Article III. On Restitution on Account of Detraction

I. Subject of restitution. 1. He who unjustly and with grave theological fault has injured the reputation of the neighbor is held under grave obligation to restitution "just as to restitution of any thing taken away" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 73, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, III, 991).

2. He who with slight fault or inculpably has injured the reputation of the neighbor is held to remove the cause of damage placed by him and morally persevering, i.e. to revoke the detraction or deprive it of force, if he conveniently can.

3. What has been said about the detractor should also be applied: 1° to him who positively influenced an unjust detraction, for example by asking, applauding, etc. (n. 1075); 2° to a Superior, in the case in which from justice he is held to provide for reputation to be restored, according to what is to be said in n. 1075.

II. Object of restitution. The obligation is of restoring: 1° the reputation unjustly injured; 2° the real damages following from the injury of reputation and at least confusedly foreseen. Moreover, "the obligation of restoring reputation, since it is purely personal, does not pass to heirs. But the obligation of compensation for the aforesaid damage, since it has respect to the goods of the defamer, passes to heirs" (St. Alphonsus, III, 996).

III. Mode of restoring. 1. He who narrated what is false ought openly to retract the false thing imputed, for example by saying that he erred or, if that is not sufficient, that he lied; indeed, if there is need, he should prove the retraction and confirm it by oath or even by witnesses (St. Alphonsus, III, 991).

2. He who revealed what is true ought prudently to correct the opinion of the hearers, for example by saying with equivocation that he erred, etc. If the matter does not succeed in this way, he should strive to furnish an equivalent compensation, for example by praising the defamed person in the same or in a different matter, etc. (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 62, a. 2, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, III, 992).

3. A detractor, in default of the immediate hearers, is held to restore reputation before mediate hearers, as follows:

a) He is not held if he narrated the matter before those whom he thought would hide it, because damage not foreseen is not imputed to him.

b) It is disputed whether he is held if he could foresee that the hearers would not keep the secret. But he seems per se to be held, because in the hypothesis posited the detractor becomes not merely an occasional cause of damage to be inflicted by the immediate hearers, but an occasional cause which puts on the character of culpable cooperation toward that damage. But he who culpably cooperates toward the damage of someone acts formally unjustly, and therefore is held to restitution. I have said per se, because practically he will often be excused, either because the immediate hearers will restore the damage, or on account of moral impossibility (St. Alphonsus, III, 991).

IV. Causes excusing from restitution of reputation are customarily enumerated:

1. Physical or moral impossibility. But with respect to moral impossibility note that the detractor is not held to restoration of reputation with damage much greater. Damage to one's own reputation does not excuse, unless the reputation of the detractor is necessary for the public good (St. Alphonsus, III, 1002). Yet no one is held to compensate injured reputation with money (St. Alphonsus, III, 1000). But if you ask whether the defamed person can compensate himself with money of the defamer, it seems this must be said: if the defamer unjustly refuses restoration of reputation, the defamed person more probably can compensate himself, relying on the principle: if you unjustly deny me what is owed to me, it is lawful for me to take something from you which is yours; almost as "you are not compelled to restore his right to another if he refuses to restore yours to you" (St. Alphonsus, IV, 999). If the defamer is excused from restoring reputation, it seems it must be denied, because on the one hand the right to money is doubtful, and on the other hand compensation on account of a doubtful right is not admitted (n. 1033; cf. St. Alphonsus, III, 1001).

2. Cessation of damage; as if someone has already from elsewhere, for example by sentence of a judge or by forgetfulness, been purged from infamy. In doubt whether the crime of the neighbor has been given over to oblivion, ordinarily the obligation of restoring will cease, both because there will be danger of harming the defamed person more, and because restitution cannot be made without one's own damage, which no one is held to suffer for repairing an already doubtful damage of the neighbor (St. Alphonsus, III, 997, 998).

3. Condonation by the defamed person, whether express or presumed. Yet damage of reputation cannot be presumed to be condoned as easily as damage in goods of fortune. Condonation is prohibited if the infamy redounds to others, or harms the common good, as if there is question of a priest or religious (St. Alphonsus, III, 1003).

4. Compensation, understood in this sense, that after injury has been inflicted on both sides, you can sufficiently probably defer restitution until the other is prepared to make satisfaction. Yet from these things do not conclude that the defamer can likewise be defamed (St. Alphonsus, III, 999). Yet that is lawful, that you may lessen belief in the defamer, or that you may lead him, unwilling, to restore reputation or to omit further detraction.

Note. Excuse from restitution of reputation per se does not bring with it excuse from repairing real damages following from the injury of reputation.