Article Fifth. On Restitution of Reputation

655. Obligation of the detractor and calumniator. 1. The unjust detractor is bound from justice: a. to repair as soon as possible the reputation unjustly taken away; b. to repair all temporal damages which he foresaw at least in confusion would follow from the defamation: for he is the efficacious and unjust cause of all these. And indeed the former obligation of restoring reputation is personal and therefore does not pass to heirs; but the latter of repairing temporal damages is real and therefore passes to heirs.

a. Therefore the calumniator is always bound to restitution of reputation; but the detractor is bound only when he harmed another in reputation without a just cause, because only then is he the unjust cause of damage.

b. It can happen that a light lesion of reputation can inflict grave damage in goods of fortune. Therefore with light detraction there can at the same time be joined a grave obligation of repairing temporal damages arisen from detraction, as if someone narrates that he is talkative whom the hearer of the narration wished to assume for the office of secretary.¹

c. He who cannot restore the injured reputation is not bound to compensate it with money, because reputation and money are not goods of the same order; yet if the defamer is condemned by the sentence of the judge to furnishing compensation in money, he must obey the just sentence of the judge, from vindicative justice.

d. He who by defaming another, from smallness of matter, sinned only lightly, must repair the reputation under light obligation; therefore he is not bound to repair it with grave inconvenience to himself. But he who sinned gravely must repair it even with grave inconvenience to himself; for a grave obligation of justice obliges with proportionately grave inconvenience. Yet if the damage which the defamer would have to suffer greatly exceeded the damage of the defamed person, he would be excused from restitution.

2. A non-unjust detractor who from inadvertence or from inculpable error injured another's reputation is bound from justice, insofar as he conveniently can, to forestall his speech from harming further: for anyone is bound to impede further damages proceeding from his action. But he is not bound to this with grave inconvenience to himself, because he harmed the other inculpably; nor is he bound if he foresees that retractation will be useless (n. 454, b).

He who culpably omits due retractation is bound to repair the damages which follow from this omission and were foreseen in some way, even with grave inconvenience to himself, because he is the culpable cause of these.

To the question whether reputation must be repaired not only before the hearers, but also before those who received the defamation mediately, one must distinguish. If the detractor foresaw that the hearers would easily divulge the defamation, as if he had narrated it without secrecy to light and talkative men, of himself he is bound, because he is the efficacious and unjust cause of the damage; yet because he is a mediate cause of the damage, he himself is bound only when other causes, namely immediate causes, fail. But if he did not foresee the future damage, because he narrated under secrecy to those whom he judged prudent, he is not bound, because he is not the theologically culpable cause of the damage. It is said of himself, because in practice detractors are generally excused from the obligation of restitution before those who had received the detraction mediately, both because it is morally impossible, and because by retractation made before those who immediately received the matter, they implicitly commit to these that they also divulge the retractation.²

¹ Cf. Genicot I, n. 449.

² Cf. Lugo, disp. 15, n. 16.

656. How reputation must be restored. It must be restored in one way by a calumniator and in another by a detractor.

1. The calumniator is bound before the hearers to retract the things said in an efficacious mode, even with loss of his own reputation or another good, because the condition of the innocent is better than that of the guilty. He is excused only when the damage which he himself would have to suffer would greatly exceed the damage of the defamed person.

Hence if this is required for efficacious retractation, the calumniator must confess that he lied. If retractation would not be efficacious unless an oath is added or witnesses are employed, these means would have to be employed, because they are not considered very difficult. He who calumniated another by a book published in print must also, so that it may be efficacious, divulge the revocation in print.

2. Strictly speaking, the detractor cannot retract, lest he lie, but he must repair the injured reputation in another way, and first indeed by employing equivocal words. And so he can say that he spoke unjustly, that he did injury to the other, that he erred, that he was deceived; but not that he said what is false or that he lied. But since from these formulas of speaking most persons infer that that is true which is not openly declared false, the detractor will very often repair the damage more efficaciously by, when occasion is given, following the defamed person with praise and honor, excusing his vices, etc.

657. Five causes excusing from restitution of reputation are usually numbered:

a. If it is prudently judged that no detriment of reputation followed, either because the hearers did not believe the detraction, or because another, by correcting the detractor, impeded the damage: for in order that there be an obligation of repairing reputation, moral certitude concerning damage caused is required.

b. If the damage has already been taken away, either because by the sentence of a judge or the testimony of others the reputation was repaired, or because by the passage of time the defamation was wiped away by oblivion.

c. If the other either expressly or tacitly condoned it, provided he could condone it; but an injury done cannot be condoned if from the condonation damage to others would follow. Sometimes even presumed condonation suffices. "And by this reason," says Sporer, "commonly men, especially the common people, are excused from restitution of reputation among themselves."

d. If restitution is morally or physically impossible. Therefore he is excused who could repair reputation only with danger to life; likewise he who would suffer a much greater damage of reputation or honor than was inflicted on the defamed person; finally, if the defamer cannot meet those who heard the detraction because of too great a distance, or if the fault has become public by another way.

e. If the injured person also violated the reputation of the defamer and refuses to restore: for one is not bound to return his right to another if the latter refuses to return the right which he himself owes him.¹

¹ Cf. Lugo, disp. 14, n. 44; St. Alphonsus, n. 999.