Article I. On the Nature and Conditions of Sin

I. Nature. Sin is usually defined with St. Augustine as: a word, deed, or desire against the eternal law.¹ It is understood as free; for "sin is nothing other than an evil human act" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71, a. 6). But a human act imports a free act. Besides, it is said:

1. A word, deed, or desire, by which the material element of sin is indicated, i.e., the word itself (sin of mouth), deed (sin of work), and desire (sin of heart); likewise the omission of a word, deed, and desire when their obligation is present (St. Thomas, cited place, body and ad 1).

2. Against the eternal law, by which the formal element of sin, or its malice, is assigned; this consists in the fact that it is opposed to the eternal law.

"Augustine," says St. Thomas, "placed two things in the definition of sin: one which pertains to the substance of a human act, which is quasi-material in sin, when he said: a word, or deed, or desire; the other, which pertains to the character of evil, which is quasi-formal in sin, when he says: against the eternal law" (cited place). Besides, observe:

a) The definition handed down agrees to original sin to this extent, insofar as Adam acted in the person of all of us, and therefore sin was in some way voluntary and free even for us.

b) Although the definition speaks only of the eternal law, nevertheless the transgression of other laws also, even ecclesiastical and civil laws, is comprehended, since all other laws borrow their force from the eternal law.

Corollary I. There is no purely philosophical sin, i.e., a sin which would indeed be opposed to right reason but not to the law of God, whether because the sinner was ignorant of God, or because he did not think about God. For reason is nothing other than a participation of divine law, so that what is repugnant to reason is ultimately repugnant also to law. Hence Alexander VIII condemned this proposition: "Philosophical sin, however grave, in one who either is ignorant of God or does not actually think about God, is grave sin, but it is not an offense against God, nor a mortal sin dissolving the friendship of God, nor worthy of eternal punishment" (St. Alphonsus, V, 11).

Corollary II. In sin one can distinguish the material element, or the material of sin, and the formal element, or the formal of sin. The material of sin is the physical act or its omission which is found in sin; the formal of sin is the very disorder or malice which is found in the act or in the omission.

Now it is asked in what the disorder or malice of sin consists, whether in privation or in something positive. Now the formal element of a sin of omission is situated in the privative, since it is nothing other than the omission of a due act.² But it is sharply disputed, even among Thomists,³ whether the formal element of a sin of commission consists in the privative or in the positive. But it seems to consist in the privative; for if it consisted in the positive, God, as the author of every positive thing, would seem to become the author of malice itself.

Corollary III. Sin involves a manifold ugliness; for it is a disorder:

1. Against rational nature, according to these words of St. Thomas: "Vice is against the nature of man insofar as it is against the order of reason" (I-II, q. 71, a. 2).

2. Against God, whom the sinner offends: a) as Legislator; b) as Judge, by not fearing his sentence; c) as Witness, by not revering his presence; d) as the Supreme Good in himself, by despising his friendship and embracing those things which displease God exceedingly; e) as our Supreme Good, by not caring for God insofar as he is our exceedingly great reward; f) as Lord, by injuring God's supreme right over our actions; g) as Benefactor, by not taking account of God's gifts, abusing them to offend him.

3. Against Christ the Redeemer. Under this respect sin is in some way deicide;⁴ for sins are the cause why Christ willed to undergo death. Hence one who, although he knows these things, nevertheless sins, constitutes himself the cause of the passion and death of Christ.

4. Against the Sanctifying Spirit. Under this respect sin in a Christian is in some way sacrilege, by which the faithful person, specially consecrated through the sacraments and the Holy Spirit dwelling within, is violated.

There is added that through sin a man is constituted a slave of the devil.⁵

Observe, however, that the described uglinesses are not contained according to formal species in every sin; for sin takes its species only from opposition to the motive on account of which the evil act is prohibited, as was explained elsewhere (n. 148). Hence, even if in every sin the aforesaid reasons of opposition to God are found, nevertheless for that reason it does not contain several species of malice or circumstances which must be declared in confession.

¹ Contra Faustum, bk. 22, c. 27.

² Billuart, diss. 1, a. 3.

³ Cf. Billuart, cited place.

⁴ Heb. 6:6.

⁵ Sweens, Theol. Mor. fund., n. 770.

II. Conditions of formal sin. For every formal sin there are required:

1. An act deficient from the rules of morals or contrary to some law, at least according to the apprehension of the agent. But it suffices that the act be repugnant to the rules of morals either on the part of the object, or on the part of the end, or on the part of the circumstance. "Any single defect causes evil; but good is caused from an integral cause" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3; St. Alphonsus). Cf., however, the things said in n. 69 sq., where we noted that the goodness of an act is not totally destroyed by just any evil end or circumstance.

2. Some advertence to the malice of the act, or to the act insofar as it is deficient from the rules of morals. Nevertheless it suffices that actual advertence was present when the cause of the evil act was placed; likewise that it be present or have been present only confusedly (St. Alphonsus, V, 4).

3. Some consent of the will, whether full or half-full (n. 19). But it is not required that the malice be intended; it suffices that the malice of the act be apprehended and the act nevertheless be placed. The reason is that evil must be avoided; and this is not done by one who chooses an act which he knows to be evil.