, from the compression of the senses, of the flesh, and of the appetitions, from the execution of the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience? Assuredly all these are signs. These are probable enough, but sometimes fallacious. For all these can be the fruits of hypocrisy. That a man may prepare himself a way to government, to prefectures, that he may procure for himself the estimation of a religious man and of an observer of his own institute, he can execute all the aforesaid, and under the cloak of sacred Religion become a martyr of the devil. What then are the arguments of a soul aspiring to Christian perfection? The exercises of charity; love toward all; patience and tolerance of injuries; candour of soul; sincerity of tongue; docility of mind; contempt of worldly things; the trampling down of political respects; the fortitude of an evangelical breast; a study of professing openly the discourses of Christ, hostile and adverse to flesh and blood; a neglect of one's own estimation and of worldly things. These are the indications which show a soul running in the stadium of Christian perfection. Since indeed means can be found without an end; but an end cannot subsist without means. Ceremonies therefore and observances of vows, constitutions, and other rites can appear outwardly destitute of the nuptial garment and covered with the mask of hypocrisy. But the exercises of charity, which are their end, cannot stand without the same.

VIII. Hence you may gather that those superiors of Regulars do not sufficiently satisfy their own office who in their Chapters continually cry out against certain transgressions of ceremonies, and scarcely inculcate anything else upon their subjects than the custody of silence, frequency of choir, and the observance of fasts and of certain genuflexions. I praise all these things; but I grieve at this, that they omit to exhort, persuade, and urge to the exercises of charity. For this flame being kindled in the souls of Religious, all the rest flow of their own accord. Charity indeed is a most fruitful plant bearing fruits ripe for eternity. Charity is kind, is patient, envieth not, dealeth not perversely, is not puffed up, beareth all things, endureth all things, seeketh not the things that are her own but the things which are Jesus Christ's, dreads not the power of the age, fears not the calumnies of adversaries; but with undaunted breast in word and work fulfils exactly the law of Christ and the duties of her own profession. That heavenly fire always burns where it is present, and continually emits flames. If it burned in the hearts of Superiors, beyond doubt it would send its sparks into the souls of subjects. Let those therefore who, the preaching of charity being neglected, inculcate only the observation of ceremonies, fill themselves with charity, that, pouring this into others, they may procure for themselves the best subjects.

IX. Charity joins souls with the sweetest covenant of benevolence, and makes them one heart and one soul. In that community in which aversions, dissensions, and contrary factions boil; in which Superiors put on the mask of prudence with craft and cunning, a double heart and an amphibological tongue, candour, sincerity, and affability being driven out — there assuredly the flame of charity does not burn, but a lying and worldly spirit, and that knowledge which St. James calls diabolical, dominates. If superiors play with words, tergiversate in deeds, deny, answer, delude, trim their sails, and set themselves against, as the reckonings of times bear, between subjects and the superiors themselves, their craftiness being detected, no sincerity, no candour of soul, no charity flourishes. But on the contrary murmurs, dissensions, aversions, and perpetual wars are carried on. Superiors who with open soul, sincere heart, and ingenuous tongue gather and embrace their subjects bind them to themselves and oblige them at that very time at which they deny favours, when they cannot impart them with the law safe. But let us return to the path from a digression otherwise opportune.

X. Those Religious therefore who, the exercise of prayer, mortification, penance, abstinence, and of their own rule and constitutions being neglected, perform only those things which they cannot omit; who indulge in games, storytelling, idleness, solaces, and diversions; who, taking up cape or cloak, go about the cities and follow after curious things; who, if the table be not furnished to their palate, murmur; who deride the exhortations and mandates of superiors, and jest, tell tales, and dispute about them — these run not the way of evangelical perfection, but of eternal damnation.

XI. That I may contract many things into few: all Christians, whether lay or religious, are bound to aspire to evangelical perfection by force of a precept binding under mortal sin, but by various means, which all lead by one and a narrow way to the same goal. Lay Christians by the exact observation of the precepts alone; Religious add to the execution of the precepts the observance of the three vows and of their own constitutions. These vows, these constitutions and rules are not, say the Fathers, packs and weights which oppress, but are wings which lighten the journey and raise upward. Wherefore the religious state is named a school of arriving more easily at the perfection of charity, to which all Christians are bound to tend. More gravely assuredly and more wickedly do Religious sin who violate this precept than lay Christians. Since religious men, instructed by God with a richer store of graces and gifts, can more easily and conveniently tread the narrow evangelical path. Therefore these are held sacrilegious, ungrateful, and most worthless servants of God, when they squander and dilapidate so many talents received from God. Since indeed, segregated from the cares of the world and from the dangers of the world to which wretched Christians are obnoxious, compelled to think nothing of food and clothing, they can most easily be free for God alone and for the observance of their own institute. Wherefore they will be beaten doubly, if they omit, much more if they contemn, the attaining of evangelical perfection.

XII. Theologians are wont to dispute whether the observance of the three vows suffice, the other laws being neglected which do not oblige to grave fault; and again they debate whether a continued transgression of those laws induce a virtual and interpretative contempt. But I settle the matter in few words. The three vows are common to all sacred Orders. Every religious Order is distinguished from another by its own peculiar statutes, rules, and constitutions. Therefore besides the three vows common to all, the observance of one's own institute is necessary; otherwise that Religious would be of no determinate Order who kept only the three vows. Necessary therefore is the observance of one's own rule and constitutions, that a man may be said to be free for the study of evangelical perfection.

XIII. Does the transgression of this or that monastic constitution intercept the way of Christian perfection? A constant and firm mind of fulfilling one's own profession is to be distinguished from the transgression of this or that law proceeding from a subreption of soul and from weakness. Daily we all fall. Those who from infirmity violate some law not obliging to fault, at least grave, stumble and in some manner limp on the way; but they rise again at once, and restore their mind and strength that they may run more swiftly; and because we are weak and infirm, we limp anew, and at the same time anew take up wings, more or less, according as the fire of charity burns more or less in the heart. Those therefore who from common infirmity violate some constitution are not outside the way of perfection, provided they keep a firm and constant mind of observing their own profession. On the contrary those who everywhere violate the peculiar laws of their own institute, caring nothing for the transgressions of the same, and persevering in the same corruption, are outside the narrow path, and run the broad and spacious way of perdition. Nor does it avail them at all that they dwell in Convents where the observance of the laws, at least for the greater part, has passed into desuetude, since no corruption prescribes against a law. In brief, the vows and the constitutions are joined by a reciprocal knot. The constitutions are the safeguards of the vows; the vows are the bulwark of charity. Charity, the vows, and the constitutions hold out mutual hands to one another. This knot being gravely injured and broken, the whole edifice must needs fall. Those who with deliberate mind violate their own constitutions indiscriminately lie, if they boast either the observance of the vows or the exercise of charity.

XIV. Three vows are necessary for constituting the religious state, and indeed emitted with a solemn rite in the face of the Church: for that state includes firmness and stability. These three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience denounce perpetual war upon the three evils of the world which St. John describes, 1 epistle, chapter 2: All that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life. Of these three vows the discourse will presently return. Meanwhile if you desire more on this matter, read St. Thomas, II-II, q. 186, articles 6 and 8.

AMONG the other advantages of solemn vows this one especially shines forth, that in this state not fewer vows are joined together among themselves than of lives of many persons joined together; Hence, as the Seraphic Doctor teaches tit. 4. Diaetae, cap. 1., many gathered together into one walk more securely, resist more strongly, and take their comfort more sweetly: hence also it is said in Psalm 49.: Gather together unto him his saints, seeing that, it is better that two be together than one, for birds flying apart are either rapacious, like hawks; or mourning the loss of their companion, like turtledoves; nor does the Lord suffer anything but a pair of Turtledoves to be offered in the Temple, that we may know that, if the soul is alone, having no one to be joined to, it has not even that bond of perfection, namely charity, by which it is joined; wherefore the Holy Spirit descended not upon the Disciples scattered, but assembled together Act. 2., as the Saintly Doctor observes in the place cited, where he illustrates the conventual life with many other and most beautiful similitudes.

HE treats of these things also in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, and more broadly in many little works, after the exposition of the Rule of the Friars Minor, where he disputes against the assailants of religion. But since this disputation is broad, we shall divide it into many Sections; and first concerning the state of Religion in general: Then indeed we shall treat of the individual Vows: in which disputation Suarez and Sanchez speak excellently and at length. Waldensis Tom. 1. Doctrinalis fidei., Bellarm. Tom. 2., with Valentia disput. 10.

As in ancient times in the Mosaic law there were some sacrifices which the people offered to God in part, and others which they offered totally; so in the law of grace the Church dedicates some to God in part through simple vows, but devotes others totally through solemn vows; for those are accustomed to fall upon some particular thing; but these heal the whole man, by taking away those three sicknesses with which almost the whole world is infected, according to the saying of D. John, everything that is in the world is either the concupiscence of the eyes, or the concupiscence of the flesh, or the pride of life; yet the solemnity or simplicity of vows does not arise from this totality or partiality alone, as will be discussed shortly.

Famous is this question, and exceedingly necessary, all the more so as new decrees of the Pontiffs are in force for deciding it.

¶ The first opinion is, that Solemn and simple vows differ from the very nature of the vows themselves, with all ecclesiastical law set aside; and that the essence of solemn vows consists in the handing over of oneself and of one's goods into the hands of God and of those who act in God's place: Brought forward by Sanchez for this opinion are D. Thomas in 4. d. 38. quaest. 1. art. 2. quaestiuncula 3., D. Bonaventura same dist. art. 2. quaest. 1., Durandus there quaest. 1. and 2., Richardus there art. 7., Mayro quaest. unic. part. 4., Capreolus 4. d. 33. quaest. unic. art. 1. concl. 2. and art. 3., Deca there quaest. unic. art. 3., Carthus. 4. d. 3. quaest. 2., Fortunius Garcia cap. 1. de pactu, num. 13., Turrecrem. cap. presbyterus, num. 1. and 2. d. 27., Tabiena dispensatio quaest. 7., Sotus 7. de Iust. quaest. 2. art. 5. and 4. d. 38. quaest. 2. art. 1., Petrus Soto lect. 5. de matrim., Couarr. 4. decret. 2. part. cap. 7. § 4. num. 7., Ledesma 2. part. 4. quaest. 55. art. 5., Alex. Carterius lib. 3. de sponsal. cap. 6., Celatia 4. d. 37. quaest. 3. and d. 38. quaest. after the seventh argument, Viguerz Instit. cap. 16. § 7., Stunica lib. 5. recopil. tit. 1. rubr gloss. 1., Vega in summa, cap. 49., Henriquez lib. 1. de matrim. cap. 5., Barbosa Rubrica, ff. soluto matrimonio 2. part. from num. 93. up to 100., Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 7., Hugolinus de Sacramentis, where on marriage cap. 19., Valentia 2. 2. d. 6. quaest. 9. puncto 5. and 4. puncto d. 10. de matrimonio quaest. 5. puncto 3., Candelabr. p. p. num. 129., Petrus Ledesma de matrim. quaest. 53. art. 2., Barthol. Ledesma de matrim. dub. 32. and dub. 33., Ludovicus Lopez 2. part. Instruct. de matrim. cap. 48., Graffi 2. part. decis. lib. 2. cap. 12., Vega 2. Tomo summa, cap. 57. casu 21.

¶ Certain other, older authors also acknowledged this same difference between a solemn and a simple vow, though they assert that the subsequent marriage can be dissolved by mere human law through the profession. These are Ioan. Andr. cap. unico de voto. in 6., there Abb. Anchar., Dominicus Archid., who has the same thing cap. finali. num. 5. d. 27., Cardin. Clementina unica de consang. num. 19. quaest. 42., Altisiodor. lib. 3. summae, Tract. 28. cap. 1. quaest. 3., and Brunellus de sponsal. concl. 31.

¶ As to D. Bonaventure, who is brought forward for this opinion, I say that in that question he only asserts that it cannot commonly be said that the Church dispenses in a solemn vow of chastity for entering marriage, and that therefore it seems false to him that its illegitimacy comes from her, because she can dispense in her own constitutions.

¶ But in question 1, proposing again: Whether the Church can dispense in solemn vows, as we said in the preceding disputation, quaest. 29., and reviewing the opinions on both sides, he does not dare to define, and candidly admits he does not know which is the truer opinion (for he records another besides these two) and he adds: Either can well be sustained, for I bring forward no decisive reason. As I noted above as well.

¶ But in the Dicta salutis lec. cit. he candidly admits that the solemnity of vows arose from the Church, as I shall say in the arguments. However that may be, no one insists on this first opinion, as it is commonly circulated. Rather he seems to embrace the second, which I shall report immediately; although he holds all vows to be of Divine law as regards their obligation, whence he uses a certain moderation in dispensation, as we saw; nothing against this; for that is common to simple vows.

The second opinion, therefore, is that solemn vows are distinguished from simple ones by the sole institution of the Church. So D. Bonaventure, reported above, whom Scotus follows in 4. d. 38. quaest. unica, and there Paludanus quaest. quart. 4. concl. 11. num. 49., Caiet. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 7. dub. 1., Abul. quaest. 100. ad 30. Numer., Michael Medina de sacrorum hominum continentia, lib. 4. controv. 7. cap. 12., Guilielmus Vottilongo 4. d. quaest. unica, art. 2. concl. 1. and there Palacios d. 1. concl. 1. 2. 3. and 4., Ouandus there quaest. unica prop. 16., Azor. lib. 11. Instit. moral. cap. 6. quaestio 1. and all these are they, who assert that the marriage bond can be dissolved by mere ecclesiastical law through the profession of religion, whom I shall report below; and Valentia says this opinion is probable 2. 2. d. 6. quaest. 6. puncto 5.

¶ Finally this opinion is excellently defended by Ribadeneira in libro de Instit. Societatis Iesu, cap. 15., Vasquez p. 2. d. 165., Sanchez lib. 7. de matrimonio, d. 25. and lib. 5. summae mor. cap. 1., Tanner. d. 5. quaest. 4. num. 63., citing all the Canonists, D. Thomas, Aragonius quaest. 88. art. 7., Suarez Tom. 2 de religione, cap. 14., Lessius lib. 2. cap. 40. dub. 14., Bellarminus lib. 1. de matrimonio, cap. 21., Vasquez d. 165. cap. 2. and with him Abulensis, Pelag. Ledesma, Corduba, and others: So too the Scotists in Mastrius Tom. 4. d. 7. num. 438.

¶ I assert that solemn vows differ from simple ones by the tradition of the Church, probably.

¶ It is proved first from D. Bonaventure lib. 1. Pharetrae, cap. 51. from D. Bernard tract. de praecepto, et dispens. before the middle, where he says; Let consideration be with the Abbot, that this or that should be in the providence, or judgment, or disposition of the Abbot; Yet that he may change anything of the rule at his own will,¹ I do not recall reading there: nay rather let all follow the mistress rule, nor let anyone rashly depart from it: Therefore not even the Abbot himself. Let all follow the mistress rule, therefore no one his own will; and a little later: We are founded upon the transgressions of brothers, not upon the traditions of the Fathers, whence the Abbot is chosen, a keeper of commandments, an avenger of vices. Where the Abbot asserts that the observance of the rule belongs to the traditions of the Fathers: Therefore of the Church. ¹ N. Editor's note: the print/OCR reads 'pro sua voluntate diis uid mutet de regula' (garbled); rendered as 'aliquid mutet' with St. Bernard, De praecepto et dispensatione.

PROVED second from D. Bonaventure in the Diaeta salutis, titulo 4. cap. 1., because although in ancient times Samuel, Elias, and Eliseus gathered disciples for perfection, and John the Baptist educated disciples, as is had in 1. Reg. 10. 4. Reg. 4. Ioan. 1., and Christ chose disciples and Apostles, as is had in Matth. 4.; nevertheless those who first together instituted the religious life were the Apostles Actorum 4., where no one said that anything was his own, but all things were common; as also D. Mark in Alexandria. For from there the Monks arose, of whom there were three kinds, that is, of Caenobites, who lived in common, Remobath, who dwelt two or three together, and Anchoretes, who lived alone in the desert, whose Prince was John the Baptist. But that Religious Orders began from the Apostles, as D. Bonaventure says, is proved from Eusebius lib. 2. historiae, cap. 16., Jerome de viris illustribus on Philo., Augustine sermone 2. de vita communi clericorum., Possidius in vita Augustini., Isidore l. 2. de off. cap. 15., Cassian collat. 18., as Bellarminus notes lib. 1. de monach. cap. 5.

This is what Boniface VIII cap. unico de voto, in 6. declares, that the solemnity of a vow was found to be from the sole institution of the Church.

And Gregory XIII in his Extravagant Ascendente Domino, in order to refute those saying that those making simple vows of the biennium in the Society of Jesus are not religious, gives the reason for their error, namely that they did not consider that the solemnity of a vow was found by the sole constitution of the Church.

But these Bulls were issued after the time of D. Bonaventure, as clearly appears; therefore it is no wonder if D. Bonaventure seemed to incline also to the other opinion, which was the older; for this opinion first had as its defender Scotus, who lived long after D. Bonaventure; the other, however, many ancients, reported above.

THEY ANSWER, however, that the solemnity of vows which is from ecclesiastical tradition is that which was instituted so that the profession may be manifest in the face of the Church and cannot be denied; but essentially, insofar as it speaks of the handing over of oneself into the hands of the prelate, it is from the very law of solemn vows; Just as the solemnity of marriage, that it be made before witnesses and the Pastor, is necessary from the institution of the Church, so that if it is lacking the marriage is rendered void; but no one will deny that the essential solemnity of marriage is by natural Divine law; for it consists in the mutual handing over of bodies: which the anxious [provision] of the Council of Trent suffices for the validity of marriage. This answer is gathered in D. Bonaventure loc. cit. in corpore.

Sanchez loc. cit. de matrimonio, num. 2. strives to refute this answer thus, because Boniface VIII deduces from it that only two vows annul marriage; for since the nature of a solemn vow depends on the sole institution of the Church, and the Church admitted that a vow made in Profession and in Order is solemn, therefore the solemn vow is only twofold; which reasoning would collapse if it were understood of a merely accidental solemnity; for that thing was not to be defined from accidents.

Yet this answer is blunted by the example brought forward of marriage; for even the Council of Trent annuls marriages lacking that accidental solemnity superinduced, because that solemnity was added as necessary thereafter; and therefore it does not stand in the manner of an accident. It is enough, therefore, if it be deduced thus: Because there are only two vows solemn according to the decrees of the Church; therefore according to the same decrees we will that they annul marriage. Nay, I urge: If he defined that by force of solemn vows marriage is annulled, whose bond is of the law of nature, because essential vows are by ecclesiastical law alone, essentially it would follow that the reasoning of the Pontiff is weakened, and that from a mere impediment of ecclesiastical law the annulment is introduced of a thing which is of the law of nature. I know that the reasoning is not drawn from there: for since marriage is also a contract, it can be compelled to certain necessary conditions, by whose failure it becomes annulled. So from the defect of the Church's solemnity it is annulled newly by the Council of Trent, although before it was valid, just as it is also valid in places where the Holy Council has not been received.

MORE FORCEFULLY, therefore, the Pope will argue: A solemn vow is such essentially by natural Divine law, and this is twofold: Therefore it will suffice for annulling the contract of marriage if it is introduced.

Vasquez brings forward other arguments loc. cit. from num. 14. up to 18. in order to make the opinion seated in these decrees immovable; but with peace to all, let it be only probable.

PROVED third from Sanchez lib. 5. de variis, cap. 1. num. 6., because although in the vows of poverty and chastity that transfer of dominion takes place, and the incapacity for marriage; yet in the vow of obedience it is not present; for after the vow he can still freely will and do many things, and against the precept of the superior: here the just man, lest he vow, or do an act for another, can still act validly. Similarly the vow of the Minims concerning the forty-day fast is at the same time solemn, although in this there is not given that handing-over depriving of dominion, even with the contrary faculty of acting validly.

This reasoning is weak, for the Pontiff argues (and deservedly) the annulment of marriage from the solemn vow insofar as it is a handing-over of dominion, implicated with the conjugal handing-over; but we are invited in vain to this handing-over of the Minims as regards Lenten foods, and the vow of obedience in certain things: yet it is necessary that liberty be present even in other things implicated with the law of matrimony.

PROVED fourth from Sanchez. No handing-over can naturally annul marriage even if it be the greatest (except the bond of a preceding marriage still subsisting). It is proved; for servitude, which is the greatest of all handings-over, does not impede a future marriage.

This reasoning is weak, as D. Bonaventure has it in 4. d. 38. art. 1. quaest. 3. in corpore. For servitude consists only in the service of the body with respect to those things which regard the remainder for the Lord,², and it includes neither the will, nor cohabitation with the wife, if he has one to serve: Therefore servitude is not the greatest handing-over, as Sanchez himself admits in the summa, lib. 4. cap. 15.; which is proved from himself, for the spouse can annul all the vows of the wife (according to him:) but not so the Lord; the reason of the thing is, because the power of dominion, which the slave handed over, is less than others, and it requires at least some services of the body, owed to the Lord: but the vow of religion in many things obliges to subjection, as is clearer than the noonday light: even if in some respect servitude goes before in having something of one's own, which the religious cannot have. ² Editor's note: the print/OCR reads 'in corporis servitio quo ad ea, quae Domino reliquium respiciunt ... serviti ratio ems est'; the passage is garbled in the print itself — rendered from context as 'with respect to those things which regard the remainder for the Lord ... the reason of the servitude is'

PROVED fifth from Sanchez, because one vowing poverty is not by its nature made deprived of the dominion of his goods, nor incapable of acquiring dominion; for it is not any donation with another accepting; therefore it comes from the law of the Church.

IT IS ANSWERED, that it comes from the very law of the vow, whereby it passes to the Prelate holding the place of God under the common life; but wherever the goods are diverted, it matters nothing; therefore, with ecclesiastical law set aside, dominion has been transferred by the very vower, at least to the heirs ab intestato.

Add, that testimonies intervene, which proceed from the counsel of God: Go, sell, etc.

PROVED sixth from Sanchez loc. cit., at least with respect to marriage, that the vower is not rendered solemnly incapable, because the will of any private person can be revoked by the same person through another contrary will, because the incapacity, being revoked, ceases: Therefore that incapacity does not come from the law of nature. It is confirmed; for by the ancient law it is probable that the professed had the dominion of certain goods, as Ribad., Vasquez, and Azorius prove at length. But these things are far weaker, for it is false that every handing-over (donation and conjugal handing-over excepted) can be validly revoked, human law being removed. But if that were true, even a dispensation by the Pontiff, given without cause in vows, especially of religion, would be valid; for the Pope could take away the annulment of human law, since he presides over all ecclesiastical constitutions, as D. Bonavent. loc. cit. in corpore. notes. Why then, with the religious himself willing, and the Church consenting, is the liberation from vows invalid, unless because, since dominion is transferred to God through the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, it cannot be validly revoked by the sole will of the vower, as Sanchez lib. 4. summa, cap. 45. proves.

BUT that otherwise it would not be an entire handing-over of the dominion of temporal goods is frivolous, as is had in all the rules of the Patriarchs, and is gathered from 4. Actuum Apostolorum cited. Nay, by the ancient law no clerics were permitted to have anything of their own, as D. Bonavent. ad caput 1. Regulae, §. fine proprio. notes.

The same is PROVED also d. 25. septimi de matrimonio, first from cap. unico de voto, to which I answered.

THEN because Caelestinus III. cap. rursus, qui clerici, vel vou. says: A simple vow obliges no less before God than a solemn one.

IT IS ANSWERED, that he is then answering the case in which someone had vowed chastity and afterwards had sworn to take a certain girl as wife: whether the oath was valid.

But he answers that it is evil, and he imposes penance, because the vow is a promise owed to God, just as the solemn one, and in this the oath can render both void, after it has been made. Therefore that (no less) signifies a comparison as it were proportional, so that nevertheless by its nature the solemn vow is the greater bond; which is proved, for he immediately adds: If he has hastened to these nuptials, he says the marriage is valid, because a simple vow impedes a marriage from being contracted, but does not dissolve a contract: Where note, the Pontiff says in the same way, A simple vow obliges before God, even if afterwards the contrary is sworn, just as the solemn vow also obliges, that is, by its nature; and to subjoin: the simple vow does not annul, just as the solemn one annuls, that is, by its nature; otherwise the Pontiff would not have spoken soundly.

He PROVES third, because before the times of Caelestinus III. cap. Rursus cited: and of Alexander III. cap. insinuante and cap. meminimus, same title. no mention of a simple and solemn vow was heard of in the Church. Wherefore D. Augustinus Psal. 75., recounting the species of vows, does not mention this one. Nor Hugo serm. 53. de Instit. Monast. and lib. 2. de Sacramentis, parte 12., where he only speaks of a vow secret and public. That S. Theodorus Archiepiscopus Cantuariensis, who flourished in the year 690, mentions a simple vow, as it is reported cap. si vir, 27. dist., seems to be something added by someone, since it is not had in cap. si quis votum, 27. quaest. 1., where the same chapter is reported. Whence it is a sign that a mere institution of the Church imposed this distinction. It is confirmed, because in ancient times this form of profession did not exist, and it was invented by the Church.

IT IS ANSWERED, that he has nothing firm; for the gloss on a simple vow was added in cap. si vir, where the whole canon is recited; but cap. si quis votum refers itself to the Canon Si vir, and only begins: Si quis votum virginitatis habens, etc., referring itself to the said chapter si vir, that it be a simple vow, as the marginalist and the Gloss note; therefore nothing to the point against the first opinion; nay, I refute it: the solemnity of the vow, which is from the institution of the Church, is added by Boniface VIII, who died in the year 1303, and reigned after S. Caelestinus V, who died in 1294; wherefore before that another essential solemnity was given, annulling marriage. Nor may you say that Boniface supposes it to be already so; for this is found nowhere.

AS TO the profession indeed, it is established from the rules of the Saints, Benedict, Augustine, Pachomius, Basil, that the same solemnity existed essentially, even if something of the words has been changed.

PROVED fourth, because the Church could decree that solemn vows should not annul marriage.

IT IS ANSWERED, by denying it; nor does Sanchez, at any rate, or anyone else prove it; nay, Sanchez himself admits it below in the answer to the argument from cap. Cum ad monasterium.

Caius, a secular priest ordained under the title of the Mission for a certain English diocese, having experienced in himself not slight signs of a vocation to the religious state, and not for a brief time, consults his missionary Rector about the matter. The Rector says that he does not understand what Caius lacks for acquiring the highest perfection, since it is written in the Fourth Council of Westminster, decree XII, no. 7: “Moreover, by the Lord, who has compassion on our weaknesses, exceptional aids are granted to us in England, who fight for the kingdom of truth, for acquiring priestly perfection. To the priesthood with which missionaries are distinguished is entrusted the care of souls and therefore spiritual gifts of every kind that are attached to the pastoral state; furthermore, pastors are especially pastors of the poor, the friends of Jesus, ‘who have nothing with which to repay us,’ and they themselves also are poor, and are nourished and contented by the alms of the poor. There is added also the daily and almost perpetual denial of one’s own will in lightening the burdens of others, in comforting the sick, and in assisting the dying by day and night. Finally there remains the remarkable grace and privilege of the missionary oath, by which, on the threshold of the apostolate they have undertaken, after the likeness of the offering of Jesus made on the Cross, they freely offer themselves day by day as a living and pleasing sacrifice to God the Father.” “Behold for you,” says the Rector, “a state of perfection, and indeed one made stable by virtue of the oath of the Mission; poverty also, chastity, and obedience. What else can you have in religion that conduces to acquiring perfection?” Caius, however, still not content, secretly consults Julius, a regular, who, recognizing an excellent vocation, affirms that nothing prevents Caius from passing immediately to religion, since this privilege is granted in law to secular priests, nor does the oath of the Mission stand in the way, because, insofar as it is contrary to the evangelical counsels, it places an obstacle before the Holy Spirit, according to St. Thomas, in III, distinction 39, question 1, article 3, minor question 3, reply to 2, where the Angelic Doctor [correcting an evident omitted-letter printing error] adds these words: “By the very fact that someone swears that he will not enter religion, he is perjured.” Hence it is asked:

1. Is the state of a secular priest with the care of souls a state of perfection?

2. Is at least the religious state a higher state of perfection than the state of a secular priest with the care of souls?

3. Which state is of greater dignity?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. This question is answered above, p. 59.

2. Is the religious state a higher state of perfection than that of a secular priest with the cure of souls?

Yes, the office of a secular priest with the cure of souls is not a state of perfection in the strict sense, for he is bound by no perpetual obligation to give himself to the duties of his office. The Church permits them to abandon their office and enter religion, which is a proof that the religious state is of greater perfection than the office of a secular priest, as St. Thomas teaches (II— II, q. 184, a. 8). This, of course, does not prevent some priests being personally more perfect than some religious, as St. Thomas also teaches (II— II, q. 184, a. 4).

3. Which state is higher in dignity?

Secular priests have precedence over Religious, and this is a mark of their greater dignity of rank in the ecclesiastical hierarchy.

4. The case. The quotation from the Fourth Council of Westminster shows the excellence of the priestly office, and the necessity of having great virtue in order to fulfil its duties worthily. But as was said above, it wants the stability required for a state in the strict sense, and it does not of itself provide the safeguards and the helps which a state of perfection should provide for the acquiring of perfection. The missionary oath does not bind a priest perpetually to devote himself to the cure of souls, nor is he under vows of poverty and obedience. His promise of canonical obedience only binds him to obey the bishop in matters belonging to clerical discipline, and not to leave the diocese without the bishop’s consent. In religious life the priest will be under the perpetual obligation of the three vows, and he will have innumerable helps and safeguards for the practice of the highest perfection. Julius was also wrong in saying that Caius might enter religion at once. He must not enter without leave of the Holy See as he is bound by the missionary oath. This oath does not bind him not to enter, but not to enter without leave of the Holy See, whose business it will be to find out whether the public good of the diocese will permit of his abandoning his office and seeking his private good in religion. So that the quotation from St. Thomas is not to the point.¹

1 Cf. Instruct. 8. C. de P. F., 27 April, 1871, De Titulo Ordinationis, n. 10.