Article — Konings, Theologia Moralis
ARTICLE II: ON RESTITUTION OF REPUTATION
- Principles. - I. The detractor is bound from justice, as much as can be done, 1° to repair the reputation unjustly taken away; 2° to compensate all temporal damages arising from the defamation and in some way foreseen.
The reason of the first is that through the taking away of reputation a damaging injury has been inflicted; for the right which each one has to reputation cannot be taken away by private authority; and so, since restitution of a good unjustly taken away is necessary, that injury must be repaired. - Thus all.1
The reason of the second is that all damages proceeding from detraction are to be attributed to the detractor as their efficacious cause, whether the crime revealed is false or true, since in each case the detractor has unjustly harmed reputation. - Thus commonly.2
II. The obligation of restoring reputation is personal. But the obligation of repairing damages which have arisen from defamation is real, and therefore passes to heirs. - The obligation of restitution urges also if someone has detracted from the dead. Nor can heirs condone it, since they are not masters of another's reputation.
- III. Restitution of reputation is to be done in one way by a calumniator, and in another by a simple detractor. Hence:
1° A calumniator is bound to retract the things said, and indeed of itself even with loss of his own reputation, if otherwise reparation cannot be made; the reason is that the condition of the innocent is better than that of the guilty, and he ought to impute to his own malice whatever he is going to suffer on account of this.
2° A simple detractor cannot retract the things said, because thus he would lie, but in another way, as much as is in him, he ought to restore reputation, by saying, for example, that he spoke badly, that he erred, or something similar; for not only those err who recede from truth, but also those who recede from rectitude, according to that saying:3 They err who work evil. But often that mode does not suffice among the intelligent and clever, who rather from these formulas conjecture that the crime is true, which is not openly asserted to be false. Therefore then the detractor, by being silent concerning the things said, on an occasion being given, ought with dexterity and truth to praise and honor him from whom he detracted.
Let the confessor take care that compensations of reputation of this sort, when they can conveniently be made, be made before absolution, because afterward they will be fulfilled with difficulty.5
Notes to n. 529. (1) L. IV. 990. (2) L. IV. 996. (3) Prov. 14. 22. (5) H. A. Tr. XI. 18.
- You will resolve. - 1° He who has unjustly defamed another by manifesting a true crime is bound to repair the whole damage coming from this and foreseen, at least in common, because that unjust revelation of his is the true and sole cause of the damage.1 Hence he who in this way impeded someone from entering into a contract with a merchant, who would have perceived honorable profit from it, must satisfy him according to the estimation of the profit. Likewise he who for this reason deprived another of an office - for example, by accusing a man who is now upright of a delict which he secretly committed some years before - is bound to satisfy for the measure of the emolument lost. But in estimating damages, the hope of gain indeed, speculatively speaking, is to be considered with St. Alphonsus;2 yet practically the estimation of the hope will have to be judged from the gain itself, account being taken also both of the labor which he was compelled to spend on the office lost and which he now spends on another business, and of the uncertainty whether he would otherwise have discharged the office for a long time, which uncertainty must be attended to especially in our region. Cf. Kenrick.3
2° He who detracted through a libel is bound, so that the restitution be efficacious, to make it by contrary writings or by public revocation. Likewise the reparation ought to become known, if it is known that the defamation has reached many, but it is unknown to whom it came.4
3° Likewise, in default of the defamer, those who cooperated in propagating the defamation are bound to reparation of reputation, and all these are equally bound concerning damages of fortune, if any have occurred.
4° A defamer is not bound to petition pardon if he cannot repair reputation; because through the petition of pardon the lost reputation is not restored; nor is he more urged by the obligation of seeking pardon than he who cannot restore goods of fortune in which he has harmed someone. - Thus commonly.
Notes to n. 530. (1) L. IV. 994. 996. (2) L. IV. 996. (3) Tr. X. n. 162. (4) L. IV. 997.
- Questions. - Quaer. 1° What are the causes excusing from restitution of reputation?
Resp. The following are commonly admitted:
1° If the delict which you revealed to one or several has become public by another way, or if reputation has been repaired in another way, for example by a sentence of a judge, etc.
2° If it is prudently judged that the memory of the crime has been erased by oblivion through passage of time. - But in doubt, a true crime in general is not to be recalled into the memory of men, unless there is evident danger lest that infamy return into memory in another way; for then restitution obtains the desired effect with more difficulty. But if the crime is false, the defamation is to be recalled. Except, however, if perhaps the greater good of the defamed man counsels otherwise, or if certain damage threatens the detractor from the retraction, unless the doubtful damage of the defamed in some case ought to be estimated higher.1
3° If restitution of reputation cannot be done without much greater damage of the one defaming, as if the danger of life were imminent for him, and not for the defamed, or if a prelate must undergo much graver infamy from restitution of reputation taken away from a lowly man: in which case it will suffice afterward to extol the defamed man with merited praise. L. IV. 1002.
4° If reparation is morally impossible on account of too great distance of places or other special difficulties, which are especially found in the reparation of simple detraction; for example, if those who heard the detractor cannot be recalled from their preconceived opinion.
5° If it is judged that faith was not given to the detraction by the hearers, as happens more often when detraction is done in the heat of anger.
6° If the defamed man has remitted the obligation expressly or tacitly, provided he can remit it; indeed sometimes presumed condonation suffices.2 But he remits it invalidly if another, suppose an accomplice, loses reputation thereby; illicitly, namely with charity or piety forbidding, if someone, for example a priest, needs reputation for the utility of others.3
Quaer. 2° Is there given an obligation of restoring reputation harmed without formal injustice, for example, if someone detracts from inadvertence?
Resp. In the affirmative, because each one is bound to repair damage arising from his action, although damaging only materially, if he conveniently can, as we shall say in the Treatise on Justice and Right.4
Notes to n. 531. (1) L. IV. 998. (2) L. IV. 1003. (3) L. IV. 1003. (4) L. IV. 994.
- Quaer. 3° Is the defamer bound to restore reputation also before those who have received mediately the crime revealed by him?
Resp. In the affirmative, more probably, if you violated reputation before hearers whom you foresaw would easily divulge the infamy; because then you are the true and voluntary cause of the damage; otherwise you are not bound.1
Quaer. 4° Are you excused from restitution of reputation if the one harmed has also violated your reputation, and is unwilling to restore it?
Resp. Navarrus, Sporer, and certain others deny; but more probably one must affirm with St. Alphonsus;2 because you are not bound to render to another his right if he refuses to render yours to you. (c) p. 481.
Quaer. 5° Are you bound to compensate reputation with money if you cannot restore it?
Resp. In the negative, at least more probably, because justice obligates only to rendering the thing taken away, or its equivalent; but money was not taken away through detraction, nor is it the equivalent of reputation, since it is of another order.3 - Yet foreseen damages are to be repaired. See n. 528. (d) p. 481.
Notes to n. 532. (1) L. IV. 991. (2) L. IV. 999. (3) L. IV. 1000. Notes to nn. 532-543 - note sequence 1. (1) L. IV. 970. (2) Ib. (3) L. II. 70. Notes to nn. 532-543 - note sequence 2. (1) L. II. 70. (2) Mar. p. 434. n. 368; p. 438. n. 378. Appendix annotation (c), to n. 532. q. 4°. p. 236. col. 2. From the things said in this place concerning compensation, and at the same time from the things handed down in n. 531 under 6° concerning presumed condonation of the obligation of restoring reputation, some (see Marres, p. 431. n. 362) adhere to Sporer (Tr. V. C. IV. n. 116), who writes: "I think that commonly men, especially common people, are excused among themselves from restitution of reputation; for since generally they know that others everywhere detract, and that restitution is never made, nor do they themselves demand restitution, they can be judged to wish mutually to remit to one another the debt of restoring; or certainly to wish to use mutual compensation in not restoring." Appendix annotation (d), to n. 532. q. 5°. p. 236. col. 2. They ask whether it is lawful for one to compensate himself by money in secret for reputation which another either cannot or does not wish to restore. St. Alphonsus denies against others. See L. I. 35 in the note of Fr. Heilig to this number.