Article — Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)
Article II. On Restitution of Reputation
- Principles. - I. A detractor is bound from justice, insofar as it can be done, 1. to repair the reputation unjustly taken away; 2. to compensate all temporal damages arising from the defamation and in some way foreseen.
The reason for the first is that by the taking away of reputation a damaging injury has been inflicted; for the right which each one has to reputation cannot be taken away by private authority: therefore, since restitution of a good unjustly taken away is necessary, that injury must consequently be repaired. - Thus all. - St. Lig., n. 991; and lib. 3, n. 613.
The reason for the second is that all damages arising from detraction must be attributed to the detractor, as to their efficacious cause, whether the crime revealed was false or true, since in either case the detractor has injured reputation unjustly. - Thus commonly. - St. Lig., n. 996.
The obligation of restoring reputation is personal. But the obligation of repairing damages which have arisen from defamation is real, and therefore passes to the heirs.
- II. Restitution of reputation must be made in one way by a calumniator, and in another by a simple detractor. Hence:
- The calumniator is bound to retract the things said, and indeed per se even with loss of his own reputation, if otherwise reparation cannot be made: the reason is that the condition of the innocent person is better than that of the guilty one, and he must impute to his own malice whatever he is going to suffer on that account.
- A simple detractor cannot retract the things said, because thus he would lie; but in another way, insofar as it is in him, he must restore reputation, by saying, for example, that he spoke badly, that he erred, or something similar; for not only those err who recede from truth, but also those who recede from rectitude, according to that saying of Prov. 14. 22: "They err who work evil." - St. Lig., n. 992. But often that manner does not suffice among intelligent and astute persons, who rather conjecture from these formulas that the crime is true, which is not asserted openly to be false. Therefore then the detractor, keeping silence about the things said, when occasion has been given, with dexterity and truth must praise and honor him from whom he detracted.
- Resolves. - 1. He who unjustly defamed another by manifesting a true crime is bound to repair the whole damage arising from this, because that unjust revelation is the true and sole cause of the damage. - St. Lig., n. 994.
- He who detracted by a defamatory pamphlet is bound, so that restitution may be efficacious, to make it by contrary writings or by public revocation. Likewise the reparation must become known if it is known that the defamation has spread to many, but it is unknown to whom it has come. - St. Lig., n. 995.
- Likewise, in default of the defamer, those are bound to reparation of reputation who cooperated in propagating the defamation; and all these are equally bound concerning damages of fortune, if any have occurred.
The defamer is not bound to asking pardon, if he cannot repair reputation, unless he has injured reputation and honor at the same time; because lost reputation is not restored by asking pardon; nor is he urged more by the obligation of asking pardon than one who cannot restore goods of fortune in which he has injured someone. - Thus commonly.
- Questions. - Q. 1. What are the causes excusing from restitution of reputation?
Resp. The following are commonly admitted:
- If the crime which you revealed to one or several has become public by another way, or if reputation has been repaired in another way, for example, by the sentence of a judge, etc.
- If it is prudently judged that the memory of the crime has been destroyed by oblivion through the passage of time.
- If restitution of reputation cannot be made without danger to life; because life is a good of a higher order than reputation. Likewise, if the restitution of reputation is of much less value than the loss which the defamer would have to suffer, for example, if he were an honored man and especially very useful to the public good or to Religion.
- If reparation is morally impossible on account of too great a distance of places, or other special difficulties, which are found especially in the reparation of simple detraction; for example, if those who heard the detractor cannot be recalled from a preoccupied opinion.
- If it is judged that faith was not given to the detraction by the hearers, as happens rather often when detraction is made in the heat of anger.
- If the defamed person has expressly or tacitly remitted the obligation, provided he can remit it; indeed sometimes presumed condonation suffices. - St. Lig., n. 1005. But he cannot remit it when scandal follows from his infamy, or damage either common or to his own people, etc.; for example, if there is question of the infamy of a Priest, magistrate, etc. - St. Lig., n. 997 and following.
Q. 2. Whether there is given an obligation of restoring reputation injured without formal injustice, for example, if someone detracts through inadvertence?
Resp. It is affirmed, because each one is bound to repair damage arising from his action, if he conveniently can, as we shall say in the Treatise on Justice and Right. - St. Lig., n. 994.
- Q. 3. Whether one defaming is bound to restore reputation also before those who have received mediately the crime revealed by him?
Resp. It is affirmed more probably, indeed also more truly, if you violated reputation among hearers whom you foresaw would easily spread the infamy abroad; because then you are the true cause of the damage; otherwise you are not bound. - St. Lig., n. 991.
Q. 4. Whether you are excused from restitution of reputation, if the injured person also has violated your reputation and does not wish to restore?
Resp. Navarrus, Sporer, and certain others deny; but more probably it must be affirmed with St. Alph., n. 999; because you are not bound to render his right to another, if he refuses to render yours to you.
Q. 5. Whether you are bound to compensate reputation with money, if you cannot restore it?
Resp. It is denied, at least more probably, because justice obliges only to rendering back what was taken away, or an equivalent; but money was not taken away by detraction, nor is it itself equivalent to reputation, since it is of another order. - St. Lig., n. 4000, etc.