What sin is

A SIN is nothing but a bad human act, and it may be defined as a free transgression of the law of God. For a bad human act is a disturbance of right order either because in itself it is against right reason, as murder or suicide, or because it is against the command of a legitimate superior, which imposes a strict obligation, and which right reason bids us obey. But such a disturbance of right order is against the law of God.

Every voluntary act against right reason is an offence against God and a sin, for although the sinner in committing sin does not always think explicitly of God, yet he always apprehends that he is doing a wrong action, an action which his conscience condemns, and in the condemnation of conscience is implicitly contained the condemnation of God himself.

A sin must be distinguished from an imperfection, which is either negative or positive. A negative imperfection is merely the omission of a good action which is not of precept; and such an omission when grace moves one to perform the act, though not a sin, yet is a falling short of the perfection which was within one’s reach. A positive imperfection is a violation of God’s will made known to us, but which does not strictly oblige us. God wishes a religious to observe his rule, but frequently this does not bind under sin. A positive imperfection, then, is a falling short not only of the perfection which was offered to us and which we might have had, but also of that which God wished us to have, though he did not oblige us to have it.

Sin in the sense defined is called actual sin; habitual sin is the state which follows the commission of actual sin until this be forgiven.

A formal sin is committed knowingly and wilfully; a material sin is committed without knowledge or free consent.

Sin is said to be against God, our neighbour, or ourself, as it is against some virtue which immediately regards God, or our neighbour, or ourself. All sin is ultimately against God.

Sins of ignorance are committed through culpable ignorance; sins of infirmity through passion or bad habit; sins of malice with cool deliberation and forethought. The last, as is obvious, are the least excusable.

A sin of commission is an act against a negative precept; a sin of omission is the wilful neglect of a positive precept.

The meaning of the terms sins of thought, word, and deed, is obvious.

I. Nature. Sin is usually defined with St. Augustine as: a word, deed, or desire against the eternal law.¹ It is understood as free; for "sin is nothing other than an evil human act" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71, a. 6). But a human act imports a free act. Besides, it is said:

1. A word, deed, or desire, by which the material element of sin is indicated, i.e., the word itself (sin of mouth), deed (sin of work), and desire (sin of heart); likewise the omission of a word, deed, and desire when their obligation is present (St. Thomas, cited place, body and ad 1).

2. Against the eternal law, by which the formal element of sin, or its malice, is assigned; this consists in the fact that it is opposed to the eternal law.

"Augustine," says St. Thomas, "placed two things in the definition of sin: one which pertains to the substance of a human act, which is quasi-material in sin, when he said: a word, or deed, or desire; the other, which pertains to the character of evil, which is quasi-formal in sin, when he says: against the eternal law" (cited place). Besides, observe:

a) The definition handed down agrees to original sin to this extent, insofar as Adam acted in the person of all of us, and therefore sin was in some way voluntary and free even for us.

b) Although the definition speaks only of the eternal law, nevertheless the transgression of other laws also, even ecclesiastical and civil laws, is comprehended, since all other laws borrow their force from the eternal law.

Corollary I. There is no purely philosophical sin, i.e., a sin which would indeed be opposed to right reason but not to the law of God, whether because the sinner was ignorant of God, or because he did not think about God. For reason is nothing other than a participation of divine law, so that what is repugnant to reason is ultimately repugnant also to law. Hence Alexander VIII condemned this proposition: "Philosophical sin, however grave, in one who either is ignorant of God or does not actually think about God, is grave sin, but it is not an offense against God, nor a mortal sin dissolving the friendship of God, nor worthy of eternal punishment" (St. Alphonsus, V, 11).

Corollary II. In sin one can distinguish the material element, or the material of sin, and the formal element, or the formal of sin. The material of sin is the physical act or its omission which is found in sin; the formal of sin is the very disorder or malice which is found in the act or in the omission.

Now it is asked in what the disorder or malice of sin consists, whether in privation or in something positive. Now the formal element of a sin of omission is situated in the privative, since it is nothing other than the omission of a due act.² But it is sharply disputed, even among Thomists,³ whether the formal element of a sin of commission consists in the privative or in the positive. But it seems to consist in the privative; for if it consisted in the positive, God, as the author of every positive thing, would seem to become the author of malice itself.

Corollary III. Sin involves a manifold ugliness; for it is a disorder:

1. Against rational nature, according to these words of St. Thomas: "Vice is against the nature of man insofar as it is against the order of reason" (I-II, q. 71, a. 2).

2. Against God, whom the sinner offends: a) as Legislator; b) as Judge, by not fearing his sentence; c) as Witness, by not revering his presence; d) as the Supreme Good in himself, by despising his friendship and embracing those things which displease God exceedingly; e) as our Supreme Good, by not caring for God insofar as he is our exceedingly great reward; f) as Lord, by injuring God's supreme right over our actions; g) as Benefactor, by not taking account of God's gifts, abusing them to offend him.

3. Against Christ the Redeemer. Under this respect sin is in some way deicide;⁴ for sins are the cause why Christ willed to undergo death. Hence one who, although he knows these things, nevertheless sins, constitutes himself the cause of the passion and death of Christ.

4. Against the Sanctifying Spirit. Under this respect sin in a Christian is in some way sacrilege, by which the faithful person, specially consecrated through the sacraments and the Holy Spirit dwelling within, is violated.

There is added that through sin a man is constituted a slave of the devil.⁵

Observe, however, that the described uglinesses are not contained according to formal species in every sin; for sin takes its species only from opposition to the motive on account of which the evil act is prohibited, as was explained elsewhere (n. 148). Hence, even if in every sin the aforesaid reasons of opposition to God are found, nevertheless for that reason it does not contain several species of malice or circumstances which must be declared in confession.

¹ Contra Faustum, bk. 22, c. 27.

² Billuart, diss. 1, a. 3.

³ Cf. Billuart, cited place.

⁴ Heb. 6:6.

⁵ Sweens, Theol. Mor. fund., n. 770.

II. Conditions of formal sin. For every formal sin there are required:

1. An act deficient from the rules of morals or contrary to some law, at least according to the apprehension of the agent. But it suffices that the act be repugnant to the rules of morals either on the part of the object, or on the part of the end, or on the part of the circumstance. "Any single defect causes evil; but good is caused from an integral cause" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3; St. Alphonsus). Cf., however, the things said in n. 69 sq., where we noted that the goodness of an act is not totally destroyed by just any evil end or circumstance.

2. Some advertence to the malice of the act, or to the act insofar as it is deficient from the rules of morals. Nevertheless it suffices that actual advertence was present when the cause of the evil act was placed; likewise that it be present or have been present only confusedly (St. Alphonsus, V, 4).

3. Some consent of the will, whether full or half-full (n. 19). But it is not required that the malice be intended; it suffices that the malice of the act be apprehended and the act nevertheless be placed. The reason is that evil must be avoided; and this is not done by one who chooses an act which he knows to be evil.

(Summa Theologica, I-II, qq. 71-89.)

Definition.—A vice is a habit inclining to moral evil. A sin is an act resulting from a vice, or tending to the formation of a vice; or it is any thought, word, deed or omission against the law of God.

What is sin? - Since "where there is no law, neither is there transgression," Rom. 4:15, sin, which is an evil human act, is rightly defined by St. Augustine as: a word, deed, or thing desired against the eternal law. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 71, a. 6. Deed, for "sin can happen whether someone does what he ought not, or by not doing what he ought." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 71, a. 5, ad 1. By doing, it is a sin of commission; by not doing, of omission. Against the eternal law, because every law, whether human or divine, has its force from this law; because there is no power except from God; because no transgression of law would be a sin unless it offended God; because in this which is said, against the eternal law, aversion from the end and all other disorders are touched.

Against law; if it is not against law but against counsel, it is imperfection, which is merely negative if it is a mere defect in a human act of further perfection, e.g., of greater fervor in an act of love of God; and positive if it is an involuntary transgression of a law lightly obliging, e.g., praying with distraction. But it is rather only material sin than imperfection. Or it is the voluntary omission of a greater good, notwithstanding divine inspiration of it; and this, practically and regularly, is not without venial sin, by reason of the disordered motive or end, as, e.g., for a religious to violate rules not obliging to sin. Sin is formal if the law is violated freely and knowingly; it is material if the transgression of the law is altogether involuntary. - Sin is a delict. Delict is so called because good is abandoned. Hence "delict, taken commonly, signifies any omission; sometimes, however, it is taken strictly for this, that something is omitted from those things which pertain to God; or when knowingly, and as if with a certain contempt, a man abandons that which he ought to do; and thus it has a certain gravity, by reason of which it needs greater expiation." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79, a. 4, ad 1. L. 1, 11; S. Th. de Malo, q. 2, a. 1, 2; 1 p., q. 63, a. 1; a. 7, ad 2; 1. 2. q. 71, a. 6, ad 5; q. 87; q. 76, a. 2, ad 1; 2. 2. q. 20, a. 3; Compend. Theol., c. 119; Wirceburg., D. 1, c. 1, 2; E. M.

Is actual advertence and consent of the will necessarily required for actual sin? - R. Affirmatively. For sin is the free transgression of law. But an actual free transgression cannot be had without an actual act of the will, either here and now or in the cause. Likewise an actual free transgression of law cannot be had unless someone in some way, either here and now or in the cause, at least confusedly notices the sin; for nothing is willed unless first known. - But he who here and now is ignorant, notices nothing, doubts nothing, here and now sins in nothing, although perhaps the ignorance or inadvertence was culpable in the cause. For if previously he foresaw the effect of his ignorance or inadvertence, he is indeed guilty of what he does in the cause, but only in act. Yet it is not necessary for sin that the offense of God be apprehended explicitly and reflexively; but it suffices that it be apprehended implicitly and directly, namely by knowing that the thing is evil; for then it is also implicitly apprehended as prohibited by God. Proposition 2 condemned by Alexander VIII. Nor indeed are faith or charity simply required for avoiding sin. Proposition 31 condemned by Leo X; proposition 8 condemned by Alexander VIII; proposition 48 condemned by Clement XI. L. 1-5, 10; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 74; q. 75; q. 76, a. 3; de Malo, q. 2, a. 1, 2; q. 7, a. 6; E. M. 287, 288, 313.

Resolves: No sin is had if the use of reason is disturbed and freedom is taken away, as in a most vehement movement of anger; if advertence is had, but consent of the will is lacking, as in depraved movements against chastity as long as they are displeasing; if advertence and consent are had, but not as to an evil thing, e.g., if someone on a day of abstinence indeed eats meats advertently and altogether voluntarily, but thinking nothing of the precept of the Church. A human act has only that malice which is apprehended. Wherefore, if in some matter of multiple malice, the malice of only one species is noticed, only this is contracted. Likewise if negligence, e.g., of guarding against drunkenness or the events usually following from it, was only venial, even the evils which could have been foreseen are only venial. Since they are free not in themselves, but in the cause, they cannot have greater guilt than in the cause itself. - L. 2, 4; l. 1, n. 165.

Is sin contained only in an internal act, or also in an external one? Sin formally is an internal act of the will. For sin according to its nature is properly only from free will and in the will. "Sin," says St. Thomas, de Malo, q. 3, a. 1, "according as it is properly said in morals, has the nature of fault, and comes from this, that the will falls short of the due end, through this, that it tends toward an undue end." Another internal act, and the exterior action of other faculties, are the object of the internal act of the will, and as it were its complement. For from that internal act of the will, and from the internal act of other faculties, or an exterior action, one total moral concrete is effected; for that other internal act, or exterior action, as moral acts, in their whole extent, pertain to the very moral individual of the internal act of the will, to which they are subject, and from which they receive their moral being. Therefore sin is begun by the internal act of the will; it is perfected and consummated by another act or another action of other internal or external faculties. Hence, since a part differs essentially from a whole, the sin which is contained only by the internal act of the will differs essentially, morally speaking, from the sin which is perfected by another internal act of another internal faculty, or which proceeds even to an external work, which consequently must necessarily be accused in confession. Whence it is not sufficient to confess the will of homicide, but it is necessary also to confess the homicide itself committed. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 17, a. 4; q. 72, a. 7; q. 74; q. 75; L. 5.

What are the merely internal sins of the will, and what is their nature? All sins which are committed by the interior will alone can easily be reduced to desire and delectation. - Desire is the purpose of some thing, or an act of the will by which we will to attain some good. One is efficacious, and is a purpose absolutely efficacious of itself, whence it is that someone in reality undertakes means to lead it to effect. Another is inefficacious, and is a purpose only conditionally efficacious, which someone would execute if he could; e.g., if he could steal the treasure of the Church, he would steal it. Now the desire of an evil thing is evil, since the object of action and of desire is one and the same. Hence a depraved desire has the species and malice, mortal or venial, of the sin which the exterior thing has toward which it is borne. Namely desire tends to this, absolutely or at least conditionally, that it execute the thing and constitute it as really existing. But if someone truly executed the thing, he would contract every malice both of the object and of the circumstances. Therefore the same must be said if someone pursues the thing by affection and desire; for since this affection of desire is joined with the very existence of the object, it is necessarily joined with all things necessarily connected with the object itself. Wherefore Titius having relations with Caia, another's wife, commits adultery if he knows her to belong to another, even if he would not wish her to belong to another; in the same way one desiring Caia, another's wife, is also guilty of adultery if he knows her to belong to another, and even if he would not wish her to belong to another, because desire tends, as the execution itself does, into the same existing work, and thus concrete with all its circumstances. Consequently in confession of the desire, e.g., of fornicating, the circumstances of consanguinity, marriage, the vow of chastity of the person, etc., are to be declared. L. 12. By no means, however, is there need to add whether the act concerning the object was absolute or conditioned. La-Croix, l. 6, p. 2, n. 1032.

Delectation is a certain simple rest and complacency of the will from the presence of a fitting good, either possessed according to the thing, or according to cognition and apprehension. Delectation does not properly differ from joy, except insofar as joy is rather called the delectation of the rational appetite, and delectation rather is called that which belongs to the sensitive appetite with a certain transmutation of the body; and this delectation is also called sensible or sensual, and if it is with transmutation of the organs and spirits serving generation, it is called carnal or venereal delectation. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 31; q. 72, a. 2; Sanch. in Dec., l. 1, c. 2, n. 33. - But according to St. Alphonsus, 15, as desire regards future time and the work to be committed, so joy regards past time, namely when someone is pleased with himself concerning an evil work committed; and delectation regards present time, that is, when someone through imagination and thought renders present to himself the work of sin, e.g., fornication, and with deliberate consent delights in it, as if he were actually fornicating, yet without the desire of executing it. Morose delectation in a depraved thing is sin, because love is present in delectation. For that depraved thing would never delight unless it were loved according to itself. Suarez, de Pecc., d. 5, s. 7, n. 5. Moreover delectation is the rest of the appetite in good. "And therefore according to the delectation of the human will a man is chiefly judged good or evil. For he is good and virtuous who rejoices in the works of virtues, but evil who rejoices in evil works." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 34, a. 4. Morose delectation is voluntary delectation; for it is called morose not on account of a necessary delay of some time, but on account of the necessary consent of the will. For not delectation, but consent to delectation, is sin. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 74, a. 6, 8; q. 88, a. 5, ad 2. In a depraved thing; for delectation is twofold. One is concerning a depraved work, so that the evil work is the object of delectation, and this is always evil; another is delectation concerning the thought of an evil object, so that not the evil work, but the very thought concerning the evil work is of itself the object of delectation. And this can either be good, if there is a just cause of thinking, e.g., for the sake of study, consultation, etc., with abhorrence of the object; or it can be venially evil, if it is done from curiosity, etc.; or it can sometimes be even gravely evil, if there is proximate danger of consent. S. Th. de Verit., q. 15, a. 4; L. 16, 17.

Morose delectation in a depraved thing, insofar as delectation is distinguished from joy according to time, has malice and species according only to the variety of objects exhibited by the mind. For simple delectation does not tend into the object as something to be placed in reality, but rests in it as represented by the intellect. But the intellect abstracts from the other properties of the object except that one which moves delectation. L. 15, 28. But joy, as desire, takes on the malice and species both of the object and of the circumstances really annexed to it. For joy, since it is a volition pleased with itself, and therefore approving the past thing, is borne into it such as it existed in itself, namely clothed with its circumstances. Hence, in recollection and complacency over past sins, it is necessary in confession to declare the nature and specific circumstances of the object. L. 15. In recollection and complacency. For sin is not had by simple recollection of a sin formerly committed, from the fact that it neither pleases nor displeases the one remembering, because by no law are we commanded to repent several times of sins, if we have already done penance for them, or here and now to repent, if we have not yet repented of them. Laymann, de Poenit., d. 2, s. 8; Sporer, de Poenit., n. 192; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 376 ff.; S. Th. Quodl. 12, a. 33.

Lest in this matter the confessor scandalize the penitent by indiscreet questions, it must be noted that the confessor, from the general rule, ought to make judgment concerning sins as they are set forth, according to the obvious and natural sense of the accusation. Thoughts about a venereal matter, delectations, desires, are regularly borne, the former into carnal commotion, the latter into pollution and copulation. Wherefore the confessor satisfies his duty if he asks the penitent concerning consent furnished; for the aforesaid acts are not always voluntary and deliberate, nor is consent always explicitly explained. Consent often in these acts is not concerning some determined object, but is indeterminate consent into venereal delectation, pollution, and copulation, which is regularly followed by delectation arising from the commotion of the genital organs. And into this ordinarily are simple delectations borne. Desires, on the contrary, are borne into the completed act. Therefore the confessor will then be able to ask the penitent only whether the aforesaid acts regarded himself or another person, of a different or the same sex. But even from this question one must abstain if the penitent is still ignorant of these matters, especially since it is a lesser evil that confession not be exact than that the penitent be scandalized. Besides, if at times extraordinary species are present, and penitents know them, they are ordinarily accustomed to declare them themselves. Reuter, p. 2, n. 209.

Resolves: To rejoice concerning the manner, e.g., new, clever, vigorous, by which a thing was accomplished is not illicit, since the object of delectation is not evil. L. 18. If the thing, as it happened, is not evil, not even materially, nor harmful to another, to desire it is not of itself illicit, although otherwise it would be intrinsically evil, e.g., pollution which naturally happens in sleep. To desire, namely by simple affection and without any cooperation. But if it is licit to desire, it is also licit to rejoice concerning it already done. The reason is, "because what it is licit to desire that it be done, it is also licit to rejoice that it has been done; and conversely, if it is right to rejoice concerning the fact, it is also licit to desire that it be done; for these are of the same morality: for joy necessarily results from the desired good obtained, and supposes or implicitly includes desire." Lessius, de Iust. et Iur., l. 4, c. 3, n. 104; Laymann, l. 3, s. 4, n. 17; Lugo, l. c., n. 389. "I, however," says the same Lessius, l. c., "am not an author that desires of this sort be admitted to anyone; both because, although they are not evil in themselves, nevertheless they indicate an imperfect affection of chastity; and because holier remedies, and those used by holy men, are not lacking. I would say the same about joy. Also in all matters of this sort, as we have already often warned, every cooperation and danger of consent must be avoided." - Billuart, tr. de Temp., diss. 6, a. 4, Obj. III; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 154, a. 5; L. 19, 20; l. 3, n. 478.

It is not a sin, speaking in itself, at least not mortal, if spouses delight, only by the rational appetite, concerning an act of marriage past, future, or possible, with respect to the co-partner present or absent. The same must be said if a spouse-to-be desires future copulation, or likewise delights in it only by the rational appetite, or a widow concerning a past one, with the danger of consent into venereal delectation arising from it set aside. The reason is that these acts have a licit object. Nevertheless they are full of danger on account of the aforesaid venereal delectation often arising from them. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 19, n. 376, 385; Sanch., de Matr., l. 9, d. 47, n. 1, 4, 7; L. 23, 24, 25.

Sadness concerning a good accomplished which was commanded under grave obligation is gravely culpable; concerning a good which was commanded under light obligation, it is light. Likewise concerning a good under neither grave nor light precept, it is light, unless there is a just cause now of regretting it; for it is a certain disorder to be saddened over a good accomplished, although not commanded by precept. But if sadness is borne not into the good itself, but into the annoyance, the labor, etc., it is of itself not a sin. Sanch. in Dec., l. 4, c. 12, n. 2; Suarez, l. 5 de Voto, c. 7, n. 4; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 39.

Is it licit to desire evil under the condition, if it were licit?

R. Affirmatively in itself, if the condition added removes the whole malice of the work, e.g., I would eat meats in Lent, unless the Church prohibited it. For such an affection involves no disorder, neither in itself nor in the object, from which all malice is excluded by the condition. - But otherwise negatively, e.g., I would sin if there were no hell, because the affection tends into an evil object, and indeed absolutely, since the condition does not remove malice from the object, even as represented, and therefore the whole malice of the object is poured back into the act of the will. And indeed there are certain objects concerning which a condition, however added, cannot remove malice, e.g., if it were licit, I would destroy God. For those things which are intrinsically evil cannot be changed; and therefore the condition would be applied uselessly, since to wish such things is to desire that the law and order of nature be changed, which would be still worse. Yet probably he would be excused from grave sin who, by such a desire, would not certainly will that what is intrinsically evil become licit, but would only show his natural inclination toward that object, e.g., I would avenge myself if it were licit, but I do not wish it because of the law of God; or would state the matter only enunciatively, e.g., younger, I would have avenged myself, signifying not what he would now wish if he were younger, but what perhaps as a younger man he would have done; yet with the danger of efficacious desire always removed, and also of true inefficacious desire, namely every will of doing, and every simple affection of the will. What has been said of desire must consequently also be said of delectation and joy of the rational appetite. For it is not licit to rejoice and delight in that good which it is not licit to love and desire; and, conversely, it is licit to rejoice and delight by the rational appetite in that good which it is licit to love and desire. For love and desire are the way to joy and delectation, as motion tending to rest. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 284 ff.; Sanch. in Dec., l. 1, c. 2, n. 22 ff.; Billuart, tr. de Temp., diss. 6, a. 15, § IV, You ask third; S. Th. de Verit., q. 15, a. 4; L. 12, 13, 14.

Is it licit to delight concerning some evil thing, if it was done without any guilt? - If that thing is intrinsically evil, it is not licit to delight in it according to itself. The reason is that that object is evil in itself; but that it was not sin is for this reason, that it was not voluntary. Therefore, if now the will accedes, approving such an act, or rejoicing concerning it, which happens in delectation, it will be sin.

La-Croix 89; Suarez, de Peccat., d. 5, s. 7, n. 14. - If that thing is not intrinsically evil, and delectation concerning it is not had under the aspect of prohibition, e.g., if someone delights that he inadvertently ate meats on Friday, some think it licit to delight in it according to itself, because according to itself it is not evil; but others think it illicit, because it was not without material sin, or was materially evil. Lessius, de Iust. et Iure, l. 4, c. 3, n. 104; L. 20, 27.

If delectation is referred to a past act evil not according to itself, insofar as it is objectively evil, but exclusively insofar as it was the cause of a good effect, and the right order of justice or charity is not perverted, some affirm that it is licit, others illicit. The reason of the first opinion is that then we do not rejoice concerning the evil work on account of the good effect, in this sense, insofar as on account of the good effect we rejoice that that evil work was done; but, supposing that that evil work was done, we rejoice concerning the causation of good, which belongs to such a work. This is not illicit, since it concerns an honorable object, namely that good quality and power which an otherwise evil work had. Abstraction is made from the objective malice, which does not move the affection, and delectation falls precisely upon the predicate which is causative of good, which is good. But the restriction added, nor is the right order of justice, etc., is clear in itself, and is confirmed from propositions 13, 14, 15 condemned by Innocent XI. The reason of the second opinion is that by the very fact that someone delights concerning an evil work insofar as it is causative of good, he already implicitly delights in the evil work itself according to itself, or according to its existence. For real causality implicitly includes real existence.

"Nevertheless in any case it is licit, speaking in itself, for anyone to delight not concerning the cause, but concerning the effect that followed, namely concerning relief caused by pollution even voluntary, or concerning the obtaining of an inheritance on account of homicide, provided the cause is detested." L. 20. And indeed the object of this delectation is good. La-Croix 91; Suarez, l. c., n. 15; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 389; Ithur., Cas. 18, n. 6; Lessius, l. c.; S. Th. 4 D. 9, q. 1, ad 5; 3 D. 30, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4; L. 19-22; E. M.

"Does he sin gravely who behaves negatively, and does not positively resist a movement of the sensitive appetite concerning an object prohibited under mortal sin? - There are three opinions. The first affirms that one sins gravely, even when the danger of consent ceases... The second opinion says that such a one does not sin even venially, with danger of consent removed...

The third and true opinion holds that, when the danger of consent ceases, it is venial not to resist illicit movements positively, but not mortal. And this seems expressly confirmed by St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 74, a. 4, where he says: mortal sin cannot be in sensuality, but only in reason. Therefore the reason is, both because consent to sinning gravely does not arise from the sensible appetite, but from the will, and when it does not positively consent, mortal sin is not committed; and therefore venial sin is committed insofar as man ought to beware lest the appetite draw the will after itself; but this obligation, when the danger of consent is not proximate, is only light. And also because, if under grave obligation we were held positively to repel all disordered movements, we would be held to the impossible; for it is impossible positively to coerce all these movements taken collectively." L. 6, 29; Diana, vol. 8, tr. 6, de aliq. cas. circa mat. lux., r. 8; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 74, a. 8, ad 3; q. 79, a. 1; La-Croix, l. 5, n. 111.

"Note: There is no obligation to resist carnal movements positively, if there is a just cause of not resisting, namely if someone has experienced that by resisting the movements are more excited and increased; or if the movements have their origin from a necessary or useful action;... if it is not an easy business to repel them. It is enough, therefore, then to behave negatively, with the firm purpose of never consenting; for the actual care of not consenting itself then suffices to free a man from fault, at least mortal fault, although not from venial fault, if the resistance is tepid." L. 9. Therefore when temptation lasts long, and it would be too troublesome continually to repel its movements positively, it is no sin to permit them by behaving negatively. And to do thus is counseled to those who are of timorous conscience. L. 9.

How is resistance made positively? - Positive resistance can be furnished in two ways: 1. Directly, by repelling those movements; and indeed there is no obligation to employ this direct resistance, which, as regards carnal movements, often excites them more; much less is there an obligation to material resistance, which itself also often, as regards those carnal movements, is harmful. 2. Indirectly, by diverting the mind to other things. As regards movements against chastity and against faith and charity, this indirect resistance is more to be counseled than any direct resistance or attack; and if the movements are slight, it is better to despise them. L. 8; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 74, a. 3, ad 2.

1. Stanislaus is accustomed to be harassed by evil thoughts. He indeed rejects them, but immediately they return, and remain in the mind for a rather long delay. He himself always fears concerning consent given. The confessor adds courage to him, saying that fully deliberate consent is required for mortal sin, and that the mere thought of an evil thing, and even its delay in the memory, does not suffice; and that mortal sin is a monster so horrible that he who is stained by it knows this well; nor indeed does anyone sin unknowingly. Stanislaus, thinking these things over, has the thought occur to him that, in order to free himself from the most troublesome anxiety of mind concerning consent given to evil thoughts, he might sometimes consent to them, so that he may experience the different state of mind. But soon he is vexed by a greater anxiety concerning the sin committed by this thought.

Q. 1. What is required for grave sin? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 287-289, 311-314. To the second: Stanislaus is without doubt too much liable to scruples; nevertheless let him be consoled, because he is not to be blamed for grave sin. For sin is not without consent, and consent is not in the thought, nor in the importunate and even long-lasting thought of an evil thing against the will, nor even in the most importunate thought of delectation, or consent, or mortal sin, as when scrupulous persons of this sort, on account of such a thought, then fear concerning delectation, consent, and sin committed. Thought is in the intellect; consent is in the will. But the anxiety itself and the fear by which Stanislaus is continually vexed, lest he have sinned in thoughts of this sort, sufficiently shows that every consent was lacking in him. But in the case of doubt, the presumption favors him, if, as appears, he himself is not accustomed to consent with full advertence; because from things commonly happening a prudent presumption is made. A fortiori, indeed, this very thing must be presumed concerning a scrupulous person, as one whose whole solicitude tends to this, that he not offend God. For from what other cause is he so vehemently distressed and disturbed? Cf. Elbel 226 seqq., 548 seqq.; Reuter, Neoconfess., 267, 8; Scav., 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 1, n. 740; G. 141.

But what if Stanislaus deliberately conceived that proposal? Without doubt he would have sinned gravely. But of what species such a sin would have been depends on the nature of those evil thoughts to which he had resolved to consent. For if those evil thoughts occurred to Stanislaus against some determinate virtue, charity, justice, chastity, etc., the evil proposal of Stanislaus would have been in the same species. But if no determinate evil thought was being objected to Stanislaus, that evil proposal of his would have been against no determinate virtue, nor consequently of a determinate species, but would have been of generic malice against that general rule of morality: Turn away from evil and do good. Elbel 548; I. M. 315.

2. Parthenius promised by vow that he would give to the parish church two most beautiful golden candlesticks, so that the Marian month might be celebrated with greater solemnity in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Meanwhile, while he is at home, he often looks at those candlesticks, and is affected by grief and displeasure. Nevertheless, the month of May being near, although with still greater grief and displeasure, he calls a servant, and orders him to carry the candlesticks to the parish church. Seeing them on the altar on the first day of the month of May, furnished with many lit candles, before the statue of the Blessed Virgin Mary, he is affected by great joy and great gladness.

Q. 1. Is grief and sadness over a completed work of virtue a sin? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 392. To the second: "He who, after he has bound himself by a grave vow, then seriously grieves that he has done so, does not sin gravely, provided that he retains the mind of fulfilling it." L. 123. But the displeasure of Parthenius does not seem serious and deliberate; but rather natural displeasure, on account of the beauty of those candlesticks, which, as is gathered from the case, were very dear to him. This is gathered from the prompt mind with which he exactly fulfilled the vow, from the fact that Parthenius appears a very good man and devoted to the Blessed Virgin Mary, and from the joy by which he is then affected. Wherefore from that natural displeasure his vow in no way loses its merit. "If however," says St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88, a. 6, ad 2, "the work itself, considered according to itself, were sad and involuntary after the vow, provided nevertheless that the will of fulfilling the vow remains, it is still more meritorious than if it were done without a vow." Indeed, with that natural repugnance standing, and by conquering and expugning it, acting against it, merit increases. Cf. I. M. 56. Nor indeed is it established from the case that the grief and displeasure of Parthenius were over the vow performed; but merely over a thing dear to him being given up, which is clearly different.

3. Quirinus, desiring to avoid every sin, judges this altogether impossible for himself. For, he says, every act, in the concrete, is either good or evil, since indifferent acts are not given in the individual. Moreover, when I act, I could always indeed do something more perfect. But to omit the more perfect act is not an act of virtue and good. Therefore by choosing the less perfect I sin, and consequently I always sin. Hence Quirinus is agitated by great anguish, and approaches various confessors that they may resolve his doubt, and he acquiesces in the resolution of none.

Q. Is it always a sin, in the concrete, to do what is less perfect?

R. Negatively. This is clear 1. from this very thing, that otherwise it would follow that anyone sins in every act, which is absurd. For no one necessarily sins. 2. Because by the very fact that someone chooses a lesser good, he indeed chooses a good; and therefore he acts honorably. Whence 1 Cor. 7:25-40: "Therefore, he who joins his virgin in marriage does well; and he who does not join her does better.... Let her marry whom she wishes.... But she will be happier if she remains thus." 3. For if someone, by choosing a lesser good, had a will actually contemning the greater good, or delighting itself in the rejection of the greater good, then certainly sin would be present. But this perverse will does not necessarily and always accompany the choice of the lesser good. For often and ordinarily a man leaves behind the greater good by simply pursuing the lesser good, without by a positive act of the will abstaining from the pursuit of the greater good, to which he is not held. And then indeed there is no sin, and no evil act; but the act is only good and virtuous. But if he leaves behind the greater good by a positive act indeed of the will, and pursues the lesser good, because he sees this to be good, and that not to be commanded, nor necessarily to be done, but free; because he sees this at present to be suitable for himself, within the limits of the virtues of prudence, temperance, modesty, etc.; because he wishes to use his own right, to preserve liberty for himself, not to form for himself a too strict conscience, nor to become liable to scruples, etc., certainly choosing the lesser good and leaving behind the greater, he sins in nothing, and acts honorably and virtuously, although less virtuously and less perfectly. - Hence let Quirinus strive always to act from right reason and from the motive of some virtue; and not to be led by sensual inclination or a less right motive; and he will always act honorably and virtuously, without it also being necessary always that by a reflex act he institute that comparison between the greater and lesser good. Let Quirinus acquiesce in this doctrine, reduce it to practice, and he will be freed from all anguish and will avoid every sin.

143. • DEFINITION. Sin is commonly defined: A free transgression of divine law, that is, of any law obliging in conscience. - St. Lig., book 5, no. 1. - Or "it is a voluntary departure from the law of God." - Thus St. Thomas, 1.2, qu. 72, art. 1. - Or "it is a word, deed, or desire contrary to the eternal law of God." - St. Aug., book 22, Against Faustus, ch. 27.

DIVISION. Sin is distinguished in manifold ways, namely:

1. Actual, or habitual, according as it is either an act or omission disconformed to law, or a state of sin not yet destroyed.

2. Mortal, or venial, according as it either dissolves divine friendship, or is only a light offense of God, which can easily obtain pardon.

3. Sin of commission, or omission, according as it is done by placing a prohibited act, or by omitting a commanded act.

4. Sins against God, neighbor, and oneself, according as they specially and immediately are opposed to God, or are adverse to justice and charity due to the neighbor, or especially regard temperance and moderation of the passions ¹.

¹ ** Perhaps you would say better: according as they violate duties due either to God, or to neighbor, or to oneself. For otherwise there are certain sins against the neighbor which are opposed properly neither to justice nor to charity, for example disobedience.

5. Sins of malice, or ignorance, or infirmity, according as they are committed either from mere malice, or from vincible ignorance, or from mere frailty.

Sin is called formal when the law is violated freely and knowingly. But it is called material when the transgression of the law is wholly involuntary.

We shall say nothing about original sin, the treatment of which pertains to speculative theology.

429. Etymological notion.¹ Sin is designated by various names among the sacred authors.

¹ Schleusner, Novus thesaurus philologico-criticus, Leipzig, 1821; Grimm, Lexicon graeco-lat. in libr. N. Test., Leipzig, 1903; Trench, Synonyms of the N. Testament, 9th ed., London, 1880, rendered in French by C. de Faye, Synonymes du N. Testament, Paris, 1869.

In Hebrew: hatta't, that is, aberration from the mark or end, because the sinner recedes from his end; awon, that is, iniquity, depravity; pesha, or rebellion, defection; sarah, secession, because the sinner withdraws from the law.

But in Greek it is called: ἁμαρτία, that is, aberration from the mark;¹ or ἁμάρτημα, which has the same sound, with this distinction, however, that the former word signifies sin whether habitual or actual, while the latter always designates a sinful act; ἀνομία or παρανομία, that is, violation and contempt of the law² (in the Vulgate it is rendered iniquity); παράβασις, or transgression of the law;³ παρακοή, that is, the will not to hear the voice of God, disobedience;⁴ παράπτωμα, that is, fall, because by sin we slip and lie prostrate;⁵ ἀγνόημα, ἄγνοια, or ignorance, because every sin imports a certain error, although not altogether excusable;⁶ ἥττημα, that is, diminution, defeat, because sinners, overcome by temptations, experience defeat;⁷ πλημμέλεια, or that which is beyond measure and harmony, inharmonious.⁸

¹ Rom. 5:12; 7:7, etc.

² 1 John 3:4; 2 Pet. 2:16.

³ Gal. 3:19; 1 Tim. 2:14, etc.

⁴ Rom. 5:19; Heb. 2:2.

⁵ Mark 11:25-26.

⁶ Heb. 9:7; Acts 17:30.

⁷ Rom. 11:12.

⁸ Lev. 5:15; Num. 18:9, etc.

430. 2. Historical notion. Sin is exhibited in a general way by the sacred authors as something negative, or as something contrary to justice and rectitude, yet in a diverse way.

(A) In the Old Testament. (a) In Genesis, sin is exhibited as disobedience, or the transgression of a divine precept,⁹ which not only is reproved by God, but is strictly punished;¹⁰ hence Cain, after killing his brother, suffers remorse of conscience and the divine curse;¹¹ and, when iniquities were multiplied upon the earth, men are punished by the flood,¹² because especially "every thought of the heart was intent upon evil at all times."

⁹ Gen. 2:16; 3:11.

¹⁰ Gen. 3:14-19.

¹¹ Gen. 4:9-16.

¹² Gen. 6:5-7 and 11-13.

(b) After the election of the Israelite people and the promulgation of the Mosaic law, positive precepts are multiplied, and therefore various species of sins against various laws; but, since God is the special legislator and king of Israel, transgressions of the law assume a special malice of rebellion. Among graver sins, idolatry is principal, by which false gods are preferred to the one and perfect Deity: wherefore whoever indulges idolatry is severely chastised.¹³ Among lesser sins are numbered legal impurities, which, although they by no means suppose internal fault, had to be expiated by various ablutions and sacrifices.¹⁴ - Lighter offenses were destroyed by expiatory sacrifices;¹⁵ but graver ones were punished by the penalty of death.¹⁶ In order that the people might be more efficaciously turned away from sinning, abundant blessings are promised to those keeping the law, and dreadful evils, especially temporal ones, are denounced against those violating the same.¹ Yet the fulfillment of the law is also urgently commended on account of gratitude and love toward God.² - Another motive for fleeing sin is taken from the fact that one person's offense affects the whole nation because of the law of solidarity;³ in truth God sometimes punishes the sins of fathers even in sons, "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of those who hate me."⁴

¹³ Exod. 32:30-35.

¹⁴ Lev. 11-15.

¹⁵ Lev. 4-6.

¹⁶ Lev. 18:29; 20:6-21, etc.

¹ Deut. 7:11-26; 10:12-22; 11:13-28.

² "Love therefore the Lord thy God and observe his precepts." (Deut. 11:1; cf. 8:2-20.)

³ Josh. 20:20.

⁴ Exod. 20:5.

431. (C) From the time of the Prophets, sin is exhibited more vividly as an offense against God and neighbor, and true repentance of heart is more urgently preached as a means for satisfying for offenses. For sin is contempt of God as benefactor and father, and therefore impiety: "I have nourished and exalted sons; but they have despised me";⁵ infidelity toward God, who is as it were the spouse of the chosen nation: "But thou hast fornicated with many lovers."⁶ It is also often denounced as injustice against neighbor, because it oppresses the poor: "Who crush the heads of the poor upon the dust of the earth, and turn aside the way of the humble."⁷

⁵ Isa. 1:2; cf. Jer. 2:4-37.

⁶ Jer. 3:1.

⁷ Amos 2:7.

Moreover sinners, by leaving God, the fountain of living water, inflict upon themselves the greatest evil: "But they who commit sin and iniquity are enemies of their own soul."⁸ Hence sin is truly a certain kind of foolishness, concerning which the impious will grieve bitterly.⁹ - Therefore, in order to obtain mercy, nothing remains except to do penance; nor is it sufficient to offer victims or to rend garments, but it is necessary to offer to God a contrite and humbled heart: "Be converted to me with all your heart, in fasting, and in weeping, and in mourning; and rend your hearts and not your garments... A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit; a contrite and humbled heart, O God, thou wilt not despise."¹⁰

⁸ Tob. 12:10; cf. Jer. 2:13.

⁹ Wis. 5:2-13.

¹⁰ Joel 2:12-13; Ps. 50:19.

432. (B) In the New Testament. (a) Christ from the beginning is exhibited as the lamb who takes away the sins of the world, and therefore He speaks more concerning the destruction of sin than concerning its nature.

Nevertheless He supposes sin to be a transgression of the law, an offense against God and neighbor, a disordering of the will, by which one's own glory is preferred to the glory of God.¹¹ From another side, by teaching and inculcating a more perfect law, by that very fact He indirectly declares the nature and extension of sin: thus, in the sermon on the mount, He reproves as sinful many acts which were presented as honorable by the doctors of the law and the scribes, for example, anger, hatred of enemies, boasting, pride, etc. In a special manner He denounces hypocrisy, scandal, infidelity, and sin against the Holy Spirit.¹ From another side He takes away merely legal sins from the midst, and openly declares that sins go out from the heart:² "For from the heart go forth evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false testimonies, blasphemies: these are the things which defile a man; but to eat with unwashed hands does not defile a man."

¹¹ John 12:43.

¹ Matt. 23:5-32; Matt. 18:6; Luke 17:1-2; Matt. 12:31-32; Mark 16:16.

² Matt. 15:19-20.

(b) According to St. Paul, sin is a certain servitude, from which we are freed by grace: "But being freed from sin, you have been made servants of justice";³ it is also the cause of death: "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death";⁴ it is deservedly called disobedience and prevarication,⁵ and therefore is punished with a terrible judgment, because the sinner tramples underfoot the Son of God and grieves the Holy Spirit.⁶

³ Rom. 6:18.

⁴ Rom. 5:12.

⁵ Heb. 2:2.

⁶ Heb. 10:26-31; Eph. 4:30.

(c) According to St. John, we all indeed sin, but we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the just, who is the propitiation for our sins;⁷ but sin is iniquity and the work of the devil; everyone who is born of God does not commit sin⁸ (namely, as long as he remains a son of God, by imitating divine morals). Among sins, two especially are to be fled: those which are opposed to charity, and those which are against Christ, especially the denial of His divinity.⁹ With regard to gravity, sin is twofold, one which is not unto death, but another which is unto death,¹⁰ that is, to which the will adheres so obstinately that there is scarcely hope of obtaining pardon.

⁷ 1 John 1:8-10; 2:1-2.

⁸ 1 John 3:4-10.

⁹ 1 John 3:15; 5:10-12.

¹⁰ Ibid., 16-17.

433. 1. Definition of sin. It is commonly defined as a free transgression of the law, according to that saying of Augustine: "Sin is some deed, or word, or desire against the eternal law. But the eternal law is divine reason or the will of God commanding the natural order to be preserved, forbidding it to be disturbed."¹² - Hence a twofold element is found in sin: a voluntary act,¹³ whether of deed or of mouth or of heart, which Augustine does not mention in his definition, but supposes; and a defect of rectitude, or privation of due order toward the ultimate end, and therefore lack of conformity with divine reason, which is the ultimate rule of morals, and with the dictate of conscience, which manifests the same to us. - This indeed is true even of the transgression of human law: for this is not truly law except insofar as it is consonant with divine reason; and therefore the transgressor of human law indirectly violates divine law.

¹¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71-72; Suarez, De Peccatis, disp. I-IV; Salmant., Tr. XX, De principiis moralitatis, cap. 8; St. Alphonsus, lib. II, n. 1-10; Billuart, De peccatis, diss. I, art. 2-4; L. Billot, Disquisitio de natura et ratione peccati, 3rd ed., Rome, 1900.

¹² St. Augustine, Contra Faustum, l. XXXII, c. 27; Migne, P.L. XLII, 418. - Concerning the eternal law, we spoke above, n. 210.

¹³ Wherefore for formal, or subjective, sin there is required advertence of the intellect and consent of the will, concerning which above, n. 78-84.

434. Corollaries. (A) From this it follows that there is not per se a merely philosophical sin, that is, one opposed to right reason without nevertheless being an offense against God. (a) For the following proposition 2 was condemned by Alexander VIII, 24 August 1690, as scandalous, rash, and erroneous: "Philosophical or moral sin is a human act disagreeing with rational nature and right reason; but theological and mortal sin is a free transgression of divine law. Philosophical sin, however grave, in him who either is ignorant of God or does not actually think of God, is grave sin, but is not an offense against God nor a mortal sin dissolving friendship with God, nor worthy of eternal punishment."¹ - And deservedly; for of itself he who apprehends some action as morally evil, by that very fact at least implicitly perceives it as prohibited by the supreme legislator, and therefore logically and interpretatively as an offense against God.² (b) Yet from this it cannot be inferred that the opinion of Lugo and of certain other theologians was reproved, who assert that a merely philosophical sin can hypothetically be given, namely in those who inculpably are ignorant of God;³ for these do not offend God even implicitly, since they by no means know His existence. - But the proposition was condemned because it did not distinguish between vincible and invincible ignorance of God, and from another side supposed this ignorance to be common enough.

¹ Denzing., n. 1157; Viva, on this proposition, where he observes that that proposition, ascribed to a certain professor of Dijon (Musnier), had not been defended by him so absolutely; Mangenot, Dictionn. de theol., t. I, p. 749; A. Vermeele, La morale de Kant et la theorie du peche philosophique, apud Annales de Philos. caret., Sept. 1894, p. 543-565.

² St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73, a. 7, ad 3.

³ Lugo, De Incarnat., disp. V, sect. 5; Viva, cited place, n. 22.

435. (B) From this can also be gathered the difference between evil, sin, and fault; for evil indeed is any deformity, whether moral or physical, consisting in the privation of due perfection; but sin is a morally evil act, whether voluntary or involuntary (material, or objective, sin); finally, fault is a morally evil and voluntary act. Yet sin and fault are often taken promiscuously.

(C) It must likewise be noted that, in St. Paul and in ancient authors, by the name sin is also designated that which induces to sin, for example, concupiscence,¹ or that which follows from sin, for example, the stain impressed on the soul by sin; indeed, by extension, the penalty of sin, or sacrifice for sin, or the object of sin.² Wherefore, from the context the genuine sense must be defined.

¹ "This concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, the holy Synod declares that the Catholic Church has never understood to be called sin because it is truly and properly sin in the reborn, but because it is from sin and inclines to sin." (Trent, sess. V, can. 5, apud Denzing., n. 674.)

² Lev. 20:20; 2 Cor. 5:21; Deut. 9:21.

436. 2. Divisions of sin. Sin is divided in many ways, because it can be considered under a manifold respect: -

(a) By reason of the principle from which it arises, sin is original or actual: the former is not committed by the proper consent of each one, but is transfused from Adam into his descendants, from a certain moral connection between these and him, as we declared in the Treatise on God the Creator, n. 189-193. But the latter, concerning which alone we treat here, is committed by the proper will of each one.

(b) By reason of the mode in which it is completed, sin of commission consists in a positive act against some forbidding precept, such as homicide; while sin of omission consists in omitting an action prescribed by law, as is the omission of fasting: sin of this kind requires a positive act of the will, by which someone wills to omit the thing commanded, or at least wills something else incompatible with the thing commanded,³ as was declared above, n. 84.

³ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71, a. 5.

437. (c) By reason of malice, sins of ignorance are distinguished, which proceed from ignorance, although culpable (above, n. 90-97); sins of infirmity, which arise from the impulse of passion, although not without free consent (above, n. 102-106); sins of malice, which especially draw their origin from an evil and perverse will, without being excused by ignorance or the vehement impulse of passion: these, other things being equal, are graver.

(d) By reason of the powers by which they are committed, sins are of heart, of mouth, and of deed, according as they are completed by the mind alone, or by words externally brought forth, or by external action; suppose if someone first conceives anger in the heart against a neighbor, then expresses it by harsh words, and finally strikes the enemy with blows and wounds. But what malice the external act adds to the internal act of the same kind, we have already explained, n. 162-166.

(e) By reason of gravity, sin is called mortal, from a certain analogy with physical death, when it brings spiritual death upon the soul, by depriving it of sanctifying grace,¹ which is supernatural life; but venial, if it does not deprive the soul of sanctifying grace, and therefore in some way deserves pardon, even when it has not been remitted.

¹ In the state of mere nature, grave sin would not deprive the soul of grace, but of that rectitude and beauty which arises from the ordering of the faculties to God, the ultimate end.

438. From this it follows that the word "sin" is not univocal, but analogous, insofar as it does not have altogether the same sense when it is predicated of certain kinds of sins. For, other divisions being passed over, actual mortal sin, venial sin, and original sin so differ among themselves that they can be reduced to the same genus only analogically; since mortal sin not yet remitted turns us altogether away from the ultimate end, while venial sin indeed retards us from the attainment of the end, but does not turn us away;² from another side original sin is not voluntary by one's proper will, while actual sin supposes one's proper fault.

² "The division of sin into venial and mortal is not the division of a genus into species which equally participate in the notion of the genus, but of an analogue into those things of which it is predicated according to prior and posterior." (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 1, ad 1.)

Wherefore, original sin being set aside, concerning which something has been said elsewhere, we shall speak separately of mortal and venial sin, since their nature and effects differ as much as heaven from earth.

Usefulness. Since the study of moral theology is chiefly ordered to the right administration of the sacrament of penance, in which the minister is in the first place a judge concerning sins to be absolved, the moment of the whole treatise on sins can escape no one. In the first chapter, moreover, we already hand down several things which in reality are fundamental, concerning the very essence of every sin; concerning its specification and its seat. Nor today can the question, once so greatly disputed, concerning philosophical sin, be neglected (1).

N.B. We shall treat of sin in the confused sense, not because we propose to speak here without order and clarity, but because, from the beginning, we wish strongly to inculcate this: that there is not some genus of sin under which mortal and venial should be placed as species. Therefore we give a confused notion of sin, when we do not speak separately of each sin. If there were a common genus, Chapter I would be inscribed: On sin in common.

— I. The name of sin and its confused description. The word sin was already often used by Cicero himself to designate a human act deformed from its rule or law ¹, as in the most beautiful saying: "Apart from fault and sin, nothing can happen to a man which is horrible and to be greatly feared" (Ad Fam. V, 21).

By nominal description, sin is called a morally evil act ². In these words, the word moral does not designate a genus, of which there would be the two species, good morality and evil morality. For there is no common notion of morality which indifferently becomes good or evil, as the same notion of animality is preserved in man and in the brute; but he who says a moral act already says, confusedly, a good act or an evil act, just as he who names being already insinuates such a being.

Furthermore, although the description related falls upon mortal sins and upon venial sins, and although we are accustomed to speak of the theological specification by which mortal sins are distinguished from venial, nevertheless there is not even a genus of sin whose species would be mortal and venial sin: but, as will easily appear from the notion to be handed down here, there is sin properly so called, mortal, and there is sin of diminished notion, venial.

¹ Because laws are of art, therefore by metaphorical usage an artisan can be accused of having sinned against art.

² Summa, 1, 2, q. 71, art. 6.

— II. Essence. Insofar as it is an evil act, sin says some privation of good, which here will be some departure from the order of reason or from the law of God; but insofar as it is a moral act, it necessarily says some good which is inordinately sought. For evil as such is not appetible, but we do not choose it except under the aspect of good, or as joined with the good which we love. Hence, as such, evil is not voluntary except per accidens. But although the act is wholly evil and the omission is wholly evil whereby, on account of some good, we choose or embrace evil, nevertheless it is a lesser evil to will evil under the aspect of good than under the aspect of evil. Therefore, in that tendency toward good, in that election of evil under the aspect of good, there remains a trace of positive order. Hence that saying of St. Thomas, that evil in morals is not pure privation; but "is a certain good joined to the privation of another good" ¹. Whereas in the physical order there is had total privation, for example of vision by blindness, and partial privation, by dimness of sight. Only observe that, in the physical order, what remains of vision in one who sees dimly is simply good, whereas in the moral order the positive appetite itself is evil, because it founds the choice of evil.

¹ Summa, 1 p., q. 48, art. 1 ad 2; 1, 2, q. 73, art. 2.

— III. Specification. If in every sin there is had some appetite of a good object, which of itself is voluntary, and an appetite of evil, which is only voluntary per accidens, since voluntary acts are specified according to that part by which they are voluntary of themselves rather than according to another by which they are only voluntary per accidens, hence again follows that consequence or corollary indicated by St. Thomas, that the moral specification of sins is made by the objects to which the sinner turns himself, rather than by the privation which accompanies the pursuit of the object. Hence it happens that mortal sin, or sin properly so called, and venial sin, or sin of diminished notion, can agree in the same moral species. (Cf. 1, 2, q. 72, art. 5; q. 73, art. 3, and below, n. 426-427.)

— IV. Distinctions. Sins are distinguished:

1. Into deliberate sins, which are committed from full consent, and surreptitious or semi-deliberate sins, in which full advertence was lacking, or where only a certain remissness in repelling the suggestion of evil can be charged to the will.

2. Into sins committed in duties toward God, toward oneself, toward one's neighbor, from the order or proximate object to which they pertain. Duties toward God, moreover, are ruled both by the theological virtues and by the moral virtue of religion. The material object of the former is God himself; the material object of religion is the worship of God, taken most broadly.

3. Into sins of malice, of infirmity, of ignorance, according as the free choice of evil is made without any illusion of ignorance and affection of the senses; or guilt is lightened because of the impulse of passions, of temptations, or because of a certain ignorance, although blameworthy in itself.

4. Into sins of heart, of mouth, of work, according as they are completed by the mind alone, or also by words, indeed by external action. Observe that there are sins, say hatred, blasphemy, which are perfected by mind or words, while others are merely begun by mind or words: say the internal intention and the external proposal of stealing.

5. Into sins of commission or omission, according as a prohibited action is done or a prescribed action is neglected.

6. Into one's own sins or another's sins: the latter consist in illicit cooperation toward another's sin.

— Formal sin, material sin. Sin is properly formal when it is formally opposed to the dictate of conscience and at the same time, of itself, to the dictate of law, while material sin disagrees with the remote rule of law alone, but not with the proximate rule of conscience. Material sin excludes free consent into evil.

Wherefore material sin supposes: a) a person who is subject to the law; b) an act which of itself is done freely, and therefore can be deliberated, not however a first-first movement; c) an act prohibited by law, such as passive pollution is not; d) error or a certain good faith of the agent with ignorance of the prohibition.

[Supplementary note to n. 395.] There we described the material sin which he commits who acts freely but ignorantly. But another reason of material sin is had when an evil act is done by him who, on account of madness, sleep, or drunkenness, is not master of himself.

— V. Subject of sin. In every power, moreover, which is a principle of acts, sin can be present, dependent, of course, on the will. Wherefore sin is had in the sensitive appetite, in reason, and in the will. (Cf. 1, 2, q. 74, art. 1-4.) It is not had in powers which we rule despotically, for example, in the locomotive power.

— VI. Concerning philosophical sin. We know that sin is present psychologically where action has been taken against the absolute dictate of conscience. And there is no doubt that sin is opposed at the same time to the order of reason and to the law of God ¹. Moreover, it is called theological insofar as it offends God; philosophical, insofar as it repugns the order of reason. Merely philosophical sin, therefore, would be that which is opposed to right reason but not to the law of God.

That no such sin exists objectively is most certain, for "whatever is contained under the order of reason is contained under the order of God himself" ¹, and therefore is sanctioned by the most wise will of God. Besides, without God there would be neither the order of reason nor honorable good, since the essences of things have their ultimate foundation in the divine essence, and are formally constituted by the divine intellect.

But it is asked whether a man who perfectly or invincibly is ignorant of God as author and preceptor of order and reason can sin merely philosophically: or whether, on the contrary, it is repugnant that the same man should say that something absolutely must be done or omitted, and not advert, at least confusedly, to a divine command.

That this should happen regularly, so that some ordinary division of sins into philosophical and theological should be proposed, must be altogether denied. Alexander VIII, decree of the Holy Office, August 24, 1690, condemned as scandalous, rash, offensive to pious ears, and erroneous this proposition: "Philosophical or moral sin is a human act disagreeing with rational nature and right reason; but theological and mortal sin is a free transgression of the divine law. Philosophical sin, however grave, in one who is ignorant of God, or who does not actually think of God, is a grave sin, but it is not an offense of God nor a mortal sin dissolving the friendship of God nor worthy of eternal punishment" (Denz. 1290). But not a few scholastics, holding the matter rather as hypothetical, think that this can happen in strictness: thus Lessius, Suarez, Vasquez, Lugo; while others contend that the same thing strictly repugns. Thus today C. Frins and several others.

Concerning this matter we think it must be said as follows.

He who perceives the absolute obligation of doing good and declining from evil, at the same time spontaneously, in the order perceived, perceives at least confusedly an ordering force dominating him, which he obeys while he does good and declines from evil; which he resists, from which he makes himself alien, if he does evil. In this way, however, he tacitly acknowledges God as legislator, and by his action either honors or more or less despises him. Therefore, if he has acted badly against conscience, he has at the same time acted against God. Cf. Lehmkuhl I, n. 281.

Those, however, who explicitly deny God and then turn their mind to the imperious commands of conscience are logically brought to the conclusions of modern impiety, which simply denies absolute moral duties. It is indeed decorous to preserve the order of reason; noble is the appetite of satisfaction which is begotten from an order preserved. Yet this belongs to the genus of relative goodness which alone is open to man, and which therefore can be outweighed by a greater goodness. And in very truth, with God set aside, the necessary dictate by which I judge that one must act honorably and the equally necessary appetite of one's own beatitude often cannot be reconciled with each other. That absurdity or contradiction causes each necessity, at least in an elicited act, to be denied as absolute.

¹ Not rarely here a passage of St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 71, art. 6 ad 4, is badly alleged, as if the Holy Doctor there had handed down that every moral malice is rooted in divine prohibition, so that, for this reason, when divine law is being treated, that celebrated distinction must be denied, by which some things are called evil because prohibited, but others prohibited because evil. At first sight St. Thomas seems to teach this in the place indicated. For he has it thus: "When it is said that not every sin is evil because prohibited, it is understood of a prohibition made by positive law. But if it is referred to natural right, which is contained first indeed in the eternal law, but secondarily in the natural judgment of human reason, then every sin is evil because prohibited." But that interpretation is excluded by the final words which ought not to have been neglected: "for from the very fact that it is disordered, it repugns natural right." For by these words the disordered thing is proposed rather as logically prior to the right of nature. But it must be said that the question concerning that priority, or concerning the relation of divine prohibition to the malice of an act, is not touched by St. Thomas in this place. His present intention is this: to demonstrate that the definition of St. Augustine is true, by which sin is called "something said or done or desired against the eternal law." But for this it is enough that no evil exists which is not prohibited by that law, so that it draws its malice, whether first or second, initial or complete, from opposition to divine law. Here, therefore, the Holy Doctor already affirms what he will repeat more than once, that by divine law, not by human law, all sins are prohibited and punished. Cf. 1, 2, q. 91, art. 4 c. (where Augustine is alleged from the same book I On Free Will from which he was brought forward in the present objection); 1, 2, q. 93, art. 3 ad 3, etc.

¹ Summa, 1, 2, q. 72, art. 4 c.

— Corollary. Barbarians are not accustomed to scrutinize such things. Wherefore, in regions of the missions, the poor natives, although they are formally and explicitly ignorant of God as orderer and legislator, nevertheless, while they do what they judge to be good, are not incapable of merit before God (grace being supposed); and by acting against conscience they must be judged to sin theologically.

— 1. By a usage already ancient, sin says a human act deformed from its rule; and it is a morally evil act, with this observation, however, that there is no generic notion of morality which indifferently becomes good or evil, but only a confused and analogical notion is proposed, as of being. The notion of sin also belongs analogically to mortal and venial.

2. Since evil is always sought under the aspect of good or as joined with some good, evil in morals does not say pure privation, but is some good joined to the privation of another good. And the moral specification of sin is made, rather than by the joined privation, by the objects to which the sinner turns himself, since on that side the act is voluntary of itself.

3. Sins are distinguished into deliberate and surreptitious; committed in duties toward God, toward oneself, toward one's neighbor; of malice, of infirmity, of ignorance; of heart, of mouth, and of work; of commission or omission; one's own or another's.

4. Sin is properly formal. Material sin supposes a person subject to law, who acts freely, and with a certain good faith does an act or omission prohibited by law.

5. Sin is always done dependently on the will; but it can be present in any power which is a principle of acts.

6. Philosophical sin exists neither objectively, since by divine law every moral evil is forbidden, nor even subjectively, since conscience of absolute obligation brings with it a confused notion of God the legislator. Hence even barbarians are capable of merit (with divine grace) and of theological demerit.

356. Sin is rightly and deservedly called the mystery of iniquity.¹ For up to the present day theologians do not agree in what the formal constitutive element of sin consists. The best and most noble men have disputed on this matter, for example Ioannes a S. Thoma, Cajetan, Sylvius, Suarez, Billuart, Scheeben, Billot, etc., yet without being able to bring the desired clarity. Hence St. Anselm² calls the perverse will of the sinner "a marvelous horror and a horrible marvel."

Diverse names are customarily imposed upon sin in Sacred Scripture. Thus, for example, it is called disobedience or prevarication and transgression of a divine precept,³ offense against God,⁴ contempt of God,⁵ injustice,⁶ iniquity,⁷ ingratitude toward God,⁸ impiety toward God,⁹ pride,¹⁰ foolishness,¹¹ etc., etc. - Offense against God is perhaps the best among all the other denominations of sin, because it excellently expresses the nature and gravity of sin. For according to the common adage, honor must be measured on the part of the one honoring, but offense must be weighed on the part of the one offended. For the greater he is who is offended, the greater is the offense brought upon him. But God is of infinite majesty, and therefore an offense brought upon him puts on some true, although not absolute, infinity.¹²

¹ 2 Thess. 2, 7.

² Medit. 3 (Migne, Patr. lat. 158, 726).

³ Gen. 2, 16. Hebr. 2, 2.

⁴ Num. 17, 14. Eccli. 34, 20. Phil. 1, 10.

⁵ Lev. 26, 15.

⁶ Ps. 31, 5.

⁷ Gen. 4, 13.

⁸ Luc. 6, 35.

⁹ Ps. 31, 5.

¹⁰ Ps. 73, 23.

¹¹ Sap. 10, 8.

¹² Cf. on this matter Billuart, De pecc. diss. 8, a. 5.

357. Note. 1. In Sacred Scripture the name of sin occurs very often, but it is sometimes taken in a broader sense a) for the cause of sin, namely for concupiscence. Thus St. Paul says: "Now I do not work that, but the sin which dwells in me."¹³ b) For the victim which is offered for the expiation of sin. Thus it is said of Christ: "Him who had not known sin, he made sin for us."¹⁴ c) For the punishment or effect of sin. In this sense can be understood the text: "It is therefore a holy and salutary thought to pray for the dead, that they may be loosed from sins."¹⁵

2. The name of vice by modern authors is customarily taken for greater sins (Verbrechen), but by St. Thomas¹⁶ and the old scholastics for a sinful habit.

¹³ Rom. 7, 17.

¹⁴ 2 Cor. 5, 21.

¹⁵ 2 Mach. 12, 46.

¹⁶ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 71.

358. Definition of sin. In catechisms sin is customarily defined simply according to St. Ambrose:¹⁷ a prevarication of divine law. This definition indeed is good, but St. Augustine gives a more explicit definition:¹⁸ "Sin is a deed or word or something desired against the eternal law of God."

St. Thomas has a special article¹⁹ for showing the fittingness of this definition. For that definition is good which explains the material and formal element of the thing defined, since every temporal thing coalesces from some material and formal element. But the aforesaid definition first explains the material element in sin, namely, the human act. For every sin of men is a truly human act. Augustine could indeed have said more briefly: Sin is a human act against the law of God; but he better added the diverse words (deed, word, desire), expressing sins of deed, of mouth, of heart.²⁰ For there were some who denied that depraved thoughts are sins; but others taught that the external acts themselves are not sins. - Besides, the aforesaid definition excellently also explains the formal element in sin, namely, by the words "against the eternal law of God." For no true moral sin is given which is not against the eternal law of God. For above it was proved that all other laws must be derived from the eternal law and are just laws obliging in conscience insofar as they agree with the eternal law. Therefore those acts which are against some other just moral law, by that very fact, are also opposed to the eternal law of God. - But since every true moral sin is formally against the eternal law of God, it follows that every sin is an offense against God, nor does there exist a merely philosophical sin, which indeed would be against right reason, but would not constitute an offense against God and therefore would not merit the punishment of gehenna or purgatory. Already above in n. 25 the intrinsic reason was indicated why merely philosophical sin is not possible.

Conditions required for sin. Since every sin is a human and moral act, sufficient knowledge of the malice of the act and consent on the part of the will are required for it; or in other words: there is required a) advertence at least indirect to the malice of the act and b) consent, whether direct or at least indirect, to this malice. Consent and advertence are called direct if the malice of the act is known and intended in itself; but they are called indirect if they are known and intended only in the cause. For this reason he who in no way adverts to or suspects the malice of his act (on account of an invincibly erroneous conscience or forgetfulness) does not commit a formal sin; but he who from culpable negligence does not advert to the malice of his act is not excused from every fault. Generally here those things must be recalled which were said above in n. 35 sqq. concerning the requisites for a human act.

¹⁷ Lib. de paradiso c. 8 (Migne, Patr. lat. 14, 309).

¹⁸ Contra Faustum l. 22, c. 27 (Migne, Patr. lat. 42, 418).

¹⁹ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 71, a. 6.

²⁰ Under the name of word and deed culpable omissions also are comprehended, because affirmation and negation are referred to the same genus. Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 71, a. 6 ad 1.

359. Scholion. On the formal constitutive element of sin. The old scholastics, investigating more deeply the nature of sin, posed the question whether the formal constitutive element of sin is something positive or privative.²¹ All indeed must admit that in sin there is something positive, namely a disordered conversion toward a temporal good, and also something privative, namely aversion from God; but they are not agreed as to which of these is more essential. This controversy indeed is of little practical usefulness. St. Thomas²² rightly teaches: "Every sin consists formally in aversion from God"; and again:²³ "Mortal fault has both: both aversion from God and conversion to a created good; but aversion from God is there as the formal element, while conversion is there as the material element." Blessed Albert says neatly: "Sin is an averting conversion." Aversion from God, which is in any mortal sin, is punished in gehenna by compelled aversion, that is, the punishment of loss; but the disordered conversion toward creatures will be punished after death by the punishment of sense.

²¹ See Billuart l. c. diss. 1, a. 3.

²² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 118, a. 5.

²³ 3, q. 86, a. 4 ad 1.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 21, a. 1 and 2; q. 71, a. 1-4; De Malo, q. 2, a. 2.

413. Sin properly so called is taken philosophically and theologically:

a) Among philosophers an evil act is called a sin, which is a middle term between evil and fault: for not every evil is a sin, nor is every sin a fault. Evil, indeed, is the privation of a perfection which ought to be in something. But sin is the privation of a perfection due in order to an end, that is, in operation when this is not directed as its end requires; but since law is the rule according to which an act is to be directed so that it may come to its end, it is the same whether sin is called a disordering from the end, or a transgression of law. Moreover there are three laws: the law of physical nature, the rules of art, and the moral law; hence a monster is said to be a sin of nature, and a weak structure a sin of art. But transgression of the moral law has this special feature, that it arises from a free will, as mistress of its own acts; and consequently it is imputable and blameworthy: hence it has obtained the special name of fault.

b) But among theologians, who consider sin only in the moral matter and in order to the ultimate end, God, the custom has prevailed of taking sin and fault in the same sense. Therefore in the stricter signification sin is a morally evil act, or an evil human act. And in this sense, in the present treatise, there will be speech of sin.

414. Sin is distinguished from vice and from malice in strictness of speech, although in common speech these are often confused: vice is a habitual inclination to sin, or an evil habit; sin, an evil act; malice is the discordance with right reason and law, on account of which an act or habit is evil and therefore a sin or vice. Vice is directly opposed to virtue, sin to a good act, malice to goodness.

Sin has greater malice than vice, for 1) habit is midway between potency and act, and therefore just as it exceeds potency in good or evil because it inclines it to this, so it is exceeded by the act which determines the potency to this; whence it is worse to act badly than only to be able to do this or to be inclined to it; 2) vice is not evil except on account of the malice of the act, because it inclines to an evil act. Nevertheless under a certain respect vice is worse than sin, because it lasts longer and can be the efficient cause of many sins; but sin with respect to vice is the final cause according to which goodness or malice is considered, and therefore it is simply worse.

415. Sin differs from imperfection, which is either negative or physical, namely, the defect of a greater perfection which an act could have, and this is proper to every created act; or positive or moral. This again is distinguished as twofold: one, improperly so called, is a wholly indeliberate transgression of a law of lesser moment, for example, a wholly involuntary distraction in prayer: this is materially a true venial sin but without any fault; another, properly so called, is a voluntary action or omission against a counsel to which someone is stirred either by divine inspiration, or by the judgment of reason, or by the directive will of a superior, for example, to omit morning prayers, to violate the statutes of a community, etc.; and in this sense they are now accustomed to speak of imperfection. This in itself is not sin because it is not against law; nevertheless, if it is done deliberately and especially habitually, it will not always be without fault, either by reason of the effect, such as scandal or damage, or more often by reason of the cause, namely, an inordinate affection or depraved motive on account of which it is placed: whether from negligence or levity, or from inordinate passion, for example, of sensuality, curiosity, concupiscence or anger, impatience, sloth, worldly fear, etc., or from contempt; for reason forbids man to act in his acts from an evil or irrational motive.

In this matter it is altogether necessary to preserve the essential difference between a precept, which of itself is obligatory because it concerns a good necessarily to be done or an evil to be avoided, and a counsel, which is not obligatory of itself, as concerning a better good; so that every theory which would remove this difference in practice, by that very fact would be shown to fall short of the truth. Therefore the doctrine of those more recent authors cannot be admitted, who hold the passing over of the better good as per se and necessarily and always culpable, unless from determined circumstances it were proved that this good in the case is less fitting or less good: these remove in practice the aforesaid difference between precept and counsel. Besides, they do not prove their affirmation validly, although it belongs to the one affirming to prove. Namely, by the very fact that there is question of a better good, which of itself pleases God more, there is also a lesser good, which also of itself pleases God, as being good, although it pleases less because it is less good.

Therefore the passing over of the better and the choice of a lesser good is not of itself, necessarily, and always irrational, nor consequently evil: for it can be done from a rational motive, especially if someone does not positively intend to abandon the greater good, but chooses the lesser good because it is fitting to him here and now, from which the omission of the greater good follows indirectly. Therefore imperfection is not always fault, but it is not always without fault. And therefore it would better be called a less perfect act than imperfection.

416. Conditions of sin. - Sin strictly so called is a voluntary act deprived of due order to the ultimate end, or of due rectitude; therefore two things concur for it: a) disorder, whence it has the notion of evil, namely, privation of due order to the ultimate end and therefore recession from right reason and the law of God: this comes to it on the part of the object; b) the notion of the voluntary, whence it has the notion of fault: this comes to it on the part of the act or subject. Hence a threefold condition is required for sin:

1. moral malice of the object, otherwise it would not be evil; but subjective malice in the object suffices, that is, in the thing or action insofar as it is known, nor is objective malice necessarily required in the thing or action as it is in itself: for he who thinks something is evil and does it, really wills evil; whence he who falsely believes that it is Friday and eats meat nevertheless sins;

2. in the subject there is required some advertence to the malice, at least confused: for nothing is willed unless foreknown; whence if evil is in no way adverted to, not even by suspecting it or doubting about it, man cannot will it; hence he does not sin who on Friday, thinking nothing about the precept, eats meat;

1. This is clear from the condemnation of proposition 35 of Luther by Leo X, June 15, 1520; and of proposition 68 of Baius by Pius V, October 1, 1567; and of proposition 2 by Alexander VIII, December 7, 1690.

3. consent of the will is required, direct or indirect, because sin is a human act; hence an act which neither is in the will nor from the will nor accepted by it is not sin, as is a temptation not accepted by the will; and indeed free consent is required, whence the most vehement movements of anger or of another passion by which the use of reason and freedom are taken away excuse from sin.

1. This is clear from the condemnation of proposition 46 of Baius, and proposition 1 by Alexander VIII.

2. Freedom is required not from coercion but from necessity, as is clear from the condemnation of propositions 39, 41, 66, and 67 of Baius; and of proposition 3 of Jansenius condemned by Innocent X, May 31, 1653.

When advertence to malice is lacking, the evil act which is placed is called material sin, which is an involuntary transgression of law: it is not sin because in the acting subject the voluntary is lacking, yet it is called sin because on the part of the object or matter about which it is concerned, all things required for sin are present. Formal sin, however, is a deliberate, voluntary, and culpable transgression of law, whether the law exists or is thought to exist.

417. The notion of sin is not univocal but analogical. - That is not univocal which belongs in the same mode to all things of some genus, but it is called analogical whose property is that according to the full and perfect notion it is predicated of one genus, namely, of actual mortal sin, but imperfectly, deficiently, and in a certain respect of others: for the very essential elements which are found in every sin, namely, the notion of a voluntary act and disorder, are diverse. For:

1. Sin primarily and originally is an act; secondarily, however, and consequently, the disorder which follows the act, or the state of sin, is also properly so called and is sin, which is an evil act only in a certain respect, insofar as the act perseveres morally or by guilt.

2. Mortal and venial sin differ in the notion of disorder: the former is perfectly against the law, from whose end it turns away, to which we are united through charity; the latter only imperfectly, and therefore only delays from the end.

3. Personal and original sin differ in the notion of the voluntary: the former is voluntary by one's own will; the latter is most imperfectly voluntary, namely, not by one's own will but only by the will of our head Adam.

1. Analogy of proportionality, according to being and intention. Cf. I-II, q. 88, a. 1, ad 1; De Malo q. 7, a. 1, ad 1; II Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2.

418. Sin in the Scriptures is called: 1) in order to the end: αμαρτία and αμάρτημα, that is, aberration from the end (Rom. V, 12; VII, 7), in such a way, however, that the first word is said also of the state of sin, the other of the act alone; 2) in order to the law of God: άνομία and παρανομία (in the Vulgate, iniquity), that is, violation or contempt of law (I John III, 4; II Peter II, 15); παράβάσις, that is, transgression or prevarication of law (Rom. V, 14; Gal. III, 19; I Tim. II, 14); παράκοή, that is, the will of not hearing the voice of God, or disobedience (Rom. V, 19; Heb. II, 2); 3) in order to the sinner: παράπτωμα, that is, fall (Mark XI, 25-26); ήττημα, that is, defeat, diminution (Rom. XI, 12); αγνόημα, that is, ignorance, because every sin imports culpable error (Heb. XI, 7; Acts XVII, 30).

Sin is also rather often taken in a metaphorical and improper sense, either for the sacrifice offered for sins (Hos. IV, 8; II Cor. V, 21), or for the cause, occasion, or object of sin (Deut. IX, 21), or even for its punishment or effect (Lev. XX, 20), or for cause and effect at once, as concupiscence is called sin by the Apostle (Rom. VII, 17), because it is from sin and inclines to sin (Council of Trent, sess. 5, can. 5).

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71, a. 6; q. 74, a. 2; De Malo, q. 2, a. 2 and 3.

422. What the external sin of commission is. - Sin of commission properly so called is not only the interior will of evil, but also an evil external work commanded by the will or not impeded, for example, homicide, theft, an external movement of anger: for the external act, although it does not have the notion of fault except from the will, nevertheless of itself has the notion of evil because it has deformity or discordance with right reason and the law of God, on account of undue matter or undue circumstances. Whence it also is prohibited by God: but everything which is prohibited by God is sin (and therefore to be declared in confession).

External sin is begun interiorly in affection when its cause is voluntarily placed, and is consummated exteriorly in effect when the external act is really present, in the same mode as was said concerning omission.

423. External sin can be voluntary in the cause or only indirectly. - For sin is an evil human act; whence, just as for a human act, so that an evil external work may be sin, it is required, but also suffices, that it be voluntary in some way. Therefore it is not required that it be voluntary in itself, but it suffices that it be voluntary in a positive cause (for example, anger from drunkenness), or indirectly in a preceding omission insofar as the will ought to prohibit it and does not do so (for example, damage from the fact that a father does not prohibit his son from stealing).

424. Question: Is actual advertence to malice required for sin? - The response is that from the aforesaid the question is easily solved: for sin some voluntary thing suffices, whether in the cause or indirect from omission; but for such a voluntary thing advertence at the moment at which such a cause or omission is placed suffices. Hence:

a) Actual advertence to malice is not always required here and now, that is, at the moment at which the external sin is consummated or the external act is effectively placed: for this is not required so that it may be voluntary, since evil effects or acts are rightly imputed to man which are placed with culpable inadvertence and proceed from a voluntary cause from which they are foreseen as going to follow, as from culpable ignorance on account of negligence (for example, damage to a sick person from a physician negligent in learning the things which he is bound to know), from a passion which someone deliberately wills to follow (for example, homicide from drunkenness or anger), from an evil habit (for example, blasphemy from custom), from voluntary inconsideration, as by acting precipitously (for example, a hunter negligent in considering whether a man or beast is present, and killing a man).

b) Nevertheless that inadvertence and the act placed with it will not be voluntary and culpable, unless at the moment at which the cause was placed there was actual advertence by which in some way the effect or evil act was foreseen at least confusedly, obscurely, and indistinctly, insofar as someone at least doubted or suspected that evil would follow, or knew the obligation of attending to it or of applying greater caution; otherwise they would in no way be voluntary. At this moment sin is begun interiorly and committed as to affection and fault.

From the explanation given, the opposed opinions of theologians are easily reconciled, of whom some always require actual advertence, while others, on the contrary, affirm that sometimes virtual and interpretative advertence suffices (n. 60, II and 63).

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71, a. 6; q. 72, a. 1 and 5; q. 73, a. 2; Contra Gentiles III, 9; De Malo, q. 1, a. 1; q. 2.

425. Sin consists of two constitutive elements, as it were metaphysical parts, which stand to one another as matter (undetermined) and form (determining) in beings of nature, and which therefore are called material and formal. For in sin itself there is had:

1. a positive and material element: the substance of the act considered, not in physical being insofar as it tends to some good whatever (for thus it is not a human or moral act, nor therefore morally evil and consequently not a constitutive element of sin but presupposed to it), but in moral being insofar as it unduly tends to some created good which cannot be referred to the ultimate end: this is undue conversion to a creature; and

2. a privative element which necessarily follows from the first, namely, the very privation of rectitude or of due ordination to the ultimate end: this is aversion or withdrawal from God. This is the formal element because it determines the material element to this, that it be sin: for conversion to a creature would not be theological sin unless through it man also had himself inordinately concerning the ultimate end. In other words: the material of sin is the voluntary act itself by which man tends to something contrary to the eternal law; the formal, however, is the very deformity of the act or recession from the eternal law.

426. Observation. - 1. The material of sin is not to be confused with material sin: for in the latter there is no formal malice; indeed it can be a formally good act. The material of sin is its constitutive element which inseparably has malice annexed. Thus the approach of Jacob to Leah is a material sin with respect to Jacob, but the material of sin with respect to Leah; to take money for him who is compelled to this by violence is a material sin, but the material of sin for him who inflicts the violence.

Similarly, the formal of sin and formal sin are not to be confused: the latter is the whole sin; the former is the element of formal sin.

427. Essence of sin. - Concerning the essence of sin there exists a celebrated controversy: St. Thomas says that both elements, material and formal, pertain to the essence of sin and consequently that this consists in something positive; Scotus, however, Suarez, and others, considering the material element as the mere subject of sin, say that the formal is the whole sin and that this consists in a privative thing or even, as a few have said, in a negative thing.

Concerning this it must be observed:

Sin is commonly said to be the free transgression of any law obliging in conscience, or, from St. Thomas after St. Augustine, a word, deed, or desire against the eternal law of God. - Cf. St. Thom. 1-2, q. 71, art. 6. - St. Alphonsus, n. 1.

Sin is distinguished in many ways: for it is 1st. actual or habitual, according as it is an act or omission not conformed to law, or the state of sin not yet blotted out; 2nd. mortal or venial, according as it dissolves divine friendship, or does not dissolve it and is only a slight offense of God, which can easily merit pardon; 3rd. of commission or omission, according as it is done by the placing of a prohibited act, or by the omission of a commanded act; 4th. against God, neighbor, or oneself, according as the sinner violates duties owed to God, to neighbor, or to himself; 5th. of malice, ignorance, or infirmity, according as it is committed from mere malice, from vincible ignorance, or from mere frailty; 6th. formal or material, according as some law obliging in conscience is violated knowingly and freely, or altogether involuntarily. - Cf. St. Thom. 1-2, qq. 72 and 88.

For any formal sin there is essentially required advertence of the mind and consent of the will. For formal sin, as is gathered from its very definition, must necessarily be a human act: but it is repugnant that any human act be given without advertence of the mind and consent of the will. Therefore. - Besides, according to that saying of Matt. xv, 19: "From the heart come forth evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false testimonies, blasphemies," sin is completed by the heart, namely, by the will; but since the will is a blind faculty, it cannot seek the malice of sin unless it is enlightened by the aid of the intellect. Therefore for formal sin there is essentially required advertence of the mind and consent of the will. - Cf. St. Thom. 1 p. q. 19, art. 1; and 1-2, q. 74, art. 1 and 5. - St. Alphonsus, n. 5.

You Will Resolve. 1st. Evil acts have that malice which is apprehended; wherefore, if cognition occurs concerning such malice, or malice so specified, this is truly contracted through the act of the will, whatever finally may be the objective malice considered in itself.

2nd. If ignorance which is vincible, and consequently culpable in the beginning, afterward becomes invincible, the evil act which is placed by force of this ignorance is not sin in itself, but the whole account of sin is to be repeated from the cause alone, namely from the degree of culpability of that ignorance together with foresight of future acts. Moreover ignorance is to be called invincible if no thought any longer occurs concerning past negligence, or concerning actual ignorance.

3rd. If some sin has been foreseen in its cause, and then is placed with advertence, by an act formally distinct from the prior act, there will be had a twofold sin, namely 1st. in the voluntary cause, 2nd. in itself.

4th. The blinded and those accustomed to sin, although, because of defect of clearer cognition, perhaps sometimes they sin less gravely in act than others, nevertheless are not excused. Yet if sometimes they perpetrate evil acts from custom altogether inadvertently, although these acts cannot be called sins in themselves, for here and now they are not voluntary, nevertheless, since they are voluntary in their cause, they are imputed to them: indeed the strict obligation of correcting an evil custom always presses.

5th. The same thing must be said of other sins which are voluntary merely in their cause; namely, then guilt is formally contracted when the cause is placed, and since the whole guilt resides formally in the cause, it will be present in the same way whether acts of this kind follow or not, and whether these same acts are repeated in fewer or greater number: but when they actually follow, each of them constitutes one evil act with the cause. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 4. - Baller., note (a), p. 125; and note (a) and (b), p. 126.

6th. However much the soul is struck by the stimuli of evil tinder or of evil concupiscence, and however clear the cognition of these stimuli may be, there will never be any stain of sin unless the will in some way consents to them. The reason is that sin, in its whole extent, is completed by the will, but not by imagination or by the stimuli of the flesh. Wherefore the Council of Trent, sess. 5, can. 5, says: "This holy Synod confesses and judges that concupiscence or tinder remains in the baptized: and since it has been left for combat, it cannot harm those not consenting, and those manfully resisting by the grace of Christ Jesus."

7th. But these stimuli or motions of concupiscence, after advertence of reason, must be resisted at least in some way, nor is it sufficient then to bear oneself negatively or neutrally. The reason is both because these motions always bring with them some danger of consent, and because they contain some disordering of nature. But if you ask what sort of sin it is so to bear oneself negatively or neutrally, the answer is, according to the truer opinion, that it is only venial, with always excluded the case in which the danger of consent is grave, or at least is apprehended as grave.

8th. But if all motions must be resisted, this must especially be said of the motions of concupiscence in a venereal matter, which must not be retained even under the pretext of struggle and exercise of virtue. Nevertheless there is no obligation to resist them directly, since such resistance sometimes stirs them up more; much less is material resistance necessary.

9th. Not only as regards carnal motions, but also as regards motions against faith and charity, merely indirect resistance through distraction of the mind is to be advised, rather than any direct resistance or assault.

10th. Nor likewise are we bound to direct resistance against every temptation which is prolonged for a long time; for this would be too troublesome and liable to innumerable scruples. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 6 and seq.

I say ¹: Sin is rightly defined by Aug., lib. XXII contra Faustum, c. 27: « A word, deed, or desire against the eternal law. » ¹ Here q. 71, a. 6, c.

It is proved. That definition is good which explains the material and formal element of the thing defined; for by these both is the thing distinguished. But, when it says, word, deed, or desire, the material element of sin is explained, which is the human act. When it says, against the eternal law, the formal element is explained; for from this the act is sinful, namely that it is against the eternal law.

[You will object: This definition does not apply to every sin. Therefore it is not legitimate. — Proof of the antecedent. This definition does not apply to the sin of omission, which is not a deed, etc. Therefore it does not apply to every sin.

I answer. I deny the antecedent. — To prove it, again I deny the antecedent. In morals, affirmation and negation are reduced to the same genus. But omission is a negation, or rather the voluntary privation of an act owed, which act is a kind of affirmation; for in voluntary and culpable omission there is an unwillingness to obey, and thereby a will of resisting the law. Therefore omission cannot be voluntary, nor consequently culpable in the individual, without some act which is its cause or occasion, not on the part of the work, but on the part of the worker. Therefore, by reason of this act or deed, it is fitly comprehended under this definition of sin. Therefore this definition is legitimate.]

I say 2°: It is essential to sin that it be an injury and offense of God.

It follows from the preceding. For it is essential to sin that it be against the law of God, as was said. But he who knowingly and willingly acts against the law offends the lawgiver, because he contradicts his will, and refuses him the obedience and subjection owed.

And from this you will gather that there cannot be given a merely philosophical sin, that is, one which is only against reason and not against God, nor an offense of him.

(It seems that, if the matter be considered in the abstract, philosophical sin could be distinguished from theological sin. For St. Thomas says, 1ª 2°, q. 71, a. 6. ad 5: « By theologians sin is considered principally according as it is an offense against God, but by the moral philosopher according as it is contrary to reason. » But this must be understood only hypothetically or conditionally, as is clear from these words of his, 2. 2., q. 20, a. 3, c: « If conversion to a changeable good could be without aversion from God, although it were inordinate, it would not be mortal sin. »

And he brings this reason in the same place: « In every mortal sin the principal reason of evil and gravity is from this, that it turns away from God. » Therefore, if conversion to a changeable good could be without aversion from God, sin would not be theological, but only philosophical, as « disagreeing with rational nature alone and right reason. »

I say: Merely philosophical sin cannot in fact exist.

It is proved 1° from the condemnation by Alexander VIII issued on August 24, 1690, against the following proposition, which Arnaldus had fabricated by twisting certain texts, so that he might attribute it, after his manner, to his adversaries: « Philosophical or moral sin is a human act disagreeing with rational nature and right reason; but theological and mortal sin is the free transgression of the divine law. Philosophical sin, however grave, in him who either does not know God or does not actually think of God, is a grave sin, but it is not an offense of God, nor a mortal sin dissolving the friendship of God, nor worthy of eternal punishment. » — This proposition was « declared and condemned as scandalous, temerarious, offensive to pious ears, and erroneous. »

It is proved 2° by reason. According to Augustine, theological sin is « a word, deed, or desire against the eternal law, » and as the Angelic Doctor observes in the former place related above, « Augustine defines sin more fittingly from this, that it is against the eternal law, than from this, that it is against reason, especially since by the eternal law we are regulated in many things that surpass reason. » Whence it follows that we are regulated by this law also in those things which pertain to reason. But whenever anything is done against right reason, the eternal law is injured. Therefore such an act is theological sin. — Proof of the minor. 1° Right reason is nothing else than a participation of the eternal law, or an intellectual light manifesting to us the eternal law. Therefore no one can act against right reason without at the same time injuring the eternal law.

If you object that he who acts against right reason may not attend to the eternal law, and consequently cannot injure it in any way, I answer that no one is ignorant of this principle of the eternal law: « Evil is to be avoided. » But whoever acts against right reason knows and necessarily advertes that his action is evil; for it is supposed that he spurns the dictamen of conscience. Therefore he injures the eternal law. Therefore theological sin is admitted.

2° From the very name it is understood that theological sin is committed against God. For he who knowingly acts against right reason commanding or forbidding perceives that he subverts the natural order, and knows at least implicitly that this order was established from eternity by the supreme legislator, that is, by God. Therefore he sins against God himself. Therefore such sin is theological.]

Because concerning this question theologians have been most divided, even Thomists, that I may satisfy all, I shall briefly set forth the principal points of each opinion, with the responses of the adverse party.

There is proposed the opinion placing the formal constitutive of sin of commission in something privative ?

1° According to Scripture, the holy Fathers, especially St. Thomas, sin is nothing, it is aversion from God, it is lack or privation of due perfection and rectitude. Ergo.

2° Sin is essentially evil, nay supreme evil. Yet evil is essentially privation; for every being, qua being, is good. Ergo.

3° and chiefly. If moral malice or the formal constitutive of sin were something positive, God would be cause of sin, etc. The consequent is more than false and expressly condemned in Concil. Trid., sess. VI, can. 61 ¹. Ergo. — Prob. sequelae maj. God ought to be cause of every real positive, otherwise he would not be first and most universal cause, which requires that every real positive, under every real and positive formality, be from him who is the fountain of all being. Ergo. ¹ « If anyone shall say that it is not in man's power to make his ways evil, but that the works that are evil, as well as the works that are good, God works — not permissively only, but properly and of himself — so that his own working is not less the treason of Judas than the calling of Paul; let him be anathema. »

Responses of the adverse party

They observe 1° that evil is twofold: absolute and simply evil, which includes no goodness or entity, as privation of coldness in hot water; respective evil and secundum quid, which includes some entity and goodness, and thus is evil to one, while it can be good to another, as heat in water. In the act of sin both evils are found: the respective evil and secundum quid, namely a positive tendency toward an object dissonant from the rules of morals; and the absolute evil and simply, namely the privation of rectitude connoted and caused by the positive act, or accompanying it and founded in it.

They observe 2° that privation can be considered in two ways: in fieri and in facto esse. In fieri it is something positive, in facto esse it is nothing. It appears in death, which in fieri is something positive, namely disease or a lethal wound; in facto esse, mere privation of life. So in the act of sin: privation of rectitude in fieri is something positive, namely the tendency of the act toward an object dissonant from the rules of morals; in facto esse, a mere privation resulting from this tendency.

They observe 3° that there are two kinds of aversion: one privative, the other contrary; that in every sin there is aversion from God, not only privative but also, at least virtually and interpretatively, contrary, inasmuch as man by sinning not only withdraws from God, but virtually and interpretatively at least rises up against him, transgressing his law, denying him obedience and casting him off as friend and last end. These things observed,

They answer to the first, with St. Thomas, q. 2 de Malo, a. 1, ad 4, that sin is called nothing, not on account of its formal self, but on account of the mode or privation following or accompanying it.

Aversion is said on account of the same connoted privation, or aversion is taken not only privatively but also contrarily.

Privation of due perfection or rectitude is said because it founds and involves it, or we speak of sin as it is evil simply, not as it is moral and respective evil. Sometimes also the holy Fathers speak of habitual sin.

To the second they answer, that sin is evil, not simply and absolutely, but moral and respective, which does not consist in bare privation.

To the third, they deny the consequent. To the proof they distinguish. God is cause of every real positive under the character of entity, I concede; under the character of deformity, I deny. Or in other terms, he is cause of every real positive materially, I concede; formally, I deny. That is, God is cause of every real positive simply and absolutely, not as founding and connoting a consecutive or adjunct privation. But the formal constitutive of sin is real positive, not as effectible, but as defectible; not materially and absolutely, but formally, as founding privation: whence it does not follow that God is cause of sin.

They answer 2° by retorting the argument, and say, the adverse opinion labors under the same difficulty. For thus they argue: The foundation of the privation in which the adverse opinion places the formal constitutive of sin, reduplicatively as such, is something real positive; for negation or privation cannot be the foundation of another negation or privation, else to this prior negation another negation ought to be assigned as foundation, and so on to infinity. Ergo, if God necessarily causes every real positive in sin, he causes its foundation as such. — They subjoin: He truly and properly causes sin who causes its foundation as such, especially since formal sin, in this opinion, is privation. Now privation is not caused directly and per se, but results from the positing of the foundation, nor can it otherwise be caused; because, since it is nothing, it cannot of itself and directly terminate influx.

§ II.

There is proposed the opinion placing the formal constitutive of sin of commission in something positive, with the responses of the adverse party.

1° Scripture explains sin through conversion toward an evil object. Jerem., II, 13: My people have done two evils: they have forsaken the fountain of living water, and have digged to themselves cisterns, broken cisterns, that can hold no water. And Osee, IX, 10: They became abominable as those things which they loved.

2° St. Thomas, 1ª 2ª, q. 18, where he begins to treat ex professo of human acts in the order of morals, teaches, art. 5, ad 2, and q. 72, a. 1, c, and art. 9, ad 1; likewise q. 79, a. 2, ad 3, that the constitutive difference of a sinful act, qua such and as it is subdivided against moral good, is not a privation but something positive, namely a positive tendency of the act toward an object dissonant from reason; but that privation has reference to it only consequently.

And 1ª p., q. 48, a. 1, ad 2, and q. 1 de Malo, a. 1, c, says that evil simply differs in this from moral evil, that evil simply consists in privation, but moral evil in something positive to which privation is joined. Whence q. 2 de Malo, a. 11, ad 13: « Sin, he says, is not pure privation, as darkness, but is something positive. » And 2ª 2ª, q. 6, a. 2, ad 2: « Deformity [of sin] imports not only privation of due form, but also a contrary disposition, »

3° That is the formal constitutive of sin from which sin has that whereby it is first moral evil. Yet sin of commission has first that whereby it is moral evil through the positive and vital tendency toward an evil object. Ergo. — And 1° that thence it has being moral evil is proved, because that tendency proceeds freely from the will as subject to the rules of morals, and regards a moral object, namely one dissonant from the rules of morals. Ergo it pertains to the moral line, and contracts from that object some moral species, not goodness, not indifference. Ergo formal malice. 2° That from that tendency it has first that whereby it is moral evil is proved. That tendency morally evil precedes the act's privation of rectitude; for the act of sin lacks rectitude because it tends toward an evil object, since every motion tending from one term to another first per se regards the term to which, whence follows aversion or withdrawal from the term from which. Ergo.

And granted that privation would not follow but precede or at least accompany the act, as some will, nevertheless the argument would stand, because it cannot be but that the moral tendency of the act toward a moral object does not contract moral species, since every act is specified by its object.

4° Formal morality taken generically consists in something positive, namely in real transcendental order toward an object subjected to the rules of morals, and it is divided into three species: goodness, malice and indifference, as we said in the treatise on Human Acts. Yet a positive genus cannot be contracted through privation, but only through positive difference. Ergo the constitutive difference of moral malice, like that of goodness, is positive.

Responses of the adverse party

To the first it is answered that Scripture explains sin, now privatively, now positively, so that the privative is formal and the positive material. But others urge that this answer is not only gratuitous but also false, both because God complains no less of the positive than of the privative, and because only formal sin is abominable: here however the abomination is something positive, namely love.

To the second it is answered, that St. Thomas speaks of sin materially and considered in physical being, not formally and in the order of morals, or for formal malice; or, as others say, of sin of commission as it is commission, not as it is sinful. But true, say others, St. Thomas, 1ª 2ª, from q. 8 to 18 had already treated human acts in physical being; from q. 18 inclusive onward however he treats the goodness and malice of human acts. Ergo at least the texts cited from 2ª 2ª are badly expounded concerning the specification and constitution of sin as regards the material of sin. Moreover there and elsewhere the holy Doctor speaks in the same manner of the constitution of formal moral good. Ergo.

1. The great problem of Moral Philosophy is the explanation of the idea, I ought, (c. i., n. 6). We are now come close up to the solution of that problem. The word ought denotes the necessary bearing of means upon end. To every ought there is a pendent if. The means ought to be taken, if the end is to be secured. Thus we say: "You ought to start betimes, if you are to catch your train." "You ought to study harder, if you are to pass your examination." The person spoken to might reply: "But what if I do miss my train, and fail in my examination?" He might be met with another ought: "You ought not to miss the one, if you are to keep your appointment: or to fail in the other, if you are to get into a profession." Thus the train of oughts and ifs extends, until we come finally to a concatenation like the following: "You ought not to break your word, or to give needless pain to your parents, if you don't want to do violence to that nature which is yours as a reasonable being," or "to thwart your own moral development,"—and so on in a variety of phrases descriptive of the argument of the last section. Here it seems the chain is made fast to a staple in the wall. If a person goes on to ask, "Well, what if I do contradict my rational self?" we can only tell him that he is a fool for his question. The oughts, such as those wherewith our illustration commenced, Kant calls the hypothetical imperative, the form being, "You must, unless:" but the ought wherein it terminated, he calls the categorical imperative, the alternative being such as no rational man can accept, and therefore no alternative at all.

2. This doctrine of the Categorical Imperative is correct and valuable so far as it goes. But then it does not go far enough. The full notion of what a man ought, is what he must do under pain of sin. Sin is more than folly, more than a breach of reason. It is mild reproach to a great criminal to tell him that he is a very foolish person, a walking unreasonableness. If he chooses to contradict his rational self, is not that his own affair? Is he not his own master, and may he not play the fool if he likes? The answer is, "No, he is not his own master; he is under law, and his folly and self-abuse becomes criminal and sinful, by being in contravention of the law that forbids him to throw himself away thus wantonly."

3. Kant readily takes up this idea, shaping it after his own fashion. He contends,—and herein his doctrine is not merely deficient, but positively in error,—that the Categorical Imperative, uttered by a man's own reason, has the force of a law, made by that same reason; so that the legislative authority is within the breast of the doer, who owes it obedience. This he calls the autonomy of reason. It is also called Independent Morality, inasmuch as it establishes right and wrong without regard to external authority, or to the consequences of actions, or to rewards and punishments. The doctrine is erroneous, inasmuch as it undertakes to settle the matter of right and wrong without reference to external authority; and inasmuch as it makes the reason within a man, not the promulgator of the law to him, but his own legislator. For a law is a precept, a command: now no one issues precepts, or gives commands, to himself. To command is an act of jurisdiction; and jurisdiction, like justice (see c. v., s. ix., n. 1, p. 102) requires a distinction of persons, one ruler, and another subject. But the reason in a man is not a distinct subject from the will, appetites, or other faculties within him, to which reason dictates: they are all one nature, one person, one man; consequently, no one of them can strictly be said to command the rest; and the dictate of reason, as emanating from within oneself, is not a law. But without a law, there is no strict obligation. Therefore the whole theory of obligation is not locked up in the Categorical Imperative, as Kant formulated it.

4. The above argumentation evinces that God is not under any law; for there is no other God above Him to command Him. As for the ideas of what is meet and just in the Divine intelligence, though the Divine will, being a perfect will, is not liable to act against them, yet are those ideas improperly called a law to the Divine will, because intellect and will are identified in one God. Kant's doctrine makes us all gods. It is a deification of the human intellect, and identification of that intellect with the supreme and universal Reason; and at the same time a release of the human will from all authority extraneous to the individual. This amounts to a putting off of all authority properly so called, and makes each man as sovereign and unaccountable as his Maker. "Thy heart is lifted up, and thou hast said: I am God, and sit in the chair of God: and hast set thy heart as if it were the heart of God: whereas thou art a man and not God." (Ezech. xxviii. 2.) Kant is thus the father of the pantheistic school of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.

5. But it has been contended that this phrase about a man who does wrong breaking a law, is only a metaphor and figure of speech, unless it be used with reference to the enactment of some civil community. Thus John Austin says that a natural law is a law which is not, but which he who uses the expression thinks ought to be made. At this rate sin is not a transgression of any law, except so far as it happens to be, in the lawyer's sense of the word, a crime, or something punishable in a human court of justice. There will then be no law but man's law. How then am I obliged to obey man's law? Dr. Bain answers: "Because, if you disobey, you will be punished." But that punishment will be either just or unjust: if unjust, it originates no obligation: if just, it presupposes an obligation, as it presupposes a crime and sin, that is, an obligation violated. There seems to be nothing left for John Austin but to fall back upon Kant and his Categorical Imperative, and say that whoever rebels against the duly constituted authority of the State in which he lives, is a rebel against the reason that dwells within his own breast, and which requires him to behave like a citizen. So that ultimately it is not the State, but his own reason that he has offended; and the State has no authority over him except what his own reason gives.

6. If this were true, there would be no sin anywhere except what is called philosophical sin, that is, a breach of the dignity of man's rational nature; and the hardest thing that could be said in reprobation of a wrongdoer, would be that he had gone against himself, and against his fellow-men, by outraging reason, the common attribute of the race.

7. Far worse than that has the sinner done. He has offended against his own reason, and thereby against a higher Reason, substantially distinct from his, standing to it in the relation of Archetype to type, a Living Reason, [Greek: hepsychos logos] (cf. Ar., Eth., V., iv., 7), purely and supremely rational. The Archetype is outraged by the violation of the type. Moreover, as the two are substantially distinct, the one being God, the other a faculty of man, there is room for a command, for law. A man may transgress and sin, in more than the philosophical sense of the word: he may be properly a law-breaker, by offending against this supreme Reason, higher and other than his own.

8. Here we must pause and meditate a parable.—There was a certain monastery where the monks lived in continual violation of monastic observance. Their Abbot was a holy man, a model of what a monk ought to be. But though perfectly cognisant of the delinquencies of his community, he was content to display to his subjects the edifying example of his own life, and to let it appear that he was aware of their doings and pained at them. He would croon softly as he went about the house old Hell's words: "Not so, my sons, not so: why do ye these kind of things, very wicked things?" But the monks took no notice of him. It happened in course of time that the Abbot went away for about ten days. What he did in that time, never transpired: though there was some whisper of certain "spiritual exercises," which he was said to have been engaged in. Certain it is, that he returned to his monastery, as he left it, a monk devout and regular: the monk was the same, but the Abbot was mightily altered. The morning after his arrival, a Chapter was held; the Abbot had the Rule read from cover to cover, and announced his intention of enforcing the same. And he was as good as his word. Transgressions of course abounded: but the monks discovered that to transgress was quite a different thing now from what it had been. Seeing the law proclaimed, and the Abbot in earnest to enforce it, they too reformed themselves: the few who would not reform had to leave. The subsequent holy lives of those monks do not enter into this history.

9. Now, we might fancy God our Lord like the Abbot of that monastery in the early years of his rule. We might fancy the Supreme Reason, displeased indeed, as Reason must be, at the excesses and follies of mankind, but not otherwise commanding men to avoid those evil courses. Were God to be thus quiescent, what we have called (n. 6) philosophical sin, would indeed carry this additional malice, beyond what was there set down, of being an offence against God, but it would not be a grievous offence: for it would not be a sin in the proper sense of the term, not being a transgression of the law of God, inasmuch as God, by the supposition, would have given no law. But the supposition itself is absurd. God could not so withhold His command. He is free indeed not to command, but that only by not creating. If He wills to have creatures, He must likewise will to bind them to certain lines of action: which will to bind in God is a law to the creature.

10. This assertion, that God cannot but will to bind His creatures to certain lines of action, must be proved, though in the ascent we have to mount to high regions, and breathe those subtle airs that are wafted round the throne of the Eternal. As God is the one source of all reality and of all power, not only can there be no being which He has not created and does not still preserve, but no action either can take place without His concurrence. God must go with His every creature in its every act: otherwise, on the creature's part, nothing could be done. Now, God cannot be indifferent what manner of act He shall concur unto. A servant or a subject may be indifferent what command he receives: he may will simply to obey,—to go here or there, as he is bid, or to be left without orders where he is. That is because he leaves the entire direction and management of the household to his master. But for God to be thus indifferent what action He should lend His concurrence to, would be to forego all design and purpose of His own as to the use and destiny of the creatures which He has made and continually preserves. This God cannot do, for He cannot act aimlessly. It would be renouncing the direction of His own work, and making the creature His superior. God is incapable of such renunciation and subservience. He must, then, will the cooperation which He lends, and the concurrent action of the creature, to take a certain course, regulated and prescribed by Himself: which is our proposition, that God cannot but will to bind His creatures to certain lines of action. If His free creatures choose to stray from these lines, God indeed still cooperates, and to His cooperation is to be ascribed the physical goodness of the action, not its moral inordinateness and inopportuneness. Still, as the action is morally inordinate, God may be said to cooperate, in a manner, where He would not: whence we gather some conception of the enormity of sin. (See c. vii., nn. 5, 6, pp. 130, 131.)

11. The lines of action laid down and prescribed by God are not arbitrary and irrespective of the subject of the command. They are determined in each case by the nature of the subject. The Author of Nature is not apt to subvert that order which proceeds from Himself. He bids every creature act up to that nature wherein He has created it. His commands follow the line of natural exigency. What this natural exigency amounts to in man in regard to his human acts, we have already seen, (c. vi., s. i., p. 109.)

12. The difference between a necessary and a free agent is, that the former is determined by its nature to act in a certain way, and cannot act otherwise: the latter may act in more ways than one. Still, as we have seen, the nature even of a free agent is not indifferent to all manner of action. It requires, though it does not constrain, the agent to act in certain definite ways, the ways of moral goodness. Acting otherwise, as he may do, the free agent gainsays his own nature, taken as a whole, a thing that a necessary agent can nowise do. God therefore who, as we have shown, wills and commands all creatures whatsoever to act on the lines of their nature, has especial reason to give this command to His rational creatures, with whom alone rests the momentous freedom to disobey.

13. We are now abreast of the question, of such burning interest in these days, as to the connection of Ethics with Theology, or of Morality with Religion. I will not enquire whether the dogmatic atheist is logically consistent in maintaining any distinction between right and wrong: happily, dogmatic atheists do not abound. But there are many who hold that, whether there be a God or no, the fact ought not to be imported into Moral Science: that a Professor of Ethics, as such, has no business with the name of the Almighty on his lips, any more than a lecturer on Chemistry or Fortification. This statement must be at once qualified by an important proviso. If we have any duties of worship and praise towards our Maker: if there is such a virtue as religion, and such a sin as blasphemy: surely a Professor of Morals must point that out. He cannot in that case suppress all reference to God, for the same reason that he cannot help going into the duties of a man to his wife, or of an individual to the State, if marriage and civil government are natural institutions. If there is a God to be worshipped, any book on Moral Science is incomplete without a chapter on Religion. But the question remains, whether the name of God should enter into the other chapters, and His being and authority into the very foundations of the science. I do not mean the metaphysical foundations; for Metaphysics are like a two-edged sword, that cleaves down to the very marrow of things, and must therefore reveal and discover God. But Morality, like Mathematics, takes certain metaphysical foundations for granted, without enquiring into them. On these foundations we rear the walls, so to speak, of the science of Ethics without reference to God, but we cannot put the roof and crown upon the erection, unless we speak of Him and of His law. Moral distinctions, as we saw (c. vi., s. i. n. 7, p. 113), are antecedent to the Divine command to observe them: and though they rest ultimately on the Divine nature, that ultimate ground belongs to Metaphysics, not to Ethics. Ethics begins with human nature, pointing out that there are certain human acts that do become a man, and others that do not. (c. vi., s. i., p. 109.) To see this, it is not necessary to look up above man. Thus we shall prove lying, suicide, and murder to be wrong, and good fellowship a duty, without needing to mention the Divine Being, though by considering Him the proof gains in cogency. Or rather, apart from God we shall prove certain acts wrong, and other acts obligatory as duties, philosophically speaking, with an initial and fundamental wrongness and obligation. In the present section we have proved once for all, that what is wrong philosophically, or is philosophically a duty, is the same also theologically. Thus the initial and fundamental obligation is transformed into an obligation formal and complete. Therefore, hereafter we shall be content to have established the philosophical obligation, knowing that the theological side is invariably conjoined therewith. As St. Thomas says (1a 2æ, q. 71, art. 6, ad 5): "By theologians sin is considered principally as it is an offence against God: but by the moral philosopher, inasmuch as it is contrary to reason." But what is contrary to reason offends God, and is forbidden by Divine law, and thus becomes a sin. No God, no sin. Away from God, there is indecency and impropriety, unreasonableness, abomination, and brutality, all this in view of outraged humanity: there is likewise crime against the State: but the formal element of sin is wanting. With sin, of course, disappears also the punishment of sin as such. Thus to leave God wholly out of Ethics and Natural Law, is to rob moral evil of half its terrors, and of that very half which is more easily "understanded of the people." A consideration for school-managers.

Readings.—St. Thos., 1a, q. 22, art. 2, in corp. (against Lucretius, ii. 646-651); Suarez, De Legibus, II., vi., nn. 3, 5-9, 13, 14, 17, 20-24.

SIN is a voluntary transgression of the moral law. Voluntariness is of the very essence of sin. Anything that prevents an act being voluntary prevents it being sinful. A motor-car runs over a drunken man lying in the middle of a lonely road at night. The driver could not see him, he had no reason to suspect that he was there. The act was purely involuntary. A little child runs in front of his car while driving along the street. The driver saw the danger but could not pull up in time. The child was knocked down, but again the act on the part of the driver was purely involuntary. In both cases common sense acquits the driver of all blame; there is no reason why the most sensitive conscience should be troubled at the mishap.

And so if man is not free, if his every action is determined by the antecedent conditions so that it necessarily follows from them, then man cannot commit sin. He may be dangerous and may have to be put out of the way or shut up like a mad dog, but if he is not free he cannot help doing what he does, and he is not responsible for it. If he does wrong it is his misfortune, not his fault.

Many people speak of the error of philosophical sin without knowing very distinctly in what it consists. The distinction between philosophical sin and theological sin is neither new nor chimerical, as some imagine. It is from Saint Thomas, who says that sin is considered in one way by the Theologian and in another by the Philosopher. [Ia. 2, q. 71, a. 6, ad 5.] The former, he says, examines the nature of sin insofar as it is an offense against God, and the latter insofar only as it is contrary to reason. It is the same sin viewed under different aspects. According to the one it is called theological, and according to the other it is called philosophical. According to the one it offends God; according to the other it offends reason.

Since Theology is ordinarily taught in Latin, the terms employed in it must be understood according to the force they have in that language. The word offendere, which in French signifies to offend, has various significations in Latin according as it is taken in the proper or in the figurative sense. In the proper sense it signifies what happens to a body which is in motion and which strikes another upon encountering it. In the figurative sense it is said of a rational being who acts against the will, against the inclinations of another, against the respect and against the obedience which he owes him. This signification is the one most used in our language.

The Theologians, following this usage of the Latin Language, say that sin, taking the force of the terms, is an offense against God, offensa Dei, only insofar as it strikes against the obedience which is owed to him; that when neither God nor his commands are known by the one who commits the sin, this sin, speaking rigorously, ought not to be called an offense against God, because then it does not directly strike against this obedience nor against his commands, which the sinner does not know. But this sin always offends reason, because it is against the lights of conscience and against that law written in our hearts, which are not things different from reason. This is what must first be well conceived in order to understand the question of philosophical sin. This perhaps appears a vain subtlety when speaking Theology in our language; but it is not so in the customary language of Theologians, that is to say, in the Latin language. After all, in matters of this kind one must always agree upon the signification which usage attaches to words.

It is then necessary to make a very important observation. It is that the Theologians who have made all these precise distinctions, and principally the Jesuits, when saying that the sin of a man who does not know God is not properly called an offense against God, do not thereby deny that it is a sin, and a sin punishable by damnation. On the contrary, most of the Theologians say that, even in this supposition, the sinner is justly punished with Hell, because although he does not act against the commands of a known God, he nevertheless acts against the law which that God has placed in his heart; that this law marks out his duty for him and makes him understand that he violates it by not following it; which, according to them, suffices to render him guilty of the penalties with which this God, altogether unknown though he is to him, punishes him in this life and in the other. Thus almost all the Theologians agree that the sins of the Barbarians which gave rise to this question, as soon as they are against the natural law, are punished by God in hell; but they do not all reason from the same principles, and they posit different ones from which they equally conclude the just punishment of these sorts of sinners.

Some lay down as a principle that an invincible ignorance of God is never found, at least for a long time, among the Barbarians who have the use of reason, whether their natural light, stirred by the sight of creatures, suffices to give them this knowledge, or whether God acts interiorly in them by ways which are unknown to us and of which they alone could give an account. What Saint Paul says of the Pagans in the Epistle to the Romans gives great authority to this System. However that may be, this principle being laid down, it follows that the sins of these Pagans offend not only reason but also the obedience which they owe to God, and that they are offenses against God in the most exact signification that this term can have in scholastic language.

The other Theologians have reasoned from an altogether opposite principle, which they believed to be more conformable to experience. They have said that there could be among some Barbarians an invincible ignorance of God; but to this principle they add that other one of which I have already spoken: that in order for the sin of a Barbarian to merit damnation, it is not necessary that it be directly against the obedience owed to God, nor that the sinner know distinctly that the law which he violates comes from that God; but that it suffices that he commit this sin against the lights of his conscience, which marks out his duty for him and makes him understand at the same time the obligation he has to conform himself to this law, which is written in his heart. That, by not doing so, he justly incurs the disfavor of God and the punishment attached thereto for all eternity. In this manner, neither in the one opinion nor in the other is there among the Barbarians any purely philosophical sin, that is to say, one which purely offends reason without offending God, either directly or indirectly, and which does not merit Hell, when it has the other conditions required for the essence of mortal sin.

All this having been set forth, it will be easy to understand in what the error of philosophical sin consists. It consists first in saying that certain Barbarians perform actions against the natural law, such as homicides, adulteries, etc., which are not mortal sins worthy of damnation, because in all those who are ignorant of God sins are purely Philosophical, that is to say, only against reason, and in no way Theological, that is to say, they are not against God, whom the sinner does not know and by them, consequently, God himself does not hold himself offended. [In Decreto Alexandri VIII, 24 Aug. 1690.]

A second Proposition may be made which will contain the same error, or an altogether similar error founded upon the same principle. It is this: that not only those who are ignorant of God and who have never known him, but also those who are not ignorant of him, if, when acting against the Law, they do not actually think that they offend God, do not in fact offend him; that their sins are purely philosophical, because they see clearly that they are against reason, but that they are not Theological, because they do not think that they are against God, and thus they are not worthy of being eternally punished. This concerns the sins of an infinity of libertines who, they say, commit the most horrible actions and abandon themselves to the most extreme debaucheries without ever thinking that God forbids them. It is precisely in these two Propositions that the error of Philosophical sin consists, and it seems in fact expressed in the famous Theology Thesis of Dijon about which so much clamor was made some years ago.

It was denounced to the Bishops and to the Pope as a new heresy of the Jesuits. It was condemned by Alexander VIII on the twenty-fourth of August in the year 1690. The Jesuits, who were as much scandalized by it as the others, anticipated the condemnation of the Pope by being the first to condemn it in public writings. They subsequently produced, among others, one entitled The Error of Philosophical Sin Combated by the Jesuits, in which they demonstrated that this had never been the doctrine of their Society. They showed, moreover, that this very Thesis was in no way conformable to the writings of the Professor of Dijon, which they caused to be authenticated and brought to Paris. They printed extracts from them which contained only the common doctrine in Theology on this subject. And in fact, in reading the writings of the Professor, one does not comprehend how he could have made a Thesis of this nature.

This is not the place to enter into the detail of the defense of the Jesuits, nor of the calumnies which were published against them on this subject. Nothing was omitted in order to tear them apart and to render them odious everywhere. For this purpose people dared to falsify the writings of the Professor; to cite the objections which he made to himself as though they had been his assertions; and to make him advance not only the most detestable but also the most extravagant maxims, so that, in order to say what people made him say, not only would he have had to be a libertine by profession, but also mad in the sovereign degree. And what is surprising, and what will never be believed unless one is willing to take the trouble to compare the writing of the Jesuits with those of their Adversary, is that after these Fathers had published the true extracts from the writings of the Professor in order to show the falsification that had been made in them, no other answer was given than that it was by a figure of Rhetoric that he had been made to speak in that manner. [The true extracts are in the Second Letter to a Man of the Court. The false extracts are in the Denunciation of the New Heresy, art. 3, third denunciation, pp. 81-82.]

However that may be, in order to execute the design proposed here, the Jesuits declare, first, that they condemn this doctrine as scandalous, as rash, as offensive to pious ears, and as erroneous, which are the qualifications with which the Holy See censured it.

Second, they declare, and they have always declared with truth, that this was never the doctrine of their Society, and that none of their Authors ever taught it.

Third, not only is this doctrine not that of their Society, but none of the principles of their Theology leads to it. Some of their Theologians have held, after several others, that invincible ignorance of God can exist for some time among some Barbarians; but they have added at the same time that these Barbarians, acting against the lights of their conscience, committed not only philosophical sins but mortal sins worthy of hell, as I explained previously. Others have held that, in order to offend God in this manner, it is necessary to know him; but they have at the same time laid down as a principle that invincible ignorance of God was impossible, as several other Theologians think. In a word, in reasoning in this manner they have reasoned as people reason in all the Catholic Schools. From neither the one nor the other of these two principles taken separately does the error of philosophical sin with respect to the Barbarians follow. And there has never been, so far as is known, any other Jesuit who joined them both together, except a Spaniard, namely Arriaga, who did so after the example of some other non-Jesuit Theologians, but who was neither followed nor preceded in such a doctrine by the Theologians of his Society, not even by the Professor of Dijon, who in fact admits neither ignorance nor forgetfulness of God that renders sin purely philosophical, and who expressed himself as he did only in a purely metaphysical and morally impossible hypothesis, as he expressly says himself.

In the fourth place, the Jesuits declare that the constant and universal doctrine of their Society is that the sins of libertines, of habitual sinners, and of the hardened are imputed to them in themselves or in their cause; that their Theologians follow in this only the common doctrine in the Catholic Schools; that every ignorance or inadvertence which has its source in the free will of the sinner cannot excuse his sin. And, on the occasion of the Thesis of philosophical sin, they did not fear to challenge their Adversaries to show anyone among the great number of Jesuit authors of every kind - Interpreters of Scripture, Scholastic Theologians, Controversialists, Casuists or Canonists, Preachers or those who composed Treatises of devotion, and even Philosophers themselves - they challenge their Adversaries, I say, to produce any one of them who, when treating of ignorance or inadvertence with respect to our duties, did not distinguish that which is culpable from that which is not; or who did not always suppose this distinction; and who did not say, when treating the matter, that voluntary ignorance or inadvertence never excuses the evil which one has thus ignored through a criminal negligence. So constantly has this doctrine, which is directly opposed to the error of philosophical sin, always been that of their Society.

After this, what is the charity, what is the equity, what is the sincerity of those who wish to persuade the world that the error of philosophical sin is the doctrine of the Jesuits? Where is the good faith of those who every day, in Books and in Theses, affect maliciously to inveigh against the error of Philosophical sin more vehemently than against those of Nestorius and Arius, in order to cause its infamy to fall back upon the Jesuits, who detest it more than they do, and whose Society, of all the Societies that are in the Church of God, has always openly professed to be the most submissive and the most universally submissive to the decisions of the Holy See which concern faith and morals? I pass to the article of probable opinions.