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The Commandment of Love of God
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McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology
Vol. I, Pt. II, Q. I, Art. 9. The Sins Against B…, The Commandment of Love of God
The Commandment of Love of God
The Commandment of Love of God.—In the commandment of love of God two things are expressed: (a) the matter of the commandment is God, the object of love; (b) the manner of the commandment is that God be loved as the Last End, to whose love all other love is to be subordinated.
There is a twofold manner or mode of performing a virtuous act:
(a) The intrinsic mode is that which comes from the nature of the virtue commanded. Thus, in the Fourth Commandment is included not only the substance of an act (viz., that honor be shown), but also the mode of the act (i.e., that such honor and so much honor be shown as is owed to a parent by his child). The intrinsic mode is always included in a commandment along with the substance of the act prescribed (cfr. 480 sqq.).
(b) The extrinsic mode is that which belongs to some virtue different from the one commanded. This mode is not included in a commandment. Thus, if honor be shown to parents out of love of God, the mode of love of God is extrinsic to the commandment, for the commandment is concerned with the virtue of filial piety, and the mode of the act pertains to charity, which is a virtue distinct from filial piety.
The intrinsic mode of performing an act of virtue is also twofold:
(a) The essential mode is that without which an act is not virtuous. Thus, he who gives to his indigent parents according to his means and their needs fulfills the essential mode of the Fourth Commandment, for, if he gave them less than he could afford and they needed, his act would not come up to the requirements of the commandment.
(b) The ideal mode of the performance of virtue is that which adds to the virtue greater goodness and value, and which is intended by a lawgiver as the end, but not as the object of his command. Thus, he who gives to his indigent parents not only sufficiently, but also with a great willingness and cheerfulness, fulfills the Fourth Commandment with greater perfection than another who supports his parents with less alacrity.
The mode of the love of God prescribed in the first and great commandment is that God be loved with the whole heart, etc. But “to love with the whole heart, etc.,” can be understood in various senses.
(a) Thus, it may be understood to mean a love that is subjectively or intensively great, as when one loves God with much fervor and affection. This mode of love is ideal, since the measure of loving God is to love Him without measure, but it is not essential. The end of the commandment is that we love God ever more and more, and perform what is required with ever greater promptitude and gladness; but the commandment does not fix any certain degree of intensity, although it would be inordinate to choose to love God less intensely than we love creatures (see 1160).
(b) “To love with the whole heart” may be understood to mean a love that is objectively or appreciatively great, as when one esteems and loves God as the Supreme Good. This mode of love is essential, and hence without it the commandment is not observed. However much one loves God, if one does not love Him as the Supreme Good, one does not love Him aright, and does not practise the virtue of charity that is commanded.
Love of God from the whole heart, objectively or appreciatively understood, is either actual or habitual.
(a) Actually, one loves God with one’s whole heart when there is never any interruption or distraction to one’s love, and one is continually engaged in an act of loving God above all else. This is the ideal mode of fulfilling the commandment of love, and it is also the end to which the commandment is intended to lead. But it is only in heaven, where God will be all in all (I Cor., xv. 28), that this ideal fulfillment will take place.
(b) Habitually, one loves God with one’s whole heart when one is in the state of grace, preferring the love of God to every contrary love, although it is only at intervals that one is able to make acts of love. This is the essential mode of fulfilling the command of love here on earth. The whole heart must be given to God to the exclusion of love for any mortal sin, for mortal sin separates from God.
The mode of loving God is expressed in various places in scripture (Deut., vi. 5; Matt., xxii. 37; Mark, xii. 30; Luke, x. 27), and there are slightly different interpretations given to the words by which it is conveyed. Thus, some exegetes see in the expressions “heart,” “soul,” “mind,” “strength,” synonymous significations of the one thought that God should be loved over all, and they think that different words are used only in order to give greater clearness and energy to the thought. But the following seems also a reliable explanation: (a) God must be loved with one’s whole heart, that is, the will must not intend any Last End other than God; (b) God must be loved with one’s whole mind, soul and strength, that is, the powers moved by the will—intellect, appetites and executive faculties—must be subject to God, must be regulated according to His will, and must carry out His commandments.
Love of God with one’s whole heart excludes, then, opposite loves, but it does not exclude other loves that are not opposite or other dispositions that are less perfect. (a) Thus, love of God with one’s whole heart does not exclude love of self or of neighbor. (b) Love of God with one’s whole heart does not exclude the use of acts in reference to God that do not reach the height of disinterested love, such as acts of hope, gratitude, or fear (see 1033, 1054, 1093).
There are various degrees of perfection in the fulfillment of the commandment of love of God.
(a) The most perfect fulfillment is found in heaven, where there is no turning from the love of God by grave sin, no impediment to its exercise by venial sin, and no interruption of its act by other occupations.
(b) The more perfect fulfillment of this commandment found on earth is modelled on the love of God exercised by the Saints in heaven, and the nearer one approaches to the model, the better does one fulfill the commandment. Thus, he who avoids not only what is against charity (i.e., mortal sin), but also, as far as possible, what is aside from charity (i.e., venial sin), loves God more perfectly than one who is careless about venial sin; and he who shuns, not only things unlawful that are harmful to charity, but also things lawful that interrupt the exercise of charity, loves God more, other things being equal, than another who avoids the unlawful, but whose mind is greatly occupied with lawful temporal matters.
(c) The ordinarily perfect fulfillment of the commandment is found in all those who, both in their internal and in their external acts, avoid all that is contrary to the love of God, although they fall into venial sin and are mostly occupied with temporal affairs. Thus is charity the bond of perfection (Col, iii. 14), the tie that binds man to his highest good; those who keep the commandments for its sake are followers after perfection, those who embrace counsels for its sake are in the state of perfection.
Tanquerey
Vol. II, On the Theological Virtues…, On the Virtue of Charity
Conclusion: Concerning the Means of Progressing in the Love of God.
- Since disordered love of oneself is contrary to divine love, it is necessary first of all to lessen this disordered love and little by little to root it out, so that we may be able to make secure progress in the love of God.
7 St. Bonaventure, Stimulus amoris (Opera, ed. Vives, t. XII, p. 631-703); De Imit. Christi, lib. III, c. 5-6; St. Francis de Sales, op. cit., l. V-X; Scaramelli, Directorium, Tr. IV, art. 3, c. 3-4; Gay, op. cit., Tr. XII, de la Charite envers Dieu; Faber, The Creator and the Creature, rendered in French, Le Createur et la creature, l. II.
Wherefore the nourishment of charity is the diminution of cupidity, and we make as much progress in charity as we depress self-love. Hence he who wishes to be a disciple of Christ must first deny himself, according to that saying:8 "If anyone wishes to come after Me, let him deny himself." These words the pious writer of the book On the Imitation of Christ explains splendidly: "If a man should give all his substance, it is still nothing; and if he should do great penance, it is still little... still much is lacking to him, namely one thing, which is supremely necessary to him. What is that? That, all things being left, he should leave himself, and go out from himself totally, and retain nothing of private love; and when he has done all things which he knows are to be done, let him feel that he has done nothing."9 In order to furnish this, let those things be recalled to memory which we said concerning the remedies of pride, nn. 519-521.
8 Matt. 16:24.
9 De Imit., l. II, c. 11, n. 4.
- We ought also frequently to consider the motives which can inflame the will to divine love. Psychologically one can proceed thus: God is the lover of us, - God wills to be loved by us, - God is infinitely lovable.
(A) God is the lover of us. From eternity, namely, He loved us, thought of each one of us, and willed to do good to us: among innumerable possibles He chose us that He might bring us to existence. At the opportune time He created us, and whatever being, whatever good is in us, both in the natural and in the supernatural order, He gratuitously and benignly bestowed, "not to increase His own beatitude, nor to acquire it, but to manifest His perfection by the goods which He imparts to creatures."10
10 Vatican Council, sess. III, cap. 1.
But when, through original sin, supernatural goods had been lost, God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son, that everyone who believes in Him, with that faith which works through charity, may be saved through Him. He loved us at that time when through sin we were children of wrath and His enemies, and indeed while certainly foreseeing that many would contemn Him. Now, who would not love in return One so loving us? - Besides, one can consider the labors and sorrows of Christ patiently endured for us, but especially all those things which He lovingly suffered in the garden of Gethsemane and on the cross; for when we contemplate Christ crucified, can we not cry out with the Church:11 "For His whole figure breathes love and provokes to loving in return: the head inclined, the hands extended, the breast opened?" From the love of Christ, however, we easily ascend to the love of God.
11 Breviary, on the feast of the Seven Sorrows, response at the first lesson.
By these and other thoughts of this kind the love of gratitude is fostered, which, if it is not the love of charity, easily leads to it (above, n. 742).
- (B) God wills to be loved by us: (a) for to this tends the precept set forth above, n. 750, by which we are commanded to love God from the whole mind, from the whole heart, from all the powers: for by such a precept, which is the first and greatest, He clearly shows how much He values our love, and how ardently He desires to be loved by us. Hence Augustine exclaims:12 "What am I to Thee, that Thou commandest me to love Thee, and, unless I do it, art angry with me, and threatenest great miseries?" (b) The same is gathered from the promises, threats, benefits, and punishments by which God endeavors to allure His people to love of Himself: thus, among the Prophets, He compares Himself to a benefactor, who, for the innumerable benefits which he has conferred, earnestly demands gratitude and dilection; to a father, who wills to be loved by his children; to a spouse, who demands the love of his bride. To those loving Him He promises remission of sins and temporal and spiritual goods; but, on the contrary, He threatens dire punishments to those who contemn His love.13
12 St. Augustine, Confess., lib. I, c. 5, P. L. XXXII, 663.
13 Thus, for example, Isa. 1:2-31; 5:3-30; Jer. 2:2-37; 3:1-5; 31:1-39; Ezek. 20:1-44; Joel 2:1-29, etc.
(c) He expressed that desire still more vividly by sending His own Son to earth, who, veiling His majesty and putting on the infirmities of our humanity, by His kindness allures us to divine love: "The benignity and humanity of our Savior appeared."14 John, the apostle of dilection, splendidly urges this motive:15 "In this has the charity of God appeared in us, because God sent His only-begotten Son into the world, that we may live through Him... Let us therefore love God, because God first loved us." (d) In reality Christ Himself provokes us to divine love, asserting that God loves those who love Him, and pleasantly remains in their heart:16 "If anyone love Me, he will keep My word, and My Father will love him, and We will come to him and will make Our abode with him." He sweetly exhorts the disciples that they remain joined to Him by intimate affection, as a branch remains grafted into the vine:17 "I am the vine, you the branches... Remain in My love."
14 Tit. 3:4.
15 1 John 4:9, 19.
16 John 14:23.
17 John 15:5, 9; the whole passage should be read attentively.
Thence there is an easy transition to the love of God, not only of gratitude, but also of friendship: "Who would not love in return One so loving us?"
- (C) From these things it is easily understood that God is in Himself infinitely lovable. For by faith we know that whatever of beauty and whatever of good is in creatures is only an imperfect vestige of divine beauty and goodness. Wherefore, if we admire anything holy, anything heroic, anything powerful and kind in some man, all this is found in God, without any admixture of imperfection, and indeed in an infinitely more perfect degree. Therefore if we are allured to love by the beauty or goodness of creatures, how much more by divine perfection? Likewise, if love ought to be proportioned to the endowments of the beloved object, is not the mode of loving the supreme good to love it without mode? - And this is properly love of complacency, which soon is followed by love of benevolence, and afterward by love of beneficence, or zeal for promoting the glory of God.
Augustine declares this splendidly; he had sought pleasure and felicity in creatures; but having at last returned to better things, he addresses God thus:1 "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart is restless until it rests in Thee... What then art Thou, my God? what, I ask, except the Lord God... Highest, best, most powerful, most omnipotent, most merciful and most just, most hidden and most present, most beautiful and most strong, stable and incomprehensible; immutable, changing all things; never new, never old; renewing all things and bringing the proud into old age, and they know it not; always acting, always at rest; gathering, and not needing; bearing, and filling, and protecting; creating, and nourishing, and perfecting; seeking, though nothing is lacking to Thee. Thou lovest, and art not inflamed; Thou art zealous, and art secure; Thou repentest, and dost not grieve; Thou art angry, and art tranquil; Thou changest works, and dost not change counsel; Thou receivest what Thou findest, and hast never lost... My God, my life, my holy sweetness... Late have I loved Thee, beauty so ancient and so new, late have I loved Thee!"
1 St. Augustine, Confess., lib. I, cc. 1, 4; lib. X, c. 27, P. L., XXXII, 661, 662-663, 795.
- But charity is especially increased by the frequent exercise of acts of love: (A) Explicitly, namely by eliciting acts of gratitude toward God, an outstanding benefactor, and toward Christ, who loved us and delivered Himself for us; acts of complacency, by rejoicing over the divine attributes and praising them; acts of benevolence, namely by desiring that the name of God be sanctified, that His kingdom come, and that His will be done as in heaven and on earth; acts of beneficence, by promoting the glory of God with all one's powers; acts of perfect contrition, by detesting sins because they offend God, infinitely good.2
2 These acts we have already described above, n. 745. Cf. St. Francis de Sales, op. cit., l. V and VI.
- (B) Implicitly, by eliciting acts of the other virtues, which are informed by charity; for example, acts of obedience, which, according to the testimony of Scripture, are deservedly held to be truly acts of dilection: "If you love Me, keep My commandments... He that has My commandments and keeps them, he it is that loves Me."3 - The same can be said of any Christian action; prayer, labor, study, self-denial, mortifications of whatever kind, carried out on account of the love of God, obtain the merit of dilection (above, n. 149), and therefore increase charity.
3 John 14:15, 21; cf. 1 John 2:4; 5:3.
Indeed, since by the divine will we are bound to fulfill the duties of our state, it is necessary that we devote ourselves to the active life, and show our love by works from the deeds of charity.4 - Thus even common works become more pleasant, if they are performed from love, according to Augustine himself:5 "For in no way are the labors of those who love burdensome, but they even delight, as those of hunters, bird-catchers, fishermen, vine-dressers, merchants, and those delighting themselves with some game. Therefore what is loved matters. For in that which is loved, either labor is not felt, or even labor itself is loved."
4 To the point St. Vincent de Paul: "Let us love God, but let it be at the expense of our arms; let it be by the sweat of our faces; for very often so many acts of love of God, of complacency, of benevolence, and other similar affections of a tender heart, although very good and very desirable, are nevertheless very suspect when one does not come to effective love... Several flatter themselves with their heated imagination; they are content with the sweet conversations which they have with God in prayer; they even speak of them like angels: but, on leaving there, if there is question of working for God, of suffering, of mortifying oneself, of instructing the poor, of going to seek the lost sheep, of loving that something be lacking to them, of accepting illnesses or some other disgrace, alas! there is no one any more." (Apud Abelly, La vie de S. Vincent, Paris, 1891, t. I, ch. 19, p. 124-125.)
5 St. Augustine, De bono viduitatis, c. 21, P. L., XL, 448.
Among these works the works of charity toward neighbor stand out, which contribute very greatly to the love of God itself.
Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis
Vol. II, First Book: On the Theolog…, Tr. III, Title II: On Charity as It Is Love of God
Utility. - Two things especially must be attended to by us in this title: in what way the precept of loving God is satisfied, and by what reason servile fear and the desire of beatitude are composed with filial love.
I. The Precept. — The Lord in the Gospel, St. Mark 12, 30, promulgated as the greatest and first commandment the precept of loving God, and that in the words of Deuteronomy 6, 5: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God from thy whole heart, and from thy whole soul, and from thy whole mind, and from thy whole strength." Cf. St. Matthew 22, 37. (Among the Hebrews, the heart signifies intellect and affection.) Those words proclaim to us affective and effective love, the love of the whole man, full in this way, that nothing which disagrees with the love of God is admitted. Cf. the cited writers in Knabenbauer on the alleged places. Therefore in these places a love intensively supreme is not commanded. Such a love is supreme from the subjective force of affection, especially insofar as sensible love concurs with the love of the will: which intensity is most becoming, so far as it is in our power. But only a love of God appreciatively supreme is commanded, or one from the estimation of judgment, so that we place no creature before God and would rather lose all things than God.
Execution of the Precept. — As was said concerning faith, charity, besides its formal act, finds in acts which suppose that affection a quasi-virtual exercise by which the precept of charity can be fulfilled.
Moreover the precept of charity urges per se: at the beginning of moral life, so that by converting ourselves to God we may direct ourselves to Him, our end (cf. nevertheless the things said, n. 58); - if a temptation of hatred of God cannot otherwise be overcome; - as many wish, at the end of life; - frequently in life. How often? Some say once in a year, others once in a month, others on each Sunday and feast. The things said concerning the act of faith and hope return. What son asks how often he must actually demonstrate his affection toward his parents? Neither he himself nor another can define the number. But a good son is content to foster an affection which will most gladly use many occasions of acts; the less good one, however, bears no solicitude about that frequency.
From another virtue, or per accidens, an act of charity will have to be made if reconciliation with God is to be procured, and there is no supply of the sacrament with which attrition would suffice; - if a temptation against a different virtue cannot otherwise be overcome.
He exercises an act of charity implicitly or quasi-virtually who recites the Lord's prayer from the soul, who rejoices over the divine perfections, who wishes that no one offend God, who grieves over offenses inflicted on God by others, who desires that all worship God, who avoids sins because they displease Him, etc. Gury-Ballerini-Palmieri, I, n. 219.
In this matter, the following propositions were condemned by Innocent XI: 5. "Whether he sins mortally who would elicit an act of love of God only once in life, we do not dare to condemn." - 6. "It is probable that the precept of charity toward God does not per se oblige even in individual rigorous five-year periods." - 7. "It obliges only when we are bound to be justified, and we do not have another way by which we can be justified" (2 March 1679 - Denz., n. 1155, 1156, 1157). - Earlier, Alexander VII, 21 September 1665 (Denz., n. 1101), had proscribed this: "Man at no time of his life is bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity from the force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues." (The propositions were condemned at least as scandalous; the former also as pernicious in practice.)
Therefore the matter practically returns to this: that we exhort the faithful to eliciting frequent acts of charity, to acting in the spirit of love and from the motive of love, and that we gently inculcate acts of charity upon the gravely sick.
Necessity of Charity. — The habit of charity is in reality necessary by necessity of means. The same cannot strictly be said of the act of perfect charity, since the sacrament of penance restores the habit of charity, and, although it demands a quasi-virtual use of faith and hope, it can be received fruitfully without an act of perfect charity.
The Sin of Hatred of God. — It is mortal and the gravest of all sins to pursue God Omnipotent and Most High with formal hatred of enmity or malevolence, as if someone should wish that God not exist, or be deprived of some attribute, for example, knowledge, power, etc.
Fear of Hell and Love of Beatitude. — Certainly the present intention of sinning if hell did not exist would be sinful (servilely servile fear); or of not loving God unless there were the reward of beatitude; but he does not sin who, while he elicits an act of charity, has beatitude itself as the end of the one operating. For God is not therefore loved appreciatively less. Does not every right act, such as hope is, already per se direct itself to God as the supreme end? Does not St. Thomas (on this place) understand concerning theological hope itself the saying from St. Paul: Charity... "hopeth all things" (1 Cor. 13, 7)? Does not St. Paul prove these things more expressly: "Hearing your faith in Christ Jesus, and the love which you have toward all the saints, for the hope which is laid up for you in heaven" (Col. 1, 4.5)?
On the contrary, among the propositions condemned and prohibited by Alexander VIII, 7 December 1690, as respectively rash, scandalous, ill-sounding, injurious, proximate to heresy, savoring of heresy, erroneous, schismatic and heretical, there was reprobated the proposition which denied that fear of gehenna is supernatural (prop. 14, Denz. 1305); and by Innocent XII, 12 March 1699, among propositions condemned and reprobated... as rash, scandalous, offensive to pious ears, pernicious in practice, and also respectively erroneous, propositions which called it vicious to act with regard to beatitude (Denz. 1327, 1331, 1332).
Summary
— I. There is a special precept of loving God with full affective and (in disposition) effective love, and therefore appreciatively, not intensively, supreme. The Lord Himself, in the Gospel of St. Mark 12, 30, promulgated it as the first and greatest commandment.
That precept urges per se, according to St. Thomas, at the beginning of moral life, and, as many wish, at the end of life; then, if a temptation of hatred of God cannot otherwise be overcome; then frequently in life: a frequency which cannot be defined theoretically, but which in practice is procured abundantly by a pious man. Per accidens it urges when, the supply of the sacrament of penance being lacking, reconciliation with God is to be procured, or if a temptation against another virtue cannot be overcome in another way.
II. Charity, moreover, besides its formal acts, is exercised quasi-virtually in acts which suppose the affection of charity.
III. The habit of charity is in reality necessary by necessity of means.
IV. The gravest of all sins is the hatred of malevolence by which one would pursue God. Not the very prevision of future sin, but the present intention of sinning if hell did not exist, would be sinful; nor does he sin who, while he elicits an act of charity, has beatitude itself as the end of the one operating.
Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract IX. On theological c…, Chapter I. On charity toward God
In this chapter we shall treat: 1. of the nature and properties of charity; 2. of the necessity of charity; 3. of the vices opposed to charity toward God.
Marc, Institutiones Morales
Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. III, Chapter I: On Charity Toward God · Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. III, Ch. I, Article I: On the Nature of Charity · Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. III, Ch. I, Article II: On the Necessity of Charity Toward God · Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. III, Ch. I, Article III: On Sins Opposed to Charity Toward God
Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. III, Chapter I: On Charity Toward God
St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 23 seqq.; St. Alphonsus, II, 22 seqq.; ed. G., I, p. 315; H. Ap., tr. IV; Suarez, de Carit., disp. I seqq.; St. Francis de Sales, Traite de l'amour de Dieu (Theotime); Lessius, de Summo Bono; Aertnys, l. 2, n. 29; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 440.
There are three things to be treated in this chapter: 1. the nature of charity; 2. the necessity of charity toward God; 3. sins especially opposed to the love of God.
Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. III, Ch. I, Article I: On the Nature of Charity
- Things to be noted beforehand. Love, taken generally, is a willing of good. It is distinguished, by reason of the person in whose favor the good is desired: 1. Love of complacency, or willing of good in itself, which equally redounds to the favor of the one loving and of the beloved. 2. Love of concupiscence, or willing of good for the advantage of the one loving. 3. Love of benevolence, willing of good for the advantage of the beloved.
But love of benevolence, if it is a simple act of the will by which we will good to someone, is called benevolence, as if to will well; if it is with election of one good before another, it is called dilection, as if selection; if it is of some good which is esteemed greatly, it is called charity, as if very dear; if finally it is with reciprocal love and some communication of goods, it is called friendship (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 26).
DEFINITION. Charity is a theological virtue by which we love God for his own sake, and ourselves and our neighbor on account of God.
The material OBJECT of charity is twofold, namely primary and secondary. The primary is God, whom we are bound to love above all things, as our ultimate end. The secondary is we ourselves, and our neighbor, whom we ought to love as ourselves, because God has prescribed this to us (St. Franc. Sales, Theotim., P. II, l. 4, c. 11).
The formal OBJECT of charity is not some particular attribute of God (as in faith and hope), but "is the infinite goodness of God, according as it is the aggregation of all perfections, or infinite perfection. Hence, from the common sense of the wise, a true act of love is to say: My God, because thou art infinite goodness, or, because thou art infinitely good, I love thee above all things" (II, 24; H. Ap., IV, 9).
From these things you will gather: 1. There is one virtue of charity by which we love God, ourselves, and our neighbor; for the reason of loving is one, namely divine goodness, in itself, and insofar as it is communicated or communicable to us and to our neighbor.
Likewise, charity in the way and in the Fatherland is one and the same; in the Fatherland it is more perfect, yet it retains the same object (Lessius, de Summo Bono, l. 2, c. 14).
The elicited ACTS of charity are many, although they proceed from one motive. The principal ones are: a) Complacency or joy concerning the infinite perfections of God considered in themselves, and concerning all those things which please God or amplify his glory. From this joy proceeds praise of God. b) Benevolence, or desire of divine goods, for example, of the glory of God to be promoted both in us and in others. From this is born full conformity of our will with the divine will. c) Sadness concerning all evils which are opposed to the divine good. From this holy sadness flows zeal, which ardently repels those things which are against the honor and will of God (2.2, q. 27, a. 2).
To these elicited acts add all commanded acts, namely those which are elicited by other virtues from the motive of charity (Muller, l. 2, § 19).
- PRINCIPLES. I. For the notion of charity it is required that it be love of complacency and benevolence. For it is required that God be loved as Infinite Good in himself and for his own sake, not on account of another. Yet charity by no means excludes love of concupiscence, or hope (cf. n. 461). Thus St. Alphonsus (Vera Sposa, c. 22, § 1, n. 3). Elsewhere (VI, n. 442) he says with St. Francis de Sales: "If someone loved God on account of his own good and were thus affected [by act], that if he hoped nothing from God, he would in no way love him, this man certainly would sin, because he would positively exclude charity." Cf. Perrone, de Carit., n. 32.
- II. Charity ought to be sincere, complete, and supreme. It ought to be sincere on account of the supernatural perfection and excellence of God; complete, that is, both affective, namely that which is in the heart and by which we will good to the beloved, and effective or efficacious, which puts itself forth in works by doing those things in which the beloved delights; and finally supreme, by which God is loved above all things.
Note. 1. It is not indeed required that it be supreme intensively, namely that we love God before all other things with a greater striving of will and heart. It suffices that it be supreme appreciatively, insofar as we hold God in greater estimation than all other goods, and will a greater good to him than to any others whatsoever (Mazzella, de Virt. infus., n. 1280).
- Yet it pertains to the notion of charity that love be predominant, so that man makes no creature of greater value than God, and wills rather to lose all things than to offend God mortally. Whence, "if love is so weak that it does not yet attain the object of charity, namely, does not yet love God above all things, this is not true charity, but the beginning of charity; but if it suffices for the notion of charity, which consists in the love of God above all things, this, however remiss it may be, is true charity" (VI, 442).
- Corollaries. 1. The desire of POSSESSING GOD is an act of charity. For charity tends into God as ultimate end; and therefore the desire of possessing God, who is indeed our ultimate end, is a proper act of charity, indeed more perfect than others: for the possession of God is consummated charity. Hence the Apostle said: having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ (Phil. 1:23). And St. Augustine expressly teaches this, writing: I call charity a movement of the soul toward enjoying God on account of himself (de Doctr. christ., l. 3, c. 10, n. 16). Cf. St. Alph., II, 24.
- To love divine goodness as convenient TO US is sometimes an act of charity, sometimes not.
If in an act of this kind we regard our own good as the term, such an act is in reality of love of concupiscence, which pertains only to hope. But if we regard our good as the term of the glory of God, by loving divine goodness as convenient to us, because it helps us toward attaining our ultimate end, which is to love God, and on account of which God created us, this is a true act of charity. Cf. St. Augustine on Ps. 134, n. 11.
- The same must be said of love of God on account of his benefits. If the benefits are regarded as conferred on us, it is an act of gratitude; but if they are regarded as communications of divine goodness, it is an act of charity (II, 24).
Note. The principal PREROGATIVES of charity are the following: 1. It renders man just, according to that saying (1 Pet. 4:8): Charity covers a multitude of sins. 2. It constitutes true friendship between God and man, according to that saying (Wis. 7:14): They who have used it have been made participants in the friendship of God. 3. It perfects all virtues, renders their acts meritorious of eternal life. 4. It renders the yoke of the Lord sweet and the burden of the law light, etc. Whence the Apostle (Rom. 8:28): To those loving God, all things work together unto good. See the Ascetical writers, for example Alvarez de Paz, de Vita spir., l. 4, throughout.
Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. III, Ch. I, Article II: On the Necessity of Charity Toward God
- Things to be noted beforehand. It is certain 1. that the habit of charity is necessary for all, both adults and little children, by necessity of means. It is certain 2. that in the New Testament the act of charity is not necessary by necessity of means, except hypothetically, when justification and salvation are not obtained by means of a sacrament or martyrdom. Yet for all adults there is given a negative precept of charity, by which we are prohibited: a) from ever having hatred for God; b) from postponing him to any creature, by doing something which dissolves our friendship with him, namely by sinning mortally.
As regards the affirmative precept of charity, behold what must be established.
- PRINCIPLES. I. There is given a special precept, or one distinct from others, by which we are commanded to love God. It is established 1. from the words of Christ (Matt. 22:37): Thou shalt love the Lord thy God from thy whole heart, etc. This is the greatest and first commandment; 2. from various condemned propositions, notably from the 1st condemned by Alexander VII: "Man, at no time whatsoever of his life, is bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity, by force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues"; 3. from reason: because the other virtues do not attain the ultimate end except through charity (Billuart, de Carit., Diss. 4, a. 7, § 1).
It is said: special precept, and therefore not only effectively, namely by the observation of other commandments, but truly also affectively, that is, by an internal act of the will, ought we to elicit an act of charity; otherwise it would not be a special precept.
- II. For fulfilling the precept of charity, it is required and suffices that we love God appreciatively above all things. Thus St. Thomas (2.2, q. 27, a. 3). For charity appreciatively supreme, even in a remiss grade, is true and perfect charity (II, 22; VI, 442). Cf. the things said at n. 467.
Hence: 1. It is not a sin if someone loves a creature with a more intense love than God, provided that, by an act of the will, he loves God appreciatively above all things.
- These three grades pertain to the greater perfection of charity: a) that from love of God we are prepared to avoid everything which offends him even lightly; b) that we avoid those things which are less pleasing and acceptable to him, but seek above all those things which please him more; c) that we pursue him with a more intense and tender love than any creature whatsoever. See St. Francis de Sales, Theotim., P. II, l. 4, c. 4 and 5.
- Questions. QUAER. 1. When does the AFFIRMATIVE precept of charity toward God oblige?
Resp. 1. It obliges PER SE: a) At the beginning of the use of reason and of spiritual life, namely when divine Goodness, lovable above all things for its own sake, has been sufficiently proposed to someone, as they commonly teach with St. Thomas. For then man ought to deliberate concerning attaining the ultimate end, and to direct himself and his acts to it: which cannot be done without an act of charity (Salmant., tr. 21, c. 6, n. 7). b) Most probably, in the article of death, because then the safest way must be chosen, and because no one is absolutely certain that he is in the state of grace.1 c) More often in life; as is established from the 5th and 6th propositions condemned by Innocent XI, of which the former is this: "Whether he sins mortally who elicits an act of love of God only once in life, I do not dare to condemn"; and the latter: "It is probable that the precept of charity toward God does not per se oblige even rigorously in each five-year period."
- It obliges PER ACCIDENS: a) When someone is bound to be contrite, for example one about to die or about to celebrate, if namely a confessor is lacking to him; the reason is that contrition includes an act of charity. b) When there is danger of falling into hatred of God, or into another grave sin, unless an act of charity is elicited; for he who is bound to the end is bound to the necessary means (II, 23; Inst. cat., P. I, c. 1, n. 26).
QUAER. 2. How often, in life, is an act of charity to be elicited?
Resp. One must distinguish the obligation of eliciting an act of charity insofar as it is an excellent virtue, and insofar as it is a MEANS TO THE END, that is, to the observance of the precepts. There is not one opinion of all: some say that it must be elicited under grave obligation once a year; others once a week, or on any feast. But St. Alphonsus speaks thus (H. Ap., IV, 13; Conf. dir., IV, 6): "Concerning the act of charity, the opinion of those who require it once a month is more pleasing to me, since he who does not frequently exercise his love toward God by positive acts will with difficulty be able to observe the divine law." Cf. Vind. Alph., P. II, q. 3; Lehmkuhl, I, 451; Perrone, de Virt. theol., P. 3, c. 5, n. 253.
- From these things you will resolve: 1. There is no obligation of always acting from the motive of charity; for the precept of charity, insofar as it is affirmative, obliges only at stated times. Recall the things said at n. 307.
A special obligation lies upon those to whom the care of children or of the dying has been entrusted, that they suggest to these and those, at due time, acts of charity (St. Alph., de Assist. morib., § 3). Yet, as regards the dying, exhortation rather than strict admonition is to be used.
Those who remain in the state of mortal sin for months do not of themselves satisfy the precept of charity. Nor do they satisfy it if with attrition alone they receive the sacrament of penance; because attrition does not attain to the notion of true charity (cf. n. 1675).
Those who live Christianly easily satisfy this obligation. "For there is no need that these acts be made reflexively and explicitly, with the intention of satisfying the precept; but it is enough if they are made in an exercised way, although from another end, namely for casting away temptation, for eliciting contrition, if someone wishes to confess. Thus also acts of charity are all acts of uniformity with the divine will and all virtues exercised for the complacency of God" (H. Ap., IV, 3). Likewise, satisfaction can be made through prayer, notably through the Lord's prayer, when it is said from the heart: Hallowed be etc...., thy kingdom come etc...., thy will be done etc.
Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. III, Ch. I, Article III: On Sins Opposed to Charity Toward God
Besides sins of omission against the affirmative precept of divine charity, there are three sins which are opposed to the same charity, namely: inordinate love of a creature; hatred of God; sloth. Concerning sloth we have already spoken in the treatise on Sins (n. 372).
- PRINCIPLES. I. Every inordinate love of a creature, passing into act, is a mortal sin. Thus Sporer (tr. 2, c. 5, sect. 4, § 4) with the common opinion.
It is said: 1. inordinate, that is, by which a creature is preferred to God; 2. passing into act; otherwise actual sin cannot be given. It is established from the things said concerning the obligation of loving God appreciatively above all things, and from the words of the Lord (Matt. 10:37): He who loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me. Whence here lightness of matter cannot be imagined.
It must be noted: 1. Inordinate love of a creature is sometimes a special sin, sometimes not: a) It is a special sin when someone knowingly and willingly loves a creature so inordinately that on account of it, by actual consent thereafter elicited, he is prepared to transgress any precept whatsoever and mortally offend God. It is, I say, a special sin against charity, because it is repugnant to no precept in particular. b) But it is not a special sin against charity if someone from inordinate love transgresses some precept, for example of justice; but it is the same in number with the transgression of this precept: because charity is always wounded in every grave sin.
- Such love is the cause of all sins, even of hatred of God itself. St. Thomas explains this nearly thus (2.2, q. 34, a. 1 and 6): "First, man is inordinately occupied and captured by love of himself or of some creature, or wishes it to be well with himself in such a creature. Then, because often it cannot be well with him thus unless he transgresses the law of God, therefore from love of this creature he consents to sin. Further, because he experiences God as a severe legislator and avenger of sin, the impious sinner proceeds to formal hatred of God."
- II. Formal hatred of God is a special sin, and indeed the gravest of all. The reason for the first is that any hatred of God whatsoever turns away from God as troublesome to itself; whence it is opposed to the charity of God, and directly and formally destroys it. The reason for the second is that the gravity of fault consists in aversion from God. But that aversion is stronger and greater in hatred of God, in which it is per se and directly, than in other sins, in which it is indirectly and per accidens (2.2, q. 34, a. 2; St. Alph., V, 60).
Note. 1. We said: formal hatred, because in every sin by which divine friendship is dissolved there is found some hatred of God, but virtual and interpretative, by which a special fault is not constituted.
This formal hatred of God is twofold: one of abomination (opposed to love of concupiscence), by which someone hates God insofar as he experiences or apprehends him as contrary to himself; the other of enmity (opposed to benevolence and friendship), by which someone hates God in himself and according to himself, willing evil to him, insofar as it is evil to him. So great a malice is present in this latter hatred that a greater cannot be conceived. Yet hatred of enmity itself and hatred of abomination, with respect to God, do not differ in species; because although hatred of abomination of itself arises from desperation, nevertheless the will cannot come all the way to hatred of God unless God is attacked in himself, by hatred of enmity (II, 20, 24; Lehmkuhl, I, 434).
From hatred of God can proceed blasphemies, execrations, curses, sacrileges, persecutions against the Church, etc. Such hatred adds a species to these sins, as is plain (Sporer, tr. 2, c. 5, sect. 4).
Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis
Vol. I, Special Moral Theology, Treatise: On Divine Charity, Second Part: On the Object…, Question Two: On the Mater…, Article II: On Loving God · Vol. I, Special Moral Theology, Treatise: On Divine Charity, Fifth Part: On the Precept…, Single Question: On the Precepts Themselves of Dilection Toward God and Neighbor
Vol. I, Special Moral Theology, Treatise: On Divine Charity, Second Part: On the Object…, Question Two: On the Mater…, Article II: On Loving God
S. Th. II-II, q. 23, a. 4; q. 25, a. 1; q. 27, aa. 2, 5, 6; q. 28, a. 1; q. 44, aa. 4, 5, 6.
884. How charity is to be exercised toward God. - Charity or divine friendship is an efficacious love of benevolence, whence it embraces both complacency concerning divine goods, - and desire or benevolence properly so called, that is, the will of increasing divine goods, - and zeal for promoting the glory of God.
- Complacency is concerning the goods which God possesses: for when we truly love someone, we hold his goods as ours, and therefore we are complacent in his goods, as if they were ours; which Christ indicated in these words: "If you loved me, you would indeed rejoice, because I go to the Father" Jn. XIV, 28. Hence:
a) The just rejoice concerning the infinite perfections of God considered in himself, such as wisdom, power, benignity, beauty, etc.; indeed they are more complacent in the perfection and glory of God than concerning their own beatitude. Thus Augustine is reported to have said: "Lord God, I love you thus, that if I were God and you Augustine, I would wish to be Augustine, so that you might be God." And St. Francis de Sales, who reports this, himself prayed: "O most beloved of my heart, I do not indeed desire that I could wish any good to your majesty, but with my whole heart I am complacent in that supreme grade of goodness which you have, to which neither by desire nor even by thought can anything be added; but if such a desire were possible, O infinite Deity and divine Infinity, my soul would wish to be this very desire and nothing else."1
1 Traite de l'Amour de Dieu, l. V, ch. 6.
b) They rejoice likewise concerning the external manifestation of the attributes of God, concerning divine providence, concerning the extension of the kingdom of God, concerning the external glory which he receives from the Angels, the elect in heaven, and the just on earth.
c) This complacency spontaneously bursts forth into praise of God (which is an act of religion), by which they congratulate him concerning all things which pertain to his perfection and glory: "Glory to God in the highest... We praise you, we bless you, we glorify you... We praise you, O God; we confess you, O Lord."
- Desire is concerning divine goods to be increased insofar as this is possible; which is benevolence strictly so called, by which we will and wish good to God: for when we truly love someone, we wish good to him as to ourselves.
a) That desire is not absolute as regards perfections intrinsic to God, the increase of which we do not wish, since no good can accrue to the Infinite; nevertheless we can in some way wish them under a condition. For St. Thomas says (III Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4): "If it were possible that from our works something would accrue to him, one having charity would do many more things for preserving beatitude to him than for obtaining it for himself." Whence St. Francis de Sales (l. c.): "I said to the Lord: You are my God, filled with immense goodness, who need neither my goods nor anyone else's; nevertheless, if it were possible for you to need some good, I would never cease to wish it for you, and, to procure it for you, I would freely spend my life and all things dearest to me."
b) But the desire is absolute as regards the extrinsic glory of God, which by love we are led to procure, both in ourselves insofar as we are prepared to do and suffer all things for progressing in divine love, and in others insofar as we sincerely desire that sinners and unbelievers be enlightened and know, love, and glorify God, or also that the just glorify him more: "Let the peoples confess you, O God; let all the peoples confess you... Praise the Lord from the heavens... praise the Lord from the earth... praise him, all nations... Bless the Lord, all works of the Lord... Hallowed be your name, your kingdom come."
c) From this desire arises sadness concerning sins and offenses committed against God, the highest Good, and filial fear lest by offending God we be separated from him loved above all things.
- Zeal for promoting the glory of God arises when love does not rest in affection alone, but also works exteriorly. For affection is not sufficient, but charity must be effective: "Let us not love in word nor with the tongue, but in deed and truth" (I Jn. III, 18; cf. Mt. XXV, 41 sq.). "He who has the commandments and keeps them, he is the one who loves me" (Jn. XIV, 21). Whence St. Gregory: "The proof of dilection is the exhibition of work" (hom. in Ev., l. 8, hom. 30).
This happens in two ways: a) by vehemently repelling, as far as possible, those things which are against the honor and will of God, and b) by positively carrying out those things which procure the honor of God: in oneself by perfectly observing the commandments, indeed also the counsels, and by effecting all works for pleasing God in such a way that he truly reigns over us; in others by promoting the exercise of religion and of the virtues.
885. Suitable means for progressing in the love of God are to be employed. It is necessary:
- To diminish the obstacle and gradually eradicate disordered love of self, which is directly contrary to divine love and is the cause of every sin (I-II, q. 77, a. 4). Whence Christ (Mt. XVI, 24): "If anyone wishes to come after me, let him deny himself." Therefore the nourishment of charity is the diminution of cupidity, and we progress in charity so much as we depress love of ourselves.
- To consider the reasons for loving God, namely, a) God is the lover of us, who first loved us and from eternity freely chose us for existence and for innumerable natural and supernatural benefits, not for his advantage or happiness, but for our good.
b) God wills and ardently desires to be loved by us, as is clear from the precept which he imposed upon us as the first and greatest of the whole law (Mt. XXII, 37-38), - from the promises, threats, benefits, and punishments by which he allures us to love of himself, and is shown as most lavish benefactor, best father, most loving spouse, urgently demanding to be loved, - especially from the fact that he sent the Son who came to communicate the divine life to us, to send the fire of divine love so that it might be kindled, and to promise the Holy Spirit and God dwelling in us.
c) God in himself is infinitely lovable, as is clear from the fact that all perfections, goodnesses, and beauties of all creatures and all supernatural benefits he contains in himself eminently and infinitely; whence he is worthy of all love, and if love ought to be proportioned to the dignity of the object, the supreme and infinite goodness will have to be loved without measure.
- To employ means by which charity may be frequently exercised and increased, whether:
a) directly, by eliciting an act of love toward God, an illustrious benefactor lovable in himself, complacency in the divine attributes worthy of all praise, benevolence by which we wish that the name of God be sanctified, that his kingdom come, and that his will be done as in heaven and on earth, zeal by which with all our powers we promote the glory of God, perfect contrition by which we detest sins because they offend God infinitely good; - or:
b) indirectly, by eliciting acts of the moral virtues which are informed by charity, especially observance of the commandments, which is a sign of dilection (Jn. XIV, 15, 21; I Jn. II, 4; V, 3), perfect submission to the will of God, especially in fulfilling the duties of one's state; indeed by any action of piety, work, mortification, etc., performed from the love of God (I Cor. X, 31). And thus even more difficult works become easy, for, as Augustine says, nothing is difficult to those who love.
Vol. I, Special Moral Theology, Treatise: On Divine Charity, Fifth Part: On the Precept…, Single Question: On the Precepts Themselves of Dilection Toward God and Neighbor
S. Th. II-II, q. 44.
971. From natural-divine law there is given a precept of charity, obliging under grave sin, as is clear both from reason: for, supposing that God destines us to a supernatural end, to participation in His own life and to intimate friendship with Him, reverence toward Him demands that we love Him above all things as the supernatural end infinitely lovable for His own sake; and from Scripture, which establishes the commandment of this love, Deut. VI, 5 and Mt. XXII, 37. This precept is both negative, by which we are forbidden to cast away charity, and this obliges always; and affirmative, by which we are obliged to elicit an act of charity, and this does not oblige always.
Hence an act of charity is necessary; nevertheless in the present economy of the New Law it is not necessary by necessity of means. The habit of charity indeed is necessary for all by necessity of means for salvation, not only for adults but also for infants, because without it no one is pleasing to God, no one is in the state of grace or of divine friendship (I Cor. XIII; I John III, 14; IV, 16; Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7); but the act itself, in the New Testament, strictly is not of necessity of means for justification or salvation, because imperfect contrition with the sacrament really received now suffices. Nevertheless it is necessary by necessity of precept; and those do not satisfy this precept who remain for a long time in the state of mortal sin, or are justified only with imperfect contrition.
972. The obligation of eliciting an act of charity arises from various heads:
A. The virtue itself and the precept of charity obliges under grave sin per se, that is, in circumstances common to the condition of all men. For it is altogether necessary, indeed it is the greatest precept, to tend toward the ultimate supernatural end; yet we do not do this as is due except by an act of charity. Now this is especially necessary 1. at the beginning of the use of reason, when a man is bound to turn himself to God and to choose for himself an end; 2. in the article of death (or toward the end of life), when he is at the point of attaining the end; 3. often in life: for it does not suffice that we tend to God once or twice, but it is necessary to direct the whole life to the ultimate end, and therefore the act of charity must be repeated often (prop. condemned 1 by Alexander VII; 5, 6, and 7 by Innocent XI).1 Some determine this by saying: at least once a year; others, every month (St. Alphonsus), or even every week (Scotus); others finally, more probably: several times, at least three or four times a year. Yet this is easily fulfilled by leading a good Christian life; whence those who live as Christians abundantly satisfy the precept.
B. The virtue itself and the precept of charity obliges per accidens, that is, on the occasion of some special circumstance: 1. when a temptation rises up against charity, which is hoped to be overcome only by an act of this virtue; yet this does not befit the scrupulous who torture themselves in this matter, for whom nothing remains except to despise the temptation; 2. when charity has been lost, namely by an act contrary to it; 3. when we externally manifest it, otherwise the manifestation would be simulation.
C. Other virtues and precepts sometimes oblige one to elicit an act of charity, at least implicitly: 1. when temptations arise against other virtues, which are hoped to be overcome only by that act; 2. when someone, in the state of mortal sin, must celebrate and lacks the availability of a confessor; likewise if he must or intends either to administer a sacrament, or to receive a sacrament of the living, without being able or willing first to confess; 3. when he must or intends to posit an act of another virtue which cannot be exercised without an act of charity, for example, the Lord's Prayer (attentively recited in its full sense), perfect contrition for sins, a resolution of avoiding sin because it displeases God, a desire that all may serve God, etc. But in these cases the obligation does not arise from the precept of charity itself; whence, if its act is omitted, we do not sin against this virtue, but against another precept by force of which it was required.
Since charity is most excellent, most especially commanded, and the cause of supernatural merit, the faithful are to be urged very greatly to exercise it more often, and especially in the article of death, yet without speaking to the dying about the strict precept, lest they be cast into scruples.
- "A man at no time whatever of his life is bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity by force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues."
- "Whether he sins mortally who would elicit an act of love of God only once in life, we do not dare to condemn." - "It is probable that the precept of charity toward God does not oblige per se, strictly speaking, even every five years." - "It obliges only then, when we are bound to be justified and we do not have another way by which we can be justified."
973. In positive divine law, in the first place concerning charity, a special, distinct, and explicit precept had to be given. For every due thing is commanded: namely, something is commanded insofar as it is due. Now something is due per se, namely the end, because it has the character of good per se (for example, health); and something is due on account of another, namely that which is ordered to the end (for example, medicine to health). But the end of the spiritual life is that man be united to God, which is done through charity, and to this, as to the end, all other things which pertain to the spiritual life are ordered1 (a. 1). Therefore the greatest precept concerning charity had to be given, and it is so much greater insofar as that which is per se is preferable to that which is on account of another (ibid.). Hence it is called the greatest and first commandment in the law (Mt. XXII, 38; cf. prop. 1 condemned by Alexander VIII).2
1 St. Thomas proves the minor thus (a. 1): "For all the virtues, concerning whose acts precepts are given, are ordered either to purifying the heart from the disturbances of the passions, as are the virtues which are concerned with the passions; or at least to having a good conscience, as are the virtues which are concerned with operations; or to having right faith, as are those which pertain to divine worship; and these three are required for loving God. For an impure heart is drawn away from the love of God on account of passion inclining to earthly things; but an evil conscience makes one dread divine justice on account of fear of punishment; and fictitious faith draws affection to that which is fashioned concerning God, separating it from the truth of God."
2 "It suffices that a moral act tend to the ultimate end interpretatively: hence man is not bound to love either at the beginning or in the course of moral life." See the other condemned propositions, above p. 742.
Moreover concerning charity a twofold precept had to be given in positive law, explicit and distinct: the love of God and of neighbor.
For although in the first the other is included, as the conclusion is contained in the principle, and therefore he who would perfectly know the principle (the love of God) according to its whole force would also perceive the conclusion (the love of neighbor), nevertheless this does not clearly appear to all, and "therefore it is necessary that precepts be given not only concerning the love of God but also concerning the love of neighbor, on account of the less capable, who do not easily consider that one of these precepts is contained under the other" (a. 2). But these two suffice; for charity is friendship, and therefore love toward another whose good we will. Now the good is either the end, or that which is for the end, and therefore concerning charity two precepts suffice: one by which we are induced to love God as the end; the other by which we are induced to love the neighbor on account of God, as on account of the end (a. 3). Concerning love of self no explicit precept had to be given, because man naturally loves himself and his own body; but the mode of loving himself, namely that he love himself in an ordered (and supernatural) way, is sufficiently indicated in the love of God and neighbor, insofar as he ought to love God above all things and his neighbor as himself (ad 1).
Nevertheless the two aforesaid precepts were not to be enumerated in the decalogue, because they are concerning the end, while all the precepts of the decalogue are ordered to the love of God and of neighbor, which therefore are presupposed in all and included in all (a. 1, ad 3). Whence Christ says, Mt. XXII, 40: "On these two commandments depend the whole law and the prophets."
974. The intrinsic mode and mode of precept by which God is to be loved is that He be loved from the whole heart, as is said in Deut. VI, 5 and Mt. XXII, 37. For it is required for an act of virtue not only that it fall upon due matter: God to be loved; but also that it be clothed with the due circumstances by which it is made proportionate to such matter: the mode of love. But God is to be loved as the ultimate end, to whom all things are to be referred. And therefore He is to be loved totally, so that man receive nothing contrary to the love of God (a. 4). Whence it is said (Deut. VI, 5): You shall love the Lord your God from your whole heart.
Accordingly God is not only to be loved effectively by observance of the commandments, but also affectively by explicit affection; and not only affectively, or by the will, but also effectively by all the other powers moved by the will, which thus become principles of spiritual movements, namely, by the intellect, the lower appetite, and the external executive powers. And thus it can be understood that God is said to be loved from the whole heart, and from the whole mind, and from the whole soul, and from the whole strength or with all one's powers (Deut. VI, 5; Mt. XXII, 37; Mk. XII, 30; Lk. X, 27), although perhaps by all these one and the same thing is signified under different words.
"Therefore it is commanded to us that our whole intention (of the will) be borne toward God, which is from the whole heart; and that our intellect be subjected to God, which is from the whole mind; and that our appetite be regulated according to God, which is from the whole soul; and that our exterior act obey God, which is to love God from the whole strength, or virtue, or with all powers" (a. 5).
That precept will be fulfilled fully and perfectly in the fatherland, where charity is always in act according to the whole power; on the way it can be fulfilled imperfectly, insofar as man does nothing against the love of God; and thus one fulfills it more perfectly than another, insofar as he abstracts more from temporal things and thinks about God, and thus approaches more, by a certain likeness, to the perfection of the fatherland (a. 6).
975. The precept concerning love of neighbor is thus fittingly proposed: You shall love your neighbor as yourself (Lev. XIX, 17-18; Mt. XXII, 39). "For in it both the reason for loving and the mode of love are touched upon. The reason for loving is touched upon from the fact that he is named neighbor; for because of this we ought from charity to love others, because they are neighbors to us, both according to the natural image of God and according to capacity for glory... But the mode of love is touched upon when it is said: as yourself; which is not to be understood as to this, that someone should love his neighbor equally with himself, but similarly to himself, and this in three ways: 1. indeed on the part of the end, namely, that someone love his neighbor on account of God, just as he ought to love himself on account of God, so that thus the love of neighbor may be holy (and not merely natural); 2. on the part of the rule of love, namely, that someone not condescend to his neighbor in anything evil, but only in good things, just as a man ought to satisfy his own will only in good things, so that thus the love may be just (that is, honorable); 3. on the part of the reason of love, namely, that someone not love his neighbor on account of his own utility or delight, but for this reason, that he wills good to his neighbor, just as he wills good to himself, so that thus love of neighbor may be true; for when someone loves his neighbor on account of his own utility or delight, he does not truly love the neighbor, but himself" (a. 7). "But from the very fact that it is said: You shall love your neighbor, it is consequently given to be understood that those who are nearer are to be loved more" (a. 8, ad 3): "for the order of charity pertains to the very account (or essence) of the virtue" and falls under the precept (a. 8).
That precept was proposed more perfectly and declared more evidently by Christ in the New Testament, to be exercised in a more perfect manner than in the Old, and by this reason it is called new: "A new commandment I give to you, that you love one another; as I have loved you, that you also love one another" (John XIII, 34-35; cf. XV, 12-13; I John III, 16). Namely, it is new 1. by reason of a new exemplar (John XIII, 34 and XV, 12); 2. by reason of the motive, because Christ is in our neighbors: for supernatural love is founded in the communication of the divine life of Christ, who joins all in one mystical body of which He is the head, and in one participation of the Eucharist (John XV-XVII); whence Christ says: "Amen I say to you, as long as you did it to one of these my brethren, you did it to me" (Mt. XXV, 40); 3. by reason of the measure and mode, because it is necessary to love even to the giving of one's life (John XV, 12-13; I John III, 16; Eph. V, 2); 4. by reason of extension, because it is toward all, even strangers and enemies, which was not explicitly handed down in the Old Testament (Mt. V, 43-45; Lk. VI, 27-28; Rom. X, 12). The Apostle excellently describes the distinguished qualities of this eminent charity in I Cor. XIII, 4-7.
…and 2 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.
Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology
Vol. I, Tr. V, Ch. III, Article I. On Love of God
I Say. There exists a special precept of loving God above all things, as is clear both from the words of Christ, Matt. xxii, 37: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart ... this is the greatest and the first commandment," and from proposition 1 proscribed by Alexander VII, and already mentioned several times.
But this precept, insofar as it is affirmative, obliges one to love God above all things appreciatively, as is clear from the natural law; not, however, necessarily intensively, because the essence of charity does not consist in degrees. Namely, it is enough that God be in fact preferred to all goods, and the highest degree of intensity or fervor in loving is not required. For that intensity would have to be highest either absolutely or relatively; if the first, it would follow that man could never satisfy this precept; if the other, it would follow that today satisfaction could not be made by an act which yesterday was perfect. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 22. Baller., note (a), p. 178.
Questions
Question 1. When does the precept of charity press?
Response. It obliges both of itself and by accident, like the precept of faith. Of itself indeed, when the use of reason is perfectly developed for ordering life toward God, and besides several times in life, as is clear from the condemnation of several propositions, especially from the 6th condemned by Innocent XI, which is as follows: "It is probable that the precept of charity toward God, of itself, does not oblige rigorously even every five years." - But if you further ask what that particle several times properly imports, practically speaking, the response is that although St. Alphonsus says that the opinion of those who require an act of charity once a month is to be recommended, nevertheless the opinion of those who oblige to it only once a year can safely be held. Indeed, according to the same Holy Doctor, the faithful who live as Christians and often devoutly recite the Lord's Prayer are not to be disturbed, because then, if not expressly, at least in exercise, they elicit an act of charity. But it obliges by accident when the precept of contrition presses; for example, if a priest conscious of mortal sin had to celebrate, when there is not available any supply of a confessor. Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap., n. 13.
Question 2. Are the dying bound to eliciting an act of charity?
Response. They are certainly bound if they are conscious of any mortal sin, and no other means of justification is available to them. But if they have already received the sacrament of Penance with attrition, they are not to be obliged to elicit an act of charity, not because this is contained in simple attrition, but because a special precept is not established, even though the contrary opinion is much more common. For the rest, the dying are to be urged and most opportunely excited to elicit and repeat acts of charity. Cf. Baller., note (a), p. 180.
Billuart, Summa Summae
Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus III. On the Secunda …, On Charity, On the Order and the Princ…, Whether, and in what sense, it is lawful to love God and serve him for the sake of reward? · Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus III. On the Secunda …, On Charity, On the Order and the Princ…, On the precept of charity
Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus III. On the Secunda …, On Charity, On the Order and the Princ…, Whether, and in what sense, it is lawful to love God and serve him for the sake of reward?
[By faith it is certain that it is licit in some sense to serve God, whether loving him or exercising other works of virtue, on account of retribution.]
[This is true even if man is not in the state of justice, as is clear from the condemnation of the following proposition by Alexander VIII: « Whosoever serves God even with a view to eternal reward, if he lack charity, is not without fault, as often as he acts with a view even to beatitude. » It is the 13th.]
It is evident from Scripture in several places. David says, Psal. CXVIII, 112: I have inclined my heart to do thy justifications, on account of retribution. The Apostle relates, Hebr., XI, 8, 26, that Abraham and Moses did good with a view to eternal reward. Christ incites the Apostles to patience in sufferings with a view to reward: Rejoice, he says, and exult, because your reward is abundant in heaven. And the Church sings of the martyrs: « They delivered their bodies to torments, that they might become heirs in the house of the Lord. »
I say 2°: It is not licit to love God or serve him on account of retribution as on account of an end of the thing loved, that is, of God167: partly because God cannot be ordered to anything as to an end, since he himself is the last end to which all things are ordered; partly because otherwise the retribution would be loved more than God; for the end is loved more than those things which are directed to the end. 167 In III Sentent., dist. 29, a. 4, o.
I say 3°: It is licit to serve God, whether loving him or exercising works of virtue, on account of eternal retribution, in such a way that the retribution be the end of love and good works, not ultimate, but further orderable to God168. 168 Ibid.
It is proved as to the first part. 1° There is no disorder in that means are ordered to their own proper and legitimate end, and merits to reward. Now the proper and legitimate end of good works and their reward is eternal beatitude, according to that word, Matt., XIX, 17: If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments. And 1 Pet., 1, 9: Bearing about the end of your faith, the salvation of souls. This the things we adduced for the first conclusion prove.
2° It belongs to friends to seek mutual fruition. Now our reward is nothing else than to enjoy God. Therefore.
It is proved as to the second part. Our last end is God. Now eternal beatitude, although objectively it is God, formally nevertheless is not God, but something created, namely the beatific vision. Therefore.
Hence follows the third part. For if we can serve God on account of eternal retribution as on account of the end of good works, but not ultimate: therefore as on account of an end further orderable to God, so that we intend to see God, that we may love him more securely and more intensely, and praise and glorify him for eternity; so affected, that if no beatitude were to be hoped for, we would nonetheless love him and serve him.
I say 4°: It is licit to serve God with a view to temporal reward, not as an end properly so called of good works — for it would be disordered that acts of virtue, which are more excellent than temporal goods, be ordered as means to them as to an end — but as accompanying some good, or conducing to it, so that they hold the place only of certain accessory motives. For temporal goods help us toward attaining the supernatural end: 1° inasmuch as through them this corporal life, in which alone opportunity is given for meriting beatitude, is sustained; 2° inasmuch as they serve us organically for acts of virtue.
The practice of the Church confirms this, which asks of God serenity, rain, fruits, etc. Indeed Christ himself commands us to ask in the Lord's Prayer for our daily bread.
Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus III. On the Secunda …, On Charity, On the Order and the Princ…, On the precept of charity
You will ask 1° whether there is given a special precept of loving God by an internal act.
Not a few have taught that no special precept distinct from the others is given of loving God by an explicit internal act, but that the love of God prescribed is nothing else than the observance of the other commandments, even without any internal affection of love; which certainly offends pious ears not a little. Against whom therefore
I answer.169 A special precept, distinct from the others, is given of loving God with an explicit internal affection and act, and not only in effect, by observing the other commandments. 169 Hic q. 44, a. 1, ad 1.
It is proved. 1° from these words of Christ, Matt., XXII, 37-40: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind. This is the greatest and first commandment. And the second is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. On these two commandments dependeth the whole law. The same is read Deut., VI, 5, and Luke, X, 27.
From these I form a threefold argument.
First. According to Augustine and all interpreters, the words of Scripture are to be taken in the natural and obvious sense unless some grave inconvenience stands in the way. Now these words: to love with the whole heart, with the whole soul, with the whole mind, naturally and obviously signify an internal affection and act of love, nor can they be twisted into another sense except by open violence; nor does any inconvenience stand against this sense; indeed all things conspire toward it. Therefore.
Second. Among things that are not distinct, one cannot be counted first, second, and third, nor can one be called the greatest: this is evident per se. Now, according to the cited Scripture, the precept of the love of God among the others is numbered first, the precept of the love of neighbor second, the others, which hang on these two, third. Likewise, the precept of the love of God is said to be the greatest among the others. Therefore the precept of the love of God is special and distinct from the other precepts.
Third. Nothing hangs on itself. Now the law, or the precepts of the whole law, hang on these two precepts. Therefore these two precepts are distinct from the others.
It is confirmed. Scripture distinguishes the love of God and the observance of the commandments as cause and effect, as sign and thing signified, John, XIV, 15: If you love me, keep my commandments. Where love is assigned as the cause of the observance of the commandments, and the observance of the commandments as the sign of love.
To this point the following condemned propositions tend: First: « Man at no time of life whatsoever is held to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity by force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues. » It is the first among those condemned by Alexander VII, in the year 1665. — Second: « Whether he sins mortally who would elicit once only in life an act of the love of God, we do not dare to condemn. » — Third: « It is probable that the precept of charity toward God obliges per se not even rigorously every five years. » — Fourth: « Then it obliges only when we are held to be justified, and have no other way by which we can be justified. » These are the fifth, sixth, and seventh among those condemned by Innocent XI, in the year 1679. — Fifth: « Man is not held to love the last end neither at the beginning nor in the course of his life morally. » It is condemned by Alexander VIII, August 24, 1690.
What we have said about the precept of loving God internally must be said about the precept of loving one's neighbor internally, for the same reasons; to which add: We are commanded to love our neighbor as ourselves; but we love ourselves with an internal affection. Likewise Christ says, John, XV, 12: This is my commandment, that you love one another, as I have loved you. But Christ loved us not only through external works, but with internal affection.
Neither say that the neighbor is relieved merely by an external work, and that the internal affection need not be attended to. For both assumptions are false. For the neighbor is relieved also by internal prayers, and he would scorn the external work if it were shown him without affection.
Hence the following propositions condemned by Innocent XI: « We are not held to love our neighbor by an internal and formal act. » It is the tenth. — « We can satisfy the precept of loving our neighbor through external acts alone. » It is the eleventh.
[You will ask 2° whether we are held always to act from the motive of charity.
I answer. Negatively. 1° Acts of the other virtues elicited on account of their proper motives are good, as acts of faith and hope, which are obligatory even in the state of sin. The Council of Trent, session XIV, chapter 4, declares attrition to be a gift of God and to dispose the penitent to justification. Likewise session VI, canon 31, defines: « If anyone shall say that the justified man sins while he does good works with a view to eternal reward; let him be anathema. »
The following propositions were condemned by Alexander VIII: the 8th, « An infidel must sin in every work. » — the 13th, « Whosoever serves God even with a view to eternal reward, if he lack charity, is not without fault, as often as he acts with a view even to beatitude. » — the 15th, « Attrition conceived from fear of hell and punishments, without the love of benevolence toward God for himself, is not a good motive or supernatural. »
2° There are given acts indifferent from their species170, that is, acts which possess a certain natural goodness but are neither good nor evil in the supernatural order; and these acts are licit, as was proved in the treatise on Human Acts, dissertation IV, article 4. Now if we were always bound to act from the motive of charity, such acts would not be licit. Therefore.] 170 1, 2, q. 18, a. 8, o.
You will ask 3° when the precept of charity obliges.
I answer. The precept of the love of God obliges per se: 1° At the beginning of sufficient use of reason. Of this I have said enough in the treatise on Sins, dissertation VIII, article 6.
2° It obliges per se at the end of life; because then the spirit returns to God who created it, and the devil lies in wait for him most of all, man would be accused of most grave negligence and contempt if he did not convert himself through love to God, with whom he hopes to be joined in eternal love in beatitude.
3° It obliges per se frequently during life, since charity is the principal virtue by which we tend toward the end for which we were created. But how often and when, is uncertain.
Some assign Sundays and feast days, on which, when the faithful honor God as the principle of all things, they are thereby incited also to love him. Others require an act of love once or twice in the week. But since, as I said, these things are uncertain, the faithful are to be exhorted to exercise themselves often, and as often as they can, in these acts of charity. This they will easily accomplish if they recite the Lord's Prayer with attention and affection, in whose recitation the formal act of the love of God is exercised by saying: Hallowed be thy name; for this is nothing else than to will that the name of God be held holy everywhere and by all, and be glorified.
[Thus St. Liguori, Homo apost., IV, 13: « Regarding the act of charity, the opinion pleases me more of those who require it once in the month, since he will scarcely be able to observe the divine law who frequently does not exercise his love for God in positive acts. »
That acts of charity are to be elicited frequently is clear from these words, Deut., VI, 5-8: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength. And these words, which I command thee this day, shall be in thy heart, and thou shalt tell them to thy children, and thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house, and walking on thy journey, sleeping and rising, and thou shalt bind them as a sign on thy hand. It is clear moreover from the text itself that implicit acts are included under this precept and fulfilled by them; for the enumerated actions are not per se acts of charity. Whence the faithful who live piously satisfy the precept of charity easily: they pray, receive the sacraments, avoid sin lest they offend God and displease him, embrace the divine will in all things and prefer it to their own, etc. They are nevertheless to be exhorted to elicit explicit acts frequently, because they are most pleasing to God, confirm the habit of charity, and from them devotion grows.
It is clear that those do not satisfy the precept of charity, even though ignorance excuses them at least in part, who remain in mortal sin for months; nor those who indeed detest sin, but from attrition alone, which does not attain to the reason of true charity.]
But per accidens the precept of charity obliges whenever another precept presses which cannot be fulfilled without the love of God; because whoever is held to the end is held to the means.
Concina, Compendium
Bk. III, Diss. II, Chapter I — A census of the proscribed propositions · Bk. III, Diss. II, Chapter II — An inventory of propositions which seem lax · Bk. III, Diss. II, Chapter III — The notion, object, prerogatives, and precept of theological charity · Bk. III, Diss. II, Chapter IV — The times are designated at which this precept of loving God presses · Bk. III, Diss. II, Chapter V — Consequences, which urge the exercises and offices of the theological virtues
Bk. III, Diss. II, Chapter I — A census of the proscribed propositions
I. Alexander VII proscribed forty-five propositions, of which the first is of this kind: A man is at no time of his life whatever bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity by force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues.
II. Innocent XI, out of the sixty propositions which he proscribed, condemned three regarding this matter, and they are the following:
Whether he sins mortally who should elicit an act of the love of God only once in his life, we dare not condemn.
It is probable that the precept of charity towards God does not, of itself, rigorously oblige even once in every five years.
It obliges then only, when we are bound to be justified, and have no other way by which we can be justified.
III. Alexander VIII, in the year 1690, condemned thirty-one propositions, among which are the following in order:
In truth he sins who hates sin merely on account of its baseness and its unbecomingness to nature, without any respect to God offended.
The intention by which one detests evil and pursues good merely that he may obtain heavenly glory is not right, nor pleasing to God.
Everything that is not from Christian supernatural faith, which worketh by love, is a sin.
Whoever serves God even with a view to the eternal reward, if he lack charity, is not free of vice, as often as he acts even with a view to beatitude.
Attrition which is conceived from fear of hell and of punishments, without the love of God for his own sake, is not a good supernatural movement.
Bk. III, Diss. II, Chapter II — An inventory of propositions which seem lax
I. Fr. Thomas Tamburini, book II on the Decalogue, chapter 1, number 9, writing of faith, premises a doctrine by which he reduces to nothing the precepts of all three theological virtues. I think (says he) that the Faithful are never of themselves and directly obliged to believe the aforesaid mysteries either implicitly or explicitly, by force of the necessity of a precept of faith ... The reason of the first assertion is that, as we have said ... no precept ever obliges unless it be determinate. For since it cannot pass into execution except as determinate, it is not considered to be practically complete.
At number 10 he proceeds further, to destroy the special precept of charity. Our opinion is confirmed, first, from Azor, who teaches that the precept of charity obliges then only when we are bound to be justified, and have no other way by which we can be justified: because this precept does not seem to oblige except as a means of justification, or as a disposition to it. Thus he. From which I gather that the like can be said of the act of faith, and consequently of the act of hope, as I shall again intimate below when I treat of hope, chapter 2, § 1, and of charity, chapter 3, § 2, number 2, referring myself thither.
II. It must now be seen what he writes of the precept of charity in the place cited by himself. He reports, at number 1, the various opinions of the Doctors in these words: The Doctors labor in assigning the time at which the Faithful is bound by obligation to elicit a positive act of love toward God; and they assign various times, as various as are the wits of men. The first time which some assign is the beginning of the use of reason. The second, the end of life. The third, the whole of life taken indeterminately, so that at least once in it God be loved. The fourth, all feast days, on which we ought specially to be free for God. The fifth, the time at which an adult receives Baptism. The sixth, the time at which one receives the Eucharist. The seventh, when perchance martyrdom is undergone. The eighth, when you receive a great benefit from God. The ninth, when you hear someone blaspheming against God. The tenth, when you are pressed by a grave temptation, especially of hatred of God, with danger of consent, unless you turn yourself to God through love.
The doctrine of Azor pleases me, who teaches that this precept of charity was imposed for the sake of the justification of the ungodly man: therefore it obliges then only when the ungodly man, because the Sacrament of Penance is not at hand, has no other way by which to justify himself, except by eliciting an act of contrition, which always in some manner at last involves an act of love of God loved above all things. Consequently, then, and indirectly, by reason of their justification, the Faithful are obliged to an act of charity. See above, chapter 1, § 1, number 50, where the same manner of speaking pleased me regarding the precept of the act of faith and of hope: for by the things there said this doctrine of Azor will be confirmed, and the times just assigned in the preceding number can be impugned.
It is confirmed: because although the common opinion teaches that there is a special precept of loving God in those words, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, and elsewhere; yet Doctors not ignoble teach that this precept is not special, to be fulfilled at a special time, but general, imbibed in all the precepts; just as the second precept, of the love of the Neighbor, is not special, but contained in the precepts of the Decalogue; for on this account it is said: On these two commandments — that is, on the love of God and of the Neighbor — dependeth the whole law and the Prophets; and: He that hath my commandments and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me; and: Love is the fulfilling of the law. For if he who keeps the commandments loves, and he who loves keeps them, then the one of these is contained in the other; and consequently the precept of charity will oblige only indirectly, and by reason of another.
Probable, therefore, and utterly safe, is the opinion of those who deny that the Faithful, at the beginning of the use of reason (so Castropalao with Azor, Valentia, Sanchez, Suarez, Coninck, cited by the same) or at the end of life (so the same author there, number 9, with Azor and Sanchez, cited by the same) are obliged to turn themselves to God by loving him: for to posit an obligation of this kind, which certainly rests on no solid foundation, is nothing else than to instill scruples — not indeed into the unlearned, for these advert less to such an obligation, but into the more learned, etc.
III. Patritius Sporer, treatise II on the first precept of the Decalogue, chapter 5, number 31, transcribes according to his custom the opinion of his Fr. Tamburini, and of the Authors whom Tamburini alleges, and explains it at greater length, and, so far as can be done, champions it. "Probable" (he says) "has that opinion hitherto always seemed to me, that that precept never obliges of itself as to an explicit act of the love of God above all things; but that it is satisfied by the voluntary observance of the commandments, and the exclusion of all sin for God's sake, as many grave Doctors teach in Tamburini. The reason is that, on the one hand, he who wills for God's sake to observe all his commandments, and for no thing to offend him by sinning, truly loves God above all things, at least implicitly and virtually, and with his whole heart negatively ... And on the other hand, the obligation of any precept — and that a grave one, under mortal sin — is not to be asserted without a certain foundation. No certain and pressing foundation, however, can be brought forward that the precept of love ever obliges of itself to a formal and explicit act of the love of God, as will be evident on weighing the foundations commonly adduced.
"One chief foundation is the great commandment itself, the affirmative precept of charity: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart — which surely must oblige at some time to its own proper act, lest it be in vain. We acknowledge and venerate the most divine commandment, and we desire for ourselves its exercise, and that most frequent, in all things. Yet no reason or authority proves that it is a special precept, to be fulfilled of itself, by obligation, at some special time; nay, with the Doctors reported, it can most probably be said to be a general precept, imbibed in all the precepts, so that it is abundantly satisfied by implicit acts of the love of God, contained in the voluntary observance of the commandments for God's sake, as has been said.
"2. By altogether the same reason, the other precept of charity also — Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself — is not special, to be fulfilled obligatorily of itself at some special time by some internal elicited act of love toward the Neighbor (for when would this be?); but it is a general precept imbibed in all the precepts of God regarding the Neighbor; and it is abundantly satisfied when one wills to keep the precepts of God regarding the Neighbor, and, occasion given, in fact keeps them, abstaining from all hatred, offense, and injury, and, when there is need, exhibiting the external works of charity.
"3. Another new and more pressing foundation is furnished by the very first proposition among those prohibited and condemned under Alexander VII in the year 1665, running thus: A man is at no time of his life whatever bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity by force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues. So the condemned proposition. But no mention is here made of a formal explicit act of the love of God above all things; and it seems altogether to suffice that the precept of charity often obliges of itself, at least insofar as it is negative, as in the cases set down above, even though it never oblige as affirmative ... Therefore our opinion ought to be considered the less condemned.
"4. But behold, most recently, in the year 1679, a most pressing foundation, in my judgment, was set down by Innocent XI. Among several propositions condemned as scandalous and pernicious in practice, he also placed these three in order: Whether he sins mortally who should elicit an act, etc. ... Here I give my conquered hands, out of reverence and obedience to the sacred apostolic See."
IV. Fr. Castropalao, treatise 6, disputation 1, point 4, number 9: Fifthly, others assert that, danger of death pressing, even if you be not conscious of mortal sin — nay, even if, being conscious of it, you confess it sacramentally — you are obliged to love God above all things ... I confess that this obligation is sufficiently probable, and always to be counseled in practice; but it is not altogether certain, if you are not conscious of mortal sin: for Azor and Sanchez reject it. Through charity, says the Angelic Doctor, we attain the last end, and are joined to God. When the moment of separation from this world, and of conjunction with God, is at hand, are we not commanded to elicit an act of love, which is the means by which we are in very deed coupled to God?
V. The same, in the place cited, number 9: Seventhly, others say that this precept obliges, first, when martyrdom must be undergone, or some other excellent and difficult work undertaken: because it is expedient then to strengthen the soul in the service of God. But I, while I acknowledge the fittingness, disapprove the obligation. The Christian, then, when the tyrant threatens death, and death itself is imminent, is not bound to produce an act of charity, by which he may love both God and the tyrant, and confirm and strengthen himself to undergo the agony and the monstrous torture? It will be fitting, but it will not be necessary?
VI. The same, in the place cited, number 10: By this obligation, then, I judge that every adult is bound not every year, as pleased Peter de Ledesma — for this is too hard, and rests on no firm foundation — but a few times in his life ... And I should count a delay of three years grave. Is it too hard to love, in the sweet embraces of friendship, once each year, God our parent, provider, preserver, redeemer, and benefactor?
Bk. III, Diss. II, Chapter III — The notion, object, prerogatives, and precept of theological charity
I. Question I. What is charity, and what its object? Answer. Charity taken for the habit is defined: It is a virtue divinely infused, by which God is loved for his own sake, and the Neighbor for the sake of God. Charity loves God as he is God, that is, on account of his goodness and perfection. In the word Neighbor are comprehended all rational creatures capable of eternal glory.
II. The material object, or primary object which, of charity is God; the secondary is the Neighbor for the sake of God. The formal object of charity is the infinite goodness of God, lovable for its own sake. By this reason charity is distinguished from the two other theological virtues.
III. The first prerogative of charity is friendship between God and men. I will not now call you servants ... but friends: John 15. This friendship includes reciprocal benevolence, and a mutual communion of goods, as the same Evangelist adds, chapter 14: He that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him. The Son of God coupled human nature to himself, and raised it to the summit of Divinity, that he might shadow forth a certain semblance of equality. The second prerogative of charity is that it is the life of the soul, just as the soul is the life of the body, says Augustine. The third prerogative of charity is that it is a gift infused by God with none of our merits preceding, and with no regard for any natural capacity of ours. The fourth prerogative is the worth which charity bestows upon all other works. The other virtues have indeed from their proper object their honesty and goodness; but that they may come forth wreathed with the crown of the reward, they must needs be adorned with the nuptial garment of charity. The fifth prerogative of charity is that it is the most excellent of all the virtues, as St. Paul says, 1 Corinthians 13: And the greatest of these is charity.
IV. The offices and acts of actual charity are benevolence; the affection of union; complacency in the divine perfections; love of the infinite goodness; desire of his glory; to will good things to God — both intimate goods, which are all his infinite perfections, and extrinsic goods, placed in the manifestation of the divine perfections, namely, that God be worshipped, adored, praised, and loved by all creatures.
V. Question II. Does the precept of loving God press? Answer. This is the greatest and first of all commandments, says the Evangelist Matthew, chapter 22: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind. This is the greatest and the first commandment. Compare, I pray, these words of Christ with the opinions which I have reported above, at number 2, from Tamburini, Sanchez, and Sporer, and with the proscribed theses which certain recent Probabilists taught; and thence gather what faith is to be given to similar authors in the other obscure and entangled controversies of morals, if, in explaining the gravest and first commandment, so luminously expressed by Christ the Lord, they have fallen into opinions so lax.
VI. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 44, art. 1, proves this special precept by several weights of reasons. For by the same reason by which charity is a special virtue, the precept commanding its act is a peculiar one. Now something is due (says the Angelic Doctor) in two ways: in one way, of itself; in another way, on account of another. Of itself, indeed, that is due in each business which is its end, because it has the character of a good of itself; on account of another, that is due which is ordered to the end ... Now the end of the spiritual life is that man be united to God, which is done through charity; and to this are ordered, as to their end, all the things that pertain to the spiritual life ... But in any genus, that which is of itself is superior to that which is on account of another; and therefore the greatest precept is that of charity.
VII. St. Augustine, book 1 On the morals of the Church, chapter 11, explaining this commandment, says: If, then, to them that love God all things work together unto good; and if no one doubts that the supreme good, which is also called the best, is not only to be loved, but to be loved so that we ought to love nothing more — which is signified and expressed by what was said: With thy whole soul, and with thy whole heart, and with thy whole mind — who, I ask, will doubt, all these things being established and most firmly believed, that nothing else is for us the best thing, to the gaining of which, all other things set aside, we must hasten, but God? Again, if no thing separates us from his love, what can be not only better, but also more certain, than this good? But let us briefly consider the several points. No one separates us thence by threatening death: for that very thing by which we love God cannot die, except in not loving God; for to die is nothing else than to prefer anything to him in loving and following. No one separates us thence by promising life: for no one separates us from the fountain by promising water, etc.
VIII. Therefore that commandment is special, commanding of itself an act of love. False, then, is the opinion of certain men who asserted that that commandment is general, included in the other precepts. Wherefore Alexander VIII deservedly proscribed the following thesis in the year 1690: Objective goodness consists in the agreement of the object with rational nature; formal goodness, in the conformity of the act with the rule of morals. For this it suffices that the moral act tend to the last end interpretatively. Hence man is not bound to love [God] either at the beginning or in the course of his moral life.
IX. Question III. Must the love which this precept commands be appreciative, or also intensive? Answer. The Theologians distinguish a twofold love of charity: the one appreciative, the other intensive — a distinction which is not very ancient. With appreciative love we pursue God when we prefer God to all things, and when, burning with such love, we are prepared to suffer and endure all evils, and to lose whatever goods, lest we offend God. Intensive love adds a more vehement fervor, a more intense endeavor, and even a sensible tenderness, as it were, greater or less. It is agreed among all that this precept does not command intensive love explained in this manner — that is, insofar as intensity impels the soul beyond the observance of the precepts to the execution of the works of counsel, and to the traversing of the sublimer way of perfection, and insofar as it constitutes delights in mutual embraces. What is commanded, however, is appreciative love, by which we choose God before, and prefer him to, all other goods; and in this way we love God with the whole heart, with the whole soul: since God alone rules in our heart, and subjects to himself all our affections. This love, since it fights against carnal love and earthly cupidity, is not severed from some fervor, intensity, and endeavor. Yet this charity increases, and its fervor is kindled more. Therefore the Theologians, with Augustine and Thomas, distinguish three states of charity: namely, of beginners, of proficients, and of the perfect. Beginning charity subjects the man to God, restrains concupiscence, desires, and appetites, pursues all sins, and removes all the impediments of heavenly love. Proficient charity rises higher, lifts its flames upward, attempts great things, and applies itself wholly to the exercises of piety and of the virtues: it studies not only to keep the law exactly, but strives also to execute the counsels of evangelical perfection. Perfect charity, as though triumphing over prostrate enemies, enjoys God, and, tranquil, overflows with heavenly delights. But all these things are expressed by the experience and exercise of divine love more than by the pen.
X. A deliberate desire of remaining perpetually in this life several authors do not excuse from mortal sin; which opinion I judge true, when with deliberate mind one should truly desire to dwell perpetually in this world: because such a one would prefer the state of this life to God, and would therefore violate the precept of loving God above all things. Nor may you reply that such a one does not prefer this life to God, but only desires not to be deprived of this life, and not to fall into hell — that he directly desires, therefore, to avoid the eternal punishments. This, I say, you shall not object. For the way of avoiding hell is not the perpetuity of this life, but the flight of sin and the exercise of the virtues. Those who would wish to remain perpetually in this life would in very deed — though they do not express it — desire to enjoy the pleasures of sins, and at the same time to escape hell. That desire of the perennity of this life proceeds from a perverse love of carnal pleasures; therefore it is evil and vicious, and hostile to charity.
Bk. III, Diss. II, Chapter IV — The times are designated at which this precept of loving God presses
I. Question I. Does this precept oblige at any determinate time? Answer. Some have denied it, who contended that this precept is not special; but this opinion has now been proscribed by the Church.
II. Question II. Is it enough to elicit an act of the love of God once in a lifetime? Answer. The affirming opinion the Venerable Innocent XI proscribed in this thesis: Whether he sins mortally who should elicit an act of the love of God only once in his life, we dare not condemn. This opinion deserves detestation rather than confutation. The greatest and first commandment, imposed by God with such severity and emphasis of words — the precept which is the soul of the Christian life, by which alone we truly live to God — imposes the duty of exercising its vital acts only once?
III. Question III. Does this precept oblige only once in each five-year period? Answer. The affirming opinion certain men formerly championed; but this too the Venerable Innocent XI condemned: It is probable that the precept of charity towards God does not, of itself, rigorously oblige even once in every five years.
IV. Question IV. Does this precept oblige of itself at the first instant of the use of reason? Answer. The graver Theologians commonly affirm it, with St. Thomas. Since at some determinate time of life this precept of loving God obliges of itself, as the Church has defined, therefore this obligation presses above all at the first instant of the use of reason, morally taken. For the light of reason opens to the child his entrance into this world, and shows the way that leads to the harbor. Then, therefore, he must deliberate about himself, and set before himself his last end. This last end is God: therefore he is to be loved, and to be chosen before all. And surely, when that first light of reason shines forth, the young person is bound to do something. And what can he do more apt and better than to salute, to love his Creator, his Redeemer, and the divine Parent of his eternal felicity, and to pant after his embraces? No time, then, can be designated more opportune for loving God than that interval in which deliberation must be made about the way to be taken and the last end to be chosen. And this is that time at which the use of reason is acquired.
V. The opposite opinion the Probabilists commonly defend; and among the many sophisms which they obtrude, one is this: that too heavy a burden is imposed on children; but Christ says: My yoke is sweet and my burden light: Matthew 11. Now they contend that the yoke is sweet when it is accommodated to human appetites and to liberty. As often as some divine commandment imposes a burden hostile to concupiscence, to cupidity, and to the other allurements, so often do they throw back the said oracle: My yoke is sweet, etc.
VI. These authors abuse the aforesaid oracle in a false sense. All the Fathers to a man testify that the yoke of Christ is sweet because it is a yoke of love, of charity, of friendship, and of benevolence. Hard is the buffeting of the flesh, the endurance of persecutions, the crucifixion of concupiscence and cupidity, the guarding of chastity, and very many other things which the Gospel commands. Most hard and most rough are these things — not merely hard and rough. But all things become sweet and pleasant then only when divine charity, when heavenly love, pours out the unction, the sweetness, and the delights of the divine friendship. If the affections of weak women render sweet and pleasant to their lovers the gravest inconveniences which these endure to please them, with what sweetness, with what delights will not God fill his lovers? The benign Casuists make the yoke of Christ most hard and most rough, since they take away from it the frequent exercise of charity, which alone removes roughness and hardness. All the commandments of the divine law are hostile, inimical, and burdensome to flesh and blood. Add charity, friendship, benevolence — and all things grow sweet to lovers. This is the doctrine of all the Fathers.
VII. I adduce a few out of many texts of St. Augustine. On Psalm 67: For whatever is difficult in the precepts is light to him that loveth. Nor for any other reason is that saying of Matthew 11, verse 30 — My burden is light — rightly understood, except because he gives the Holy Spirit, through whom charity is poured forth in our hearts. He speaks at greater length in Sermon 96, chapter 1: Hard it seems, and grievous, what the Lord has commanded, that if anyone will follow him, he must deny himself. But it is neither hard nor grievous which he commands, who helps that what he commands may be done. For both that is true which is said to him in Psalm 16: Because of the words of thy lips, I have kept hard ways; and that is true which he himself said, Matthew 11, verse 30: My yoke is easy and my burden light. For whatever is hard in the precepts, charity makes easy. We know how much love itself accomplishes ... how much men have suffered, how many unworthy and intolerable things they have endured, to arrive at that which they loved. Likewise, in the book On nature and grace, against the Pelagians, chapter 69: Very good, however, are the precepts, if we use them lawfully. For by that very fact by which it is most firmly believed that God, just and good, could not have commanded impossible things, we are admonished both what to do in easy things, and what to ask in difficult ones. For all things become easy to charity, to which the burden of Christ is light; or it alone is that very burden which is light, according to what is said, 1 John 5, verse 3: And his commandments are not heavy. And what is said in Deuteronomy 30: The word is nigh thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart ... Everyone, therefore, being converted, as is there commanded, to the Lord his God with his whole heart and with his whole soul, does not find the commandment of God heavy. For how is it heavy, when it is the commandment of love? For either one does not love, and therefore it is heavy; or he loves, and it cannot be heavy. But he loves, if, as is there admonished, Israel be converted to the Lord his God with his whole heart and with his whole soul. A new commandment (he says) I give unto you: that you love one another: John 13. He that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the law; and: Love is the fulfilling of the law. According to this it was said: If they had walked in good paths, they had surely found the paths of justice easy. How then is it said: Because of the words of thy lips, I have kept hard ways (Psalm 16), except because both are true? They are hard to fear, easy to love.
VIII. Thus far it has been shown: 1. that the precept of charity is special, and imposes an express act of love; 2. that it obliges several times in life; 3. that it presses of itself within a five-year period. Other times must now be designated at which this commandment presses.
IX. Question V. Does the precept of charity oblige to frequent acts of the love of God? Answer. If the words in which God commands this love be regarded, the proposed question appears temerarious. Not frequency merely, but even a moral continuation of divine love does the divine commandment enjoin — so perspicuously that it cannot even be called into disputation. Let the words of Deuteronomy 6 be read. In John 15 Christ says: Abide in my love. These words betoken a constant perseverance in the divine love. More clearly St. Peter expresses this, first epistle, chapter 4: But before all things have a constant mutual charity among yourselves: for charity covereth a multitude of sins. And in truth Christians, by force of their own profession, are bound to live the Christian life. What is this Christian life, but the conjunction of the soul with God, just as the bodily life is in the union of the soul with the body?
X. Question VI. Is it enough to elicit acts of charity once in a year? Answer. When I read these and similar questions, unknown to all the Fathers, proposed by the Theologians of this latest age, I am filled with no light astonishment. For this question seems to me most like this one: Whether a living man is bound to produce acts of life once in a year? or: whether it be enough that he elicit acts of life once in a year? Would not the question be utterly ridiculous? But more ridiculous still would the question be, if the disputation were instituted about a dead man.
XI. The proposed question, then, is either about a just man, or about a sinner. If about a just man, it appears too vain. For the just man lives a divine life: therefore he morally continues the offices of charity. For there is no deliberately willed work in the just man which is not either meritorious or demeritorious, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, on the second book [of the Sentences], distinction 40, question 1, article 5: There can be no act proceeding deliberately from the will which is not good or evil — not only according to the Theologian, but also according to the moral Philosopher. And there can be no voluntary act proceeding from a deliberate will, in one having grace, which is not meritorious. But in one not having grace there can be some deliberate act which is neither meritorious nor demeritorious. And a little below: Yet an act perfect with civil goodness is not susceptible of the efficacy of merit, except in him who has grace; and therefore in him who lacks grace it is indifferent to merit and demerit; but in him who has grace it must be either meritorious or demeritorious: for as an evil act will be demeritorious, so also a good one will be meritorious. For since charity commands all the virtues, as the will commands all the powers, whatever is ordered to the end of any virtue must be ordered to the end of charity. And since every good act is ordered to the end of charity, it will remain ordered to the end of charity, and so will be meritorious. And thus to eat and to drink, the measure of temperance being kept, and to play for recreation, the measure of eutrapelia being kept — which holds the mean in games, as is said in the second [recte fourth] book of the Ethics — will be meritorious in him who has charity, through which he has established God as the last end of his life. This same he teaches in several other places. Question XI On evil, article 5 [recte question 2, article 5], ad 11: For an act to be meritorious in one having charity, it is not required that it be actually referred to God; but it suffices that it be actually referred to some fitting end, which is habitually referred to God. Just as if someone, wishing to make a pilgrimage for God's sake, should buy a horse, thinking actually nothing of God, but only of the journey which he had already ordered unto God — this too is meritorious. But it is evident that he who has charity has ordered himself and all his things unto God, to whom he cleaves as to his last end. Therefore whatever he shall have ordered either to himself or to anything of his, he does meritoriously, even if he think not actually of God — unless he be impeded by some inordination of the act, which is not referable to God. But this cannot be, unless it be a sin, at least venial. Therefore every act of one having charity is either meritorious, or is a sin. The same he has in question XIV, article 5 [recte On charity, article 11, ad 2]: It must be said that in one having charity there can be no act of virtue except formed by charity: for either that act will be ordered to the due end — and this cannot be, in one having charity, except through charity; or it is not ordered to the due end — and so it will not be an act of virtue.
XII. The act of charity is the efficacious love of the last end, namely of God: therefore it directs all things unto God — and above all the just man himself, and his will and free choice. For this is to love God with the whole heart, with the whole soul, and with the whole mind: namely, to offer the whole soul as a victim to God. If it gives the whole plant, then also the fruits — namely, all the acts and offices which proceed from that same will. The Theologians dispute how long that act of charity, by which the just man directs himself and all his things unto God, endures in the impression left in the will and in the other virtues. The Salmanticenses answer that it endures through the whole of life, unless it be retracted. Be it so. But it will quickly be retracted, unless it be fostered by a frequent repetition of acts. From this negligence in breaking forth often into these acts of love proceed the most frequent relapses of the Just into sins. Who would say that the love of friendship burns between two men present to one another, if they exchanged the offices of love once in a year?
XIII. Add to this that the love of charity in the just soul suffers perpetually the tumult of carnal appetites. Continually the demon sends in specters and paints illusions, kindles lust, that he may extinguish this heavenly love. We can, not undeservedly, compare the fire of divine love, which burns in the will of the just man in this state of corrupted nature, with the heat of fire which clings to heated water. Heated water quickly grows cold, on account of the continual conflict by which the coldness of the water fights against the heat inimical to it; and unless that heat received in the water be strengthened by continual flames, the water falls back into its native coldness. By the same reason, proportion being preserved, the heat of divine love burning in the will of the just man gradually grows lukewarm, and loses its strength in the continual fight against the most impure flames of concupiscence, and against the enticements and illusions of the world and of the demon, and grows utterly cold, unless it be restored with opportune nourishment, unless it be inflamed by the frequent heat of acts.
XIV. Hence it is ascertained and established that that question is vain — whether the Faithful ought to elicit an act of love once in a year, or on each Lord's day. For if the discourse be of the just, these, since they live a divine life, perform the offices of charity every day. And if they should elicit an act of love only once — I do not say in a year or in a month, but in a week — they will gradually become lukewarm, then cold, and at last sinners. What? Amid so many floods of tempests, against so many assaults of temptations, will they come off victors, unless the divine love be fervent and glowing? At the first sight of the enemy, at the first allurement of a seducing woman, they will fall, unless they be strong and robust in the heavenly friendship. If the discourse be of sinners, these cannot fulfill the divine precept unless they be reconciled to God, and, their faults blotted out, restore themselves to grace. And they sin by deferring their conversion long, from day to day. The question, therefore, is not of sinners, but of the just. Now if we say that the just ought to elicit acts of charity several times in a week or a month, do we impose any burden or rigor beyond what the just in fact perform in practice? For who of the just will neglect, even for a single day, to salute his most loving God, and to recite the Lord's prayer — which he cannot pronounce with a sincere heart without loving God his Father? But if they neglect this, they will easily relapse into sins, and those most grave. The Faithful, then, are to be exhorted and urged to pursue God continually with ardent love — not to be made the subject of disputes whether they ought to exercise this love once in a year, in a month, in a week. Those disputations proceed from the brain of men, not from the holy Scriptures, which command a continued and perennial love.
XV. Question VII. Are all bound, by the precept of charity, to direct their works unto God? Answer. The disputation is of virtual, not actual, direction. That the precept of charity commands this direction of all works unto God, the last end, is evident from the words of the precept itself: Thou shalt love thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul. If God demands the whole heart, the whole soul, by the same right he requires all its offspring, fruits, and works, as St. Thomas interprets, I-II, q. 100, art. 10: Under the precept of charity is contained that God be loved with the whole heart, to which it pertains that all things be referred unto God. This precept St. Paul expresses more luminously, 1 Corinthians 10: Therefore, whether you eat or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all to the glory of God. Again, in chapter 16 he adds: Let all your things be done in charity. To this doctrine all the Fathers subscribe, whose testimonies I have given in Tome I on the Decalogue, book 1, dissertation 4, chapter 12.
XVI. Into the extreme error fell Baius and Jansenius. Baius taught this proposition, which is the 25th: The works of Infidels are sins; and the virtues of the Philosophers are vices. Baius defended the view that all works must be referred unto God by force of theological charity, properly so called — which surely is not found in Infidels. Hence he inferred that all the works of Infidels are sins; which error all Catholics condemn. Not a few Theologians of the Catholics — above all Cardinal Noris, Francesco Macedo, Vincent Contenson, and many others — teach that without theological faith and charity properly so called there can be found morally good works; but not without an actual, special aid, or charity generally and commonly so called. They teach that some works of Infidels are good and honorable from their office and object; but that whenever, by force of the special divine aid, they are not referred unto God, a sin of omission occurs, which does not infect the operation, provided the one acting halt in the honesty of an operation good by its own nature, and do not twist it to a depraved end: for then all confess that the work is depraved. Take the matter in few words. All confess that the works of Infidels are for the most part sins, because in practice they commonly refer them to a depraved end. All likewise confess that Infidels sometimes work certain moral goods — either by force of a special aid, as many contend, or by the powers of nature with a general aid, as others more commonly maintain. The authors of the former opinion teach that the precept of referring all works unto God, either actually or virtually, obliges only under venial sin. The whole disagreement, then, comes down to this: whether Infidels sometimes commit a venial sin of omission, for the reason that they neglect to refer the work unto God.
XVII. Since these things stand thus, who can sufficiently marvel at certain Theologians who are carried away with so unbridled an assault against the former opinion, which the whole school of the Augustinians and other most grave Theologians defend? The opinion, on the one side, is of lighter moment; on the other, it enjoys its own great probability. Nevertheless certain Theologians, patrons of the more benign Ethics, are not afraid to brand the said opinion with the mark of heresy, and to bring its authors under suspicion of heresy.
Bk. III, Diss. II, Chapter V — Consequences, which urge the exercises and offices of the theological virtues
I. Hither Pastors and Confessors ought to direct their endeavors: that they imprint more deeply upon the souls of the Faithful the images of the theological virtues, and exercise them in their practice. And that they may perform this the more easily, I have resolved, at the end of the treatise on these three virtues, to touch briefly on a few things to this end — desiring to approach, if not wholly, at least in part, the method of the holy Fathers of the Church. For all the Fathers nowhere teach that the doctrine of morals is merely to be disputed about, but apply themselves above all to persuading its observance.
§ I. How the excellence and the exercise of faith are to be urged
II. Awake, then, O men of God, Pastors of souls, and Confessors, and, according to the zeal with which you burn, instruct your flock in the perpetual exercise of faith. The true and perfect faith of Christ is light in the mind, love in the heart. That the light of faith may shine in the mind, the oil by which that light is fostered and nourished must burn in the lamp of the heart. The sun is darkened by the vapors of the earth; and the light of faith grows dim when impure exhalations burst forth from a corrupted heart. The vices do not assail faith directly, but they prepare the way to impiety. Teach the Faithful, therefore, to purge their hearts and souls from vices, if they desire their minds to be illumined with the splendor of a living faith. If by the apparatus of words, by the force of eloquence, by the efficacy of disputations, they cannot subdue the minds of Heretics into the obedience of the faith, let them study to soften their obstinacy by innocence of life and by sanctity of virtues and of works, and to conquer their haughtiness by their own humility.
III. But this must be inculcated in them more deeply: that they keep before their eyes the Son of God made man, and subjected to the reproaches, the mockeries, and the maledictions of men; that, standing, walking, laboring, they frequently meditate the Cross, and the Son of God hanging upon it — who willed to die for this end, that he might redeem our souls from the servitude of the demon, and lead them through to eternal felicity. This Cross is the torch, this the lantern, which they must hold in the hand of the mind, that in this valley of darkness they may be able to direct their journey to the heavenly Jerusalem.
IV. Let them study to represent vividly the incredible excellence of faith, and the infinite mercy of God, which has imparted so great a benefit to us; and let them address them in this or a similar fashion. Shake off your slumber for a little while, O Christians, and consider that your faith is a most precious ring, with which the espousals of your souls with God are to be sealed. Your faith reserves for you the more secret mysteries of God, communicated now under a cloud, but in their own time — the cloud driven away and the darkness dispersed — to be seen in themselves; which is the last argument of intimate friendship. This faith, purchased by the death of Christ, grown up by the blood of the Martyrs, confirmed by the testimonies of miracles, defended by the wisdom of the Doctors, God imparts to you, moved by his clemency alone. Run through in your mind so many regions of the world, so many kingdoms, provinces, empires, and nations covered over with the gloom of the darkness of Infidelity and of Heresy. Consider that out of so many thousands of thousands you have been chosen into a holy nation, into a royal priesthood, into the sons and spouses of the deifying Trinity. But remember at the same time that those kingdoms, empires, and nations which now pay the tremendous penalties of Infidelity and Heresy were once, no otherwise than you now, bathed in the light of faith. Look about you on every side at the formidable wreckage of faith and religion taken away. They who once were your brethren, sons of God, and heirs of Paradise — their successors have now become your enemies, slaves of the divine vengeance, heralds of the demons, betrayers of Religion. Temples have been leveled to the ground, altars torn down, sacrifices abolished; and crimes, schisms, heresies, impiety unfurl their banner where once the faith of Christ shone the holier and held dominion. What is it, that before thousands of thousands God has sealed your souls with the ring of his faith? that, saved from the universal shipwreck, he has placed them in the ark of his religion? that he has embraced them with so great a predilection? This vicissitude and revolution of Religion — by which God exercises the fury of his wrath upon the very vessels of mercy, and his goodness upon the victims of vengeance — while the Apostle Paul was considering it, terrified and trembling he exclaimed: O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are his judgments, and how unsearchable his ways! Fix your mind, then, upon so great a mystery, that thence you may gather the immense riches of the divine mercy poured out upon you.
…and 9 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.
Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V
Tr. I, Disputation VIII: On Charity, Question XLIV: Whether God ought, and can, be loved in this life with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind, and all one's strength · Tr. I, Disputation VIII: On Charity, Question XLV: Whether some measure is to be kept in divine love
Tr. I, Disputation VIII: On Charity, Question XLIV: Whether God ought, and can, be loved in this life with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind, and all one's strength
ALL the HERETICS of our time clamor that the divine law is impossible to man, even to the just. From this they further deduce that all works are mortal sins. Thus Luther, Lib. de libertate Christiana, and in assert. art. 2. 31. 32. 36. Calvin Lib. 3. Instit. cap. 14. §. 9. et in Antidoto, sess. 6. cap. 11. et Lib. 2. Instit. cap. 7. §. 5. he urges this especially concerning this precept of loving God with the whole heart, etc. Kemnitius follows in Examine, Philippus de Locis et confessione Augustana.
THE CATHOLIC Faith teaches that the Divine precepts, and especially this one of the love of God with the whole heart, are not impossible to observe.
SINCE, however, I showed at length elsewhere that the Law of God is possible prima secunda, Tract. de Legibus, disp. 1. quaest. 9. and that Liberty is defended with respect to it in Tract. de anima disput. 9. quaest. 3. I shall now treat of this precept; and because in this consists the observance of the Law, it will stand proved concerning all.
THEREFORE IT IS PROVED first by St. Bonavent., because: This is the greatest, and first commandment, Matth. 22. given to us by God on the way, and he commands the very manner: With the whole heart, with the whole soul, etc. Therefore it can be observed. For God would cruelly command under penalty of damnation that which is impossible. Wherefore the Holy Fathers condemn with anathema that proposition, that God commanded impossibilities, as St. Bonavent. notes in fundamentis, and the Council of Trent sess. 6. cap. 11. And this is the argument of St. John Chrysost. Hom. 8. de Poenit. where he says: By no means accuse the Lord; he does not command impossibilities, and of St. Augustine Lib. de natura et gratia; cap. 69. where he says: By the very fact that it is most firmly believed that God, who is just and good, could not have commanded impossibilities; hence we are admonished what to do in easy things, and what to ask for in difficult ones. For all things become easy to Charity, to which alone Christ's burden is light. The same is found in Lib. de peccatorum meritis, cap. 3. et 6. et Lib. de gratia, et Lib. arbitrio, cap. 16. as in Bellarmine Lib. 5. de Iustificatione, cap. 10. et Lib. de monachis, cap. 13. Indeed a tyrant would be worse and more cruel than all, if he commanded, under penalty of eternal damnation, even to his own friends, things that are impossible. Hence St. Augustine: he would not damn a lazy servant, if he commanded things that could in no way be done.
BUT IT IS PROVED secondly, that this precept of the love of God and of neighbor is possible, Psalm. 118. I have run the way of thy commandments, when thou didst enlarge my heart. Philip. 4. I can do all things in him who comforteth me. Indeed we acknowledge that the precepts of God are observable not by the bare powers of free will, but by the grace of God, as I showed Tract. de gratia, disp. 1. quaest. 11. 12. 13. et 14.
THE Scriptures show this, witnesses, that the commandments are in fact observed by those who love, whom God calls friends. Ioan. 14. He that loveth me, will keep my word, as the Holy Doctor observes there. Rom. 13. He that loveth his neighbor, hath fulfilled the Law. Galat. 5. The whole Law is fulfilled in one word: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. But this is said, because the neighbor is loved in order to God; whence the precept of the love of God is also fulfilled, as I said quaest. 29. with the Seraphic Doctor; et prima secundae, Tract. de gratia, disp. 1. quaest. 12. Ioan. 13. By this shall all men know that you are my disciples, if you have love one for another. Nor could we become friends of God, if we could not love. For above John says 15. You are my friends, if you do the things that I command you. But what he commands, he explains there: This is my commandment, that you love one another. In Deuteronomy 30. you have a splendid testimony: The Lord thy God will circumcise thy heart, and the heart of thy seed: that thou mayest love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul.
DAVID also says Psalm. 118. With my whole heart have I sought thee, and 3 Kings 14. Thou wast not as my servant David, who kept my commandments, and followed me with all his heart, doing that which was pleasing in my sight, and Act. XIII. I have found a man according to my own heart, who shall do all my wills.
Of Josias, 4 Kings XXIII. There was no king like him before him, who returned to the Lord with all his heart, and with all his soul, and with all his strength.
Of Asa, and the people, 2 Paral. XV. it is said: With their whole will they sought the Lord, and found him.
Of Josue it is said, cap. XI. As the Lord had commanded Moses his servant, so did Moses command Josue, and he fulfilled all things: he passed not by any of the commandments, nor even one word, that the Lord had commanded Moses. Nor is there doubt that the same may be said of Abraham, Moses, Samuel, and others.
In the new Testament, Luke I. it is said of Zachary, and Elizabeth: They were both just before God, walking in all the commandments and justifications of the Lord without blame.
Of the Apostles Ioan. XVII. Thine they were, and thou gavest them to me: and they have kept thy word, and they are called friends in Luke XII.: But I say to you, my friends. Ioan. XV. You are my friends; and yet he had said there that only those are friends who keep the commandments.
But these the sectaries do not solve, answering that these things were said by non-imputation: yet the Scriptures plainly say that they observed the commandments of the Lord.
Therefore the Holy Doctor, upon those words 13. Ioan. By this shall all men know that you are my disciples, if you have love one for another, observes, that the execution of Charity is the testimony of the discipleship of Christ, as St. Gregory says Lib. XX. moral. cap. IX. Of Charity, I say, not imputed, but of which 1 John, cap. III. Let us not love in tongue, but in deed, and in truth. Let us love one another, as he hath given commandment unto us, and Rom. XI. Loving one another with the charity of brotherhood. And upon 15. Ioan., upon those words. These things I command you, that you love one another. Greater Charity than this no one hath, than that he lay down his soul for his friends. But he says that we do these things by that Charity which is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us, namely by an internal gift cooperating, not by an extrinsic imputation. Upon this testimony also the Council of Trent sess. VI. c. VII. gravely infers with St. Bonavent. that Justification is not made by imputation alone. And upon those words of Luke 1: They were both just before God, he observes, that they were such, and were asserted inwardly in the eyes of God. For the just are such within. Therefore Wisd. V. The just shall live for ever, and their thought is with the Most High: and therefore of this, Genes. VI. Noe was a just and perfect man in his generations, he walked with God. 1 Kings XVI. For the Lord looketh on the heart. So also Ezech. 4 Kings XX. he says: Remember how I have walked before thee in truth, and with a perfect heart.
Therefore also David was a man according to the heart of God, as is said in the places alleged. But God looketh on the heart, 1 Kings XVI. as above; which reason the Seraphic Doctor observes at the place cited. For whoever truly does not observe one commandment, even if he keeps the others, is become guilty of all, as James says, chapter II.
David himself, Psalm. CXVIII. I was directed to all thy commandments; I have run the way of thy commandments, as the Holy Doctor observes upon that place of the Psalm. He also says Psalm. LVIII. without iniquity have I run, and directed my steps. And the Apostle Philip. II. I have not run in vain. Then indeed, when thou didst enlarge my heart, namely softened beforehand by thy grace.
For truly the heart is softened, as is said 2 Paral. XXXIV. Because thou hast heard the words of the volume, and thy heart is softened, and thou art humbled before God. Heb. XIII. It is best that the heart be established by grace. These things indeed intimate the internal motions. All of which, and the other things said above, the Holy Doctor observes, as if he had foreseen the insanities of the Sectaries.
It is proved thirdly by St. Bonavent.: To love God with the whole heart, is to love him sweetly, wisely, and strongly, from St. Bernard, serm. XX. in Cant. and from St. Augustine. It is to love without error, without contradiction, and without forgetfulness. Lib. I. de doctrina Christiana, cap. XXII. but all this can be in the state of the way: Therefore it is also commanded. See other things in Bellarmine: To this also recur what I said tom. IV. de actibus hum. disp. XVII. quaest. X. ad proposit. I.
The heretics object first. This precept cannot be fulfilled perfectly in this life, from St. Augustine Lib. contra Caelestinum, after XVI. resp. where he says: When there is any concupiscence within, God is not loved with the whole soul in every way. And Lib. de spiritu et litt. last chapter he says: To that life now immortal belongs: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, etc. But to this; Let not sin reign in your mortal body, etc. To that, Thou shalt not covet: To this, Go not after thy concupiscences. Similar things St. Bernard says in sermon L. in Cant. and St. Thom. II. II. quaest. XLIV. art. VI. et quaest. CLXXXIV. art. III.
One must first see what is meant by those various expositions of the precept. First indeed Deuter. VI. it is had thus: Thou shalt love with all thy heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy strength. Matth. XXII. it is said: With all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy mind. Marc. cap. XII. With all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy mind, with all thy virtue. Lucae X. with all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy strength, and with all thy mind.
Some of the Fathers judge these to be different, and therefore have tried to show their distinction, namely that Soul signifies the vegetative part, Heart the sensitive, Mind the intellectual, as Bellarmine reports cap. XI. or by Heart, the natural powers, that is the vegetative; by Soul, the animal ones, that is the senses; by Mind, the rational powers. So Theophylactus, and almost Gregory of Nyss. in Tostatus.
It is better expounded to the mind of the Fathers by St. Bonavent. dist. XXVII. dub. III. thus: That although Charity immediately regards the act of the Concupiscible, around which it first consists; nevertheless it regards the acts of those powers as disposing (as Tostatus also says:) Hence all the powers of the soul are in a manner ordered to that dilection itself, as to that which has the character of what is complete with respect to all the powers; and because the higher powers of the soul are three, therefore three conditions are added. Further, because the ternary of the powers of the soul can be distinguished in a twofold way, such that one of those modes does not disagree with the other: These conditions, regarding the powers of the soul in the act of loving, are distinguished in a twofold manner. For in one way the powers of the soul are distinguished according as the image consists in them, and they are said to be three potencies in the mind, namely; Memory, Intelligence, and Will: And so according to those three powers, three conditions are added, of which one regards the intelligence, namely with the whole heart, as the Gloss says; another the will, namely with the whole soul, the third the memory, namely with the whole mind, and so these three conditions are assigned by Matthew, and are expounded by St. Augustine Lib. I. de doctrina Christ. cap. XXII. With the whole heart, that is with the whole intellect without error. With the whole soul, that is with the whole will without contradiction. With the whole mind, that is with the whole memory without forgetfulness. In another way the powers of the soul are distinguished into Rational, Concupiscible, and Irascible; and according to this three conditions are added, of which one regards the Rational, namely with the whole heart. Another the Concupiscible, namely with the whole soul. The third the Irascible, namely with the whole strength, and so they are assigned in Deuteronomy, and are expounded by Bernard, serm. 20. in Cant. With the whole heart, that is, wisely. With the whole soul, that is sweetly; With the whole strength, that is strongly, so that we be not seduced by fallacies, not led away by blandishments, not broken by injuries, and to these three can be reduced those three that are touched upon: Out of a pure heart, and a good conscience, and faith unfeigned. Nor is there any repugnance in these, because the Irascible and the Memory are strengthened in the act: and therefore one virtue is reformative of both, and one dower perfective of both, and it regards one principally, and the other consequently: Therefore, where it is said in Deuteronomy with all thy strength, in Matthew it is said: with all thy mind. And this is the reason why this condition with all thy mind, is placed last. See Gregory of Nyss. Lib. de creatione hominis, cap. 8. Theophylactus, and Anselm in commentariis, cap. 22. Matth. St. Augustine, St. Bernard loco cit. and Tostatus in 22. Matth. quaest. 171. where he explains thus, that with the whole heart, etc. signifies the internal powers; with the whole strength, the executive ones, which is the exposition of St. Bonavent. ad 10. Lucae. For to a perfect manner of loving God is required that we refer to him all thoughts, all affections, all operations. Therefore Deuter. 6. it is said: with all thy heart, thoughts; with all thy soul, affections: with all thy strength, he understands operations, and executive powers: And because intellections are both cogitative of the heart and memorial of the mind; Therefore Luke, and Matthew add with all thy mind, in which he unfolded the Law, and because, whoever refers what is within, namely the act of memory, intelligence, and will to God, consequently refers works; therefore in these three is closed the reference of all powers in Luke. See the Holy Doctor, referring almost all the expositions.
HE INTIMATES, however, that the clause with all thy powers is inclusive of all, and that all signify the same thing, so that we love God according to our powers, as Bellarmine also notes; but that many things are expressed as expressions of greater grace. So also think Hilary, Jerome, Chrysost. ad 22. Matth. Ambrose ad cap. 10. Lucae. That this sense is more conformable to Scripture, Bellarmine says here, and Maldonatus ad 22. Matth. where he says that St. Augustine wishes this Lib. 1. cap. 22. Tom. 3. de doctrina Christ. saying: But when he says, With the whole heart, whole soul, whole mind, he leaves no part of our life that ought to be empty, and as it were to give place, so that we might wish to enjoy it with another thing; but whatever comes into the mind to be loved, is carried thither, whither the impulse of the whole dilection runs. From which he infers the impiety of Calvin, who says that God thus commands impossibilities; since he commands only that we love him according to our powers, helped by grace, never failing.
BUT AS TO that clause repeated (with all) Bonaventure reports two expositions. The first is, that the totality of affections and powers is commanded; so that this precept of Charity, which is the end of the Law, and the complement of perfection, is gravely imposed as to the means, and the end is indicated, which is perfection; yet so, that if we do not attain the perfection of the end in this life, we do not sin; just as, if a King should command the army: Take the city; the soldiers would not be punished if they did not attain the end, but if they did not fight. But if they fought faithfully, it would suffice to fulfill the precept. Therefore SS. Augustine, Bernard, and Thomas say, that the means are here commanded, and the end indicated, which cannot be perfectly obtained in this life, and accordingly that this precept is fulfilled most perfectly only in the other life; yet so, that place is given to the counsels, which add other means besides the precepts. Tannerus praises this exposition disp. 2. quaest. 4. dub. 4. num. 76. where he concludes, that this precept is fulfilled in order to the end, even if the end cannot be attained here.
THE SECOND exposition, which is more consonant with Scripture, as Bellarmine also notes, and which St. Bonaventure receives, is; that by this precept: with the whole heart, there is not commanded every act of the heart, or every possible intensity, so that we do nothing with the heart but love God; but only, that we love God with such love, that in our soul we prefer nothing to him, or make anything equal to him, and accordingly that by this precept the end is not contained, but only the means, moderated in this sense as to appreciation; whence you have, that this precept is observed: provided the last end is placed in God, not in another thing, by turning away from God lethally.
THAT this manner of Charity, indeed, is intended, and nothing more; and that it is more consonant with the Scriptures, is proved; because this precept is asserted from the Scriptures to be easy, Deuter. 10. And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and love him, and serve him with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and cap. 13. The Lord your God tempteth you, that it may be made manifest whether you love him or not with all your heart, and with all your soul, and Lucae 10. to the lawyer asking, What doing shall I possess eternal life? The Lord answered: What is written in the Law, how readest thou? he said: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, etc. And the Lord: This do, and thou shalt live. Christ gives the rule: If you keep my commandments, you shall abide in my love, as Bassaeus notes num. 8.
THEN the Lord promised that he would bring it about, that in this life we should fulfill this precept Deuter. 30. alleged, and Hierem. 24. I will give them a heart, that they may know me, because I am the Lord: and they shall be to me a people, and I will be to them a God: because they shall return to me with their whole heart.
THAT MANY also observed this precept, the many Scriptures above testify.
FINALLY the Fathers testify with the fullest consent that nothing impossible is commanded us. See Origen homil. 9. in Iosue. Basil on that: Attend to thyself. Hilary in Psalm. 118. upon those words: Thy commandment is exceedingly broad. Jerome Lib. 3. cont. Pelagianos, in St. Bonaventure here. Augustine Lib. de natura, et gratia, cap. 69. and in Psalm. 56. Bernard serm. 50. in Cant. where he inclines rather to this latter opinion, which is that of St. Bonavent., as Bellarmine notes. This they commonly follow in Aragonium q. 26. art. 2. Tannerus disp. 2. quaest. 3. dub. 3.
From this exposition Bellarmine gathers with St. Bonavent. ad argumenta, that venial sins do not contravene this precept, because they do not turn away from the last end.
THEN, that inordinate involuntary movements of concupiscence are not contrary to the same precept, even in grave matters; because, since Charity stands in the will, the movements of the appetite that are not voluntary are not opposed to it. From which also tumble down the tumultuary opinions of the sectaries in Bellarmine Lib. 5. de amissione gratiae, cap. 10. where they clamor that concupiscence is indomitable, and all its acts mortal, even if involuntary; which they strive to prove from the confession of the Apostle to Rom. 6. 7. et 8. but I repelled the infamy of these in prima secunda, Tract. 4. De peccat. disp. 1.
INDEED, by Poll, it is indomitable in the sectaries, who with loosened reins break out into every crime, desperate more than impetuous.1 It is indomitable in Luther, who violated the nun Catharina of Berna, ravished from the monastery, and led her into a pseudo-marriage. It is indomitable in Calvin, who, sunk in unspeakable and most filthy abominations, deserving to be burned with the fire of Pentapolis, was consumed with the putrefaction of worms, just as Luther, in the bosom of the woman of Bern, breathed forth his soul into hell. It is indomitable in Theodore Beza, that Antichrist of the Gauls, who, inflamed toward tender boys, was first nurtured in robes of saffron, and at last embraced filth; who so stirred, excited, kindled the Huguenot seditions in that most noble kingdom, that that warlike nation drowned the glories of its triumphs, once borne back distinguished over barbarians, in the slaughter and blood of its own citizens. 1 Editor's note: the print/OCR reads 'desperati magis quam quam concitati' — 'quam' duplicated; rendered with a single 'quam'.
Tr. I, Disputation VIII: On Charity, Question XLV: Whether some measure is to be kept in divine love
D. Bonaventure teaches that an act of virtue can have a measure in three ways. First, by limitation in itself; and in this sense every act of created virtue has a measure; for every created virtue is finite and limited. Second, an act is said to have a measure by the aggregation of circumstances; and in this sense all the moral virtues and meritorious acts have a measure; for no act is praiseworthy unless endowed with the requisite circumstances. Third, in this sense measure indicates a mean between extremes, which are the Exceeding and the Falling-short; and by this reckoning the Cardinal Virtues have a measure, or a mean, between excess and deficiency.
¶ Since, then, CHARITY is a created and gratuitous virtue, it has the measure of finiteness due to creatures, and the measure imposed by circumstances, so that we love God above all things, and for himself, and according to our strength: but Charity does not have that measure which consists in standing in the middle between vicious extremes, because, being a Theological virtue with an infinite object, it never tends too much toward God, who is infinite, true, good, etc.
I assert, therefore, that Charity has no measure from its tending toward the object.
It is proved by D. Bonaventure, first, from D. Bernard On loving God, at the beginning, where he says: The cause of loving God is God; the measure is to love without measure.
Second, because the reason for loving is infinite goodness, and the last end, which has no measure; for an end, especially the ultimate end, is not measured by other things as an end, but it is itself the measure of the means, which are measured in order to the end. D. Thomas also uses this argument, at the place cited. Valencia, disp. 3, question 5, point 2.
Third: The motion of Charity appraises according to the dignity of the object; but the object of Charity, which is God, is of infinite goodness, and appraisable without measure: Therefore.
Fourth: Whatever has a measure is vitiated by excess; but no one is blameworthy, however intensely he loves God: Therefore.
I assert, second, that Charity has a measure according to the other measures brought forward above.
…and 42 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.
Coppens, Moral Philosophy
Chapter II: Our Duties to God
Article III. The Love of God.
140. Love is an act of the will by which we tend to good. We render to God the due homage of our will by loving Him above all things, just as by valuing His word above all other testimony we offer Him the homage of our understanding. Our love is well ordered when it tends towards an object according to the measure of true good which the intellect perceives in that object. Now, God is the highest good, not merely relatively, but absolutely the highest good, for He is the Infinite Good. Therefore, if we love God according to the measure of His goodness, we must love Him as the Supreme Good, and for His own sake, because He deserves infinite love. This perfect love for God is the love of benevolence or friendship; a friend being one to whom we wish well, not for our own satisfaction only, but for his sake.
141. Yet we also understand that God is the source of immeasurable good for us. This happens in many ways, but chiefly because our ultimate happiness consists in possessing Him for eternity. To love God for our own sakes is a love of desire or hope. It is well ordered, however, since it fulfills the requirements stated above. Our intellect, indeed, perceives that God is not only the highest good in Himself, but also the good most conducive to our own happiness. Still, this love is imperfect; for, in tending towards God, it does not regard the highest good, namely, God's supreme excellence. Moreover, to be acceptable to God, our love for Him, whether perfect or imperfect, must always be a love of preference, that is, a love which prefers God to all things else. We need not, however, constantly perform acts of love for God, this duty being founded upon the positive precepts, which oblige us to act only at certain times.
Daniel, Apology for the Jesuits
Daniel, Apology for the Jesuits, Sentiments of the Fathers of the Society of Jesus on the Precept of the Love of God
The occasion of the reproach made against the Jesuits, that they release men from the obligation of loving God, and the foundation of all the invectives that have been made and are still made every day on this subject against their Society, was a book entitled The Defense of Virtue. The author of this book was a Jesuit named Antoine Sirmond, who is not the famous Sirmond, so well known and so esteemed by learned men, without excepting even those of the heretical party. This one was a very obscure man; but everything is dug up when it is a question of causing trouble for the Jesuits.
The design of the Author in this treatise on the defense of virtue is to examine whether it is permitted to act through fear, or through hope, or through some motive other than that of the pure love of God. And there he combats the error condemned by the Popes and renewed by the Innovators, who maintain that every action that does not have the motive of charity for its principle is a sin.
In order to disentangle this matter, and to make more clearly seen the difference between the sentiment of this Author and that of his Society, from which he departed, it is necessary to make in a few words some observations on this subject, observations that were already made some years ago in another Work. [In the Reply to the Provincial Letters.]
First, there has never been a Theologian who absolutely denied that we had a precept of loving God, the observance of which was necessary for salvation. But after making, in order better to clarify matters, the distinction of various kinds of precepts in this matter, the Doctors find themselves divided on some points.
They say that this precept is at the same time a general precept and a particular precept. It may be regarded as a general precept, because it is impossible to fulfill its entire extent without observing all the other commandments, not one of which can be violated without destroying charity. It is regarded as a particular or special precept because it commands the acts of one certain virtue in particular, that is to say, acts of love, which in their species are altogether different from the acts of the other virtues by which the other precepts are observed.
Thirdly, the precept of charity is negative and affirmative. A precept is called negative when it is considered with respect to the things which it forbids one to do. It is called affirmative when it is considered with respect to the things which it commands one to accomplish. Thus the precept of the love of God is negative insofar as it forbids hating the sovereign good; which is understood not only of formal hatred, which is scarcely anything but the sin of the devil, but also of every other sin, because every sin contains an estrangement from God. This precept is affirmative insofar as it commands us on certain occasions to make acts of the love of God: for example, at the hour of death, and, according to the Thomists, at the time when, upon leaving childhood, we begin to know ourselves and to make use of our reason, which represents God to us as our last end.
Moreover, the Theologians teach that a precept can oblige either of itself or accidentally; these are the terms they use, per se, per accidens. It obliges of itself when, independently of every other precept, it commands me to make an act of the particular virtue to which it relates. Thus the precept of charity will oblige me of itself if, independently of every other precept, it obliges me to make acts of the love of God. A precept obliges me accidentally when I have to discharge some duty or to repel some temptation, and when the one or the other cannot be done without an act commanded by that precept. Thus, finding myself in some circumstance obliged by the precept of penance to make an act of perfect contrition, the precept of charity obliges me on that occasion accidentally, because, the act of contrition being nothing but a detestation of sin from the motive of the love of God, I cannot fulfill the precept of penance without making an act of the love of God.
Finally, all the Theologians agree that there is a precept of loving God; that this precept is negative, because it contains the prohibition against doing anything against God, and that it is also affirmative, because it obliges us to certain duties. Moreover, they agree that this precept is general and extends to the observance of all the other commandments; that there is also a special one which obliges at least accidentally, as in the case of the necessity of contrition and in some others. All the Theologians agree on all these points, and Father Antoine Sirmond agrees with them throughout the Treatise in question. Nor was it on this that he was accused; but, in accusing him of something else, it was concealed that he had even taught this, which alone would suffice greatly to diminish the horror that people endeavor to spread over his entire doctrine. The sole question that can therefore be asked here with respect to the doctrine of this Theologian in particular is to know whether, supposing all these other obligations upon which everyone agrees, this precept, insofar as it is special and affirmative, obliges us, in addition, not only accidentally but of itself, to make formal acts of love, by which one says to God: My God, I love you with all my heart.
The sentiment of this Doctor is that there is a precept of effective love which obliges one to observe all the other commandments under pain of damnation, whether through the motive of the virtue of hope, through the motive of the virtue of religion, or through that of some other virtue; but that there is no precept of affective love which obliges us of itself to make interior, formal, and proper acts of the virtue of charity. It is on this that a Writer lashes out in these terms against the Jesuits: They have gone so far as this impiety, of maintaining that the interior act of the love of God was only counseled, not commanded; and it was proclaimed everywhere that they wished to abolish the first and the principal of God’s Commandments.
To answer this horrible accusation, the Jesuits did not undertake the defense of the doctrine of Father Antoine Sirmond; but they endeavored only to excuse him, saying that if he had failed on this occasion, it was only after great Theologians. In fact, I find in the Book of a Doctor of Louvain named Dubois, Royal Professor of Holy Scripture, who wrote on the propositions of Moral Theology censured by Pope Alexander VII in 1665 and 1666 - I find that this Doctor, who is in no way of this opinion, having caused a search to be made for the Authors who had held it, places among them Bannez, a famous Theologian of the Order of Saint Dominic; Cardinal Cajetan, of the same Order; Marchantius; Jean Sanchez (who must not be confused with the Jesuit of the same surname); Jansenius, Bishop of Ghent; and Molanus, another celebrated Doctor of Louvain. I also find in another Author who gives himself the name Florimond du Plessis, Saint Antonin, Sylvester, Almaïn, an ancient Doctor of Paris, the learned Tostat, Gerson, and several others cited in favor of this doctrine. But this is not what the Jesuits of today principally wish people to consider. They will be content merely to point out that, if this doctrine is not attributed to the Order of Saint Dominic, nor to the University of Louvain, nor to the Faculty of Paris, although it was taught by one or more Doctors of these celebrated Societies, there is scarcely any justice in wishing it to be regarded as the doctrine of the Body of Jesuits because it is found in the Book of one of their Writers.
Whether, then, this doctrine was taught by others or was not; whether it was suffered with impunity in non-Jesuit Doctors and censured only in the Book of a Jesuit - this is not the matter at issue. What the Jesuits claim here solely is to make known, as they declare aloud, that they reprove this doctrine and that it was never that of their Society.
But in order to show that it is not, so to speak, after the fact that they make this declaration, as though the clamor raised against them on this occasion had caused them to change their sentiment on this subject and to return, despite themselves, to sound doctrine, it will now be shown, by the citation of a great number of their most celebrated Doctors, that the doctrine of their Society has at all times been such as they declare it to be today concerning the indispensable obligation of the precept of the love of God. Here are the extracts from these Theologians.
Cardinal Bellarmine. [Tom. 4, l. 6, De grat. & lib. arbitr., cap. 7.] Holy Scripture does not say only that charity is a gift of God, but in addition it commands us to love God. Now it does not command us merely to preserve the infused habit of charity, but it obliges us to love God with all our heart; for laws have for their object the acts of virtues and not the habits.
Cardinal de Lugo. [Disput. 7, sect. 12, num. 250.] The precept of loving God is absolutely of natural law. Even if there were no positive command of God, this precept would oblige us to it.
Suarez. [Tract. ult. De Charitat., disp. 5, De praecepto Charitatis.] First, I say that this precept is for all men. This is evident from the sixth Chapter of Deuteronomy: You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart; and from the tenth of Saint Matthew: This Commandment is the first and the greatest of all. The reason for my conclusion is that this love is a means necessary for salvation; now such means are always of an obligation of precept.
Suarez, continued. [Sect. 3.] I say, secondly, that this precept sometimes obliges of itself. For the rest, it is difficult positively to determine the time when it obliges. On this one must say what is said of the precept of restitution: that one is obliged not to delay very long.
And elsewhere. [T. 2, De Relig., lib. 1, De Orat., cap. 30.] One may give this general rule for all these affirmative precepts: that the acts they command must not be long delayed, and that these acts must be reiterated from time to time.
Molina. [Tract. 5, De Justit. & Jure, disp. 59, p. 3165.] I am persuaded that we are obliged, under pain of mortal sin, by virtue of the precept of the love that we owe to God, to undertake the defense of his interests; to oppose what might wound his honor and his glory; to do what we believe can be useful for this; and that we must do it at the peril of our life. This does not prevent there being (he says again two pages later) a particular precept of the love of God, as of a thing which is owed to him, and this love being commanded to us as a means necessary to obtain the possession of God and eternal life.
Laymann. [Libro 2, tract. 3, cap. 2.] The precept of loving God above all things, insofar as it is affirmative, obliges only at certain times. The first time is when man has attained the use of reason, God, through the lights of Faith, being sufficiently represented to him as his last end. According to Suarez (he adds), man is obliged often during the course of his life to produce acts of charity toward God.
Becan. [De Sacr., cap. 35, q., num. 4.] There is a double precept of loving God. The first is a general precept, which is comprised in the whole Decalogue and obliges us to keep the Law of God. The second is particular and positive, which obliges us to produce the act of charity, whether that act is a movement of love toward God or of detestation of sin insofar as it offends God.
Thomas Sanchez. [In Decal., l. 2, c. 3.] It is certain that there is a commandment to love God. The reason is that the act of the love of God is necessary for Salvation. He who does not love, says Saint John, remains in death. Now everything that is necessary for Salvation is commanded.
Tannerus. [In 2. 2, d. 2, De Spe & Charit., q. 4, d. 4, n. 48.] The precept of the love of God obliges at the point of death, and when, after having attained the age of reason, one is capable of penetrating the truths that engage us to love God above all things and to refer everything to him. This is the common sentiment of the Doctors.... Moreover, the precept of loving God above all things imposes on us the obligation to produce from time to time acts of love toward him, although one cannot precisely determine in particular the times of this obligation.
Arriaga. [Disp. 36, De charit., sect. 3, n. 10.] In view of the motives for this love that I have marked above, when I proved the obligation that this precept imposes on us, it is saying little to maintain that one is obliged at least once a year to renew its act.
Filliucius. [Tr. 2, c. 9, n. 287.] It appears to me that the fulfillment of the obligation which this precept imposes on us cannot be better determined as to time than it is in the third opinion, where there is marked for this the beginning of the use of reason.... the point of death.... and, in the third place, the time of life that passes between these two extremes, during which there is an obligation to make from time to time acts of the love of God.
Hurtado de Mendoza, after marking the beginning of the use of reason for the first fulfillment of this precept, adds: [d. 174, sect. 5.] I say, secondly, that one is obliged to make acts of it in the course of life, and every year; and it is asking scarcely anything to limit this obligation there.
Gregory of Valencia, after proving the possibility and the necessity there is for salvation of fulfilling this precept, and determining with the other Theologians the obligation to make the act of the love of God above all things at the beginning of the use of reason and at the point of death, notes still several other cases in which one is obliged to it, as when one receives some singular benefit from God, etc. [In 2.20, disp. 3, q. 19.]
Finally, I do not believe that, among the very great number of Jesuit Theologians who have printed courses of Theology, a single one can be shown who ever denied the necessity of the act of the love of God for salvation. An infinity of them applied themselves to proving it when they had occasion to do so. The Theologian of Louvain whom I have already cited, Dubois, took the trouble to gather as many as thirty and to transcribe their passages. Only the most famous of the Society have been reported here, in order not to weary the Reader with a multitude of extracts which all say nearly the same thing. After which the Jesuits will find themselves sufficiently exculpated before the public tribunal from the calumny that people do not cease to impose upon them even every day, by publishing everywhere that they exempt the faithful from the obligation of loving God.
It is surprising that their calumniators are so readily listened to on this subject. For, although in order to justify them not everyone can have recourse to the Books of their Theologians, which are not within the reach of an infinity of persons, who is there in the world, provided he has some affection for Books of devotion, who has not read or been able to read the Books of Rodriguez, of Saint-Jure, of Hayneuve, of Suffren, of Dupont, and a quantity of others which are in the hands of all persons of piety? One has only to open the Books of these Jesuits to see on every page that they recommend nothing so much as the exercise of divine love. And whoever wished to take the trouble to consult the Bibliography of their Writers would see, from the titles alone, that no Society has ever labored more to inspire this excellent virtue in Christians.
What is most bizarre here is that, at the same time as people continued in these latter years to decry the Jesuits on this article, they accused them of being too zealous partisans of pure and disinterested love, and it did not depend upon a thousand people that they should not be made to pass for Quietists. And what is still more admirable is that this same Father Sirmond, who was the occasion of so much clamor only by denying the indispensable necessity of affective love, understood nothing else by this affective love than pure and disinterested charity, of which since then not only the necessity but even the possibility has been called into doubt.
The Jesuits, in order perfectly to exculpate themselves on the subject in question, add that they condemn with all their heart certain particular propositions that relate to it and that are among those which Popes Alexander VII, Innocent XI, and Alexander VIII condemned. They are the following five Propositions.
1. There is no obligation, by virtue of the divine precepts which concern Faith, Hope, and Charity, to produce any act of these virtues at any time of life whatsoever.
2. We should not dare to condemn of mortal sin one who in his whole life should make only one act of the love of God.
3. It is probable that the precept of Charity does not of itself oblige, in rigor, to make an act of it every five years.
4. This precept obliges only when we are bound to be reconciled with God and have no other means of returning to his grace.
5. Man is not obliged to love God either at the beginning or in the course of his moral life.
The Jesuits therefore say anathema to these five propositions. They declare that this is not, and that this has never been, the doctrine of their Society; they do not even believe that these propositions can be shown in the books of any of their Theologians such as they are in the censure of the Popes.
The Doctors, in view of the great difficulty, or, to speak more accurately, the impossibility, of determining surely all the times and all the conjunctures in which the precept of charity obliges to the act it commands, have had very different sentiments on this subject. The Jesuits followed the doctrine which they found common in the School in this matter, as in all the others. The Popes did not believe they ought to determine anything concerning it; and they contented themselves with censuring the propositions in question, which departed too visibly from the truth, without touching several others whose truth or falsity was not evident to them.
These are the things of which the Jesuits believed they ought to inform the public, seeing themselves so unjustly accused on a point of this importance. If after this calumny were still to prevail, they would console themselves before God and would regard this oppression as a disposition of Providence which they would adore and to which they would endeavor to submit with an entire resignation. I pass to the second point, which concerns the doctrine of philosophical sin.