I. On the Nature of Sin

What is sin? - Since "where there is no law, neither is there transgression," Rom. 4:15, sin, which is an evil human act, is rightly defined by St. Augustine as: a word, deed, or thing desired against the eternal law. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 71, a. 6. Deed, for "sin can happen whether someone does what he ought not, or by not doing what he ought." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 71, a. 5, ad 1. By doing, it is a sin of commission; by not doing, of omission. Against the eternal law, because every law, whether human or divine, has its force from this law; because there is no power except from God; because no transgression of law would be a sin unless it offended God; because in this which is said, against the eternal law, aversion from the end and all other disorders are touched.

Against law; if it is not against law but against counsel, it is imperfection, which is merely negative if it is a mere defect in a human act of further perfection, e.g., of greater fervor in an act of love of God; and positive if it is an involuntary transgression of a law lightly obliging, e.g., praying with distraction. But it is rather only material sin than imperfection. Or it is the voluntary omission of a greater good, notwithstanding divine inspiration of it; and this, practically and regularly, is not without venial sin, by reason of the disordered motive or end, as, e.g., for a religious to violate rules not obliging to sin. Sin is formal if the law is violated freely and knowingly; it is material if the transgression of the law is altogether involuntary. - Sin is a delict. Delict is so called because good is abandoned. Hence "delict, taken commonly, signifies any omission; sometimes, however, it is taken strictly for this, that something is omitted from those things which pertain to God; or when knowingly, and as if with a certain contempt, a man abandons that which he ought to do; and thus it has a certain gravity, by reason of which it needs greater expiation." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79, a. 4, ad 1. L. 1, 11; S. Th. de Malo, q. 2, a. 1, 2; 1 p., q. 63, a. 1; a. 7, ad 2; 1. 2. q. 71, a. 6, ad 5; q. 87; q. 76, a. 2, ad 1; 2. 2. q. 20, a. 3; Compend. Theol., c. 119; Wirceburg., D. 1, c. 1, 2; E. M.

Is actual advertence and consent of the will necessarily required for actual sin? - R. Affirmatively. For sin is the free transgression of law. But an actual free transgression cannot be had without an actual act of the will, either here and now or in the cause. Likewise an actual free transgression of law cannot be had unless someone in some way, either here and now or in the cause, at least confusedly notices the sin; for nothing is willed unless first known. - But he who here and now is ignorant, notices nothing, doubts nothing, here and now sins in nothing, although perhaps the ignorance or inadvertence was culpable in the cause. For if previously he foresaw the effect of his ignorance or inadvertence, he is indeed guilty of what he does in the cause, but only in act. Yet it is not necessary for sin that the offense of God be apprehended explicitly and reflexively; but it suffices that it be apprehended implicitly and directly, namely by knowing that the thing is evil; for then it is also implicitly apprehended as prohibited by God. Proposition 2 condemned by Alexander VIII. Nor indeed are faith or charity simply required for avoiding sin. Proposition 31 condemned by Leo X; proposition 8 condemned by Alexander VIII; proposition 48 condemned by Clement XI. L. 1-5, 10; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 74; q. 75; q. 76, a. 3; de Malo, q. 2, a. 1, 2; q. 7, a. 6; E. M. 287, 288, 313.

Resolves: No sin is had if the use of reason is disturbed and freedom is taken away, as in a most vehement movement of anger; if advertence is had, but consent of the will is lacking, as in depraved movements against chastity as long as they are displeasing; if advertence and consent are had, but not as to an evil thing, e.g., if someone on a day of abstinence indeed eats meats advertently and altogether voluntarily, but thinking nothing of the precept of the Church. A human act has only that malice which is apprehended. Wherefore, if in some matter of multiple malice, the malice of only one species is noticed, only this is contracted. Likewise if negligence, e.g., of guarding against drunkenness or the events usually following from it, was only venial, even the evils which could have been foreseen are only venial. Since they are free not in themselves, but in the cause, they cannot have greater guilt than in the cause itself. - L. 2, 4; l. 1, n. 165.

Is sin contained only in an internal act, or also in an external one? Sin formally is an internal act of the will. For sin according to its nature is properly only from free will and in the will. "Sin," says St. Thomas, de Malo, q. 3, a. 1, "according as it is properly said in morals, has the nature of fault, and comes from this, that the will falls short of the due end, through this, that it tends toward an undue end." Another internal act, and the exterior action of other faculties, are the object of the internal act of the will, and as it were its complement. For from that internal act of the will, and from the internal act of other faculties, or an exterior action, one total moral concrete is effected; for that other internal act, or exterior action, as moral acts, in their whole extent, pertain to the very moral individual of the internal act of the will, to which they are subject, and from which they receive their moral being. Therefore sin is begun by the internal act of the will; it is perfected and consummated by another act or another action of other internal or external faculties. Hence, since a part differs essentially from a whole, the sin which is contained only by the internal act of the will differs essentially, morally speaking, from the sin which is perfected by another internal act of another internal faculty, or which proceeds even to an external work, which consequently must necessarily be accused in confession. Whence it is not sufficient to confess the will of homicide, but it is necessary also to confess the homicide itself committed. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 17, a. 4; q. 72, a. 7; q. 74; q. 75; L. 5.

What are the merely internal sins of the will, and what is their nature? All sins which are committed by the interior will alone can easily be reduced to desire and delectation. - Desire is the purpose of some thing, or an act of the will by which we will to attain some good. One is efficacious, and is a purpose absolutely efficacious of itself, whence it is that someone in reality undertakes means to lead it to effect. Another is inefficacious, and is a purpose only conditionally efficacious, which someone would execute if he could; e.g., if he could steal the treasure of the Church, he would steal it. Now the desire of an evil thing is evil, since the object of action and of desire is one and the same. Hence a depraved desire has the species and malice, mortal or venial, of the sin which the exterior thing has toward which it is borne. Namely desire tends to this, absolutely or at least conditionally, that it execute the thing and constitute it as really existing. But if someone truly executed the thing, he would contract every malice both of the object and of the circumstances. Therefore the same must be said if someone pursues the thing by affection and desire; for since this affection of desire is joined with the very existence of the object, it is necessarily joined with all things necessarily connected with the object itself. Wherefore Titius having relations with Caia, another's wife, commits adultery if he knows her to belong to another, even if he would not wish her to belong to another; in the same way one desiring Caia, another's wife, is also guilty of adultery if he knows her to belong to another, and even if he would not wish her to belong to another, because desire tends, as the execution itself does, into the same existing work, and thus concrete with all its circumstances. Consequently in confession of the desire, e.g., of fornicating, the circumstances of consanguinity, marriage, the vow of chastity of the person, etc., are to be declared. L. 12. By no means, however, is there need to add whether the act concerning the object was absolute or conditioned. La-Croix, l. 6, p. 2, n. 1032.

Delectation is a certain simple rest and complacency of the will from the presence of a fitting good, either possessed according to the thing, or according to cognition and apprehension. Delectation does not properly differ from joy, except insofar as joy is rather called the delectation of the rational appetite, and delectation rather is called that which belongs to the sensitive appetite with a certain transmutation of the body; and this delectation is also called sensible or sensual, and if it is with transmutation of the organs and spirits serving generation, it is called carnal or venereal delectation. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 31; q. 72, a. 2; Sanch. in Dec., l. 1, c. 2, n. 33. - But according to St. Alphonsus, 15, as desire regards future time and the work to be committed, so joy regards past time, namely when someone is pleased with himself concerning an evil work committed; and delectation regards present time, that is, when someone through imagination and thought renders present to himself the work of sin, e.g., fornication, and with deliberate consent delights in it, as if he were actually fornicating, yet without the desire of executing it. Morose delectation in a depraved thing is sin, because love is present in delectation. For that depraved thing would never delight unless it were loved according to itself. Suarez, de Pecc., d. 5, s. 7, n. 5. Moreover delectation is the rest of the appetite in good. "And therefore according to the delectation of the human will a man is chiefly judged good or evil. For he is good and virtuous who rejoices in the works of virtues, but evil who rejoices in evil works." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 34, a. 4. Morose delectation is voluntary delectation; for it is called morose not on account of a necessary delay of some time, but on account of the necessary consent of the will. For not delectation, but consent to delectation, is sin. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 74, a. 6, 8; q. 88, a. 5, ad 2. In a depraved thing; for delectation is twofold. One is concerning a depraved work, so that the evil work is the object of delectation, and this is always evil; another is delectation concerning the thought of an evil object, so that not the evil work, but the very thought concerning the evil work is of itself the object of delectation. And this can either be good, if there is a just cause of thinking, e.g., for the sake of study, consultation, etc., with abhorrence of the object; or it can be venially evil, if it is done from curiosity, etc.; or it can sometimes be even gravely evil, if there is proximate danger of consent. S. Th. de Verit., q. 15, a. 4; L. 16, 17.

Morose delectation in a depraved thing, insofar as delectation is distinguished from joy according to time, has malice and species according only to the variety of objects exhibited by the mind. For simple delectation does not tend into the object as something to be placed in reality, but rests in it as represented by the intellect. But the intellect abstracts from the other properties of the object except that one which moves delectation. L. 15, 28. But joy, as desire, takes on the malice and species both of the object and of the circumstances really annexed to it. For joy, since it is a volition pleased with itself, and therefore approving the past thing, is borne into it such as it existed in itself, namely clothed with its circumstances. Hence, in recollection and complacency over past sins, it is necessary in confession to declare the nature and specific circumstances of the object. L. 15. In recollection and complacency. For sin is not had by simple recollection of a sin formerly committed, from the fact that it neither pleases nor displeases the one remembering, because by no law are we commanded to repent several times of sins, if we have already done penance for them, or here and now to repent, if we have not yet repented of them. Laymann, de Poenit., d. 2, s. 8; Sporer, de Poenit., n. 192; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 376 ff.; S. Th. Quodl. 12, a. 33.

Lest in this matter the confessor scandalize the penitent by indiscreet questions, it must be noted that the confessor, from the general rule, ought to make judgment concerning sins as they are set forth, according to the obvious and natural sense of the accusation. Thoughts about a venereal matter, delectations, desires, are regularly borne, the former into carnal commotion, the latter into pollution and copulation. Wherefore the confessor satisfies his duty if he asks the penitent concerning consent furnished; for the aforesaid acts are not always voluntary and deliberate, nor is consent always explicitly explained. Consent often in these acts is not concerning some determined object, but is indeterminate consent into venereal delectation, pollution, and copulation, which is regularly followed by delectation arising from the commotion of the genital organs. And into this ordinarily are simple delectations borne. Desires, on the contrary, are borne into the completed act. Therefore the confessor will then be able to ask the penitent only whether the aforesaid acts regarded himself or another person, of a different or the same sex. But even from this question one must abstain if the penitent is still ignorant of these matters, especially since it is a lesser evil that confession not be exact than that the penitent be scandalized. Besides, if at times extraordinary species are present, and penitents know them, they are ordinarily accustomed to declare them themselves. Reuter, p. 2, n. 209.

Resolves: To rejoice concerning the manner, e.g., new, clever, vigorous, by which a thing was accomplished is not illicit, since the object of delectation is not evil. L. 18. If the thing, as it happened, is not evil, not even materially, nor harmful to another, to desire it is not of itself illicit, although otherwise it would be intrinsically evil, e.g., pollution which naturally happens in sleep. To desire, namely by simple affection and without any cooperation. But if it is licit to desire, it is also licit to rejoice concerning it already done. The reason is, "because what it is licit to desire that it be done, it is also licit to rejoice that it has been done; and conversely, if it is right to rejoice concerning the fact, it is also licit to desire that it be done; for these are of the same morality: for joy necessarily results from the desired good obtained, and supposes or implicitly includes desire." Lessius, de Iust. et Iur., l. 4, c. 3, n. 104; Laymann, l. 3, s. 4, n. 17; Lugo, l. c., n. 389. "I, however," says the same Lessius, l. c., "am not an author that desires of this sort be admitted to anyone; both because, although they are not evil in themselves, nevertheless they indicate an imperfect affection of chastity; and because holier remedies, and those used by holy men, are not lacking. I would say the same about joy. Also in all matters of this sort, as we have already often warned, every cooperation and danger of consent must be avoided." - Billuart, tr. de Temp., diss. 6, a. 4, Obj. III; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 154, a. 5; L. 19, 20; l. 3, n. 478.

It is not a sin, speaking in itself, at least not mortal, if spouses delight, only by the rational appetite, concerning an act of marriage past, future, or possible, with respect to the co-partner present or absent. The same must be said if a spouse-to-be desires future copulation, or likewise delights in it only by the rational appetite, or a widow concerning a past one, with the danger of consent into venereal delectation arising from it set aside. The reason is that these acts have a licit object. Nevertheless they are full of danger on account of the aforesaid venereal delectation often arising from them. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 19, n. 376, 385; Sanch., de Matr., l. 9, d. 47, n. 1, 4, 7; L. 23, 24, 25.

Sadness concerning a good accomplished which was commanded under grave obligation is gravely culpable; concerning a good which was commanded under light obligation, it is light. Likewise concerning a good under neither grave nor light precept, it is light, unless there is a just cause now of regretting it; for it is a certain disorder to be saddened over a good accomplished, although not commanded by precept. But if sadness is borne not into the good itself, but into the annoyance, the labor, etc., it is of itself not a sin. Sanch. in Dec., l. 4, c. 12, n. 2; Suarez, l. 5 de Voto, c. 7, n. 4; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 39.

Is it licit to desire evil under the condition, if it were licit?

R. Affirmatively in itself, if the condition added removes the whole malice of the work, e.g., I would eat meats in Lent, unless the Church prohibited it. For such an affection involves no disorder, neither in itself nor in the object, from which all malice is excluded by the condition. - But otherwise negatively, e.g., I would sin if there were no hell, because the affection tends into an evil object, and indeed absolutely, since the condition does not remove malice from the object, even as represented, and therefore the whole malice of the object is poured back into the act of the will. And indeed there are certain objects concerning which a condition, however added, cannot remove malice, e.g., if it were licit, I would destroy God. For those things which are intrinsically evil cannot be changed; and therefore the condition would be applied uselessly, since to wish such things is to desire that the law and order of nature be changed, which would be still worse. Yet probably he would be excused from grave sin who, by such a desire, would not certainly will that what is intrinsically evil become licit, but would only show his natural inclination toward that object, e.g., I would avenge myself if it were licit, but I do not wish it because of the law of God; or would state the matter only enunciatively, e.g., younger, I would have avenged myself, signifying not what he would now wish if he were younger, but what perhaps as a younger man he would have done; yet with the danger of efficacious desire always removed, and also of true inefficacious desire, namely every will of doing, and every simple affection of the will. What has been said of desire must consequently also be said of delectation and joy of the rational appetite. For it is not licit to rejoice and delight in that good which it is not licit to love and desire; and, conversely, it is licit to rejoice and delight by the rational appetite in that good which it is licit to love and desire. For love and desire are the way to joy and delectation, as motion tending to rest. Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 284 ff.; Sanch. in Dec., l. 1, c. 2, n. 22 ff.; Billuart, tr. de Temp., diss. 6, a. 15, § IV, You ask third; S. Th. de Verit., q. 15, a. 4; L. 12, 13, 14.

Is it licit to delight concerning some evil thing, if it was done without any guilt? - If that thing is intrinsically evil, it is not licit to delight in it according to itself. The reason is that that object is evil in itself; but that it was not sin is for this reason, that it was not voluntary. Therefore, if now the will accedes, approving such an act, or rejoicing concerning it, which happens in delectation, it will be sin.

La-Croix 89; Suarez, de Peccat., d. 5, s. 7, n. 14. - If that thing is not intrinsically evil, and delectation concerning it is not had under the aspect of prohibition, e.g., if someone delights that he inadvertently ate meats on Friday, some think it licit to delight in it according to itself, because according to itself it is not evil; but others think it illicit, because it was not without material sin, or was materially evil. Lessius, de Iust. et Iure, l. 4, c. 3, n. 104; L. 20, 27.

If delectation is referred to a past act evil not according to itself, insofar as it is objectively evil, but exclusively insofar as it was the cause of a good effect, and the right order of justice or charity is not perverted, some affirm that it is licit, others illicit. The reason of the first opinion is that then we do not rejoice concerning the evil work on account of the good effect, in this sense, insofar as on account of the good effect we rejoice that that evil work was done; but, supposing that that evil work was done, we rejoice concerning the causation of good, which belongs to such a work. This is not illicit, since it concerns an honorable object, namely that good quality and power which an otherwise evil work had. Abstraction is made from the objective malice, which does not move the affection, and delectation falls precisely upon the predicate which is causative of good, which is good. But the restriction added, nor is the right order of justice, etc., is clear in itself, and is confirmed from propositions 13, 14, 15 condemned by Innocent XI. The reason of the second opinion is that by the very fact that someone delights concerning an evil work insofar as it is causative of good, he already implicitly delights in the evil work itself according to itself, or according to its existence. For real causality implicitly includes real existence.

"Nevertheless in any case it is licit, speaking in itself, for anyone to delight not concerning the cause, but concerning the effect that followed, namely concerning relief caused by pollution even voluntary, or concerning the obtaining of an inheritance on account of homicide, provided the cause is detested." L. 20. And indeed the object of this delectation is good. La-Croix 91; Suarez, l. c., n. 15; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 389; Ithur., Cas. 18, n. 6; Lessius, l. c.; S. Th. 4 D. 9, q. 1, ad 5; 3 D. 30, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4; L. 19-22; E. M.

"Does he sin gravely who behaves negatively, and does not positively resist a movement of the sensitive appetite concerning an object prohibited under mortal sin? - There are three opinions. The first affirms that one sins gravely, even when the danger of consent ceases... The second opinion says that such a one does not sin even venially, with danger of consent removed...

The third and true opinion holds that, when the danger of consent ceases, it is venial not to resist illicit movements positively, but not mortal. And this seems expressly confirmed by St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 74, a. 4, where he says: mortal sin cannot be in sensuality, but only in reason. Therefore the reason is, both because consent to sinning gravely does not arise from the sensible appetite, but from the will, and when it does not positively consent, mortal sin is not committed; and therefore venial sin is committed insofar as man ought to beware lest the appetite draw the will after itself; but this obligation, when the danger of consent is not proximate, is only light. And also because, if under grave obligation we were held positively to repel all disordered movements, we would be held to the impossible; for it is impossible positively to coerce all these movements taken collectively." L. 6, 29; Diana, vol. 8, tr. 6, de aliq. cas. circa mat. lux., r. 8; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 74, a. 8, ad 3; q. 79, a. 1; La-Croix, l. 5, n. 111.

"Note: There is no obligation to resist carnal movements positively, if there is a just cause of not resisting, namely if someone has experienced that by resisting the movements are more excited and increased; or if the movements have their origin from a necessary or useful action;... if it is not an easy business to repel them. It is enough, therefore, then to behave negatively, with the firm purpose of never consenting; for the actual care of not consenting itself then suffices to free a man from fault, at least mortal fault, although not from venial fault, if the resistance is tepid." L. 9. Therefore when temptation lasts long, and it would be too troublesome continually to repel its movements positively, it is no sin to permit them by behaving negatively. And to do thus is counseled to those who are of timorous conscience. L. 9.

How is resistance made positively? - Positive resistance can be furnished in two ways: 1. Directly, by repelling those movements; and indeed there is no obligation to employ this direct resistance, which, as regards carnal movements, often excites them more; much less is there an obligation to material resistance, which itself also often, as regards those carnal movements, is harmful. 2. Indirectly, by diverting the mind to other things. As regards movements against chastity and against faith and charity, this indirect resistance is more to be counseled than any direct resistance or attack; and if the movements are slight, it is better to despise them. L. 8; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 74, a. 3, ad 2.