Article I: The Notion, Conditions, Division, and Utility of a Vow

I. What it is and with what conditions. A vow is "a deliberate and free promise, made to God, concerning a possible and better good," c. 1307 §1. (Cf. 2, 2, q. 88.)

1. A promise, therefore not a mere purpose. The criterion of distinction is not taken from the word alone, "I purpose" or "I promise," but from whether one intended to assume a special obligation or not. Hence doubts in this matter will have to be solved by the question: "Did you will to oblige yourself before God?"; and in doubt, the minimum is to be held.

2. Deliberate, with at least that deliberation which is sufficient for sinning mortally. Nor is every age or every deliberation sufficient for mortal sin sufficient for every vow. For he sins mortally who has known the gravity of the guilt, although he has not weighed the magnitude of the sin; but in order that you spontaneously assume an obligation, it is necessary not only that you know what an obligation is, but that you have perceived sufficiently clearly the quantity of the object ¹. Thus excellently Ballerini-Palmieri, t. 2, tr. 6, n. 605. From a sudden movement of the soul, from a custom such that the tongue anticipates the mind, sometimes from the heat of anger, either consideration or deliberation can be impeded. If a solidly probable reason suggests that there was only half-full deliberation, it is licit to answer in favor of liberty. With such a reason excluded, a vow made after the seventh year is presumed deliberate. Minds vexed by a scrupulous obsession of vowing are to be ordered by the confessor to care in no way for vows which they think they have made. Cf. I, 85 and 382. - Because direct deliberation is lacking, vows made in drunkenness do not oblige.

3. Free. For "a vow made through grave and unjust fear is null by the law itself." Thus at least from the positive disposition of c. 1307 §3. In the external forum, it is not presumed that light fear gave cause to the vow. If someone, from light but unjust fear alone, and for no other reason, has vowed, the vow probably is not valid, because God is not judged to accept such a vow, lest He pave a way for unjust coercion. Yet this is controverted. But when fear is not extrinsic or not unjust, nothing stands in the way of the value of the vow.

Error concerning the substance of the promised matter: the one vowing thinks that a chalice which he vows to be golden is silver; - concerning a substantial condition, that is, one so implicitly supposed that otherwise the vow would never have been emitted: the thing promised is of twice greater price or is far graver than it was estimated; - concerning the final cause: the vow is made for the health of a person who is dead or was not sick; - errors of this sort make the vow null, since free consent is lacking. Indeed, any error which has given cause to the vow is of itself sufficient that you be judged immune from the obligation. Nevertheless, excepting properly substantial error, error does not vitiate religious profession. For both private and public good demand that those things which constitute a firm and irrevocable state should not easily waver and should be liable to few conditions. Moreover, the will of the one professing is judged to have accommodated itself to the nature of the thing, and therefore to have held the profession ratified, notwithstanding other errors. Ignorance or error concerning sexual matters also vitiates profession less: both because the force of that vow, as excellent, approved by God and the Church, emitted by many, and containing a renunciation of certain delights, is sufficiently apprehended through true elements; and because, as the young man is disposed by fervor itself, knowledge of the carnal act would not change his mind. For then he does not experience those grave and troublesome temptations which afterward suggest repentance for the obligation undertaken to certain less fervent persons. Although it is regularly expedient that those who profess the religious state be sufficiently instructed concerning the matter, and be warned that grave difficulties can arise afterward.

4. Made to God. A vow is properly made to God, and is an act of latria. But the cause of a vow can also be the honor which we thus render to the saints, while their worship impels us to acts of religion; just as we can promise certain things to God in order to obtain that the Saints be more honored: for each reason the vow is made in honor of the Saints. We can also confirm by a vow a promise made to a Saint (2, 2, q. 88 art. 5 ad 3).

Finally, nothing prevents us from promising to the Saints themselves, simply or conditionally, certain honors or services ¹. Then an obligation of dulia or hyperdulia arises, distinct from a vow, yet nevertheless analogous; this more approaches the obligation of a vow than the debt of human fidelity, and therefore remains grave in its genus. Cf. Quaest. de religione, 137.

5. Concerning a good. For a promise of an evil thing can neither honor God nor be acceptable to Him.

6. Concerning a possible good. For an impossible thing cannot be intended or promised efficaciously. This also seems to have to be transferred to those things which are morally impassable, because that obligation, as in itself harmful to the soul, cannot be acceptable to God or honorific to Him.

Here, however, prudent discretion is needed. The reason is well valid when someone directly vows those things which he cannot physically or morally carry out. Wherefore a vow of avoiding all venial sins is not valid if it is so understood that, once one sin has been committed, the vow itself ceases to be. For to avoid all venial sins is not now in our power without an extraordinary privilege; nor is sufficient utility discerned in such a vow. But, as it seems to us, they pronounce too absolutely who say that such a vow is not valid even if it merely confirms the obligation which we all have of avoiding every sin: an obligation which perseveres even after sin. For, as Suarez excellently observes, Relig. tr. 6, lib. 2, c. 3, nn. 13 and 16, the vow is reasonably understood of avoiding venial sins insofar as it can be done, or of diligence to be applied in fleeing every sin. This care and diligence will of itself be very useful for every man. Wherefore we do not well understand why such vows are judged by Suarez, l. c. nn. 3 and 4, to be per se, or at least for many, little useful, to be disapproved, and simply to be dispensed. Nor can we assent to those who contend that a vow of avoiding deliberate sins can validly be made only by those who are of sufficiently proved virtue. Moreover, they admit the validity of a vow by which a positive good is promised to God, with which the obligation of avoiding all venial sins is connected, as is the vow of always doing the more perfect things, which is permitted to approved persons; nor is the validity of a vow of chastity, even imprudently emitted by the too fragile, doubted. Therefore rather than the vow itself, the negative form can displease, which can generate confusion and disturb the soul.

In practice also it will be expedient to conceive or circumscribe the vow in such a way that, with scruples avoided, it may increase the pursuits of virtue. Finally, because of the authority of others, we shall be able to treat as null a vow of avoiding all venial sins, or a vow emitted by a person not approved of avoiding all deliberate sins; indeed perhaps a vow of avoiding all grave sins, if it has been pronounced by a person too fragile.

7. And better. Every good indeed of itself pleases God. But since certain goods can obstruct better goods, it will always be acceptable to God that someone do what is better. Wherefore, by force of a vow, you will never be obliged to a less good, so that a vow concerning a lesser good, as such, would not be valid. In general, therefore, a vow of marriage will not be valid, since it remains intact for one to desire and choose honorable celibacy, which in itself is a better state. Therefore a good is understood which is better than the voluntary omission of it.

¹ At least if knowledge of the greater quantity would have prevented the vow. And this is the difference between sin and a vow. He who had known better would not have made the sin; nevertheless, now he has sinned. But if he had known the thing better, he would not have vowed; then, with the exception of vows by which a state is entered, he did not vow. And because the vow of chastity of religious would not be prevented by more perfect knowledge, the vow subsists from that very fact, even apart from that knowledge.

¹ But these things are not accustomed to be done in promises which affect the whole life. Wherefore he who vows chastity to the Blessed Virgin Mary is judged to vow it to God, moved by piety toward the Blessed Virgin Mary.

An implicit promise sometimes suffices: thus, in the Latin Church, the voluntary reception of Sacred Order, according to the common opinion, brings in a vow of chastity (nor is that step which those to be ordained to the subdiaconate who are not yet bound by the vow of chastity are ordered to make an essential rite). He who has not wished to vow, or has plainly been ignorant of that connection of the vow, as is more like the truth, will not be bound by the vow, but from the precept of the Church he will have to observe chastity from the motive of religion. Express mention of the vow is not had in cc. 132 and 211.

He who habitually has known the obligation of a vow, and deliberately promises something to God, makes a true vow, although he seems to himself not to have adverted to the obligation. St. Alphonsus, l. 4, n. 201.

Yet he does not vow who has the intention indeed of promising, but not of obliging himself; but he does vow to whom only the mind of fulfilling the obligation is lacking.

II. Division of a vow. 1. A vow is absolute or conditioned. A penal vow is so called by which some expiation of penance or of a good work is promised if some less right act has been done.

2. A personal, real, and mixed vow. Strictly speaking, a vow from its very essence is the personal act of the one vowing, like every promise; nor, because it terminates in a thing, does that promise, which is of a certain fidelity toward God, affect the patrimony any more than a promise of fidelity to a man does. Nevertheless it is called personal, objectively, if one's own action or omission is promised: fasting, a pilgrimage, abstinence from luxury, from a certain drink; real, by which some external thing is promised; finally it will be mixed which is formed from each element: whether both can be separated, as if you promise a pilgrimage with a liberality; or whether they are joined by an individual bond, as if care of a sick person to be had by one's own hands is promised.

3. A public vow, which is accepted in the name of the Church by a legitimate ecclesiastical Superior: thus the vows of religious profession; and a private vow.

4. A solemn and simple vow. It is solemn "if it has been recognized as such by the Church" (c. 1308 §2). Another vow is simple. Concerning the essence of solemnity, cf. the work Quaest. de religione.

5. A reserved vow, whose dispensation the Holy See alone can concede, and a non-reserved vow.

Besides public vows, whose dispensation or commutation is arranged by the legal regime itself (cc. 214, 633-636, 640, 648, 669), the reserved private vows are: "the vow of perfect and perpetual chastity, and the vow of entering a religion of solemn vows, which have been emitted absolutely and after the completed eighteenth year of age" (c. 1309). Before the Code, absolute vows of the three pilgrimages also were reserved.

III. The utility of vowing. A vow supposes a will which can fall away from the good or change its purpose. Wherefore neither for Christ, whose will was always most firmly fixed in the good, nor for an Angel, who stands immovable by his decrees, was there ever a reason why they should vow. Nor does it belong to the blessed comprehensors in heaven to vow, since their will is altogether fixed in loving God.

To us vows of a twofold genus can prudently be advised: a) vows by which some peculiar necessity or weakness is met, such as certain medicinal vows; and vows, generally momentary, with which we are not rarely accustomed to surround petitions made to God; b) vows which are fruitful seeds of good works, such as vows of abnegation, of seeking the more perfect things, and especially vows by which the more perfect discipline of Christ is confirmed in the religious life.

Moreover, although a vow is praiseworthy and meritorious, discretion must nevertheless be observed in advising or multiplying vows. And generally it is better not to have vowed than to have been released from vows by dispensation: that is accustomed to diminish confidence in God. Wherefore, the more a vow is of an arduous and lasting thing, with the greater caution it must be advised or admitted. Cf. Quaest. de virtute rel., 140.

But by the faithful execution of vows, we praise and imitate the immovable sanctity of God, while by an oath we honor and cultivate His infinite veracity. Cf. Quaest. de virtute relig., n. 141.

Divine fidelity in promises. Since the divine will is altogether immutable, God is faithful eminently rather than formally. Therefore God promises us the things which He signifies that He wills to give us, nor can a distinct obligation of perseverance be conceived. And the divine benevolence and liberality, which is confirmed by no formal obligation just as by no translation of right from God to us, is perceived to be more gratuitous.