Reparation for detraction

655. Obligation of the detractor and calumniator. 1. The unjust detractor is bound from justice: a. to repair as soon as possible the reputation unjustly taken away; b. to repair all temporal damages which he foresaw at least in confusion would follow from the defamation: for he is the efficacious and unjust cause of all these. And indeed the former obligation of restoring reputation is personal and therefore does not pass to heirs; but the latter of repairing temporal damages is real and therefore passes to heirs.

a. Therefore the calumniator is always bound to restitution of reputation; but the detractor is bound only when he harmed another in reputation without a just cause, because only then is he the unjust cause of damage.

b. It can happen that a light lesion of reputation can inflict grave damage in goods of fortune. Therefore with light detraction there can at the same time be joined a grave obligation of repairing temporal damages arisen from detraction, as if someone narrates that he is talkative whom the hearer of the narration wished to assume for the office of secretary.¹

c. He who cannot restore the injured reputation is not bound to compensate it with money, because reputation and money are not goods of the same order; yet if the defamer is condemned by the sentence of the judge to furnishing compensation in money, he must obey the just sentence of the judge, from vindicative justice.

d. He who by defaming another, from smallness of matter, sinned only lightly, must repair the reputation under light obligation; therefore he is not bound to repair it with grave inconvenience to himself. But he who sinned gravely must repair it even with grave inconvenience to himself; for a grave obligation of justice obliges with proportionately grave inconvenience. Yet if the damage which the defamer would have to suffer greatly exceeded the damage of the defamed person, he would be excused from restitution.

2. A non-unjust detractor who from inadvertence or from inculpable error injured another's reputation is bound from justice, insofar as he conveniently can, to forestall his speech from harming further: for anyone is bound to impede further damages proceeding from his action. But he is not bound to this with grave inconvenience to himself, because he harmed the other inculpably; nor is he bound if he foresees that retractation will be useless (n. 454, b).

He who culpably omits due retractation is bound to repair the damages which follow from this omission and were foreseen in some way, even with grave inconvenience to himself, because he is the culpable cause of these.

To the question whether reputation must be repaired not only before the hearers, but also before those who received the defamation mediately, one must distinguish. If the detractor foresaw that the hearers would easily divulge the defamation, as if he had narrated it without secrecy to light and talkative men, of himself he is bound, because he is the efficacious and unjust cause of the damage; yet because he is a mediate cause of the damage, he himself is bound only when other causes, namely immediate causes, fail. But if he did not foresee the future damage, because he narrated under secrecy to those whom he judged prudent, he is not bound, because he is not the theologically culpable cause of the damage. It is said of himself, because in practice detractors are generally excused from the obligation of restitution before those who had received the detraction mediately, both because it is morally impossible, and because by retractation made before those who immediately received the matter, they implicitly commit to these that they also divulge the retractation.²

¹ Cf. Genicot I, n. 449.

² Cf. Lugo, disp. 15, n. 16.

656. How reputation must be restored. It must be restored in one way by a calumniator and in another by a detractor.

1. The calumniator is bound before the hearers to retract the things said in an efficacious mode, even with loss of his own reputation or another good, because the condition of the innocent is better than that of the guilty. He is excused only when the damage which he himself would have to suffer would greatly exceed the damage of the defamed person.

Hence if this is required for efficacious retractation, the calumniator must confess that he lied. If retractation would not be efficacious unless an oath is added or witnesses are employed, these means would have to be employed, because they are not considered very difficult. He who calumniated another by a book published in print must also, so that it may be efficacious, divulge the revocation in print.

2. Strictly speaking, the detractor cannot retract, lest he lie, but he must repair the injured reputation in another way, and first indeed by employing equivocal words. And so he can say that he spoke unjustly, that he did injury to the other, that he erred, that he was deceived; but not that he said what is false or that he lied. But since from these formulas of speaking most persons infer that that is true which is not openly declared false, the detractor will very often repair the damage more efficaciously by, when occasion is given, following the defamed person with praise and honor, excusing his vices, etc.

657. Five causes excusing from restitution of reputation are usually numbered:

a. If it is prudently judged that no detriment of reputation followed, either because the hearers did not believe the detraction, or because another, by correcting the detractor, impeded the damage: for in order that there be an obligation of repairing reputation, moral certitude concerning damage caused is required.

b. If the damage has already been taken away, either because by the sentence of a judge or the testimony of others the reputation was repaired, or because by the passage of time the defamation was wiped away by oblivion.

c. If the other either expressly or tacitly condoned it, provided he could condone it; but an injury done cannot be condoned if from the condonation damage to others would follow. Sometimes even presumed condonation suffices. "And by this reason," says Sporer, "commonly men, especially the common people, are excused from restitution of reputation among themselves."

d. If restitution is morally or physically impossible. Therefore he is excused who could repair reputation only with danger to life; likewise he who would suffer a much greater damage of reputation or honor than was inflicted on the defamed person; finally, if the defamer cannot meet those who heard the detraction because of too great a distance, or if the fault has become public by another way.

e. If the injured person also violated the reputation of the defamer and refuses to restore: for one is not bound to return his right to another if the latter refuses to return the right which he himself owes him.¹

¹ Cf. Lugo, disp. 14, n. 44; St. Alphonsus, n. 999.

Inasmuch as detraction, calumny, and other sins of the like nature are contrary to justice, they will always leave the obligation of making restitution as far as possible for the unjust damage which they cause, as we saw above when treating of restitution.

I. Subject of restitution. 1. He who unjustly and with grave theological fault has injured the reputation of the neighbor is held under grave obligation to restitution "just as to restitution of any thing taken away" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 73, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, III, 991).

2. He who with slight fault or inculpably has injured the reputation of the neighbor is held to remove the cause of damage placed by him and morally persevering, i.e. to revoke the detraction or deprive it of force, if he conveniently can.

3. What has been said about the detractor should also be applied: 1° to him who positively influenced an unjust detraction, for example by asking, applauding, etc. (n. 1075); 2° to a Superior, in the case in which from justice he is held to provide for reputation to be restored, according to what is to be said in n. 1075.

II. Object of restitution. The obligation is of restoring: 1° the reputation unjustly injured; 2° the real damages following from the injury of reputation and at least confusedly foreseen. Moreover, "the obligation of restoring reputation, since it is purely personal, does not pass to heirs. But the obligation of compensation for the aforesaid damage, since it has respect to the goods of the defamer, passes to heirs" (St. Alphonsus, III, 996).

III. Mode of restoring. 1. He who narrated what is false ought openly to retract the false thing imputed, for example by saying that he erred or, if that is not sufficient, that he lied; indeed, if there is need, he should prove the retraction and confirm it by oath or even by witnesses (St. Alphonsus, III, 991).

2. He who revealed what is true ought prudently to correct the opinion of the hearers, for example by saying with equivocation that he erred, etc. If the matter does not succeed in this way, he should strive to furnish an equivalent compensation, for example by praising the defamed person in the same or in a different matter, etc. (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 62, a. 2, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, III, 992).

3. A detractor, in default of the immediate hearers, is held to restore reputation before mediate hearers, as follows:

a) He is not held if he narrated the matter before those whom he thought would hide it, because damage not foreseen is not imputed to him.

b) It is disputed whether he is held if he could foresee that the hearers would not keep the secret. But he seems per se to be held, because in the hypothesis posited the detractor becomes not merely an occasional cause of damage to be inflicted by the immediate hearers, but an occasional cause which puts on the character of culpable cooperation toward that damage. But he who culpably cooperates toward the damage of someone acts formally unjustly, and therefore is held to restitution. I have said per se, because practically he will often be excused, either because the immediate hearers will restore the damage, or on account of moral impossibility (St. Alphonsus, III, 991).

IV. Causes excusing from restitution of reputation are customarily enumerated:

1. Physical or moral impossibility. But with respect to moral impossibility note that the detractor is not held to restoration of reputation with damage much greater. Damage to one's own reputation does not excuse, unless the reputation of the detractor is necessary for the public good (St. Alphonsus, III, 1002). Yet no one is held to compensate injured reputation with money (St. Alphonsus, III, 1000). But if you ask whether the defamed person can compensate himself with money of the defamer, it seems this must be said: if the defamer unjustly refuses restoration of reputation, the defamed person more probably can compensate himself, relying on the principle: if you unjustly deny me what is owed to me, it is lawful for me to take something from you which is yours; almost as "you are not compelled to restore his right to another if he refuses to restore yours to you" (St. Alphonsus, IV, 999). If the defamer is excused from restoring reputation, it seems it must be denied, because on the one hand the right to money is doubtful, and on the other hand compensation on account of a doubtful right is not admitted (n. 1033; cf. St. Alphonsus, III, 1001).

2. Cessation of damage; as if someone has already from elsewhere, for example by sentence of a judge or by forgetfulness, been purged from infamy. In doubt whether the crime of the neighbor has been given over to oblivion, ordinarily the obligation of restoring will cease, both because there will be danger of harming the defamed person more, and because restitution cannot be made without one's own damage, which no one is held to suffer for repairing an already doubtful damage of the neighbor (St. Alphonsus, III, 997, 998).

3. Condonation by the defamed person, whether express or presumed. Yet damage of reputation cannot be presumed to be condoned as easily as damage in goods of fortune. Condonation is prohibited if the infamy redounds to others, or harms the common good, as if there is question of a priest or religious (St. Alphonsus, III, 1003).

4. Compensation, understood in this sense, that after injury has been inflicted on both sides, you can sufficiently probably defer restitution until the other is prepared to make satisfaction. Yet from these things do not conclude that the defamer can likewise be defamed (St. Alphonsus, III, 999). Yet that is lawful, that you may lessen belief in the defamer, or that you may lead him, unwilling, to restore reputation or to omit further detraction.

Note. Excuse from restitution of reputation per se does not bring with it excuse from repairing real damages following from the injury of reputation.

Restitution for Defamation.—Restitution for injuries committed is necessary (see 1759), and hence it is required of the defamer. In the language of Scripture (Prov., xiii. 13), he that speaks ill of his neighbor obliges himself for the future. The two injuries to be repaired are: (a) the unjust taking, that is, the fame of which he has deprived his neighbor; (b) the unjust damage, that is, the detriment to fame or the losses that resulted from the defamation (such as failure to obtain or keep a position, decline of business, etc., which were foreseen at least in a confused manner). It is clear there is no duty of restitution, if in spite of talk against a neighbor he suffered no loss (e.g., if the listeners gave no heed or credence to the talk).

Gravity of Obligation of Restitution.—The obligation of restitution for defamation is grave or light according to the degree of injury done, and the grave obligation binds even at the expense of serious inconvenience, the light obligation at the cost of small inconvenience. But the following points should be noted:

(a) the injury is not necessarily grave if the defect imputed to another is grave, for many circumstances have to be considered (e.g., blasphemy is a serious charge, but it would not be very harmful to a man publicly known as very impious, see 2053 sqq.);

(b) the injury is not necessarily slight if the defect imputed is slight, for circumstances may make the injury considerable (e.g., it is not very defamatory to say that a woman is very talkative, or unable to speak or spell correctly, but this would be very damaging if it lost the woman a very lucrative position as secretary).

Conditions Which Entail Duty of Restitution.—Restitution is not obligatory unless one is the unjust and efficacious author of the damage (see 1763). Hence, disclosures unfavorable to the reputation of others entail the duty of restitution only when the following conditions are present:

(a) the detriment to fame or other loss must be unjust objectively, and hence those who have a just reason for exposing the vices of others are not held to restitution;

(b) the detriment must be unjust subjectively, and hence one who in good faith speaks of a neighbors sin, thinking that it is true and public, whereas it is false or secret, is not bound to restitution, if he discovers his error after the results of the defamation have been removed (see, however, 2102). But if he discovers his mistake while the neighbor is still under a cloud because of the report, he becomes from that moment responsible and subjectively unjust, if he does not take steps as far as he conveniently can to correct the error (see 1769);

(c) the detriment must be due to oue’s act as to its efficacious cause, and hence one is not bound to restitution if a listener understands one to disparage when in fact one has not disparaged.

Cooperators and Restitution.—Those who cooperate in injustice are also held to restitution (see 1778 sqq.), and hence the following are bound to indemnify a defamed person:

(a) positive cooperators are held to restitution, such as those who command, counsel, or encourage defamation. The same is true of those who share in a defamatory conversation or who merely listen, but by their questions, or show of interest or approval, induce the defamer to continue, or to speak with more assurance;

(b) negative cooperators are also held to restitution, if they were bound in justice to resist or impede defamation. This will apply chiefly to a superior who does not prevent, as he should, the defamation of his subject or community, whether by a subject or a non-subject (see 2080 sqq.).

Circumstances of Restitution.—We shall now speak of the circumstances of restitution for defamation: (a) the persons bound to restitution besides the defamer, namely, his heirs, the listeners, etc.; (b) the persons to whom restitution is to be made; (c) the manner of making restitution; (d) the time for making restitution (see 1781 sqq.).

Restitution for Defamation to Be Made by an Heir of the Defamer.—(a) For the injury to fame, it seems that the heir is not bound, since the duty of restitution of fame is a personal one, that is, an obligation to perform an act of retraction or apology, not an obligation to pay compensation (see 463). But some hold that defamation may be satisfied for by pecuniary compensation (1750, 1802), and that, if the injured party should insist on this kind of compensation for the infamy suffered, the heirs would be obliged to pay it.

(b) For the damages resulting from injury to fame the heir is bound, since restitution for losses is a real one and rests upon the property or estate of the deceased. But those who are in good faith are sometimes to be left undisturbed, lest they become guilty of formal sin.

The Persons to Whom Restitution for Defamation Is to Be Made.—(a) To the person defamed restitution of fame is owed, and this is true even when the person is already dead. Just as one who dishonors the dead by desecrating their tombs or their remains owes it to their memory to make reparation, so one who defames the dead owes it to their reputation to make restitution. In fact, the heirs may be bound in conscience to insist upon this restitution, and it seems they cannot condone it, since it is not their own fame that has been hurt.

(b) To the listeners restitution is not owed, since no injustice was done them, but reparation for scandal given them may be obligatory. And, since justice to the person defamed requires retraction or other reparation, the defamer must recall his words before the persons to whom he addressed them. Hence, if defamation appeared in a journal, the honorable reparation should also appear in the same journal and with the same prominence given it as was given the offensive remarks.

Responsibility of Defamer for Spread of Defamation.—Is the defamer bound to recall his words to the wider audience that learned them from his first listeners?

(a) If the defamer is not responsible for the spread of his talk beyond the circle which he addressed (e.g., if he imposed strict silence upon his listeners or had good reason to think that they would keep his remarks to themselves, and his words nevertheless leaked out), the common opinion is that he is not held to reparation before the subsequent listeners.

(b) If the defamer is responsible for the spread of his talk (e.g., if he gave his listeners permission to quote or repeat, or if he knew well that they would carry his words far and wide), he is bound to reparation before the later listeners, in so far as this is possible, especially if he was guilty of calumny. Whether he or his listeners have the first duty of restitution will depend on the relationship in their cooperation (see 1784). If he can do nothing better, he should admonish his listeners to retract before their listeners.

The First Way of Making Restitution for Defamation.—(a) If the defamation was by calumny, the defamer (and also the propagator) must take back his words, admitting that what he said was untrue. If necessary, he should also make affidavit to this effect, or even admit that he lied. The reason is that the innocent party has a greater right to his fame than the guilty party. But the defamer is not obliged to confess his own malice, when this is not necessary, and it may suffice to say merely that his former statement was not correct.

(b) If the defamation was by detraction, the defamer cannot truthfully say that his words were false, and he must counteract directly or indirectly the effect of his defamation by something favorable to the person he has injured. If the listeners will not be confirmed in their belief by his explanation, the defamer should explain to them that his statements were unjust, that he had no right to make them, that he wishes them to regard as unsaid all that he said, etc. (direct revocation). If this cure would be worse than the sickness by strengthening the belief of the listeners that the defamation was true, the defamer should be silent about his former statements. But he should so honor or praise the person defamed that others will be led to believe, not that restitution is being made, but that the former good opinion they had of the person defamed was correct (indirect revocation). Thus, if the defamer knows that the injured person has reformed, he may call attention to and emphasize the virtues he now has; if the defamed person has still the same failing, he may be excused, when possible, or praised for the good qualities he does possess, or he may be spoken of in general terms of esteem; if the listeners have been led to dishonor the person who was detracted, the defamer may show special signs of esteem or confidence to the latter, etc.

Other Methods of Making Restitution.—If the listeners will not be impressed by any of the methods of satisfaction just indicated, what should be done?

(a) If, in the case of calumny, the listeners are unwilling to accept the formal statement that the defamation was untrue, the defamer is obliged to nothing more. For the slanderer has done all that is possible to change the erroneous view of the listeners, and the bad opinion they have of their neighbor must now be attributed, not to the defamer, but to their own wickedness or stubbornness.

(b) If the listeners cannot be properly impressed by the direct or indirect revocation of detraction, the defamer, being unable to make honorable compensation by restoration of fame, should make a profitable compensation by the bestowal of a benefit that will in some way be commensurate with the good of reputation and be acceptable to the other party. Thus, if the person defamed is satisfied with money or something measurable in terms of money, he should be given damages; if this kind of compensation is of little use or is not esteemed (few persons of honor would take money alone as pay for a lost reputation), he should be given some other good which in his own judgment and that of a prudent man is more nearly an equivalent for the good of which he has been deprived. An apology is not sufficient, since the begging of pardon does not restore what was taken; neither is it generally advisable, because the admission to another that one has been secretly defaming him and is now sorry for this may lead to quarrels and hatreds rather than to forgiveness and peace.

Legal Reparation for Defamation.—One who has been sentenced by a lawful judgment of court to reparation and penalty for defamation is obliged to obedience, but if the satisfaction decided on by a jury is excessive or meager, it can be set aside by the court. In Canon Law (Canon 2355) one who has been convicted of defamation may be sentenced: (a) to satisfaction; (b) to damages; (c) to suitable penalties, even to suspension or removal from office or benefice.

The Time When Restitution for Defamation Is to Be Made.—(a) It should be made as soon as possible, for the longer it is delayed the greater the injury that is suffered, since defamation becomes harder to correct as it progresses, or at least has a longer life when it is not corrected early. But prudence will sometimes dictate that one await a psychological or favorable moment for a retractation. (b) Restitution should be promised before absolution is given, and, if there is a well-founded doubt about the sincerity of a promise, the confessor may delay absolution until restitution has been made.

Cessation of Duty of Restitution.—The duty of restitution ceases, at least temporarily, in certain cases (see 1797 sqq.), and hence one who has been guilty of injustice through defamation is sometimes excused from reparation. (a) Thus, one is excused temporarily on account of impossibility; (b) one is excused permanently on account of the cessation of the other party’s good name or the termination of one’s own obligation.

Excuse from Restitution on Account of Impossibility.—(a) Physical impossibility excuses, for example, when one does not know who the persons were before whom one detracted, or cannot recall who the person was whom one defamed. But in this case the defamer should at least make satisfaction by praying for the person whom he defamed, or by having Masses offered for him.

(b) Moral impossibility excuses from restitution, as when the defamer will suffer a far greater loss than he inflicted on the person defamed (e.g., if the defamer cannot retract without losing his life, or a reputation which is far more valuable than that of the obscure person who was defamed). But if the defamer has subjected the injured party to the peril of death, or if he has calumniated an innocent man, he must make satisfaction even at the peril of his own life or at the cost of his own fame; for the right of the innocent prevails over that of the guilty defamer.

Excuse from Restitution on Account of Cessation of Other Party’s Good Name.—The defamer may also be excused from restitution on account of cessation of the other party’s good name through another cause, as when the secret defect first made known by the defamer becomes public from another source.

(a) The detractor is excused from the duty of restoring reputation, since the person he defamed has now independently of the first defamation lost his right to reputation (see 2053 sqq.).

(b) The detractor is not excused, however, from payment for damages which the defamed person suffered from the first defamation or for expenses which it caused him. Some moralists hold him obligated also for some compensation for the infamy suffered before the crime became public through others.

Excuse from Restitution on Account of the Termination of Obligation.—(a) The act of the defamed person ends the obligation, when, without injury to others, he expressly or tacitly condones the offense; for he has dominion over his own fame, as he has over his own money or lands. Thus, it may often be presumed that parents overlook the restitution owed them by their children for criticisms made by the latter.

(b) The act of the defamed person also ends the obligation, according to the common opinion, when he has inflicted an equal injury by defaming his defamer and is unwilling to make satisfaction for the injury; for though it is unlawful to repay evil with evil, and though one damage does not cure another damage, he who will not pay a creditor cannot insist that the creditor pay him an equal debt. Thus, if Titus has burned the barn of Claudius and Claudius then burns the barn of Titus, and neither will pay damages, the debts neutralize each other, if the losses are equal. The same principle applies in defamatory recriminations.

Right of Defamed Person to Condone Injury.—The person defamed has the right to condone the injury, if it is only personal to himself, but he has not always the right to condone the injury when the defamation causes harm to others.

(a) Thus, the defamed person would sin against justice and his act would be invalid, if he forgave the debt of restitution despite the fact that his own fame was necessary for the fame of others (e.g., when a monk loses his good name, the monastery is also disgraced), or was necessary for the fulfillment of duties owed by him in justice to others (e.g., when a prelate, priest or public official loses his good name, the good influence he should exercise over his subjects is ended). This conclusion is probable.

(b) The defamed person would sin against charity, but his act would be valid, if he forgave the debt of restitution despite the fact that his fame was necessary for the fulfillment of charitable duties owed to others, or that his silence in the face of defamation would cause great scandal (e.g., when a preacher loses his reputation, his words do not move, and thus he is unable fruitfully to accomplish works of charity by instructing the ignorant, etc.).

Excuse from Restitution When Reputation Has Been Recovered.—The obligation of restitution for defamation also ceases when reputation has been recovered without any act on the part of the defamer; for it is clear that one is not bound to give back that which is already had. But restitution may be due, nevertheless, for damages incurred, and some think that compensation (e.g., apology, honor, praise) should be made for the injury of infamy that existed before the good name was regained.

The usual ways in which reputation is recovered without the act of the defamer are: (a) by overthrow of the defamation, as when the facts against it become manifest, or when witnesses prove its falsity, or when a tribunal declares it a criminal libel; (b) by oblivion, as when a misdeed of years ago has faded entirely out of the public memory. If the defamer is uncertain whether his past defamations have been forgotten, he has to act with great prudence; for, if he makes inquiries the memory of the defamations may be awakened, while if he says nothing, the defamations, because never corrected or retracted, may break out anew. He should consider the circumstances, therefore, and treat the defamed person as he would wish himself to be treated in a like case.

457. Principles. - I. A detractor is bound from justice, insofar as it can be done, 1. to repair the reputation unjustly taken away; 2. to compensate all temporal damages arising from the defamation and in some way foreseen.

The reason for the first is that by the taking away of reputation a damaging injury has been inflicted; for the right which each one has to reputation cannot be taken away by private authority: therefore, since restitution of a good unjustly taken away is necessary, that injury must consequently be repaired. - Thus all. - St. Lig., n. 991; and lib. 3, n. 613.

The reason for the second is that all damages arising from detraction must be attributed to the detractor, as to their efficacious cause, whether the crime revealed was false or true, since in either case the detractor has injured reputation unjustly. - Thus commonly. - St. Lig., n. 996.

The obligation of restoring reputation is personal. But the obligation of repairing damages which have arisen from defamation is real, and therefore passes to the heirs.

458. • II. Restitution of reputation must be made in one way by a calumniator, and in another by a simple detractor. Hence:

1. The calumniator is bound to retract the things said, and indeed per se even with loss of his own reputation, if otherwise reparation cannot be made: the reason is that the condition of the innocent person is better than that of the guilty one, and he must impute to his own malice whatever he is going to suffer on that account.

2. A simple detractor cannot retract the things said, because thus he would lie; but in another way, insofar as it is in him, he must restore reputation, by saying, for example, that he spoke badly, that he erred, or something similar; for not only those err who recede from truth, but also those who recede from rectitude, according to that saying of Prov. 14. 22: "They err who work evil." - St. Lig., n. 992. But often that manner does not suffice among intelligent and astute persons, who rather conjecture from these formulas that the crime is true, which is not asserted openly to be false. Therefore then the detractor, keeping silence about the things said, when occasion has been given, with dexterity and truth must praise and honor him from whom he detracted.

459. Resolves. - 1. He who unjustly defamed another by manifesting a true crime is bound to repair the whole damage arising from this, because that unjust revelation is the true and sole cause of the damage. - St. Lig., n. 994.

2. He who detracted by a defamatory pamphlet is bound, so that restitution may be efficacious, to make it by contrary writings or by public revocation. Likewise the reparation must become known if it is known that the defamation has spread to many, but it is unknown to whom it has come. - St. Lig., n. 995.

3. Likewise, in default of the defamer, those are bound to reparation of reputation who cooperated in propagating the defamation; and all these are equally bound concerning damages of fortune, if any have occurred.

The defamer is not bound to asking pardon, if he cannot repair reputation, unless he has injured reputation and honor at the same time; because lost reputation is not restored by asking pardon; nor is he urged more by the obligation of asking pardon than one who cannot restore goods of fortune in which he has injured someone. - Thus commonly.

460. Questions. - Q. 1. What are the causes excusing from restitution of reputation?

Resp. The following are commonly admitted:

1. If the crime which you revealed to one or several has become public by another way, or if reputation has been repaired in another way, for example, by the sentence of a judge, etc.

2. If it is prudently judged that the memory of the crime has been destroyed by oblivion through the passage of time.

3. If restitution of reputation cannot be made without danger to life; because life is a good of a higher order than reputation. Likewise, if the restitution of reputation is of much less value than the loss which the defamer would have to suffer, for example, if he were an honored man and especially very useful to the public good or to Religion.

4. If reparation is morally impossible on account of too great a distance of places, or other special difficulties, which are found especially in the reparation of simple detraction; for example, if those who heard the detractor cannot be recalled from a preoccupied opinion.

5. If it is judged that faith was not given to the detraction by the hearers, as happens rather often when detraction is made in the heat of anger.

6. If the defamed person has expressly or tacitly remitted the obligation, provided he can remit it; indeed sometimes presumed condonation suffices. - St. Lig., n. 1005. But he cannot remit it when scandal follows from his infamy, or damage either common or to his own people, etc.; for example, if there is question of the infamy of a Priest, magistrate, etc. - St. Lig., n. 997 and following.

Q. 2. Whether there is given an obligation of restoring reputation injured without formal injustice, for example, if someone detracts through inadvertence?

Resp. It is affirmed, because each one is bound to repair damage arising from his action, if he conveniently can, as we shall say in the Treatise on Justice and Right. - St. Lig., n. 994.

461. • Q. 3. Whether one defaming is bound to restore reputation also before those who have received mediately the crime revealed by him?

Resp. It is affirmed more probably, indeed also more truly, if you violated reputation among hearers whom you foresaw would easily spread the infamy abroad; because then you are the true cause of the damage; otherwise you are not bound. - St. Lig., n. 991.

Q. 4. Whether you are excused from restitution of reputation, if the injured person also has violated your reputation and does not wish to restore?

Resp. Navarrus, Sporer, and certain others deny; but more probably it must be affirmed with St. Alph., n. 999; because you are not bound to render his right to another, if he refuses to render yours to you.

Q. 5. Whether you are bound to compensate reputation with money, if you cannot restore it?

Resp. It is denied, at least more probably, because justice obliges only to rendering back what was taken away, or an equivalent; but money was not taken away by detraction, nor is it itself equivalent to reputation, since it is of another order. - St. Lig., n. 4000, etc.

580. Principle: He who unjustly injured another's reputation, whether by calumnies or detractions, is bound from justice to restore it, and at the same time to repair all damages which efficaciously and culpably followed from the defamation.

For whoever knowingly and willingly violates another's strict right is bound to repair it; but by unjust detraction or calumny the strict right to reputation is violated, as was said above (n. 377); besides, often, by injuring reputation, by that very fact the goods of fortune are injured; thus a merchant, physician, advocate, etc., by losing reputation, will by that very fact suffer temporal damages: therefore the unjust defamer is also bound to the reparation of damages of this kind.

The obligation of restoring reputation is personal, and therefore regards only the defamer; but the obligation of repairing temporal damages is real, and therefore passes to the heirs, yet not beyond the forces of the inheritance. - Yet many are ignorant of this, and often are to be left in good faith, lest perhaps they commit formal injustice.

581. Corollaries. (a) He who has sinned gravely by defaming another is bound to repair the reputation even with grave inconvenience to himself; for a grave obligation binds with proportionately grave inconvenience. But if someone injured another's reputation not from grave fault, but from inadvertence or imprudence, he is bound to repair the reputation and damage, but not with great inconvenience.

(b) It can happen that a light injury of reputation induces grave damage in goods of fortune, e.g., if someone loses the office of secretary because he is displayed as talkative: then there is a grave obligation of repairing the grave temporal damage, if it was foreseen.

(c) If the whole fault arises not from the side of the speaker, but from the side of the hearers, who understood his words perversely, the detractor must correct the error not from justice, but only from charity.

582. The mode of repairing reputation. (A) The mode is diverse according as the injury was calumny or simple detraction.

(a) If the question concerns calumny, this must be openly retracted, even with loss of one's own reputation, unless the reputation can efficaciously be repaired otherwise, by saying, e.g., that one erred or was deceived: for the innocent person has a right to reputation rather than the calumniator.

(b) If the question concerns simple detraction, the difficulty certainly increases, since the crime unjustly manifested is true; nevertheless reparation can be made in a twofold way: directly, by saying that one was deceived, that one spoke badly and unjustly; indeed, according to some, the defamer can say that he said what was false, by using a mental restriction; nevertheless Billuart denies this, and deservedly, since such a mode of speaking is a lie; - indirectly, by praising and honorably treating him who was defamed, and by excusing his faults; which often is more efficacious than any mental restriction.

583. (B) If the defamation was public, reparation ought to be public in the same way, insofar as can be done: hence, -

(a) The defamer is bound to restore the injured reputation of the neighbor not only before the immediate hearers, but also before the mediate hearers, when he foresaw that the hearers would spread abroad this defamation; but, since direct reparation is often difficult, then it suffices to exhort the hearers that they retract themselves before those to whom they manifested this.

(b) If the defamation was in writings, generally the reparation also ought to be made in writings.

584. Causes excusing from restitution of reputation. Not rarely causes are given which excuse from restitution of reputation, namely: -

(A) If the defamation was not efficacious, because, e.g., the hearers did not give faith to the detractor, - or another, by correcting the detractor, impeded the evil effect; - or if the infamy has already been removed, e.g., because the falsity of the calumny was publicly acknowledged, or was erased by forgetfulness in the course of time: for then careful provision must be made lest, through an inopportune retraction, the defamation revive.

(B) If reparation is physically or morally impossible; e.g., if the hearers of the detraction are unknown, or cannot be approached; if the delict has already become public by another way; or if another's reputation cannot be repaired without one's own damage much graver.

(C) If the injured person has condoned the injury, whether expressly or tacitly, provided he has the power of condoning, and moreover the public good does not stand in the way; for if the question concerned a magistrate or priest, who needs a good name for exercising his function, condonation cannot be made. - To condonation compensation is added, when namely the defamed person himself injured the reputation of the detractor, and does not wish to repair the injury: for then reparation can be deferred until the other is prepared to repair the reputation.

196. On the restitution of reputation.

1. The obligation of the defamer. An unjust defamer (whether he is a detractor or a calumniator) is held from justice to repair: a) as soon as possible, the injured reputation; b) all material damages which he foresaw, at least in a confused manner, would follow from the defamation.

For the defamer is an unjust damager. But an unjust damager is held to repair all damages culpably caused and foreseen at least in a confused manner, as is clear from what was said above, n. 93. The former obligation, namely, to repair the injured reputation, is a strictly personal obligation, and therefore does not pass to the heirs of the defamer.⁴²² But the other obligation is rather real and, when the defamer has died, falls upon his heirs, yet not beyond the goods received from the inheritance. Each of these obligations is grave if the defamation itself was gravely culpable; otherwise it is light. It must be recalled, however, that defamation does not become gravely culpable from the nature of the crime revealed or imputed, but from the evil effect ensuing and foreseen. Hence if someone, e.g., by unjustly narrating that a certain man is talkative, thereby brings it about that the office of secretary which was about to be conferred upon him is denied to him, there is a grave obligation of repairing that damage, provided it was foreseen at least in a confused manner.

Since the defamer is an unjust damager, the same principles concerning the obligation of reparation must be applied in defamation as in damaging. From these is resolved the controversy whether the defamer is held to repair the reputation not only among those to whom he himself narrated the hidden vices, but also among others to whom the same vices were afterward narrated by them. The answer is: If the defamer could and ought to have foreseen such spreading, and if reparation is morally possible for him, he is held; otherwise not. Yet there are authors who excuse the first defamer from this obligation, since he is not always the cause, but only the occasion, that his defamation is propagated further.⁴²³

⁴²² S. Alph., ibid. n. 996.

⁴²³ S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 991.

197. 2. The manner of repairing the effects of defamation.

Reparation must be made in one way by a calumniator and in another way by a detractor.

The calumniator is held openly and effectively to retract his calumnious lies, "confessing that he spoke falsely,"⁴²⁴ unless sufficient excusing causes are present, concerning which there will immediately be discussion. - Hence he is held to say that he narrated something false; if he calumniated in public newspapers, he is held also to sing a recantation in the newspapers.

The detractor indeed cannot properly say that he lied, but he can and ought to excuse the crime revealed by all lawful means by which he can; he ought also deliberately to praise and treat honorably before others him from whom he detracted.

⁴²⁴ The Angelic Doctor briefly embraces the diverse modes of repairing defamation in S. theol. 2, 2, q. 62, a. 2 ad 2, where he seems also to teach that the defamer ought to compensate with money for the injured reputation if another restitution is impossible. St. Alphonsus holds the contrary opinion as the more probable, Theol. mor. l. 3, nn. 627 and 1000.

198. 3. Causes excusing from the reparation of reputation:

a) If no grave defamation actually followed from the unjust speech, e.g., because no one believed it.

b) If the defamation has already been given over to oblivion by the lapse of time.⁴²⁵ It is self-evident.

c) If the defamed person has legitimately remitted the reparation either expressly or tacitly. Compensation can be held as remission, i.e., if the defamed person has also defamed the defamer, and neither wishes to repair the injured reputation. A man placed in public office often cannot remit defamation, and especially calumny, which has gravely injured not only his person but also his state; e.g., a priest, magistrate, etc., cannot gratuitously remit calumnies, because otherwise their state and also the public good would be injured.

d) If reparation is morally or physically impossible, e.g., if the hearers of the detraction are unknown or cannot be approached, if the crime has become public by another way, or if reparation cannot be made without far graver damage to oneself. Certainly the defamer (and especially the calumniator) is held to repair the injured reputation even with great damage; but nevertheless, if that damage far exceeds the harm caused to the defamed person, the latter is judged to renounce his right.⁴²⁶

⁴²⁵ Cf. Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, n. 1438.

⁴²⁶ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 1002.

528. Principles. - I. The detractor is bound from justice, as much as can be done, 1° to repair the reputation unjustly taken away; 2° to compensate all temporal damages arising from the defamation and in some way foreseen.

The reason of the first is that through the taking away of reputation a damaging injury has been inflicted; for the right which each one has to reputation cannot be taken away by private authority; and so, since restitution of a good unjustly taken away is necessary, that injury must be repaired. - Thus all.¹

The reason of the second is that all damages proceeding from detraction are to be attributed to the detractor as their efficacious cause, whether the crime revealed is false or true, since in each case the detractor has unjustly harmed reputation. - Thus commonly.²

II. The obligation of restoring reputation is personal. But the obligation of repairing damages which have arisen from defamation is real, and therefore passes to heirs. - The obligation of restitution urges also if someone has detracted from the dead. Nor can heirs condone it, since they are not masters of another's reputation.

529. • III. Restitution of reputation is to be done in one way by a calumniator, and in another by a simple detractor. Hence:

1° A calumniator is bound to retract the things said, and indeed of itself even with loss of his own reputation, if otherwise reparation cannot be made; the reason is that the condition of the innocent is better than that of the guilty, and he ought to impute to his own malice whatever he is going to suffer on account of this.

2° A simple detractor cannot retract the things said, because thus he would lie, but in another way, as much as is in him, he ought to restore reputation, by saying, for example, that he spoke badly, that he erred, or something similar; for not only those err who recede from truth, but also those who recede from rectitude, according to that saying:³ They err who work evil. But often that mode does not suffice among the intelligent and clever, who rather from these formulas conjecture that the crime is true, which is not openly asserted to be false. Therefore then the detractor, by being silent concerning the things said, on an occasion being given, ought with dexterity and truth to praise and honor him from whom he detracted.

Let the confessor take care that compensations of reputation of this sort, when they can conveniently be made, be made before absolution, because afterward they will be fulfilled with difficulty.⁵

530. You will resolve. - 1° He who has unjustly defamed another by manifesting a true crime is bound to repair the whole damage coming from this and foreseen, at least in common, because that unjust revelation of his is the true and sole cause of the damage.¹ Hence he who in this way impeded someone from entering into a contract with a merchant, who would have perceived honorable profit from it, must satisfy him according to the estimation of the profit. Likewise he who for this reason deprived another of an office - for example, by accusing a man who is now upright of a delict which he secretly committed some years before - is bound to satisfy for the measure of the emolument lost. But in estimating damages, the hope of gain indeed, speculatively speaking, is to be considered with St. Alphonsus;² yet practically the estimation of the hope will have to be judged from the gain itself, account being taken also both of the labor which he was compelled to spend on the office lost and which he now spends on another business, and of the uncertainty whether he would otherwise have discharged the office for a long time, which uncertainty must be attended to especially in our region. Cf. Kenrick.³

2° He who detracted through a libel is bound, so that the restitution be efficacious, to make it by contrary writings or by public revocation. Likewise the reparation ought to become known, if it is known that the defamation has reached many, but it is unknown to whom it came.⁴

3° Likewise, in default of the defamer, those who cooperated in propagating the defamation are bound to reparation of reputation, and all these are equally bound concerning damages of fortune, if any have occurred.

4° A defamer is not bound to petition pardon if he cannot repair reputation; because through the petition of pardon the lost reputation is not restored; nor is he more urged by the obligation of seeking pardon than he who cannot restore goods of fortune in which he has harmed someone. - Thus commonly.

531. Questions. - Quaer. 1° What are the causes excusing from restitution of reputation?

Resp. The following are commonly admitted:

1° If the delict which you revealed to one or several has become public by another way, or if reputation has been repaired in another way, for example by a sentence of a judge, etc.

2° If it is prudently judged that the memory of the crime has been erased by oblivion through passage of time. - But in doubt, a true crime in general is not to be recalled into the memory of men, unless there is evident danger lest that infamy return into memory in another way; for then restitution obtains the desired effect with more difficulty. But if the crime is false, the defamation is to be recalled. Except, however, if perhaps the greater good of the defamed man counsels otherwise, or if certain damage threatens the detractor from the retraction, unless the doubtful damage of the defamed in some case ought to be estimated higher.¹

3° If restitution of reputation cannot be done without much greater damage of the one defaming, as if the danger of life were imminent for him, and not for the defamed, or if a prelate must undergo much graver infamy from restitution of reputation taken away from a lowly man: in which case it will suffice afterward to extol the defamed man with merited praise. L. IV. 1002.

4° If reparation is morally impossible on account of too great distance of places or other special difficulties, which are especially found in the reparation of simple detraction; for example, if those who heard the detractor cannot be recalled from their preconceived opinion.

5° If it is judged that faith was not given to the detraction by the hearers, as happens more often when detraction is done in the heat of anger.

6° If the defamed man has remitted the obligation expressly or tacitly, provided he can remit it; indeed sometimes presumed condonation suffices.² But he remits it invalidly if another, suppose an accomplice, loses reputation thereby; illicitly, namely with charity or piety forbidding, if someone, for example a priest, needs reputation for the utility of others.³

Quaer. 2° Is there given an obligation of restoring reputation harmed without formal injustice, for example, if someone detracts from inadvertence?

Resp. In the affirmative, because each one is bound to repair damage arising from his action, although damaging only materially, if he conveniently can, as we shall say in the Treatise on Justice and Right.⁴

532. • Quaer. 3° Is the defamer bound to restore reputation also before those who have received mediately the crime revealed by him?

Resp. In the affirmative, more probably, if you violated reputation before hearers whom you foresaw would easily divulge the infamy; because then you are the true and voluntary cause of the damage; otherwise you are not bound.¹

Quaer. 4° Are you excused from restitution of reputation if the one harmed has also violated your reputation, and is unwilling to restore it?

Resp. Navarrus, Sporer, and certain others deny; but more probably one must affirm with St. Alphonsus;² because you are not bound to render to another his right if he refuses to render yours to you. (c) p. 481.

Quaer. 5° Are you bound to compensate reputation with money if you cannot restore it?

Resp. In the negative, at least more probably, because justice obligates only to rendering the thing taken away, or its equivalent; but money was not taken away through detraction, nor is it the equivalent of reputation, since it is of another order.³ - Yet foreseen damages are to be repaired. See n. 528. (d) p. 481.

1205. PRINCIPLES. I. The detractor is held both to restore reputation unjustly injured, and to repair other temporal damages following from the detraction and foreseen at least in a confused way. The reason is that he is the efficacious and formally unjust cause of all these (cf. n. 948 ff.).

We have said: 1. Reputation unjustly injured; otherwise, namely, if charity alone had been injured. Further, according to the truer opinion, he is held to restitution of reputation not only before immediate hearers, but also before mediate hearers (insofar as this is morally possible): if namely such divulgation, because it was known that the immediate hearers were talkative, was foreseen, and if the immediate hearers are judged likely to be lacking to the office of restitution.

2. Other temporal damages, say if the one defamed has been deprived of his office; if he is impeded from being able to provide for himself, etc. And it must be noted that the obligation of restoring reputation is personal; but the obligation of repairing damages which have arisen from defamation is real, and therefore it passes to heirs (III, 991, 996).

Note. a) Manifestation of another's offense, made with only material injury, because, for example, the detractor thought the offense was public, or because he did not advert to the malice of detraction, does not induce the burden of restitution, from defect of theological fault. Yet the one manifesting is held, as much as he conveniently can, to impede that another damage follow from his inculpable manifestation (III, 994). b) The defamer is not held to compensate with money the reputation which he cannot restore; because money is not equivalent to the reputation taken away (III, 1000). Cf. the things said n. 928. c) In defect of the first defamer, all those who cooperated efficaciously with the defamation are held to the same restitution (n. 977). d) It can happen that with respect to reputation to be restored the obligation is light, but with respect to damage to be repaired, the obligation is grave.

1206. II. Restitution of reputation must be made in one way by a calumniator, in another by a detractor. For this one narrated the true; but the other affirmed the false.

Therefore the CALUMNIATOR is held to retract the things said, even with an oath, if it is necessary; indeed, with the loss of his own reputation, if otherwise reparation cannot be made; for the condition of the innocent is better than that of the guilty, and the calumniator must impute to his own malice whatever he will suffer in his own reputation on account of the retraction. He who detracted from another through an infamous libel is held, so that restitution may be efficacious, to make it by contrary writings, or by public revocation. Likewise, the reparation ought to become known if it is known that the defamation has reached many, but it is unknown whom it has reached (III, 991, 995; H. Ap., XI, 22).

But the simple DETRACTOR cannot indeed afterward deny the offense which he inequitably manifested, because he would lie; nevertheless, he is held to provide for the reputation of the one infamed through other means, for example by speaking of him honorably, by excusing his errors and vices, by praising his good qualities; by saying that he himself had spoken evil inconsiderately, that he had erred. For not only those err who depart from truth, but also those who depart from rectitude, according to that saying (Prov., 14, 22): They err who work evil. "I," says St. Alphonsus (Praxis, n. 45), "am accustomed to give this counsel, that they say: I drew this out of my head, equivocating; because all words proceed from the mind (for which head is taken)."

1207. III. A just cause can excuse from the obligation of restoring reputation. The reason is that this obligation is affirmative and must be fulfilled through a positive act. But an affirmative obligation ceases on account of a just and proportioned cause; therefore...

But the just causes which excuse from restitution of reputation are the following:

1. Impossibility of restitution, when namely the occult evil unjustly revealed has come to public knowledge by another way; likewise, when the detractor cannot offer reparation without danger of a much graver damage threatening himself, as would be danger of life, liberty, or reputation much more necessary to himself or his own; likewise, on account of distance of places or some other impediment which renders reparation physically or morally impossible.

2. Uselessness, when, for example, it is judged that faith was not added to the detraction. Likewise, if the infamation has been destroyed by the sentence of the judge or by the common judgment of sound-minded persons; or if the detraction has so been handed over to oblivion that its reparation or re-

calling would be judged injurious; always preserved is the obligation of repairing other damages arisen from infamation, if there were any.

3. Just compensation; if namely the infamation was mutual and equivalent, when one of the detractors refuses reparation, the other more probably can, not indeed in revenge, but as a pledge of the reparation owed to himself, defer restitution until the other is at last prepared to satisfy; for the general principle is: "You are not compelled to render to another his right, if he refuses to render yours to you."

4. Presumed condonation of the one infamed, who can yield his right; as often namely as the infamation touched him alone, and reparation is not required either for avoiding scandal or for fulfilling his office. Otherwise, if the infamation redounds into others, or yields to the spiritual or temporal damage of neighbor (cf. n. 1200, Question 6). St. Alph., III, 997 ff.; H. Ap., XI, 19.

1208. IT IS ASKED. What must be done IN DOUBT whether oblivion of the offense exists or not?

Resp. 1. If it is a question of a true offense, it is not easily to be recalled into memory, since generally attention is given rather to the offense than to the detraction. Except unless there is evident danger lest that infamy return into the memory of men in another way.

2. If a false saying has been imposed, the infamation must always be revoked unless oblivion is established; for since the matter is not true, the revocation can import no properly so-called infamy. Except if a greater good of the one infamed persuades otherwise; or if certain damage threatens the detractor from the retraction (III, 998).

1209. PRACTICAL RULES. 1. Let the confessor ask the penitent: "whether he has infamed someone; and if he has done this, whether by imposing a false offense on him, or by making known a true one? And when the offense is true, whether it was occult, or public in some place, by reputation or by sentence of a judge? Likewise let him ask whether he infamed before one or several, and (by reason of scandal) before how many? Likewise, whether he divulged the fact as known by himself, or as heard from others?

2. Let the confessor take care that restitution of reputation, when it can conveniently be made, be made before absolution; because the matter will be fulfilled with difficulty afterward, although it is of lesser difficulty than restitution of money.

3. Let restitution not be exacted if the damage was doubtfully inflicted, or the retraction is doubtfully going to be useful, according to those things which we have just said (n. 1207, 2): "Namely, if restitution of reputation is probably judged going to bring greater damage than utility to the one infamed, then it is better to seize occasions of praising the one marked with infamy in some virtue of his, so that he may place him in the good opinion of others, than to recall past matters into memory by this restitution of reputation" (Praxis, n. 45).

E. Of itself there is an obligation of restoring reputation unjustly taken away, especially if the injury redounds upon others, just as also of repairing other damages which are strictly and of themselves connected with defamation.

Nevertheless, per accidens there is no obligation of restoring reputation:

1. if reputation remained uninjured, as if faith was not given to the detractor, or his detraction was not understood or not spread;

2. if the other has recovered reputation, or infamy has now been deleted by oblivion;

3. if the other inflicted a greater injury which he does not care to repair;

4. if by prudent estimation the other is judged to have condoned;

5. if reputation either cannot be compensated at all, or only with a much greater inconvenience; in which case nevertheless a certain compensation is to be made in some better manner, whether by honoring the other, or by saying good of him.

Restitution of reputation sometimes is done more opportunely through a third person of great authority.

Those cooperating in detraction, who in some way induce the detractor to defaming, are subsidiarily bound, just as he himself is, to restitution; but not those who only internally approve the defamation, or merely take delight in it, or only do not impede it.

443. State of the question. - Just as external goods of fortune unjustly taken away are to be restored, and unjust damage caused in them is to be repaired, so a fortiori it must be held for reputation and honor, which are goods of greater moment. Nevertheless their restitution is not always convenient, but rather often presents special difficulties. Wherefore it must be carefully examined who is bound to restore them; what, when, to whom, how, and before whom he ought to restore; and what are the causes excusing from restoring them.

444. Principle I. He who unjustly injures another's reputation in any way whatsoever is bound from justice to restore it as soon as possible, and to repair all material damages, at least confusedly foreseen, which have effectively and culpably followed from the defamation. - It is said:

a) he who unjustly injures reputation: for where there is no violation of right, there can be no place for reparation; whence if someone has revealed another's crime from necessity or a just cause, he is not bound to restitution;

b) in any way whatsoever, whether internally before himself, by his own judgment of mind, or externally before others, whether by simple detraction or by calumny, whether he himself detracted or unjustly cooperated with one detracting, whether positively he did this by commanding, counseling, consenting, etc., or negatively, by not impeding when he could and from justice ought to impede;

c) he is bound to restore reputation: for what was unjustly taken away must be returned. This obligation of itself is personal and therefore regards only the defamer, but not the heirs, except by accident if the owner promised pecuniary recompense;

d) as soon as possible; otherwise the burden of the defamed person is continued, and there is danger lest the detraction be propagated farther or produce other evil effects;

e) and to repair all material damages which have effectively and culpably followed, namely, real damages which he truly caused, as if the detractor impeded another from profit, office, benefice, or from a fitting marriage, or was the cause why another is dismissed from office or compelled to labor at a lesser wage; but not those things which justly befall the other, or only on occasion of the detraction, as if from it it happens that he is justly sent to prison by a judge, or if the defamed man from sadness kills himself or brings another evil upon himself or his own, because these are related by accident to defamation. This obligation is real, and consequently passes to the heirs, both of the one injuring, though not beyond the forces of the inheritance, and of the one injured.

It is proved: Everyone who knowingly and willingly violates the strict right of another is bound to repair it. But 1) man has a strict right to reputation, which nevertheless can be injured unjustly; therefore he who injures the reputation of another unjustly is bound to repair it; - 2) man also has a strict right that damage not be unjustly brought upon goods of fortune, which nevertheless often comes from injury of reputation; therefore the unjust defamer is also bound to repair these damages.

Both obligations are grave, if the defamation was gravely culpable.

Hence 1° he who sinned gravely by defaming another is bound to repair reputation even with grave inconvenience to himself, for a grave obligation binds with proportionate inconvenience.

2° He who from light fault or from inadvertence or imprudence injured the reputation of another is bound to repair, but without grave inconvenience: for he is bound as far as he can to impede his saying from producing further effects, otherwise the infamy which follows further would also be imputed to him under grave obligation.

3° If the whole fault is not from the speaker but from the hearers, because they interpreted the words of the speaker sinisterly, the speaker is bound not from justice but from charity alone to correct the error.

4° If light infamy has induced grave damage in goods of fortune, as if someone lost the office of secretary because he was presented as talkative, there is a grave obligation of repairing that damage, if it was foreseen, because then the defamation is grave, not by reason of infamy, but by reason of damage.

5° He who injured another's reputation by rash judgment or suspicion is bound to put those away and to conceive a good estimation.

445. The manner of repairing reputation. - Generally reputation is to be repaired in that manner by which the infamy brought upon one's neighbor is truly removed, and therefore the unjust damager must choose the mode which does not seem easier to himself, but which, with the circumstances considered, is truly efficacious. Therefore in practice it will have to be distinguished whether the infamy arose from calumny or detraction, whether it remained secret or became public.

A. If calumny is in question, this is openly to be retracted, even with loss of one's own reputation or of another equivalent good; for in an equal cause the condition of the innocent is better than that of the guilty. Hence, if this is required for an efficacious retraction, the calumniator must confess that he lied; nevertheless sometimes, the circumstances being considered, satisfaction is made to justice by saying that he erred or was deceived; and if the retraction would not be efficacious unless an oath were added or witnesses employed, these means would have to be employed, because they do not appear too difficult.

Only then is the calumniator proportionately excused, if his reputation is necessary for the public good, as if a magistrate calumniated, or if the damage which the defamer would have to suffer by restoring would much exceed the damage of the defamed man: thus defamation is not to be repaired with danger of life, unless death also threatens the defamed man himself from the defamation.

B. If simple defamation is in question, a special difficulty comes from this, that the crime unjustly manifested is true. Therefore the detractor cannot declare that he spoke what was false; for this would be a lie, but a lie is never lawful. Therefore he must repair the injured reputation in another way, either formally and directly, or equivalently and indirectly.

1° Formally and directly, if it thus benefits the defamed man: by saying that he spoke unjustly and badly, that he did injury to the other, indeed, by using amphibology, that he erred, that he did not say the matter as it was to be said; nevertheless let him act cautiously, lest the hearers, understanding the ambiguity, be confirmed more in their sinister opinion.

2° Equivalently and indirectly, if directly he can effect nothing before astute hearers: by speaking honorably concerning the defamed man, by praising him when occasion is given, especially in similar matter, or by excusing him, and in various ways promoting his good reputation. This manner of repairing is often safer and more efficacious than the former, which smells of mental restriction.¹

¹ "Someone can take away someone's reputation in three ways: in one way by saying what is true and justly, for instance when someone discloses another's crime with due order observed, and then he is not bound to restitution of reputation; in another way by saying what is false and unjustly, and then he is bound to restore reputation, by saying that he said what was false; in a third way by saying what is true, but unjustly, for instance when someone discloses another's crime against due order, and then he is bound to restitution of reputation, as much as he can, without lying however, as for instance by saying that he spoke badly, or that he unjustly defamed him; or if he cannot restore reputation, he ought to compensate him otherwise" II-II, q. 62, a. 2, ad 2.

C. If the defamation was public and widely spread, the reparation also ought to be public, so that it may be efficacious insofar as it can be; hence:

1° Defamation published in writing and in print is fittingly repaired in the same way, and ordinarily is to be repaired thus; indeed even defamation made orally is often suitably repaired in that public way, especially if it has already been widely diffused and it is unknown to whom it has come;

2° otherwise, however, first it must be retracted before the immediate hearers themselves, because before them the defamer was the immediate cause of infamy;

3° then also before mediate hearers, insofar as the diffusion must be attributed to the fault of the defamer and reparation is possible: a) thus of itself, if by direct intention he disclosed the crime so that the hearers would divulge it, or moved them to this by command or persuasion; or also if he told light and talkative persons whom he foresaw would easily publish it, at least if he did it without stipulation of secrecy: for then the damage of further defamation was foreseen and voluntary;

b) on the contrary, if he narrated under secrecy, or to such persons whom he prudently judged would not publish the matter further: for then the further infamy is involuntary to him, and must be imputed to the malice of the hearers;

c) in practice, reparation before mediate hearers is often morally impossible; in which case it suffices to retract before the immediate hearers, at the same time exhorting them to do the same, when opportunity is given, before those to whom they manifested the crime.

In the case in which the defamation is at least in part irreparable, some reparation through money can be counseled, especially in the case in which the defamer is rich, but the defamed man poor and willing to accept a compensation of this kind.

446. Several causes excusing from restitution of reputation are listed:

1° Absence of damage, namely, if the defamation was not efficacious, because for example the hearers did not understand, or did not give faith to the detractor, or knew the matter from elsewhere, or another, by correcting the detractor, impeded the evil effect.

2° Cessation of damage, namely, if the infamy has already been removed, whether because reputation was recovered through a good life, or because the falsity of the calumny was publicly acknowledged, or the defamation was destroyed by oblivion in the course of time: for then one must altogether beware lest by an inopportune retraction the defamation come back to life.

3° Impotence, by which namely reparation is physically or morally impossible, as if the hearers of the detraction are unknown, or cannot be approached; if the delict has become public by another way; or another's reputation cannot be repaired without one's own far graver damage: then the defamed man is judged to renounce his right.

4° Remission or condonation by the injured person, whether express or tacit, provided he has the power of perfectly condoning, and the public good does not stand in the way from elsewhere; for if infamy redounds to others, or scandalizes others, or stands in the way of an office being duly performed, as of a magistrate or priest, who needs a good name for exercising his office, perfect condonation cannot be made: for then the defamation also injures the state.

5° Mutual compensation, provided the injuries on both sides are equal, and a third party does not suffer from it. Compensation is not to be understood in the sense that the defamed man can defame his defamer: for this would be mere vengeance; but because, if the defamed man himself has injured the reputation of the detractor and does not wish to repair the injury, reparation can be delayed until the other is prepared to repair reputation.

Thus plebeians are judged tacitly to remit injuries to one another, since they know that very often others detract from them and nevertheless do not restore; whence neither are they presumed to demand restitution, or certainly to wish to use mutual compensation in not restoring.

Question 7. What are the causes excusing from restitution of reputation?

Response. The following are commonly admitted: 1st. if the offense which you revealed to one or more persons has become public by another way, or if the reputation has been repaired in another way, e.g., by the sentence of a judge, etc.; 2nd. if it is prudently judged that the memory of the crime has been effaced by the passage of time or by oblivion; 3rd. if restitution of reputation cannot be made without danger to life, because life is a good of a higher order; likewise if the restitution of reputation is of much less value than the loss which the defamer would have to suffer, e.g., if he were an honorable man and especially very useful to the public good or to religion; 4th. if the reparation is morally impossible on account of excessive distance of places or other special difficulties, which are especially found in the reparation of simple detraction, e.g., if those who heard the detractor cannot be recalled from a preconceived opinion; 5th. if it is judged that belief was not given to the detraction by the hearers, as happens rather often when detraction is done in the heat of anger; 6th. if the defamed person has remitted the obligation expressly or tacitly, provided he can remit it; indeed sometimes presumed condonation suffices. But he cannot remit it when from his infamy there follows scandal or harm either common or to his own, etc., e.g., if it concerns the infamy of a priest, magistrate, etc. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 997 and 998.

Question 8. Is he who is only materially a calumniator, namely because he manifested a false crime which he had thought to be true, bound to restore reputation with danger of losing his own?

Response. A material calumniator, when the error has been discovered, is held to restitution, but not so strictly as he who made the calumny through formal injury: for the latter is held even with detriment to his own reputation, even equal detriment; the former not likewise, but only insofar as he can without his own notable inconvenience. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 993.

Question 9. Is there an obligation of restoring reputation from simple detraction only materially unjust, e.g., if someone detracts from inadvertence?

Response. Affirmatively, as soon as he adverts to the injustice, in the same way as one who sets fire to another's house without formal fault is held to extinguish the fire as soon as he adverts, if he conveniently can; otherwise the harm which follows from it will be imputed to him. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

Question 10. Is one who defames bound to restore reputation even before those who received mediately the crime revealed by him?

Response. Negatively, if he did not foresee, not even confusedly, the propagation of his detraction, and a fortiori if before or after the violation of reputation he demanded secrecy; for then he is not the true and unjust cause of the extension of the harm. - But otherwise it must be said if he detracted for this reason, that he might lead the hearers to repeat the infamy, because then they are to be judged as an instrumental cause which the detractor uses. - But if there was indeed foresight of the propagation, but not an express and positive intention of harming by the help of the hearers, according to St. Alphonsus, more truly he is held, because foresight alone suffices that the detractor be called the true cause of the whole harm. Nevertheless, he seems able to be excused from such a burden not only by reason of moral impossibility, which is often present, but also because after all the true cause of so great a harm is the action freely placed by the hearers. Besides, according to the testimony of Cardinal de Lugo, the practice of confessors is that such a burden is not imposed. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 991. - Lugo, de just. et jur., disp. 15, nn. 15 and 16.

Question 11. Are you excused from restitution of reputation if the injured person also violated your reputation, and does not wish to restore it?

Response. Many theologians deny, but more probably one must affirm with St. Alphonsus; because you are not held to render to another his right if he refuses to render yours to you. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 999.

That reputation is a good having marketable value, the taking away of which obliges in justice to restitution, is certain. For reputation is good estimation among others, of which Proverb. 22: Melius est nomen bonum, quam divitiae multae. From this S. Bonaventure p. p. Centil. sect. 13 deduces that the detractor is held under greater obligation to Restitution than the thief, which Valentia thereupon noted disp. 5. quaest. 6. puncto 5.

Therefore the detractor is held to restore reputation, three conditions concurring. The first is that the reputation have been taken away — for sometimes reputation is not removed by a saying, either because it is not believed, or because that sin does not blacken a person of that rank, as if you say of a knight: He wounded another man. The second condition is that the reputation have been taken away unjustly. The third, that the defamed man have not redeemed his stolen reputation. Thus they report from the common teaching: Soto Lib. 4. de Iustitia, quaest. 6. art. 3, Valentia disp. 5. quaest. 6. puncto 5, Turrianus disp. 53. dub. 3, Caspensis disp. 10. sect. 5.

I assert, therefore, first, that the unjust detractor is held to restore reputation, even with the loss of his own reputation, though not of his life, even by saying (if need be) that he lied. Thus D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. ad 2, Caietanus ibi, Sotus Lib. 4. de Iustitia, quaest. 6. art. 3, Petrus Navar. Lib. 2. de restit. cap. 4. disput. 5. num. 375, Michael Salonius 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. controu. 13, Navar. in manuali Latino, cap. 18. num. 45, Rodriquez 2. part. summae, cap. 45, Lopez prima parte, instruct. cap. 16, Sayrus Lib. 11. cap. 3. num. 21, Filliucius Tom. 2. tract. 32. cap. 9. num. 145, Malder. de Iust. tract. 7. cap. 2. dub. 9. fol. 554, et all the Doctors commonly, as in Valentia loco cit. Fagundez in octavum praeceptum Decal. cap. 15, Tannerum disp. 4. quaest. 6. dub. 4, Bassaeum V. Detractio, 2. num. 4.

Some add a little exception: unless there be great inequality — as if the defamed man be of low condition, but the defamer of great dignity, and he suffer greater detriment by saying he lied. Thus Sotus and Valentia, although Nauarrus doubts of this: for one is not held to make greater restitution than what he took away. Whence it comes about that he is not held to restore reputation with the loss of his own life; for although reputation is a kind of civil death, as Anselmo teaches Lib. de simil. cap. 147 as cited by D. Bonaventure in Pharetra Lib. 3. cap. 3. §. De Detractione, still it is not the proper taking away of life, but of a good inferior to life itself, namely reputation, which outweighs riches, according to Proverb. 22; and accordingly it binds more to restitution than the taking away of an eye, as the Saintly Doctor again enjoins in speculo animae, cap. 1. Most follow this doctrine, as in Fagundez cap. 15 et Dianam part. 2. Tract. 5. resol. 29 et 30.

There is, moreover, a question there in Diana: whether one who falsely defamed someone is held, if need be, to swear that he spoke falsely. They answer affirmatively: Caietanus and Aragon 2. 2. quaest. 62. artic. 2, where also Sylvius quaestione 22. tractat. 32. cap. 20. num. 245, Turrianus disp. 52. dub. 1, Salon de Iust. tom. 1. quaest. 62. art. 2. controv. 3, Carbo de restit. quaest. 18, Villalob. in summa, Tom. 2. tract. 11. diff. 37, Tanner. 2. 2. disp. 4. quaest. 6. dub. 6. num. 141, Diana ibi, Fagundez Lib. 8. cap. 15, Navar. cap. 18. num. 45, Pet. Navar. Lib. 2. cap. 4. num. 137, Sotos de Iust. Lib. 4. quaest. 6. art. 3, Faustus in speculo, disp. 21. quaest. 21, Bassaeus num. 9. Nay, they add — Molina tom. 5. disp. 41, Ioan. de la Cruz in Direct. pract. 1. punct. 7. art. 2. dub. 5, Soto, Aragon, and Salon — that he must, if need be, even bring witnesses.

I WONDER, however, that the Doctors so crowd headlong into binding consciences; for, as Faventinus observes in 4. dist. 15. quaest. 3. disp. 53. cap. 1. num. 32, the ancient Theologians — such as S. Bonaventure in the places adduced and elsewhere, Alensis part. 2. quaest. 129. memb. 6, D. Thom. quaest. 62. art. 2. ad 2, Scotus loco cit. — require only a simple retraction. But the modern Zealots superadd a most heavy burden, which perhaps they themselves do not touch with a finger.

The Doctors bring forward a certain SMOOTH manner of restoring reputation. For since to say one lied is an arduous act, they teach that the reputation is to be restored by praising the defamed man before those who had heard the detraction. Thus Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2, Soto de Iustitia, lib. 4. quaest. 9. art. 3. ad 4, Villalob. in summa, Tom. 2. tract. 11. diff. 37. num. 4, Tannerus 2. 2. disp. 4. quaest. 6. dub. 4. num. 143, Valentia quaest. 4. puncto 5 and quaest. 17. puncto 2, Fagundez in octavum praeceptum, Lib. 8. cap. 15. num. 3, Lessius Lib. 2. cap. 11. dub. 10, Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2, Faustus in speculo confess. disp. 21. quaest. 74. num. 6, Diana loco cit. Whatever they may bring to the contrary: Layman Lib. 3. sect. 5. tract. 3. part. 2. cap. 7, Navar. lib. 2. cap. 4. num. 370, Faber n. 46, Sylvius 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. quaeritur 22, Fillucius Tom. 2. tract. 31. cap. 10. num. 246.

IT IS ASKED second: whether the defamer, not being able to restore the reputation, can, and ought, to make satisfaction with money.

They AFFIRM that he is held: Layman Lib. 3. sect. 5. tract. 3. part. 2. cap. 7, Filliuc. Tom. 2. tract. 32. cap. 10. n. 239, Turrianus 1. 2. tomo 2. disp. 53. dub. 7, Faber in 4. disp. 53. cap. 4. num. 122, Malderus 2. 2. tract. 7. cap. 7. dub. 8, Navarrus cap. 17. num. 19, Bannes 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2, Sylvest. verbo Detractio, quaest. 4, Navar. lib. 2. cap 4. num. 416, Lessius Lib. 2. cap. 11. disp. 11, and others as in Bassaeum num. 7.

OTHERS, however, as in Diana resol. 50 citata, propose with probability that it can be done. Thus Villalob. Tom. 2. tract. 11. diffic. 39, Sotos de Iust. Lib. 4. quaest. 6. art. 2, Aragon 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2, Valentia disp. 5. quaest. 6. puncto 5, Couar. lib. 1. variar. cap. 2. num. 8, Molina tract. 4. disput. 25, Sà V. Infamia, num. 7, Sylvius 1. 2. quaestio 62. art. 2. Quaeritur 22, post Rebell. — Sotum, Richardum, Adrianum, Caietanum, and others as in Fagundez Lib 8. cap. 14. num. 11, asserting also Couar. reg. peccatum, p. p. num. 6 et Lib. 1. var. resol. cap. 2. num. 8, Cordubam quaest. 33. art. 2, Lopez p. p. Instruct. cap. 116, Salonium 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. controv. 13, Rodriquez 2. part. summa, cap. 45, Rebell. Lib. 2. quaest. 10, the Gloss on cap. Ecclesia sanctae Mariae extra, ut lite pendente nihil innovetur, Malderum de Iust. tract. 7. cap. 2. de restit. famae, dub. 8, Tannerum disp. cit. num. 150, and others adduced above. Add Bassaeum num. 7, who says it can be done in equity if the defamer is poor.

The OPINION of the Seraphic Doctor, in my judgment, is that this compensation cannot be made. Thus the authorities cited, to whom add Caspensem disp. 10. sect. 5. num. 37, and Tanner judges it probable.

The rationale of D. Bonaventure, in nearly all the places cited and ad cap. 10. Ecclesiast., is this: Restitution is an act of Justice, reducing to equality according to commutation through compensation of what was taken away; but money, or other goods of fortune, are not proportionate to compensating reputation: Therefore. The minor is proved by Proverb. 22, Melius est nomen bonum, quam divitiae multae, and Ecclesiasticus 41, Curam habe de bono nomine: hoc enim tibi magis permanebit, quam mille thesauri pretiosi. The authors of our opinion use this rationale, from which it also follows that, conversely, one is not held to restore with goods of a higher order of life. Thus it is laid down in cap. offi. II., de poenit. et remiss, and the Doctors commonly cite it as in Fagundez in octavum Praeceptum Lib. 8. cap. 13 and Diana part. 2. Tract. 3. resol. 30 — even if the defamed man is a noble defamed by a VILE man. The reason has already been given. IT WILL BE ASKED third: whether one who, without just cause, makes known the hidden crime of someone to one or two prudent men whom he knows will not spread it about, sins mortally.

YOU WILL ASK third: whether one who, without just cause, makes known the hidden crime of someone to one or two prudent men whom he knows will not spread it about, sins mortally.

They answer AFFIRMATIVELY: Turrianus 2. 2. Tom. 2. disp. 53. dub. 8, Sotus de Iust. Lib. 7. quaest. 10. art. 2, Molina de Iust. tract. 4. disp. 29, Lessius Lib. 2. cap. 11. dub. 11. num. 70, Bannes 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2, Azor. Tom. 1. Lib. 6. cap. 9, Fillincius Tom. 2. tract. 40. cap. 4. num. 91, Suarez tom. 4. disp. 34. sect. 1, Villalob. Tom. 2. tract. 11. diffic. 36, Valentia tomo 3. disp. 5. quaest. 17. puncto 2, Malderus 2. 2. tract. 7. cap. 1. dub. 4, Layman Lib. 3. sect. 5. tract. 3. part. 2. cap. 3, Ioan. de la Cruz part. 8. quaest. 2. art. 2. dub. 3, Salonius 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2, who state this opinion to be common among the more recent Thomists; Fagundez also defends it in octavum praeceptum, Lib. 8. cap. 2. num. 7, and Bassaeus V. Detractio 1. num. 11.

Caietanus teaches the CONTRARY opinion, 1. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2, Navar. de restit. Lib. 2. cap. 4. num. 234, Graffius lib. 2. cap 137, and others; and many of the adversaries hold this opinion probable, as Tanner. 2. 2. disput. 4. quaest. 8 dub. 7. num. 138, Ioan. de la Cruz, and others, with whom Diana subscribes, part. 2. Tract. 5. resol. 23.

The OPINION of D. Bonaventure is that this man sins mortally. His rationale, which the Moderns use as in Diana and Fagundez, is that reputation is blackened even before one or two. Wherefore Jesus Christ in Matth. 18 grants that one or two be called to correct someone when the obstinate man refuses solitary correction; otherwise he commands it to be done inter te, et ipsum solum. For one man could be harming, even if prudent, and of the sort Christ desires to help in reproving the fallen. For he wills that suitable men be chosen to raise up the fallen; and indeed reputation is often more harmed if it is said to one weighty person than if to many of the common people; but especially if the defamed man depended upon him. Thus the Saintly Doctor defines this question at those words of Ecclesiasticus 10, Si mordeat serpens in silentio, nihil eo minus habet, qui occulte detrahit, from which he elicits a new argument; for the striking is deadly even when secret before one whom he defames, for he compares this to the striking of a venomous serpent.

They OBJECT that the prudent man would not reveal it. It is answered, as I said, that it makes no difference. Next, who made you the guarantor of this?

ANOTHER doubt arises: whether the detractor is held to restitution of damages in the goods of the man's household, and in other things, lost on account of his ruined reputation.

A DISTINCTION must be made. For if he defamed him falsely, he is held to full restitution of all damages. Thus commonly with Lessio Tom. 1. Lib. 2. cap. 12. de detract. dub. 19. numero 101.

Sayro lib. 11. cap. 3. de restit. bon. exter. num. 17, Soto lib. 4. de Iust. quaest. 6. art. 3. ad 4, Pet. Navar. lib. 2. de restit. cap. 4. disp. 4. num. 375, Navar. summa Lat. cap. 18. num. 47, Salon 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. controv. 20; and it is clear from cap. si culpa, de iniur. et damn. as Fagundez notes in octavum Praeceptum, lib. 8. cap. 24. num. 5, who observes that this opinion is to be understood of goods already existing in possession; but as regards goods in hope — say, if on account of the defamation he was impeded from some dignity — he says the matter must be judged by a prudent man.

HE ADDS, moreover, that even one who defamed of a true crime is not held to restore goods in hope in full, but well those already acquired. Thus also Navar. summa, cap. 18. num. 45, Sayrus lib. 11. cap. 3. de restit. bon. exter. num. 20, Lessius Tomo 1. lib. 2. cap. 12. de detract. et contum. n. 19 et num. 109, Petrus Navar. de restit. cap. 4. dub. 6. num. 384, and Salon. supra.

The rationale of the latter is that the debt of restitution arises not from the quantity of the sin, but from the quantity of the damage inflicted; whence, although one who speaks the truth sins less, yet he inflicted the same damage unjustly. Nor say that he gave the occasion by his own sin. For it is answered that the crime would inflict no damage except through the mediation of knowledge, and the detractor has no right to set this cause in motion. But he who is the cause of an unjust damaging is immediately constituted guilty of restitution, as the Saintly Doctor argues in Speculo animae, cap. 1, and with him Bassaeus, v. Detractio 2. num. 2.

A doubt, however, OCCURS here at once: whether he is held to restore the reputation before all those to whose notice the sin came through those to whom he himself told it.

Faber answers NEGATIVELY, disp. 35. allegata, cap. 1. num. 35, adducing Alensem. See Dianam loc. cit. resol. 34, Tannerum disput. 4. quaest. 6. dub. 6. num. 146, and others as in him and in Villalob. Tom. 2. tract. 11. diffic. 37. num. 11.

I JUDGE with Villalobos loc. cit. and Caspensi Tract. 18. de Restit. disp. 10. sect. 5. num. 33, and Diana, that such a man is excused if he believed those to whom he told it would not defame him to others; but if he believed they would defame him, he is held; for what is the cause of a cause is also the cause of what is caused. But the cause of the damaging is guilty of restitution, as the Saintly Doctor says loco citato.

I SUBMIT ANOTHER doubt: whether, if someone tells another of an injury secretly inflicted upon himself by someone, in order to lessen his grief, he sins mortally. Diana answers negatively loc. cit. resol. 32, with Sylvio 2. 2. quaestion. 62. art. 2. quaerit. 15, Lessio lib. 2. cap. 11. dub. 12. num. 31, Navar. lib. 1. cap. 4. num. 345, Molina tract. 4. disp. 29. num. 5, Layman lib. 3. sect. 5. tract. 3. p. 2. cap. 3. num. 6, Tannero 2. 2. disp. 4. quaest. 8. dub. 7. num. 145, and others commonly. But Ioan. de la Cruz in Direct. p. 8. quaest. 2. art. 2. dub. 3 adds more. If a person gravely injured in secret, unable to restrain himself from grief, breaks out into public complaints, he is not immediately condemned of mortal guilt if the injurer is defamed; for it seems hard to restrain so afflicted a mind from breaking into complaints, since this is most natural. He adduces for this opinion also Ludovicum Lopes.

I judge S. Bonaventure assents to these, who at those words Eccles. 10. Si mordeat serpens in silentio reduces the causes of detracting someone's reputation to three heads.

The FIRST is from necessity, when he is compelled by some legitimate precept, human or divine. Human, when he who can commands him to speak; Divine, when conscience dictates to a man that he is bound to look after his neighbor, that he may be corrected, according to that precept of the Lord concerning fraternal correction.

The SECOND head is from usefulness, when he tells the evil of someone to one who can help and not harm, as when he tells it to a man who loves and sympathizes and has the will to correct him.

The THIRD is from the lust of detracting. When, therefore, neither necessity is considered nor usefulness, even if it be the truth, he is not excused from the lust of detracting; indeed he sins the sin of detraction. Thus the Saintly Doctor.

THEREFORE he replies further, that if some usefulness intervenes, it is not a sin.

He adds in speculo animae, cap. 1. what Cruz says. Yet it matters greatly whether this vice proceeds from envy, or from an indiscreet Zeal of justice; for it sometimes happens that the evils of others, done out of a certain indignation or lightness of speech, are recited, or even aggravated, without the intention of defaming anyone as evil — which it would be hard to judge mortal. Thus the Saintly Doctor.

FINALLY many admit compensation, if the other also took away the other's reputation and is unwilling to restore it. Thus Toletus lib. 5. cap. 7, Lessius disput. 25, Molina disp. 49, Sylvius 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. quaeritur 10, Malder. 2. 2. tract. 7. cap. 2. n. 14, Diana p. 2. Tract. 5. resol. 30. ante controv. 13 et 24, Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. ad 2, Petro de Navar. lib. 2. de restit. cap. 4. num. 6, Sayro lib. 11. cap. 8, and others, after D. Bonau. in 3. dist. 9. quaest. 4 et 5. Moreover honor is harmed by words, as by insults which impose faults to one's face; by insults which also oppose penal charges, such as being a bastard, etc.; by reproaches, casting up the miseries from which he has been relieved. So also by deeds one is harmed, by blows, scourges, etc., as the Doctors commonly teach with D. Bonau. in speculo animae, cap. 1; and accordingly they are held, as inflictors of damage, to restitution, as all concede. And indeed that it is a mortal sin, if they are grave.

IT IS PROVED by the Saintly Doctor loc. cit. from that of Matth. 5: Qui dixerit fratri suo, Racha: reus erit iudicio. Qui dixerit fratri suo, fatue: reus erit gehennae ignis. The Saintly Doctor expounds what Racha is in serm. 1. in Dominica 5. post Pentec.; and Racha is an interjection of one indignant, expressing a Hebrew word which signifies empty or vain; but it is worse to call one a fool, and he calls these the insulting and the revilers, and there calls strikers those who damage and are condemned. Hence the Saintly Doctor proves, in serm. 4. in Dominica 5. post Pentec., that these insulting revilers are held to satisfaction. For the Lord adds: Si ergo offers munus tuum ad altare, et ibi recordatus fueris, quia frater tuus habet aliquid adversum te, etc. vade prius reconciliari fratri tuo. On this testimony rest Fagundez in octavum praeceptum Decal. lib. 8. cap. 18. num. 9 and others.

IN MANY ways, however, this restitution of honor can be made. First, by honorable nomination; and Fagundez says this manner is enough for superiors, Lessius Tom. 1. lib. 2. cap. 11. de contum. dub. 27, Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 72, adducing D August. de regulis superior.

SECONDLY, by asking pardon. And they say that this inferiors owe to superiors: Fagundez num. 10, Lessius loc. cit. num. 145. Nay, if the injury is atrocious, Fagundez says, it can be juridically decreed that the suppliant ask pardon with a rope about his neck; and he says that when this was done, it was decreed in the most flourishing kingdom of the Gauls, in the time of Louis XIII, who governed that most flourishing Empire most justly and most prudently, as this Spaniard exclaims.

THIRDLY, by inviting to dinner and giving a place of honor. Thus Fagundez num. 13 and Petrus Nauar. lib. 2. cap. 4. num. 63. Lessius lib. 2. cap. 11. de contum. dub. 27. Filliuc. Tom. 2. tract. 32. cap. 9.

COMMONLY, however, they assert that pardon must be asked if the injury is grave. Thus Sotus lib. 4. de Iustitia, quaest. 6. art. 3. ad 5, Mastrius, Ledesma 2. 4. quaest. 18. art. 2. dub. 8, Sylvest. verb. Contumel. quaest. 4, after Nicolao de Lyra and Abul. in id Matth. 5. Si offers munus tuum, etc., Barthol. Medina lib. 1. Instruct. Confessar. cap. 14. §. 35, Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. ad 3, Salon. ibidem, controv. 24, Valentia disp. 5. quaest. 16. punct. 1, Clauis regia lib. 11. cap. 8.

OTHERS, however, assign a milder reason. Thus Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 72. art. 3, Couar. lib. 2. variarum, cap. 10, Corduba de detract. quaest. 3. concl. 11, Angles in floribus 4. quaest. de restit. art. 1, Petr. Nauar. lib. 2. de restit. cap. 4. p. 1. dub. 6. This, I think, is the opinion of D. Bonaventure; for in the places cited he only says one is held to restitution, but he does not lay down the manner as a precept, on which account the rest rely. They subscribe with others: Turrianus disp. 53. dub. 11, Caspens. disp. 10. sect. 5, Tanner. num. 158, adducing others.

But what turns my stomach is that some of the authorities cited compel subjects to ask pardon, but never superiors. I argue against it, thus: Restitution establishes equality and mediocrity, which consists in the thing, not in reason, as Aristot. 3. Eth. cap. 6 says — although it establishes it in reason also, as I taught in prima secundae Tract. de actibus humanis, disp. quaest. — yet it depends upon the thing; but this is not a restitution of honor, when you defamed the man by calling him by the name of Honor: Therefore. I do not see what restitution of honor this is. The natural law cannot be undermined, and so easily dispensed. Nor did D. Augustine speak in a grave matter, but in light ordinary ones. For when a superior, out of an indiscreet Zeal of justice or love, so exceeds that he thus acts inordinately, such that he would incur such contumelious defamation, then the Zeal of justice would by no means excuse him from sinning mortally. But who shall exempt such a one from restitution of the honor taken away? Truly it ought to be compensated to the Commutative according to an Arithmetic proportion: if you cried out against a man as a thief or infamous, you must bring forward that he is not infamous, and render the counterpass of the contumely received to the man offended — even if you were the Duke of Macqueda.