Chapter V — On the matter subject to a vow. The true meaning of that phrase, "a better good," is explained. The vow not to marry, and Leander's opinion, teaching that a vow of chastity is never valid on account of subsequent temptations and lapses, is refuted as lax and improbable

I. All agree that the matter of a vow must be something honorable, possible, free, not indifferent, and not an impediment to a greater good. For in any vow, two actions occur: one material, which constitutes the vow — such as fasting, sacrificing, and the like; the other formal, which is the promise to carry out the material action; and this promise made to God is an act of religion. All this will be explained in the following little questions.

II. Question I. Can things prescribed by human or divine law be the matter of a vow? Response: For the negative opinion, the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 2, n. 30) cite St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, §1), Sylvester (s.v. Votum, q. 4). But it must be affirmed that these authors are not correctly cited by the theologians of Salamanca, since they teach the entirely opposite view: they merely distinguish, with St. Thomas, a commanded or necessary thing from free matter, and establish that a necessary work is not the matter of a vow, but a free one is. But whatever is commanded, whether by human or divine law, though it may be necessary for salvation insofar as salvation cannot be obtained without it, is nevertheless free — both because man can refuse it, and because he can bind himself, under a new title, to its observance. Or, more briefly: they distinguish a twofold necessity — one absolute, which is incompatible with a vow; and another, the necessity of the end, which necessity is imposed on an absolutely free work, and is necessary only in the sense of being required for the attainment of some end. This is the teaching of St. Thomas (II-II, q. 88, art. 2): "Because a vow implies a voluntary promise, and necessity excludes voluntariness, that which is absolutely necessary — namely, to be, or not to be — in no way falls under a vow; for it would be foolish for someone to vow that he would die, or that he would not fly. But that which does not have absolute necessity, but the necessity of the end — as, for instance, because without it one cannot be saved — does indeed fall under a vow, insofar as it is done voluntarily, but not insofar as it is a matter of necessity." This teaching is defended by St. Antoninus, Sylvester, Angles (s.v. Votum, n. 1), and Trovamala (s.v. Votum, n. 2).

III. The most common opinion teaches that all things prescribed by divine, civil, or ecclesiastical law can be the matter of a vow. This opinion is clearly drawn from Sacred Scripture, for it is said (Psalm 118): "I have sworn, and am determined to keep the judgments of thy justice." It is likewise drawn from canon law — from the chapter Ego, on oaths, and the chapter Cum Ecclesiis, and the chapter Significasti, on elections. This is also established by the consent of all nations. For not only Christians, but pagans too, commonly confirm with oaths the covenants, pacts, and contracts to whose observance men are bound by natural and divine law. Why, then, should they not be confirmed by both vows and oaths together? For when confirmed by vows and by oaths, an additional bond of religion is superadded. Whence the barbarians themselves, if they break sworn covenants, believe they commit two crimes, specifically distinct — one against religion, the other against justice. The reason for this is, in the end, evident. A work imposed under precept is absolutely free, and is called necessary only by the necessity of the end, or of the obligation — a necessity which Trovamala himself calls a conditional, or suppositional, necessity, which does not exclude freedom. Nothing, then, prevents us from binding ourselves by a new bond of religion to perform a work already imposed under precept. For precept in no way removes freedom from the will; rather, it presupposes it. Why, then, could this same commanded work not become the matter of a vow — such that what is owed under the title of law, divine or human, should also be owed under another title, namely, that of religion? Citation of authors is superfluous here, since this is the most common opinion.

IV. Question II. Is the promise made at the reception of baptism, to renounce the devil and his pomps, a vow? Response: St. Raymond (title on transgression, p. 34) says: "Of vows, some are of necessity, others of will. Vows of necessity are those which every man is necessarily bound to fulfill, whether he vows them or not — as to renounce the devil, and all his pomps... to this everyone binds himself at baptism: and hence, whoever afterward sins mortally is a transgressor of this kind of vow: and therefore is bound to do penance for that sin, and additionally for the transgression [of the vow]. But say that a penance is not to be imposed on him as for different mortal sins, but as for one, aggravated by the circumstance of the transgression of a vow." Having the baptismal promise as a vow, in this broad sense, its transgression does not constitute a distinct mortal sin, but only a sin graver within its own kind. St. Thomas teaches the same (Bk. IV, dist. 38, art. 2, q. 1, ad 3): "The transgression of a common vow does not make a special sin, but adds a special deformity to the sin." For a baptized person sins more gravely by committing the same kind of sin. The same is taught by Antoninus (Part II, tit. 12, ch. 15, §1), Cajetan (II-II, q. 88, art. 2, dub. 2), and theologians commonly. The promise made at baptism can, then, be called a vow, though in a broad sense — a vow whose transgression, as a law, is stained with the taint of a peculiar deformity.

V. Question III. How is that phrase, "of a better good," to be understood? Response: Something can be called a "greater," or "better," good in two ways. First, comparatively to another good — as it is better to give alms to a poor person than to fast; better to help a girl in peril than not to help another poor person exposed to no danger to her soul. Second, comparatively to the contrary omission of the same good — as it is better to give alms than not to give it; better to fast than not to fast; better to preserve chastity than not to preserve it. For something to be suitable matter for a vow, it suffices that the good in question be a "better good" in this second sense. For if it were required to be a better good comparatively to another good, it would follow that no vow would be valid unless it concerned the most perfect of all works. Authors do not speak on this matter with sufficient clarity. The theologians of Salamanca report two opinions as though contrary: one teaches that a better good must, absolutely, and in whatever way considered, be a work of supererogation; the other maintains that this is not required, but that it suffices that it be a work of supererogation, or of precept, provided it is not the contradictory opposite of it. There is, however, no real disagreement between these opinions, if the authors' true meaning is sincerely explained. For St. Thomas, and others, when they assert that the matter of a vow is a work of supererogation, are speaking of the matter of a vow taken precisely and strictly, as he clearly explains himself (Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 1, qc. 2): "If a vow is taken according to its proper nature, it properly concerns those goods to which not all are bound, which are of supererogation; and therefore they are called 'better goods,' because they are added to those goods without which there is no salvation; and therefore a vow properly taken is said to concern a better good." Nor does the Angelic Doctor thereby exclude commanded works from the matter of a vow; rather, he openly includes them (II-II, q. 88, art. 2): "That which does not have absolute necessity, but the necessity of the end — as, for instance, because without it one cannot be saved — does indeed fall under a vow. But that which is in no way necessary falls most properly under a vow," the Angelic Doctor concludes in the same place. In brief: works of counsel, or of supererogation, are, as the Angelic Doctor says, most properly the matter of a vow; and indeed men commonly make vows about matters of counsel. But commanded works are sufficient matter for vows as well — that is, vows can also be made concerning them. No one has any right to depart from this teaching of St. Thomas; and, so far as I have been able to gather, no one does depart from it. For St. Thomas grants that the commandments themselves become, under a new title, the matter of a vow; while the evangelical counsels, or those reduced to them, are more properly — indeed, as he himself says, "most properly" — the works subject to a vow. Who would dare call this into controversy?

VI. Question IV. Is a vow concerning matter opposed to the counsels valid? Response: It is certain, and agreed among all, that all those things absolutely opposed to the evangelical counsels are not subject to vows, being no fit matter for them; and consequently there are no valid vows not to fast, not to lend, not to give alms, not to enter religious life, and the like of this kind. For such things cannot please God, since they are an impediment to greater perfection — and this St. Thomas expressly teaches (q. 88, art. 5, ad 2). Circumstances can nonetheless arise such that a work which is absolutely opposed to the counsels is not, in that particular case, opposed to them. For instance, not lending to one's neighbor is absolutely opposed to the evangelical counsel; but not lending on such-and-such an occasion can be a work not contrary, but rather consonant, with the evangelical counsel — as will be more fully explained below. If someone stubbornly and obstinately vowed to omit works of counsel, he would sin mortally, since he would be showing contempt for the evangelical counsels. It should be added that certain counsels frequently become precepts on account of some circumstance. One who, however, out of levity or ignorance, made two or three such vows, would not exceed the bounds of venial fault. This is common doctrine among authors.

VII. Question V. Is a vow to contract marriage valid? Response: It is invalid, according to the most common opinion of theologians — since it is opposed to the evangelical counsel. You will say: If someone swore to some girl that he would take her as his wife, would he not then, in justice, be bound to fulfill his oath? Why, then, would such a vow not likewise bind? The difference is self-evident. A betrothal, sworn and accepted by the girl, must indeed be fulfilled by the promiser in fulfillment of that oath. But a vow dedicated to God concerning the contracting of marriage is not accepted by God. What if someone promised to take as his wife a poor girl, or a prostitute? Not even in this case would the vow be valid — since the girl's poverty does not outweigh the greater good of celibacy, nor is marriage a means, in itself ordained, or altogether sufficient, for securing the spiritual salvation of a prostitute. It must be judged otherwise, however, if someone vowed to take as his wife a girl he had deflowered; or if he vowed to marry a prostitute, on the condition that he intends at some point to contract marriage anyway — for in that case, either vow would be valid. A vow to contract marriage would likewise be valid whenever, as very rarely happens, marriage would be necessary for the common good of the commonwealth, or of a principality, to secure peace between princes, for the conversion of heretics, or for the enlargement of the Catholic Church. For in these cases, it is not so much the marriage as the common good that would be the matter of the vow. All this is common doctrine.

VIII. Question VI. Does one who, tormented by the stings of concupiscence, vows to contract marriage, in order to avoid fornication and other acts of lust, vow validly? Response: There are two extreme opinions. The first affirms that such a vow is valid, given the supposition that the one vowing is unwilling, or unable, to use other remedies to check the impulses of the flesh. Since, say the authors of this opinion, marriage was granted as a remedy for concupiscence, the Apostle saying: "It is better to marry than to burn." It will, therefore, be better to use this remedy; and consequently a vow to contract such a marriage will be a vow concerning a better good. This can be confirmed by the fact that if someone, having a concubine, vowed either to enter religious life, or to marry his concubine, he would, in the opinion of all, be bound to enter religious life within the year, if he did not marry her. Finally, a frail man, frequently succumbing to lust, is bound, by natural law, to contract marriage as a remedy for concupiscence, unless he has some impediment, so as to avoid further sins — given the supposition that he is unwilling, or unable, to use other remedies.

This opinion is defended by the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 2, §2, n. 40), citing in its favor Bellarmine (Bk. II, On Monks, ch. 14). But wrongly: for Bellarmine only asserts that it can sometimes be better for a certain person to marry, and consequently that the vow can be valid — as if he marries for the common good of the commonwealth, and the other reasons indicated above. He says not a word there about a vow to marry as a remedy for concupiscence. They also cite Navarrus, in his Manual, ch. 11 — but this is an error, for that reference is ch. 12, n. 43, verse 15; and even there this author, at least in the place cited, says nothing on this matter. They further cite Villalobos, Bonacina, López, Trullench, and Cajetan (II-II, q. 88, art. 2, concl. 6), who does indeed really defend this opinion, along with several others, among whom is Sylvius.

IX. The contrary opinion seems to me more probable — namely, that the aforesaid vow is invalid. And first, this is clearly established from St. Thomas's teaching. For the Angelic Doctor teaches that marriage was instituted for the office of nature, and for the procreation of offspring; but that it was permitted, by way of indulgence, for restraining concupiscence (Bk. IV, dist. 31, q. 2, art. 2, ad 2): "If someone, through the marital act, intends to avoid fornication in his spouse, this is no sin at all, since this is a kind of rendering of the debt, which pertains to the good of fidelity; but if he intends to avoid fornication in himself, thus, according to this, there is a venial sin, nor is there any superfluity in it; for it is not for this that marriage was instituted, except by way of an indulgence which concerns venial sins." And indeed the Apostle says: "They that have not continency, let them marry: for it is better to marry than to be burnt" — that is, than to burn with lust, or to fornicate, as the Fathers explain. But if marriage, as a remedy for concupiscence, is only permitted by way of indulgence, no one would dare deny that a vow is invalid which has for its object not a better good, but a good so imperfect that a venial sin is attached to it. But, setting aside this opinion for the present — which we shall discuss more fully in the treatise on marriage — we establish our own opinion by a most cogent argument.

X. All theologians maintain that a vow to contract marriage, made absolutely, is invalid; and this all the authors of the contrary opinion admit, to a man. With even greater reason, then, will a vow to contract marriage as a remedy for concupiscence be invalid. I prove the consequence: marriage contracted as a remedy for concupiscence, even granting it to be good, no one would deny is a good far inferior to the good of marriage contracted for the office of nature. Therefore, if the vow of this latter kind is invalid, with greater reason will the vow of the former kind be invalid. Why does a vow to enter marriage for the propagation of nature — which is a great sacrament in the Church, and is often, and very frequently, advisable — impede a greater good, namely, the celibate life, to which the one vowing might be called by the inspiration of the divine Spirit? Is not that greater good equally impeded by contracting marriage to extinguish the ardor of concupiscence? Either, then, it must be conceded that a vow to contract marriage absolutely, and for the office of nature, is valid; or, if this is denied, as indeed all deny, it must likewise be denied that a vow to enter marriage as a remedy for concupiscence is valid. Finally, even after such a vow has been made — indeed, even after a marriage ratified but not consummated — one who vowed may still enter religious life. That vow, then, is in every respect null.

XI. The arguments of the contrary opinion collapse of their own accord. We grant that marriage, for the sole remedy of concupiscence, is a good, especially for a man troubled by the stings of the flesh. We grant that for this frail man marriage is a suitable and good remedy. What follows from this? If we said the vow was invalid because marriage as a remedy for concupiscence is not a good, our argument would prove something. But we say that although it is good, marriage nonetheless impedes a greater good — which is enough to invalidate the vow. Otherwise, if a vow concerning a good thing were valid, with even greater reason a vow to contract marriage for the office of nature ought to be valid — which is certainly a greater good than entering marriage for the extinguishing of concupiscence. What the theologians of Salamanca oppose in the second place is altogether inept. If someone made a vow to steal, the vow would be null, because theft is unsuitable matter for a vow — not merely because it is a lesser good, but because it is an evil thing; but to take a concubine in marriage is, in its own kind, a good thing, although it impedes a greater good. The difference, then, is evident. What they add in the last place — and it is astonishing that such things should be foisted on us by theologians — is of no greater weight: that someone may be bound, by natural law, to contract marriage, so as to avoid the sin of lust, by no means implies that he can place himself, by a vow, in a state of resisting the Holy Spirit, whereby he would be prevented from assenting to a call to a higher state. Let them note, then, the sophistical reasoning here. Someone can contract marriage to avoid the sin of lust. Let us even grant that he is sometimes bound to this — though I do not know whether such an obligation can actually arise, since very many other remedies for lust are available. But no one can, by a vow, render himself unfit to embrace a more perfect state, to which he may be called by God. The examples which the aforesaid theologians of Salamanca adduce (n. 45) we shall examine elsewhere. This, our own opinion, is defended by Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 1, art. 3), Prado (Vol. II, ch. 31, q. 3, n. 50), John of St. Thomas (II-II, disp. 29, art. 7, concl. 4), Aragón (II-II... ..., q. 88, art. 1), John of St. Thomas (II-II, on the 2nd precept of the Decalogue, ch. 2, sect. 1), Sporer (Bk. IV, tract. 4, ch. 2, n. 12) — although these last three, Palao, Layman, and Sporer, rather concede the contrary opinion: for they say that, under the virtual hypothesis that a frail man is unwilling to employ other remedies, the vow is binding. But they produce nothing that is not already resolved by what has been said. Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 18, n. 14), Sporer (tract. 3, on vows, dub. 1, concl. 6, n. 61), Layman.

XII. Question VII. Can a married person, hindered from requesting the debt by a vow, an oath, or spiritual kinship, request it whenever he is agitated by vehement stirrings of the flesh, lest he be exposed to the danger of falling into grave sins of lust? Response: Fr. Patritius Sporer, who proposes this very case (tract. 3, on the 2nd precept, ch. 2, sect. 2, §3, n. 65), says: "I follow the affirmative." And he attempts to prove his conclusion in this manner, which it is worth quoting in his own words, lest we seem to misrepresent him: "It is proved (he says) in the case of one who, after marriage, or before it, has vowed chastity. For just as a vow, according to the common opinion of the Doctors, following St. Thomas, must concern a better good, so too must its observance. But the vow, and its observance in the aforesaid circumstances, do not concern a better good. Therefore they do not oblige. The major premise is certain. The minor is certain too: for when, from the observance of the vow, someone is exposed to the proximate danger of falling into some sins of lust that are intrinsically evil, then non-observance of the vow (namely, requesting the debt from one's own spouse) is not intrinsically evil; it is manifest, therefore, that neither the vow, nor the observance of the vow, concerns a better good, etc." He adds: "This and much more on this subject, the most learned Fr. Quintanadueñas... to which the most experienced casuist Gobat subscribes."

XIII. This opinion, in my own judgment, is not merely lax, but improbable — and, with all due respect to such great, most learned, and most experienced casuists, opens far too wide a path toward doing away with all vows whatsoever. For the patrons of this opinion teach, in express words, that a vow does not bind one who, through the rebellion of the senses, is so drawn to commit sins against the observance of the vow, that he feels himself placed in proximate danger of violating it. All vows of chastity, then, would be null, whenever men who have made them are provoked by lustful itching to fornicate and commit adultery. Married persons bound by a vow, or by some other bond, from requesting the debt, would then be able to request it, so as to avoid the crimes of lust. Why? Because the non-observance of the vow is not intrinsically evil, since requesting the debt, when non-observance of the vow, is a good thing. Why, then, would monks, and secular clergy alike, burning with the ardor of concupiscence, not be able to contract marriage — since entering marriage even as a remedy for concupiscence is no less good than requesting the debt to soothe that same concupiscence? Why, I ask, would a vow be invalid for a married person prone to lust? Why, in this man's case, would the observance of the vow not concern a better good? Because this observance is joined with the proximate danger of falling into lust. Then it will not concern a better good for a monk either — for the observance of a vow of chastity is likewise attached to a proximate danger of falling into lust. That vow, then, will not be valid either.

XIV. What can be said to this? Perhaps that the vow of chastity of monks and clerics is solemn, while that of married persons is simple. But that distinction is altogether irrelevant, and unsuited to our present purpose. For both a solemn and a simple vow must, as all admit, concern a better good. But, according to the most learned Quintanadueñas, Gobat, and Sporer, when a married man bound by a vow is urged by the sharpest stirrings of the flesh, and is in proximate danger of violating it, the vow then does not concern a better good. If, then, it does not concern a better good in a married man, neither will it, in a priest or a monk in the same proximate danger, concern a better good. But if this vow does not prevent a married person from being able to request the debt, or a priest or monk from being able to contract marriage — since requesting the debt is good, just as entering marriage is good — but let us set aside the solemn vows of Religious, and turn our discussion to simple vows: will all the vows of chastity which so many Catholics make be null, whenever they find themselves in proximate danger of lust? Null, they say. Hear the following case.

XV. Parthenius, a young man, is vehemently tormented by lustful temptations, and frequently succumbs to them — although he realizes that the married state would be far more beneficial for him than the unmarried — yet he makes a vow of chastity, and gravely violates it, so that he now wishes it had never been made. The question is asked, whether this vow is valid. Response: It is probable that this vow is not valid, since, all things considered, it does not concern a better good. So Fr. Adam Burghaber holds, in his 66th selected case; so too Fr. Patritius Sporer, loc. cit., n. 69.

XVI. The opinion just reviewed is lax, and in no way probable. Let us grant that the aforesaid vow was imprudent; this imprudence nonetheless does not prevent chastity, vowed, from being suitable matter for a vow, nor does it remove the deliberate choice of the one vowing. The one vowing experiences frequent lapses into lust; nonetheless, he deliberately wishes to vow chastity. On what basis, then, is it to be concluded that this vow is null? From the repeated violation of the vow? If that were so, few vows would be valid. Martín Bonacina also teaches the aforesaid opinion (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 1, n. 26). He adds, however, that a dispensation must be sought. What could be more absurd! The vow is null; yet a dispensation must be obtained! What effect would this dispensation produce, if the vow is null? From what bond must the one vowing be absolved, if he is bound by no bond at all? But greater absurdities are to come.

XVII. Question VIII. Is a vow of chastity, of the religious life, or of not marrying, made by one for whom marriage would be more salutary on account of his incontinence, valid, and does it prevent marriage from being lawfully contracted? Likewise, do such vows, once validly made, become null on account of subsequent temptations to lust? Response: Leander (tract. 9, on Marriage, disp. 23, q. 12 and 13) teaches the following: "The negative opinion — namely, that such a vow is not valid, nor does it prevent marriage — can be argued for on these grounds. First, a vow to enter marriage is valid for those for whom it is judged more salutary that they enter marriage on account of incontinence, since this concerns a better good relative to the one vowing: therefore the aforesaid vows contrary to this concern a lesser good relative to that same person vowing: therefore they are void. This is clear: for two contradictory things cannot be legitimate matter for the same person and at the same time." Sharp indeed, and robustly argued dialectically! But let us hear the second argument. "A vow (he adds) of chastity or of the religious life, made by one whom bodily troubles and frequent falls precede, is not concerning sufficiently suitable and just matter; indeed it is rather made contrary to the counsel of St. Paul (1 Cor. 7), who says: 'But if they do not contain, let them marry: for it is better to marry than to burn.'"

XVIII. Whether such principles favor Luther and Calvin, who rail against Catholic vows on the grounds that they are unbearable for human frailty, and contrary to the ardors of the loins, let others judge. As for the first argument Leander makes, we have already shown above that it is false. The law of non-contradiction he cites against us is wrongly applied. For from it only this much can be drawn: that the same person cannot make both a vow to marry and a vow not to marry, or a vow to marry and a vow of chastity, at one and the same time, concerning contradictory or contrary objects. One who makes a vow of chastity, even though entangled in the allurements of the flesh, chooses that vow as an instrument for restraining the flesh's rebellion. The matter, by its own nature, is regarded as something better; and the one vowing regards it as the more advisable remedy. If he were to form the opposite judgment, he would make a vow to marry instead. Wherefore, since the matter — namely, chastity — is by its own nature suited to a vow, as being a better good, by that very fact it cannot become unsuitable matter for a vow even in a man exposed to the danger of lust — even granting that, had he formed the contrary judgment, he could have made a vow to marry instead. This much is said against the sophistical reasoning. But, so that the laxity of this opinion may be more fully apparent, before I proceed further to refute it, it is worth setting before our eyes the still laxer things that this same Leander, along with a few others, teaches.

XIX. Leander continues, saying that not only are vows invalid which are made at the very time when someone burns with the heat of lust, but also those which, though made in a time of tranquility and concord of the flesh with reason, nonetheless become, on account of subsequent temptations and rebellion of the senses, unsuitable matter for a vow: "...what, before the vow was made, renders the promised matter unsuited matter for a vow, if it supervenes after the vow is made, removes the obligation of the vow. But it is so that, in the opinion of these Doctors, frequent lapses into lust invalidate vows of religion, of chastity, etc. Therefore these same lapses will invalidate the preceding vows as well." This opinion he afterward calls "more probable speculatively." But what does that matter to practice? "I answer, probably (he says there, q. 13, p. 320), that the aforesaid opinion, speaking practically too, is somewhat probable, and can safely be embraced. Therefore, without dispensation, he can enter marriage."

XX. Did you hear that? The aforesaid opinion is "somewhat probable": therefore it "can safely be embraced." The Probabilists proceed by stages. First they devise some most subtle reasonings, by which they claim a veil of speculative probability for their own opinion. Then, this most subtle veil they wrap in further reflections, which they make so thick and solid that it becomes, in the end, a safe rule of conduct. It could be objected in favor of this opinion that, according to weighty authors, a vow to marry is valid whenever it is judged to avoid fornication — therefore a vow of chastity, or of celibacy, is invalid whenever such celibacy reaches the point of being less advisable than marriage for that same person. Sylvius denies this consequence (II-II, q. 88, art. 2, concl. 2), since a vow, when free, and when no vow at all binds one, will nonetheless become obligatory if one wishes to bind oneself by a vow to a frail man, provided celibacy will then be more useful for him than marriage. John Marín (Vol. II, tract. 9, disp. 12, sect. 6, n. 77) answers that a vow to marry, taken conditionally, is valid — that is, provided the one vowing is unwilling to choose other means. But none of this reasoning pertains to us, who have taught the opposite. Setting this aside, then,

XXI. Let us briefly weigh the principles and consequences of this opinion. This first thing must be noted above all: that chastity, and the embrace of the religious life, are, according to all Catholics, fit — indeed, the foremost — matter for vows. The authors of the aforesaid opinion affirm this; but they simultaneously contend that in circumstances of the flesh assailing and inflaming the mind of the one who made the vow, the matter now becomes unsuitable, since marriage becomes more salutary in these circumstances for a man frail and subject to the stings of the flesh. I ask, however, why chastity, in these circumstances, becomes incongruous matter. Is it because it becomes impossible for a frail man tormented by the stings of the flesh? You are a heretic if you say this. For God does not permit us to be tempted beyond our strength, and, with the aid of heaven, we can overcome everything, as our Savior Christ himself says: "Not all men take this word." Is it difficult matter? But all the evangelical counsels, subject to vows, are arduous, and most difficult. And especially with respect to chastity, is this to be said, with respect to a frail man, and one prone to lust? Then this reasoning ought to be drawn concerning all vows made by frail men, and those inclined to evil. Here lies the whole force of the sophistical argument. Is chastity, then, unsuitable matter, since it is more salutary for this frail man, exposed to lust, that marriage should be the matter? I, however, deny this. The nature of the matter to be made subject to a vow must itself be considered: and if, in its own kind, and by its own character, it is better, it will be fit matter for a vow. When theologians say that a vow must concern "a better good," do they take that "better" comparatively to this or that man exposed to the ardors of the flesh? No one of sound mind would say this. Whatever, then, is by its own nature a better good is also matter for a vow — even though it may turn out less salutary for this or that person on account of his own iniquity. There are many things that would sometimes be salutary for a man, such as sowing wild oats, fornication, and not a few others. I know these are, in their own kind, evil, and therefore do not press this point much. But it is likewise true that chastity is, in its own kind, better than marriage, and consequently can in no way be rendered inferior by the frailty of a private individual. The frailty, and the inclination toward lust, of a man can, at most, bring it about that this man imprudently vows chastity; and, if he first sought counsel, a theologian ought to dissuade him from making such a vow, in order to remove from him the many risks of sinning; but it can never bring it about that chastity should be unsuitable matter for a vow, and the vow itself invalid, whenever a man deliberately and of his own free will makes such a vow. That the matter of a vow must be better absolutely, and in itself, and not with reference to this or that particular person vowing, is taught by Maior (Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 1, concl. 2), and this is approved by Sánchez (Bk. IV, Summa, ch. 8, n. 10). And I add that this can, by right, be denied by no one. If the Doctors do not all express this explanation in so many words, they omit it only because it seemed superfluous to them.

XXII. This is confirmed. Can a frail man, falling into lust, preserve chastity, and win the victory over impure lust, with divine aid? This is a matter of faith, and is nonetheless clearly gathered from the common doctrine of all. That man, then, by his own malice, serves lust; therefore, from the malice of his own lapses into lust, will chastity become unsuitable matter for a vow, so that such a vow, however deliberately made, is null? Who has dared to say this? Who among Catholics would say that human iniquity can pervert the order of things, and reduce, by rank, those things that are in their own kind holier, and make them worse, according to the malice and operations of men? Let chastity's lapses into lust, then, be as frequent as they may — never will they be able to make chastity incongruous matter for a vow, such that a vow of chastity, deliberately made, should become invalid.

XXIII. It should be added that a man burning with the ardor of lust has many other remedies available to him besides marriage, and often more effective ones — prayers, fasts, labors, and not a few others, by which he can restrain the impulses of concupiscence. Indeed, those who contract marriage to quench the thirst of lust suffer, as the Apostle says, "tribulation of the flesh"; and the thirst of chastity is not always extinguished, but rather increased, unless the love of the conjugal state opposes and resists the stings of concupiscence, arousing one to drink at other cisterns, and other waters, than those. Since, then, one can, by many other means, avoid the reefs of treacherous lust and its inclination, marriage is wrongly proposed as somehow more salutary for a man too much a stranger to chastity, on account of his own inclination toward lust. All this is most true. But, even granting that marriage would now be more fitting for this man, all circumstances being considered, it does not follow, even on this supposition, that chastity becomes unsuitable matter for a vow, and that a vow concerning it would be invalid, as has already been shown.

XXIV. Finally, the extreme laxity of this opinion is most clearly understood from what Leander adds, from which it appears, from the common sense of the Catholic Church, even more evidently. For Leander not only maintains that the vow which Christians make is invalid when they experience the tyranny of lust and frequent lapses; he goes even further in laxity, alleging, in the name of other authors, that even those vows which a man made at a time when he was not at all subject to lust also become entirely void, if grave temptations should later supervene, and the one vowing be placed in proximate danger of falling into lust and incontinence. The reasoning he assigns we have already given above, in n. 7; and Leander copied it word for word from Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 8, n. 9) — for it is a habit of this casuist to copy out others' writings. I say this so that the reader may gather from this very opinion how little regard is to be paid to its doctrine. For not only does he embrace with both arms the laxer opinions of other authors, but adds something laxer still, and expands them; as is plain from the fact that Ledesma, Sánchez, Martín de San José, and some others taught that preceding incontinence renders a vow invalid. Leander, however, adds that subsequent incontinence invalidates a vow already made — and others sold this as a merely speculatively probable opinion; but he himself proposes it as practically probable, indeed as safe to embrace, to his readers, this most benign writer. This same opinion is defended by Leandro Murcia Gobat (Moral Disquisitions, Bk. 2, disp. 71, resol. 25, n. 5), in these words: "It is gathered from the common opinion of the Doctors that a vow, even of chastity or of the religious life, is null and void, if, after the vow is made, its matter becomes unsuitable or impossible — even if the aforesaid vow was simple. They do not suppose that a vow must be concerning a better good, and not concerning what is better for the one vowing in himself, since this is contrary to the common opinion of all, and also manifestly against the counsel of the Apostle, saying: 'It is better to marry than to burn.' Chastity is not, then, an impossible matter here."

Our friend the Probabilist thus asserts flatly, and without hesitation, that it is supposed by the common opinion of the Doctors that subsequent temptations render chastity unsuitable and impossible matter for a vow. It is true that all Doctors assert that a vow is null once its matter has become impossible. But that subsequent temptations, and lapses into lust, render chastity impossible for one who has vowed it — this is a Lutheran, heretical claim. As for his further assertion — that it is contrary to the common opinion of all that the matter of a vow should be a better good in itself, and not for the one vowing — this smacks of excessive audacity, and of imposture. For from this it follows that a vow becomes null on account of subsequent temptations, since chastity is then not better for the one vowing — which is quite the opposite of the most common opinion of Catholic theologians, that such a vow remains valid, as we have said elsewhere (n. 19) — namely, that a vow must concern a better good, which is both such by its own kind, and remains better even for men equipped with divine aid. If this "better good" had to be measured by the open iniquity and frailty of the flesh of the one vowing, this doctrine, which overthrows nearly all vows, would apply to almost all of them. Wherefore Fr. Claude La Croix (Bk. III, part 1, dub. 3, n. 405) wrongly rejects the opinion of Sánchez, Valentia, and others who uphold our own opinion, and adheres instead to Gobat and Moya — who certainly err in this matter, wishing that the promised matter be "better" for the one vowing by comparison to his own inclination toward lust, and his lapses into fornication. For the true opinion holds that the promised matter, to be made subject to a vow, must be better in its own kind, and for the one vowing relying on divine aid — that is, for one who, like other Christians, can, if he wills, preserve chastity. Let me explain the matter more clearly. Divine law is undoubtedly a matter of a better good, not only absolutely, or with reference to man as such (for it is God alone who imposes this law), but with reference to man as instructed by heavenly grace, well-behaved, and most thirsty for his own eternal salvation — not with reference to a shameless, lustful, brutish man. This law becomes, for him, a harsh and most heavy yoke. What follows from this?

XXV. How much laxity — indeed, how much deformity — the aforesaid opinion presents, no one fails to see. First, it is repugnant to the entire sense of the Catholic Church. For it has always been the practice for those who have made vows of chastity to obtain a dispensation from the Supreme Pontiff — which the Pontiff scarcely grants, unless some commutation is offered. Would not such a dispensation be quite ridiculous, if the vow were null? Would not this perpetual and most manifest custom of the Church have sufficed to restrain the excessive license of those casuists? Would it not betray a great deal of audacity, that a few casuists should dare to abolish the universal custom of the Church? Yet they do abolish it, as far as lies in their power, when they write, in express words, that a Christian bound by a vow of chastity can, without dispensation, enter marriage.

XXVI. The consequences flowing from this most lax opinion are to be briefly indicated, even if only in passing — since they thrust themselves, of their own accord, before everyone's eyes. For, granting that supervening difficulties, troubles of the flesh, and rebellions of the senses render vows once validly made obsolete, void, and dissolved, there is no one who does not see what follows from this. Does it not follow from this that absolutely no vows at all will be valid, given the sheer multitude of those who make them, who does not feel the troubles, difficulties, and rebellions of the flesh among the countless who make such vows? And yet very many, with the help of divine favor, abstain from such lapses, and win triumphs over the flesh and concupiscence. But if some succumb through their own fault, will they thereby be freed from the bond of the vow on account of their own wickedness? If troubles, the arduousness of the matter, and frequent lapses dissolve simple vows of chastity, why not solemn ones too? For solemn vows require the same suitable matter as simple ones do. If chastity is unsuitable matter for a simple vow, why not equally for a solemn one? Who does not see that this argument could be used to honor the sacrilegious marriages of Luther, Bucer, and other similar heretics? Luther judged marriage more salutary for himself for no other reason than the extreme difficulty — indeed, as he himself blasphemously said, the impossibility — of preserving chastity. And although there is a great difference between a solemn and a simple vow, they agree in this: that both must have suitable and fitting matter. But if difficulties, troubles, and frequent transgressions suffice to render chastity unsuitable matter for a vow, the same reasoning will suffice to render all other vows obsolete as well. Vehement desires for money, and frequent transgressions of the vow of poverty, will then render that vow null; and the same must be said of the vow of obedience. It will now be more salutary to possess riches than, having sold all things, to follow Christ; more salutary to be one's own master than to be subject to others; more salutary to fill one's belly than to fast. Not to belabor the point: this doctrine, which asserts that temptations, difficulties, troubles, and transgressions render the promised matter unsuited for a vow, and dissolve and void the vow itself, does away with nearly all vows, just as it would likewise break and sever all promises made among men, and rupture human commerce itself. For if the aforesaid obstacles dissolve vows dedicated to God, on the grounds that they change the matter, why should they not likewise invalidate promises made among men, on the same grounds? Nor is it of any weight, what Leander adds (loc. cit., q. 12) — namely, that it is not left to each individual's own judgment whether, all circumstances considered, it would be more salutary to contract marriage, but only to the judgment of a pious and prudent confessor. This is empty trifling, and vain pretense, which can in no way disguise or diminish the horror of this most lax doctrine. Indeed, no one is more expert a judge of temptations, troubles, and lapses into lust than the one who actually experiences them. Given, then, that the aforesaid inconveniences render vows already made void, as these aforesaid casuists contend, everyone will be able to judge his own vow null. At most, he will be able to consult some confessor who holds Leander, Moya, and — even though condemned! — La Croix, Gobat, and the rest, as his masters, all of one mind in this one kind of teaching.

XXVII. We say, then, that the aforesaid vows are altogether valid, provided they were made deliberately — whether temptations supervened, or preceded, or accompanied them; and whether the lapses are frequent, or rare. Such obstacles to the observance of chastity, or of some other vow — whether troubles, difficulties, or dangers — are, at most, a valid reason for seeking a dispensation, if they arise long after the vows have already been made; or, if they precede the vows and are known to a prudent director, they will provide a most just reason for persuading a man, given his weakness, that abstaining from the vow would be a good for him. Nor do I think we should have recourse to that teaching which Sánchez gives (Bk. IV, ch. 8, n. 10), and which the theologians of Salamanca adopt (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 2, §2, n. 44) — namely, that men bound by a vow can be regarded either as private individuals, or as members of the community of the Church. Now, they say, although it may be better for this man to marry, considered as a private person, this is not true if he is considered as part of the Church — because, under this consideration, such a vow of chastity is far more pleasing to God. Why? Because, say the theologians of Salamanca, it is greatly to the good of the Church that one bound by a vow of chastity should be judged bound; otherwise the vow — so arduous, and so celebrated in the Church — would collapse on the slightest pretext. I would say, rather, that it pertains to the good of the Church that one bound by a vow of chastity be judged bound, if he really is bound. For the good of the Church rests on truth, not on falsehood. This teaching, if explained more clearly and precisely, conveys this sense: a vow of chastity made by a frail man is valid, if he is considered as part of the community of the Church; but it is invalid, and null, if considered as a private individual — since for a man as a private individual, marriage is better; but for him as a member of the Church, chastity is more salutary. This distinction is arbitrary — indeed, it seems to me false, and injurious to the Church. For it seems to follow from it that it pertains to the common good of the Church that the vow of chastity be valid, even though it is not really valid for private individuals of the faithful, even though marriage would be more salutary for private individuals of the faithful — which is plainly false, as anyone can see.

XXVIII. The example by which the theologians of Salamanca (n. 45) attempt to illustrate their doctrine seems to us, equally, quite tangled — not to say downright false. For why, they say, will that solemn vow of chastity be valid, though it would be better for the one vowing to marry than to be subject to the bond of a vow to which he is liable to so many lapses? Because, as he is part of that religious order, it is better that the vow remain in its full force, lest, through excessive relaxations, an opening be given for many scandals. Leander of Murcia teaches the same (Moral Disquisitions, Bk. II, disp. 71, resol. 25). This doctrine, too, is at least entangled, and open to erroneous interpretations. For it seems thereby to defend a solemn vow of chastity as valid in a frail Religious, prone to lapses, so that scandals — which would otherwise follow, if the vow were null, and the good name of the religious order thereby intact — might be avoided; not because it is really valid with respect to that private person. But all this, as we have indicated, is false — since the validity of a vow does not depend on these considerations and relations, but on the deliberation of the one vowing, who chooses matter suitable and fitting in its own kind. These Probabilists give no small occasion to heretics to attack monastic vows, and to decry them as a burden exceeding human strength. For if, as Leander of Murcia and his fellow casuists contend, a solemn vow of chastity is valid even though the one vowing falls into lust, and is continually tormented by the rebellion of the flesh, only for the sake of the perfection of the state, for the sake of avoiding scandals and disturbances which the religious order, of which the one vowing is a member, would otherwise undergo, and on account of the many Religious who would leave the cloister, and declare themselves no longer Religious — then solemn vows will be valid only for political considerations, to avoid certain extrinsic harms. Subsequent temptations, and lapses into lust, render a simple vow of chastity null. Why? Because it is no longer a better good for the one vowing. Such temptations and lapses do not render a solemn vow of chastity null. Why? Because it is a better good for the one vowing, considered as a part and member of a religious order, which, were the vow rendered null, would succumb to many evils. Why is it a lesser evil, according to these Doctors, for a private individual to be condemned, than for the religious order to be exposed to scandals? These are the consequences that flow from this most lax, and utterly improbable, opinion. But the most common doctrine of all Catholic Doctors is (whatever fables Leander of Murcia, along with his fellow Leander, and a few others, may spin) that a vow of chastity, whether simple or solemn, is valid, since it always concerns a better good, both absolutely and with respect to those who make it — even though, through the malice and iniquity of some, its observance may become difficult, it never becomes impossible. For vows, whether simple or solemn, can always be observed. If those who make them do not observe them, this happens solely through their own depravity.

XXIX. These authors immediately propose marriage as somehow more salutary for a man frail and subject to lust, as though no other remedies existed at all. What if a man, burning with the act of lust, were to marry, and his one wife were not sufficient to extinguish his impure thirst — would they permit him another wife? By no means, certainly, since this is forbidden by natural law. What if he is bound by a solemn vow of chastity? But then, they say, he is considered as a member of a religious order. What if, having contracted marriage, this man became subject to countless acts of unchastity, so that marriage became for him an occasion for perpetrating innumerable crimes? What if, all things weighed, a vow of chastity would be more salutary for him? The obvious answer is that marriage, valid by its own nature, cannot be undone by the malice of the contracting parties; nor should wives be multiplied on account of men's unbridled lust; nor should a solemn vow be voided on account of the malice of those vowing. Why, then, should the same not be said of a simple vow of chastity as well?

XXX. Before I bring this question to a close, it is worth reviewing the judgment which Fr. Matteo Moya passes on this opinion I have hitherto opposed (Select Disputations, tract. 2, disp. 2, q. 2, on vows and oaths). He treats this controversy at length, across three paragraphs. First, in one paragraph, he reports the authors disputing over the validity of a vow made by one who, before he vows, is inclined toward lust; and he pronounces the opinion which upholds the vow's validity to be the truer one. Then, in the second paragraph, he brings forward the opinion which maintains that the vow is dissolved, and rendered null, by a subsequent inclination toward carnal matters. He calls the authors of this opinion "most learned," so as to lend weight to it by superlative praise. In its favor he cites the most learned Dominicans Domingo Báñez, Sylvester, and Trovamala — who, however, only teach that no vow is made at all, whenever its matter becomes unsuitable or impossible. But that chastity, promised to God by vow, becomes unsuitable, or impossible to observe, on account of a subsequent inclination toward lust — none of them says. Finally, in the third paragraph, he settles his own opinion, and says that, although the opinion proposed in §1 is quite probable, he nonetheless judges the contrary opinion to be held. Consequently he judges the second opinion, from §2, also quite probable, and necessarily follows from the first — and indeed he does not refute it, but proposes it, with its arguments, to his readers. And he who once published lax opinions under the mask of "Amadeus Guimenius," now reissues them under the splendid guise of probability, and calls Leander a most learned patron — though it is plain that he is a mere copyist. I say this not to bring the glory of a most learned man into disrepute, but lest readers be dazzled by the deceptive splendor of his learning. Having thus demolished so many sophistical subtleties, I say that a vow is always valid when it has the conditions that all require — namely, that it be made by a person master of himself, free, and with deliberate will, and concerning a better good; and that "a better good" is called that which is such by its own nature, not by comparison to the frailty or iniquity of the one vowing. Chastity is impossible for no man; anyone, aided by God's grace, can preserve it. If someone violates it, this must be attributed to his own fault and depraved will. Whenever, then, a man has made a true vow of chastity, however much he may be tormented by the stings of the flesh, he remains always bound by the vow, and is obliged to keep it.

XXXI. You will object: what, before a vow is made, renders something unable to be suitable matter for a vow, likewise renders a vow, once made, void, if it supervenes after the vow was made. But many weighty theologians teach, maintaining that a vow to contract marriage is not valid for a frail person if, after the vow is made, frailty and a vehement inclination toward lust should supervene — that this frailty and inclination, present before the vow is made, render chastity unfit matter for a vow, and the vow of chastity invalid: which opinion, being far too lax, cannot be rejected. Therefore neither can that opinion be rejected which maintains that a subsequent inclination renders a vow already made null. Response: The first proposition, taken absolutely — of which more below — is false. Let us grant that a preceding inclination toward lust prevents a vow from being valid (which I nonetheless in no way concede): it does not follow from this that a subsequent frailty can abolish a vow which, once made, obtained its validity. For that proposition is true only when what supervenes renders the matter promised by the vow either impossible, or harmful to the one who made the vow. Continence is neither harmful in itself to a man bound by a vow, nor is its observance rendered impossible; it therefore cannot, by itself alone, render a vow, once validly made, void. For more is required to abrogate a vow that was validly made, and sometimes even already carried into execution, than is required to prevent it from being validly made in the first place. This much is said in whatever excuse can be found for those authors who teach that a preceding frailty renders a vow null. For my own part, however, I openly maintain that neither a preceding nor a subsequent frailty can abrogate a vow of chastity, and render it entirely void.

XXXII. Question IX. Is a vow not to vow valid? Response: All admit that this vow, taken absolutely, is invalid — since it does not concern a better good; indeed, it concerns an evil thing, being contrary to the honor due to God, since it is pleasing to God that vows dedicated to him be concerning matter agreeable to him. There will, then, be no obligation to do the opposite — namely, not to vow. A vow would, however, be valid whereby someone resolved, or vowed, that he would make no vow except before witnesses, or a confessor, or in writing — so as to avoid a rash and overly hasty making of a vow. For this deliberation does not impede a vow, but rather includes a reasonable manner of vowing. What fault, then, would such a person commit, if he later broke this vow, having omitted this circumstance? This is a matter that must chiefly be gathered from the circumstances. For if someone, moved by some weighty consideration, decided that he would never consider a vow of his own valid unless made in such-and-such circumstances, otherwise just, and then really made a vow omitting the said circumstances — such a transgression would undoubtedly be a sin, whether mortal or venial the others dispute. But if someone, without such weighty consideration, simply resolved that any vow he might make would not be valid unless certain conditions were observed, that vow, once made without that circumstance, would not be valid. For the one vowing is the legislator. By this very fact, then, that he does not wish his vow to be valid unless made in such circumstances, it in fact does not become valid.

XXXIII. Question X. Is a vow not to seek a dispensation, commutation, or annulment valid? Response: There are two opposing opinions among authors. That such a vow is foolish, and null, is held by the first opinion, defended by Sotus (Bk. VIII, q. 1, art. 9, near the end), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 8, n. 21), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 34, q. 3), Bartolomé a San Fausto (Bk. I, Thesaurus, q. 85), Trullench (Bk. II, dub. 5, n. 10), Tamburini (Bk. III, ch. 5, §4, n. 8), and others — since this vow, taken absolutely, does not concern a better good, since it can sometimes be more useful to seek a dispensation than not to seek one. Indeed, never to seek a dispensation in any case whatsoever is, by its own kind, an evil thing. For evil arises from any defect whatsoever. Hence vows never to lend, never to stand surety, and the like, are invalid — since such absolute vows comprehend many cases in which it will be better to stand surety, to lend, to seek a dispensation, and likewise many other cases in which the opposite will be necessary. Wherefore, since evil arises from any defect whatsoever, the aforesaid vows have an object that is evil, not merely less good; and therefore they are null.

XXXIV. The other opinion maintains that the aforesaid vow is valid, though it does not oblige when it would sometimes be more useful for the soul to seek a dispensation. This is defended by Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 1, n. 18), Suárez (Bk. II, ch. 11, n. 6), Filliucci (tract. 23, ch. 2, q. 11, n. 65), Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 19, q. 4), Palao (tract. 15, disp. 1, punct. 8, n. 5) — but this author, in the place cited, does not speak of this question, but of a vow not to seek a dispensation except from the Roman Pontiff. The theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 1, §3, n. 40) uphold this second opinion, and, besides the authors already cited, also cite Sylvester (s.v. Votum, 2, q. 14) and St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 9, §9). But St. Antoninus contributes not a word of his own; he merely copies out the opinion, in its own words, of Richard, Bk. IV, dist. 38. This author either the theologians of Salamanca ought to have cited for the contrary opinion — since he holds it — or they should not have cited St. Antoninus either, since he adds nothing of his own, but transcribes Richard's opinion in almost exactly the same words, as will be plain to any reader.

Richard's opinion, and St. Antoninus's, is that the aforesaid vow is valid whenever it would be more beneficial for the soul not to seek a dispensation; but invalid whenever it would be useful for the soul to seek a dispensation — unless the express intention of the one vowing is that, if the vow he made does not oblige in some case, it should oblige in none: for then the vow would be entirely null. These are the words both of Richard and of St. Antoninus: "If someone vows something which can, in one case, be useful for salvation, and in another case useless, he is obliged to observe the vow in that case in which it is useful for salvation, even if he is not so obliged in the case where it is useless for salvation — unless it was the intention of the one vowing that, if it does not oblige in that case, it should oblige in none." What is read in St. Antoninus in that passage is a printer's error. This opinion is the safest in practice, since it is certain among all that a vow not to seek a dispensation without a legitimate cause is valid. Indeed, a dispensation sought without a legitimate cause is invalid, or at least unlawful, both on the part of the one seeking it and of the one granting it. It is, moreover, certain — even granting the validity of a vow, made absolutely, never to seek a dispensation — that the one vowing can, with a safe conscience, have recourse to a superior for a dispensation from the vow, when a just cause for such a dispensation arises; for the authors defending the validity of the vow admit that it does not oblige in the event that it would be more beneficial for the soul to seek a dispensation. For no one — neither the one vowing, nor the superior — can be deprived of this faculty. For the subjection of a subject with respect to his superior, and the authority of the superior over the subject, constitute a right which cannot be taken away by a subsequent vow. No vow, then, can prevent subjects, a legitimate cause arising, from approaching their superior. Wherefore, if the matter is examined by reason, the first opinion seems more probable. It is safer, however, to keep one's pledge, and to seek a dispensation only under an evident and pressing cause. Fr. Sánchez teaches that although someone may have made a vow not to seek a dispensation from a first vow, he does not thereby elicit a vow not to seek a dispensation from this latter vow as well; and so, having obtained a dispensation from the latter, the first vow remains capable of dispensation; or, if he made a vow not to seek a dispensation from this latter one, he can still seek a dispensation from that vow, provided he never made a vow not to seek a dispensation from this final one — which he adds last of all, even if he should multiply his vows to infinity. But this fable-like repetition of vows, and this daydream of idle minds, I dismiss. Those who imagine such deliriums need not a dispensation, but hellebore [a remedy for madness].

XXXV. Question XI. Can those who have made a vow not to seek a dispensation nonetheless seek a commutation or an annulment? Response: Sánchez and Trullench (loc. cit.) deny this, since one who excludes commutation excludes dispensation with even greater reason. The second opinion affirms this, defended by Prado (ch. 31, n. 65), Leander (q. 5), Tamburini (ch. 15, §4), and the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 27, ch. 1, punct. 1, §1, n. 9). The extension of an obligation is a matter of fact, entirely dependent on the will of the one vowing. If the one vowing has renounced the privilege of commutation, he is not thereby considered to have renounced dispensation as well, since he can separate one from the other. It is true that one who refuses commutation is prudently presumed also to refuse dispensation. But since it can also be the case, conversely, that the one vowing may deprive himself of the faculty of seeking commutation, while retaining the freedom to seek dispensation, the matter must therefore be gathered from the intention of the one vowing. For such circumstances can arise in which it would be advisable to obtain a dispensation, but not a commutation — though this does not happen frequently.