Chapter XII — The opinion of Fr. Cattaneo, of Fr. La Croix, and of a few other authors, who compare a lie with a theft committed in extreme necessity, does not seem consonant with the teaching of the Church

I. Before all else, Cattaneo's opinion must be set forth in his own words. He writes thus, then (Vol. I, sacred Lectures, Lecture 44): "But, however much you may hear, that not even an officious lie is permitted, not even for the sake of saving an entire city from fire — know that not even for such an end is it lawful to commit a theft of half a solidus, nor even of a single silk thread. But just as, in such a case, this would no longer be theft (this having been so agreed among men for the public good), so, for the same reason, that would cease to be a lie — since the whole of humankind is no less the master, at its own discretion, of all things than of the significations of the words instituted by it, for the benefit of the world. And let it be noted that this must especially be understood, when someone is asked, it being against every rule of honesty, that anyone should be obliged, in such cases, to serve as a minister to wickedness." This is the opinion of Cattaneo, which we transcribed more fully above, ch. 5. First of all, his last words must be observed: namely, that this doctrine is especially to be understood in forced responses, which must be given to an unjust questioner. If the recounted doctrine is chiefly to be understood in these cases, it is inferred that it can, absolutely, be applied to other cases too, just as Cattaneo himself really applies it.

II. Fr. La Croix speaks more cautiously; yet he himself too admits that a lie in the most grave cases is not a lie; but that, the most grave cause ceasing, it is a lie. These are Fr. La Croix's words: "But outside these, and similar most grave cases, it would be a lie." See above, ch. 7, n. 7, where we reported La Croix's whole opinion.

III. According to the teaching of these theologians, then, this same locution is now a lie, now not a lie: it itself, that is, now denies, now does not deny, or signifies nothing. This opinion of Fr. Cattaneo's seems to be repugnant to the Church's teaching under a threefold head. First, it is repugnant to it in this: that he compares a lie to theft. The Church teaches that not even for the preservation of life is a lie lawful. Sacred Scripture forbids lying for another's life: chapter "Super eo," Extra, on usury. But where, in any canon, or Council, or ancient Father, or Theologian, do we find it forbidden that theft be committed for the preservation of life? This author alone, with a very few others, speaks in the same manner of theft as of lying. If the reasoning of theft, and of lying, were the same, why did the Fathers never declare that one must lie in extreme events, just as they declared theft to be lawful, urgent necessity pressing? To avoid prolixity, other Fathers set aside, I will bring forward only St. Thomas, who speaks with the voice of the rest of the Fathers. Concerning theft, the Angelic Doctor writes this (II-II, q. 66, art. 7): "He asks whether it is lawful for anyone to steal on account of necessity." To this question he responds thus: "It must be said that those things which are of human right cannot derogate from natural right, or from divine right. But according to the natural order instituted by divine providence, lower things are ordained to this end, that from them the necessity of men be relieved. And therefore, by the division and appropriation of things proceeding from human right, it is not prevented that man's necessity be relieved from these things. Whence, whatever certain persons have in superabundance is due, by natural right, to the sustenance of the poor. Whence Ambrose says, and it is held in the Decretum, dist. 47: 'It is the bread of the hungry which you withhold; it is the clothing of the naked which you hoard.'"

IV. In the same q. 110, art. 3, he asks whether every lie is a sin, or whether it is ever lawful to lie. And he raises six arguments against himself, drawn both from the Old and New Testament, and from the amphibologies of Abraham, and of Jacob, and from homicide to be avoided, by which he tries to show that a lie is sometimes lawful in writing. He then responds thus: "It must be said that a lie can in no way be good, since, for anything to be good, it is required that all things concur rightly. But a lie is, by its own kind, evil, being an act falling upon undue matter." This last is worth commending as words which will be useful for eluding certain things which the adversaries oppose under the color of angelic doctrine. Certainly the Angelic Doctor teaches, with all the Fathers and Theologians, that truth is to be concealed, in many cases, under some dissimulation — namely, by silence, or by turning the conversation to other matters; but never, according to the Angelic Doctor, is it lawful to conceal truth by a word which signifies something other than what the speaker has in mind.

V. St. Thomas, then, in express words, teaches that it is lawful sometimes to steal. Why? Because, he says, in the place cited, in the argument Sed contra: "In necessity all things are common." Why are all things common in necessity? Because, by their own nature, they were sometimes common, and the division was introduced by human right alone. But since those things which are of human right, such as the partition of goods, cannot derogate from those which are of natural right, therefore the division of goods among men did not abolish that primary natural right, by which men are entitled to temporal goods necessary for preserving their own life. For under this condition, this burden, this pact, the commonwealth of humankind divided temporal goods, that in extreme necessity all things should remain common. To those to whom it apportioned an abundant portion, it also imposed the burden of succoring the poor. And because the commonwealth of humankind published that law, or pact, by tacit consent, and God himself, the supreme Lord of things, who created all things so as to serve men's sustenance, attached this same debt to the division of goods, all recognize this aforesaid law and pact; no one is ignorant of it. Does not sacred Scripture, do not the Fathers, do not the Theologians, do not even the unlearned themselves, know this law attached to the partition of goods, so to speak, thoroughly, proclaim it, and, occasion given, carry it into execution?

VI. Moreover, if the human commonwealth had added the same exception for concealing truth, which it appended to the division of things — namely, that, necessity urging, it would be lawful to lie... , just as it is lawful to steal in a similar case — would not all have kept silent about such a privilege, necessary for preserving life, chastity, and sometimes the very soul? But why do I say, would have kept silent? Would they not really have taught the opposite? Augustine, and the Angelic Doctor, with all the rest, propose to themselves whether it is ever lawful to lie to avoid homicide. "Another evil" (he objects to himself, 4th, in the place cited above) "is to be chosen, so that a greater evil be avoided. But it is a lesser harm that someone should generate a false opinion in another's mind, than that someone should kill, or be killed. Therefore man can lawfully lie, so that he may preserve one from homicide, or preserve another from death. Now scarcely a greater necessity than this can occur." This is the very case that Cattaneo, and others, propose. What does the Angelic Doctor answer? "To the fourth it must be said that a lie has the character of sin not only from the harm inflicted on one's neighbor, but from its own inordinateness, as has been said in the body of the article. It is not lawful, however, to use any illicit inordinateness to impede the defects of others; just as it is not lawful to steal, so that a man may give alms, except perhaps in a case of necessity, in which all things are common. And therefore it is not lawful, for the sake of freeing another from any danger, to say a lie. One may, however, prudently conceal the truth under some dissimulation, as Augustine says in the Book On Lying." The Angelic Doctor, then, concedes that we can steal in a case of necessity; he expressly denies that we can lie in that same case of necessity. Therefore, according to Thomas, Augustine, and the rest of the Fathers, the opinion of Fr. Cattaneo, and Fr. La Croix, which speaks in the same manner of theft as of lying, is false. The Angelic Doctor certainly concedes that we can, under dissimulation, prudently conceal the truth; but that we can lie, never. Whether they can open their mouths here, I certainly do not see.

VII. Perhaps they will reply that a formal lie is not lawful, which the Angelic Doctor, with Augustine, disapproves; but a material lie is lawful. But this is nothing but a delusion of words. Since, when the Fathers deny that, in the extreme case of avoiding death, we can lie, they decree that a lie, in this case, is neither material, nor formal, and cannot be called material. And, so that I may close off every refuge of evasion, do you concede that I can, if I wish, lie in a case of necessity? This, certainly, you cannot deny. An assassin enters my house, sword drawn, about to kill my father. He asks me whether he is at home. I am ready to lie officiously, so that I may preserve my father's life. I ask: what words must I utter, so that I commit an open, material lie? None other than these, "He is not at home." What must be added, so that this becomes a formal lie? Fr. Cattaneo says that this is a material lie. Why so? So that I have the intention of concealing truth, and of helping my neighbor. But this is the very end of every officious lie. What, then, is required? So that I not direct my mind to the pact entered into by the human commonwealth, by which it declared that words then signify nothing. But if this pact really existed, it would be lawful to lie, just as it is lawful to steal. But the Fathers teach that theft is lawful, and lying unlawful. Therefore the asserted pact is chimerical.

VIII. Lest we seem to have said in vain that all the Fathers, with St. Thomas, teach that theft is lawful in a case of necessity, but not so lying, it is worth confirming what has been said, from the universal teaching of the Fathers. The Valentinians, the Marcionites, the Manichaeans, as reported by Tertullian (Bk. IV, Against Heresies, ch. 49) and Augustine (Bk. II, Against Marcion, ch. 20), condemned as thieves the Israelite people, because they despoiled the Egyptians of gold and silver, as is held in Exodus 12:35-36: "They asked of the Egyptians vessels of silver and gold, and very much raiment. And the Lord gave favor to the people in the sight of the Egyptians, so that they lent unto them: and they stripped the Egyptians." This theft God did not punish, but approved. Origen, Cassian, and others, cited in the same Augustine, object that the Egyptian midwives lied, and that God rewarded such lies. They therefore inferred that lies were licit, a grave cause urging.

IX. What do the Fathers answer? With unanimous consent, they say that the Hebrews committed no theft, because, says St. Thomas, since God has dominion over all things created by him, he can, by his own decree, impart these same things to whomever he wills. By his precept, then, the people of Israel carried off the spoils of the Egyptians, since God can bestow the same, at his own arbitrary will, on whomever he wishes. All the Fathers offer this same answer. But to the other example, drawn from the same Scripture, what do they reply? All, to a man, confess that both the midwives, and Rahab of Jericho, lied. Let it suffice to praise one — Augustine, who, in the Book Against Lying, ch. 15, writes this: "But because it is written that God dealt well with the Hebrew midwives, and with Rahab the harlot of Jericho, this is not therefore false, because they lied, but because they were merciful toward the men of God. It is not deceit, then, that is rewarded in them, but benevolence; the goodness of their intention, not the iniquity of their lying."

X. Here the response of Cattaneo, and others, would have been obvious: namely, that neither did the Hebrews commit theft, nor did the aforesaid women commit a lie, because, as this author says, humankind's commonwealth possesses dominion no less over all things than over words. Why, then, did the Fathers proceed by an altogether opposite path, purging the Israelite men from the taint of theft, but condemning the women for the guilt of lying, for any other reason than that, as the Angelic Doctor says, a lie is, by its own kind, an evil — because it perverts the order of nature, which instituted words to be signs of what we bear in our mind; but the division of things, introduced by human right, was so introduced, on this condition and pact, that in necessity all things should remain common, as at first? What is to be said to this? Is this a negative argument? Do not the Fathers really disapprove this fictitious law of the commonwealth, which strips words of any signification whatsoever — since they teach that a lie uttered in extreme necessity is a sin, both because it is, by its own nature, evil, and because the essence of words, in common and serious speech, consists wholly in signification?

XI. The recounted opinion of mental restrictions, secondly, seems to me — saving always a better judgment — most openly repugnant to the Church's teaching, in that it is even laxer than that doctrine of mental restrictions itself, proscribed by the Church. Since, in mental restrictions, one's wits must be racked, one's mind vexed, so that the speaker may devise the internal sense which the words admit. And yet this doctrine has been proscribed. Fr. Cattaneo, however, so as to free men from this vexation of mind, gave them the courage to hurl, absolutely, without any restriction, a round "no" into the face of an unjust questioner, without any inconvenience — so that men will be all the more innocent, and will not hurl that lie into the face of the assailant more boldly, in whatever way it may open the sincerity of the aggressor.

XII. Thirdly, and lastly, this opinion is repugnant to the Church's teaching in this: that it teaches words are stripped of their proper signification not only in extreme necessity, but even to avoid any notable inconvenience whatsoever. Wherefore it is to be disapproved not only because it establishes that it is lawful to lie, just as it is lawful to steal in extreme necessity; but it goes even further: for it teaches that it is lawful to lie to avoid any grave inconvenience whatsoever. Wherefore, from the doctrine of Fr. Cattaneo himself, his opinion seems not only to be proscribed in propositions 16 and 17, condemned by Innocent XI, but even in proposition 36 of the same Pontiff, which is of this kind: "It is permitted to steal, not only in extreme necessity, but also in grave necessity." Fr. Cattaneo teaches that the commonwealth of humankind published the same law concerning the malice of theft, and of words. But, according to the Church's teaching, theft loses the malice of theft, and becomes material, or is not theft, only in extreme necessity. Therefore, admitting Cattaneo's opinion concerning the commonwealth's law with respect to words, these words will lose their own signification only in extreme necessity, just as theft does. And yet Fr. Cattaneo excuses even light and slight cases. For, by this doctrine of his, he excuses a merchant, denying that he has cloth which he really has, lest he sell a few ells of that cloth to a buyer of risky solvency; he excuses another, denying that he has money, of which he has an abundance, lest he lend a hundred to a borrower of whom... he doubts whether he is solvent. It is indeed true, however, that such a case he first purges from a lie by another way — namely, by a restriction which he himself calls not purely mental. But because not all are fit for forming such amphibologies, he therefore, so as to open a way pervious and easy for all, adds the law of the commonwealth depriving words of any signification whatsoever. And, although (lest I dissemble anything) near the end of the cited Lecture he warns that care must be taken lest, just as an unbridled greed for goods feigns necessity where there is none, the same thing happen also in the use of words — such medicines, and salves, nonetheless profit nothing the wound already inflicted on truth: all the more since the case proposed by the author himself yields no extreme necessity; and finally he himself closes his Lecture with these words: "This much said suffices for the practice of the cases that occur daily. But the case of an assassin seeking the father of a family for death is not a daily occurrence." But of this again below.

XIII. You will object: It is false that man must always conform his words to his internal senses; for justice and charity, which command that secrets of the highest moment be guarded, often forbid this — and this is proved by the authority of St. Thomas, who teaches (II-II, q. 109, art. 3) that a man is not bound, from the debt of justice alone, to the manifestation of truth: "For this virtue does not attend to the legal debt, which justice attends to; but rather a moral debt, insofar, that is, that one man, from honorableness, owes another the manifestation of truth." This text a certain Anonymous author objects, in an allegation of Fr. Cattaneo against Fr. Orsi, who most effectively refuted not only this allegator, but other adversaries too, and, among all whom I have read, treated this controversy most successfully, and, so far as could be done, exhausted it.

XIV. In the citation of the text which the Anonymous author objects from St. Thomas, good faith is to be believed. The cited text, however, is mutilated. In the words related, St. Thomas speaks of the debt of manifesting truth, which we can often, and most often ought to, conceal, when, that is, its manifestation produces harm to honorableness — since this having been removed, from the debt of honesty (because man is a sociable animal), he is bound to communicate truth to others. This truth, however, the Angelic Doctor never said — that, if man wishes to speak, and to reveal his internal conceptions, he ought not to fit his words to the conceptions of his mind; but rather he teaches the opposite, indeed, in that very place from which the Anonymous author plucked out the truncated text, which I will transcribe whole. "The virtue of truth, moreover, agrees with justice in two respects. In one way, in that it constitutes a certain equality in things which pertains to another... In another way, insofar as it establishes an equality. The virtue of truth also does this: for it equates signs to the things existing concerning it. But it falls short of the proper reason of justice as regards the reason of debt. For this virtue does not attend to the legal debt..." See how different a sense the whole Angelic text renders from that which the words plucked out by the Anonymous author produce! And these are the men who cry out that we bring forward the Casuists' words less than sincerely, when they cause a horror of laxity. The Angelic Doctor compares truth with justice. He says, first, that truth agrees with justice in two respects: in respect to another, and in constituting an equality between words, and the things existing in the mind of man, which are manifested by the medium of words. He then adds that truth differs from justice, insofar as this latter compels a man to render what he owes from justice, and binds him by a legal debt; but the virtue of truth does not impose a legal debt of always manifesting one's secrets, but only a moral debt, insofar as society, and human commerce, or other reasons, are wont to require.

XV. Several other objections are customarily raised, but we shall resolve these below. It is worth adding only this: that Fr. Domenico Viva, in his commentaries on propositions 16 and 27, proscribed by Innocent XI, recounts this opinion concerning the material signification of words, and attributes it to Sotus, who does not indicate it even remotely, to Valentia, to Sánchez, and to Pallavicino. He himself, however, does not excuse it from being a lie: for he says, n. 15: "But, whatever be the case with this opinion, which perhaps does not teach lying, it suffices that it be taught by three, or four, so that it be received as probable." Nonetheless, elsewhere, he admits it as probable: because, whatever is devised by three or four, is taken up as probable.