Article — Marc, Institutiones Morales
Article IV: On Restitution of Reputation
- PRINCIPLES. I. The detractor is held both to restore reputation unjustly injured, and to repair other temporal damages following from the detraction and foreseen at least in a confused way. The reason is that he is the efficacious and formally unjust cause of all these (cf. n. 948 ff.).
We have said: 1. Reputation unjustly injured; otherwise, namely, if charity alone had been injured. Further, according to the truer opinion, he is held to restitution of reputation not only before immediate hearers, but also before mediate hearers (insofar as this is morally possible): if namely such divulgation, because it was known that the immediate hearers were talkative, was foreseen, and if the immediate hearers are judged likely to be lacking to the office of restitution.
- Other temporal damages, say if the one defamed has been deprived of his office; if he is impeded from being able to provide for himself, etc. And it must be noted that the obligation of restoring reputation is personal; but the obligation of repairing damages which have arisen from defamation is real, and therefore it passes to heirs (III, 991, 996).
Note. a) Manifestation of another's offense, made with only material injury, because, for example, the detractor thought the offense was public, or because he did not advert to the malice of detraction, does not induce the burden of restitution, from defect of theological fault. Yet the one manifesting is held, as much as he conveniently can, to impede that another damage follow from his inculpable manifestation (III, 994). b) The defamer is not held to compensate with money the reputation which he cannot restore; because money is not equivalent to the reputation taken away (III, 1000). Cf. the things said n. 928. c) In defect of the first defamer, all those who cooperated efficaciously with the defamation are held to the same restitution (n. 977). d) It can happen that with respect to reputation to be restored the obligation is light, but with respect to damage to be repaired, the obligation is grave.
- II. Restitution of reputation must be made in one way by a calumniator, in another by a detractor. For this one narrated the true; but the other affirmed the false.
Therefore the CALUMNIATOR is held to retract the things said, even with an oath, if it is necessary; indeed, with the loss of his own reputation, if otherwise reparation cannot be made; for the condition of the innocent is better than that of the guilty, and the calumniator must impute to his own malice whatever he will suffer in his own reputation on account of the retraction. He who detracted from another through an infamous libel is held, so that restitution may be efficacious, to make it by contrary writings, or by public revocation. Likewise, the reparation ought to become known if it is known that the defamation has reached many, but it is unknown whom it has reached (III, 991, 995; H. Ap., XI, 22).
But the simple DETRACTOR cannot indeed afterward deny the offense which he inequitably manifested, because he would lie; nevertheless, he is held to provide for the reputation of the one infamed through other means, for example by speaking of him honorably, by excusing his errors and vices, by praising his good qualities; by saying that he himself had spoken evil inconsiderately, that he had erred. For not only those err who depart from truth, but also those who depart from rectitude, according to that saying (Prov., 14, 22): They err who work evil. "I," says St. Alphonsus (Praxis, n. 45), "am accustomed to give this counsel, that they say: I drew this out of my head, equivocating; because all words proceed from the mind (for which head is taken)."
- III. A just cause can excuse from the obligation of restoring reputation. The reason is that this obligation is affirmative and must be fulfilled through a positive act. But an affirmative obligation ceases on account of a just and proportioned cause; therefore...
But the just causes which excuse from restitution of reputation are the following:
Impossibility of restitution, when namely the occult evil unjustly revealed has come to public knowledge by another way; likewise, when the detractor cannot offer reparation without danger of a much graver damage threatening himself, as would be danger of life, liberty, or reputation much more necessary to himself or his own; likewise, on account of distance of places or some other impediment which renders reparation physically or morally impossible.
Uselessness, when, for example, it is judged that faith was not added to the detraction. Likewise, if the infamation has been destroyed by the sentence of the judge or by the common judgment of sound-minded persons; or if the detraction has so been handed over to oblivion that its reparation or re-
calling would be judged injurious; always preserved is the obligation of repairing other damages arisen from infamation, if there were any.
Just compensation; if namely the infamation was mutual and equivalent, when one of the detractors refuses reparation, the other more probably can, not indeed in revenge, but as a pledge of the reparation owed to himself, defer restitution until the other is at last prepared to satisfy; for the general principle is: "You are not compelled to render to another his right, if he refuses to render yours to you."
Presumed condonation of the one infamed, who can yield his right; as often namely as the infamation touched him alone, and reparation is not required either for avoiding scandal or for fulfilling his office. Otherwise, if the infamation redounds into others, or yields to the spiritual or temporal damage of neighbor (cf. n. 1200, Question 6). St. Alph., III, 997 ff.; H. Ap., XI, 19.
- IT IS ASKED. What must be done IN DOUBT whether oblivion of the offense exists or not?
Resp. 1. If it is a question of a true offense, it is not easily to be recalled into memory, since generally attention is given rather to the offense than to the detraction. Except unless there is evident danger lest that infamy return into the memory of men in another way.
- If a false saying has been imposed, the infamation must always be revoked unless oblivion is established; for since the matter is not true, the revocation can import no properly so-called infamy. Except if a greater good of the one infamed persuades otherwise; or if certain damage threatens the detractor from the retraction (III, 998).
- PRACTICAL RULES. 1. Let the confessor ask the penitent: "whether he has infamed someone; and if he has done this, whether by imposing a false offense on him, or by making known a true one? And when the offense is true, whether it was occult, or public in some place, by reputation or by sentence of a judge? Likewise let him ask whether he infamed before one or several, and (by reason of scandal) before how many? Likewise, whether he divulged the fact as known by himself, or as heard from others?
Let the confessor take care that restitution of reputation, when it can conveniently be made, be made before absolution; because the matter will be fulfilled with difficulty afterward, although it is of lesser difficulty than restitution of money.
Let restitution not be exacted if the damage was doubtfully inflicted, or the retraction is doubtfully going to be useful, according to those things which we have just said (n. 1207, 2): "Namely, if restitution of reputation is probably judged going to bring greater damage than utility to the one infamed, then it is better to seize occasions of praising the one marked with infamy in some virtue of his, so that he may place him in the good opinion of others, than to recall past matters into memory by this restitution of reputation" (Praxis, n. 45).