Article IV: On the Constitutive Elements of Sin

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71, a. 6; q. 72, a. 1 and 5; q. 73, a. 2; Contra Gentiles III, 9; De Malo, q. 1, a. 1; q. 2.

425. Sin consists of two constitutive elements, as it were metaphysical parts, which stand to one another as matter (undetermined) and form (determining) in beings of nature, and which therefore are called material and formal. For in sin itself there is had:

1. a positive and material element: the substance of the act considered, not in physical being insofar as it tends to some good whatever (for thus it is not a human or moral act, nor therefore morally evil and consequently not a constitutive element of sin but presupposed to it), but in moral being insofar as it unduly tends to some created good which cannot be referred to the ultimate end: this is undue conversion to a creature; and

2. a privative element which necessarily follows from the first, namely, the very privation of rectitude or of due ordination to the ultimate end: this is aversion or withdrawal from God. This is the formal element because it determines the material element to this, that it be sin: for conversion to a creature would not be theological sin unless through it man also had himself inordinately concerning the ultimate end. In other words: the material of sin is the voluntary act itself by which man tends to something contrary to the eternal law; the formal, however, is the very deformity of the act or recession from the eternal law.

426. Observation. - 1. The material of sin is not to be confused with material sin: for in the latter there is no formal malice; indeed it can be a formally good act. The material of sin is its constitutive element which inseparably has malice annexed. Thus the approach of Jacob to Leah is a material sin with respect to Jacob, but the material of sin with respect to Leah; to take money for him who is compelled to this by violence is a material sin, but the material of sin for him who inflicts the violence.

Similarly, the formal of sin and formal sin are not to be confused: the latter is the whole sin; the former is the element of formal sin.

427. Essence of sin. - Concerning the essence of sin there exists a celebrated controversy: St. Thomas says that both elements, material and formal, pertain to the essence of sin and consequently that this consists in something positive; Scotus, however, Suarez, and others, considering the material element as the mere subject of sin, say that the formal is the whole sin and that this consists in a privative thing or even, as a few have said, in a negative thing.

Concerning this it must be observed:

1. It is certain that sin does not consist in a negative thing: for sin is an evil act, but evil is not the simple absence of perfection, but the absence of a due perfection. Whence sin essentially is not something negative, but at least something privative.

2. It is certain that the formal element of sin is something privative. For the formal of sin is that by which an evil act is evil. But evil is the privation of good. Therefore the formal of sin is privation, and sin insofar as it is evil is something privative, namely, privation of conformity with the eternal law or of the rectitude due to the act.

3. It is certain that the sin of omission, considered in its essence separately from the act which is its cause, namely, insofar as it is mere omission, is something privative, as was said above, n. 419. In it the material is the privation of the due act; the formal, privation of order to the ultimate end.

4. It seems that one must say the essence of a sin of commission is not pure privation, but something positive, namely, that the voluntary act which is the material of sin pertains to the very essence of sin. It is proved:

1. Thus the great Thomists: Capreolus, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, etc.; in recent times Billot and Vermeersch have acceded. Cf. Gillon, La theorie des oppositions et la theologie du peche.

a) Privation is twofold: one is pure, total, and complete, which corrupts the whole opposite good, as death, blindness, and therefore can be conceived without anything positive, but essentially is nothing but privation; another is not pure, but partial and incomplete, as sickness, which is the way to death, and ophthalmia or dim-sightedness to blindness: this does not corrupt the whole opposite good, but retains something of it so that it cannot be conceived without that, and therefore in its essence includes something positive. But in moral matters there is not given pure privation (or pure evil), because no will can tend to evil as evil, but always under the aspect of good: namely, the will in acting does not totally remove the good of reason, but always retains something of rectitude or of the order of reason to good. Therefore the privation of due order which is found in sin essentially includes the conservation of some rectitude or tendency to good, which is something positive. Whence just as sickness is not the pure and total privation of life, but includes the partial conservation of life, which nevertheless is not lived in a normal mode, so sin is not the pure and total privation of the order of reason, but positively includes a tendency or order of reason to an apparent good, which really is evil and prohibited because it cannot be referred to the ultimate end.

b) Moral good and evil are not opposed contradictorily, as quality and privation, thing and nothing, but contrarily, as two opposed qualities: for virtue and vice are contraries because they tend to contrary objects, good or evil; and if vice is contrary to virtue, so also sin from which vice is generated or which is elicited by it. But if moral evil or sin were mere privation, it would be opposed to good contradictorily, and would be the simple absence of good. Therefore moral evil or sin is not mere privation but something positive, namely, an act tending to an evil object.