Question I: In what solemn vows differ from simple vows

Famous is this question, and exceedingly necessary, all the more so as new decrees of the Pontiffs are in force for deciding it.

¶ The first opinion is, that Solemn and simple vows differ from the very nature of the vows themselves, with all ecclesiastical law set aside; and that the essence of solemn vows consists in the handing over of oneself and of one's goods into the hands of God and of those who act in God's place: Brought forward by Sanchez for this opinion are D. Thomas in 4. d. 38. quaest. 1. art. 2. quaestiuncula 3., D. Bonaventura same dist. art. 2. quaest. 1., Durandus there quaest. 1. and 2., Richardus there art. 7., Mayro quaest. unic. part. 4., Capreolus 4. d. 33. quaest. unic. art. 1. concl. 2. and art. 3., Deca there quaest. unic. art. 3., Carthus. 4. d. 3. quaest. 2., Fortunius Garcia cap. 1. de pactu, num. 13., Turrecrem. cap. presbyterus, num. 1. and 2. d. 27., Tabiena dispensatio quaest. 7., Sotus 7. de Iust. quaest. 2. art. 5. and 4. d. 38. quaest. 2. art. 1., Petrus Soto lect. 5. de matrim., Couarr. 4. decret. 2. part. cap. 7. § 4. num. 7., Ledesma 2. part. 4. quaest. 55. art. 5., Alex. Carterius lib. 3. de sponsal. cap. 6., Celatia 4. d. 37. quaest. 3. and d. 38. quaest. after the seventh argument, Viguerz Instit. cap. 16. § 7., Stunica lib. 5. recopil. tit. 1. rubr gloss. 1., Vega in summa, cap. 49., Henriquez lib. 1. de matrim. cap. 5., Barbosa Rubrica, ff. soluto matrimonio 2. part. from num. 93. up to 100., Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 7., Hugolinus de Sacramentis, where on marriage cap. 19., Valentia 2. 2. d. 6. quaest. 9. puncto 5. and 4. puncto d. 10. de matrimonio quaest. 5. puncto 3., Candelabr. p. p. num. 129., Petrus Ledesma de matrim. quaest. 53. art. 2., Barthol. Ledesma de matrim. dub. 32. and dub. 33., Ludovicus Lopez 2. part. Instruct. de matrim. cap. 48., Graffi 2. part. decis. lib. 2. cap. 12., Vega 2. Tomo summa, cap. 57. casu 21.

¶ Certain other, older authors also acknowledged this same difference between a solemn and a simple vow, though they assert that the subsequent marriage can be dissolved by mere human law through the profession. These are Ioan. Andr. cap. unico de voto. in 6., there Abb. Anchar., Dominicus Archid., who has the same thing cap. finali. num. 5. d. 27., Cardin. Clementina unica de consang. num. 19. quaest. 42., Altisiodor. lib. 3. summae, Tract. 28. cap. 1. quaest. 3., and Brunellus de sponsal. concl. 31.

¶ As to D. Bonaventure, who is brought forward for this opinion, I say that in that question he only asserts that it cannot commonly be said that the Church dispenses in a solemn vow of chastity for entering marriage, and that therefore it seems false to him that its illegitimacy comes from her, because she can dispense in her own constitutions.

¶ But in question 1, proposing again: Whether the Church can dispense in solemn vows, as we said in the preceding disputation, quaest. 29., and reviewing the opinions on both sides, he does not dare to define, and candidly admits he does not know which is the truer opinion (for he records another besides these two) and he adds: Either can well be sustained, for I bring forward no decisive reason. As I noted above as well.

¶ But in the Dicta salutis lec. cit. he candidly admits that the solemnity of vows arose from the Church, as I shall say in the arguments. However that may be, no one insists on this first opinion, as it is commonly circulated. Rather he seems to embrace the second, which I shall report immediately; although he holds all vows to be of Divine law as regards their obligation, whence he uses a certain moderation in dispensation, as we saw; nothing against this; for that is common to simple vows.

The second opinion, therefore, is that solemn vows are distinguished from simple ones by the sole institution of the Church. So D. Bonaventure, reported above, whom Scotus follows in 4. d. 38. quaest. unica, and there Paludanus quaest. quart. 4. concl. 11. num. 49., Caiet. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 7. dub. 1., Abul. quaest. 100. ad 30. Numer., Michael Medina de sacrorum hominum continentia, lib. 4. controv. 7. cap. 12., Guilielmus Vottilongo 4. d. quaest. unica, art. 2. concl. 1. and there Palacios d. 1. concl. 1. 2. 3. and 4., Ouandus there quaest. unica prop. 16., Azor. lib. 11. Instit. moral. cap. 6. quaestio 1. and all these are they, who assert that the marriage bond can be dissolved by mere ecclesiastical law through the profession of religion, whom I shall report below; and Valentia says this opinion is probable 2. 2. d. 6. quaest. 6. puncto 5.

¶ Finally this opinion is excellently defended by Ribadeneira in libro de Instit. Societatis Iesu, cap. 15., Vasquez p. 2. d. 165., Sanchez lib. 7. de matrimonio, d. 25. and lib. 5. summae mor. cap. 1., Tanner. d. 5. quaest. 4. num. 63., citing all the Canonists, D. Thomas, Aragonius quaest. 88. art. 7., Suarez Tom. 2 de religione, cap. 14., Lessius lib. 2. cap. 40. dub. 14., Bellarminus lib. 1. de matrimonio, cap. 21., Vasquez d. 165. cap. 2. and with him Abulensis, Pelag. Ledesma, Corduba, and others: So too the Scotists in Mastrius Tom. 4. d. 7. num. 438.

¶ I assert that solemn vows differ from simple ones by the tradition of the Church, probably.

¶ It is proved first from D. Bonaventure lib. 1. Pharetrae, cap. 51. from D. Bernard tract. de praecepto, et dispens. before the middle, where he says; Let consideration be with the Abbot, that this or that should be in the providence, or judgment, or disposition of the Abbot; Yet that he may change anything of the rule at his own will,¹ I do not recall reading there: nay rather let all follow the mistress rule, nor let anyone rashly depart from it: Therefore not even the Abbot himself. Let all follow the mistress rule, therefore no one his own will; and a little later: We are founded upon the transgressions of brothers, not upon the traditions of the Fathers, whence the Abbot is chosen, a keeper of commandments, an avenger of vices. Where the Abbot asserts that the observance of the rule belongs to the traditions of the Fathers: Therefore of the Church. ¹ N. Editor's note: the print/OCR reads 'pro sua voluntate diis uid mutet de regula' (garbled); rendered as 'aliquid mutet' with St. Bernard, De praecepto et dispensatione.

PROVED second from D. Bonaventure in the Diaeta salutis, titulo 4. cap. 1., because although in ancient times Samuel, Elias, and Eliseus gathered disciples for perfection, and John the Baptist educated disciples, as is had in 1. Reg. 10. 4. Reg. 4. Ioan. 1., and Christ chose disciples and Apostles, as is had in Matth. 4.; nevertheless those who first together instituted the religious life were the Apostles Actorum 4., where no one said that anything was his own, but all things were common; as also D. Mark in Alexandria. For from there the Monks arose, of whom there were three kinds, that is, of Caenobites, who lived in common, Remobath, who dwelt two or three together, and Anchoretes, who lived alone in the desert, whose Prince was John the Baptist. But that Religious Orders began from the Apostles, as D. Bonaventure says, is proved from Eusebius lib. 2. historiae, cap. 16., Jerome de viris illustribus on Philo., Augustine sermone 2. de vita communi clericorum., Possidius in vita Augustini., Isidore l. 2. de off. cap. 15., Cassian collat. 18., as Bellarminus notes lib. 1. de monach. cap. 5.

This is what Boniface VIII cap. unico de voto, in 6. declares, that the solemnity of a vow was found to be from the sole institution of the Church.

And Gregory XIII in his Extravagant Ascendente Domino, in order to refute those saying that those making simple vows of the biennium in the Society of Jesus are not religious, gives the reason for their error, namely that they did not consider that the solemnity of a vow was found by the sole constitution of the Church.

But these Bulls were issued after the time of D. Bonaventure, as clearly appears; therefore it is no wonder if D. Bonaventure seemed to incline also to the other opinion, which was the older; for this opinion first had as its defender Scotus, who lived long after D. Bonaventure; the other, however, many ancients, reported above.

THEY ANSWER, however, that the solemnity of vows which is from ecclesiastical tradition is that which was instituted so that the profession may be manifest in the face of the Church and cannot be denied; but essentially, insofar as it speaks of the handing over of oneself into the hands of the prelate, it is from the very law of solemn vows; Just as the solemnity of marriage, that it be made before witnesses and the Pastor, is necessary from the institution of the Church, so that if it is lacking the marriage is rendered void; but no one will deny that the essential solemnity of marriage is by natural Divine law; for it consists in the mutual handing over of bodies: which the anxious [provision] of the Council of Trent suffices for the validity of marriage. This answer is gathered in D. Bonaventure loc. cit. in corpore.

Sanchez loc. cit. de matrimonio, num. 2. strives to refute this answer thus, because Boniface VIII deduces from it that only two vows annul marriage; for since the nature of a solemn vow depends on the sole institution of the Church, and the Church admitted that a vow made in Profession and in Order is solemn, therefore the solemn vow is only twofold; which reasoning would collapse if it were understood of a merely accidental solemnity; for that thing was not to be defined from accidents.

Yet this answer is blunted by the example brought forward of marriage; for even the Council of Trent annuls marriages lacking that accidental solemnity superinduced, because that solemnity was added as necessary thereafter; and therefore it does not stand in the manner of an accident. It is enough, therefore, if it be deduced thus: Because there are only two vows solemn according to the decrees of the Church; therefore according to the same decrees we will that they annul marriage. Nay, I urge: If he defined that by force of solemn vows marriage is annulled, whose bond is of the law of nature, because essential vows are by ecclesiastical law alone, essentially it would follow that the reasoning of the Pontiff is weakened, and that from a mere impediment of ecclesiastical law the annulment is introduced of a thing which is of the law of nature. I know that the reasoning is not drawn from there: for since marriage is also a contract, it can be compelled to certain necessary conditions, by whose failure it becomes annulled. So from the defect of the Church's solemnity it is annulled newly by the Council of Trent, although before it was valid, just as it is also valid in places where the Holy Council has not been received.

MORE FORCEFULLY, therefore, the Pope will argue: A solemn vow is such essentially by natural Divine law, and this is twofold: Therefore it will suffice for annulling the contract of marriage if it is introduced.

Vasquez brings forward other arguments loc. cit. from num. 14. up to 18. in order to make the opinion seated in these decrees immovable; but with peace to all, let it be only probable.

PROVED third from Sanchez lib. 5. de variis, cap. 1. num. 6., because although in the vows of poverty and chastity that transfer of dominion takes place, and the incapacity for marriage; yet in the vow of obedience it is not present; for after the vow he can still freely will and do many things, and against the precept of the superior: here the just man, lest he vow, or do an act for another, can still act validly. Similarly the vow of the Minims concerning the forty-day fast is at the same time solemn, although in this there is not given that handing-over depriving of dominion, even with the contrary faculty of acting validly.

This reasoning is weak, for the Pontiff argues (and deservedly) the annulment of marriage from the solemn vow insofar as it is a handing-over of dominion, implicated with the conjugal handing-over; but we are invited in vain to this handing-over of the Minims as regards Lenten foods, and the vow of obedience in certain things: yet it is necessary that liberty be present even in other things implicated with the law of matrimony.

PROVED fourth from Sanchez. No handing-over can naturally annul marriage even if it be the greatest (except the bond of a preceding marriage still subsisting). It is proved; for servitude, which is the greatest of all handings-over, does not impede a future marriage.

This reasoning is weak, as D. Bonaventure has it in 4. d. 38. art. 1. quaest. 3. in corpore. For servitude consists only in the service of the body with respect to those things which regard the remainder for the Lord,², and it includes neither the will, nor cohabitation with the wife, if he has one to serve: Therefore servitude is not the greatest handing-over, as Sanchez himself admits in the summa, lib. 4. cap. 15.; which is proved from himself, for the spouse can annul all the vows of the wife (according to him:) but not so the Lord; the reason of the thing is, because the power of dominion, which the slave handed over, is less than others, and it requires at least some services of the body, owed to the Lord: but the vow of religion in many things obliges to subjection, as is clearer than the noonday light: even if in some respect servitude goes before in having something of one's own, which the religious cannot have. ² Editor's note: the print/OCR reads 'in corporis servitio quo ad ea, quae Domino reliquium respiciunt ... serviti ratio ems est'; the passage is garbled in the print itself — rendered from context as 'with respect to those things which regard the remainder for the Lord ... the reason of the servitude is'

PROVED fifth from Sanchez, because one vowing poverty is not by its nature made deprived of the dominion of his goods, nor incapable of acquiring dominion; for it is not any donation with another accepting; therefore it comes from the law of the Church.

IT IS ANSWERED, that it comes from the very law of the vow, whereby it passes to the Prelate holding the place of God under the common life; but wherever the goods are diverted, it matters nothing; therefore, with ecclesiastical law set aside, dominion has been transferred by the very vower, at least to the heirs ab intestato.

Add, that testimonies intervene, which proceed from the counsel of God: Go, sell, etc.

PROVED sixth from Sanchez loc. cit., at least with respect to marriage, that the vower is not rendered solemnly incapable, because the will of any private person can be revoked by the same person through another contrary will, because the incapacity, being revoked, ceases: Therefore that incapacity does not come from the law of nature. It is confirmed; for by the ancient law it is probable that the professed had the dominion of certain goods, as Ribad., Vasquez, and Azorius prove at length. But these things are far weaker, for it is false that every handing-over (donation and conjugal handing-over excepted) can be validly revoked, human law being removed. But if that were true, even a dispensation by the Pontiff, given without cause in vows, especially of religion, would be valid; for the Pope could take away the annulment of human law, since he presides over all ecclesiastical constitutions, as D. Bonavent. loc. cit. in corpore. notes. Why then, with the religious himself willing, and the Church consenting, is the liberation from vows invalid, unless because, since dominion is transferred to God through the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, it cannot be validly revoked by the sole will of the vower, as Sanchez lib. 4. summa, cap. 45. proves.

BUT that otherwise it would not be an entire handing-over of the dominion of temporal goods is frivolous, as is had in all the rules of the Patriarchs, and is gathered from 4. Actuum Apostolorum cited. Nay, by the ancient law no clerics were permitted to have anything of their own, as D. Bonavent. ad caput 1. Regulae, §. fine proprio. notes.

The same is PROVED also d. 25. septimi de matrimonio, first from cap. unico de voto, to which I answered.

THEN because Caelestinus III. cap. rursus, qui clerici, vel vou. says: A simple vow obliges no less before God than a solemn one.

IT IS ANSWERED, that he is then answering the case in which someone had vowed chastity and afterwards had sworn to take a certain girl as wife: whether the oath was valid.

But he answers that it is evil, and he imposes penance, because the vow is a promise owed to God, just as the solemn one, and in this the oath can render both void, after it has been made. Therefore that (no less) signifies a comparison as it were proportional, so that nevertheless by its nature the solemn vow is the greater bond; which is proved, for he immediately adds: If he has hastened to these nuptials, he says the marriage is valid, because a simple vow impedes a marriage from being contracted, but does not dissolve a contract: Where note, the Pontiff says in the same way, A simple vow obliges before God, even if afterwards the contrary is sworn, just as the solemn vow also obliges, that is, by its nature; and to subjoin: the simple vow does not annul, just as the solemn one annuls, that is, by its nature; otherwise the Pontiff would not have spoken soundly.

He PROVES third, because before the times of Caelestinus III. cap. Rursus cited: and of Alexander III. cap. insinuante and cap. meminimus, same title. no mention of a simple and solemn vow was heard of in the Church. Wherefore D. Augustinus Psal. 75., recounting the species of vows, does not mention this one. Nor Hugo serm. 53. de Instit. Monast. and lib. 2. de Sacramentis, parte 12., where he only speaks of a vow secret and public. That S. Theodorus Archiepiscopus Cantuariensis, who flourished in the year 690, mentions a simple vow, as it is reported cap. si vir, 27. dist., seems to be something added by someone, since it is not had in cap. si quis votum, 27. quaest. 1., where the same chapter is reported. Whence it is a sign that a mere institution of the Church imposed this distinction. It is confirmed, because in ancient times this form of profession did not exist, and it was invented by the Church.

IT IS ANSWERED, that he has nothing firm; for the gloss on a simple vow was added in cap. si vir, where the whole canon is recited; but cap. si quis votum refers itself to the Canon Si vir, and only begins: Si quis votum virginitatis habens, etc., referring itself to the said chapter si vir, that it be a simple vow, as the marginalist and the Gloss note; therefore nothing to the point against the first opinion; nay, I refute it: the solemnity of the vow, which is from the institution of the Church, is added by Boniface VIII, who died in the year 1303, and reigned after S. Caelestinus V, who died in 1294; wherefore before that another essential solemnity was given, annulling marriage. Nor may you say that Boniface supposes it to be already so; for this is found nowhere.

AS TO the profession indeed, it is established from the rules of the Saints, Benedict, Augustine, Pachomius, Basil, that the same solemnity existed essentially, even if something of the words has been changed.

PROVED fourth, because the Church could decree that solemn vows should not annul marriage.

IT IS ANSWERED, by denying it; nor does Sanchez, at any rate, or anyone else prove it; nay, Sanchez himself admits it below in the answer to the argument from cap. Cum ad monasterium.

PROVED fifth, if someone, deceived, should vow solemnly in a religion not approved by the Church, he can, not being bound by those vows, [marry], the subsequent marriage, as is gathered from cap. unico de voto, in 6.

IT IS ANSWERED, that it does not prove; for the promise must be made to someone deputed in the name of God: but a prelate not legitimate is not deputed by God, nor indeed does one hand himself over as a slave to God, beating the air, as Sanchez supposes in the confirmation, but to someone acting in the place of God.

PROVED sixth, because someone could hand himself over to God, transferring the dominion of his own will, and yet it will not be a vow of religion.

IT IS ANSWERED, that for the solemnity of the vow there is required the foundation of a perfect handing-over of all things, especially of obedience to a man, which should not be to God alone, to whom we are always bound.

One vowing chastity and afterwards fornicating sins; but he who vows to enter religion in the future does not sin by sacrilege; the reason is, because the former has already handed himself over to God; the latter not yet: Therefore in the simple vow there is a handing-over, and it does not differ in this from the solemn one.

IT IS ANSWERED, that there is some handing-over in the vow of chastity, but not an adequate one, as I shall say below; nor of the whole of life, whence it is not to the point; nor should religion be understood as endowed with a single vow, since three are necessary for it. Moreover let there be a handing-over under some man, in the name of God; yet the obligation is still of Divine law; for that man is not the Lord of this vower by human law. By this the way is open to the rest.

NAY, I argue from the ninth argument of Sanchez, where he proves the assertion from this, that Gregory XIII defines that the simple vows of the biennium in the Society of Jesus constitute a true religious. If those vows are newly decreed by the very ecclesiastical law, as the Pope admits, saying: We ordain that the three vows of this kind, although simple, by the institution of this See, and by our declaration and confirmation also, are truly substantial vows of religion, and in the said society, as in a religion approved by the same See, have been admitted and are, and are admitted by us; it follows therefore from ecclesiastical law that there is no difference, and that all are solemn; for the simple vows of the Society of Jesus have the same effect: therefore the difference must be found elsewhere.

He proves 10. A handing-over and a promise are contraries; but a solemn vow is a promise made to God; therefore it is not a handing-over.

This argument is frivolous; for it is called a promise with respect to the whole future life, to be led to that service; it is called a handing-over with respect to the present donation, which therefore has a promise joined to it, because the handing-over could be for the present.

PROVED eleventh, because the handing-over has the character of genus in the solemn vow; but the circumstances imposed by the Church the character of difference; but a thing has its being not from the genus, but from the difference: Therefore the solemn vow has its being from the ecclesiastical circumstances.

SURELY a FUTILE argument, begging the question; for this is the very thing to be proved, since the adversaries say that the ecclesiastical solemnities have only the character of an accident.

LASTLY he proves. A solemn oath differs from a simple one only because it has a certain formula prescribed by law: Therefore also the vow.

IT IS ANSWERED, by denying the parity; indeed, in this way he would prove that a public and a private vow are the same thing; but the solemn one exhibits more, and more perfectly, than the private one.

I ASSERT second, that the former opinion is not to be disapproved.

It is PROVED from D. Bonaventure loc. cit.: Whatever things are of ecclesiastical law can be changed and dispensed by the Church; but in the solemn vow the Church cannot probably dispense for marriage, as Sanchez admits lib. 8. de matrimonio, d. 8. num. 5. Therefore the major is evident, and granted by all.

The minor is proved from cap. cum ad Monasterium toward the end of de statu Monachorum, where it is had: The keeping of chastity is so closely annexed to the Monastic rule that not even the Supreme Pontiff can grant a dispensation against it.

Innocent answers there num. 31., the Cardinal num. ultimo., Durandus in 4. d. 28. quaest. 2., Pelagius de planctu Ecclesiae, lib. 1. art. 46., that the text says advisedly that the Pope cannot give a dispensation, and does not speak of dispensation, as if it said that he cannot at will and without just cause.

CONTRA, because, as the Abbot notes there, "licentia" comes from licet, which implies a just cause and a consistent reason, as with Bartolo leg. aliam, num. 8. ff. de alim. et cibar. and as others hand down, Menochius de arbitr. lib. 1. quaest. 8. num. 45., Naevo cap. 1. num. 110. de constit.

The Abbot answers there that the Pontiff cannot dispense easily with a cause; or cannot dispense, by changing into another good more acceptable to God.

But this answer does not please Sanchez himself. The reason may be, because the text is absolute.

Bartholomaeus Socinus consil. 91. num. 1. vol. 1., Richardus in 4. d. 38. art. 9. quaest. 1., Durandus loc. cit., Paludanus quaest. 4. art. 4. concl. 11., Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 11. and in opuscul. tom. 1. tit. 27. quaest. unica., Palud. dist. 3. quadrupl., Azorius lib. 11. Instit. moral. cap. 7. quaest. 1., Valentia 2. 2. d. 6. quaest. 6. puncto 7., Sanchez lib. 8. de matrim. d. 8. num. 12. ANSWER that the Pope cannot dispense a Monk in chastity in the composite sense, so that he takes a wife, remaining in the Monastic state, because it is against the essence of the Monastic state.

Sanchez ADDS another answer, that the Pope speaks in a kind of hyperbole; for since the Abbot wished it to be entirely within his power to dispense a Monk in retaining property, the Pope argues from the lesser to the greater; as if saying: Scarcely is there in me the power of dispensing, and it is greatly disputed; by what reasoning, then, do you usurp it to yourself?

TRUE, as the Gloss notes there, the Pope defines his opinion not hyperbolically; but seriously, and concluding adequately: Nor let the Abbot judge that he can dispense with any Monk in holding property, because the abdication of property, just like the keeping of chastity, is so closely annexed to the Monastic rule that not even the Supreme Pontiff can grant a dispensation against it. But the reason of the Gloss is that which D. Bonaventure gives in 4. d. 38. art. 2. quaest. 3. in corpore, because nothing worthy exists into which the state of solemn chastity could be changed, to which there is an allusion Ecclesiast. 26: All weight is not worthy of the soul of the continent, not because he could not be religious, for it is not at all established whether entire chastity is necessary for the religious state, as Sanchez admits cap. 1. num. 17.

NOR is that case relevant, that the Abbot presumed to grant the Monks property; nor does the Pontiff rebuke him, but he hands down many things necessary for observance, as is clear to the reader of his works. These things I have said probably. Therefore probable is the opinion which S. Bonaventure does not dare to reprove, namely that the solemn vow, which indeed is not such insofar as it is public, as some would have it, unless perhaps Hugo lib. 1. and others employ the word "public" for "solemn" — certainly he knew solemn vows, as is clear to the reader of his works. The vow, I say, is solemn differing by its nature from the simple one; that it is solemn is a translation of the dominion of the vower into the hands of the one accepting in the name of God, who accepts it, so that from this he is rendered incapable of transferring the same dominion to another by revoking it from the first legitimate possessor through marriage: but in the simple vow dominion is not transferred perfectly to God, but only as regards the non-use of venereal acts, therefore it can be validly transferred through marriage.

SIMILARLY in the solemn vow man is bound to man and to God at the same time, just as also in marriage; therefore there is an equal obligation on both sides, and an equal obligation does not dissolve the bond of the obligation of peace; therefore the obligation of the solemn vow cannot be broken by the supervening bond of marriage, but not so the simple one, which promises to God alone.

HENCE I seem to elicit some reason why Caelestinus III, cap. Rursus, qui clerici, vel voventes, defining that he who, after a simple vow of chastity, had sworn marriage to a girl is not bound to keep that oath, although it seemed a promise was made to God and to man, brings forward as the reason that a simple vow obliges before God no less than a solemn one; as if he said: The solemn vow is a promise made not only to God, but to men; therefore in this respect I compare the obligation of these vows only before God, for in the other respect the solemn vow excels; but the promise of the oath, made to that woman, is posterior, and inferior, to the promise made to God; nor could that other legitimate promise be made to God on any other foundation through that oath; he adds, nay rather it is an injury; therefore it does not stand, nor subsist.

I gather THE SAME difference of vows from cap. meminimus, same title, where the Pontiff defines: If anyone who has devoted himself to religion, and has made profession with the habit received, afterwards joins himself to some woman, he is compelled to withdraw from her, and to pass to the Church to which he applied himself without contradiction. But if he has received neither the habit, nor made the profession, but has only made a vow, and promised that he would pass to religion: Although he afterwards contracted marriage, he is not compelled to pass to religion and to rescind the marriage vow.

HERE the Pontiff clearly gives the reason of S. Bonaventure why the solemn vow, but not the simple vow, annuls marriage, namely because the solemn vow is by its nature the greater bond, namely a handing-over of the man made to God, but the simple vow is a promise to God alone. The same is intimated in cap. insinuante, same title.

NOW indeed the best reason is had for the first opinion, which D. Bonaventure seems to embrace. However much two things are equal: one does not act upon the other, as is had in sound Philosophy, but action must be upon an unequal inferior: but the bond of marriage and of religion are equal, for each hands itself over to God and to man; but the vow of chastity is an unequal inferior, because it is a handing-over to God alone: Therefore marriage cannot act to dissolve the bond of the solemn vow of religion, and it can act upon the simple vow. These things I would say, because the adversaries say that no reason is found for this opinion; but only that doctrine concerning the handing-over.