Pride

THEOLOGIANS divide the chief vices to which human nature is subject into seven heads or capital sins, as they are called. The name implies that they are the source and origin of many more, inasmuch as the inordinate love of any temporal good is apt to give rise to many inordinate ways of pursuing it. The seven capital sins are: Pride, Covetousness, Lust, Anger, Envy, Sloth, Gluttony.

Pride is the inordinate love of our own pre-eminence. There is a tendency deeply seated in human nature, which arises from the self-love which is innate in every man, and which leads him to prefer himself to others, to wish to lord it over them, and to bear with impatience the yoke of subjection to authority. Truth requires that we should look upon any qualities and gifts that we possess as coming to us from the bounty and goodness of God, and as giving us no right to exalt ourselves above others who have received similar or even greater benefits from the generosity of our common Father. Pride, on the contrary, would willingly close its eyes to this salutary and humbling truth; it looks upon whatever it possesses as its own, as the fruit of its own labour and merit; it is prone to magnify its gifts, and to consider them to be greater than they really are, while on the other hand it is blind to the good qualities of others. This leads to the growth of a spirit of independence which is impatient of subjection to any authority, human or divine, and to a depreciation and contempt of others. The proud man has no need to ask God for anything; he thanks him that he is not as the rest of men; he is self-sufficient and independent of all the world. This is the pinnacle of pride, the inordinate love of one’s own pre-eminence.

Consummate pride, which refuses to be subject to God and to lawful authority, and which looks down upon other men with profound contempt, is a mortal sin. If it does not go to these lengths, but merely magnifies self without grave insubordination and contempt of others, it is a venial sin.

Pride is so serious an evil because it strikes at the root of the primary obligations of reverent obedience towards our Lord God and love of our neighbour, because it is opposed to the truth, and because of its universality; it is in the heart of every man and quickly grows to fearful dimensions unless corrected and subdued.

To pride is opposed humility, the virtue which occupies the mean between the two extremes of pride and pusillanimity or mean-spiritedness. The mean-spirited man refuses to take the place for which his talents fit him, and which God intends for him. He puts himself beneath his equals and inferiors to the detriment of his dignity and office; he is afraid to exercise the authority entrusted to him, and the public good suffers in consequence. Humility, on the other hand, keeps a man in his place both with respect to God and his fellow-men. It is grounded on the knowledge of God and of self; the humble man knows and acknowledges that he has nothing but what he has received from God, that he is utterly and entirely dependent on God every moment of his life, that if left to himself he will fall into the lowest depths of sin and degradation; and this knowledge causes him to think much of God and little, very little, of self. This is the virtue so much recommended by our divine Lord: “‘ Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart.’’¹

Pride leads to many other vices, among which are: presumption, ambition, vainglory, boasting, and hypocrisy.

(a) Presumption is the inclination and wish to undertake what is above one’s capacity. Ordinarily it is a venial sin, but it will be mortal if it is the occasion of serious harm to the cause of God or our neighbour.

(b) Ambition is the inordinate striving after dignities and honours. The inordinateness consists in striving after honours to which one has no just claim or greater than one’s due, or by unlawful modes and means, or with too great eagerness. Apart from such inordinateness it is not sinful to seek after honours and dignities, as these belong to the class of things that are in themselves indifferent; it is a meritorious act to seek with moderation after dignities and honours in order thereby to be able to do more for God and one’s fellow-men. “If a man desire the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work.”² Such an act belongs to the virtue of magnanimity. Ambition is commonly a venial sin, but it becomes mortal when it is the cause of serious harm, or when the means employed to attain its end are grievously sinful.

(c) Vainglory is the inordinate striving after the esteem and praise of men. It is not wrong but praiseworthy to seek after and preserve a good reputation, which, as Holy Scripture teaches, is better than great riches.³ But inordinateness, vanity, and sin come in when the esteem and praise of those men is sought whose esteem is not worth having, or when esteem is sought for what does not deserve esteem, or not so great as is sought after, or when glory is not referred to the proper end. It is usually a venial sin, but may become mortal in the same way as ambition.

(d) Boasting is the inordinate bragging about one’s own good qualities or gifts, or even about what is sinful. If the inordinate display is in action rather than in word it is called ostentation.

(e) Hypocrisy is the feigning of virtues and qualities that one does not possess.

¹ Matt. xi 29.

² 1 Tim. iii 1.

³ Prov. xxii 1.

I. Notion. Pride is the inordinate appetite of one's own excellence (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, aa. 1 and 2; St. Alphonsus, V, 65), by which someone either judges that he has a good from himself; or, although he believes that he has received a good from God, ascribes it to his own merits; or boasts that he has a good which he lacks; or desires to seem singularly to have that which he has (St. Thomas, cited place, a. 4).

II. Division. Pride is distinguished as twofold, perfect and imperfect. Perfect pride is that by which someone disdains to be subject to divine authority. Imperfect pride is that by which someone, while preserving due subjection, esteems himself more than is just or inordinately desires to excel others (St. Alphonsus, V, 65).

III. Morality. 1. Perfect pride is a mortal sin from its whole genus, and indeed a most grave sin.

a) It is a mortal sin from its whole genus. For the root of pride is considered in this, that "man in some way is not subject to God and His rule. But it is manifest that this very thing, not to be subject to God, has the nature of mortal sin; for this is to turn away from God; hence it follows that pride according to its genus is mortal sin" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, a. 5).

b) It is a most grave sin. For aversion from God, which formally completes sin, belongs per se to pride, while it is as it were consequent in other sins. Therefore pride is a most grave sin. The major is proved by St. Thomas thus: "In other sins man is turned away from God either on account of ignorance, or on account of infirmity, or on account of desire for any other good whatever; but pride has aversion from God from this very fact, that it does not will to be subject to God and His rule" (II-II, q. 162, a. 6).

2. Imperfect pride is per se venially evil, because it involves excess in an indifferent matter, such as, for example, esteem of oneself, the praise of men, etc. It becomes mortally evil if grave contempt of others is added, or a manner of acting injurious to God; the latter would have place if someone behaved as if he had his goods either from himself or as owed to his own merits (St. Alphonsus, V, 65).

IV. The daughters of pride are:

1. Presumption, "which is the inordinate appetite of undertaking something beyond one's powers. It is commonly only venial. It becomes mortal, however, if it brings harm to God or one's neighbor; for example, if you presume ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the power of sacred Order, likewise the office of physician, advocate, confessor, etc., without due skill" (St. Alphonsus, V, 66).

2. Ambition, "which is the inordinate appetite for dignity and honor not owed, or greater than is owed; as if you seek a benefice or office of which you are unworthy; or by an illicit manner and means, for example, by simony. It is per se a venial sin. But it becomes mortal either by reason of the means through which honor is sought, or by reason of the harm which is brought upon one's neighbor. Finally, if honor is sought moderately for an honorable end, it will be an act of magnanimity" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

3. Vain glory, which is the inordinate appetite of praise and fame to be obtained by the manifestation of one's own excellence. "It is called vain when it is sought from a bad, false, or fictitious thing; or from something which is not worthy of glory, or not of so much glory, as from riches, trifles, etc.; or among those who do not judge rightly about the thing; or without a due end. It is per se a venial sin; often mortal by accident, as was said concerning ambition" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

By vain glory one sins in two ways:

a) "Directly; and this either by words, and it is boasting, which is venial per se, if it is about good things, for example, fasting, prayer, etc., although by accident, often by reason of harm, if it is false, it becomes mortal; as also: 1. If one says something against the glory of God, as in Ezekiel 28: 'I am God.' 2. If he breaks forth into insults; for example, 'I am not as the rest of men, an adulterer, etc., or even as this man.' 3. From an evil end. 4. If it is done with notable harm to one's neighbor. 5. If it is about a mortally evil matter... Or by deeds, which, if they are true and have something of admiration, is called the invention of novelties, for the common people are accustomed to admire these, such as foreign garments, opinions, etc.; mortal, if it notably corrupts youth or morals. But if the deeds are false, it is hypocrisy; for example, if someone does some good thing so that he may seem good, although he is not" (St. Alphonsus, V, 66; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 132, a. 5).

b) "Indirectly, insofar as someone does not wish to be less than another. This happens in four ways: 1. Through the intellect; and it is pertinacity, by which someone adheres too tenaciously to his own opinion, which is mortal if truth of great moment is opposed, or if it is joined with danger to a third party, for example, if a physician remains in his opinion with danger to the sick person. 2. Through the will; and it is discord, by which one sins mortally when it concerns the good of God or of one's neighbor, in which they ought to be concordant. 3. Through words; and it is contention, which is mortal when, with a mind to contradict, you wrangle about truth pertaining to the faith or to the salvation of soul or body. 4. Through deeds, when someone does not wish to carry out what he ought; and it is disobedience" (St. Alphonsus, cited place; St. Thomas, cited place).

V. Remedies of pride are: 1. Consider that you are nothing and sinful.¹ 2. Weigh the hatred by which God rejects and punishes the proud, while He affects the humble with benefits.² 3. Meditate on the example of Christ.³ 4. Exercise humility, especially by tolerating humiliations.⁴

¹ 1 Cor. 4:7.

² Ecclus. 10:7; 35:21; Matt. 23:12; Luke 1:48 sq.; Rom. 1:21, 26; 1 Pet. 5:5, 6.

³ Phil. 2:7.

⁴ Sweens, Theologia moralis fundamentalis, n. 956.

III. Opposed Vices. By excess there is opposed pride, which is an inordinate appetite for one's own excellence (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, aa. 1 and 2),¹ by which someone either estimates that he has good from himself; or, although he believes that he has received good from God, ascribes it to his own merits; or boasts that he has a good which he lacks; or desires to seem singularly to have what he has (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, a. 4).² Moreover, it must be observed that "pride is not the same as vain glory, but its cause; for pride inordinately seeks excellence, but vain glory seeks the manifestation of excellence" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, a. 8, ad 4).³ By defect there is opposed excessive self-abjection, by which someone desires vile things not befitting his state and condition.⁴

¹ Salmanticenses, Arb. praed., n. 145 (p. 496).

² Cf. Salmanticenses, cited place, n. 146 (p. 496).

³ On pride one should read St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, entire; St. Alphonsus, Theologia moralis, book 5, n. 65 sqq.

⁴ Cf. Salmanticenses, cited place, n. 145 (p. 496).

The Origin of Discord.—(a) The disagreement with the will of a neighbor arises from envy. For he who considers the excellence of his neighbor as a lessening of his own excellence, is inclined to contradict the wishes of the neighbor, even if he recognizes them as good. (b) The preference of one’s own will and persistence in it are due to pride and vainglory. For he who unduly desires his own excellence or fame does not wish to yield to others or change his purposes. He feels that, even though he is in the wrong, he must not take what he regards as a position of inferiority.

The Causes of Sinful Contention.—(a) The cause of that which is principal in contention—namely, the departure from the truth held by another and the stand made for error—is envy, pride and vainglory, as said above (see 1854) concerning discord. (b) The cause of that which is secondary in contention—namely, the wrangling or bawling manner and the shouts or screams of the contenders—is anger.

The Causes of Contumely.—(a) Pride is sometimes a cause, inasmuch as those who consider themselves better than others are quick to express the contempt they feel for others, if they hope that this will add to their own glory (Prov., xi. 2). But a proud person will just as often disdain to revile those whom he despises.

(b) Foolishness (see 1621) is sometimes a cause of contumely, for the foolish man speaks without thinking as he should or without caring what damage his words may cause (Prov., xx. 3). Hence, those who speak abusively to others merely in order to raise a laugh among the bystanders, little caring about the disrespect they show, cannot excuse themselves on the plea that it was all a joke.

(c) Anger is the usual cause of contumely, for the angry man seeks to show his revenge in some open and manifest way, and there is no easier or more ready means to this end than bitter, scornful or jeering words. Hence the danger of contumelious reprimands given by superiors. The subject will be enraged by the hard names applied to him, and the superior in his wrath will easily go to extremes, even of mortal sin, on account of the language he uses (e.g., exaggerated invective) or on account of circumstances (e.g., the scandal given).

Vices Opposed to Greatness of Soul by Excess.—The vices opposed to greatness of soul by excess are such as desire great deeds, or honors, or fame, when or where or how they should not be desired.

(a) Excessive desire of great deeds is presumption, which attempts to do greater things than one is able to perform (cfr. 1075 sqq.), This happens in conceited persons who overestimate their own abilities, taking on themselves offices for which they are incompetent or exercising powers for which they have no authority; also in vulgar persons who mistake their fortuitous advantages, such as wealth or influence or birth, for character and ability. Presumption is a mortal sin when its cause is a grave sin (e.g., lack of faith) or when its effects are very harmful (e.g., when one who is ignorant presumes to teach or practise medicine, when one who is morally frail presumes to enter occasions of sin). There is no sin if one attempts too much in good faith and from inculpable ignorance.

(b) Excessive desire of honors (see 2010, 2011, 2351) is ambition, or an inordinate hankering after distinctions and deference. The great of soul desire honors when these are due to their station or when there is a just reason, such as the glory of God or the advantage of the neighbor (Matt., v. 15, 16; Heb., v. 4). The ambitious, on the contrary, seek to be honored beyond their deserts (e.g., when an ignorant man longs for academic degrees, a tyrant wishes to be respected on account of his tyranny, an inferior man seeks to perpetuate himself in temporary elective offices, a rich man or athletic hero expects that he will be revered above those who are eminent for virtue or learning), or they seek honor for its own or their own sake, like the Pharisees who loved the first places at feasts and the first chairs in the synagogues, and salutations in the market place, and to be called by men Rabbi (Matt., xxiii. 7; cfr. I Tim., iii. 1 sqq.; Matt., xx. 25). This sin, being excessive desire of something indifferent, is not per se mortal; but it is made mortal either by a cause that is seriously sinful (e.g., if one’s whole life is but a mad chase for preferments) or by a result that is seriously harmful (e.g., if one commits or is ready to commit serious injustice or uncharitableness to win a coveted dignity). Ambition is cured chiefly by charity, for charity is not ambitious (I Cor., xiii. 5; cfr. Gal., v. 13).

(c) Excessive desire of praise or celebrity is vanity (see 2028, 2269). The great of soul desire the good opinion of their fellow-men (see 1575 sqq.), but they also desire that their good reputation be well founded, and their motive is the glory of God or the spiritual profit of man. The vain, on the contrary, are eager for admiration and praise for which there is no justification (e.g., those who wish to be praised for virtues they do not possess) or which are valueless (e.g., those who fish for compliments over things of no great importance, such as good looks or dress, or who wish to appear learned among the uneducated, or who crave notoriety), or seek admiration without a proper motive (e.g., those who advertise themselves for self-glorification alone). Vanity, like ambition, is per se only a venial sin, but it becomes mortal on account of its cause (e.g., when the motive is to conceal crimes that are planned), or its results (e.g., when the desire to be famous makes one boast of one’s crimes, or refuse to repair injuries done to others, or neglect the honor of God), or its matter (e.g., when one is vain about a reputation for skillful injustice). Vanity is one of the capital sins (see 268 sqq.), since it is one of the motives that chiefly lead men into sin; for all desire excellence, and in consequence the love of renown is one of the chief incentives to action. Even the ambitious crave honors because of the glory honors bring. The offspring of vanity includes the sins by which a man seeks unlawfully to show off his good points, or to prove that he is not inferior and thus capture popularity or glory. In the first class are the publication by word or deed of one’s own true or pretended exploits (boasting hypocrisy), the cultivation of novelties and eccentricities designed to attract attention (such as singularity in opinion, in pronunciation, in dress, etc.). In the latter class are sins of intellect which make one hold obstinately to one’s views (stubbornness), sins of will which make one resist desires of others (discord), sins of word which make one loudly dispute (contention), sins of deed which make one refuse to yield to authority (disobedience).

Pride.—Pride is an inordinate desire of one’s own personal excellence.

(a) It is a desire, for the object of pride is that which is pleasing and yet not easy of attainment.

(b) The desire is concerned with excellence, that is, with a high degree of some perfection (such as virtue, knowledge, beauty, fame, honor) or with superiority to others in perfection.

(c) The excellence sought is personal; that is, the object of pride is self as exalted on high or raised above others. Ambition seeks greatness in honors and dignities, presumption greatness in accomplishment, and vanity greatness in reputation and glory; pride, from which these other vices spring, seeks the greatness of the ego or of those things with which the ego is identified, such as one’s own children, one’s own family, or one’s own race.

(d) The desire is inordinate, either as to the matter, when one desires an excellence or superiority of which one is unworthy (e.g., equality with Our Lord), or as to the manner, when one expressly desires to have excellence or superiority without due subjection (e.g., to possess one’s virtue without dependence on God or from one’s own unaided merits). In the former case pride is opposed to greatness of soul, in the latter case to humility. The contempt which is proper to pride is a disdain for subjection, and the contempt which belongs to disobedience is a disgust for a precept; but pride naturally leads to contempt for law and for God and the neighbor (see 2367).

The Acts of Pride.—(a) In his intellect, the proud man has an exaggerated opinion of his own worth, and this causes his inordinate desire of praise and exaltation. But pride may also be the cause of conceited ideas, for those who are too much in admiration of themselves often come to think that they are really as great as they wish to be.

(b) The will of the proud man worships his own greatness, and longs for its recognition and glorification by others.

(c) In his external words and works, the proud man betrays himself by boasting, self-glorification, self-justification, by his haughty appearance and gestures and luxurious style, by arrogance, insolence, perfidy, disregard of the rights and feelings of others, etc.

The Sinfulness of Pride.—(a) Complete pride, which turns away from God because it considers subjection detrimental to one’s own excellence, is a mortal sin from its nature, since it is a manifest rebellion against the Supreme Being (Ecclus., x. 14). Such was the pride of Lucifer, but it is rare in human beings. Complete pride may be venial from the imperfection of the act, when it is only a semideliberate wish.

(b) Incomplete pride, which turns inordinately to the love of created excellence but without disaffection to superiors, is in itself a venial sin, for there is no serious disorder in the excess of an otherwise indifferent passion. But circumstances may make this pride mortal (e.g., when it is productive of serious harm to others).

Pride Compared with Other Sins.—(a) Gravity.—Complete pride is less than hatred of God, for the former has as its object personal excellence, the latter separation from God. But after hatred of God complete pride is worse disloyalty than any other mortal sin; it separates from God directly, since it abjures allegiance to the Supreme Being, while other sins separate from God only indirectly, since they offend, not from contempt, but from ignorance, or passion or excessive desire.

(b) Origin.—Pride was the first sin, because by it the angels and our first parents fell, the angels desiring likeness to God in beatitude, Adam and Eve likeness in knowledge (Ecclus., x. 15; Prov., xviii. 11; Tob., iv. 14).

(c) Influence.—Pride is called the queen and mother of the seven capital vices—namely, vainglory (2450), gluttony (2473), lust (2494), avarice (2426), sloth (1322), envy (1342), and anger (2549)—not in the sense that every sin is the result of pride (for many persons sin from ignorance, passion, etc.), but in the sense that the inordinate desire of personal excellence is a motive that can impel one to any kind of sin, just as covetousness offers a means that is useful for every temporal end (I Tim., vi. 10). Pride is also most dangerous, since it steals away the reward of virtue itself (Matt., vi. 2); and, as humility is the first step towards heaven, pride is the first step towards hell.

What is pride? "Pride is named from this, that someone by will tends above that which he is." Whence it is clear that it is a sin. Insofar as it is an inordinate appetite of one's own excellence, it is a special sin. But insofar as all vices can arise from it, because to one's own excellence "there can be ordered everything which someone inordinately desires"; and because "man through pride contemns the divine law, by which he is prohibited from sinning," it has a certain generality, or is a general sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 162, aa. 1, 2, 7, 8. - Hence the same Holy Doctor, 2. 2. q. 132, a. 4; q. 162, a. 8, posits pride not as a capital vice, but as the queen of all vices; and he posits vainglory as the capital vice, which arises immediately from it.

Commonly, however, pride is constituted as a capital vice. Pride by its genus is a mortal sin. For "pride is opposed to humility. But humility properly regards the subjection of man to God. Hence, on the contrary, pride properly regards the defect of this subjection, according namely as someone exalts himself above what is fixed for him according to the divine rule or measure.... But it is manifest that this very thing, namely not to be subject to God, has the account of mortal sin; for this is to be turned away from God." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 162, a. 5.

"And therefore to be turned away from God and his precepts, which is as a consequence in other sins, per se pertains to pride, whose act is contempt of God." S. Th. l. c., a. 6. Moreover, when the aforesaid aversion and contempt cease, and there is had only a certain inordinate movement toward one's own excellence, by willing to excel above equals, pride is had only improperly so called, and it is venial, unless it is done with notable contempt of others, by taking pleasure in their abasement before oneself. But there would be no disorder if someone wished from an honorable motive to excel above inferiors. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 77, aa. 4, 5; q. 84, a. 2; L. 65.

What are the daughters of pride and vainglory? "Those vices which of themselves are apt to be ordered to the end of some capital vice are called its daughters." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, a. 5. The daughters of pride are three: 1. Presumption, which is an inordinate appetite of undertaking something above one's powers. It is commonly only venial. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 130, a. 1; q. 134, a. 2 ad 4; q. 21, a. 4. Nevertheless it becomes mortal if it brings grave harm, e.g., if someone presumes to obtain ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the office of physician, etc., without due knowledge. But insofar as presumption is a special sin, opposed to theological hope, it is always a mortal sin, unless imperfection of act excuses. 2. Ambition, which is the inordinate appetite of dignity and honor not owed, or in an undue way and by an undue means. It is per se a venial sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 131, a. 1. But it becomes mortal by reason of the matter from which; or by reason of the means by which; or by reason of the end for which honor is sought; or by reason of the harm which is inflicted on one's neighbor. 3. Vainglory, namely the desire of empty glory, whose end is the inordinate manifestation of one's own excellence, whether true or fictitious. It is per se a venial sin. It is often mortal per accidens, as was just said concerning ambition. But to perform even sacred things on account of vainglory, e.g., to preach, does not exceed venial sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, aa. 3, 4; q. 162, a. 7; L. 66. Pusillanimity corresponds by opposition to the three daughters of pride, by which someone, distrusting himself too much, refuses honors, glory, or an office for which he is worthy. It is venial from its genus; and it becomes mortal if you refuse that to which you are bound under mortal sin. L. 67.

Moreover, the daughters of vainglory, which St. Thomas constitutes as a capital vice, are assigned thus by the same Holy Doctor, 2. 2. q. 132, a. 5. A man can tend to the manifestation of his own excellence in two ways: "in one way directly, either by words, and thus there is boasting; or by deeds, and thus, if they are true things having some admiration, there is presumption of novelties, which men are accustomed to admire more; but if they are false, thus there is hypocrisy. In another way someone strives to manifest his own excellence indirectly, by showing himself not to be less than another, and this in four ways. First indeed as to the intellect, and thus there is pertinacity, by which a man cleaves too much to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe a better opinion. Second as to the will, and thus there is discord, while he does not wish to depart from his own will so that he may agree with others. Third as to speech, and thus there is contention, when another by words quarrels noisily against another. Fourth as to deed, and thus there is disobedience, namely while someone does not wish to execute the precept of a superior." And thus these vices are fittingly called the daughters of vainglory.

Boasting is a certain vain proclamation of one's own excellence, and is per se venial if it is concerning good things; and it can be grave per accidens. If it is concerning lightly evil things, it is likewise per se light, grave per accidens, if, for example, it proceeds from a grave cause against God or neighbor. But if it is concerning gravely evil things, it is grave, because the approval of a work has the same species as the work, which therefore must be expressed in confession, at least when complacency concerning the same sin was joined with the boasting. At least when, etc.; because, if it was without that complacency, many hold that it is not necessarily to be explained. For any boasting concerning mortal sin, abstraction made from complacency in it, is of the same species, namely that someone glories in this, that he has offended God. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 112; L. 26, 66, 67; l. 3, n. 426; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 266 seqq.

Presumption of novelties, which is also called ostentation, if those deeds have nothing of admiration, is also per se venial. And thus it is light to be dressed in foreign garments, or to adorn oneself too much from lightness of mind, vanity, etc.; but grave if it is such as notably to corrupt morals. L. 66, 67. Presumption of novelties can be in opinions, in a mode of speaking, in a mode of acting, etc.

Hypocrisy, by which someone "does not care to have holiness, but only to appear holy... is a mortal sin.... To simulate holiness from which one is deficient through mortal sin... is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes venial," according as it happens to oppose charity or not. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 111, a. 4. Likewise to simulate improbitity is a sin, and can be mortal. S. Th. ibid., a. 1; L. 66, 67.

Pertinacity. "Someone is called pertinacious who is imprudently holding, as if wholly tenacious." Hence pertinacity is opposed to perseverance; for the persevering person persists in his own opinion "according as he ought"; but the pertinacious person perseveres in it "more than he ought." And therefore it is a sin because of excess. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 138, a. 2.

Discord is a dissent of wills concerning the good which we ought to will from charity. Moreover, since certain goods can be owed to one's neighbor not only from charity, but also from justice, discord and dissent from the rendering of similar goods is opposed both to charity and to justice. Discord is per se from its genus a mortal sin. For it directly repugns to charity. But per accidens it can become venial, from the smallness of the owed good in the rendering of which we do not wish to consent. Indeed, sometimes it will be no sin, if it arises, namely, from a probable judgment, from which one person judges this, another that, for the honor of God and the utility of neighbor, and if the mode of dissenting is not opposed to charity. - Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 38; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 37.

Contention is the impugnation of truth with confidence of shouting. Contention is from its genus a mortal sin. The reason: because by charity we ought to will and communicate to others truth necessary or useful for the salvation of the soul, or even of the body; and therefore to impugn it, and to wish to defeat it, is opposed to the virtue of charity, and is from its genus a mortal sin. - Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 39; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 38.

Disobedience, properly and speaking per se, or formal disobedience, is had only when "someone contemns a precept, because moral acts have their species from the end. But when he does something against a precept, not on account of contempt of the precept, it is disobedience only materially, but formally pertains to another species of sin," according to various motives, e.g., to the species of theft, homicide, etc. Therefore disobedience by its nature is a grave sin. For not to obey the precepts of God and of Superiors is contrary to charity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 105, a. 1.

If someone has received a depraved book lent by another to be read, can he restore it to the owner? - R. Negatively, unless prudent fear of some grave inconvenience persuades otherwise. This flows of its own accord from the obligation of impeding the sins of others by reason of charity, when this can be done without grave inconvenience. But it is to be judged a grave inconvenience if you fear grave quarrels, blasphemies, hatreds, and other things of this sort from the owner.

174. • Pride is the disordered love of one's own excellence.

Pride is distinguished as perfect, or complete and consummated in its own genus, and imperfect pride. - It is indeed called perfect when a man so stands in himself and is complacent in himself that he is in a disposition of gravely transgressing the law rather than obeying the commands of a Superior. But this by that very fact always includes mortal sin in itself. - But in the other cases it is called imperfect, and then of itself it usually induces only venial sin, unless grave injury to the neighbor accedes, for example if he is gravely contemned, etc. - St. Lig., no. 66.

The daughters of pride are ambition, vainglory, presumption, boasting, ostentation, and hypocrisy.

The remedies are consideration of one's own infirmity, of the vanity of human glory, and of the humility of Christ.

514. 1. Pride is described. Pride is the inordinate appetite of one's own excellence. To love oneself, to have a good estimation of oneself according to justice and truth, and therefore to seek one's own excellence in a way consonant with reason, is indeed not sin.

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162 and 132; De Malo, q. 8-9; Nat. Alexander, op. cit., 728-818; Bossuet, Tr. de la Concupiscence, c. 10-23; id., Sermon sur l'Ambition; Bourdaloue, Careme, Serm. pour le mercredi de la 2e sem.; Alibert, op. cit., t. I, p. 23-57; Descuret, op. cit., t. II, p. 191-240; Paulhan, Les Caracteres, p. 167, and others alleged at n. 120; also Formation a l'Humilite, Paris, 1902, p. 33-55; Thomas, L'Education des sentiments, Paris, Alcan, 1904, p. 113-124, p. 113-123 and 133-148.

But especially in four ways do we seek this excellence inordinately: (a) when someone thinks that he has from himself what he has from God, or at least acts as though he thought this; now, with the Apostle as witness, whatever is in us in the natural or supernatural order proceeds from God, and is to be attributed primarily to God:² "For what do you have that you have not received? But if you have received it, why do you glory as though you had not received it?" (b) When someone thinks that he has received these goods from God, but only from his own merits; which indeed is likewise false; for we receive many things which we in no way merit, and merits themselves, although truly ours, are to be attributed more to God than to us, since we have being, faculties, the faculty of meriting, and divine help, necessary for meriting, only from the Lord. Wherefore Paul wrote concerning supernatural gifts:³ "For by grace you have been saved through faith; and this not from yourselves: for it is the gift of God; not from works, lest anyone should glory. For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus in good works which God has prepared, that we may walk in them." The same can be said of natural goods, which greatly exceed our merits. (c) When someone boasts that he has what he does not have, or at least a greater good than he has; for not rarely, from an inordinate desire of vainglory or from self-deception, we amplify our endowments beyond measure. This John indeed reproves:¹ "Because you say that I am rich, and made wealthy, and have need of nothing; and you do not know that you are wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked." (d) When someone, conscious of his own excellence, thence despises others, and wishes to be singularly seen and esteemed; thus the Pharisee, giving thanks to God that he was not a sinner like other men, despised the publican; but Christ rebuked this manner of acting in this way:² "Everyone who exalts himself shall be humbled, and he who humbles himself shall be exalted."

² 1 Cor. 4:7. - If the proud man truly believed that he had all these things from himself, he would be a heretic; yet generally he does not think this, but practically bears himself as though these gifts were not from God.

³ Eph. 2:8-10.

¹ Apoc. 3:17.

² Luke 18:14.

515. 2. The daughters of pride are enumerated. Pride, in a general way, is called the mother of all vices; this indeed is true, if it is taken in a broad sense, insofar as it is love of oneself; but if it is understood in the strict sense explained above, certain vices proceed more immediately from it, and are called its daughters in a special sense, namely ambition, presumption, vainglory.

(A) Ambition, which is the inordinate appetite of undue honor, or of honor greater than is due, - or of due honor, but by undue mode or means. - The scribes and Pharisees labored under this vice, concerning whom Christ said:³ "But they love the first places at suppers, and the first chairs in the synagogues, and greetings in the marketplace, and to be called by men rabbi." The Lord willed to be subject to this temptation, when the devil took him onto a high mountain, and showed him all the kingdoms of the world and their glory, saying: "All these things I will give you, if, falling down, you will adore me."⁴ - Nor today are there lacking those who serve the devil and the world, that they may be able to obtain honors and dignities; in the priestly order itself, there are some, with St. Gregory as witness,⁵ who "desire to be seen as teachers, long to surpass the rest, and, with Truth bearing witness, seek the first greetings in the marketplace, the first places at suppers, the first chairs in assemblies." These indeed the Master rebukes with these words:⁶ "You know that the princes of the gentiles lord it over them, and those who are greater exercise power over them; it shall not be so among you: but whoever will wish to become greater among you, let him be your minister; and whoever will wish to be first among you, shall be your servant; just as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a redemption for many."

³ Matt. 23:6-7.

⁴ Matt. 4:9.

⁵ St. Gregory, Pastoral., p. I, c. 1, P. L., LXXVII, 14.

⁶ Matt. 20:24-28.

(B) Presumption, which undertakes works exceeding one's powers. Thus not a few seek dignities and offices for the exercise of which they are unskilled, with great detriment to themselves and others; others, presuming too much on their own powers, imprudently cast themselves into dangers, and there frequently sin.

516. (C) Vainglory, which is the inordinate appetite of manifesting one's own excellence, and of capturing the esteem and praises of men.¹ For there are many who care more for the esteem of their neighbor than for the very practice of virtues: they wish to please, and therefore display to others, with vain ostentation, true or imagined endowments, of body or soul, natural or supernatural.

¹ Pride therefore is distinguished from vainglory in that the latter seeks fame or the esteem of others, while pride takes complacency in its own excellence. Yet these two are often found united in the same man: nevertheless in some pride prevails, in others vanity. Cf. Thomas, L'Education des sentiments, Paris, Alcan, 1904, ch. 14.

There are those who glory in the nobility of their stock or in the favor of great men; others because they are splendidly dressed, or sit upon a noble horse; but who does not see how great this folly is: for if there is any glory in this matter, it is to be attributed to ancestors, great men, the tailor, or the horse. "Others," says St. Francis de Sales,² "for one ounce of knowledge wish to be honored and cultivated by all, as though all ought to consult them as an oracle, always learn from them, and have them as masters: hence not undeservedly they are called pedagogues. Others boast of themselves and set themselves forth for sale, while they consider their beauty, and think that on account of it they are cultivated and loved by all. All these things are very vain, foolish, impertinent; and the glory which is borrowed from such empty things is called vain, foolish, and frivolous." But those who wish to be praised for good works Christ thus reproves:³ "Take heed that you do not do your justice before men, that you may be seen by them; otherwise you shall not have a reward with your Father, who is in heaven."

² Introd. a la Vie devote, III p., c. 4; cf. c. 5-7.

³ Matt. 6:1; cf. 2-9.

Among the daughters of vainglory, of which seven are enumerated,⁴ three are eminent: (a) boasting, by which one's own excellence is manifested inordinately by words; (b) ostentation, by which the esteem of men is sought through deeds or other external signs; (c) hypocrisy, which seeks glory through simulated virtues or endowments.

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 132, a. 5.

517. 3. The malice of pride. This malice can be considered in itself and in its consequences. (A) Concerning the gravity of this sin considered in itself. (a) When pride is complete, namely when someone so seeks to excel others that he wishes to be subject neither to God nor to legitimate superiors, it is a mortal sin from its kind, and indeed most grave: for then he turns himself away from God, not on account of ignorance or infirmity, or on account of the desire of any other good whatever, but because he does not wish to be subjected to God and his supreme dominion.¹ - Yet this kind of pride occurs very rarely.

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, a. 5-6.

(b) Incomplete pride, by which someone, while preserving due subjection to God and superiors, makes more of himself and wishes to be esteemed more by others than is fitting, does not exceed venial sin, because it does not import a grave disorder. But by accident it can become a grave sin, if it inflicts grave injury upon one's neighbor, or induces to other grave sins, for example, if from wounded pride there is stirred up grave anger, or an appetite for vengeance.

518. (B) Concerning the depraved consequences of pride. (a) The Fathers note that pride was the beginning of every sin, that through it the angels were cast from heaven, and men expelled from paradise; they add that there is no evil which can be compared with pride, on account of the depraved effects which it produces: "It makes a man an insulting demon, blasphemous, perjured, it causes murders to be desired. The proud man always lives in griefs and troubles, is always angry, is always sad."² For indeed, with Gregory as witness, it is the root of all vices:³ "Other vices attack only those virtues by which they themselves are destroyed... but pride, which we have called the root of vices, by no means content with the extinction of one virtue, rises up against all the members of the soul, and, like a general and pestiferous disease, corrupts the whole body, so that whatever is done while it invades, even if it is shown to be a virtue, does not thereby serve God, but only vainglory."

² St. Chrysostom, in ep. II ad Thessal., cap. I, homil. I, n. 2, P. G. 471.

³ St. Gregory, Moral., lib. XXXIV, c. 33, n. 48, P. L., LXXVI, 744.

(b) They observe moreover that pride is the greatest evil from the fact that, with Scripture as witness, God resists the proud:⁴ "Scripture says: God resists the proud, but gives grace to the humble. See, brother, what kind of evil that is which has God as its adversary. On account of this in the Gospel both the arrogant Pharisee is rejected, and the humble publican is heard." In reality God, who has bestowed his goods on us so profusely, does not wish to give his glory to another,⁵ and therefore resists the proud who keep for themselves the glory which belongs to God alone; he afflicts them with privation of grace and other penalties: "The day of the Lord is upon everyone proud and high, and upon everyone arrogant: and he shall be humbled."⁶

⁴ St. Jerome, ep. 12 ad Anton., n. 26, P. L., XXII, 346.

⁵ Isa. 42:8.

⁶ Isa. 2:12.

519. 4. Remedies against pride. Since among men, even simple and rustic men, there are many who indulge pride,¹ it is useful to say a few things about the means of tearing it out. (A) For restraining the movements of pride, intimate and sincere knowledge of oneself is certainly of much profit; for he who recalls past sins, and attentively considers his own infirmities or moral defects, and at the same time recognizes that the endowments with which he shines forth are from God,² cannot reasonably lift himself above others. This is indeed the more efficacious the more benignly we at the same time consider the virtues and endowments of others, covering their vices with the veil of charity. For since we are prone to amplifying our own virtues and disguising our vices, it is necessary that, prejudices of this kind being set aside, we attend to those things which others rightly do or say: then we will often discover others to be better than ourselves.

¹ Bossuet, Tr. de la Concup., ch. 16-18.

² "Yet let it be far from a Christian man to trust or glory in himself, and not in the Lord; whose goodness toward all men is so great, that he wishes those things to be their merits which are his own gifts." (Trent, sess. VI, c. 16.)

520. (B) The vanity of those things in which we are accustomed to glory is likewise to be carefully considered. On this matter Chrysostom should be heard:³ "Are you strong and proud? For this you ought rather to have been cast down... For even the lion is more courageous than you, and the boar stronger... and robbers and diggers of graves and gladiators and your servants, perhaps also those who are among them the duller, surpass you in strength and powers... But are you beautiful and fair? This is the boasting of crows; you are not more beautiful than the peacock... But do you abound in riches? Whence? In what things do you abound? In gold, silver, precious little stones? This also is the boasting of robbers." And thus he runs through the various goods in which men boast, and shows how foolish it is to glory in them. Moreover, man is mortal; and in the sepulcher who discerns the servant from the master, the poor man from the rich, the conquered from the king, the beautiful from the deformed?

³ St. Chrysostom, in ep. ad Philip., c. 2, hom. 7, n. 5, P. G., LXII, 235.

Therefore those who are desirous of human glory should lift the mind higher, and seek eternal glory. Those who seek their own excellence should pursue it not in perishable endowments, but in virtue, which is perennial and truly excels, according to what the Apostle wisely wrote:⁴ "But he who glories, let him glory in the Lord... Gladly therefore I will glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may dwell in me."

⁴ 2 Cor. 10:17; 12:9.

521. (C) But above all it is helpful to contemplate the humility of Christ, who, "though he was in the form of God, did not think equality with God a thing to be grasped; but he emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man; he humbled himself, made obedient unto death, even the death of the cross."¹ And indeed, when he was an infant, he lay in a manger; he was in the house of a carpenter and of a poor mother, subject to both.² At the beginning of his public life, he receives from John the baptism of penance, is tempted by the devil, does not resist those rising up against him, nor did he exercise against his enemies the divine power with which he was endowed. In the Passion, he gave himself over to unjust aggressors as though they were more powerful than he, stood before priests unjustly accusing him, was led to the governor, and, although he could have refuted the false witnesses, he bore the calumnies in silence; he was spat upon by servants, scourged, ignominiously crowned with a crown of thorns, and unjustly handed over to a most disgraceful death. Deservedly therefore he draws us to humility: "Learn from me, because I am meek and humble of heart";³ deservedly St. Jerome adds:⁴ "Have nothing more excellent than humility, and nothing more lovable. For this is the chief preserver, and as it were a certain guardian, of all virtues; nor is there anything which makes us so pleasing both to men and to God, as if, great in the merit of life, we are lowest in humility."

¹ Phil. 2:6-8. The Apostle uses this argument to urge the necessity of humility: "With fear and trembling work out your salvation." (2:12.)

² Concerning this Bossuet exclaims, Elevat. sur les Mysteres, 20e Sem., 8: "O God, I am seized once again. Pride, come and burst at this spectacle: Jesus, son of a carpenter, himself a carpenter, known by this occupation, without there being mention of any other employment, or of any other action!" - Cf. 24e Sem., 1, where he treats of the humility of John the Baptist.

³ Matt. 11:29. - Concerning humility we will speak below, n. 1079.

⁴ St. Jerome, ep. ad Celant., 148, n. 20, P. L., XXII, 1213.

I. PRIDE. —Pride (superbia, cenodoxia) is inordinate self-esteem or love of one's own preeminence, coupled with a desire of inducing others to accept the exaggerated opinion one has formed of oneself. This vice manifests itself in as many different ways as there are objects which man is able to claim as real or supposed excellences or prerogatives.³

³ Cfr. Luke XVIII, 9-14. —St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 93, n. 15: "Who is proud? He who does not do penance by confession of sins, so that he may be healed through humility. Who is proud? He who wishes to claim for himself even those few good things which he appears to possess and detracts from the mercy of God. Who is proud? He who, even if he attributes to God the good things he does, nevertheless insults those who do not do them and exalts himself above them." (Migne, P. L., XXXVII, 1203). —Cfr. S. Haidacher, Des hi. Johannes Chrysostomus Biichlein iiber die Hoffart, pp. 34 sqq.

Pride may take the form of vanity, presumption, ambition, or arrogance.

I. VANITY. —Vanity is pride inspired by an overweening conceit in one's personal appearance, attainments or characteristics, especially when coupled with an excessive desire for notice or approval. This vice makes a man foolish in the eyes of his fellowmen, injures the moral character, favors sensuality and extravagance, and often entails poverty and want. Intentional neglect of one's personal appearance or of the rules of taste and good breeding may also be put down as a kind of vanity.

2. PRESUMPTION. —Presumption is an exaggerated notion of one's intellectual or moral excellence, talents, virtues, etc., attended by the wish to undertake things that are above one's capacity. Intellectual presumption renders a man ridiculous, while moral presumption is destructive of religion and morality and often entails hypocrisy.⁴ 3. AMBITION. —Inordinate ambition (prava ambitio) is an unreasonable striving after dignities, honors, or power. Ambition is commonly only a venial sin, but becomes mortal when it employs grievously sinful means and disregards the distinction between true and false honor.⁵

⁴ Cfr. Matth. VI, 1-6; VII, 1-5; Luke XVIII, 10-14; 1 Tim. VI, 4. —St. Jerome, Epist., 148 (a/. 14), n. 20: "It is one thing to possess virtue, another to possess the likeness of virtue; one thing to follow the shadow of things, another the truth. Far more hideous is that pride which lies hidden under certain signs of humility. For I do not know how it is that vices concealed under the appearance of virtues are more shameful." (Migne, P. L., XXII, 1214).

⁵ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theof., 2a 2ae, qu. 131 sq.

There is a just ambition which moves a man to desire dignities and honors with moderation for the purpose of being able to accomplish more for the glory of God and the welfare of his fellowmen. "If a man desire the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work/' says St. Paul.⁶

⁶ 1 Tim. III, 1. —Cfr. C. Gennari, Consultazioni Morali-Canoniche, Vol. I, 2nd ed., Rome 1902, p. 638. — Homer, Iliad, VI, 208. —It is not honors and titles as such that are forbidden, but the inordinate desire for them.

4. ARROGANCE (superbia completa sive perfecta) is that haughtiness and proud contempt of others which leads a man to despise and transgress human and divine laws. This vice frequently accompanies wealth, high social position, noble birth, etc., and sometimes develops into tyranny, nay rebellion against God and self-deification.⁷

⁷ Cfr. Gen. III, 5; Is. XIV, 14; Judges VII, 2; IX, 38; 1 Mace. VII, 34; 2 Mace. V, 21; Matth. IV, 9. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 162; Ovid, Metamorphoses, VI, 193, sqq.; Horace, Satyrae, I, 6, 5, 10, 64; IDEM, Epod., IV, 5 sq.

Arrogance often leads to boastfulness, which is the habit of bragging inordinately about one's own good qualities or talents, nay, even defects or sins, and to hypocrisy, i. e., feigning virtues that one does not possess.

Pride "is so serious an evil because it strikes at the root of the primary obligations of reverent obedience towards our Lord God and love of our neighbor, because it is opposed to the truth, and because of its universality; it is in the heart of every man and quickly grows to fearful dimensions unless corrected or subdued." ⁸ That there is a legitimate pride appears from I Cor. XV, 10: "By the grace of God I am what I am, and the grace he gave me hath not been fruitless; nay, I have labored more than all of them, yet not I, but the grace of God with me.” Still the Apostle warns against "being more wise than it behooveth," ¹⁰ and "being wise in your own conceits."¹¹ n Opposed to pride is the virtue of humility, which keeps a man in his proper place both with respect to God and his fellowmen. Humility is highly recommended by our Divine Lord as the fundamental virtue of the Christian life, and He has set Himself up as a model thereof. Matth. XI, 29: "Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart."¹²

⁸ Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, p. 155. "By the grace of God I am what I am, and His grace toward me was not fruitless; rather, I labored more than all of them—yet not I, but the grace of God with me."

¹⁰ Rom. XII, 3, 16.

¹¹ 1 Tim. VI, 17. —Cfr. Homer, Iliad, I, 244; Odyssey, IX, 20; Horace, Carmina, IV, 2, 40: "Sapere av.de," i. e., boldly strive for wisdom.

¹² Cfr. Ecclus. X, 15; Matth. V, 3; XVIII, 3; Luke XIV, 1; John V, 14; James IV, 6. —St. Bernard, Tract. de Gradibus Humilit. et Superbiae, IV, n. 14 sqq.: "The great and thick beam in the eye (Matt. VII, 5) is pride in the mind, which by a certain vain bulk of self—unhealthy, swollen, and not solid—darkens the eye of the mind and overshadows the truth, so that, if it occupies your mind, you can no longer see yourself or perceive yourself as you are or as you are able to be; rather, as you love yourself, so you think yourself to be or hope that you will be. For what else is pride but love of one’s own excellence? Therefore, one who takes care to know the truth fully in himself must remove the beam of pride that shuts the eye away from the light, arrange ascents in his heart by which he may seek himself within himself, and thus attain the first degree of truth." (Migne, P. L., CLXXXII, 949).

— Notion. 1. An inordinate appetite of one's own excellence, which is the generic definition of pride, can be of one repudiating subjection, and this is pride of perfect reason, mortal from its kind, and the beginning of every sin; or it is of him who does not refuse to be subject, but with too great affection wills to excel, is too complacent in his own merit, true or supposed; it is an inordinate mode of pursuing one's own excellence. This is imperfect pride, venial, and a special capital vice.

2. It is a capital vice insofar as it begets presumption, ambition, vainglory.

Presumption is, in this place - for another presumption is opposed to hope - the appetite of undertaking something beyond one's powers. Venial from its kind, it becomes mortal if it turns out gravely harmful.

Ambition is an inordinate appetite of dignity and honor. It is venial, but becomes mortal by reason of the matter, of the means employed, or of harm effected.

Vainglory inordinately desires and seeks the manifestation of one's own excellence.

Vainglory of this sort is sought from an evil, false, fictitious thing, or one disproportionate to the intention; or among those who do not judge well concerning the thing; or without a due end. Venial of itself, it becomes mortal accidentally, as if it leads to boasting concerning a mortally evil thing. Cf. Sanchez, Decal. l. 1, c. 3, n. 4 ff.

3. Opposite vice. Those excesses are opposed to magnanimity, from which, also, by defect, one recedes through pusillanimity. By this someone, too distrustful of himself, declines honors, glory, or an office of which he is worthy. The fault is venial; it becomes mortal if you decline to assume or carry out what you were bound to furnish under mortal obligation.

— Opposite virtue. Magnanimity raises the soul to doing great things, or things worthy of great honor, yet proportioned to oneself.

409. Notion. Pride is the disordered appetite of one's own excellence. Thus St. Thomas.⁹ Pride is the appetite of perverse loftiness. Thus St. Augustine.¹⁰

It is called 1. a disordered appetite, because, although pride, like any human act, supposes an act of the intellect, namely an erroneous consideration of the defects of others and of one's own merits, nevertheless formally it resides in appetite, whether rational or sensitive irascible.¹¹ For the proper object of pride is something arduous, namely one's own excellence, which is sought inordinately, that is, against right reason.

This disorder can occur chiefly in four ways: a) if someone thinks that he has from himself what in reality he has from God. St. Paul rebukes such a proud man, saying: "For what hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it?"¹² b) If someone indeed admits that all goods come from God, but that he has obtained them from his own merits. Against such a proud man it is said: "By grace you are saved through faith; and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God; not of works, that no man may glory."¹³ c) If someone boasts that he has what either he altogether does not have or does not have in so great a degree. This manner is most frequent; for proud men are wont to esteem their endowments more highly than they really are; and therefore they are blamed: "Thou sayest that I am rich and made wealthy and need nothing; and thou knowest not that thou art miserable and wretched, and poor and blind and naked."¹⁴ d) If someone contemns others, but wishes himself to appear singularly, as did the Pharisee giving thanks to God that he was not a sinner like other men and especially like the publican.¹⁵ Christ refutes such proud men: "Every one that exalteth himself shall be humbled."¹⁶

It is called 2. of one's own excellence, because the object of pride is the excellence of one's own, not another's, person. "For just as humility intends the depression of the person, so pride, which is opposed to it, seeks the exaltation of the person; and by this it is distinguished from ambition, presumption, and vain glory. For the object of ambition is excellence in honors and dignities; of presumption, excellence in works; of vain glory, excellence in reputation and glory. These, however, draw their origin from pride and serve it; for because the proud man inordinately seeks his own excellence, therefore it happens that he intends great honors and great dignities, that he undertakes presumptuous works, and that he seeks great reputation and great glory, so that from these he may excel and become great." Thus Billuart¹⁷ after St. Thomas,¹⁸ who skillfully observes that pride, as it is a special vice, is opposed both to the virtues of humility and magnanimity, but in different ways: "to humility indeed, according as it rejects subjection; but to magnanimity, according as it inordinately extends itself to great things."¹⁹ More directly, however, pride is opposed to humility.

⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 162, a. 2 (Hoffart, Uberhebung).

¹⁰ De civ. Dei l. 14, c. 13.

¹¹ S. theol. l. c. a. 3.

¹² 1 Cor. 4, 7.

¹³ Eph. 2, 8 sq.

¹⁴ Apoc. 3, 17.

¹⁵ Cf. Luc. 18, 10 sqq.

¹⁶ Luc. 18, 14. Cf. concerning those four manners or species of pride brought forward by St. Gregory, St. Thomas, l. c. a. 4.

¹⁷ De temperantia diss. 7, a. 4, § 2.

¹⁸ S. theol. l. c. a. 4.

¹⁹ L. c. a. 1 ad 3.

410. Malice. a) Complete pride is a mortal sin from its whole genus; b) incomplete pride is indeed a venial sin from its genus, but c) it is a most dangerous vice.

a) Complete pride is that which so extols itself that it refuses to subject itself to God and his law, as though that subjection were injurious to its own excellence. Such pride is truly diabolical and proper to the angel Lucifer; but it is rarely found among men. That it is a mortal sin from its whole genus is clear of itself; for it is manifest rebellion against God. Indeed such pride is the gravest sin at least on the part of aversion from God, "because in other sins man is turned away from God either on account of ignorance, or on account of weakness, or on account of the desire of any other good whatever; but pride has aversion from God from this very fact, that it does not wish to be subject to God and his rule.... On account of this also it is especially said that God resisteth the proud.²⁰ And therefore to be turned away from God and his precepts, which is as it were consequent in other sins, belongs of itself to pride, whose act is contempt of God. And because that which is of itself is always more powerful than that which is through another, it follows that pride is the gravest sin according to its genus." Thus St. Thomas,²¹ who nevertheless elsewhere²² teaches that hatred of God is a still graver sin. But the reason is that hatred of God has aversion from God for its very object, while on the contrary the object of pride is one's own excellence inordinately sought, from which aversion from God follows.

b) Incomplete pride is that by which someone, while preserving due subjection to God and to superiors, extols himself too much, makes too much of himself, and wishes to be esteemed by others more than is fitting. Such pride of itself is only a venial sin, because its disorder does not seem to be so great that it induces aversion from God; for it is the disordered appetite of a thing indifferent in itself. Accidentally, however, even incomplete pride is a grave sin, namely if from it a grave injury is inflicted on one's neighbor, or if from it other grave sins arise.

c) Pride is a most dangerous vice, both a) because it lies in wait even for good works, that they may perish; b) because we have within ourselves the source and root of that sin, and nothing lives in us earlier and dies later than pride; c) because, if by chance pride dominates in a man, it is for the most part a sign of reprobation. For a proud man detects this vice in himself with difficulty, and consequently does not even strive vigorously to overcome it.

Nearly all the holy Fathers speak of the malice and danger of pride. Just as St. Benedict enumerates twelve degrees of humility,²³ so twelve degrees of pride are enumerated by St. Bernard, namely curiosity, levity of mind, foolish gladness, boasting, singularity, arrogance, presumption, defense of sins, simulated confession, rebellion, liberty of sinning, custom of sinning. It would be long to explain here more broadly each of those degrees, but I do not know another who describes pride, as it is found in a religious man, so graphically and perfectly as St. Bernard.²⁴ Let as an example be what the Mellifluous Doctor says concerning the sixth degree, arrogance: "He praises what he does, and he does not attend to what he intends; ... and he who in every other matter trusts himself more than others, concerning himself alone trusts others more than himself; ... and whatever he has recognized as praised in himself, he arrogantly ascribes not to the ignorance or benevolence of the praiser but to his own merits." Alardus Gazaeus, writing a commentary on the work of John Cassian "on the institutes of monasteries," delineated two ladders having twelve degrees. The first ladder is of humility, through which by the twelve degrees of humility enumerated by St. Benedict one ascends to heaven. The other ladder is of pride, through which by twelve degrees of pride one descends into the abyss of gehenna.²⁵

²⁰ Jac. 4, 6.

²¹ L. c. a. 6.

²² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 34, a. 2.

²³ For their explanation, see St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 161, a. 6.

²⁴ Tract. de gradibus humilitatis et superbiae c. 15 (Migne, Patr. lat. 182, 965).

²⁵ See those two figures reproduced in Migne, Patr. lat. 49, 1329 sqq.

411. Daughters of pride. Pride in the broader sense, insofar as it is excessive love of oneself, is the mother and queen of all the vices, as has already been said. But if it is taken in the strict sense explained above, then first of all the following vices spring up from it: presumption, ambition, vain glory.

412. Presumption is taken in different senses, both in canon law and in Moral Theology. As a twofold sin it is taken in Moral Theology: "one, which leans upon one's own virtue, attempting, namely, something as possible to oneself which exceeds one's own virtue; ... but the other is presumption which leans inordinately upon divine mercy or power, through which someone hopes to obtain glory without merits or pardon without penance; and such presumption seems to arise directly from pride, as though he should esteem himself so much that even when he is sinning God would not punish him or exclude him from glory."²⁶

Presumption taken in the first sense is indeed directly opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, but it is also in some way reduced to vain glory and pride. For the Angelic Doctor says:²⁷ "No one attempts something above his capacity except insofar as he estimates his capacity to be greater than it is. Concerning this there can be error in two ways: in one way according to quantity alone, for example when someone estimates that he has greater virtue, or knowledge, or something else of this kind, than he has; in another way according to the genus of the thing, for example when someone from this estimates himself great and worthy of great things, from which he is not, for example on account of riches, or on account of some goods of fortune. For as the Philosopher says: 'Those who have such goods without virtue neither justly make themselves worthy of great things nor are they rightly called magnanimous.' - Similarly also that to which someone tends above his powers sometimes indeed is great simply according to the truth of the thing, as is clear concerning Peter, who was tending to this, that he might suffer for Christ, which was above his virtue; but sometimes it is not something great simply, but only according to the opinion of fools, as to be clothed in costly garments,²⁸ to despise and insult others."²⁹

This presumption, which is placed by St. Bernard³⁰ as the seventh degree of pride, is beautifully described thus: "For he who thinks he surpasses others, how does he not presume more concerning himself than concerning others? He sits first in meetings; in councils he answers first; not called, he approaches; not sent, he thrusts himself in; he reorders things ordered, remakes things made. Whatever he himself has not done or ordered, he judges neither rightly done nor beautifully ordered. He judges those judging, he prejudges those about to judge.... But if some middling obedience [function or office] is enjoined upon him, he is indignant, he scorns it, judging that he is not to be occupied with lesser things, who feels himself fit for greater." - This presumption of itself does not include so great a disorder, and consequently from its genus is only a venial sin; but accidentally, by reason of grave danger and damage to be caused, it easily becomes a grave sin. Thus, for example, a confessor, physician, etc., presuming to perform his office without sufficient knowledge and skill, easily sins gravely on account of the damages arising therefrom.

Concerning presumption in the second sense, insofar, namely, as it is opposed to the virtue of hope, there will be discussion below in n. 549.

²⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 21, a. 4.

²⁷ Ib. q. 130, a. 2 ad 3.

²⁸ Gigerlium.

²⁹ Lumpenstolz, Geckenstolz.

³⁰ Tract. de grad. humil. et superb. c. 16.

413. Ambition is the disordered appetite of honor.³¹ Honor, however, is reverence shown to someone in testimony of his excellence. The excellence of man is especially considered according to virtue. Other things which are below virtue are honored insofar as they assist toward works of virtue, such as nobility, power, riches, etc.³² Honor is also owed to superiors insofar as they are God's vicegerents. But honor is sought inordinately in three ways: 1. if someone seeks honor concerning an excellence which he does not have, as if he wishes to be honored as learned when he is ignorant; 2. if someone desires honor for himself without referring it to God; 3. if someone does not refer received honor to the utility of his neighbor. For that in which a man excels is given to him by God, so that therefrom he may profit others.³³ Ambition indeed arises from pride, but it is directly opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, which according to right reason induces man to seek honor. - Just as presumption, so also ambition of itself is a venial sin; but accidentally, by reason of evil effects, it can become a mortal sin.

³¹ Eitle Ehrsucht, vain desire of honor.

³² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 145, a. 1.

³³ Ib. q. 131, a. 1.

414. Vain glory³⁴ is here taken for the appetite of vain glory. Glory is clear knowledge with praise concerning the good of someone, or frequent report concerning someone with praise.³⁵ Strictly speaking, glory is distinguished both from reputation and from honor. Reputation is the opinion and speech of many concerning the life and morals of someone, and consequently, if it is good, consists in the good opinion which many have concerning some man. Honor is testimony concerning the excellence of someone, or reverence shown to someone on account of his excellence. Finally, glory is the effect and end of honor. For from this, that someone is often and by many honored, glory is born to him. - The appetite of vain glory is directly opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, inasmuch as this virtue rightly seeks true and not empty glory; but it is produced by pride, which thinks to increase its own excellence from vain glory. Glory is called vain if someone seeks glory from a thing which either does not exist or which merits no glory, or at least not so much glory.³⁶ - Vain glory according to itself is only a venial sin, because it does not include so great a disorder, nor is it contrary to charity;³⁷ nevertheless it becomes mortal in two ways: 1. by reason of the matter concerning which someone glories, for example if someone seeks vain glory from fornication committed, from a duel, etc.; 2. by reason of the circumstances and especially the end of the agent, as if someone for the sake of vain glory is prepared to transgress a precept obliging under grave sin.

Since there is some difference between pride and the appetite of vain glory, certain authors, such as John Cassian, Evagrius Ponticus, and John Damascene, enumerate eight capital vices, as was already said above in n. 407. But the difference between pride and the appetite of vain glory is this: pride is the disordered appetite of one's own excellence; vain glory is the disordered appetite of the manifestation of this excellence.³⁸ By St. Gregory and with him by St. Thomas,³⁹ who number not pride but only vain glory among the capital vices, there are assigned the daughters of vain glory, that is, seven vices which of themselves arise from vain glory and moreover serve it.⁴⁰

1. Boasting, which is the disordered manifestation of one's own excellence, principally through words.⁴¹

2. Presumption of novelties, or singularity, by which someone tries to do something singular, for example in religious exercises, or conducts himself singularly, so that he may be esteemed above the rest.⁴²

3. Hypocrisy, which is the disordered manifestation of one's own excellence through simulated virtues.⁴³

4. Pertinacity, by which someone trusts too much in his own judgment.⁴⁴

5. Discord, which is disordered dissent with others.⁴⁵

6. Contention, which is clamorous litigation with others.⁴⁶

7. Disobedience, namely when someone often refuses to carry out the command of a superior.⁴⁷

³⁴ Eitle Ruhmsucht, vain desire of fame. John Cassian treats very well of vain glory, which he calls cenodoxia (κενοδοξία), De coenob. instit. l. 11 (Migne, Patr. lat. 49, 397 sqq.). Likewise very good are the commentaries which Alardus Gazaeus, O.S.B., writes concerning this work (ib. in Migne l. c.).

³⁵ Cf. Cicero, De invent. rhetor. 2, 55.

³⁶ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 132, a. 1.

³⁷ Cf. ib. a. 3.

³⁸ Cf. ib. q. 162, a. 8 ad 2.

³⁹ Cf. ib. a. 5.

⁴⁰ Cf. De malo q. 9, a. 3.

⁴¹ Prahlerei, prahlerische Aufschneiderei, hablerie, cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 112, a. 1 ad 2.

⁴² Hascherei nach eigentumlichem Benehmen, chasing after peculiar behavior.

⁴³ Scheinheiligkeit, false sanctity.

⁴⁴ Rechthaberei, self-opinionatedness, ergoterie, cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 138, a. 2 ad 1.

⁴⁵ Zwietracht, discord, cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 37, a. 2.

⁴⁶ Streitsucht, quarrelsomeness, cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 38, a. 2.

⁴⁷ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 105, a. 1 ad 2.

415. Remedies against pride are: 1. The intimate and sincere knowledge of oneself. For if someone recalls all the sins of his past life, considers his manifold defects, and is inwardly persuaded that all the endowments by which he is strong have been conferred on him by God, it is impossible for him still to be proud concerning anything. - 2. Contemplation of the humility of Christ, who "humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the cross,"⁴⁸ and who invited all: "Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart."⁴⁹ - 3. The continual exercise of humility. For opposites exclude one another. But humility is opposed to pride. Concerning humility there will be discussion below in the treatise on the virtue of temperance.

⁴⁸ Phil. 2, 8.

⁴⁹ Matth. 11, 29.

715. Opposed vices. Opposed to humility by excess is inordinate self-abjection, which is the inordinate renunciation of one's own honor and reputation and is therefore done with neglect of one's duty;¹⁴¹⁰ but by defect, pride, which is the inordinate appetite for one's own excellence. Pride is called an appetite because, although it presupposes an act of the intellect, namely, an excessive estimation of one's own merits, nevertheless it formally consists in the appetite for one's own personal excellence. For pride seeks the exaltation of one's own person, and by this it is distinguished from ambition, presumption, and vainglory. For ambition concerns honors and dignities; presumption seeks excellence in works; and vainglory, finally, seeks excellence in reputation and external glory. St. Gregory¹⁴¹¹ enumerates four species of pride, namely: 1. when someone thinks that he has goods from himself; 2. when someone thinks that he has goods indeed from God, but from his own merits; 3. when someone arrogates to himself goods which he does not possess; 4. when someone, despising others, wills to be preferred to them more than is fitting.

How pride manifests itself outwardly is beautifully explained by St. Thomas.¹⁴¹² Just as the essence of humility consists in due subjection to God, so the essence of pride is situated in the refusal of that subjection. Hence also the malice of pride is manifest, which is the graver, the greater that rebellion against God is. From these things there also shines forth the gravity of the first sin of our first parents and of the devil. Pride, as just explained, is called by St. Thomas and St. Gregory the Great the queen of all vices, because it truly commands all the vices and can induce to all vices. Wherefore it is also easily understood that God must resist the proud and withdraw his grace from them.¹⁴¹³ We treated pride more broadly above in the tract on the capital vices, I, n. 409.

¹⁴¹⁰ Selbstwegwerfung [self-abjection].

¹⁴¹¹ Moral. l. 23, c. 7.

¹⁴¹² S. theol., l.c., q. 162, a. 4, ad 4.

¹⁴¹³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 162, a. 6, ad 3.

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, 130, 131, 132; De Malo q. 8 and 9.

499. Pride is the inordinate appetite of one's own excellence.¹ It is called:

¹ Capital sins, if they are considered singly according to their proper species, pertain to special moral theology; but insofar as they are capital and thus exercise a general influence on other vices, they already pertain to the general part of moral science. Concerning them see the little work De Variis Peccatis in sacramentali confessione medendis, c. III.

1. an appetite, because pride resides in the appetite, namely principally in the will, if it seeks excellence in spiritual things; secondarily in the irascible appetite, which tends toward a sensible, arduous, and excellent good;

2. inordinate: to seek excellence according to itself is not evil, but it is against the order of reason that someone tend above that which he is, as the proud man does: "for right reason has this, that the will of each one be borne toward that which is proportioned to him" (II-II, q. 162, a. 1);

3. of excellence: both relative, by which someone wills to excel others, implicitly at least contemning them; and absolute, by which someone simply wills to excel above that which he is, even without thinking of others;

4. one's own: the special object from which pride receives its species is the loftiness of one's own person; for not in this or that matter, but commonly and in all things, the proud man bears himself as lofty. Therefore pride seeks a certain universal excellence, and by this it is distinguished from presumption, ambition, and vainglory, which inordinately seek some particular excellence, whether in works, or in honors and dignities, or in fame and glory.

500. Pride of itself is contrary to charity and therefore is mortal sin: for the proud man exalts himself above that which he is, that is, above that which has been fixed for him by God; hence implicitly at least contempt of God is included in pride, insofar as man does not will to be subjected to God and his rule. But this is to be turned away from God, which is against charity, by which we are converted to God, and therefore according to itself it is mortal sin. - If that contempt is explicit, formal, and perfect, from an intention of contemning God because one disdains being subjected to God and his law and it seems injurious to one's own excellence, it is always mortal. But if it is only implicit, without an intention of contemning God, it can indeed be mortal, namely, in a grave matter; but often it is venial, not only from indeliberation but also from lightness of matter.

Now, according to Gregory (Moralia, l. 23, c. 4), pride is committed in four ways, diverse in species on the part of the object: 1. by judging that the goods which someone has are had from himself, not from God, or by acting as if he judged that he had them from himself; - 2. by judging that he has received them from God, but on account of his own merits, or by acting as if this were so;² - 3. by attributing to himself goods which he does not have; - 4. in the goods which he has, by willing, others being despised, to be preferred to them more than is fitting. The first two modes, since they include formal contempt of God, are mortal sin; the last two are often only venial, unless they are done with grave irreverence toward God, or render one prepared for sinning mortally, or there is grave contempt of neighbor or notable detriment.

² If the proud man truly believed, by a speculative judgment, that he had all these things from himself or on account of his own merits, he would be a heretic; for the most part he does not specially think this, but practically bears himself as if these gifts were not from God, or not without merit.

501. Daughters of pride. - "Those vices which of themselves are apt to be ordered to the end of some capital vice are called its daughters" (II-II, q. 132, a. 5). All vices indeed are apt to be ordered to the end of pride; yet certain ones, because they seek special excellence, have an object very close to the object of pride, and therefore immediately, proximately, and more frequently than other sins arise from it according to the account of the end, and immediately serve it; whence those alone are called its daughters. But they are three: 1. presumption, which is the inordinate appetite of excellence in works, namely, by undertaking something above one's powers; 2. ambition, which inordinately seeks the excellence of dignity and of honor not due, or greater than is due; 3. vainglory, which inordinately tends into fame and glory, that is, into a vain manifestation of excellence.

Presumption, ambition, and vainglory of themselves are venial sins, because they are not against charity, but are an excessive appetite for a thing good or indifferent according to itself. Per accidens they become mortal (more often vainglory), either because they proceed from a mortally evil cause, for example, from affection for mortal sin; or because they have mortal sin as their effect, as if they are done with notable harm or injury to neighbor, or if someone on account of them is prepared to commit mortal sin; or by reason of matter, as if someone seeks honor or glory from mortal sin (cf. treatise on Fortitude).

502. Vainglory is the inordinate appetite of glory and fame, that is, the appetite of vain glory, or of a vain manifestation and estimation among others concerning one's own excellence, whether true or fictitious. This happens in three ways: a) by seeking glory concerning a thing which is not worthy of glory or of so much glory, as concerning an evil, false, fictitious, fragile thing, concerning riches, trifles, etc.; b) by seeking it from those who are not able to discern what is worthy of glory, for example, from one whose judgment is not certain; c) by seeking and not referring glory to the due end, namely, to the honor of God or the salvation of neighbor or one's own utility.

From vainglory seven vices more commonly arise, and therefore they are called its daughters. For by vainglory the manifestation of one's own excellence is sought, which can happen: a) directly: 1. either by words through boasting, by which someone glories concerning a work committed; or by deeds, 2. through presumption of novelties, by which someone devises novelties which excite the admiration of others; and 3. through hypocrisy, by which someone does good so that he may seem good, although he is not; - b) indirectly someone seeks the manifestation of his own excellence by showing himself not to be less than others, and this happens: 4. as to the intellect, through pertinacity, by which someone adheres too much to his own opinion; 5. as to the will, through discord, by which he does not will to recede from his own will so as to agree with others; 6. as to speech, through contention, by which he quarrels noisily; 7. as to deed, through disobedience, by which he does not will to execute the precept of a superior.

S. Th. II-II, q. 162; I-II, q. 84, a. 2 and 4.

1048. Pride (orgueil; hoovaardigheid) is the inordinate appetite of one's own excellence. It is called:

1. Appetite, because pride resides in the appetite, namely principally in the will, if it seeks excellence in spiritual things, secondarily in the irascible power, which tends to sensible, arduous, and excellent good;

2. Inordinate: to seek excellence according to itself is not evil, but it is against the order of reason that someone tend above that which he is, as the proud man does: "for right reason has this, that the will of each one be borne toward that which is proportioned to him" (a. 1);

3. Of excellence: both relative, by which someone wills to excel others, at least implicitly by contemning them; and absolute, by which someone simply wills to excel above that which he is, even not thinking of others;

4. Of one's own: the special object or proper appetible thing from which pride receives its species is the loftiness of one's own person; for not in this or that matter, but commonly and in all things, the proud man has himself as lofty. Therefore pride seeks a certain universal excellence and by this is distinguished from presumption, ambition, and vainglory, which inordinately seek some particular excellence, whether in honors and dignities.

1049. Pride is a mortal sin. - For pride is contrary to subjection to God and to charity; for the proud man exalts himself above that which has been fixed for him by God, whether contempt of God is included in pride, or the man does not wish to be subjected to his rule.

But pride happens in four ways: 1. by judging that the goods which one has are not had from God, or at least by acting as if he had them from himself; 2. by judging that he has received those things from God but on account of his own merits, or by acting as if it were so; 3. by attributing to himself goods which he does not have; 4. in the goods which he has, by willing, with others contemned, to be preferred to them more than is fitting. The first two modes, since they include formal contempt of God, are mortal sin; the last two often are only venial, because to magnify oneself in affection and to raise oneself more than is just, while one does not refuse to be subjected to God, is not a grave disorder, unless it is done with grave irreverence toward God, or renders one ready to sin mortally, or there is present grave contempt of neighbor or notable detriment.

1050. Gravity of pride. - Pride 1. under a certain respect is the gravest of sins, namely on the part of aversion. For the aversion which in other sins follows conversion to created good pertains per se to pride, which per se refuses to be subjected to God; but not to wish to be subjected to him and to his rule is to be directly turned away from him; hence on the part of aversion it is the gravest of sins: for that which is per se is stronger than that which is through another. Therefore pride exceeds other sins in aversion, which formally completes sin. But on the part of conversion it is not the greatest, because one's own excellence is not an object which has the greatest repugnance to the good of virtue. Finally, simply speaking, it is not the gravest, for sins against the theological virtues have for their object the very aversion from God; but pride has only one's own excellence, by reason of which, since it does not wish to be subject to God, it turns away from him (a. 6).

Hence 2. it is the beginning of every sin: a) indirectly and as it were per accidens, by removing an obstacle, insofar as namely man through pride contemns the divine law, by which he is prohibited from sinning (according to Jer. 2:20): thus it is the cause of sin or the beginning on the part of aversion. For aversion or contempt of God, by which someone does not wish to be subjected to his rule and which per se pertains to pride, is found in all sins implicitly as consequent upon conversion to a good opposed to the law; but from this aversion sin has that it is evil, and therefore there the account of evil begins, and thus it is the beginning of sin; b) per se, insofar as other sins are ordered to the end of pride, which is one's own excellence, to which everything which someone inordinately seeks can be ordered: thus it is the cause of every sin or the beginning on the part of conversion, insofar as all sins can arise from it as from a final cause, insofar as temporal goods which man seeks in other sins can be willed on account of one's own excellence, which is the end of pride.

Hence 3. because it is the final cause of all sins, it is not in the strict sense a capital sin, but rather the cause of all the capitals, and the mother and queen of all vices. Nevertheless there are certain sins which immediately and more frequently arise from it, and immediately serve it, because they seek a certain special excellence and have an object very near to the object of pride; hence they are customarily called its daughters. They are presumption, ambition, and vainglory, concerning which it was said in n. 918.

1051. Remarks. - 1. Pride differs from disobedience: the latter is from disdain for the precept as such, the former from disdain for subjection to God.

2. On the origin and progress of pride, cf. Lehmkuhl, Th. M. I, n. 884.

3. Bernard distinguishes twelve grades of pride which are opposed to the twelve grades of humility. Cf. S. Th., a. 4, ad 4.

I. Pride is the inordinate appetite of one's own excellence. It is called:

1. an appetite, because pride resides in the appetite, namely principally in the will, if it seeks excellence in spiritual things; secondarily in the irascible appetite, which tends toward a sensible good that is arduous and excellent;

2. inordinate: to desire excellence according to itself is not evil, but it is contrary to the order of reason that someone should desire greater excellence than he has, and should tend above that which he is, as the proud man does: "for right reason has this, that the will of each one be borne toward that which is proportioned to himself";¹

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, a. 1.

3. of excellence, both relative, by which someone wishes to surpass others, at least implicitly by contemning them, and absolute, by which someone simply wishes to excel above that which he is, even while not thinking of others;

4. one's own: the special object, or proper appetible thing, from which pride receives its species is the loftiness of one's own person; for not in this or that matter, but commonly and in all things, the proud man bears himself as lofty. Pride therefore desires a certain universal excellence, and by this it is distinguished from presumption, ambition, and vain-glory, which inordinately desire some particular excellence, whether in works, or in honors and dignities, or in fame and glory.

II. The gravity and species of pride. - Pride of itself is contrary to the law of subjection toward God and to charity, and therefore is a mortal sin; for the proud man lifts himself above that which he is, that is, above that which has been fixed for him by God. Whence at least implicitly there is included in pride contempt of God, insofar as man is unwilling to be subject to God and to His rule. But "this very thing, not to be subject to God, has the account of mortal sin; for this is to be turned away from God," which is proper to mortal sin and is contrary to charity, by which we are turned toward God. Whence it follows that pride according to its genus is mortal sin.² This contempt, if it is explicit, formal, and perfect, from the intention of contemning God because one disdains to be subject to God and His law and it seems injurious to one's own excellence, is always mortal. But if it is only implicit, without the intention of contemning God, it can indeed be mortal, namely in a grave matter; but often it is venial, not only from lack of deliberation, but also from lightness of matter.

² St. Thomas, ibid., a. 5.

Now, according to St. Gregory, Morals, book 23, c. 6 (or 4), pride is committed in four ways, diverse in species on the part of the object: 1. by judging that the goods which someone has he has from himself, not from God, or at least by acting as if he had them from himself; 2. by judging that he has received them from God, but on account of his own merits, or by acting as if it were thus; 3. by attributing to himself goods which he does not have; 4. in the goods which he has, by wishing, with the rest despised, to be preferred by them more than is fitting. The first two modes, since they include formal contempt of God, are mortal sin; the last two often are only venial, because to magnify oneself in affection and to raise oneself above what is just, while one does not refuse to be subject to God, is not a grave disorder, unless it be done with grave irreverence toward God, or renders one prepared to sin mortally, or there is present grave contempt of one's neighbor or notable detriment.

III. The general influence of pride upon other sins. - It is said in Sirach 10:15: The beginning of every sin is pride.

These words are to be understood of pride properly so called, as it is a special sin.³ It can truly be called the beginning of every sin, not only in the historical order, because the angels and the first man were guilty of that thing, but also from the nature of the thing; and not only:

³ Certain persons have interpreted this of pride improperly so called, and indeed a) of aversion or actual contempt of God, by which someone does not wish to be subject to His rule, which is found implicitly in all sins because they tend toward some created good opposed to the law of God. This is the general condition of every sin and the cause of sin or beginning on the part of aversion; for from this sin has that it is evil, and therefore on the part of aversion the account of evil begins. Also b) of the inclination of fallen nature toward contempt of this kind, from which all sins come. These things are true, but they do not hand down the sense of Scripture, which manifestly from the context speaks of pride properly so called, which is a special sin, namely the appetite of one's own excellence. I-II, q. 84, a. 2.

1. indirectly and per accidens, by removing what prohibits, insofar as, namely, through pride man contemns the divine law by which he is prohibited from sinning; but also:

2. directly and per se, insofar as other sins are ordered to the end of pride, which is one's own excellence, to which everything that someone inordinately desires can be ordered. Whence all sins can arise from it as from a final cause. For the temporal goods which man seeks in other sins he can will so that through them he may have a certain singular perfection and his own excellence, which is the end of pride. Pride is therefore the final cause of all sins, not indeed in this sense, that any sin whatsoever singularly arises from it, but insofar as any genus of sin is naturally apt to be ordered to the end of pride and thus to arise from it.

And since the end is first in the order of intention, and intention precedes execution, pride is rightly called the beginning of all sins.⁴

⁴ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 2; Quaestiones disputatae de Malo, 8, a. 2.

And because it is the final cause of all sins, in the strict sense it is not a capital sin from which only several genera of sins arise according to the account of an end, but rather the cause of all the capital sins and the queen of all vices. Nevertheless there are certain sins which immediately and more frequently arise from it according to the account of an end and immediately serve it, because they seek a certain special excellence and have an object very close to the object of pride; and therefore those alone are customarily called its daughters. For "those vices which of themselves are naturally apt to be ordered to the end of some capital vice are called its daughters."⁵

⁵ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 132, a. 5.

IV. Pride has three daughters: presumption, ambition, and vain-glory. - Those are daughters of pride which inordinately seek a certain special excellence; but this can be sought either in works, or in dignity and honor, or in fame and glory. Whence there are three daughters of pride: 1. presumption, which is the inordinate appetite of excellence in works, namely of undertaking something above one's powers; 2. ambition, which inordinately desires the excellence of dignity and honor not owed, or greater than is owed; 3. vain-glory, which inordinately tends toward fame and glory, that is, toward a vain manifestation of excellence.

Of themselves they are venial sins, because they are not against charity, but are an excessive appetite for a thing good or indifferent according to itself; and they are not mortal except per accidens, whether by reason of the cause, as if they proceed from an affection toward mortal sin, or by reason of the effect, if they are done with grave harm to oneself or to another.

On account of its importance, something must be said specially concerning vain-glory.

V. Vain-glory is the inordinate appetite of glory and fame, that is, the appetite of vain glory, or of a vain manifestation, and of a good estimation by others concerning one's own excellence, whether true or fictitious. It is called:

1. an appetite: the word glory is taken here not for the object of the evil act, that is, for the glory itself which is sought, but for the sin which is a movement and tendency toward vain glory, an excessive desire for esteem and praise;

2. of glory and fame: glory signifies a certain clarity; but clarity and comeliness have a certain manifestation, because what is clear can be seen by many and from afar, and therefore the name glory properly imports the manifestation of someone concerning that which seems comely among men.⁶ Hence it is customarily defined: clear knowledge with praise, or fame, that is, distinguished knowledge and the good estimation of others concerning one's own excellence; if this is expressed in words, it is properly praise; but praise conveys that knowledge to others, and this is fame. This glory and fame is the special object of this sin, by which it is distinguished from all others, especially a) from pride, which desires every and universal excellence; and b) from ambition, which inordinately seeks honor and reverence. Glory is the effect and end of honor, since through it someone is rendered clear in the knowledge of others; for from the fact that testimonies of honor are exhibited to someone, his excellence becomes clear among men;

⁶ "Nevertheless, if the name of glory is taken more broadly, it consists not only in the knowledge of a multitude, but also of a few or of one, or of oneself alone, when namely someone considers his own good as worthy of praise." St. Thomas, II-II, q. 132, a. 1.

3. inordinate: to desire glory according to itself is not something evil but indifferent. For it is not a sin that someone know and approve his own good, while he considers it as worthy of praise, nor that he wish a good work to be approved, for it is said, Matt. 5:16: Let your light shine before men. But it is a sin that he seek vain glory.⁷

⁷ St. Thomas, ibid., and Quaestiones disputatae de Malo, 9, a. 1.

Now it is vain in three ways: a) when it is sought concerning a thing which is not worthy of glory, or not worthy of so much glory, as concerning an evil, false, fictitious, fragile thing, concerning wealth, trifles, etc.; b) when it is sought from those who are unable to discern what is worthy of glory, for example from him whose judgment is not certain; c) when it is sought and is not referred to its due end, that is, to the honor of God or the utility of one's neighbor. For glory of itself is an indifferent thing, and consequently to rest in it as in an end and to seek it for its own sake is illicit; for to desire an indifferent thing is not good unless it be done for a good end extrinsic to the thing, as to desire glory insofar as it is useful for something; otherwise it would be an idle and vain act, and consequently sinful.⁸ Hence St. Thomas:

⁸ Ibid.

"It belongs to the perfection of man that he know himself; but that he be known by others does not belong to his perfection, and therefore it is not to be desired per se. Nevertheless it can be desired insofar as it is useful for something, either for this, that God be glorified by men, or for this, that men profit from the good which they know in another, or from this, that the man himself, from the goods which he knows in himself through the testimony of another's praise, strive to persevere in them and to advance to better things. And according to this it is praiseworthy that someone have care for a good name and provide good things before God and men; not, however, that he be vainly delighted in the praise of men."⁹

⁹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 132, a. 1 ad 3.

VI. Vain-glory is of itself a venial sin, but per accidens can be mortal. - Of itself it does not import something against charity or the love of God or of neighbor, but is only a disorder of the appetite for a thing indifferent according to itself. Per accidens, however, that is, by reason of another thing or an adjunct, it becomes mortal:

1. On the part of the one glorying himself:

a) by reason of the effect, for example if someone is prepared to sin mortally in order to acquire glory, or establishes his last end in glory, or grave damage to the neighbor follows from it, as if on account of it a physician refuses to have a colleague, with grave danger to the health of the sick person, or a teacher refuses to retract a great error which he taught;

b) by reason of the end, as if he seeks glory from an affection toward a mortal sin.

2. Also on the part of the matter concerning which someone glories:¹⁰

¹⁰ Matter here is not understood as the object itself of the sin: this is glory itself; but as the objective cause from which glory proceeds.

a) if someone glories concerning a good, but falsely, which is against reverence for God, or concerning goods as if they were not from God, or concerning a temporal good loved more than God, or concerning the testimony of men which he prefers to divine testimony;

b) if he glories concerning evil, namely concerning a mortal sin committed.¹¹

¹¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 132, a. 3; Quaestiones disputatae de Malo, 9, a. 2.

VII. Vain-glory is a capital sin, because it has a most appetible end, near to the end of pride. For pride desires one's own excellence; "but among the goods through which man obtains excellence, glory seems especially to operate toward this, insofar as it imports the manifestation of someone's goodness; for good is naturally loved and honored by all... for through the glory of men a man obtains excellence in human things. And therefore, on account of its nearness to excellence, which men most desire, it follows that it is very appetible. And because from its inordinate appetite many vices arise, therefore vain-glory is a capital vice."¹²

¹² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 132, a. 4.

VIII. There are seven daughters of vain-glory. - According to St. Gregory, Morals, book 31, c. 45 (or 17), there are seven vices which more commonly arise from vain-glory, and therefore are called its daughters. For by vain-glory the manifestation of one's own excellence is sought, which can be done:

a) Directly: 1. either by words, through boasting, by which someone glories concerning a work committed; or by deeds: 2. through presumption of novelties, by which someone devises novelties which excite the admiration of others; and 3. through hypocrisy, by which someone does good so that he may seem good, although he is not.

b) Indirectly someone seeks the manifestation of his excellence by showing that he is not less than others, and this is done: 4. as to the intellect, through pertinacity, by which someone adheres too much to his own opinion; 5. as to the will, through discord, by which he does not wish to recede from his own will so that he may agree with others; 6. as to speech, through contention, by which he litigates noisily; 7. as to deed, through disobedience, by which he does not wish to execute the precept of a superior.¹³

¹³ Ibid., a. 5, and Quaestiones disputatae de Malo, 9, a. 3.

IX. The origin and progress of pride. - The matter is described thus by Lehmkuhl, Theologia Moralis, I, n. 884, 2:

"Man begins to consider the good which he has in himself, but beyond measure; he considers his own perfections and at the same time considers neither imperfections nor dependence on God; then he apprehends in himself a greater excellence than he has in reality; then he loves or is complacent in that apprehended excellence; finally he judges himself above that which he is, which estimation does not consist in judgment alone, but at the same time in affection, by which man is affected toward himself as toward something great.

1. This excessive estimation of self is the first complete act of pride (I do not say 'of completed pride'); the other acts are the way and beginning.

2. The proud man, progressing further, judges himself worthy of great things, exceeding himself, his condition, and his powers in reality (to which presumption pertains).

3. He inordinately desires honors and other things as congruent to himself: ambition.

4. He wishes to be considered great, honored, esteemed by others: ambition and vain-glory.

5. If he sees that he does not obtain this, he grieves, is angry, is indignant.

Capital sins are so called because they are as it were the heads or fountains of other sins. Hence they should be called vices rather than properly sins, if they are considered in general.

Seven are enumerated, namely: 1st. Pride; 2nd. Avarice; 3rd. Lust; 4th. Envy; 5th. Anger; 6th. Sloth; 7th. Gluttony. But how fittingly all sins are reduced to seven heads St. Thomas explains excellently, 1-2, q. 84, art. 4.

We shall say very few things here about the individual capital sins, but we shall carefully indicate the places of St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus to which recourse must be had for a fuller exposition of the doctrine.

Pride is the disordered love of one's own excellence, and is distinguished into perfect, or complete and consummated in its own genus, and imperfect. It is called perfect when a man so stands in himself and is pleased with himself that he is in the disposition of gravely transgressing the law rather than obeying the commands of superiors. But this, by that very fact, always includes mortal sin in itself. In other cases it is called imperfect, and then of itself it is accustomed to introduce only venial sin. From pride proceed ambition, vain glory, presumption, boasting, ostentation, and hypocrisy. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 162; and QQ. DD. De Malo, qq. 8 and 9.

Avarice is the disordered appetite of temporal goods. It is opposed to justice or to liberality. If the former, it will easily issue into mortal sin, namely as often as it impels one to grave injustice toward the neighbor. - If the latter, of itself it will produce only venial sins. For the rest, excessive affection toward earthly things can impel, and indeed is accustomed to impel, into other even grave sins. From avarice also proceed hardness of heart toward the miserable, disquiet of soul, perfidy, deceit, etc. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 118; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 13.

Lust is the disordered appetite of a venereal thing. Lust is a grave sin from its whole genus; but this is to be understood if venereal delectation is deliberate in itself and directly willed. But if it is only indirectly voluntary, it sometimes admits smallness of matter, as will be said more fully below where the sixth precept of the Decalogue is treated.

Blindness of mind, inconsideration, inconstancy, hatred of God, languor of faith, indeed even loss of faith, are effects of lust. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, qq. 153 and 154; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 15.

Envy is sadness concerning the good of another, insofar as it is judged as one's own evil, or at least as one's lesser good. To it is reduced joy concerning the evil of another, which is judged an increase of one's own good. Envy is directly against charity, and from its genus, although not from its whole genus, imports grave sin. From envy proceed detraction, calumny, whispering, contumely, etc. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 36; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 10.

Anger is the kindling of the soul, and a disordered motion against someone or something; or it is a disordered appetite of vengeance. Irascibility is the habit of anger. Anger is mortal from its genus, if it is an appetite of vengeance; but venial, if it is only a disordered motion of the soul. - Anger generates indignation, rancor, shouting, insults, blasphemies, etc. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 158; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 12. - St. Alphonsus, nn. 80 and seq.

Sloth in general sounds the same as laziness; but more strictly it is torpor of mind and weakness of will, from which distaste for spiritual things flows because of the labor and trouble attached to them. - If it is so great that grave obligations are omitted from it, it must be held grave; if otherwise, it is to be judged slight. Torpor, wandering of the mind, nausea in prayer, etc., are the fruits of sloth. Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 35; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 11. - St. Alphonsus, n. 84.

Gluttony is the disordered appetite of food or drink, and from its genus it is nothing but venial sin. But it becomes grave if it gravely harms health, or if it renders someone unfit for duties. - From gluttony come drunkenness, about which more fully presently, dullness of mind, buffoonery, much speaking, and uncleanness of every kind. Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 148 and 150; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 14. - St. Alphonsus, nn. 74 and seq.

Note. - It would perhaps be very fitting to consult St. Thomas concerning sobriety. Sobriety is especially concerned with drink having the power of making drunk. For sobriety preserves measure: "and therefore," says the Angelic Doctor, 2-2, q. 149, a. 1, "it especially assigns to itself that matter in which it is especially praiseworthy to preserve measure. But of this kind is drink capable of making drunk, because its measured use contributes much and a moderate excess harms much, because it impedes the use of reason more than excess of food." And ibid. ad 3: "although measure is required in all things, nevertheless sobriety is not properly said in all things, but in those things in which measure is especially necessary." Now then, "it pertains to moral virtue to preserve the good of reason against those things by which it can be impeded. And therefore," he says ibid. a. 2, "where a special impediment of reason is found, there it is necessary that there be a special virtue for removing it. But intoxicating drink has a special account of impeding the use of reason, insofar as namely it disturbs the brain by its fumes. And therefore ... a special virtue is required, which is sobriety." And although "food and drink commonly can impede the good of reason, by absorbing it through immoderation of delectation, ... drink capable of making drunk impedes according to a special account." Would that also the following words of the Angelic Doctor were noted by some: "in all drinks capable of making drunk there is one and the same account of impeding the use of reason. And thus that diversity of drinks is related accidentally to virtue." Ibid. ad 3. No food or drink, speaking according to itself, is illicit. Yet drink can be rendered illicit by accident, either "because by wine [a man] is easily harmed, or because by a special vow he is obliged not to drink wine," or "from the manner of drinking, because namely he exceeds measure in drinking," or "on the part of others who are scandalized by this." Ibid. art. 3. To the objection that the use of wine is totally illicit, because it impedes wisdom without which someone cannot be in the state of salvation, the Angelic Doctor responds: "Wisdom can be had in two ways. In one way according to the common mode, insofar as it suffices for salvation. And thus it is not required for having wisdom that someone altogether abstain from wine, but that he abstain from the immoderate use of wine. In another way according to a certain degree of perfection. And thus it is required in some persons, for perceiving wisdom perfectly, that they altogether abstain from wine, according to the conditions of certain persons and places." ad 1. But for women and young people, if we regard proneness to pursuing bodily pleasures, "for old men in whom reason ought to flourish for the instruction of others, and for Bishops or any ministers of the Church who with devout mind ought to insist upon spiritual offices, and for kings who by wisdom ought to govern the subject people, sobriety is specially enjoined." Ibid. a. 4. - Cf. the places to be cited at n. 148 from St. Thom. 1-2, q. 88, a. 5, ad 1; 2-2, q. 150, a. 2.

Drunkenness is a voluntary excess in drink unto disturbance of reason, whether this is done from or with pleasure, or without pleasure. But it is divided into perfect and imperfect. The first is had when the use of reason is altogether taken away, so that the drunk man is incapable of acting morally; but the other is that by which the mind is indeed disturbed, yet still has the power to discern between good and evil.

But many others, following St. Thomas, define the vice of drunkenness as: superfluous drink without necessity and from the pleasure of wine alone unto deprivation of the use of reason.

Perfect drunkenness is always a mortal sin, but imperfect drunkenness of itself is only venial. The reason for the first is gathered both from the consent of theologians and the estimation of God-fearing men, and because to deprive oneself of the use of reason in a violent and unnatural way, and indeed in such a way that it cannot immediately be recovered, gravely repugns rational nature; and finally because in the Scriptures, for example, I Cor. vi, 10, drunkards are excluded from the kingdom of God. But the reason for the second is both because there is no grave disordering as long as one can act morally, and because the consent of theologians so holds. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 150, art. 2. - St. Alphonsus, n. 75. But St. Thomas speaks thus, 1-2, q. 88, a. 5, ad 1: "Concerning drunkenness it must be said that according to its own account it has this, that it is a mortal sin. For that a man without necessity renders himself unable to use reason, through which man is ordered to God and avoids many sins that occur, from the pleasure of wine alone, is expressly contrary to virtue. But that it is venial sin happens on account of a certain ignorance or infirmity, for instance when a man does not know the strength of wine or his own weakness, whence he does not think that he will be made drunk: for then drunkenness is not imputed to him as sin, but only overabundance of drink. But when he is frequently made drunk, he cannot be excused through this ignorance, without his will seeming to choose rather to suffer drunkenness than to abstain from superfluous wine, whence the sin returns to its own nature." Therefore the drunk man is guilty of a twofold disordering according to St. Thomas: by drinking wine from pleasure alone; and by drinking from excess unto the loss of the use of reason without any motive which would justify even the account of excessive drink. Cf. Baller., tr. 4, n. 381, seq. - Azor., l. 7, c. 33, q. 5. - Lessius, lib. 4, c. 3, d. 3, n. 13. - Dicastillo, lib. 1, disp. 3, d. 11, n. 104.

You Will Resolve. 1st. It is lawful to use any liquors whatever, as medicine for driving away diseases, for example, typhus, even if drunkenness is foreseen as going to follow, provided nevertheless that it is not directly intended, and the salvation of the soul is not placed in danger. It is required namely 1st. that drunkenness follow only indirectly, and 2nd. that no danger be present that the sick man die without reception of the sacraments. Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 150, a. 2, ad 3. - St. Alphonsus, n. 76. St. Thomas speaks thus: "When someone drinks much according to the counsel of medicine ... the drink is not reputed superfluous." l. c.

2nd. The same seems able to be said of those of our country who take a great quantity of liquor in order to expel or restrain the poison which they have drawn from the bites of serpents; for drunkenness, if any follows in such a case, would be said to have followed only indirectly. In this case it is not taken from the pleasure of wine alone nor without necessity.

3rd. It can never be lawful to assume drunkenness as a means for obtaining some effect, however good, because evils are not to be done that goods may come. But if a great quantity of liquor were taken, not indeed for violent deprivation of the use of reason, but for relaxing and thus soothing the nerves, so that from this some surgical operation may be done more easily, it does not appear why this would be illicit, since it is said to be lawful to use opium or ether for performing similar operations.

4th. Those mothers or nurses are altogether to be condemned who, for quieting the tears of children, use alcoholic or opiated drinks, and thus from the first age introduce an evil custom into them.

5th. A fortiori doctors are to be condemned who recur to the same remedy in order to provoke the sick to gladness or to lessen pains of the body; for those acting thus, although perhaps they can be excused from the sin of drunkenness, because they procure it only indirectly, nevertheless certainly introduce an evil custom into the sick if they recover; or, if they die, expose them to the danger of eternal damnation.

6th. Certainly they sin gravely who by command, counsel, or provocation induce others to drunkenness, or induce them to drink with foresight of future drunkenness: something which here and there is done under the vain pretext of friendship or civility.

7th. Likewise he who drinks to excess in order to free himself from the death which another threatens against him does not drink from the pleasure of wine alone or without cause; hence it is not sin.

Question 1. What must be said concerning the promise not to drink (the pledge) as it is accustomed to be made among us?

Response. Although a promise of this kind is good in itself, and, as daily experience establishes, offers an excellent remedy for amending the life of many, nevertheless the practice of receiving it is not without difficulties. For if it is said openly, what theologically speaking is certainly true, namely that violation of that promise is no sin or only venial sin, it will scarcely not happen that the whole efficacy of the remedy vanishes. But from the other side, if nothing is said, many and grave sins will be perpetrated from an ill-formed conscience; since there are many who judge violations of that promise to be graver sins than perfect drunkenness. Therefore much prudence and discretion is needed in receiving promises of this kind. - Wherefore, if there are those who doubt concerning the quantity of that obligation and inquire about it, or if they are not so untaught that they can easily grasp an explanation, or are not drawn to liquors by an utterly mad and ruined love, it will be useful, indeed necessary, to explain to them what the nature of that promise is; for since this is not a vow, but only a purpose manifested to a priest, it cannot of itself oblige under grave sin. But in the other hypothesis perhaps it would be better to say nothing, and to bear oneself permissively concerning those grave sins which would follow; for the lessening of drunkenness will be a sufficient reason for permitting them. - Cf. Irish Ecclesiastical Record, May 1883, pp. 338 and seq.

Question 2. What must be said concerning those sodalities recently instituted for extirpating the vice of drunkenness?

Response. That they are very good and are preferred by many apostolic laborers to the other remedy which consists in the promise not to drink. The reason is that these more recent remedies, while from one side they foster piety more, which is the beginning of every true conversion, from the other side offer no occasion of new sins. The Fathers of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore indeed alluded to these remedies in the following words: "Since monstrous scandals arise from excessive drinking, we exhort pastors, and beseech them by the bowels of Jesus Christ, that they put every zeal into eliminating the vice of drunkenness. To this end, we judge worthy of praise the zeal of those faithful who abstain from every ardent liquor in order to decline more safely the danger of excesses. But those who spontaneously enter a society among themselves, so that by mutual examples of virtues they may help and strengthen one another, ought first of all to employ those aids which Christ the Lord left in the Church, by which human vices are amended and infirmity is sustained; and by prayer, frequent reception of the sacraments, and other exercises of piety, to obtain heavenly aid for themselves, and to trust not in themselves, nor in their purposes, but in God, without whom human effort profits nothing." But the Fathers of the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore, speaking more explicitly, say: "The societies which come under the name of 'Catholic Union for promoting Total Abstinence' and 'Sacred Thirst,' we acknowledge as worthy of great praise; for they are governed by a truly Catholic spirit, and seek the necessary strength not so much in firmness of their own will as in the power of prayers and of the sacraments. Moreover it is known that the Head of the whole Church and Vicar of Christ on earth has more than once enriched them with his apostolic blessing and with the indulgences of the Church. Therefore we also exhibit to the same the signs of our benevolence, and that they may flourish the more, we commend them to the paternal care of all our priests, that they may not only add courage to them but also always show them the Catholic path." Cf. Conc. Plen. Balt. II, nn. 470 and seq.; and Conc. Plen. Balt. III, nn. 260 and seq.

Very recently special spiritual graces in favor of the faithful enrolled in societies of Temperance or Abstinence from intoxicating drink were conceded by the Supreme Pontiff Pius X on 21 May 1914 - namely: indulgences both plenary and partial, and also an altogether singular favor by virtue of which all Masses which are applied by any priest whatsoever for the soul of some deceased member can assist that soul as if they had been celebrated at a privileged altar. These graces were granted by the Supreme Pontiff wishing to show his more favorable will toward the aforesaid Societies and to find their Members more eager in advancing so salutary a purpose. - Acta Apost. Sed., v. VI, p. 309.

Question 3. Is it lawful to induce someone to drunkenness so that he may be turned away from a greater evil?

Response. Affirmatively, if drunkenness is only material to him; because a material evil can be permitted for a grave cause. Thus commonly against Collet, Concina, etc. But they more commonly deny it if drunkenness is formal; because evils are not to be done that goods may come: nevertheless St. Alphonsus, n. 77, admits the opposite opinion as probable with several others, "because it is lawful to induce another to a lesser evil so that he may be impeded from a greater." For when someone can be deterred from perpetrating a greater evil by no other means, to persuade the lesser evil has the account of good. See below n. 185. Q. 5th.

Note. - 1st. Habitual excessive drink produces enormous harms for the individual, the family, and society. It harms the health, fortune, and morals of individuals: domestic peace departs from the family, horrible crimes are committed, reason itself day by day becomes degenerate and more vicious.

Personal remedies: for all to avoid the occasions of this sin and those persons and assemblies by whom temperance is violated; to acquire strength by exercise of this virtue and of Christian mortification, and by consideration of motives both natural and supernatural by which men may become stronger against the vice of drunkenness, finally by petition of divine aid. - Dictionnaire de Theol. Cath., under the word Gourmandise.

2nd. The use of morphine, chloroform, and other medicines bringing exile of reason must be ruled by these general principles. The use of morphine, etc., for calming grave pains by soothing the senses is permitted in surgical operations, in more difficult births, and in general when there is a just cause. The use of morphine, etc., taken habitually induces an unquenchable thirst, to which follows unfitness for performing grave duties, and servitude under the medicine itself: such use is gravely prohibited; indeed doctors sin gravely who so frequently prescribe these things to the sick that there is proximate danger of inducing this habit or desire for morphine. The use of morphine which does not bring with it this danger but only a lessening of pains is not illicit of itself. The use of morphine, etc., inducing the loss of the exercise of reason for a long time without cause is certainly a grave sin.

The use of morphine, etc., employed with the dying without their consent so that they may remain in a state of semi-wakefulness is a grave sin and against natural right: such use in those circumstances, that is, with one dying, is gravely illicit when he is not prepared by the sacraments for dying, nor is it lawful for him to consent to it. If he is prepared and there is no danger of falling into grave sin, doctors are to be deterred from employing these means. But what if the pains are most bitter and extraordinary, for example, if someone is burned by slow fire in a conflagration, and cannot be removed from the flames themselves, because, say, he is held by the beams of the house? Is it lawful in this case, when there is no danger of falling into a state of sin, without the consent of the dying man so to soothe his senses that he will remain in fainting until death? It is not lawful: because he has a right to acquire enormous merits. What if he himself wishes it, or if there is danger of falling into grave sin? In those most difficult circumstances let the priest assist him with every help and exhortation so that he may suffer the pains bravely. If at last the sacred minister himself fears, let him be silent; indeed it does not seem altogether certainly prohibited so to soothe the senses, because in the case, morally speaking, he is a prepared sick man: to this indeed he is bound, but it is not clear that he is bound to acquire greater merits. It is his right: but whether a grave obligation rests upon him, this is not evident. Cf. Villada, Cas., v. 3, p. 309. Lehmkuhl speaks more severely, n. 892, ed. 11a.

3rd. Nor does artificial sleep seem illicit, by which, induced by medicinal injections, a woman giving birth does not fully perceive the pains of birth. During this state, so it is reported, she is not deprived of the use of the senses; afterward, however, she is said not to remember those things which then happened, and the sleep is called twilight. Moreover we affirm that if the woman in that state is duly protected, if the doctor is prudent, if care is applied so that nothing harmful happens either to the woman or to the fetus, the matter is done licitly. But another thing would have to be said if these conditions were not verified.

FIRST therefore I assert that Pride, opposed to Humility, is a special vice.

It is proved by D. Thomas, art. 1. and D. Bonavent. in speculo animae, cap. 1. and part one of the Centil. sect. 17. and book 3. of the Compend. Theol. verit. cap. 15. For it is against reason, which dictates that the will of each be borne toward that which is proportioned to him: but Pride wills to overstep; or wills to seem above, whence it is called Superbia.

I ASSERT secondly that there are four species of pride, from D. Gregory 23. Moral. cap. 7. So D. Thom. art. 4. D. Bonavent. LL. CC. of the Centil. and of the Compendium Theol. verit.

THE FIRST is to esteem that one has a good from oneself. The second, to esteem the gifts of God as received from one's own merits. The third is, to boast of having what one does not have. The fourth is, despising the others, to wish to be seen uniquely to have what one has.

THE REASON is, because the immoderate appetite of excellence and preeminence above others is wont to vary according to the aforesaid modes: And indeed according to the various degrees of humility so many degrees of Pride could be numbered, because contraries are multiplied in just as many modes, as the S. Doctor declares in the places cited, and D. Thomas ad 4. who also ad primum notes that it is without the vice of unbelief that the proud man glories, as if he had goods from himself and from his merits.

I ASSERT thirdly: Pride from its genus is mortal sin, and among the vices opposed to the moral virtues the gravest. So S. Thom. quaest. 162. art. 5. D. Bonavent. in Pharetra, lib. I. cap. 6. and LL. cc.

IT IS PROVED by the S. Doctor in the place cited, with the argument of D. Augustine de Virginitate, cap. 31. and 19. de Civit. cap. 12. which D. Thomas uses, because just as humility regards the subjection of man to God: so on the contrary Pride properly regards the defect of this subjection, so much so that it pertains properly to Pride to refuse to be subject to God, and to exalt oneself above that which is fixed for the man himself according to the divine rule or measure, against what the Apostle says, I. Corinth. 10. But we will not glory beyond measure, but according to the measure of the rule which God hath measured to us. Therefore Eccles. 10. it is said: The beginning of the pride of man is to fall away from God.

From this excellence, however, by which he refuses to be subject to God, it arises that it exceeds the other sins opposed to the moral virtues, which turn away from God either through ignorance, or through cupidity and frailty. For Pride prevails in malice above them. The same argument he has in speculo animae, cap. 3.

I ASSERT fourthly, that Pride is a capital vice.

IT IS PROVED by D. Bonavent. in Diaeta, tit. I. cap. 3. for from it arise Presumption, Ambition, Disobedience, Boasting, Shame at good, the Mockery of the good, or of the simple, Vainglory, and Hypocrisy.

OR, as the S. Doctor says in speculo animae, cap. 1. there arise Presumption, Contempt, and Vain glory.

PRESUMPTION consists chiefly in this, that man presumes that he has grace and other goods, either from himself, or from his merits, or falsely, or more than others; which are the four modes, or species of Pride, related above from D. Gregory.

HENCE arises the tempting of God, by which one wills to ask without necessity, and to make trial of the Divine power. Hence arises the presumption of peril [discrimen], when someone exposes himself to danger, trusting in the divine power alone, despising human aid, or spurning the fitting means without necessity of faith, or of the Church; and this has the character of mortal sin; whence it is said Deuter. 6. Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God. Where he brings in the Gloss saying: He tempts God, who having what he might do, without reason commits himself to danger. Thus S. Bonaventura.

THESE things must be explained somewhat. Temptation and the presumption of peril, related above, are opposed to that religious subjection by which we are bound to God. For we pretend to take trial of some perfection of God, doubting of it at least indirectly, by asking such things as seem ordered to nothing else, as when I despise the means ordered by God, wishing to obtain the effect from the power of God, as that God provide food from heaven for a whole multitude, and other similar things.

ANOTHER mode of the presumption of peril is, when I expose myself to danger, pretending that God deliver me by a miracle, as if falling from a high tower I wished to be sustained by God; for Christ also Matth. 4. answered the Devil persuading this: It is written: Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.

FORMAL temptation indeed, which includes doubt about some perfection of God, is mortal: for it includes a great injury inflicted on God, and grave contempt; whence it does not become venial from the smallness of the matter, but only from the surreption of the act, as Sanchez notes, in Decal. Tom. I. lib. II. cap. 4. num. 5. Valentia II. II. disput. 6. quaest. 14. puncto 2.

BUT if the temptation of God is without express doubt, Toletus, lib. 4. sum. cap. 19. says it can be venial, when it arises from mere curiosity of seeing a supernatural work: And Valentia above, Sayrus lib. 4. cap. 7. num. 14. say it is commonly venial, unless the matter be too grave, as when one tempting God exposes himself to the greatest danger. But Sanchez says it is mortal, unless simplicity and ignorance, not altogether coarse, excuse.

So also Suarez Tom. 1. de Relig. tract. 3. lib. 1. cap. 2. num. 16. The reason is, because he wills the Divine omnipotence to serve his curiosity by supernal works. Nevertheless Sanchez adds, and almost Suarez with Lessio, lib. 2. de Iustitia, cap. 45. dub. 1. that the danger and the work must be so slight that the fault be venial, as in a light illness refusing to use medicines. I judge also that the tempting of the Divine will by some sign asked is a tempting of God, as the S. Doctor teaches here, and D. Thomas, quaest. 97. art. 1. Suarez Tomo 1. de Relig. tract. 3. lib. 1. cap. 2. Sanchez, num. 8. Nor is it required that it always arise from doubt about some perfection of God.

TO the temptation of God pertains the willing of a sign from God for the truth of faith, for instance, that Christ appear in the Most Holy Sacrament.

TO the presumption of peril pertains the purgation by glowing iron, which is forbidden by Canon law, cap. Mennam, and can. Monomachiam, and cap. Consulnisti 2. quaest. 5. and cap. Ex tuarum on canonical purgation. See D. Thomam 2. 2. quaest. 95. art. 8. ad 3. and p. p. quaest. 80. art. 6. ad 3. Valentiam 2. 2. disput. 6. quaest. 14. puncto 1. corolar. 4. Sayrum, lib. 4. cap. 7. Sanchez, num. 71.

TO the temptation of God also belongs, in grave illness to refuse medicines, and to will to obtain health from God suddenly, and it is mortal. So Navar. Summa, cap. 11. Sanchez, num. 14. Suarez in the place cited, cap. 2.

IT is also a temptation of God rashly to expose oneself to martyrdom without cause. So Navar. cap. 11. Sanchez num. 15. and others. But already in the Treatise on Hope, and on Religion, these things have been treated.

FROM Presumption also arise excessive confidence in oneself, inept audacity, etc. And the like.

CONTEMPT is the proper effect of pride, refusing to be subject to God and superiors; from which result Disobedience, Despising, Irreverence, Killing, Mockery, Irony, etc. See the S. Doctor.

VAIN glory is that by which someone vainly strives to show forth his own excellence, and it is mortal, when it covets the glory due to God. From this arise Ambition for honor, the appetites of human favor, fear of confusion, and love of praise.

From ambition for honor arises Pomp, from which three fruits blossom: Ostentation in a superfluous retinue and apparatus, and an ostentatious bearing and speech, which are often venial, and sometimes deadly.

From the appetite for human favor arises Flattery, which is mortal, if one praise an evil grievously [laudes malum grave], giving occasion that they remain in sin, glory, and are puffed up beyond their merits. But if you praise with the sole intention of pleasing, it will be venial sin according to D. Augustinum, serm. 41. de Sanctis. From that appetite for favor also arises prodigality, which is mortal, when those goods which ought to be expended on the poor are dissipated uselessly, or distributed to dishonest persons. And in this he reprehends Ecclesiastics, whose goods beyond the sustentation of their person and state ought to be bestowed on the poor.

From fear of confusion arises evil bashfulness, and false humility. Evil bashfulness begets shame at divine things, shame at poverty, shame in Confession. There arises also the denial of truth, false impugning, excuse, and the defense of sin.

From the appetite for human praise arise Hypocrisy, Ostentation, Singularity, and Boasting.

HYPOCRISIS according to Isidore, de summo bono, cap. 14. sentent. 2. is the simulation of a good not existing; but it is a lie. Therefore just as a lie is not mortal, unless it be pernicious to one's neighbor, or against the truth of Faith and morals: so Hypocrisy is mortal, when it is with the intention of deceiving under the appearance of goodness: as he who feigns sanctity, that he may obtain ecclesiastical goods of which he is unworthy.

OSTENTATION is, when one strives to show outwardly the good which he has, or simulates that he has, that he may thence catch praises, nor is it mortal from its genus.

SINGULARITY is, when one wishes to appear singular, and it has various evil fruits, according as it is found in various matters. From this also arises Envy.

BOASTING is that by which one glories in words about a good, either which he has, or which he does not have. See the S. Doctor declaring at length that almost all sins are begotten from Pride.

HENCE also D. Thomas, quaest. 162. art. 2. from D. Augustino, lib. de natura, et gratia, cap. 29. says, that Pride is indeed a special sin, but that it can nevertheless be called general by causality, inasmuch as other sins arise from it. First per se, inasmuch as others are ordered to the end of Pride, which is one's own excellence, to which whatever is inordinately desired can be ordered. Secondly indirectly, and per accidens, namely by removing a hindrance, inasmuch as man in Pride contemns the Divine Law, by which he is prohibited from sinning, according to that Hieremiae 2. Thou hast broken my yoke in pieces, and thou hast said: I will not serve: Yet many things are done against the law of God not from contempt, but from ignorance, or frailty. Whence D. August. says in the place cited, Many things are done wrongly which are not done proudly.

EX HIS you have that Pride is a vice, not only capital, but the head, and beginning of almost every sin: Whence S. Gregorius 31. Moral. cap. 31. names it not a capital vice, but the Queen of vices.

IT is however difficult to avoid, as S. Doctor, LL. CC. especially, lib. 3. Compendii Theol. cap. 15. and D. Thom. art. 16. ad 1. warns; for pride insinuates itself even into goods. This he pursues at length and most beautifully in S. Doctor, in Diaeta, tit. 1. cap. 3. which I beseech you to read, treating the various and apt similitudes of Pride.

I ASSERT lastly, that this is the beginning of every sin. Eccl. 11. Pride is the beginning of all sin.

THE REASON is, because the aversion from God, which formally completes the nature of sin, pertains to Pride per se; but to the other sins consequently. It is called therefore the beginning of all sin, both because the first sin of Lucifer and of Man issued from Pride; and because every sin is aptly born to be begotten from Pride, even if not all necessarily arise from it, as Tannerus, disp. cit. says.

To these the S. Doctor adds, Compend. Theol. lib. 3. cap. 15. that every sin, since it is an aversion from God, is a certain contempt of God. That therefore which D. Prosper lib. de vita Contempl. cap. 2. says: No sin can, or could be, or will be able to be without Pride, is understood materially, inasmuch as in every sin there is a certain appetite for something above that which befits man subject to the divine laws, namely for the very transgression itself, under the notion of a certain excellence and loftiness; which is the proper object of Pride, which is a special vice, as Valentia notes disput. 9. quaest. 3. puncto 1. with Bonaventura, in the place cited.

HE notes truly, with the S. Doctor, at the beginning of cap. 1. that all Pride can be venial on account of the imperfection of an act not fully deliberate, as happens also with other vices.

Titius, a layman of outstanding ability, was studying civil law; and, since he knew that he easily surpassed others, he hoped that he would acquire the highest honors and dignities, from which he could leave a great name to posterity. By a certain misfortune he failed in a case of great importance. Thereupon, ambition having been cast aside and reputation among others despised, he indulged in drunkenness and, if not an excuse for his vices, found at least some consolation in the sayings of ascetical writers about the vanity of the world and contempt for glory. Paul, a friend of Titius, indeed knows that Titius erred, but he finds it by no means easy to say, practically and theoretically, where virtue stands. Hence it is asked:

1. What is pride, and in what precisely does its malice consist?

2. What is ambition, and what kind of sin is it?

3. What is vainglory, and how is it distinguished from care for a good name?

4. Did Titius sin in these things, and how?

1. What is pride and in what precisely does its malice consist ?

Pride is the inordinate love of one's own excellence. To acknowledge and to love in due measure the good qualities of soul or body or the gifts of fortune which one possesses is not pride; if such blessings are referred to their proper source, they become the grounds of a proper and becoming self-respect. Truth requires that we should esteem ourselves at our real value, and that we should attribute any good that we have to its true source, our Creator and Lord. If we leave God out of account and claim practical independence of Him, and magnify ourselves for the gifts which we possess or which we think that we possess, we become proud. Similarly inordinateness and pride make their appearance when we attribute the good that we have to our own merits, or when we affect to have more than in reality we have, or when we conduct ourselves as if we were the only persons who had such good things, and consequently look down with contempt on others. The malice of pride consists in so extolling oneself as to claim practical independence of Almighty God. The proud man does not like to acknowledge his indebtedness to God for all that he has; he does not like to submit to the ordinances of God or to those of legitimate superiors; he strives to shake off as far as possible the yoke of subjection which is the necessary condition of man inasmuch as he is a creature.

2. What is ambition and what sort of sin is it?

Ambition is an inordinate desire of dignities and honors. A moderate desire of dignities and honors for a good object is not vicious, but if the desire becomes immoderate, or the end in view is not good, or unlawful means are employed to attain honors, vicious ambition makes its appearance. It is a venial sin in itself, but it may be mortal on account of the means employed, or the end, or on account of injury done to one’s neighbor.

3. What is vainglory and how is it distinguished from the care of a good reputation ?

Glory is knowledge by others accompanied by their praise.

It is natural and praiseworthy to seek by good deeds to deserve the esteem and praise of the good. "This is what is meant by a good reputation, and we are obliged to strive to acquire it and to preserve it when acquired, as the necessary condition for doing good in the world. The desire of being praised by others becomes the sin of vainglory when praise is sought for what does not deserve praise, or without due moderation, or for an improper object, or from those whose opinion is of no value.

4. Did Titius commit sin in the case, and if so, what sin?

Titius was a clever young man who studied law. He knew that he surpassed others in ability and aspired to the greatest honors and dignities, and thus he hoped to enjoy a great reputation with posterity. There is nothing that is necessarily vicious so far. He failed in a case of great importance, and disappointment caused him to give up his schemes for the future, to care nothing about his reputation, and to take to drink. He found some consolation if not excuse for his conduct in the sayings of ascetics about the vanity of the world and contempt for human glory. Here, of course, Titius did wrong in taking to drink, and he misapplied the sayings of ascetics. Ascetics warn us truly of the vanity of the world, and they teach us not to indulge in vainglory, but they do not tell us that we may throw away a good reputation. On the contrary, a good reputation is useful not only to others, but to the possessor of it as well, especially while his virtue is immature. Few can afford to rest on God alone; the many, who are good but imperfect, need the spur of others’ praise and the fear of their censure in order to persevere in the difficult paths of virtue.