§ 1. On the Nature and Division of a Vow

388. Definition. A vow (Greek εὐχή) is a promise made to God concerning a possible and better good. Thus a vow is most commonly defined.³¹⁵ Therefore three things are required for the essence of a vow, namely: 1. that it be a true promise; 2. that it be a promise made to God; 3. that it be a promise concerning a possible and better good. We shall treat of this last condition in paragraph 3, where there will be discussion of the object of a vow.

1. A vow must be a true promise; and therefore a mere resolution does not suffice. For in Sacred Scripture a vow is customarily explained through a promise: "If thou hast vowed any thing to God, defer not to pay it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him."³¹⁶ "It is much better not to vow than after a vow not to perform the things promised."³¹⁷

In practice it is often not easy to distinguish whether a true promise or only a resolution was present. And nevertheless, it is entirely necessary to distinguish between a resolution and a promise. A promise is defined as an act by which someone intends to do something under an obligation manifested to another; but a resolution is the mere will to do or omit something, without a man thereby wishing to impose a strict obligation upon himself. Hence, if a confessor doubts whether a mere resolution or a true promise and consequently a true vow was present, let him ask the penitent: When you resolved upon that work, did you wish to impose upon yourself a true obligation, and that under sin, or did you not wish to establish such an obligation for yourself? If the penitent responds negatively to the first part of the question, there is no vow nor grave obligation to execute the resolution, since a resolution of itself produces no moral obligation. Per accidens, however, namely, because of negligence or sloth joined to it, even the violation of a resolution can be sinful. If, after investigation, a doubt remains whether an obligatory promise or a resolution was present, the presumption stands for liberty, and therefore no obligation of a vow is present.

2. A vow must be a promise made to God Himself, because a vow is an act of latria by which someone obliges himself to God to do or omit something for His worship and service. Although vows are often customarily made in honor of the Blessed Virgin and the saints (e.g., someone vows that he will say the Rosary daily in honor of the Blessed Virgin), nevertheless such vows are not properly made to the saints and the Blessed Virgin, but to God alone. The signification of vows of this sort can be threefold: a) a man vows to God that he will fulfill that which he promised to the saints; or, in other words, that which is promised to the saints is not the vow itself, but the matter of the vow;³¹⁸ b) the vow is made to God, but before the saints, who are as it were witnesses of our promise; c) the vow is made principally to God, but secondarily in honor and memory of the saints, in almost the same manner as churches are erected principally for the worship of God, but secondarily in honor of the saints, and as Mass is said in honor of the saints. But if someone were to make a vow to the Blessed Virgin or to some saint without any relation to God and without the intention of obliging himself to God, but to the Blessed Virgin or the saint alone, it would not be a vow properly so called, but a certain sacred promise and an act of hyperdulia or dulia. Hence, e.g., if some girl should say: Most Holy Virgin, I promise thee perpetual chastity because I love thee; but if she thinks nothing about entering into an obligation toward God, such a promise is either no vow or a doubtful vow, and therefore a dispensation of the Supreme Pontiff is not required to free her from such a promise, as is necessary for removing a vow of perfect chastity.

³¹⁵ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 2. Code of Canon Law, c. 1307, § 1.

³¹⁶ Eccles. 5:3.

³¹⁷ Ib., v. 4.

³¹⁸ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 5 ad 3.

389. The moral value and utility of vows. Since a vow is an act of the virtue of religion, and indeed of latria, as is apparent from the things said, it follows that it is a good and useful act. Protestants, however, with Wycliffe, Luther, and Calvin leading them, teach that vows (especially the vows of religious) are harmful, sinful, and immoral, since they injure human liberty.³¹⁹ Modern Protestants, however, do not agree concerning the moral goodness of vows.³²⁰ Yet they rather commonly reject the vows of religious orders. Already in the times of St. Thomas, William of Saint-Amour indirectly attacked religious vows by condemning the religious state of the Mendicant Orders. Blessed Albert the Great, St. Thomas Aquinas, and St. Bonaventure fought victoriously against "those who attack the worship of God and religion."³²¹ The Quietists also spread errors concerning vows. Hence Innocent XI condemned the following propositions:³²² "Vows concerning the doing of something impede perfection"; "Superiors are to be obeyed in external things, and the extent of the vow of obedience of religious reaches only to the exterior; but in the interior the matter stands otherwise, into which God alone and the director enter." Against all these let there be the following:

Thesis. Vows prudently made from the motive of worshiping God are morally good and very useful.

Proof 1. From Sacred Scripture. In the Old Testament the Patriarchs and most holy men made vows and on that account were blessed by God.³²³ In the Mosaic law fulfillment of vows is prescribed: "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it, because the Lord thy God will require it; and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin."³²⁴ In the New Testament Christ and the Apostles frequently invited men to embrace the evangelical counsels, which are not customarily put into practice without vows.³²⁵ Concerning Aquila, a disciple of St. Paul, it is said: "For he had a vow."³²⁶

Proof 2. From the whole Christian tradition. From the first Christian centuries onward, pious men and women made vows³²⁷ and either went into the desert following the examples of Pachomius and Anthony, or lived holily in their own homes. Especially was the vow of chastity frequently made. Let St. Augustine alone be heard, addressing certain spouses who, after making a vow of chastity, intended to break it: "But now, because thy pledge is held before God, I do not invite thee to great justice (if I exhort thee not to withdraw from the vow), but I deter thee from great iniquity. For thou wilt not be such as thou wouldst have remained if thou hadst vowed nothing of this sort. For then thou wouldst have been less, not worse. But now, which God forbid, thou wilt be the more wretched if thou breakest that same thing with God, by as much as thou wilt be the more blessed if thou fulfillest it. Nor therefore repent that thou hast vowed; indeed rejoice that it is no longer lawful for thee to do that which would have been lawful to thy detriment.... Happy is the necessity which impels toward better things."³²⁸

Proof 3. From the definitions of the Church. The Council of Trent³²⁹ defined: "If anyone says that men are so to be recalled to the memory of the baptism they received that they understand all vows made after baptism to be invalid by force of the promise already made in baptism itself, as though by them something were detracted from the faith which they professed and from baptism itself, let him be anathema." The same is apparent from the propositions of the Quietists condemned by Innocent XI and already mentioned above.

Proof 4. From reasons. It suffices to adduce the words of the Angelic Doctor:³³⁰ "For three reasons it is better and more meritorious to perform the same work with a vow than to perform it without a vow: first, because to vow ... is an act of latria, which is chief among the moral virtues. But the work of a nobler virtue is better and more meritorious. Hence the act of an inferior virtue is better and more meritorious from the fact that it is commanded by a superior virtue, whose act it becomes through command; just as an act of faith or hope is better if it is commanded by charity. And therefore the works of the other moral virtues (for example, to fast, which is an act of abstinence, and to practice continence, which is an act of chastity) are better and more meritorious if they are done from a vow, because thus they now pertain to divine worship as certain sacrifices to God. Hence Augustine³³¹ says that 'virginity itself is honored, not because it is virginity, but because it is dedicated to God, which the continence of piety cherishes and preserves.' Secondly, because he who vows something and does it submits himself to God more than he who only does it; for he subjects himself to God not only as regards the act, but also as regards the power, because thereafter he cannot do otherwise; just as he would give more to a man who gave him a tree with its fruits than he who gave him only the fruits.... Thirdly, because through a vow the will is immovably confirmed in the good. But to do something from a will confirmed in the good pertains to the perfection of virtue.... Just as also to sin with a mind obstinate in evil aggravates the sin and is called a sin against the Holy Ghost."

Protestants indeed object that liberty is destroyed by vows; but this objection is very weak. For even through marriage the liberty of withdrawing from the contract is removed; indeed, in every human contract a man is obliged to do or omit something. Therefore marriage also and all onerous contracts would have to be repudiated. Moreover, even the saints in heaven no longer have liberty to sin or to separate themselves from God, and nevertheless they are supremely free. Happy, therefore, is the necessity which impels toward better things, as St. Augustine says in the text cited above.³³² Never is man more free than when, liberated from the yoke of the passions, he perfectly fulfills the duties of the Christian life.

³¹⁹ Cf. Luther's short work on monastic vows.

³²⁰ Cf. Realencyklopädie für prot. Theol., s.v. "Gelübde."

³²¹ Cf. St. Thomas, Opusc. I, Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem, and Opusc. III, Contra pestiferam doctrinam retrahentium homines a religionis ingressu.

³²² Denz. nn. 1223 and 1285.

³²³ Cf. Gen. 28:20 and Wetzer and Welte, Kirchenlex., s.v. "Gelübde bei den Israeliten."

³²⁴ Deut. 23:21.

³²⁵ Cf. Matt., cc. 16 and 19; 1 Cor. 7:25.

³²⁶ Acts 18:18; cf. 21:23ff.

³²⁷ Cf. St. Ignatius, Ep. ad Polyc. c. 5 (Migne, Patr. graec. 5, 724); Tertullian, De virg. velandis c. 11 (Migne, Patr. lat. 2, 954); St. Cyprian, De habitu virg. c. 4 (Migne, Patr. lat. 4, 456).

³²⁸ Ep. 127 (Migne, Patr. lat. 33, 487).

³²⁹ Sess. 7, can. 9, De bapt. (Denz. n. 865).

³³⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 6.

³³¹ De virg. c. 8.

³³² Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 4.

390. Divisions. Vows are divided in many ways. The following divisions seem to be the principal ones:

1. By reason of the object, a vow is divided into personal and real. A personal vow principally obliges one to perform or omit some personal action, e.g., a vow of fasting, of not gambling, etc. A real vow principally obliges one to some thing, e.g., to give alms.

Besides the personal and real vow, some theologians distinguish a mixed vow, in which an action and a thing are intended and promised equally principally, e.g., a vow of making a pilgrimage to some miraculous image and offering a candle there. But a mixed vow of this kind is nothing other than two vows joined together: one personal, the other real.

2. By reason of duration, a vow is distinguished into temporary, which obliges for a determined time, e.g., for a year; and perpetual, which is promised to be observed for the whole of life.

3. By reason of manner, a vow is divided into absolute, which is made without any condition added, e.g., I vow perpetual chastity; and conditional, which does not oblige unless some condition is verified, e.g., I vow a pilgrimage if I shall have recovered my health; I vow entrance into religion if my parents shall have given consent. If someone, under the condition of a determined future fault, vows that a punishment is to be inflicted upon himself, such a vow is called penal; e.g., if I shall have become drunk again, I vow that I shall give an alms of one hundred francs.

4. By reason of form, a vow is distinguished into express, which is made in formulated words; and tacit, which consists in some free action to which a vow is annexed. Thus, e.g., if someone in the Latin Church freely receives the subdiaconate, he tacitly vows chastity.³³³ In ancient times there also existed a tacit religious profession of the three vows of obedience, chastity, and poverty.³³⁴ The greatest part of vows made today are express vows. Akin to this distinction is the division of a vow into explicit and implicit. For an explicit vow is the same as an express vow, but an implicit vow is that which is contained in another. Thus, e.g., a religious who explicitly vows obedience according to the rule implicitly vows poverty and chastity.

5. By reason of the acceptance of the Church, a vow is distinguished into private and public. A private vow is that which is made by the person vowing alone without the intervention of the Church; e.g., someone vows to say the Rosary daily. A public vow is that which is accepted in the name of the Church by a legitimate ecclesiastical superior.³³⁵ All essential vows of religious orders and congregations are public vows, provided these have been duly approved by the Church.

³³³ There are, however, some authors who teach that a subdeacon is obliged to preserve chastity not by force of a vow but by force of ecclesiastical law; discussion of this controversy will recur below, III, 819.

³³⁴ Cf. the canonists concerning this matter.

³³⁵ Code of Canon Law, c. 1308, § 1. A public vow, therefore, is not opposed to an occult vow.

391. Public vows are distinguished into simple and solemn. Simple public vows are those which are made in all approved religious congregations and in the ancient orders during the first three years after the novitiate. (The Society of Jesus, however, has special laws concerning this matter.) Solemn vows are those which by the authority of the Church are made a) in religious orders after three years of simple vows;³³⁶ b) in the Society of Jesus by certain members according to the special laws of that Society; c) the vow of chastity made in the reception of the subdiaconate.³³⁷

It has been much disputed down to our days wherein precisely the essential difference between solemn vows and simple public vows is situated. Since this controversy seems to pertain more to canon law than to Moral Theology, it can be touched upon here only in passing. First, a twofold solemnity must be distinguished: one essential, the other accidental. The accidental solemnity of a vow consists in the Rubrics, circumstances, and conditions which must necessarily be observed by the statute of the Church, e.g., the statute of the Church that solemn vows cannot validly be made before the completion of the twenty-first year of age; or that they cannot be made unless the novitiate and at least three years of simple vows have preceded. This accidental solemnity undoubtedly depends solely upon the institution of the Church, which can freely change it and has in fact changed it several times. For it belongs to the Church to determine wisely under what conditions someone is capable of making solemn profession; just as it also belongs to the Church to establish certain things which are essentially required for validly entering Christian marriage. And just as the Church, in the course of time, instituted certain diriment impediments of marriage, so likewise it attached certain conditions without which solemn profession is not held valid. The Supreme Pontiffs Boniface VIII³³⁸ and Gregory XIII³³⁹ seem to speak of this accidental solemnity of profession when they assert: "We, considering that the solemnity of a vow was devised solely from the constitution of the Church...."

The essential solemnity of vows is that by which those vows are intrinsically distinguished from all other vows. Several authors, e.g., Suarez,³⁴⁰ Schmalzgrueber,³⁴¹ and Wernz,³⁴² think that solemn vows differ essentially from simple vows because of the juridical effects annexed to them by the Church. Others, namely, St. Thomas,³⁴³ the Thomists,³⁴⁴ and several others, e.g., Lehmkuhl,³⁴⁵ teach that the essence of solemn vows consists in a certain internal spiritual surrender and consecration of the person vowing, which the Church accepts in the name of God; but that simple vows contain only a spiritual surrender. This opinion seems better to us, especially because of the Council of Trent defining: "If anyone says that a ratified but unconsummated marriage is not dissolved through the solemn religious profession of one of the spouses, let him be anathema."³⁴⁶ For a ratified marriage is a true marriage and indissoluble by divine law itself. If nevertheless solemn profession dissolves such a marriage, this cannot come from ecclesiastical law alone, but from divine law; otherwise even some Supreme Pontiff could abolish the canon of Trent just cited, which indeed seems impossible. Although solemn vows consist essentially in the spiritual consecration of the person vowing, nevertheless the Supreme Pontiff can for a grave cause dispense from their obligations, just as he can also permit a consecrated chalice to be employed for profane uses.

³³⁶ By decree of the Pontifical Commission on 15 July 1919, special laws were established concerning the profession of religious who must perform military service. Cf. our Man. iur. can. q. 212.

³³⁷ This vow is more accurately called solemnized.

³³⁸ C. unic. 3, 15 in VI°.

³³⁹ Const. Ascendente Domino, 22 May 1584.

³⁴⁰ De relig. tr. 7, l. 2, c. 108ff.

³⁴¹ Ius can. l. 3, tit. 34, n. 8.

³⁴² Ius Decret. III, n. 684, and IV, n. 377.

³⁴³ IV, dist. 38, q. 1, a. 2.

³⁴⁴ Cf. Billuart, De relig. diss. 4, a. 5.

³⁴⁵ Theol. mor. I, n. 647ff.

³⁴⁶ Sess. 24, can. 6 (Denz. n. 976).