Question XLV: Whether some measure is to be kept in divine love

D. Bonaventure teaches that an act of virtue can have a measure in three ways. First, by limitation in itself; and in this sense every act of created virtue has a measure; for every created virtue is finite and limited. Second, an act is said to have a measure by the aggregation of circumstances; and in this sense all the moral virtues and meritorious acts have a measure; for no act is praiseworthy unless endowed with the requisite circumstances. Third, in this sense measure indicates a mean between extremes, which are the Exceeding and the Falling-short; and by this reckoning the Cardinal Virtues have a measure, or a mean, between excess and deficiency.

¶ Since, then, CHARITY is a created and gratuitous virtue, it has the measure of finiteness due to creatures, and the measure imposed by circumstances, so that we love God above all things, and for himself, and according to our strength: but Charity does not have that measure which consists in standing in the middle between vicious extremes, because, being a Theological virtue with an infinite object, it never tends too much toward God, who is infinite, true, good, etc.

I assert, therefore, that Charity has no measure from its tending toward the object.

It is proved by D. Bonaventure, first, from D. Bernard On loving God, at the beginning, where he says: The cause of loving God is God; the measure is to love without measure.

Second, because the reason for loving is infinite goodness, and the last end, which has no measure; for an end, especially the ultimate end, is not measured by other things as an end, but it is itself the measure of the means, which are measured in order to the end. D. Thomas also uses this argument, at the place cited. Valencia, disp. 3, question 5, point 2.

Third: The motion of Charity appraises according to the dignity of the object; but the object of Charity, which is God, is of infinite goodness, and appraisable without measure: Therefore.

Fourth: Whatever has a measure is vitiated by excess; but no one is blameworthy, however intensely he loves God: Therefore.

I assert, second, that Charity has a measure according to the other measures brought forward above.

It is proved by D. Bonaventure, first, because he ordered all things in number, weight, and measure, as is had in Wisd. 9.

Second: Every finite act of Charity has a measure; every act of ours is finite: Therefore it has a measure.

Third: Measure, Species, and Order are compared to one another as One, True, and Good; but Good presupposes True, and True presupposes One: Therefore by equal reason Order presupposes species, and species presupposes measure; but the motion of Charity toward God is ordered: Therefore it is measured.

Another argument he brings forward, which he does not approve. Wisdom is above Charity, as Bernard says in the Book on the love of God, chapter 2, where he says: Love advances into Charity, and Charity into wisdom: but wisdom must have a measure, as the Apostle says, Rom. 12: Not to be wise beyond what it behooves to be wise, etc. Therefore Charity itself also ought to have a measure.

The Seraphic Doctor answers that Wisdom, insofar as it means savory knowledge, or the savor of knowledge, is not vitiated by excess; and in this sense wisdom from savor is above Charity; but insofar as it is said from sapere, to be wise, it can have the excess of curiosity: But in this sense it is not above Charity.