What a vow is

A vow is a promise made to God about something which is good, possible, and better than its omission.

It is, then, a promise, a contract with God, a deliberate taking on one’s self of a new obligation which binds the conscience; and in this it differs from a mere purpose to do better, which imposes no new and special obligation. Such an act must be perfectly human, performed with full knowledge and with complete use of reason, so that a vow taken by a man who was half drunk, or who had not the full use of reason, would not be valid. A vow, however, does not require actual and explicit consent when the obligation is assumed; it will be sufficient if there is virtual and implicit consent. A person who receives the subdiaconate, to which he knows that the Church has annexed a solemn vow of chastity, takes the vow by the very fact of being ordained, though at the time he is not thinking of it.

A vow in the strict sense is an act of divine worship offered to God alone, and so we cannot take a vow to the Blessed Virgin Mary or to the saints.

The matter of a vow must, of course, be something which is lawful and good; it would be an insult to God to promise him to do something wrong. It must be something which is possible, both physically and morally, for there can be no obligation to do what is impossible. A vow, then, to avoid all sin, even the slightest, would be invalid, for without a special privilege of God it is impossible. The matter of a vow must not only be good, but better than its omission or its opposite. For what is promised to God in a special manner and under a fresh obligation must be something that will be pleasing to him, but a promise to do something which had better not be done cannot be pleasing to God, who desires our perfection.

A vow is absolute when it has no condition attached to it, otherwise it is conditional.

A personal vow makes a promise of some action to be performed; a real vow dedicates a thing to God.

Vows are perpetual if the obligation is undertaken for life; otherwise they are temporary.

A solemn vow is one which is invested by the Church with special force and stability, together with certain legal effects; others are simple. The vows taken by religious in regular orders specially approved by the Pope, and by those who receive sacred orders, are solemn.

I. Notion. A vow strictly so called is a deliberate and free promise made to God concerning a possible and better good (can. 1307, § 1). It is said:

1. Promise, that is, the giving of faith, from which an obligation of faith arises. Therefore a vow differs from a mere proposal or will of doing something; indeed, a promise of doing something can be composed with the proposal of not doing it.

2. Deliberate and free; these will be explained more opportunely soon.

3. Made to God; a promise made to the Saints, if it rests in them, is not a vow strictly so called or an act of latria, but of dulia or hyperdulia. Nevertheless the promises which are said to be made to the Saints, as it seems, are commonly vows strictly so called, because for the most part they are made to God alone in honor of a Saint, or at least are primarily referred to God (St. Alphonsus, III, 194; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88, a. 5, ad 3).

4. Concerning a possible and better good; these also will soon be clarified.

II. Division. A vow is divided:

1. Into public and private. A public vow is one which is accepted in the name of the Church by a legitimate ecclesiastical Superior; otherwise it is private.

2. Into solemn and simple. A solemn vow is one which has been recognized by the Church as such; otherwise it is simple.

3. Into reserved and non-reserved. A reserved vow is one whose dispensation only the Apostolic See can grant; otherwise it is non-reserved.

4. Into personal, real, and mixed, according as an action of the one vowing, or some thing, or both together, for example alms to be distributed by the one vowing, is promised.

5. Into explicit and implicit, according as it is emitted in proper terms, or is contained in another act or vow, or is judged annexed to it.

6. Into perpetual and temporary.

7. Into absolute and conditional, according as someone obliges himself absolutely, or dependently on some condition: either a condition suspensive of the obligation, as if someone vows entrance into Religion if he recovers health; or resolutory, as if someone vows entrance into Religion unless his sister enters marriage (St. Alphonsus, III, 195).

III. Morality. A vow is an honorable act. This is established against Wyclif; likewise against Luther and Calvin, who hold as honorable only vows concerning things already otherwise prescribed; finally against those who at least disapprove religious vows.³ But the honorableness of a vow is clear: 1. from Sacred Scripture, which commends the making of vows both expressly⁴ and by narrating the examples of holy persons;⁵ 2. from the fact that a vow, by inducing an obligation, confirms the will in good.

¹ Cf. Waffelaert, Confessarius rite institutus ad impugnandam blasphemiam; Aertnys, De imprecatione "Deus damnet"; Brahm, Dissertatio de formula: G. v. d., Deus damnet me.

² Cf. Kirchberg, De voti natura, obligatione, honestate.

³ Letter of Leo XIII, Testem benevolentiae, January 22, 1899.

⁴ Ps. 75:12.

⁵ Gen. 28:20; Acts 18:18.

The Various Kinds of Vows.—(a) By reason of its object, a vow is either personal (i.e., the promise of some act or omission, such as a fast or the avoidance of an occasion of sin), real (i.e., the promise of some payment or object, such as an alms), or mixed (i.e., the promise of some action and some object, such as pilgrimage to a shrine with an offering).

(b) By reason of its subject, a vow is either singular (i.e., made by a physical person) or common (i.e., made by a moral person or community).

(c) By reason of its duration, a vow is either temporary (e.g., a vow taken for one year) or perpetual (i.e., a vow taken for life).

(d) By reason of its manner, a vow is either absolute (e.g., an unconditional vow of chastity) or conditional (e.g., a vow to go on pilgrimage, if one recovers one’s health; a vow to enter religion, if parents consent). A conditional vow is either non-penal, as in the example just given, or penal, in which the promise is that one shall undergo a penalty if fault is committed (e.g., a vow to say the Rosary every time one uses profane language, to fast every time one becomes intoxicated, to give alms every time one is dishonest).

(e) By reason of its form a vow is either express (i.e., externally manifested by words or other signs) or tacit (i.e., externally assumed by reason of some office to which it is annexed, as when one takes the subdiaconate in the Latin Church, to which is attached the duty of celibacy. (It must be noted, however, that some authors consider celibacy arising from the subdiaconate as a duty arising from ecclesiastical law and not from a vow.) The express vow in turn is explicit (i.e., manifested by signs that immediately express the vow, as when the vower mentions poverty and chastity) or implicit (i.e., manifested by signs that express another vow which includes the implicit vow, as when the vower mentions only obedience according to the rule, but the rule includes the other two vows of poverty and chastity). An explicit vow is either determinate (i.e., one in which the thing promised is definitely indicated, as when one vows a pilgrimage) or disjunctive (i.e., one in which the vower promises to perform at his will one or more out of a number of things indicated, as when he vows either to make a pilgrimage or to perform a fast).

(f) By reason of its position before the Church, a vow is either private (i.e., one made without the intervention or acceptance of the Church, as when a person in danger of shipwreck makes a vow for his safety) or public (i.e., one made before the Church and accepted in its name by an ecclesiastical superior, as in the essential vows made in approved Orders or Congregations). The public vow is either simple or solemn, according as the Church has determined for different religious institutes.

Vows in Canon Law.—The canonical dispositions in reference to vows in general will be found in Canons 1307-1315, while religious vows are treated in the section on religious (Canons 492 sqq.), and the effects of vows on matrimony are declared in Canons 1072, 1073, 1058. A fuller treatment of the canonical aspects of vows than can be given here will be found in commentaries on these parts of the Code.

Distinction between Solemn and Simple Vows.—Is the distinction between a solemn and a simple vow one of divine or one of ecclesiastical law?

(a) As to accidental solemnity (i.e., the conditions of time, place, age, fitness, rubrics, etc.), the solemn vow depends on the Church, for there is no doubt that the Church has the right to determine these matters as circumstances may require. Hence, the Church may appoint conditions for the validity of a solemn vow, and she may also change these conditions as she sees fit.

(b) As to the essential solemnity (i.e., the internal characteristic that distinguishes the solemn from other vows), the solemn vow depends, not on the law of the Church, but on the divine law, since, unlike other vows, it is not a mere promise of acts, but an irrevocable giving over to God of one’s person itself and an internal spiritual consecration or espousals accepted by the Church. This is denied, however, by some authorities, who place the difference between the solemn and the simple vow in the different juridical effects which they produce in Canon Law, the solemn vow making acts opposed to it invalid and the simple vow rendering opposed acts illicit, but not invalid (see Canon 579). All agree that the Church may for just reasons dispense even in solemn vows.

The Matter of a Vow.—(a) A vow is a free promise, and hence its matter must not be something necessary. (b) A vow is made to God, and hence its matter must not be something that is not pleasing to Him.

Vows that Promise Something Necessary.—(a) If the necessity is absolute, because a certain thing must be or cannot be, a vow is invalid. A vow to die is null, because death is a necessity; a vow to avoid venial sin, deliberate and indeliberate, is null, because it is impossible without a special privilege from God to keep such a vow; a vow that one’s child shall enter religion is also null, because one has no power over that which depends on the will of another. The vows made by communities do not oblige their successors or posterity as vows, but only as laws or customs having the force of law, or as contracts to which agreement is given, etc.

(b) If the necessity is hypothetical, because a certain thing must be done or omitted if one is to observe the natural or positive law, the vow is valid. For though it is necessary to observe a commandment (e.g., to avoid intoxication), it is not necessary to add to the existent obligation the new obligation of religion. The most suitable matter for a vow, however, is something that is of counsel, but not of precept, for example, to practise celibacy.

When Fulfillment of Vow Is Only Partly Possible.—(a) If the vower intended that his promise should be an entire one obliging him to fulfillment of all the items, the vow is invalid, since its fulfillment as intended is impossible. Thus, if one vowed to go on foot to a place of pilgrimage but was unable to accomplish the journey on foot, or vowed to go to Rome and became unable to go the full distance, there would be no obligation.

(b) If the vower intended that his promise should be severable, the difficulty can be settled as follows: he is held to nothing if the matter is severable but the principal part impossible (e.g., if he vowed to go on a pilgrimage and also to go barefooted, he is not bound to go barefooted an equal distance if the pilgrimage becomes impossible). He is held to the part that is possible, if it is really severable and was intended as the principal part of the vow (e.g., if he vowed to go on a pilgrimage and to go barefooted, but is unable to go barefooted).

(c) If the intention of the vow-maker is uncertain, it seems he is held to perform what is possible (e.g., if one has vowed to pay for the erection of a church but becomes unable to pay for more than a part of the expense); but if there is a good reason to presume that he intended an entire vow, or a severable vow whose chief part has become impossible, one may decide the doubt in the sense of that presumption (cfr. 465).

Vows that Promise Something Displeasing to God.—(a) Vows that promise what is always evil (e.g., to steal) are invalid and, on account of the irreverence, gravely sinful, at least if the sin promised is mortal. (b) Vows that promise something that may turn out either evil or good (e.g., Jepthe’s vow to immolate the first living being that came before him) are imprudent, and should not be kept as to the part that is sinful.

What should be said of vows that promise something good, but that have an evil end or other evil circumstances?

(a) The vow is invalid and illicit if the evil circumstance affects the thing promised itself, so that the fulfillment of the vow must be sinful, for example, when one promises to give an alms in order to seduce the recipient into sin or to build a church in order to gratify pride or spite. Similarly, invalid and illicit are vows made to obtain something evil (e.g., the vow of an alms in order to obtain success in a robbery) or to render thanksgiving for success in evil already done (e.g., the vow to give God half the booty taken in robbery); for such vows can not be fulfilled without the implicit protestation that God is the author of sin.

(b) The vow is valid but illicit if the evil circumstance affects only the act of vowing; for the thing promised is good and is to be performed properly, but the disposition of the vower is not free from sin as he makes his promise. It should be noted, however, that the evil circumstance does not always deprive the act of vowing of substantial goodness (see 78). Thus, if one vows to build a church and the sole motive for making the vow is the applause one will receive, the vow is substantially illicit; but if vainglory is only a secondary motive, the vow is substantially licit.

(c) The vow is valid and licit if the evil circumstance affects neither the act promised nor the act of vowing, both of these being good. Thus, it is lawful to vow an alms for every time one yields to a sinful habit. It is also lawful to vow an offering to God if one escapes unhurt from a duel, for such a vow does not ask God to bless the duel but to protect one’s life.

Vows that Promise Something Indifferent.—(a) These vows are invalid if there is no circumstance to make the promise honorable to God (e.g., if one promises to save up a certain percentage of one’s earnings each month). The sin committed by those who vow necessary, impossible or indifferent things, does not seem to exceed venial fault per se, for the vow is illicit, not because its matter is evil and displeasing to God, but because it is not good and pleasing to Him. The sin seems to be one of levity rather than of irreverence.

(b) These vows are valid and lawful if there is a circumstance that makes the indifferent subject-matter honorable to God (e.g., if one vows to save up so much each month in order to practise frugality, or to set aside means for some charitable or pious cause).

Meaning of a Better Good.—It is also necessary for validity of a vow that the thing promised be a better good; for this is the will of God, our sanctification (I Thess., iv. 3), and the vow is made to God.

(a) By the better good is not meant that which has no good superior to it, for then one could vow only the most excellent good, which is not true.

(b) By the better good, then, is understood that which is preferable to its contrary good (e.g., virginity is better than marriage), that which is absolutely or objectively preferable to its contradictory (e.g., it is better to give an alms than not to give one, it is better to keep the law of fasting than not to keep it), that which is relatively or subjectively better than its contradictory (e.g., it is better to marry than to commit fornication, or live in concubinage, or give scandal, or leave children illegitimate). Generally, however, it is not advisable to vow matrimony, for, even if the vow is not invalid, it seems to have little advantage. If a person thinks marriage is better for him, let him take the marriage vows or engage to marry the woman of his choice.

Vows Invalidated by Promise of Lesser Good.—(a) The vow to do what is less pleasing to God (e.g., never to make a vow, never to embrace a counsel) is invalid per se. There may be cases, however, in which a vow of this kind would be better and therefore valid (e.g., when a person who is prone to making vows is bidden by the confessor to make no other vows without advice).

(b) The vow to do what may easily become less pleasing to God also seems to be invalid. Thus, if one were to make a vow to play no more games in order to give more time to prayer or to avoid temptations, the vow might later be a cause of spiritual harm, for at times it is more pleasing to God to take recreation than to abstain from it.

Case in Which One Has Taken Two Opposite Vows.—(a) If the vows are equally good, or if it is doubtful which is better, the first prevails; the second being impossible does not oblige. (b) If the second is certainly better, it prevails, and the first does not oblige, being impossible. Thus, if one has first vowed to go on a pilgrimage and next to stay at home and attend the sick during an epidemic, the pilgrimage should not stand in the way of the more urgent good of caring for those in distress.

What is the nature of a vow? - A vow is: a deliberate promise made to God concerning a possible and better good. Made to God; for a vow is an act of religion, indeed it is an act of latria, owed to God alone. "A promise can also be made to man; and the promise itself of good which is made to man can fall under a vow insofar as it is a certain virtuous work. And in this way must be understood a vow by which someone vows something to the Saints or to Prelates; so that the promise itself made to Saints or to Prelates falls under the vow materially, insofar namely as man vows to God that he will fulfill what he promises to Saints or Prelates." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 5. Therefore a vow is made principally to God, secondarily in honor of the Saints, just as temples and altars which are principally dedicated to God are also said to be dedicated to them. Therefore two conditions are required for the validity of a vow: true intention of a vow, and apt matter. L. 194; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, aa. 1-6; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 281 seqq.; Bouquillon, de Virt. relig., l. 2, p. 2; E. M.

Of how many kinds is a vow? - A vow is distinguished: 1. as absolute or conditioned. The former is that which is made without any condition; but the latter is that which is made with a condition, so that, unless this is posited, no obligation arises. Hence a penal vow is specially distinguished, namely when a good thing is vowed as a penalty or penance, for example, I will give alms if I become drunk.

2. A vow is of some determinate thing, or disjunctive of some thing to be determined afterwards from several at one's judgment. If in this one part is apt and another part inept, for example, either to pray or to play, the whole vow is not valid. L. 203. 3. Personal or real, according as an action or omission of the one vowing, for example, a pilgrimage, or some thing separable from the action of the person, for example the donation of a chalice, alms, etc., is promised. 4. Temporary or perpetual, according as it is promised to be observed only for a certain time, or through one's whole life. 5. Public or private, according as it is made with the Church accepting the vow, or without this authority of the Church accepting intervening. S. C. EE. et RR., 11 Aug. 1889. 6. Solemn or simple, according as it is made solemnly and is accepted by the Church as solemn; or, solemnity and this acceptance of the Church being excluded, it is emitted. Therefore the solemnity of a vow is had in this acceptance and approval of the Church, by which, by that vow, someone is totally bound over to divine worship as to preserving chastity, obedience, and poverty, through the blessing and consecration of the Church, implicit in that acceptance and approval. But the Church annexed this blessing and consecration to the reception of sacred order, by which someone is applied to divine ministry, and to the profession of a certain rule, by which, through renunciation of the world and of one's own will, someone assumes the state of proper perfection. But since solemnity signifies a certain exterior apparatus and ceremony which is employed when someone is totally bound over to some thing, hence a vow is said to be solemnized through reception of sacred order and through profession of a religious rule, to which the Church has annexed a solemn vow. Therefore only the vow of chastity annexed to major orders and the vow of religious profession is solemn. L. 195; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, aa. 7, 11; Cajetan on this place; Struggl 28; cf. here v. 2, n. 248.

1. A vow (εὐχή, votum) is a free and deliberate promise made to God to do something that is good and possible, and better than its omission.¹

¹ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88, art. 1: “A promise proceeds from a purpose of doing. But a purpose presupposes some deliberation, since it is an act of the deliberate will. Thus, therefore, three things are necessarily required for a vow: first, deliberation; secondly, a purpose of the will; thirdly, a promise, in which the nature of a vow is perfected.”—Cfr. Codex Iuris Can., can. 1307, § 1.

A vow is essentially an act of divine worship (cultus latriae) because it is, so to speak, a contract which a man makes with God and by which he deliberately assumes a new obligation that binds him in conscience.²

² St. Thomas, ibid., art. 5: “A vow is a certain ordination of the things which one vows to divine worship or service. And thus it is clear that to vow is properly an act of latria or religion.”

As a rule the taking of a vow is accompanied by prayers and sacrifices offered for the purpose of obtaining some particular grace. Pious persons wishing to be relieved from evil, or to secure the divine assistance in circumstances of particular difficulty or danger, have long been wont to add to their prayers the promise of some sacrifice, e. g., to perform a work of charity or self-denial, in order to make the appeal to God’s mercy stronger and more efficacious. The vows of which we read in the Old Testament were all hypothetical, i. e., subject to the fulfilment of some condition.³

³ Gen. XXVIII, 20–22; Numb. XXI, 2; Judg. XI, 30 sq.; 1 Kings I, 10 sq.; 2 Kings XV, 7 sq.—Cfr. A. Aust, die Religion der Römer, pp. 29 sq., 126.

Being a formal promise, a vow differs from the mere purpose of doing or omitting something, because a purpose does not per se oblige in conscience, whereas a vow does.⁴

⁴ Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacram., l. II, p. 12, c. 3 says: “A vow is a certain attestation of a spontaneous promise, which is more properly referred to God alone and to those things which are God’s. For to vow is, by the attestation of a spontaneous promise, to bind oneself to God and constitute oneself His debtor. For he who promises simply pledges that he will do something; but he who vows solemnly affirms his promise and confirms the promise itself. Where it is a promise, he is held; where it is an attestation, he is bound.” (Migne, P. L., CLXXVI, 521).

The mere intention of making a vow is not sufficient to constitute a vow, and involves no obligation. The essential constituent of a vow is an obligation assumed in conscience. This is a matter in regard to which the faithful ought to be instructed in confession, lest they erroneously believe that the mere resolve of making a vow or performing some virtuous act entails the same obligations as the vow itself. To fail to keep a good resolution may be a sin, if the failure results from carelessness, sloth, or sensuality; but it is a sin (usually venial) only per accidens, because the sinful character of the omission lies in the cause, not in the act itself.⁵

⁵ Cfr. F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., p. 464.

2. To deny the religious and moral character of vows is to doubt or deny the value of prayer and the significance of sacrifice. To promise God to do something one is not obliged to do, is manifestly a religious act, which derives its moral quality from the fact that it may be made a powerful means of acquiring virtue. By a vow the will, which is so easily moved, is directed toward goodness, i. e., toward God, and thus a fruitful source of heroic virtue is opened.⁶

⁶ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88, art. 6: “For three reasons to perform the same work with a vow is better and more meritorious than to perform it without a vow. First, because to vow is an act of latria, which is chief among the moral virtues. But the work of a nobler virtue is better and more meritorious.... Secondly, because he who vows something and performs it subjects himself more to God than he who only performs it. For he subjects himself to God not only as to the act, but also as to the power, because thereafter he cannot do otherwise; just as he would give more to a man who gave him a tree with its fruits than one who gave him only the fruits. And thence it is that thanks are also given to those who promise. Thirdly, because through a vow the will is immovably confirmed in good. But to do something from a will confirmed in good belongs to the perfection of virtue.”—Ibid., qu. 189, art. 2.

It is true that a vow binds the will, but this very fact constitutes it a positive instrument for the acquisition of true Christian liberty, which is the result of self-control, and thus makes a vow a powerful aid to human frailty.

Christ never made a vow because he was God and confirmed in goodness.⁷ But for men vows are expressly approved alike in the Old and in the New Testament.⁸ We read in the Acts of the Apostles that St. Paul and other early Christians shore their heads in pursuance of a vow.⁹ St. Ambrose,¹⁰ St. Augustine,¹¹ and others of the Fathers warmly recommended the practice of making vows.¹²

⁷ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88, art. 4, ad 3: “To Christ, considered in Himself, it was not fitting to vow, both because He was God and also because, inasmuch as He was man, He had a will confirmed in good, as one possessing comprehension.”

⁸ Gen. XXVIII, 20; Lev. XXVII, 2 sqq.; Ps. XLIX, 14 sq.; LX, 9; LXXV, 12.

⁹ Acts XVIII, 18; XXI, 23 sqq.—Cfr. J. E. Belser, Die Selbstverteidigung des hl. Paulus, pp. 141 sqq.; and the same author’s Beiträge zur Erklärung der Apostelgeschichte, pp. 89 sqq.

¹⁰ De Offic., l. III, c. 12, n. 76–81 (Migne, P. L., XVI, 137 sqq.).

¹¹ Enarr. in Ps., 75, n. 16: “Let each one vow and render what he can. Do not vow and fail to render, but let each one vow and render what he can. Do not be slow to vow. For you will not fulfil it by your own powers.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 967).—IDEM, ibid., 131, n. 3: “Let no one presume to render by his own powers what he has vowed; He who exhorts you to vow, Himself helps you to render.” (P. L., XXXVII, 1717).

¹² J. B. Wirthmüller, Über das Sittengesetz, pp. 52 sqq.; Kirchberg, De Voti Natura, pp. 167 sqq., 195 sqq.

That abuses have arisen in connection with vows proves nothing against their legitimacy.¹³

¹³ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 189, art. 2, ad 3: “To vow entrance into religion is a certain confirmation of the will toward better things, and therefore, of itself, it does not give man an occasion of falling, but rather removes it. But if one who transgresses a vow falls more gravely, this does not detract from the goodness of a vow, just as the fact that some sin more gravely after baptism does not detract from the goodness of baptism.”—Cfr. H. Denifle, O. P., Luther und Luthertum, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 61 sqq. (English ed. by Volz, I, 73 sqq.); A. Schulze, Das Gelübde in der neueren theologischen Ethik, Gütersloh 1906.

The Church by esteeming and recommending vows imposes no yoke on any one. The vowing individual imposes a yoke upon himself, and this act of self-denial, if prudently and deliberately performed, is truly moral. The Church by her legislation on vows and the binding force thereof does not impair liberty; on the contrary, her laws are liberty’s best guarantee, for, in the first place, they prevent the faithful from binding themselves thoughtlessly and without a divine call; and, secondly, they interpret the obligations incurred by vows leniently and dispense from them when fulfilment would prove harmful. This is a great advantage, especially when we consider that, had not the Church the power to interpret vows, individual Christians would often be sorely troubled in conscience when they wished to withdraw from such an obligation merely on the strength of their own private judgment.¹⁴

¹⁴ F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, p. 331.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88.—IDEM, Comment. in Sent., IV, dist. 38.—IDEM, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, c. 138.—F. Suarez, De Religione, tr. VI, l. 1–6.—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 194–262 (ed. Gaudé, I, 495).—J. B. Wirthmüller, Die moralische Tugend der Religion, pp. 538 sqq.—C. Kirchberg, De Voti Natura, Obligatione, Honestate, Münster i. W., 1897, pp. 5 sqq.—Marsot, Traité Pratique des Voeux, 9th ed., Paris 1919.—J. B. Ferreres, S.J., Comp. Theol. Moralis, Vol. I, 9th ed., pp. 273 sqq.—Sabetti-Barrett, Comp. Theol. Mor., 27th ed., pp. 229 sqq.—H. Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 222 sqq.—Th. Bouquillon, De Virtute Religionis, Part II, Bruges 1880, n. 302–502.—E. Müller, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 170 sqq.—J. d’Annibale, Summula Theol. Mor., Vol. III, 5th ed., pp. 178 sqq.—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, pp. 321 sqq.

I. What it is and with what conditions. A vow is "a deliberate and free promise, made to God, concerning a possible and better good," c. 1307 §1. (Cf. 2, 2, q. 88.)

1. A promise, therefore not a mere purpose. The criterion of distinction is not taken from the word alone, "I purpose" or "I promise," but from whether one intended to assume a special obligation or not. Hence doubts in this matter will have to be solved by the question: "Did you will to oblige yourself before God?"; and in doubt, the minimum is to be held.

2. Deliberate, with at least that deliberation which is sufficient for sinning mortally. Nor is every age or every deliberation sufficient for mortal sin sufficient for every vow. For he sins mortally who has known the gravity of the guilt, although he has not weighed the magnitude of the sin; but in order that you spontaneously assume an obligation, it is necessary not only that you know what an obligation is, but that you have perceived sufficiently clearly the quantity of the object ¹. Thus excellently Ballerini-Palmieri, t. 2, tr. 6, n. 605. From a sudden movement of the soul, from a custom such that the tongue anticipates the mind, sometimes from the heat of anger, either consideration or deliberation can be impeded. If a solidly probable reason suggests that there was only half-full deliberation, it is licit to answer in favor of liberty. With such a reason excluded, a vow made after the seventh year is presumed deliberate. Minds vexed by a scrupulous obsession of vowing are to be ordered by the confessor to care in no way for vows which they think they have made. Cf. I, 85 and 382. - Because direct deliberation is lacking, vows made in drunkenness do not oblige.

3. Free. For "a vow made through grave and unjust fear is null by the law itself." Thus at least from the positive disposition of c. 1307 §3. In the external forum, it is not presumed that light fear gave cause to the vow. If someone, from light but unjust fear alone, and for no other reason, has vowed, the vow probably is not valid, because God is not judged to accept such a vow, lest He pave a way for unjust coercion. Yet this is controverted. But when fear is not extrinsic or not unjust, nothing stands in the way of the value of the vow.

Error concerning the substance of the promised matter: the one vowing thinks that a chalice which he vows to be golden is silver; - concerning a substantial condition, that is, one so implicitly supposed that otherwise the vow would never have been emitted: the thing promised is of twice greater price or is far graver than it was estimated; - concerning the final cause: the vow is made for the health of a person who is dead or was not sick; - errors of this sort make the vow null, since free consent is lacking. Indeed, any error which has given cause to the vow is of itself sufficient that you be judged immune from the obligation. Nevertheless, excepting properly substantial error, error does not vitiate religious profession. For both private and public good demand that those things which constitute a firm and irrevocable state should not easily waver and should be liable to few conditions. Moreover, the will of the one professing is judged to have accommodated itself to the nature of the thing, and therefore to have held the profession ratified, notwithstanding other errors. Ignorance or error concerning sexual matters also vitiates profession less: both because the force of that vow, as excellent, approved by God and the Church, emitted by many, and containing a renunciation of certain delights, is sufficiently apprehended through true elements; and because, as the young man is disposed by fervor itself, knowledge of the carnal act would not change his mind. For then he does not experience those grave and troublesome temptations which afterward suggest repentance for the obligation undertaken to certain less fervent persons. Although it is regularly expedient that those who profess the religious state be sufficiently instructed concerning the matter, and be warned that grave difficulties can arise afterward.

4. Made to God. A vow is properly made to God, and is an act of latria. But the cause of a vow can also be the honor which we thus render to the saints, while their worship impels us to acts of religion; just as we can promise certain things to God in order to obtain that the Saints be more honored: for each reason the vow is made in honor of the Saints. We can also confirm by a vow a promise made to a Saint (2, 2, q. 88 art. 5 ad 3).

Finally, nothing prevents us from promising to the Saints themselves, simply or conditionally, certain honors or services ¹. Then an obligation of dulia or hyperdulia arises, distinct from a vow, yet nevertheless analogous; this more approaches the obligation of a vow than the debt of human fidelity, and therefore remains grave in its genus. Cf. Quaest. de religione, 137.

5. Concerning a good. For a promise of an evil thing can neither honor God nor be acceptable to Him.

6. Concerning a possible good. For an impossible thing cannot be intended or promised efficaciously. This also seems to have to be transferred to those things which are morally impassable, because that obligation, as in itself harmful to the soul, cannot be acceptable to God or honorific to Him.

Here, however, prudent discretion is needed. The reason is well valid when someone directly vows those things which he cannot physically or morally carry out. Wherefore a vow of avoiding all venial sins is not valid if it is so understood that, once one sin has been committed, the vow itself ceases to be. For to avoid all venial sins is not now in our power without an extraordinary privilege; nor is sufficient utility discerned in such a vow. But, as it seems to us, they pronounce too absolutely who say that such a vow is not valid even if it merely confirms the obligation which we all have of avoiding every sin: an obligation which perseveres even after sin. For, as Suarez excellently observes, Relig. tr. 6, lib. 2, c. 3, nn. 13 and 16, the vow is reasonably understood of avoiding venial sins insofar as it can be done, or of diligence to be applied in fleeing every sin. This care and diligence will of itself be very useful for every man. Wherefore we do not well understand why such vows are judged by Suarez, l. c. nn. 3 and 4, to be per se, or at least for many, little useful, to be disapproved, and simply to be dispensed. Nor can we assent to those who contend that a vow of avoiding deliberate sins can validly be made only by those who are of sufficiently proved virtue. Moreover, they admit the validity of a vow by which a positive good is promised to God, with which the obligation of avoiding all venial sins is connected, as is the vow of always doing the more perfect things, which is permitted to approved persons; nor is the validity of a vow of chastity, even imprudently emitted by the too fragile, doubted. Therefore rather than the vow itself, the negative form can displease, which can generate confusion and disturb the soul.

In practice also it will be expedient to conceive or circumscribe the vow in such a way that, with scruples avoided, it may increase the pursuits of virtue. Finally, because of the authority of others, we shall be able to treat as null a vow of avoiding all venial sins, or a vow emitted by a person not approved of avoiding all deliberate sins; indeed perhaps a vow of avoiding all grave sins, if it has been pronounced by a person too fragile.

7. And better. Every good indeed of itself pleases God. But since certain goods can obstruct better goods, it will always be acceptable to God that someone do what is better. Wherefore, by force of a vow, you will never be obliged to a less good, so that a vow concerning a lesser good, as such, would not be valid. In general, therefore, a vow of marriage will not be valid, since it remains intact for one to desire and choose honorable celibacy, which in itself is a better state. Therefore a good is understood which is better than the voluntary omission of it.

¹ At least if knowledge of the greater quantity would have prevented the vow. And this is the difference between sin and a vow. He who had known better would not have made the sin; nevertheless, now he has sinned. But if he had known the thing better, he would not have vowed; then, with the exception of vows by which a state is entered, he did not vow. And because the vow of chastity of religious would not be prevented by more perfect knowledge, the vow subsists from that very fact, even apart from that knowledge.

¹ But these things are not accustomed to be done in promises which affect the whole life. Wherefore he who vows chastity to the Blessed Virgin Mary is judged to vow it to God, moved by piety toward the Blessed Virgin Mary.

An implicit promise sometimes suffices: thus, in the Latin Church, the voluntary reception of Sacred Order, according to the common opinion, brings in a vow of chastity (nor is that step which those to be ordained to the subdiaconate who are not yet bound by the vow of chastity are ordered to make an essential rite). He who has not wished to vow, or has plainly been ignorant of that connection of the vow, as is more like the truth, will not be bound by the vow, but from the precept of the Church he will have to observe chastity from the motive of religion. Express mention of the vow is not had in cc. 132 and 211.

He who habitually has known the obligation of a vow, and deliberately promises something to God, makes a true vow, although he seems to himself not to have adverted to the obligation. St. Alphonsus, l. 4, n. 201.

Yet he does not vow who has the intention indeed of promising, but not of obliging himself; but he does vow to whom only the mind of fulfilling the obligation is lacking.

II. Division of a vow. 1. A vow is absolute or conditioned. A penal vow is so called by which some expiation of penance or of a good work is promised if some less right act has been done.

2. A personal, real, and mixed vow. Strictly speaking, a vow from its very essence is the personal act of the one vowing, like every promise; nor, because it terminates in a thing, does that promise, which is of a certain fidelity toward God, affect the patrimony any more than a promise of fidelity to a man does. Nevertheless it is called personal, objectively, if one's own action or omission is promised: fasting, a pilgrimage, abstinence from luxury, from a certain drink; real, by which some external thing is promised; finally it will be mixed which is formed from each element: whether both can be separated, as if you promise a pilgrimage with a liberality; or whether they are joined by an individual bond, as if care of a sick person to be had by one's own hands is promised.

3. A public vow, which is accepted in the name of the Church by a legitimate ecclesiastical Superior: thus the vows of religious profession; and a private vow.

4. A solemn and simple vow. It is solemn "if it has been recognized as such by the Church" (c. 1308 §2). Another vow is simple. Concerning the essence of solemnity, cf. the work Quaest. de religione.

5. A reserved vow, whose dispensation the Holy See alone can concede, and a non-reserved vow.

Besides public vows, whose dispensation or commutation is arranged by the legal regime itself (cc. 214, 633-636, 640, 648, 669), the reserved private vows are: "the vow of perfect and perpetual chastity, and the vow of entering a religion of solemn vows, which have been emitted absolutely and after the completed eighteenth year of age" (c. 1309). Before the Code, absolute vows of the three pilgrimages also were reserved.

III. The utility of vowing. A vow supposes a will which can fall away from the good or change its purpose. Wherefore neither for Christ, whose will was always most firmly fixed in the good, nor for an Angel, who stands immovable by his decrees, was there ever a reason why they should vow. Nor does it belong to the blessed comprehensors in heaven to vow, since their will is altogether fixed in loving God.

To us vows of a twofold genus can prudently be advised: a) vows by which some peculiar necessity or weakness is met, such as certain medicinal vows; and vows, generally momentary, with which we are not rarely accustomed to surround petitions made to God; b) vows which are fruitful seeds of good works, such as vows of abnegation, of seeking the more perfect things, and especially vows by which the more perfect discipline of Christ is confirmed in the religious life.

Moreover, although a vow is praiseworthy and meritorious, discretion must nevertheless be observed in advising or multiplying vows. And generally it is better not to have vowed than to have been released from vows by dispensation: that is accustomed to diminish confidence in God. Wherefore, the more a vow is of an arduous and lasting thing, with the greater caution it must be advised or admitted. Cf. Quaest. de virtute rel., 140.

But by the faithful execution of vows, we praise and imitate the immovable sanctity of God, while by an oath we honor and cultivate His infinite veracity. Cf. Quaest. de virtute relig., n. 141.

Divine fidelity in promises. Since the divine will is altogether immutable, God is faithful eminently rather than formally. Therefore God promises us the things which He signifies that He wills to give us, nor can a distinct obligation of perseverance be conceived. And the divine benevolence and liberality, which is confirmed by no formal obligation just as by no translation of right from God to us, is perceived to be more gratuitous.

388. Definition. A vow (Greek εὐχή) is a promise made to God concerning a possible and better good. Thus a vow is most commonly defined.³¹⁵ Therefore three things are required for the essence of a vow, namely: 1. that it be a true promise; 2. that it be a promise made to God; 3. that it be a promise concerning a possible and better good. We shall treat of this last condition in paragraph 3, where there will be discussion of the object of a vow.

1. A vow must be a true promise; and therefore a mere resolution does not suffice. For in Sacred Scripture a vow is customarily explained through a promise: "If thou hast vowed any thing to God, defer not to pay it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him."³¹⁶ "It is much better not to vow than after a vow not to perform the things promised."³¹⁷

In practice it is often not easy to distinguish whether a true promise or only a resolution was present. And nevertheless, it is entirely necessary to distinguish between a resolution and a promise. A promise is defined as an act by which someone intends to do something under an obligation manifested to another; but a resolution is the mere will to do or omit something, without a man thereby wishing to impose a strict obligation upon himself. Hence, if a confessor doubts whether a mere resolution or a true promise and consequently a true vow was present, let him ask the penitent: When you resolved upon that work, did you wish to impose upon yourself a true obligation, and that under sin, or did you not wish to establish such an obligation for yourself? If the penitent responds negatively to the first part of the question, there is no vow nor grave obligation to execute the resolution, since a resolution of itself produces no moral obligation. Per accidens, however, namely, because of negligence or sloth joined to it, even the violation of a resolution can be sinful. If, after investigation, a doubt remains whether an obligatory promise or a resolution was present, the presumption stands for liberty, and therefore no obligation of a vow is present.

2. A vow must be a promise made to God Himself, because a vow is an act of latria by which someone obliges himself to God to do or omit something for His worship and service. Although vows are often customarily made in honor of the Blessed Virgin and the saints (e.g., someone vows that he will say the Rosary daily in honor of the Blessed Virgin), nevertheless such vows are not properly made to the saints and the Blessed Virgin, but to God alone. The signification of vows of this sort can be threefold: a) a man vows to God that he will fulfill that which he promised to the saints; or, in other words, that which is promised to the saints is not the vow itself, but the matter of the vow;³¹⁸ b) the vow is made to God, but before the saints, who are as it were witnesses of our promise; c) the vow is made principally to God, but secondarily in honor and memory of the saints, in almost the same manner as churches are erected principally for the worship of God, but secondarily in honor of the saints, and as Mass is said in honor of the saints. But if someone were to make a vow to the Blessed Virgin or to some saint without any relation to God and without the intention of obliging himself to God, but to the Blessed Virgin or the saint alone, it would not be a vow properly so called, but a certain sacred promise and an act of hyperdulia or dulia. Hence, e.g., if some girl should say: Most Holy Virgin, I promise thee perpetual chastity because I love thee; but if she thinks nothing about entering into an obligation toward God, such a promise is either no vow or a doubtful vow, and therefore a dispensation of the Supreme Pontiff is not required to free her from such a promise, as is necessary for removing a vow of perfect chastity.

³¹⁵ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 2. Code of Canon Law, c. 1307, § 1.

³¹⁶ Eccles. 5:3.

³¹⁷ Ib., v. 4.

³¹⁸ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 5 ad 3.

389. The moral value and utility of vows. Since a vow is an act of the virtue of religion, and indeed of latria, as is apparent from the things said, it follows that it is a good and useful act. Protestants, however, with Wycliffe, Luther, and Calvin leading them, teach that vows (especially the vows of religious) are harmful, sinful, and immoral, since they injure human liberty.³¹⁹ Modern Protestants, however, do not agree concerning the moral goodness of vows.³²⁰ Yet they rather commonly reject the vows of religious orders. Already in the times of St. Thomas, William of Saint-Amour indirectly attacked religious vows by condemning the religious state of the Mendicant Orders. Blessed Albert the Great, St. Thomas Aquinas, and St. Bonaventure fought victoriously against "those who attack the worship of God and religion."³²¹ The Quietists also spread errors concerning vows. Hence Innocent XI condemned the following propositions:³²² "Vows concerning the doing of something impede perfection"; "Superiors are to be obeyed in external things, and the extent of the vow of obedience of religious reaches only to the exterior; but in the interior the matter stands otherwise, into which God alone and the director enter." Against all these let there be the following:

Thesis. Vows prudently made from the motive of worshiping God are morally good and very useful.

Proof 1. From Sacred Scripture. In the Old Testament the Patriarchs and most holy men made vows and on that account were blessed by God.³²³ In the Mosaic law fulfillment of vows is prescribed: "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it, because the Lord thy God will require it; and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin."³²⁴ In the New Testament Christ and the Apostles frequently invited men to embrace the evangelical counsels, which are not customarily put into practice without vows.³²⁵ Concerning Aquila, a disciple of St. Paul, it is said: "For he had a vow."³²⁶

Proof 2. From the whole Christian tradition. From the first Christian centuries onward, pious men and women made vows³²⁷ and either went into the desert following the examples of Pachomius and Anthony, or lived holily in their own homes. Especially was the vow of chastity frequently made. Let St. Augustine alone be heard, addressing certain spouses who, after making a vow of chastity, intended to break it: "But now, because thy pledge is held before God, I do not invite thee to great justice (if I exhort thee not to withdraw from the vow), but I deter thee from great iniquity. For thou wilt not be such as thou wouldst have remained if thou hadst vowed nothing of this sort. For then thou wouldst have been less, not worse. But now, which God forbid, thou wilt be the more wretched if thou breakest that same thing with God, by as much as thou wilt be the more blessed if thou fulfillest it. Nor therefore repent that thou hast vowed; indeed rejoice that it is no longer lawful for thee to do that which would have been lawful to thy detriment.... Happy is the necessity which impels toward better things."³²⁸

Proof 3. From the definitions of the Church. The Council of Trent³²⁹ defined: "If anyone says that men are so to be recalled to the memory of the baptism they received that they understand all vows made after baptism to be invalid by force of the promise already made in baptism itself, as though by them something were detracted from the faith which they professed and from baptism itself, let him be anathema." The same is apparent from the propositions of the Quietists condemned by Innocent XI and already mentioned above.

Proof 4. From reasons. It suffices to adduce the words of the Angelic Doctor:³³⁰ "For three reasons it is better and more meritorious to perform the same work with a vow than to perform it without a vow: first, because to vow ... is an act of latria, which is chief among the moral virtues. But the work of a nobler virtue is better and more meritorious. Hence the act of an inferior virtue is better and more meritorious from the fact that it is commanded by a superior virtue, whose act it becomes through command; just as an act of faith or hope is better if it is commanded by charity. And therefore the works of the other moral virtues (for example, to fast, which is an act of abstinence, and to practice continence, which is an act of chastity) are better and more meritorious if they are done from a vow, because thus they now pertain to divine worship as certain sacrifices to God. Hence Augustine³³¹ says that 'virginity itself is honored, not because it is virginity, but because it is dedicated to God, which the continence of piety cherishes and preserves.' Secondly, because he who vows something and does it submits himself to God more than he who only does it; for he subjects himself to God not only as regards the act, but also as regards the power, because thereafter he cannot do otherwise; just as he would give more to a man who gave him a tree with its fruits than he who gave him only the fruits.... Thirdly, because through a vow the will is immovably confirmed in the good. But to do something from a will confirmed in the good pertains to the perfection of virtue.... Just as also to sin with a mind obstinate in evil aggravates the sin and is called a sin against the Holy Ghost."

Protestants indeed object that liberty is destroyed by vows; but this objection is very weak. For even through marriage the liberty of withdrawing from the contract is removed; indeed, in every human contract a man is obliged to do or omit something. Therefore marriage also and all onerous contracts would have to be repudiated. Moreover, even the saints in heaven no longer have liberty to sin or to separate themselves from God, and nevertheless they are supremely free. Happy, therefore, is the necessity which impels toward better things, as St. Augustine says in the text cited above.³³² Never is man more free than when, liberated from the yoke of the passions, he perfectly fulfills the duties of the Christian life.

³¹⁹ Cf. Luther's short work on monastic vows.

³²⁰ Cf. Realencyklopädie für prot. Theol., s.v. "Gelübde."

³²¹ Cf. St. Thomas, Opusc. I, Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem, and Opusc. III, Contra pestiferam doctrinam retrahentium homines a religionis ingressu.

³²² Denz. nn. 1223 and 1285.

³²³ Cf. Gen. 28:20 and Wetzer and Welte, Kirchenlex., s.v. "Gelübde bei den Israeliten."

³²⁴ Deut. 23:21.

³²⁵ Cf. Matt., cc. 16 and 19; 1 Cor. 7:25.

³²⁶ Acts 18:18; cf. 21:23ff.

³²⁷ Cf. St. Ignatius, Ep. ad Polyc. c. 5 (Migne, Patr. graec. 5, 724); Tertullian, De virg. velandis c. 11 (Migne, Patr. lat. 2, 954); St. Cyprian, De habitu virg. c. 4 (Migne, Patr. lat. 4, 456).

³²⁸ Ep. 127 (Migne, Patr. lat. 33, 487).

³²⁹ Sess. 7, can. 9, De bapt. (Denz. n. 865).

³³⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 6.

³³¹ De virg. c. 8.

³³² Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 4.

390. Divisions. Vows are divided in many ways. The following divisions seem to be the principal ones:

1. By reason of the object, a vow is divided into personal and real. A personal vow principally obliges one to perform or omit some personal action, e.g., a vow of fasting, of not gambling, etc. A real vow principally obliges one to some thing, e.g., to give alms.

Besides the personal and real vow, some theologians distinguish a mixed vow, in which an action and a thing are intended and promised equally principally, e.g., a vow of making a pilgrimage to some miraculous image and offering a candle there. But a mixed vow of this kind is nothing other than two vows joined together: one personal, the other real.

2. By reason of duration, a vow is distinguished into temporary, which obliges for a determined time, e.g., for a year; and perpetual, which is promised to be observed for the whole of life.

3. By reason of manner, a vow is divided into absolute, which is made without any condition added, e.g., I vow perpetual chastity; and conditional, which does not oblige unless some condition is verified, e.g., I vow a pilgrimage if I shall have recovered my health; I vow entrance into religion if my parents shall have given consent. If someone, under the condition of a determined future fault, vows that a punishment is to be inflicted upon himself, such a vow is called penal; e.g., if I shall have become drunk again, I vow that I shall give an alms of one hundred francs.

4. By reason of form, a vow is distinguished into express, which is made in formulated words; and tacit, which consists in some free action to which a vow is annexed. Thus, e.g., if someone in the Latin Church freely receives the subdiaconate, he tacitly vows chastity.³³³ In ancient times there also existed a tacit religious profession of the three vows of obedience, chastity, and poverty.³³⁴ The greatest part of vows made today are express vows. Akin to this distinction is the division of a vow into explicit and implicit. For an explicit vow is the same as an express vow, but an implicit vow is that which is contained in another. Thus, e.g., a religious who explicitly vows obedience according to the rule implicitly vows poverty and chastity.

5. By reason of the acceptance of the Church, a vow is distinguished into private and public. A private vow is that which is made by the person vowing alone without the intervention of the Church; e.g., someone vows to say the Rosary daily. A public vow is that which is accepted in the name of the Church by a legitimate ecclesiastical superior.³³⁵ All essential vows of religious orders and congregations are public vows, provided these have been duly approved by the Church.

³³³ There are, however, some authors who teach that a subdeacon is obliged to preserve chastity not by force of a vow but by force of ecclesiastical law; discussion of this controversy will recur below, III, 819.

³³⁴ Cf. the canonists concerning this matter.

³³⁵ Code of Canon Law, c. 1308, § 1. A public vow, therefore, is not opposed to an occult vow.

391. Public vows are distinguished into simple and solemn. Simple public vows are those which are made in all approved religious congregations and in the ancient orders during the first three years after the novitiate. (The Society of Jesus, however, has special laws concerning this matter.) Solemn vows are those which by the authority of the Church are made a) in religious orders after three years of simple vows;³³⁶ b) in the Society of Jesus by certain members according to the special laws of that Society; c) the vow of chastity made in the reception of the subdiaconate.³³⁷

It has been much disputed down to our days wherein precisely the essential difference between solemn vows and simple public vows is situated. Since this controversy seems to pertain more to canon law than to Moral Theology, it can be touched upon here only in passing. First, a twofold solemnity must be distinguished: one essential, the other accidental. The accidental solemnity of a vow consists in the Rubrics, circumstances, and conditions which must necessarily be observed by the statute of the Church, e.g., the statute of the Church that solemn vows cannot validly be made before the completion of the twenty-first year of age; or that they cannot be made unless the novitiate and at least three years of simple vows have preceded. This accidental solemnity undoubtedly depends solely upon the institution of the Church, which can freely change it and has in fact changed it several times. For it belongs to the Church to determine wisely under what conditions someone is capable of making solemn profession; just as it also belongs to the Church to establish certain things which are essentially required for validly entering Christian marriage. And just as the Church, in the course of time, instituted certain diriment impediments of marriage, so likewise it attached certain conditions without which solemn profession is not held valid. The Supreme Pontiffs Boniface VIII³³⁸ and Gregory XIII³³⁹ seem to speak of this accidental solemnity of profession when they assert: "We, considering that the solemnity of a vow was devised solely from the constitution of the Church...."

The essential solemnity of vows is that by which those vows are intrinsically distinguished from all other vows. Several authors, e.g., Suarez,³⁴⁰ Schmalzgrueber,³⁴¹ and Wernz,³⁴² think that solemn vows differ essentially from simple vows because of the juridical effects annexed to them by the Church. Others, namely, St. Thomas,³⁴³ the Thomists,³⁴⁴ and several others, e.g., Lehmkuhl,³⁴⁵ teach that the essence of solemn vows consists in a certain internal spiritual surrender and consecration of the person vowing, which the Church accepts in the name of God; but that simple vows contain only a spiritual surrender. This opinion seems better to us, especially because of the Council of Trent defining: "If anyone says that a ratified but unconsummated marriage is not dissolved through the solemn religious profession of one of the spouses, let him be anathema."³⁴⁶ For a ratified marriage is a true marriage and indissoluble by divine law itself. If nevertheless solemn profession dissolves such a marriage, this cannot come from ecclesiastical law alone, but from divine law; otherwise even some Supreme Pontiff could abolish the canon of Trent just cited, which indeed seems impossible. Although solemn vows consist essentially in the spiritual consecration of the person vowing, nevertheless the Supreme Pontiff can for a grave cause dispense from their obligations, just as he can also permit a consecrated chalice to be employed for profane uses.

³³⁶ By decree of the Pontifical Commission on 15 July 1919, special laws were established concerning the profession of religious who must perform military service. Cf. our Man. iur. can. q. 212.

³³⁷ This vow is more accurately called solemnized.

³³⁸ C. unic. 3, 15 in VI°.

³³⁹ Const. Ascendente Domino, 22 May 1584.

³⁴⁰ De relig. tr. 7, l. 2, c. 108ff.

³⁴¹ Ius can. l. 3, tit. 34, n. 8.

³⁴² Ius Decret. III, n. 684, and IV, n. 377.

³⁴³ IV, dist. 38, q. 1, a. 2.

³⁴⁴ Cf. Billuart, De relig. diss. 4, a. 5.

³⁴⁵ Theol. mor. I, n. 647ff.

³⁴⁶ Sess. 24, can. 6 (Denz. n. 976).

S. Th. II-II, q. 88, a. 1, 4, 5, 6.

710. A vow (voeu; gelofte) is a promise made to God.1 - In this definition there is indicated:

1. The genus: promise, that is, a deliberate and spontaneous obligation of faith or fidelity toward another, undertaken for doing or omitting something; and thus it is distinguished from a simple purpose, even one made before God and firmly established, which per se induces no obligation, although by not fulfilling it one can sin by negligence or inconstancy toward oneself. A purpose, namely, is the mere will of doing or omitting something, but a vow is the will of furnishing it as a debt, so that from it there arises an obligation toward God, and as it were a special title is acquired by God for exacting for Himself the thing promised. The reason is that a vow, like a contract, is a certain private law which the one vowing of his own accord imposes upon himself and by it obliges himself to God.

Moreover, for a promise, on the part of the one promising, three acts are required: a) deliberation of the intellect; b) a spontaneous purpose of the will, that is, the intention of obliging oneself or giving faith; c) the signification or manifestation and expression of this will, which is essentially the promise itself. This is an act of practical reason, to which it pertains to order: for just as by commanding or entreating a man orders what is to be done for him by others, so by promising he orders what he himself ought to do for others. To these, on the other side, is added a) acceptance of the faith given. But since every heart lies open to God, the will and interior thought suffice for a vow; and if the due conditions are present, it is accepted by God, because it is pleasing to Him (Deut. XXIII, 21; Num. XXX, 3; Eccl. V, 3).

2. The specific difference: made to God, so that it may be indicated that a vow is an act of religion: for a promise is made to another for his advantage and utility, or service and honor; but from our promises no advantage can arise for God, but only honor and glory; hence by vow we order good works to be performed in honor of God, and therefore by its nature it is an elicited act of religion.

Hence promises which are made directly to the saints are not vows strictly so called, but acts of dulia, as if someone promises something to the Blessed Virgin, not thinking of God and without any relation to God. Nevertheless a) a promise made to God of fulfilling or executing what was promised to the saints (a. 5, ad 3), b) likewise a promise made to God before the saints as patrons or witnesses, under their invocation or protection (IV Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, ad 4), c) or made principally to God but secondarily in honor or memory of the saints, in the way in which churches and altars are erected to the saints and sacrifices are celebrated, so that they may be more honored and God may be honored by the worship of the saints, are vows: this last mode the faithful generally intend when they say that they vow to the saints.

1. Canon 1307: "A vow, that is, a deliberate and free promise made to God concerning a possible and better good, must be fulfilled from the virtue of religion."

I. Before I present the notion, or definition, of a vow, I set forth first the various meanings of this word. The name "votum" derives from the verb vovere, "to vow." Now to vow is the same as to promise — not to anyone, but to God or to the Saints. "To promise," "to pledge," "to engage" are words by which we disclose to men, or to God, the desires of our mind, and bind ourselves. "To vow," however, properly signifies to promise something to God, since a vow is an act of religion, by which we worship God. The word "votum" is also often taken for "desire" ["wish"]. Hence those who obtain their desires are called "compotes voti" ["having attained their wish"]. "To make vows" (vota facere) not infrequently means the same as to pray, or to wish; and pious desires are called "vota," and are sometimes even used for the very resolve of the will. From these various meanings, we must now establish the genuine notion of the vow, which shall be the subject of the disputation to follow.

II. St. Raymond (in his Summa, Bk. I, on vows) gives this definition of a vow: "A vow is a deliberate promise made to God concerning a better good." This definition differs little from that which theologians commonly give, following St. Thomas (II-II, q. 88), which is as follows: "A vow is a deliberate and spontaneous promise made to God concerning a better good." Five conditions are commonly assigned to a vow. The first is deliberation, whereby the intellect weighs and considers the burden to be undertaken. The second is the resolve, or the will to promise, to bind oneself, and to carry out the promise. The third is the promise itself, which is customarily called a certain practical utterance of the intellect. The fourth, that this promise be made to God, to whom alone, as will be said below, vows properly so called are made. The fifth, that it be a promise concerning a better good — that is, concerning a matter pleasing to God, or a good of supererogation, which is not commanded — if a vow is taken strictly and properly. Although, as will be said below, a vow can also be made concerning a commanded thing, insofar as the commanded thing is constituted, by the one vowing, as matter of religion; and under this title, it can be called a better good, or a work of supererogation. But, as I said, when we come below to discuss the matter of a vow, this condition will be more fully explained from St. Thomas.

III. The conditions indicated must be explained. And first it must be noted that no words or signs at all are required for a vow to be complete, as the Angelic Doctor teaches (loc. cit.), and St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2). "It is not necessary," he says, "for the promise to be expressed in words; but it suffices to have promised in the heart." For that reason, words, signs, or nods, by which the internal feelings of the mind are made known, are necessary for a promise made to a man — because man does not see what is in the heart, as God does. Wherefore a human promise, to be accepted, needs words or signs; a vow made to God does not. This, however, is said so that we may explain the nature of a vow. In practice, however, it will always be advisable, both for firmer memory and for a clearer declaration of the vow, to express the vow in words — as David is read to have done (Ps. 65): "I will pay thee my vows, which my lips have uttered."

IV. Theologians dispute, not without difficulty, in which act — of the intellect, or of the will — the essence of the vow consists. We will free ourselves from this difficulty briefly. All agree that several acts, both of the will and of the intellect, are required beforehand for a vow. If you look to the essence of the vow, it consists in a practical act of the intellect. For a vow is a private law, whereby someone binds himself to God to do something; and orders and directs what he imposes on himself to be done, to God's honor and glory. Now to direct, and to order, is an act of the commanding intellect; yet it carries with it the resolve of the will. How the resolve of the will, which moves, precedes the very acts of the intellect, will be discussed elsewhere, when the internal acts come to be outlined.

V. Question I. How much deliberation is required for a vow? Response: All, to a man, affirm that deliberation is necessary for making a vow. But since deliberation, or freedom of action, can be imperfect and only half-complete, or, on the other hand, perfect and full, the question here is which of these is required for a vow. The most common opinion is that full and perfect deliberation is required. This perfect deliberation consists in the one vowing being fully master of himself — that is, that he advert to, and know, what he is promising. For this perfect and full deliberation, a long and lengthy discussion of all the surrounding circumstances is by no means necessary. Nor does this perfect deliberation suffer from any disturbance or agitation of mind whatsoever — only from that which clouds the mind, and removes the light of reason. Otherwise, if any agitation of mind at all removed the necessary deliberation, very few vows would be found valid — since very many vows are made either in a spirit of devotion, or under the vehement impulse of some desire, or of anger, or of fear — all of which, though occasions, are nonetheless not the cause of the vow's invalidity. That freedom, then, which suffices for committing a sin, or for completing a contract, or some other grave business, is not doubted to suffice also for making a vow. Deliberation, then, can be considered in two ways: as it is opposed to a sudden impulse — which they call the "first movement" — and as it implies a serious discussion of all the means which might either advance or delay the deliberated matter. Deliberation taken in the first sense is necessary for a vow; not so in the second.

VI. Question II. Must sudden, hasty vows be fulfilled? Response: Vows, even if made suddenly, are valid, since, as has been said, they flow from a deliberate will. Such vows, however, are marked by imprudence. But if they are valid, they undoubtedly induce an obligation. Such a sudden making of a vow, moreover, gives just cause to seek either a dispensation, or a commutation. That someone, having made a vow, immediately repents of it, does not thereby prove the vow invalid — since it is not uncommon for many things to displease us as soon as they are done, even though conceived and carried out with full deliberation. If, however, the vow proceeded from some vehement disturbance, whether of anger or of fear, and the one vowing immediately repented of it, this would be no slight argument that the vow was invalid. No precise rule, however, can be assigned. For deliberation is an internal act, and can only be gathered from external signs. From various conjectures and circumstances, then, such vows are to be declared valid, or invalid. One rule alone is certain: that vows should be made only with great weighing and discussion. For they are private laws, which, before being enacted, ought to be brought to a severe examination of all the circumstances. Wherefore we say, with the most common opinion of theologians, that those who make vows of great import with only slight consideration sin, at least venially. For the greater the burden to be undertaken, the more mature the consideration, the more serious the discussion, and the more prudent the deliberation required. Hence it is said (Ecclesiasticus 5): "It displeaseth God, and a foolish promise." A promise is called foolish which lacks prudence and deliberation.

VII. Question III. Does one who rashly makes a vow of great import sometimes commit a mortal sin? And is a vow made with such a sin valid? Response: The gravity of any inconsideration is taken from the greater or lesser importance of the matter to be undertaken. A vow, by its very kind, is a grave matter entered into with God. It can become light on account of the lightness of the matter. But if the matter is grave, it will always be most grave. It will therefore be culpable to omit, more or less, the due consideration, according as the vow made will have been of greater or lesser importance. That a mortal sin should ever occur here, however, I would say, in my own opinion, is never the case. Sánchez, Suárez, and Lessius maintain that a mortal sin does occur, when the one vowing, taught by experience, foresees that he will transgress the vow he is making without due consideration. This opinion is rejected by the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 1, §2, n. 13), on the grounds that the danger of transgressing a vow arises equally when a vow is made with perfect deliberation. For one who vows precipitately exposes himself, on account of his own frailty, to the danger of promising impossible or unlawful things. For to promise such things to God is a grave sin. It will therefore likewise be a grave sin to expose oneself to the danger of promising similar things. They add, however, that a mortal sin can occur when one exposes himself to this danger by vowing without consultation and precipitately, foreseeing such a danger.

VIII. I judge both the first and the second opinion to be false. Do not all agree that perfect and full deliberation is required for a vow? One who vows precipitately, with only half-complete deliberation, vows nothing. If the lack of full deliberation excuses from the vow, it will, with even greater reason, excuse from the aforesaid danger. What then? Will deliberation be imperfect with respect to the vow, but full with respect to the danger? These are paradoxical claims. For one who, with full light and deliberate will, foresees the danger, also sees what he is vowing. But if the inconsideration is such as to impede freedom and full deliberation, the one vowing vows nothing at all. How, then, can it be true, as the theologians of Salamanca say, that the one vowing exposes himself to the danger of promising unlawful or impossible things — if, indeed, he vows nothing, and promises nothing, on account of the lack of the necessary and full deliberation? He sins, then, only venially, on account of the lack of due consideration and reflection — a crime of mere imprudence, which does not exceed the bounds of venial malice. Men are, therefore, to be dissuaded from such vows, and instructed that, before making vows, they should give more serious thought to their own strength, inclinations, circumstances, and state in life. As for the second point — that one who, after experience of a violated vow, vows the same thing again, even with full deliberation, sins mortally, even though nothing prevents him from fulfilling the vow to God — this is likewise clear to be false. For such a vower always makes his vow with the intention of showing God worship, in order to restrain himself from vice. It is, therefore, solely a crime of imprudence and inconsideration, which does not exceed the bounds of venial malice.

IX. Question IV. When a vow is valid, and the one vowing is bound to fulfill it, does nothing prevent that vow from proceeding from some fit of anger, fear, or other passion, as if from an occasion, and consequently occurring with some accompanying half-deliberate fault? Response: This is affirmed, since such a fault neither removes the deliberation necessary for the vow, nor infects the vow itself.

X. Question V. Does full deliberation suffice for any vow, even one concerning a slight matter, or is virtual deliberation sufficient? Response: Some affirm, among whom the theologians of Salamanca are counted (loc. cit., n. 15), citing St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, notab. 6), that a sudden vow does not oblige to a perfect sin, nor to a perfect good. This, however, is false: for regardless of how the matter stands, I answer that full deliberation is required for any vow, however slight the matter, and that half-complete deliberation does not suffice. For any vow whatsoever is a private law, whose nature the magnitude or smallness of the matter in no way alters. Such a vow, by its very nature, obliges gravely. Even granting (the opposite of which we shall show below) that, by reason of a slight matter, it induces only a light obligation, this in no way prevents it from being a true law — and a private law, by its very nature, requires perfect deliberation. A venial sin (as the previous argument runs) can be committed by only half-complete deliberation, because the act is, by its own kind, imperfect in the moral order; but any vow whatsoever, whatever its matter, whether great or small, demands, in the order of religion, perfect deliberation, or actual freedom — this consideration removed, whatever else is perfect [would not matter]. But this author establishes no reason from this at all. In another part of his little work, he shows little regard for authority.

XI. Question VI. Does a firm resolve, or any kind of simple willing, constitute a vow? Response: Some canonists teach that a resolve alone suffices for a vow. The common opinion of theologians and canonists is the contrary — since a resolve is nothing other than the will to do something; a resolve is indeed a prerequisite for a vow, but the nature of the vow does not consist in it. Concerning the second part of the question, there is not a single unanimous opinion among theologians. What all agree on is that the violation of no resolve, however efficacious and firm, is a mortal sin. There is dispute about venial fault. Not a few — Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 41, dub. 4), Angles (s.v. Votum, n. 1), Prado, Raphael de la Torre (II-II, q. 88, art. 1, disp. 7) — hold that no fault at all is committed in the violation of a resolve, since the very nature of a resolve indicates that it obliges no one, and it remains free for anyone to alter their plan at will. For in those things which men impose on themselves, their freedom always remains, so that they can, according to their own choice, change their resolve. This teaching follows St. Thomas here, art. 1, ad 1: "Those who propose to do something have not yet begun to do it, but only intend to do it in the future; whereas one who promises has already begun, in a certain way, to show that he will fulfill what he promises — just as one who puts his hand to the plough has already begun to plough, even though he has not yet finished the ploughing." This opinion of St. Thomas's is very frequently invoked by the Fathers in support of a vow's resolve. Whenever Augustine indicates the violation of a vow, he calls it a falling away from resolve — a "transgression," as he says. In the same way Bernard and Gregory speak. That the breaking of a resolve is not free of venial fault is held by other Fathers, who cite that saying of St. Bernard (Epistle 9): "Whoever has made a good resolve to do something has made it unlawful for himself not to do what he could have done." This opinion of St. Thomas's is used to argue for an inconstancy, a levity, and, so to speak, an unfaithfulness. That it is false is denied, however. Nay, I myself judge that some fault does occur, if someone, without any cause, departs from a good resolve — not indeed on the ground that he thereby violates the obligation, which we have said does not exist, of the resolve; but on account of that general principle: that not to advance in the way of the Lord is to fall behind. Everyone, then, ought to take care to carry out what he has resolved, unless reasons arise that suggest the contrary. And although this is not a binding law, nor does it bind the debt of fidelity, such a change can with great difficulty be cleared of the taint of inconstancy and fickleness on the part of the one changing. And to this extent, perhaps, we can in no way condemn the first opinion; and in this sense we by no means reject it.

XII. Question VII. Does the essence of a vow consist in the use of the word "promise" — and does what has been promised differ from a resolve carried out? Response: The most common opinion of theologians holds that a vow consists precisely in the falling due of a promise made to God. The reason is drawn from Scripture itself, which describes a vow through the term "promise." For it is said (Deut. 23): "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it... thou shalt do according as thou hast promised." Likewise (Ecclesiastes 5): "If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it: for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him" — and further on: "it is much better not to vow, than after a vow not to perform the things promised." A vow, then, is explained by Scripture through the term "promise." All alike affirm this. For this distinction to become clearer, however, the notions of both must be set forth. A promise is customarily defined thus: "An act by which someone intends to do something, his own obligation having been undertaken toward another." This definition explains the common meaning, or nature, of a promise. For the promise of a vow is a particular act by which someone binds himself to render something to the worship of God; a resolve, however, as is commonly said, proceeds from a deliberation to do something; or, as this common definition explains, a resolve proceeds from the deliberation of the thing to be done; a promise, from the deliberation of accepting an obligation, and imposing it upon oneself. Theologians dispute to which power of the soul a promise pertains. Fr. Suárez (Bk. I, ch. 13) treats this question at great length, which we judge it best to pass over, since it appears to us of no great importance. We say only, following St. Thomas (II-II, q. 88, art. 1), that a promise pertains to the intellect — for it is a practical utterance, or command, by which a man directs himself toward God, or by which he binds himself to him. For through a vow, which consists in a promise, a man raises himself up toward God. Now to direct and to order pertains to the intellect, not to the will — whatever Suárez may assert to the contrary, following Scotus, whose objections I now pass over in silence, since they are not of such weight that I ought to spend more time examining them.

XIII. Question VIII. What resolve is required for a vow to be valid? Response: All, to a man, admit the necessity of a resolve for the validity of a vow. The disagreement concerns only the quality of the resolve, or of the intention and deliberation. For the resolve of the one vowing can be considered in different ways. First, if he has a deliberate resolve to promise, and to bind himself (in other words, to promise and to vow), and has a deliberate mind not to vow. Second, if someone has the resolve to vow, and to bind himself, but at the same time has a deliberate will not to carry out the promise. In a third way, the one vowing can be considered insofar as he has the intention, or resolve, to promise and to fulfill the promise, but without the intention of binding himself.

XIV. The common opinion is that one who vows in the first manner makes no vow at all, since he only wishes to trifle with words. In confirmation of this opinion, the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 1, §3, n. 14) adduce this authority of St. Thomas, from Bk. IV of the Sentences, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 1, qc. 1, ad 1: "A promise made only in words, and in the heart, to God, is not a vow." This authority of St. Thomas is, however, cited only in part, and does not express the Doctor's true mind; for the Angelic Doctor immediately adds: "Yet man can be sufficiently compelled to promise by a certain interpretive coercion... although he can be compelled simply to an exterior promise, as also to other exterior acts of the will, he cannot, however, be compelled to an interior promise." The opinion of St. Thomas, then, is that if someone, under compulsion, uttered the exterior words that express a vow, he would make no vow at all — since a compelled exterior promise, if the one vowing lacks the positive will to promise, is a mockery, and a mere shadow of a promise. But if someone had a positive, deliberate mind to promise, and, with this deliberate will, spontaneously and freely uttered the words of a vow — even though, with another intention, he did not wish to bind himself — it seems to us probable that such a person does make a vow; because that internal, efficacious intention, or resolve, contains a vow, and necessarily carries with it the will to bind oneself. For whoever, seriously and with a deliberate mind, with no one compelling him, utters the words of a vow, freely wills and deliberately promises — or deliberately makes a vow. As for the intention which would elicit the opposite — namely, that by which the one vowing refuses to bind himself — whether it can prevail against that former, efficacious intention, I leave to be disputed by others, since this is more a discussion for the author's own scrutiny; I abstain from it here. This much I will add for practical purposes: that one who, with a deliberate mind, without any interior resolve, would utter the words of a vow, could not, in the opinion of all, I think, be excused from any fault whatsoever. For if a mocking and deceitful promise made to men is not free of fault, how much more vicious will a promise full of deceit and guile, made to God, be?

XV. Those who vow in the second manner — namely, with the intention of promising, and of binding themselves, but with the will not to fulfill the promise — although Valentia (Vol. III, II-II, disp. 6, q. 6, punct. 1) says that such vowers do not make a vow, the most common opinion is that they do elicit a true vow; since the essence of a vow is completed by a voluntary promise, made with both the intention to promise and the intention to bind oneself. A vow is a private law, which is enacted by the legislator with the will to bind, without the will to carry out [immediately]. It can, quite well, be asked. But the latter — the resolve not to fulfill — is not efficacious, and cannot nullify the first two elements — of promising and of binding oneself, that is, the very practical command by which the vow is commanded, and directed toward the worship of God. Wherefore one who promises marriage, or who receives holy orders, with the will to act against them, validly contracts marriage, and validly receives holy orders... receives holy orders — even though he did not have the will to fulfill what he promised; nevertheless he is bound to fulfill his promises. But such cases scarcely arise in practice.

XVI. You will object: St. Thomas says that a promise proceeds from a resolve, and the will to fulfill the promise constitutes the essence of the promise. If, then, the resolve to act is lacking, the promise itself is lacking. What more is there to say? If someone promised a man something, and immediately added that he had no intention of fulfilling it, would he not be held a mocker, not a true promiser?

XVII. Response: St. Thomas, when he says that a promise proceeds from the resolve to make the promise, is speaking of a perfect promise; and when he says that three things are required for a vow — deliberation, resolve, and promise — he is speaking of a vow according to the regular and common norm of vowing. But when some condition is lacking which pertains neither to the essence of the vow, nor of the promise, the vow is not destroyed, but remains merely imperfect. Now the condition of fulfilling what is promised, or vowed, in no way pertains to the nature of either the promise or the vow; it is external and incidental to it, and therefore cannot destroy the vow. What is added, then, is beside the point. To be sure, if someone promised, and immediately added that he refused to fulfill the promise, he would not be a true promiser, but a mocker. But if he promised sincerely and deliberately, as we are now discussing, he would be compelled to hold to his promises, and to fulfill them.

XVIII. One who vows in the third manner is bound by the vow. For one who vows and promises with a sincere and deliberate mind really wills all those things which are necessarily included in the vow and promise itself. Now in a true vow and promise is included the obligation of carrying out the thing promised. In the same way that someone deliberately wills some cause, by that same will he necessarily wills to attain that cause's effect. Can one who deliberately commits a rape reject vengeance? This opinion is upheld by Sotus (Bk. 7, q. 1, art. 1), Suárez (Bk. I, ch. 3, n. 7), Azor (Part I, Bk. XI, ch. 13, q. 9), Sánchez (II-II, q. 88, art. 1), Aragón, Prado (Vol. II, ch. 31, q. 1), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 1, n. 27), Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 41, n. 12), Trullench (dub. 1, n. 6), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 1, §6, n. 24), and many others. Sotus (q. ult.) and Valentia (disp. 1, punct. 1) argue the contrary, on the grounds that whoever attaches a condition contrary to the substance of a contract renders that contract void. Moreover, a vow is a private law, which does not oblige beyond the legislator's intention.

This question is much ado about nothing, and to be dismissed among trifles: for either the hypothesis is chimerical, or it is true. For, granting the premise that someone really wishes to vow and promise — indeed, that he really does vow and promise, admitting, I say, this true and sincere will, which has already broken forth into the act of vowing and promising — the later will is a mere velleity, which cannot override the former, efficacious will. Since, moreover, it can scarcely, if at all, be conceived that a man, master of himself, should sincerely and with deliberate mind wish to vow and promise, while simultaneously wishing not to bind himself, we pass over this question as an empty one.

I. This dispute is carried on both against heretics, and among Catholics. Modern heretics, the Lutherans and Calvinists, just as they take away all worship from the Saints, likewise maintain that no vows, no promises, can be dedicated to the honor of the Saints in any sense whatsoever, without incurring the guilt of idolatry. Erasmus, in the dialogue entitled "The Shipwreck," pours scorn on the vows of sailors; and although he seems to rail furiously against ill-considered vows made out of fear of death by those who, to escape the jaws of the waves, flee to the Saints, he nonetheless proceeds most shamelessly to ridicule not only the vows themselves, and the very prayers offered to the Saints, but even attacks the Saints themselves, and prattles that the Most Sacred Virgin, invoked by sailors as though ignorant of navigation, cannot come to the aid of the shipwrecked; he blurts out that it is Venus, not the Virgin, who presides over the sea, and vomits forth much else against St. Thomas, Vincent, and Catherine of Siena, which it pains me even to recall. Elsewhere I have plainly shown that the Saints are to be honored and invoked by us. Now, however, the discussion concerns only vows. We do not deny to Erasmus and his companions that many ill-considered vows are, at times, dedicated to the Saints, extorted by human fear. But it is one thing to say that Catholics abuse vows on occasion; it is quite another to detest the vows themselves.

II. All Catholics teach, against the heretics, that vows can, in some sense, be dedicated to the Saints, and that this is a most ancient custom of the Church, as is gathered from Eusebius (Bk. XIII, Preparation for the Gospel, ch. 7), who says, in the name of all Christians approaching the monuments of the Martyrs: "This we do, as messengers of true piety... we approach the monuments of Martyrs as friends of God, and we perform our vows, professing them, as it were, to holy men." Theodoret (Bk. VIII, To the Greeks) represents the images, or the members' likenesses, of vows offered by the lame, the blind, and other such afflicted persons who had received health from God through the patronage of the Saints. He says: "They, having prayed piously and faithfully, and having obtained in large measure what they desired, testify to this by fulfilling their vows: some hang up images of eyes, others of feet or hands, fashioned from silver or gold." I could adduce much more, were it not readily available among theologians.

III. Setting aside, then, the various manners of speaking, we shall now explain the way in which vows may be said to be dedicated to the Saints — the manner which we find more probable, and which St. Thomas gives (II-II, q. 88, art. 5, ad 3), where he decrees that vows are properly made to God alone, in these words: "To the third it must be said that a vow is made to God alone, and the promise itself is also made to God — but a promise can also be made to a man, as it is a certain virtuous work. And in this way is to be understood a vow whereby someone vows something to the Saints, or to Prelates — namely, that the promise itself made to the Saints, or to Prelates, falls under the matter of the vow, insofar, that is, as a man vows to God that he will fulfill what he promises to the Saints or to Prelates." Two promises, then, though not distinguished in words, must in fact be distinguished. One is that whereby someone promises to perform some work in honor of a Saint; and this promise is not a vow. The other is the promise made to God, whereby someone pledges to God that he will fulfill what he promised in honor of the Saints; and it is in this second promise that the vow consists. From this it follows that vows are properly dedicated to God alone, under the auspices of the Saints — since a vow is an act of religion, and of the worship of latria, which is owed to God alone. This brief and clear teaching of St. Thomas alone overthrows all the fabrications of the Lutherans and Calvinists against vows dedicated to the Saints.

IV. What has been said does not prevent vows from being said to be dedicated to the Saints themselves, if the term is used in a broader sense. For the heretics themselves are forced to admit that the term "vow" extends more broadly, and is not restricted to an act of religion alone. For pious desires and prayers are very often called "vows," both in the Scriptures, and in common speech, and even in the writings of the pagans themselves. There is no reason, then, for the heretics to cavil that we commit the crime of idolatry when we dedicate vows to the Saints — if we openly testify that the vows we dedicate to them are not vows properly so called, nor acts of religion, that is, of the worship of latria, but of a far lower kind. Sacrifice is never offered to the Saints, since the term "sacrifice" is not as broad as the term "vow." For in the common estimation of all, "sacrifice" signifies an oblation owed to God alone; nor is it extended to signify gifts offered to creatures, as "vow" is. We dedicate "vows," then, to God, as the first and supreme giver of all good things, as a token of a grateful mind for benefits received, or to be obtained; we offer "vows" to the Saints as intercessors, through whom we trust to receive benefits from God more easily.

V. When Catholics, then, vow to the Blessed Virgin, to St. Augustine, to St. Benedict, to St. Francis, or to St. Dominic, the genuine sense is that they vow to God in the presence of these Saints, as witnesses, patrons, and helpers, to implore divine aid, by which the vows made may be fulfilled. What, I ask, is there of idolatry in this? Similarly, one who promises obedience to a Prelate, or vows to render or offer something to a hospice, vows to God, although he promises to obey the Prelate — which promise, as it concerns the Prelate, is not a vow, but the matter of a vow; nor, in the aforesaid vow, does the one honoring the hospice intend God, although the vow made to God is directed toward the benefit of that hospice.

VI. You will object: When we dedicate vows to the Saints, do we not thereby honor and worship the Saints themselves? Our vows, then, concern the Saints themselves, and consequently we offer our vows not to God alone, but to the Saints as well. Response: The solution is clear from what has been said. We dedicate vows, properly so called, as they are taken in the sacred Scriptures, to God alone. We offer to the Saints promises, which are not vows, but the matter of vows. We honor and worship the Saints as witnesses and intercessors of our vows, or as those who obtain for us from God the aids by which we may be able to fulfill our vows. Cajetan adds that vows are not made to the Saints considered as creatures endowed with reason, but insofar as God dwells and resides within them through glory; so that the vows said to be made to the Saints are made to God residing in the Saints. This solution does not depart from St. Thomas's teaching, as Suárez indicates (Bk. I, ch. 16, n. 5). For Cajetan, by this solution, or distinction, confirms the teaching of the holy Doctor: for if the vows dedicated to the Saints are made to God residing in the Saints, it is plain that a vow, properly taken, is made to God alone. The worship, however, that is offered to the Saints in these vows, taken in their broad meaning — those which are really only promises — does not proceed from the virtue of religion, or the worship of latria, but only of dulia. More clearly: it is not a merely civil and human worship, nor is it a worship of latria owed to God alone, as the supreme, sole Godhead, the principle and giver of all goods; but it is a worship customarily called dulia, which we offer the Saints on account of the singular excellence with which they have been endowed by God. And when we dedicate such vows to them, we do not recognize them as distributors of graces and aids, but as mediators and intercessors before God and Jesus Christ his Son, who is our true and only mediator and redeemer. For all — whether Angels or Saints — intercede for us before God solely by virtue of the merits of Jesus Christ. As for the further objection commonly repeated — that, by the same reasoning by which vows are offered to the Saints reigning in heaven, they could likewise be offered to saintly persons still living on earth — this is an empty sophism. For those who dwell with us on earth are neither confirmed in grace, nor in glory; they may be holy now, and cease to be so later. Besides which, we cannot know for certain that anyone clothed in this mortal flesh is holy; we only piously believe it of someone. But we know for certain that those reigning with God in heaven will never lose their sanctity; we know for certain that they are confirmed forever in grace and in glory.

I. We shall have occasion, when we discuss the number and multitude of vows made in the religious state, to say more on the division of vows. For the present we shall touch on only a few points. First, a vow is customarily divided into absolute, conditional, and penal. Then into solemn and simple. Third, into necessary and free, or common and particular, personal and mixed. Fourth, into affirmative and negative; perpetual and temporary; reserved and non-reserved; public and secret; express and tacit, or mental and vocal. These are the divisions you will find everywhere among all authors.

II. A vow is called absolute when you vow something free from any dependence on a condition. It is called conditional when some condition is attached to it, upon whose occurrence the obligation of fulfilling the vow arises — as if you say: "I vow chastity," "I vow two fasts on bread and water, if I recover," "if I escape from this danger." A vow is called penal when, in order to observe the thing promised, you add a penalty to be incurred — as if you say: "I vow the discipline [i.e. self-flagellation] to the point of shedding blood, if I gamble, if I enter that house full of snares." This vow is called conditional-penal. It differs from a purely conditional vow in this way: in the latter, the condition is not added as a penalty, but as a condition; in the former, the condition is added in the manner of a penalty.

III. Before I proceed further, a few things must be said about the various conditions that can be attached to vows. For some are general and necessary conditions; others are particular and free ones.

The general and necessary conditions, which are presupposed by their very nature, do not, by any means, constitute a conditional vow. Such are these: "if I live," "if it pleases God," "if my superior does not forbid it," "if the sun will rise tomorrow," as is held in the chapter Beata, dist. 26, q. 2. Likewise, a condition concerning the past or present does not render a vow conditional; rather it leaves it absolute, since it does not suspend anything, from the moment it is made, just as if no condition had been attached at all. The reason is that a condition, properly so called, suspends a contract in view of a future event; but a condition regarding the past, or the present, does not suspend anything — as if you say: "I vow a fast, if my father is dead," "if he is now alive": for once the truth of the condition is established, the obligation of the vow is not suspended, but is in full force, and binds the one vowing. So authors commonly teach. It could, however, sometimes be called a conditional vow with respect to the one vowing, if the knowledge of the outcome of the condition were future — and so the vow would then be bound up with the father's death, or life. But this is a disagreement among authors on words. An absolute vow is also called one made with the intention of suspending its execution to a future time — as if you say: "I vow to enter religious life, if my father should die, if I reach my twentieth year, if I complete my course of studies." For that particle "if," in these cases, conveys the same sense as "when." For you absolutely vow to embrace religious life at a determinate time. The theologians of Salamanca (loc. cit., punct. 3, n. 88) also defend as absolute a vow like this: "I promise to enter religious life, if my elder brother should have sons" — since, they say, you absolutely intend religious life, and do not prefer your brother's succession to it, but merely suspend its execution.

This opinion, however, seems to me false — whether we look at the very notion of a condition, as authors commonly do, or at the theologians of Salamanca themselves. For a condition is called that which suspends an act until it is itself posited. Now one who binds his entry into religious life to his brother's future — truly future, and uncertain, or contingent — succession, attaches his vow to a condition. Why, then, will it not be conditional? Wherefore Suárez (Bk. VI, ch. 21, n. 6), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 20, n. 83), and Pontius (Bk. VII, ch. 9, n. 18) rightly defend it as truly conditional.

IV. The theologians of Salamanca object: One who promises to enter religious life, if his elder brother should have sons, makes his vow out of an affection for religious life; nor does he prefer his brother's succession to the obligation of religious life, but merely postpones its execution; therefore the vow is absolute. They add, then, that if the one vowing says: "I promise to enter religious life, if I recover my health, if I escape from danger, if I fall into such-and-such a sin" — this vow would be conditional. Response: I do not see why this latter vow would be conditional, and the former absolute; rather, I judge the opposite to be true. For the reason given is shown to be false. Does not one who binds his entry into religious life to his brother's succession prefer his brother's succession to religious life? I ask: if his elder brother lacked sons, would the one vowing be bound to enter religious life? By no means, certainly — just as one who vowed in the second manner would not be bound, if the attached conditions should fail to occur. Truly, then, he prefers his brother's succession to religious life; for, his brother's succession failing, he does not intend to enter religious life.

V. A celebrated division of vows is into solemn and simple. A vow is called solemn which is made in the sight of the Church, and accepted by her; simple, which is made by a person as it were in private. Whether such vows differ in species, or only by divine or ecclesiastical law, according to the dignity of the religious state, has already been discussed above.

VI. A vow is called necessary — that which all make at baptism, renouncing the devil, and the pomps of the world; and this is called necessary because it concerns the observance of the evangelical law, necessary for salvation. It is not, however, properly called a vow, as we have already indicated above. A vow is called free which is spontaneously made concerning something not necessary for salvation — such as preserving chastity; or, if someone makes a vow concerning a thing that is already necessary, prescribed by precept, freely binding himself to it by a new bond of vow, which he could have omitted.

VII. Again, a vow is called either common or particular. Some, such as Bonacina, call "common" a vow made by a community, or by all its members; "particular" that which each individual makes at his own discretion. But authors commonly teach that "common" is the same as "necessary," and "particular" the same as "free" — and this is the true opinion.

VIII. A "real" vow is that whereby some external thing is offered to God; a "personal" vow, whereby an action, or omission, pertaining to the person is bound; a "mixed" vow, whereby both are promised — namely, both an external thing, such as alms, and an action affecting the one vowing, such as a pilgrimage, or fasting together with alms. So all agree. Likewise, all assert that a vow is called "affirmative" when something positive is pledged to be done — for example, alms; "negative," when something negative is promised — such as abstinence from meat, from gambling, from sin.

IX. A vow is called "perpetual" which lasts until the death of the one vowing — such as a vow to give alms every month for one's whole life; and this is called perpetual with respect to the bond of the obligation affecting the one vowing. It can, however, be perpetual in another way — namely, on the part of the matter, destined to endure after the death of the one vowing; such is a vow to build a monastery, or a hospital, in which Religious, or sick poor persons, are perpetually to be fed. A vow is also customarily called perpetual "of itself," and by the nature of the thing, when it was absolutely uttered — as when someone vows chastity, religious life, etc. — since, even though nothing express concerning perpetuity is stated, nonetheless, according to common understanding, perpetuity is understood of itself. It is called perpetual "by accident," however, when it does not, by its own nature, present this perpetuity, but it must be gathered from the intention, or words, of the one vowing. A vow is called "temporary" when it lasts for a certain, definite time — say, a vow to fast once a week for one year. All this is most common.

X. Vows are called "reserved" in which immediate and inferior Prelates lack the power of dispensing; such power is reserved to a higher Prelate alone. Those are called "not reserved" whose relaxation belongs even to immediate, and inferior, Prelates. An "express," or "formal," vow is one made in set formulas of words; a "tacit," or "virtual," or "implicit" vow is one made not by express words, but is inferred from other things — namely, when something is performed to which a vow is attached; such is the vow of chastity which subdeacons of the Catholic Church make upon receiving holy orders. A vow is called "public" which is made openly; "secret," which is made privately. All this is easy, and common ground among all.

I. Question I. What is a vow, and what its conditions? Answer. It is a deliberate and spontaneous promise made to God concerning a better thing. Five conditions are assigned: 1. deliberation; 2. the will of promising and of executing the promise; 3. the promise itself; 4. that this promise be made to God; 5. that it be concerning a better thing, or one pleasing to God. Each condition must be explained.

II. For a vow, full deliberation is required, which consists in this: that the one vowing be master of himself, and advert to and know what he promises. Not to say more: that liberty which suffices for committing a sin, for perfecting a contract, suffices for a vow. Wherefore vows, even sudden ones, can be valid, when they proceed from a deliberate will. Vows of this kind, however, suffer from imprudence, which, on account of such a precipitate emission, according to the variety of circumstances, can be dispensed with or commuted. A virtual deliberation suffices, however, as in all other actions, contained in other preceding actions, provided the one vowing be master of himself. A mere purpose does not suffice for a vow, since a purpose is nothing other than a will of doing something. A promise, then, is necessary. Often the unlearned confuse a purpose with a promise, and conversely. Wherefore a prudent director of souls will gather from the circumstances whether a vow has been made or not. If someone should vow with the mind of promising and binding himself, but with the will of not fulfilling the promise, he would elicit and constitute the vow: because the latter purpose of not fulfilling is inefficacious and inept.

III. The other clause, promise made to God, indicates that vows are made to God alone. When someone pledges that he will do some work in honor of some Saint, this is not a vow properly so called, but the matter of a vow. Wherefore vows which are made in honor of some Saint are called vows in a broader signification, which nevertheless have the force of binding. These vows are not acts of latria, owed to God alone, but of dulia, or hyperdulia. Catholics, then, vowing to the Blessed Virgin, to SS. Augustine, Benedict, Dominic, etc., vow to God before these Saints as witnesses, patrons, and helpers.

IV. Question II. What does the other clause, "concerning a better good," signify? Answer. The matter of a vow must be honorable, possible, free, not indifferent, and not impeding a greater good. Things which are commanded by divine or ecclesiastical law can be the matter of a vow, as the common opinion teaches. The clause "concerning a better good" has a twofold sense: first, compared to another good — as it is better to succor an endangered girl than another poor person exposed to no danger of soul. Secondly, with respect to the omission of that same good — as it is better to give alms than not to give. For fitting matter of a vow it suffices that it be a better good in this second way. Matter opposed to the evangelical counsels is in no way fit for a vow. Hence a vow of contracting marriage is invalid, because it is opposed to the evangelical counsel. If marriage were necessary for preserving the Commonwealth, for confirming peace between Princes — which scarcely, or not even scarcely, happens — they say that then the vow would be valid: because the matter of the vow is not so much the marriage, as the common good of the Commonwealth and of the Church. A vow of marrying, in order to bridle and restrain concupiscence, is null.

V. If a married person, impeded by a vow made from asking the debt, is troubled by stimuli of concupiscence, can he ask the debt? Fr. Sporer affirms it, citing Fr. Gobat. But this opinion is lax and false. Even laxer is the other opinion of Leander, denying that a vow of chastity, of religion, or of not marrying is valid when made by one for whom marriage is more wholesome, and who suffers grave rebellions of concupiscence. Nay, the same most benign Leander adds that supervening temptations and anxieties of the flesh render a vow of not marrying null. Read Tome 3 on the Decalogue, book 4, dissertation 1, chapter 4, number 12 and following. A vow of not vowing is invalid. That a vow of not seeking a dispensation is valid, if it is more useful to the soul not to seek a dispensation; on the contrary, that it is null, if it is more wholesome to the soul to request a dispensation, St. Antoninus and Richard teach.

VI. Question III. Are indifferent, useless, or vicious things the matter of a vow? Answer. All deny it. Yet if a thing which is by its own nature indifferent should, on account of some circumstance, put on honesty, it is fit matter for a vow. A vow whose execution is a sin is null. Wherefore Jephthah sinned in killing his daughter. Similarly, a vow made concerning a good thing for a depraved end is null: since then the vow is taken as an instrument for procuring a depraved end. Invalid too are vows of offering God gifts, of celebrating Masses, of laying out alms, which certain Christians are wont to make, this condition being added: if they come off victors in a duel, or in an unjust war. Likewise a vow made in thanksgiving to God for a shameful act already committed is invalid, and unbefitting God — as for a gain procured from unjust gambling. But valid is a vow made to obtain the safety of a son begotten of a concubine: because the health of the son is a good, although sin has preceded it. Equally valid are vows of punishing one's own crimes. Vows of a good thing for an indifferent end are null. A vow concerning an impossible thing is null.

VII. Question IV. If one who cannot fulfill the whole vow is bound to fulfill a part? Answer. You vowed to build a Church: unable to build the whole, are you bound to a part? That this one vowing is bound to nothing, Tamburini, Leander, Castropalao, and others teach. But a distinction must be made. If the separated part redounds to the honor of God, then the one vowing must execute it; but not if the separated part would be useless. But in this case the one vowing should build a Chapel in another Church, or something else in some temple, which would redound to God's honor. When the matter of a vow is mixed, partly good and partly evil, or vain, the good part must be fulfilled, the other neglected. Hence a vow of coming to Rome with a naked body is valid as regards the making of the journey; only the manner of nakedness must be omitted.

VIII. Question V. Is a vow of not gaming valid? Answer. The true and common opinion affirms it, because it concerns a better good. For gaming is something fortuitous in order to gain, or loss, and a source of evils. Therefore abstinence from gaming concerns a better good.

IX. Fr. Claude La-Croix teaches lax opinions on this argument, book 3, part 1, number 453 and following. An error crept into my Tome 3 on the Decalogue, page 117, number 8, where, in editing the lax opinion of this author, in place of "you wished" [voluisti], by an error certainly of the printers, "you vowed" [vovisti] was printed. This material error, although trivial and of no moment, I now correct, that I may satisfy my censors, and give thanks, since by objecting such very light blemishes to me they make plain to the whole World that Christian Theology is free both from Rigorism and from Laxism.

X. "If you vowed to this end" ("vowed" here, not "wished," says Fr. La-Croix, place cited, number 454) "that you would avoid quarrels, blasphemies, oaths ... it will be licit to play through another, even though these inconveniences are feared, because in very deed you are not playing." You are not playing, indeed, under your own name, but under another's; so neither do you blaspheme, quarrel, or swear with your own mouth, but with another's mouth. How lax these things are, and others which La-Croix teaches in the same place, let others judge.

XI. Question VI. Is a vow of never sinning valid? Answer. If the vow is of abstaining from every mortal sin, it is most valid. But if the vow is of avoiding all faults, even venial ones, taken collectively, the vow is null, inasmuch as it concerns a matter humanly...

impossible to human weakness. Valid, however, is a vow of avoiding this or that determinate deliberate venial sin — for instance, of not lying. But there is no need to dwell on unraveling these vows, since Christians must be persuaded to abstain in very deed from sins, not to burden themselves with a load of vows.

I. A vow is divided: 1. into absolute, conditional, and penal; 2. into solemn and simple; 3. into necessary and free; 4. into common and particular; 5. into real, personal, and mixed; 6. into affirmative and negative; 7. into perpetual and temporal; 8. into reserved and non-reserved; 9. into public and hidden; 10. into express and tacit, or into mental and vocal.

II. An absolute vow is free from every condition. A conditional vow has a condition attached — as if you say: "I vow alms, if I recover." Penal is when a penalty is attached, as if you say: "If I gamble, I vow a scourging." A penal vow differs from a conditional one, in that in the latter a condition is attached as condition, in the former as penalty.

III. A solemn vow is made in the sight of the Church, by which it is accepted through a Superior. A simple vow is made privately by a person. A necessary vow is that which all make in Baptism, renouncing the devil and his pomps. It is called necessary, because it concerns the observance of the evangelical law necessary for salvation. Free is that concerning a matter not necessary for salvation, such as entering Religion; or, if it concerns something already commanded, someone freely adds a vow. Common is the same as necessary, and particular the same as free.

IV. A real vow is that by which an external thing is offered to God. A personal vow is that by which an action or omission affecting the person is promised to God. A mixed vow concludes both, namely both a thing, such as alms, and an action, such as a pilgrimage. An affirmative vow is that by which something positive is pledged to God, such as alms. A negative vow abstains from something, such as from flesh, from gaming, from a sin.

V. A perpetual vow lasts until the death of the one vowing, such as a vow of monastic profession, of a perpetual alms, etc. Reserved vows are called those from which interior Prelates cannot dispense, but can from those not reserved. An express vow is that which is made in conceived formulas. An implicit, or tacit vow is that which is not made in express words, but is attached to another thing or state, such as the vow of chastity which Subdeacons make in receiving sacred Orders. A public vow is that which is made openly. A hidden vow, that which is made secretly. All these are obvious.

A VOW is a promise made to God concerning a better good. So D. Thomas, D. Bonaventure, and the others commonly. D. Bonaventure hands down another definition of a vow by way of the argument "sed contra": A vow is a conception of a better good, confirmed by deliberation of the mind.

The Socratic Doctor brings forward another definition, 3rd part, Centilog., section 55, from Hugh of St. Victor, book 2, part 12, chapter 3: It is the testimony of a promise made spontaneously, which ought to be made to God, and concerning things that pertain to God.

For deriving the essence of a vow from this, know from D. Bonaventure in the body of the text, and D. Thomas, article 1, that a promise properly so called is that by which we promise something to men, which therefore requires that it be made in a human manner, by words or by signs; and thus he says that by the first definition is defined a Solemn Vow, which is made in the face of the Church.

For the latter indicates a Vow according to externals: but by the second definition he says that the essence of a Vow is handed over simply before God. Sanchez adds, however, that the promise extends also to an internal pledge made to God. In which sense, in the definition of every vow, a Vow is called a Promise.

Next observe from D. Bonaventure that this pledge must be made to God; for it is an act of religion, by which we render to God what is owed, as to the giver of all things, either for giving thanks for things received, or for obtaining benefits.

The object of a Vow is said to be not only a good, but a better one, namely, it must be better than its opposite, that is, of greater virtue, as Sanchez notes De voto, cap. 1, and Azorius, book 11, Inst. cap. 14, n. 10.

But since this pledge must be morally good, it is necessary that it be voluntary, for which is required first deliberation, which is an action of the intellect and a full knowledge of the object. Second, proposal, which is confirmed freely from the knowledge of the object. Third, promise added to consent, as D. Bonaventure notes ad 1, and Sanchez loc. cit., Tanner, disp. 5, quaest. 4, dub. 1, with D. Thomas, art. 1 and 2 in corpore, and art. 5 ad 3, with whom all agree.

S. Bonav. asserts this in 2. dist. 38. dub. 2. and quaest. 1. First, from the definition of a vow. It is PROVED by D. Bonav. in Bibliis pauperum, cap. 15., from the vows which are read in Holy Scripture, all of which he recounts as made to God; inasmuch as they are acts of Religion. ALTHOUGH indeed in 1. Machab. 9. Antiochus is said to have promised to the temple of Jerusalem, this is understood as done to God, who is adored in the Temple.

So promises made to the saints are held to be exhibited to God, that God may be honored in the saints; just as also to swear by creatures, especially by the Saints, inasmuch as God shines forth particularly in them, and thus one swears by God alone, as S. Bonav. proves in 3. dist. 39. art. 2. quaest. 1., and D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 5. ad 3., whom all follow, as Baffeus v. Vot. notes, Sanchez l. 4. Decal. cap. 1. num. 41., and I shall say in the disputation on the Oath. See also Azorius l. 11. Instit. Moral. cap. 13. at the end, where he notes in what manner, in the issuing of solemn Vows, it is said: I promise to the Blessed Virgin, to B. Francis; Dominic; etc.: namely, the Saints are invoked as witnesses and patrons, that they may assist. Moreover, a vow is made to the holy Patriarchs, who hold the place of God; but let the vow be to God alone, as the giver of all things, as I said in quaestio 1.

THIS direction of a vow to the Saints, or of an oath to other creatures also, D. Bonav. calls Habitudinal; but that to God, immediate and Actual; and therefore he finds in it a greater obligation. See the S. Doctor in 3. dist. 39. dub. 2., in the letter.

Lucia, an Anglican, makes the three perpetual vows of religion in a certain congregation of Anglican women called Saint Margaret’s. While she was faithfully observing her vows, by reading Catholic books she gradually became persuaded that the Catholic religion alone was true. Therefore she left the Anglican Church and the congregation without any permission of the superioress, and was received into the Catholic Church by Julius, a Catholic priest. She asked Julius whether and to what extent she was still bound by the vows made in the Anglican Church, and what she must do if she were bound; he answered that she was by no means bound by them, inasmuch as they had been made from error, and that even if she were bound, he dispensed her from them in such a way that she remained entirely free. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a vow, and to what extent is it invalid from ignorance or error?

2. What is the obligation of a vow, and how does it cease?

3. Who are able to dispense from vows?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is a vow and how far is it rendered invalid by ignorance or mistake? A vow is a promise made to God concerning something which is possible and better than its opposite. Ignorance and mistake about the substance of the vow, or about some quality of it which is of great importance, makes the vow invalid; ignorance and mistake about accidental qualities of small moment do not invalidate the vow.

2. What is the obligation imposed by a vow and how does it cease?

A vow produces an obligation to perform what was promised to God. This obligation, like that of a law, depends partly on the matter of the vow, partly on the intention of him who takes the vow. If the matter is serious, the obligation will be grave, unless he who made the vow expressly limited the obligation, and willed it to be light. The obligation of a vow ceases intrinsically or extrinsically. It ceases intrinsically if the matter of it becomes impossible, useless, or immoral; if it undergo a change of importance; if the final cause of it cease to exist; and on the non-fulfilment of a condition if the vow was conditional. It ceases extrinsically if it is annulled, dispensed, or commuted by competent authority.

3. Who can dispense vows?

Those who have spiritual jurisdiction in the external forum can for good cause dispense from vows which are not reserved to a higher authority. The Pope, bishops, and Religious superiors can dispense by their ordinary authority; confessors and others who are capable of exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction, by delegated authority.

4. The case. Lucy, an Anglican, took the perpetual vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, in an Anglican order of St. Margaret. From reading Catholic books she became convinced that the Catholic Church is the true Church of Christ, left her convent without leave of her superioress, and asked Julius, a Catholic priest, to receive her into the Church. She further asked Julius whether and how far she was bound by her vows, and he answered that she was not bound at all, because they were taken under mistake, but in any case he said that he would dispense her from them as far as was necessary, so that she might be free.

Julius was wrong in saying that the vows were invalid on account of mistake. Lucy was under mistake about the true Church, but not about her vows, as far as the case allows us to see. She was also in error about the Religious congregation to which she belonged, and if she only took her vows as a member of the order, and conditionally on her remaining in it, they would lapse on her leaving it. But as they were perpetual we must not presume such a condition; they were taken to God independently of the order in which she took them. She had promised God to observe during her life poverty, chastity, and obedience, and we must presume that she knew and intended what she promised. The Anglican Church, however, had no legitimate claim on her, nor had the Anglican sisterhood. Hence they will be private vows, not vows of religion in the strict sense. Julius, as confessor, would usually have faculties to dispense the vows of poverty and obedience; the perpetual vow of chastity is reserved to the Holy See, though special powers are often granted to bishops to dispense in it. If Lucy wants a dispensation from this vow, she may have recourse to the bishop either directly or through her confessor. The Sacred Penitentiary, Nov. 29, 1842, answered that the vows of a Protestant made orally and in writing before an Anglican minister are simple vows, and that the one vowing is bound to the observance of the vow if he had a true intention of vowing.¹

1 Collectanea S. C. de P. F., n. 959. 2d ed.