Question — Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V · from Schola Thomistica

Question I: What a vow is, and what its conditions are

English · Latin · Both

1.

A VOW is a promise made to God concerning a better good. So D. Thomas, D. Bonaventure, and the others commonly. D. Bonaventure hands down another definition of a vow by way of the argument "sed contra": A vow is a conception of a better good, confirmed by deliberation of the mind.

2.

The Socratic Doctor brings forward another definition, 3rd part, Centilog., section 55, from Hugh of St. Victor, book 2, part 12, chapter 3: It is the testimony of a promise made spontaneously, which ought to be made to God, and concerning things that pertain to God.

3.

For deriving the essence of a vow from this, know from D. Bonaventure in the body of the text, and D. Thomas, article 1, that a promise properly so called is that by which we promise something to men, which therefore requires that it be made in a human manner, by words or by signs; and thus he says that by the first definition is defined a Solemn Vow, which is made in the face of the Church.

4.

For the latter indicates a Vow according to externals: but by the second definition he says that the essence of a Vow is handed over simply before God. Sanchez adds, however, that the promise extends also to an internal pledge made to God. In which sense, in the definition of every vow, a Vow is called a Promise.

5.

Next observe from D. Bonaventure that this pledge must be made to God; for it is an act of religion, by which we render to God what is owed, as to the giver of all things, either for giving thanks for things received, or for obtaining benefits.

6.

The object of a Vow is said to be not only a good, but a better one, namely, it must be better than its opposite, that is, of greater virtue, as Sanchez notes De voto, cap. 1, and Azorius, book 11, Inst. cap. 14, n. 10.

7.

But since this pledge must be morally good, it is necessary that it be voluntary, for which is required first deliberation, which is an action of the intellect and a full knowledge of the object. Second, proposal, which is confirmed freely from the knowledge of the object. Third, promise added to consent, as D. Bonaventure notes ad 1, and Sanchez loc. cit., Tanner, disp. 5, quaest. 4, dub. 1, with D. Thomas, art. 1 and 2 in corpore, and art. 5 ad 3, with whom all agree.