Title XXIV: On Oaths

Latin source headnote: An action can be brought for release from an oath whose fulfillment contains turpitude on the part of the recipient. This it says as to its meaning, and it is a notable case. Abbas.

Gregory III.

From the administration—(And below:) Therefore, because creditors bind debtors by oath to pay them usury, to the manifest peril of souls, we, wishing according to the duty of our office to provide for their salvation and to remove the unjust burden from debtors, and especially from those who have given themselves as aid for bringing relief to the land of Jerusalem, command all of you that you shall compel the creditors themselves by ecclesiastical coercion to release the oaths furnished concerning payment of usury to them, with the obstacle of contradiction and appeal removed.

Latin source headnote: An oath furnished by a prelate not to seek the return of property of the church is not valid. Or thus: absolution from an oath induced by fear is made by an ecclesiastical judge.

From the Register of Gregory.

It has reached us that the Bishop of Laodicea, despoiled of his property by Count Ar., was compelled at sword-point, in an increase of wickedness, to swear that he would not seek the return of the things thus taken, and [the count] asks that pardon for so great a crime be imparted to him. Therefore, having learned of the insult inflicted upon himself in blessed Peter, we grieved greatly, asserting that the bishop himself could be bound by no bonds of an oath concerning this; nevertheless, by apostolic authority, we absolve him who swore under most abominable compulsion. [Given at Rome, on the third day before the Kalends of February, in the third indiction, 1080.]

Latin source headnote: One who changes the fulfillment of an oath for the better does not perjure himself; and no one is bound by an oath to fulfill what he swore if the other party, with respect to whom he furnished the oath, does not fulfill [his part].

The same, to the King of the Franks.

It has reached us that, when formerly [you went] to the regions of Auvergne, etc. (And below:) For one who changes a purpose or promise for the better does not break it. Nor are you bound to him in any respect, even if you had confirmed your aforesaid promise by an oath or an obligation of faith with a condition interposed, if it is established that he did not at all comply with the condition.

Latin source headnote: A form of oath containing seven chapters is set forth, according to which bishops swear to the Pope; but today all persons receiving a dignity from the Pope swear to him. Let this stand for the summary and division.

The same, to Peter the Subdeacon.

I, N., bishop, from this hour forward shall be faithful to Saint Peter, to the holy apostolic Roman Church, to my lord Pope C., and to his successors entering canonically. I shall be neither in counsel nor in deed that he lose life or limb, or be taken by an evil capture. Counsel that he shall reveal to me, either by himself, by letters, or by a messenger, I shall disclose to no one to his harm. I shall be a helper in defending and retaining the papacy of the Roman Church and the rules of the holy Fathers, saving my order, against all men. Summoned to a synod, I shall come unless I shall have been hindered by a canonical hindrance. I shall treat honorably, in going and returning, a legate of the Apostolic See whom I shall know to be a certain legate, and shall aid him in his necessities. I shall visit the thresholds of the Apostles every year, either by myself or by a certain messenger of mine, unless I shall be released by their permission. So may God and these holy Gospels aid me.

Latin source headnote: A cleric is not bound to furnish an oath of obedience to his bishop except by reason of an administration granted to him.

Pope Urban.

No bishop shall compel his clerics to swear to him, except perhaps those to whom the administration of ecclesiastical property shall have been committed.

Latin source headnote: One who obligated himself to pay usury is not compelled to pay unless he swore; in that case he is compelled, but he recovers it.

Alexander III, to the Bishop of Ávila.

Debtors, however, ought not to be compelled to pay usury to which they had bound themselves, unless they are bound by oath to pay it. But if they have sworn concerning its payment, they are to be compelled to render the oath to the Lord, so that they may be released by the creditors. And when the usury has been paid, the creditors are to be compelled by ecclesiastical severity to restore it, if necessary.

Latin source headnote: A debtor who swore to inflict no burden upon the creditor concerning a pledged thing until he paid the debt is not heard when seeking the pledge back and wishing to set off the fruits against the principal; but he ought first to pay the debt in full and then seek the thing together with the fruits received from it. This it says, and it is a notable case.

The same, to the Archbishop of Rouen and his Suffragans.

Know that it has reached our hearing that, when Peter de Neasdem, during the war that existed between our dearest son Henry, illustrious King of the English, and his sons, lent a certain sum of money to certain men of a province of the Kingdom of France, he received from them in pledge certain possessions and revenues, binding them to himself under the sanctity of an oath that they would inflict no burden or molestation upon him concerning those possessions and revenues until they paid him the lent money. Although he has not yet received his principal, as he asserts, from those possessions and the aforesaid revenues after expenses have been deducted, nevertheless, because you, brother Archbishop, bound him with the bond of excommunication on this account, we are therefore compelled to direct our letters to you, especially since he wishes, as he asserts, to be content with [his] principal. Therefore, by commanding you through apostolic writings, we order your fraternity that, having received from the aforesaid P. sufficient security that in this matter he ought to obey your mandate, you shall by our authority wholly absolve him, contradiction and appeal ceasing, from the sentence by which he is bound. Then, if it is so, you shall compel his debtors, who are said to have withdrawn from him the aforesaid possessions and revenues contrary to their oath, by ecclesiastical censure to restore these to the same P., delay and appeal ceasing, and not henceforth inflict molestations upon him contrary to their oath until the money is paid to him, because it is not safe for anyone, but rather dangerous, to violate the sanctity of an oath. But when they have paid his money to him, as they swore, you shall endeavor studiously to admonish and diligently induce him to restore whatever, after expenses have been deducted, it is established before you that he received beyond the principal; and, if after admonition he does not do this, you shall, appeal removed, bring him back under the same sentence of excommunication, because, just as it is dangerous for debtors to violate their oath, so it is no less dangerous for creditors to retain what they have received as usury, since the crime of usury is detestable and exceedingly horrible and condemned by the page of either Testament.

Latin source headnote: If an oath extorted through fear can be observed without the destruction of eternal salvation, it is to be observed; nevertheless, the Roman Church has been accustomed to absolve from such an oath.

The same, to the Archbishop of Sens.

But if someone, by gravest fear and under the sanctity of an oath, has compelled another to renounce his right and has retained it for himself, because you wished to consult us whether one of them or neither ought to have it, we have determined to respond this to you: it is not safe for anyone to go against his oath unless the oath is such that, if observed, it tends toward the destruction of eternal salvation. Nor do we will by our response to give anyone material for going against his own oath, lest we appear to be authors of perjury. But it is recalled that this was sometimes done in the Roman Church by many of our predecessors: clerics who, under compulsion, abjured the ministry of the church merited the benefit of absolution from the oath, and, in order to restrain the iniquity of those who compelled ecclesiastical men to furnish that oath, they were permitted to minister in the same church.

Latin source headnote: Monks who swear to remain in hostage for a debt of the monastery, and sureties who swear to keep the creditor indemnified, are compelled to observe their oaths.

The same, to the Bishops of Sardinia.

From a certain rescript presented to us, it became manifestly known to us that R., formerly Abbot of Tremiti, agreed with Peter concerning a sum of eight thousand solidi in this manner—(And below:) In addition, the aforesaid abbot gave certain monks as hostages, who swore to observe the agreement, so that, if they failed, other monks would be placed in hostage in their place. Moreover, if the said monks did not keep faith, the abbot gave to the same man V. and his wife as sureties, who are likewise said to have pledged faith. Therefore, we command that you shall take care studiously to admonish the abbot and the monks, and V. and his wife, that, as they swore, they cause the same agreement to be fulfilled; otherwise, you shall prohibit entry into the church to the same abbot and monks, and prohibit divine offices from being celebrated in the land of the aforesaid V. and his wife until worthy satisfaction.

Latin source headnote: One who goes against a lawful oath not from necessity but voluntarily is perjured and is to be removed from the church.

The same, to the Bishops of London and Worcester.

We have received the complaint of R., canon of the church of Lincoln, that, when a cleric named V. Savage had paid him two bezants in the name of the church of Statera for very many years, and had confirmed by an interposed oath that he would pay them to him annually, the sanctity of the oath now having been contemned, for two years he has ceased from payment of a pension of this kind. Therefore, because those who are entangled in the crime of perjury do not deserve to rule churches, by commanding you through apostolic writings, we order your fraternity that you shall summon the parties before your presence and take care to inquire more diligently into the truth of the matter concerning these things; and, if it is established to you that the aforementioned V. ceased from payment of the same pension contrary to his oath not from necessity but voluntarily, you shall, by our authority, contradiction and appeal ceasing, remove him from the aforesaid church and not at all delay restoring it to the aforesaid R., and shall cause him to possess it peacefully.

Latin source headnote: If a person presented swears to the presenter to increase an ancient payment and afterward swears the contrary to the person instituting him, the second oath is valid and not the first; nevertheless, he is removed from the church.

Lucius III, to the Bishop of Norwich.

Your fraternity considered that we should be consulted as to which oath is to be followed when religious persons bind certain clerics by the sanctity of an oath to pay a greater pension than customary, or to furnish something [in the name] of the benefice beyond the customary pension; but, when they are instituted by bishops, they swear that they will not increase the ancient and customary pension. We therefore respond briefly to your consultation that, since the later oath is supported by reason and the authority of the Lateran Council, it prejudices the first, which proceeded from greed. Moreover, it is just that clerics [thus entangled] be perpetually excluded from churches because of the perjury that they cannot avoid.

Latin source headnote: Bishops are to be punished more gravely for perjury than others. This it says. — § 1. An oath not to furnish aid to a relative is unlawful. This it says.

Urban III, to the Archbishop of Pisa.

When a certain—(And below: cf. c. 8, On the Times of Ordinations, I.11.) We respond to your consultation in this way: punishment is to be taken against bishops who have transgressed their oath all the more gravely in proportion as they are eminent in greater dignity and others can more easily be provoked to similar acts by their example. (And below: cf. c. 8, On the Times of Ordinations, I.11.)

§ 1. But those who swear not to speak to father, mother, sister, or brother, or not to furnish them the aid of humanity, are to be absolved from observance of that oath, since it is unlawful and contrary to all reason; nevertheless, a fitting penance is to be imposed upon them for having sworn wrongly concerning this.

Latin source headnote: The oath of a monk abjuring the cloister is not valid, and a grave penance concerning this is imposed upon him.

The same.

As we have learned from the letters of your discretion, R., prior of your monastery and bearer of the present letters, inflamed by the heat of anger, by the rash impulse of a precipitate mind confirmed by oath that he would no longer remain with the monk G. in the cloister of the same monastery, to which he bound himself by the bond of profession. Therefore, to you who ask what is to be done concerning this with regard to the same monk, we respond that, since blessed Benedict in his rule, which nearly all monks profess, altogether prohibits swearing, it was not permitted to the aforesaid monk to make the rash oath, especially since he would break the faith of his profession and make void his purpose of stability. Therefore, your solicitude shall provide concerning him that such a penance be imposed upon him through which he may make satisfaction to almighty God for taking his name in vain, so that anyone else, deterred by his example, may fear to do anything similar; but he himself shall perform his penance with perpetual stability in the cloister, which he could not lawfully abjure, yet in such a way that, because he approached our presence, he is not deprived of the customary portion of the benefit of the rule.

Latin source headnote: A vassal who swore to a prelate is not compelled to swear to his successors.

Clement III.

Simplicity, the friend of truth, does not seek to be obscured by any deceits of words or by any coverings of ambiguities. [It is therefore frequently necessary that those things which appear to have been said less fully, and which might generate the scruples of ambiguities although said soundly, should shine forth more clearly through truthful explanation.] On this account, dearest son in the Lord, having heard that a question was moved in the presence of your greatness as to whether it was gathered from the tenor of our rescript that each of your heirs ought to furnish an oath of fealty and homage to each of our successors; having understood also the exposition of our beloved sons A., cardinal priest of the title of the Holy Cross in Jerusalem, and P., cardinal priest of the title of Saint Lawrence in Damaso, legates of the Apostolic See, which was transmitted to us under the attestation of their seals; unwilling to dissent in any way from their sound understanding, we have determined to intimate to the royal serenity that, since our intention is to impose nothing intolerable upon you [and your] heirs, we respond to you in this article in such a way that your heirs who have sworn to us or any of our successors shall not at all be compelled to swear [afterward] to others. Nevertheless, they shall be bound at all times faithfully and without any tergiversation to observe toward our Catholic successors who shall be in office for the time being the purity of homage and fealty, no less than if they had sworn, unless perhaps homage shall have been relaxed to any of them, as it was to your person, by the benignity of the Apostolic See; yet such a person shall not on that account believe himself immune from observance of his fealty. [Given at the Lateran.]

Latin source headnote: The Church is accustomed to absolve from an oath extorted through fear, and its transgressors are not punished as persons sinning mortally.

Celestine III.

But in that question which in addition to this is placed fifth—namely, whether those who made an oath unwillingly in order to preserve life and property are absolved from the bond of the oath—following the custom of our Church, we judge nothing other than what our predecessors, the Roman Pontiffs Zacharias, Gelasius, Gregory VII, Urban II, and others, are known to have judged, who absolved such persons from the bonds of the oath. Moreover, so that action may be taken more advisedly and material for perjuring themselves be removed from them, it shall not be said to them so expressly that they are not to observe the oaths; but, if they do not attend to them, they are not on that account to be punished as for a mortal crime.

Latin source headnote: If the person whose mandate I swore to obey commands me to do something contrary to an oath previously and lawfully made by me, I am not bound to observe it. This it says, adhering to the words of the letter.

Innocent III, to H., S., and M., Citizens of Venice.

Coming to our presence, the beloved son A. [Mengun,] bearer of the present letters, by a humble report explained to us that, when formerly he had been established in the presence of the beloved son, the noble Doge of Venice, together with several others for the discussion of many causes, he contended with M. Maurien., alternately inflicting insults. Because he incurred grave enmities on this account, and you and your other relatives were more vehemently stirred on this account, certain persons who were lovers of either party, placing themselves in the middle, endeavored to recall that disturbance to peace and concord, suggested to the aforesaid A. that, in satisfaction for the injuries, he should swear to obey your mandate. And since he did not believe that he had committed anything of such a kind that something grave ought to be imposed upon him, and had furnished that oath under such confidence, you immediately commanded him under the obligation of the oath that, from the feast of blessed Michael immediately past onward, he should never enter the court of the said doge except when all persons were generally called to court by his edict, or unless it should happen that he was released by the nobleman Count Roger and M. Mauricen., who are said to be absent. But because the same A., who, as he asserts, is a counselor of the said doge and is bound by promise to assist in their right many churches of which he is advocate, would by no means have sworn in this way if he had foreknown that mandate contrary to him, especially since he fears to act against the salvation of his soul, through apostolic writings we command [you] that, for the remedy of your souls, you shall wholly revoke the mandate itself. But if you are unwilling or unable to revoke the mandate itself, know that we have commanded our venerable brother the Patriarch of Grado that, if that mandate conflicts with the prior oath lawfully made, he shall by our authority declare that it is not to be observed. [Given at Civita Castellana, on the fourth day before the Ides of October, 1198.]

Latin source headnote: One who swore to defend a church and, when required, refuses without just cause is perjured, and an appeal does not defend him.

The same, to Master Apollinaris.

You asked the Apostolic See in a brief question whether a person who is bound by oath to preserve and, to the extent possible, defend the rights of some church incurs the guilt of perjury if, when necessity presses, he has been required under the obligation of the oath concerning this and, unwilling to do it, has determined to appeal to the Apostolic See. But we respond to your question in this way: in this article, such an appeal does not excuse the appellant from perjury; rather, unless some difficulty exists on account of which the person required cannot aid the church, he is instead entangled in the fault of perjury. [Given at the Lateran, on the twelfth day before the Kalends of November, 1198.]

Latin source headnote: One who knowingly swears to something unlawful does not need absolution but is bound not to observe it. But if he swore in ignorance, he ought to observe it if it is observable in some lawful manner. If, however, he swore to something lawful that he thought unlawful, he ought to observe the oath, but shall do penance for his depraved intention.

The same, to the Illustrious King of Aragon.

In proportion as we love your person among the other Christian princes with more sincere charity, with so much the more diligent solicitude do we wish to take precaution for the royal serenity, lest anything, which God forbid, threaten it that could redound either to the peril of the soul or detriment of the land. For from the tenor of your letters and those of many prelates, and also of many others dwelling in your kingdom, it became known to us that, when you were hastening with a multitude of armed men against the enemies of Christianity, who at that time occupied the land of Spain by reason of the magnitude of their power, to the aid of our dearest son in Christ, the illustrious King of Castile, certain of your counselors—or rather deceivers—induced your mind to swear, without the assent of the people having been sought, that until a certain time you would preserve your father’s coinage, which nevertheless around the time of his death had been defrauded of its lawful weight. But since the same coinage has been so diminished and rendered of lesser value that grave scandal is generated among the people on this account, you, desiring to revoke what you had done indiscreetly and to satisfy the necessity of the people, supplicated us humbly to be absolved from observance of the aforesaid oath, from which you fear that grave peril threatens you and your kingdom.

Concerning this, a diligent investigator, the truth having been discovered, could easily perceive that absolution was not so much necessary as interpretation was to be sought, because, when you made the oath, you believed the coinage to be either false or lawful. If false—which we do not believe concerning the royal serenity—the oath would have been unlawful and in no way to be observed, and penance would have to be imposed upon you for it, since an oath was not instituted to be a bond of iniquity. But if you believed it to be lawful, the oath was lawful and is altogether to be observed. And so that it may be observed blamelessly, we counsel and command that, the coinage that had been defrauded of its lawful weight having been rejected, another coinage be struck under the name of your father, which you shall restore to lawful weight according to the best condition that it had in your father’s time, in such a way that [also] the old coinage that had not been falsified from that condition shall be spent equally with it, through which both loss can be avoided and the oath observed. Nevertheless, if perhaps when furnishing the oath you believed that the coinage itself had been diminished from lawful weight, and your conscience reproaches you concerning this, you shall humbly confess your sin to our venerable brother the Bishop of Zaragoza, to whom we write concerning this, and shall devoutly receive and endeavor to fulfill the satisfaction imposed upon you for the unlawful oath. [Given at the Lateran, on the Nones of April, 1199.]

Latin source headnote: An oath furnished to the prejudice of the right of a superior is not valid.

The same, to the Consuls and People of Todi.

When recently your beloved sons, the consuls, came to the Apostolic See, we received them benignly and took care both to admonish [you] paternally and to convene [you] somewhat sharply concerning those matters that are rather frequently reported to us about you. For although, when appeals have been interposed to the Apostolic See, you are bound humbly and devoutly to defer to them, since even secular laws do not deny the benefit of appeal after sentence to persons aggrieved, you, attending to this less than befits you, put into execution sentences suspended by appeal, and, in contempt of the Apostolic See, burden those appealing when aggrieved. But the same consuls took care to explain to us, in your excuse, that, when any of you are called to the office of consul, they confirm by their own oath that they will judge concerning loans and kidnappers according to the custom of your city and will execute within twenty-eight days the things they have judged. Hence they said that, saving an oath of this kind, you were unable to defer to appeals concerning these matters.

But because judges swore to judge according to the laws no less than your consuls according to the custom of your city, and therefore, just as judges could burden subjects contrary to the laws, so also could your consuls contrary to custom, lest we appear to fail the aggrieved even in these matters, through apostolic writings we command and order all of you that, since we will your approved customs to be observed, you shall humbly and devoutly defer to appeals interposed to us, since the aforesaid oath cannot excuse you, in which the right of a superior ought to be understood to be excepted. Therefore, since, as we have learned, after the beloved son S., bearer of the present letters, appealed to the Apostolic See from the sentence of Judge G., you determined to put the sentence itself into execution, placing the adversary of the appellant in possession of the things concerning which the question was being conducted, we nevertheless will and command that you restore the possession itself to the same man. Otherwise, know that we have commanded our venerable brother the Bishop of Nocera through apostolic writings that, admonition having been given beforehand, he shall compel you to this by ecclesiastical censure, appeal removed. [Given at the Lateran, 1200.]

Latin source headnote: One who swears not to recover usury can, notwithstanding the oath, recover it upon a new cause. This it says according to the more notable understanding.

The same, to the Archbishop of Pisa.

Know that it has reached our hearing that, when I. Pellar. and G., his son, had paid no small amount of usury to Peter Soctan., by an oath furnished they confirmed that neither by themselves nor through another would they recover the aforesaid usury, or bring a question concerning it before an ecclesiastical or even a secular judge. And when the creditor himself, established at the point of death, made a testament, he commanded his heirs that they should take care to restore it to all who should reasonably prove that they had given usury to him. Hence, since the aforesaid I. and G. do not attempt to recover the usury because of an oath of this kind, and the heirs of the aforesaid P. neglect to satisfy them concerning the usury, therefore, through apostolic writings, we command your fraternity that you shall cause it to be publicly proposed in the church under penalty of excommunication—or shall propose it—that those who know the truth concerning this shall come forward to put forward testimony; and, if it is lawfully established to you concerning the foregoing through the statements of witnesses or other documents, you shall, admonition having been given beforehand, compel his heirs by ecclesiastical censure, appeal removed, to restore all the usury that their father received from the aforesaid I. and G. [Given at Rome at Saint Peter’s, on the Ides of March, 1205.]

Latin source headnote: A general oath ought, if possible, to be understood in such a way that it does not conflict with law; otherwise, as rash, it does not bind contrary to observance of law.

The same, to the Archbishop of Naples.

Know that it has reached our hearing that some time ago, almost through extortion, an oath of such a kind was furnished by you: that in every cause you ought to observe judicial order. But because, according to canonical traditions, manifest matters do not need an accusation, nor is the judicial order that ought to be observed in other matters to be observed in them; and because, when you swore under the foregoing tenor, you did not have it in mind that on account of this you would go against the canonical sanctions—for otherwise it would have been not an oath but rather perjury, and would not have to be observed for any reason—we, wishing to interpret your oath more benignly so that it accords with canonical institutes, intimate to your fraternity by authority of the present letters that, in manifest and notorious matters, we do not believe that by reason of the foregoing oath you are bound to observe the subtlety of judicial order, which the very reason of law also postulates and requires not to be observed in all respects in such matters. Hence, to one looking subtly, it will appear, and not undeservedly, to proceed from the order of judgments that judicial order is not observed in all respects in the foregoing, although also according to the approved understanding of divine scripture what you swore can rightly be understood as meaning that you would observe judicial order in all causes—namely, in those in which judicial order is to be observed. Therefore, by acting thus, you will both observe the tenor of the oath and not omit the canonical institutes. [Given at the Lateran, on the eighteenth day before the Kalends of December, 1198.]

Latin source headnote: If one oath owed to one person is furnished to another, it is unlawful, and notwithstanding it the oath is to be furnished to the person to whom it is owed.

The same, to the Judge of Cagliari.

We believe that you flourish in such discretion that you understand by yourself that a burden is not remitted but increased when that which is to be furnished to another as a debt is imprudently discharged to someone else. Indeed, when our venerable father the Archbishop of Torres exacted from you in our name an oath of fealty, as he had received a mandate from us, you deferred furnishing it into his hands, asserting that you had furnished an oath of this kind to our venerable brother the Archbishop of Pisa, saving the honor of the Apostolic See. Therefore, since you are bound to make fealty to us and the Roman Church, as even your prudence acknowledges, if you reckon the oath furnished to be contrary to that which is to be furnished to us by you as a debt, you will judge it unlawful and, notwithstanding the unlawful oath, will furnish what is lawfully—indeed, by debt—sought; or, if the oath furnished does not conflict with that to be furnished, you will furnish the latter without difficulty. We therefore admonish and attentively exhort your nobility, and through apostolic writings [to you] command and order that, every excuse and occasion ceasing, into the hands of the same archbishop you shall furnish to us and the Roman Church an oath of fealty. [Given at Ferentino, on the seventeenth day before the Kalends of October, 1203.]

Latin source headnote: One who swore to stand by someone’s mandate is not bound to obey if he commands unlawful things, such as that he disinherit his son or abjure his wife.

The same, to the Bishop of Alatri.

Quintavallis, a vicar, intimated to our ears that, when formerly his daughters and Giborga and Venetia, daughters of John Bertius, had come from words even to blows, the same Quintavallis, desiring on the advice of neighboring persons to make satisfaction to those women and their relatives for the injury that his daughters had inflicted upon the other women, furnished an oath that he would obey their mandate for their injury. After receiving the oath from him, they gave him such a mandate under the obligation of the oath: that, if at any time his sons or daughters or his wife should cast some insulting deed or word against those women, the same Quintavallis should disinherit his daughters and sons and remove his own wife from himself. Wherefore, through apostolic writings, we command your fraternity that you shall inquire more diligently into the truth concerning the foregoing, and, if you learn that the matter is so, since the oath was lawful but the mandate unlawful, you shall enjoin upon the aforesaid daughters of John Bertius that they revoke that mandate; otherwise, supported by our authority, you shall declare that he is not bound to observe that mandate. [Given at Anagni, on the third day before the Nones of February, 1204.]

Latin source headnote: Spouses cannot separate themselves, even as to bed and mutual cohabitation, for a light and rash cause, even with the interposition of an oath.

The same, to the Archbishop of Tarragona.

Your fraternity considered that we should be consulted as to what is to be done by you concerning this article, namely, that B. of Bell-lloc and A., his wife, formerly swore to one another that they would never seek one another again; but now he insistently seeks her again, while she on the contrary affirms that she would sooner make herself a Saracen and lose her soul than return to him, but would willingly dismiss the adulterer to whom she adhered after she withdrew from him, and would promise and swear chastity. We therefore, responding to your fraternity concerning this, through apostolic writings command you that you shall attentively admonish and induce both to observe continence. If they wish to promise and observe it, you shall permit each to remain without the other. Otherwise, if the man is unwilling to be continent, you shall compel her, by a sentence of excommunication and with appeal removed, to return to him and remain with the man as his wife, since an oath of this kind was rash and adultery was committed on both sides. [Given at Ferentino, on the twelfth day before the Kalends of July, 1203.]

Latin source headnote: One who swore to contract with a woman can reject her because of supervening fornication or deformity, but not because of preceding fornication or deformity. This it says. — (Moreover, that, etc.:) If a man swore not to accuse his wife, the oath is rash. But if he swore this specifically concerning adultery, he will be able to denounce her, but ought not to accuse her.

The same, to the Archbishop of Genoa.

Just as, if a man had sworn to a woman when he contracted with her that he would always hold her as his lawful wife, he indeed could not dismiss her for fornication that the woman had committed before, but could dismiss her for fornication that she might perpetrate afterward, notwithstanding an oath of this kind, because in it this condition was to be understood—namely, if she did not sin against the law of marriage—so, if someone has sworn that he will take a certain woman as wife, he assuredly cannot object against her preceding fornication, but can object against her subsequent fornication so that he does not take her as spouse, because in that oath this condition ought to be understood—namely, if she does not go against the rule of betrothal. Otherwise, if after an oath of this kind she became a public prostitute, he would be bound to take her as wife, which is utterly absurd. For if, after marriage has been contracted, a man can lawfully dismiss a wife from his cohabitation because of fornication, much more strongly, before marriage has been celebrated, a betrothed man can lawfully refuse to admit a betrothed woman into his cohabitation for the same cause, because a guest is more shamefully cast out than not admitted; notwithstanding in either case the bond of the oath, which indeed, because of the condition to be understood, is of such a kind that the person who swore can comport himself toward either outcome without transgression.

But if, after an oath of this kind, the woman became not only leprous but also paralytic, or lost her eyes or nose, or something more shameful befell her, would the man be bound to take her as wife? Certainly, he could not dismiss her once taken. But would he be bound to admit her when not taken, although that which sometimes does not dissolve a contract impedes a contract to be made?

Moreover, that oath is undoubtedly rash if a man swears to his wife that he will accuse her of no crime, because, if the woman should become an unbeliever and should be unwilling to cohabit with the man without insult to the Creator, or [should seek] to draw him into the error of unbelief, then the man ought without hesitation to accuse her before his judge so that, unless she came entirely to her senses, he should dismiss her altogether according to the canonical sanctions. But if he had expressly sworn that he would not accuse her concerning adultery, would an oath of this kind have to be observed, since scripture testifies that he who conceals the crime of his wife is a patron of turpitude, and according to the rule of the Gospel, if after being corrected a first and second time she were unwilling to come to her senses, it would have to be told to the Church, so that she would thereafter be avoided as a heathen and a publican, and through this a free faculty of sinning would not be furnished to her because of the impunity of sin? But can a man not forgive his wife who sins against him, not only seven times but even seventy-seven times, according to the truth of the Gospel? It therefore appears safer in this case that, because of the sanctity of the oath, the man desist from accusing his wife for the pronouncement of a separation, although he can denounce her for the performance of penance. Therefore, having weighed the tenor of this response, you shall proceed in the cause concerning which you determined to consult us. [Given at Viterbo, on the Kalends of September, in the tenth year, 1207.]

Latin source headnote: An oath is lawfully made from a necessary cause, even by religious persons.

The same, to the Abbot and Chapter of Châtillon.

Although Christ commanded according to the truth of the Gospel [that] your speech be “yes, yes,” and “no, no,” [that is,] that an affirmation or negation should proceed from the heart just as it proceeds from the mouth, nevertheless, because as human malice grows a simple assertion or negation is scarcely believed, he therefore prudently added: “What is more than this is from evil.” From evil indeed, not so much of fault as of punishment; and not of those furnishing the oath but of those exacting it. For unbelief of this kind is more punishment than fault. Hence he did not say “evil,” but said “from evil.”

For although the Lord appears to have prohibited an oath, he nowhere prohibited swearing by the Creator, but by a creature, lest through an oath of this kind the honor of the Creator be transferred to a creature. Wherefore, when in the Gospel he had premised, “I say to you, do not swear at all,” he immediately added: “neither by heaven, because it is the throne of God; nor by earth, because it is his footstool; nor by Jerusalem, because it is the city of the great king; nor by your head, because you cannot make one hair white or black.” And although one must not swear by a creature, nevertheless, if one swears by a creature, it is indeed to be observed, provided that what is sworn is lawful, because, as Truth testifies, “he who swears by heaven swears by the throne of God and by him who sits upon it.”

James also does not simply prohibit an oath, but “the will to swear,” when he says: “Before all things, my brothers, do not swear,” since spontaneous will ought not to induce anyone to an oath, [because one who swears easily perjures himself easily,] but pressing necessity ought to draw him. And then you can swear without fault, provided the oath has those three companions concerning which the Prophet speaks thus: “And they shall swear, ‘The Lord lives,’ in truth, judgment, and justice, and all shall bless him and praise him.” But when James adds, “neither by heaven, nor by earth, nor by any other oath whatsoever,” he forbids swearing by any creature, whatever it may be. Otherwise, the Apostle would not have said: “Men swear by one greater than themselves, and an oath for confirmation is the end of all their controversy.” In this he plainly shows by whom one is to swear, when he says, “Men swear by one greater than themselves,” that is, by God; and why one is to swear, namely, that an oath may be the end of all controversy.

The angel also whom John saw in the Apocalypse standing upon the sea and upon the earth lifted his hand to heaven and swore by him who lives for ever and ever. Christ also is read to have said more in the Gospel than “yes, yes,” “no, no,” since he very frequently said, “Amen, I say to you.” Explaining this according to Luke, when he had premised, “Amen, I say to you, that no prophet is accepted in his own country,” he consequently added: “In truth I say to you, that there were many widows in Israel in the days of Elijah.” The Apostle also swore when he said, “God is my witness,” and again, “I die daily by your glory, brothers.” The Greek copies show these words to be a most manifest oath.

For if to swear were evil in itself, assuredly the Lord would not have sworn, although in the Old Testament it is read: “Because the Lord has sworn and will not repent,” and again: “The Lord swore truth to David and will not frustrate him”; indeed, he also commanded in the Old Testament: “Render your oaths to God.” For some things are prohibited because they are evil in themselves, such as theft, adultery, and things of this kind, which are not to be done in any way. But some things are prohibited because of a cause, not because they are evil in themselves, but because, if they are done frequently and much, evils follow from them. Thus wine is not [indeed] evil in itself, and nevertheless the Apostle prohibits it, saying: “Do not become drunk with wine, in which there is wantonness,” since wantonness is generated from frequent and immoderate drinking of wine. So also an oath is indeed not evil in itself, since it is a confirmation of truth, but nevertheless it is prohibited for a cause, because perjury often occurs from frequent and incautious swearing, as is read in Ecclesiasticus: “A man who swears much will be filled with iniquity, and a plague will not depart from his house.”

Therefore, just as Paul permitted his disciple [namely] Timothy, on account of necessity, to use a little wine because of his stomach and frequent infirmities, so assuredly, when necessity exacts it, one can safely swear concerning a true, lawful, and honorable matter, because when the cause ceases the effect ceases. Therefore, although you ought to be perfect men, so that, insofar as you can, you avoid the bond of an oath, nevertheless, wishing with paternal solicitude to provide for the indemnity of your monastery, lest through a deficiency of witnesses it sustain injury to its right, by the authority of him who says in the Gospel, “If your brother sins against you, correct him between you and him alone; and, if he does not hear you, take with you two or three witnesses, so that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may stand,” by the present page we grant to you that you and the lay brothers of your monastery may in its causes, when other witnesses are lacking, bear testimony to the truth on its behalf. [Let no one therefore, etc. Given at Rome at Saint Peter’s, on the twelfth day before the Kalends of April, in the ninth year, 1206.]

Latin source headnote: An oath furnished contrary to ecclesiastical utility does not bind.

The same, to the Bishop of Amelia.

As was intimated to our ears, when the Church of Todi was some time ago vacant, its canons—and our venerable brother the Bishop of Todi with them, while he was established in minor orders—made certain oaths to the detriment of episcopal right before any discussion was had concerning the election of a pontiff, as to whether they ought to be observed, especially since it would happen from them that episcopal revenues would be diminished, the same bishop, as a provident and discreet man, formerly considered that we should be consulted. We therefore, wishing with paternal solicitude to provide for his salvation, caused a fitting penance to be imposed upon the bishop for the incautious swearing. And nevertheless, considering that an oath was not instituted to be a bond of iniquity, and because things attempted contrary to ecclesiastical utility are to be called not oaths but rather perjuries, through apostolic writings we command your fraternity that, personally approaching the Church of Todi, you shall inquire more diligently from the canons themselves into the truth concerning the foregoing; and, if you find that the things said above are true, you shall, supported by our authority and with appeal removed, reduce to its due state whatever you find to have been attempted in this manner to the detriment of episcopal right, causing what you decree to be firmly observed through ecclesiastical censure.

Latin source headnote: An oath furnished concerning an act invalidated by law principally in favor of the person swearing, although secondarily in the public interest, necessarily is to be observed if it was furnished neither by force nor fraud and does not principally redound to the prejudice of another. This it says, with the core of the chapter considered in a very singular manner.

The same.

Since it sometimes happens in your diocese that, while a marriage continues, women [spontaneously] consent to alienations concerning dotal property and donations given to them on account of marriage, confirming by their own oath that they will not afterward contravene them, and, after the marriage is dissolved in the course of time, endeavor to contravene them, your fraternity asked us whether this is permitted to them. But we respond to your fraternity in this way: although the consent of women in such matters does not appear obligatory according to the lawful sanctions, nevertheless, lest under such a pretext it happen that a way is opened to perjuries, the women themselves ought to observe oaths of this kind, furnished willingly and in good faith, without force and fraud, since they do not redound to the prejudice of another, nor, when observed, tend toward loss of eternal salvation. [Moreover, you asked, etc. Given at the Lateran, on the sixteenth day before the Kalends of June, in the thirteenth year—1210.]

Latin source headnote: One who initiates an unjust war is compelled to restore the things he occupied through violence and to absolve those from whom he unduly extorted oaths. This it says as far as the words “But the oath.” — § 1. No one is bound by an oath to fulfill what he swore if the other party, with respect to whom the oath was furnished, does not fulfill [his part].

The same.

As [the tenor of the letters offered to us by the beloved son I. de Cuter. expressed, he recently experienced in himself that the deceptive pleasantness of this life scarcely or never remains in the same condition. For the more willingly one clings to it, the more easily one falls with it as it falls. (And below:) Therefore, since we are established in that place where, according to the prophetic word, we ought to dissolve the bonds of impiety and the bundles that oppress, to send free those who are broken, and to break every burden, through apostolic writings we command your discretion that,] if it is established to you that the aforesaid H. unjustly initiated war against I., you shall endeavor attentively to admonish and induce H. himself to restore both [the] land of the same man and all other things occupied through violence of this kind without delay to the complainant, wholly absolving him from the oath furnished to H. But if perhaps, after your admonitions, he is unwilling to acquiesce, you shall, if the foregoing rests upon truth, compel him to this by a sentence of excommunication, [with the obstacle of any contradiction and appeal removed,] also subjecting his land to a sentence of interdict.

§ 1. But the oath that [the same] I. asserts that he last furnished, if it was made with the assent of both parties, does not bind the person who furnished it while the person to whom it had been furnished neglects to observe what he promised.

Latin source headnote: Clerics who do not hold temporal things from laymen are not bound to furnish them oaths of fealty.

The same, in the general council.

Laymen indeed strive to usurp too much of divine right when they compel ecclesiastical men who hold nothing temporal from them to furnish oaths of fealty to them. But because, according to the Apostle, a servant stands or falls to his own lord, by authority of the sacred council we prohibit clerics of this kind from being compelled to furnish such oaths to secular persons.

Latin source headnote: One who swears not to be against someone can be against him in causes belonging to himself and his church. This it says according to the understanding of the gloss.

Honorius III, to A. and C., Canons of Antioch.

Your petition exhibited to us contained that, while the Church of Antioch was vacant, the nobleman R., Prince of Antioch, fearing that certain conspiracies would be made against him, extorted from you an oath that henceforth you would not be against him. But since the same prince has frequent disputes against the church itself, you can neither fail the church without its detriment nor dare to assist it lest you appear to act contrary to the said oath. Wherefore you humbly supplicated us that we should deign to provide concerning these matters with paternal solicitude. We therefore, providing equally for the utility of the same church, your salvation and reputation, and the honor of the said prince, declare by a fitting interpretation that you are not bound by an oath of this kind so that you cannot stand freely against the prince himself in lawfully defending the rights and honors of the church itself, and also your own particular rights, restraining you only from a machination through which the same prince ought to incur injury to his person or loss of his principality. We therefore decree that, when necessary, by resisting the said prince for defense of the right or honor of the often-mentioned church or of yourselves, you are subject through this to no mark or calumny.

Latin source headnote: When the matter concerns usury, a judge can at any part of the litigation, proofs being deficient, exact from the parties by his office an oath to tell the truth. And by the same reasoning the same applies in any cause in which sin threatens. This it says according to Panormitanus.

The same, to the Archdeacon and Master G., Canon of Toul.

We have learned from your letters that, in the cause concerning usury committed to you by the Apostolic See for G., a knight of Rossuel, against E., a knight of Épinal in the Diocese of Toul, the quantity of the principal could not become clear to you through witnesses produced by the party of G. himself, although the obligation of the pledge was established. Hence you see it to be expedient that an oath to tell the truth be exacted from the parties, since it is held as virtually notorious from report that the aforesaid E. received the principal and more from a certain land of G. himself obligated to him by title of pledge. Therefore, lest justice succumb with the truth concealed through the lack of an oath of this kind, we command your discretion that, if it is so, you shall compel the parties by ecclesiastical censure, appeal removed, to furnish an oath of this kind.

Latin source headnote: If one placed in a dignity alienates the goods of the dignity, the alienation is not valid; and he himself ought to revoke it, notwithstanding an oath not to revoke it, especially if he first swore not to alienate. This it says according to the true understanding. Panormitanus.

The same, to the Archbishop of Kalocsa and his Suffragans.

Having understood some time ago that our dearest son in Christ, the illustrious King of Hungary, made certain alienations to the prejudice of his kingdom and contrary to the honor of the king, we, desiring to counsel him concerning this with paternal affection, direct our writings to the same king that he shall endeavor to revoke the aforesaid alienations, notwithstanding an oath, if he made any, not to revoke them, because, since he is bound, and also swore at his coronation, to preserve inviolate the rights of his kingdom and the honor of the crown, an oath not to revoke alienations of this kind was assuredly unlawful if he furnished it, and is therefore not at all to be observed.

Latin source headnote: If a woman swore that someone was her husband and lost her case because she did not prove it otherwise, permission to contract with another is neither given nor denied to her.

Gregory IX, to the Bishop of Le Mans.

To a woman who asserted at law, under an oath furnished, that a certain man had consented matrimonially to her through words of the present tense, but who had no other proofs, the man having been absolved from her claim by sentence, you ought not to give permission to contract marriage with another, lest you appear an author of perjury. Nor do we say that this is to be prohibited to her, lest perhaps, if she swore falsely, it should happen that a lawful marriage is impeded; but it is rather to be left to her own conscience.

Latin source headnote: One who swore to observe statutes already issued and afterward, by that oath without swearing otherwise, promised to observe statutes to be issued or afterward issued is not bound by the oath to those newly issued. This it says according to the true understanding.

The same.

A cleric who swore that he would observe the statutes issued in his church, promising through the same oath faithfully to observe a statute that followed afterward, although he ought not to have transgressed what he promised, is not bound to its observance by the obligation of the furnished oath.

Latin source headnote: A decisory oath in litigation tendered by a judge cannot be refused without just cause; but one tendered by a party is lawfully refused and referred back; nevertheless, in an infamous action it is not permitted to the defendant to refer it back. This it says as far as § Certainly. — § 1. When the claimant proves nothing, the defendant is to be absolved without any burden; but if there is a presumption for [the claimant], an oath is tendered to the defendant or to the claimant himself, after consideration of the circumstances of the persons and the cause. This it says.

The same, to Judge H.

An oath tendered by you to a party could not be refused except for a just cause, although an oath tendered in judgment by one party to another can be lawfully refused and referred back; nor is it permitted to the person convened in an infamous action to refer back an oath of this kind.

§ 1. Certainly, if the claimant has wholly failed in proof, the defendant ought to prevail even if he has furnished nothing; but if a presumption makes for the claimant, an oath can be tendered to the defendant to show his innocence, unless the judge, after inspecting the circumstances of the persons and of the cause, sees that it should be tendered to the claimant.