Chapter I. On the Nature of Sin

Sin is commonly said to be the free transgression of any law obliging in conscience, or, from St. Thomas after St. Augustine, a word, deed, or desire against the eternal law of God. - Cf. St. Thom. 1-2, q. 71, art. 6. - St. Alphonsus, n. 1.

Sin is distinguished in many ways: for it is 1st. actual or habitual, according as it is an act or omission not conformed to law, or the state of sin not yet blotted out; 2nd. mortal or venial, according as it dissolves divine friendship, or does not dissolve it and is only a slight offense of God, which can easily merit pardon; 3rd. of commission or omission, according as it is done by the placing of a prohibited act, or by the omission of a commanded act; 4th. against God, neighbor, or oneself, according as the sinner violates duties owed to God, to neighbor, or to himself; 5th. of malice, ignorance, or infirmity, according as it is committed from mere malice, from vincible ignorance, or from mere frailty; 6th. formal or material, according as some law obliging in conscience is violated knowingly and freely, or altogether involuntarily. - Cf. St. Thom. 1-2, qq. 72 and 88.

For any formal sin there is essentially required advertence of the mind and consent of the will. For formal sin, as is gathered from its very definition, must necessarily be a human act: but it is repugnant that any human act be given without advertence of the mind and consent of the will. Therefore. - Besides, according to that saying of Matt. xv, 19: "From the heart come forth evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false testimonies, blasphemies," sin is completed by the heart, namely, by the will; but since the will is a blind faculty, it cannot seek the malice of sin unless it is enlightened by the aid of the intellect. Therefore for formal sin there is essentially required advertence of the mind and consent of the will. - Cf. St. Thom. 1 p. q. 19, art. 1; and 1-2, q. 74, art. 1 and 5. - St. Alphonsus, n. 5.

You Will Resolve. 1st. Evil acts have that malice which is apprehended; wherefore, if cognition occurs concerning such malice, or malice so specified, this is truly contracted through the act of the will, whatever finally may be the objective malice considered in itself.

2nd. If ignorance which is vincible, and consequently culpable in the beginning, afterward becomes invincible, the evil act which is placed by force of this ignorance is not sin in itself, but the whole account of sin is to be repeated from the cause alone, namely from the degree of culpability of that ignorance together with foresight of future acts. Moreover ignorance is to be called invincible if no thought any longer occurs concerning past negligence, or concerning actual ignorance.

3rd. If some sin has been foreseen in its cause, and then is placed with advertence, by an act formally distinct from the prior act, there will be had a twofold sin, namely 1st. in the voluntary cause, 2nd. in itself.

4th. The blinded and those accustomed to sin, although, because of defect of clearer cognition, perhaps sometimes they sin less gravely in act than others, nevertheless are not excused. Yet if sometimes they perpetrate evil acts from custom altogether inadvertently, although these acts cannot be called sins in themselves, for here and now they are not voluntary, nevertheless, since they are voluntary in their cause, they are imputed to them: indeed the strict obligation of correcting an evil custom always presses.

5th. The same thing must be said of other sins which are voluntary merely in their cause; namely, then guilt is formally contracted when the cause is placed, and since the whole guilt resides formally in the cause, it will be present in the same way whether acts of this kind follow or not, and whether these same acts are repeated in fewer or greater number: but when they actually follow, each of them constitutes one evil act with the cause. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 4. - Baller., note (a), p. 125; and note (a) and (b), p. 126.

6th. However much the soul is struck by the stimuli of evil tinder or of evil concupiscence, and however clear the cognition of these stimuli may be, there will never be any stain of sin unless the will in some way consents to them. The reason is that sin, in its whole extent, is completed by the will, but not by imagination or by the stimuli of the flesh. Wherefore the Council of Trent, sess. 5, can. 5, says: "This holy Synod confesses and judges that concupiscence or tinder remains in the baptized: and since it has been left for combat, it cannot harm those not consenting, and those manfully resisting by the grace of Christ Jesus."

7th. But these stimuli or motions of concupiscence, after advertence of reason, must be resisted at least in some way, nor is it sufficient then to bear oneself negatively or neutrally. The reason is both because these motions always bring with them some danger of consent, and because they contain some disordering of nature. But if you ask what sort of sin it is so to bear oneself negatively or neutrally, the answer is, according to the truer opinion, that it is only venial, with always excluded the case in which the danger of consent is grave, or at least is apprehended as grave.

8th. But if all motions must be resisted, this must especially be said of the motions of concupiscence in a venereal matter, which must not be retained even under the pretext of struggle and exercise of virtue. Nevertheless there is no obligation to resist them directly, since such resistance sometimes stirs them up more; much less is material resistance necessary.

9th. Not only as regards carnal motions, but also as regards motions against faith and charity, merely indirect resistance through distraction of the mind is to be advised, rather than any direct resistance or assault.

10th. Nor likewise are we bound to direct resistance against every temptation which is prolonged for a long time; for this would be too troublesome and liable to innumerable scruples. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 6 and seq.