Chapter XIII — The common opinion of very many more recent writers, which defends restrictions not purely mental, by the benefit of communicable and incommunicable, useful and non-useful knowledge, is brought under examination. It does not differ from the opinion of authors upholding purely mental restrictions

I. I fear this chapter's title may stir the reader against me. For it will perhaps seem to some to betray an elevated arrogance, that I should call into scrutiny the common opinion of more recent writers. What? If the common opinion is not proven, will you dare to attack it? Are you alone against all? Far be it. Rather, since I am conscious of my own smallness, I wish to adhere to the firm columns of all the Fathers, and Doctors, whom God has set to rule the Church. Not for this, however, do I despise more recent writers, whom I hold in great esteem, and venerate; but the opinions of many are not proven to me, because they have been proscribed by the Church, or are contained within them, as will become plain to the reader. Before I proceed further, this must be considered, which I object: that almost all those cases which the patrons of lying defended, and which Augustine, with the other Fathers, impugned, the authors of purely mental restriction likewise defend, after the Church declared that lying is never lawful. Lies, then, and purely mental restrictions, having been condemned, very many more recent writers who wrote after the decrees of Alexander VII and Innocent XI, under the title of restrictions not purely mental, defend almost all the cases which the authors of the condemned propositions defended. And if the reader, so that he may emerge certain, should wish to make trial of this matter, it is established from what the theologians of Salamanca, and very many others cited by them, write (tract. 17, ch. 2, §6, n. 139), and ch. 6, n. 15 and following, of Sánchez, who most certainly, in so many words, as it is said, teaches the propositions condemned concerning mental restrictions, whose opinion, nonetheless, was then the common one. Below we shall report some cases. Let no one, then, brand me as either less obsequious to more recent writers, or as greedy for singularity; but let him weigh what I am about to say with a mind free of prejudices, and by equal right.

II. So that we may clearly show that the opinion of very many more recent writers, in the matter of restrictions which they themselves call not purely mental, really differs in no way from the opinion of purely mental restrictions, first of all the principles of each opinion must be set forth. So that I may avoid prolixity, as far as possible, Fr. Leander, who, among Casuists, claims for himself a singular diligence and sincerity in citing authors, and in reporting their opinions, expounds the doctrine of mental restrictions (tract. 1, on the oath, disp. 45, §1, q. 9): "It must be said that mental amphibology is, and is given, then, when the exterior words, precisely taken, do not have a proper and complete signification in which they yield a true sense — since they are drawn away from their proper signification by some restriction, not uttered by voice, but conceived internally, as if someone should say by voice, 'I have not eaten this meat,' and internally understand, 'today,' or 'so as to tell you.' Thus Suárez, Bk. III, ch. 10, n. 1; Sánchez, Bk. III, ch. 6, n. 15; and all." All, says Leander, restrict the internal sense by the medium of incommunicable knowledge. Castropalao teaches the same (tract. 14, disp. 1, punct. 7, n. 3): "Asked about a crime which, at least under a probable opinion, you are not bound to manifest, either because you are not asked juridically, or because grave harm would ensue from the manifestation — you can deny that you did it, understanding 'in prison,' or 'so as to be bound to say it.'" Without controversy, then, the authors of purely mental restriction defended their own opinion by the benefit of communicable and incommunicable knowledge.

III. Now the principles of purely mental restrictions must be compared. It is commonly agreed, however, that very many more recent writers began to call these restrictions not purely mental, or external, which the earlier writers called mental, and purely mental — adding nothing external besides the aforesaid restrictions, of which more, referring their own reason for calling these restrictions external, and not purely mental — which is demonstrated by this: that authors who wrote after the condemned propositions cannot further defend purely mental restrictions, by this appellation; for the principles by which they defend that these external, and not purely mental, restrictions are lawful, are the very ones by which authors before the condemned propositions used to defend the aforesaid restrictions. They say, then, that these restrictions are made external by the benefit of communicable, or incommunicable, knowledge, the circumstances in which the respondent utters his proposition being inspected. Note, however, that these circumstances are called external by them only in name: for by the name of circumstances of this kind, they understand nothing other than sufficient causes for justifying restrictions of mind; as if the authors, before the licit use of mental restrictions, taught nothing other, absolutely, than that they be used with just... and urgent cause, in the midst of which no one would deny that the aforesaid authors taught principles from which such an inference is drawn.

IV. Fr. Domenico Viva, in his commentaries on propositions 26 and 27, condemned by Innocent XI, n. 3, writes this: "To this restriction, not purely mental, is reduced the use of a twofold knowledge: namely, communicable and incommunicable — as when a Confessor is asked whether he knows anything of a penitent's sin, and he responds that he knows nothing, it being apparent from the circumstances that words are to be taken with respect to communicable knowledge only." So that the principle of a twofold knowledge, communicable and incommunicable, might present some semblance of validity, the Author immediately brings forward the example of the Confessor. For, with respect to a Confessor, the use of a twofold knowledge can perhaps have some place, since a Confessor really bears a twofold person; that principle is thus easily rendered plausible to less experienced readers. But so that the falsity of this doctrine may appear, it must be observed that Fr. Viva teaches, not only for a Confessor — whom he sets before the reader's eyes as a mere pretext — but for all men, urgent grave cause pressing, that they can lawfully employ this principle of twofold knowledge, and with this amplitude, I say. And in this I say that this doctrine is, by force of just reasoning, evidently false, and condemned by the Church: for it differs in nothing from the doctrine of purely mental restriction.

V. And first, that Fr. Viva exhibits this doctrine of twofold knowledge for all men, the matter is most manifest — and, lest it seem said by us gratuitously, his own words must be transcribed. Thus, n. 15, having reported the opinion of those who teach that words can sometimes be used materially, or as signifying nothing, and having rejected this, as suspect of lying, he concludes: "But, whatever be the case with this opinion, which perhaps does not decline a lie, it suffices to have hinted at it, since the sacramental seal can be so naturally guarded by all, with easy business, through the use of twofold knowledge." There you have the amplified use of twofold knowledge, extended to guard even a natural seal. But, if you wish to grasp the whole amplitude of it, read what he adds in the number immediately following, which I will transcribe whole.

VI. "Lastly, rustics, who do not know how to employ opportune equivocations, ought to consider whether the concealment of truth prevails for the public good, so that the sincerity of their confession is not deceived. Certainly, when the concealment of truth conduces to the protection of health, honor, family property, or to any other act of virtue, then the concealment of truth is licit, provided a cause is required to superadd to the ambiguous speech: greater equivocation is nonetheless required, when a convenient equivocation, or EXTERNAL RESTRICTION, does not occur — although, if the cause is grave, rustics can, by the use of a TWOFOLD KNOWLEDGE EASILY AT HAND, conceal the truth, not with the intent of deceiving, but only by permitting deception."

VII. I ask my reader to weigh this recounted doctrine seriously and carefully; for it is of the highest importance. So that you may more clearly penetrate the Author's mind, I must therefore set before your eyes the very response which Fr. Viva presents, which is objected to himself by authors defending purely mental restrictions. Fourth, because cases arise everywhere in which it is not lawful to reveal the truth, or it cannot be revealed without great inconvenience, whence the concealment of truth is expedient, and to be sought — this argument itself must be set forth in the words of Fr. Viva himself, who objects it to himself, n. 7. So, then, some way must be given for this, one common to all, even to rustics. But the way of equivocation, or of external, not purely mental, restriction, is not easily open to all, and it labors under difficulties and dangers of falling into a lie, lest the truth to be concealed be manifested. On the contrary, however, recourse to purely mental restriction is easy, nor does it contain the intent of lying.

VIII. Fr. Viva sensed the force of this argument — namely, that the way of equivocation, and of real and external restriction, is not open, nor always pervious, to all, especially to rustics, and to less sharp-witted men. Therefore he has recourse to twofold knowledge, communicable and incommunicable, or to purely mental restriction, when, however, he says, a convenient equivocation, or external restriction, does not occur: "if the cause is grave, rustics can, by an easy use of twofold knowledge, conceal the truth." Which can be said in fewer words thus: "If a convenient external restriction does not occur, use the internal one." For the use of communicable and incommunicable knowledge signifies nothing else than: "I do not know, so as to say it, because I know it by incommunicable knowledge; and I know it, so as to say it, because I know it by communicable, or useful, knowledge." Exactly the same, and nothing more, do the authors of purely mental restriction say. And note that Fr. Viva himself writes: "When a convenient external restriction does not occur" — internal restriction must be used.

IX. In settling controversies of morals, two extremes must be avoided. One must abstain from censuring others' opinions; but one must beware lest an excessive fear of displeasing men induce a loss of truth. Not, then, so as to exercise a censorious rod against a most learned man, whom I cultivate with due deference, do I do this; but so as to vindicate a most evident truth of the highest moment from vain fabrications. But Fr. Viva establishes, without any explanation, that, when a convenient external restriction does not occur, an internal medium must be used. But nothing at all can occur that would more easily conceal the truth, than this internal medium, once the external restriction has failed. Therefore, while Fr. Viva teaches that, where external restriction does not occur, one must have recourse to the use of twofold knowledge, he already teaches a purely internal restriction. Therefore, etc.

X. It is established, then, by force of the very argumentation which Fr. Viva employs, that his opinion is contained in the condemned proposition, or is itself the proscribed proposition.

XI. What has been said is confirmed by the very explanation of the terms. For the use of communicable and incommunicable knowledge is merely internal. What else did the authors of purely mental restriction ever understand, when they said, "I do not know, so as to say it," or "I do not know it by communicable knowledge, or by knowledge useful for saying it"? What, I say, did they understand, other than purely mental restriction? The use of incommunicable and communicable knowledge, then, is reduced to sheer, pure mental restriction.

XII. You will perhaps respond that the matter stands thus, if all these are taken absolutely, and apart from circumstances; but not so, if they are considered as bound and circumscribed by circumstances. The use of communicable knowledge is internal, absolutely considered; but externally... they take refuge, by reason of the circumstances in which they find themselves — and this sophism is the chief cause of erring. What are these circumstances, by force of which internal use of incommunicable knowledge becomes external? Assign, then, that principle with respect to all men indiscriminately, which constitutes external the use of incommunicable knowledge. For our discourse is not now of some particular person, such as a Confessor, a Prince's secretary, or another similar one; but of men, of rustics, who are distinguished by no character, no dignity. The cases of a Confessor, a secretary, a judge, who bear the office of a twofold person, we shall examine individually below. The controversy, then, concerns men not distinguished by any peculiar circumstance affecting their person. Answer, then: what are these circumstances which draw internal conceptions from the interior of the mind? These are certainly none other than the causes which all authors assign, so as to defend purely internal restrictions as licit. When there is danger of one's own safety, honor, and family goods, these are the circumstances by force of which the knowledge of truth becomes incommunicable. And because this knowledge, here and now, the danger of losing life, or honor, or family goods being attended to (which are external circumstances), becomes not useful, but rather harmful, for manifestation — therefore the use of incommunicable knowledge becomes external, and the restriction is called not purely internal. Thus Fr. Viva reasons, and, with him, very many more recent writers.

XIII. Now anyone endowed with reason evidently perceives that either no mental restrictions at all are given, or, if any are given, they are exactly those which Fr. Viva defends. Weigh the condemned proposition extracted from Fr. Sánchez; weigh what Sánchez says in the place cited, where you will find: "The cause of using these amphibologies is, whenever it is necessary, or useful, for the safety of body, honor, and protecting family property, or for any other act of virtue, such that the concealment of the truth is then judged expedient, and worthy of pursuit." This is the proposition proscribed from Fr. Sánchez. Neither did anyone among the many Doctors who defended purely mental restrictions ever say that these restrictions were made external, without a just cause; nor did any of them say that the causes for which they asserted it lawful to make use of the said restrictions would render them external. What more? These very causes are recounted in the condemned proposition. Therefore it must be said, either that the condemned proposition is not condemned, or that the causes recounted in that same condemned proposition in no way render external the restrictions of mind, which are absolutely internal. On the other hand, Fr. Viva assigns no other circumstance, with respect to rustic men, than the aforesaid causes. For if it is asked why the knowledge, or the incommunicable knowledge, is hidden, he answers, because it is occult, because its manifestation induces a loss either of life, or honor, or of temporal goods. Therefore his doctrine is really contained in the proscribed proposition.

XIV. Fr. Claude La Croix confirms, in express words, what we have said — namely, that these causes, of defending life, honor, etc., are circumstances which constitute a restriction not purely mental. For he says: "When the causes are grave, then the restriction will not be purely mental; but if the causes are not grave, the restriction will be purely mental." Here are his words (Bk. III, part 1, ch. 2, dub. 4, n. 289): "When the causes for so restricting are not very grave, if the restriction is made properly on the part of the respondent alone, it will commonly be purely mental, and consequently illicit. For example: a father asks his son, 'Were you at the tavern?' It is not lawful for the son to say, 'I was not,' understanding, 'so as to be known to you, so that I would have to confess it.' The reason is that, where the causes for restricting are not grave, the question is reckoned to be made absolutely, according to the words alone, and this has common judgment among men: for the questioner has the right to ask, and is not above human weakness to answer according to the precise words. Therefore these circumstances are not such that they can be reckoned to constitute, together with the words, a speech manifesting what is reserved in the mind: therefore this restriction is a purely mental one." This doctrine signifies, in a few words, that when there is danger of losing life, or honor, or something similar, a mental restriction is licit, because it is not a purely mental restriction; when it is not so, the restriction is not licit, because it is a purely mental one. Why? Because then, the manifestation of truth being joined with the danger of life, is above human weakness; therefore this mental restriction is not purely mental. Why is it not purely mental? Because then I ought to presume that you do not question me, so that I would reveal to you the hidden crime. A charming doctrine indeed! But hear what he writes in the preceding number, 288: "If you ask me whether I killed Caius, I respond, 'I did not kill him' — even if I did kill him, I do not lie, nor sin, because in those circumstances in which the crime is entirely hidden, which, if I confess, my life is endangered — I ought not to presume, unless it is otherwise established to me, that you ask me whether I committed the crime absolutely, since you do not have the right to question me so absolutely; nor, in those circumstances, am I bound to reveal to you even what is not fully proven, with the certain loss of my life, even though you were my judge; for this would be too harsh to demand of me..." And what is said there, very many teach with Cárdenas, that these things exceed and overcome human weakness. I have transcribed this whole passage, not because I disapprove all that is said in it (since I too approve that a defendant is not bound to reveal a crime which is occult, and not even half-proven), but so as to confirm what I proposed — namely, that these authors teach that the danger of losing life is a cause which suffices to render a purely mental restriction not purely mental; which is the same as saying that a purely mental restriction is licit, whenever a peril to life impends; or, that a lie is licit, a grave cause urging. For a purely internal restriction is a lie.

XV. This same doctrine of his Fr. Claude La Croix explains and impresses (Bk. VI, part 2, ch. 3, n. 1587), where, having reported several ways of guarding a seal, whether sacramental or natural, he concludes that, outside similar most grave cases, amphibologies are lies. And what, he says, has been said of a Confessor, holds for every other person bound to a seal. But outside these, and similar most grave cases, it would be a lie thus to use words. Furthermore, when truth can be concealed in a manner less suspect of lying, this must be employed here first, rather than the extreme remedy, when necessity urges. Even Cassian taught that a lie should be employed in the manner of hellebore in extreme necessity. Fr. La Croix, then, confesses, in the most express words, that it is licit, in extreme necessity of guarding a seal — not only sacramental, but even natural — and in other similar cases, to use a speech composed of such words, which, outside these most grave cases, would be a lie. What could be said more openly to be Cassian's, and the other ancients', proscribed doctrine, than to say that a lie in extreme necessity is not a lie, or, in extreme necessity, that a lie is licit? This, indeed, is entirely the same as saying, this doctrine is Cassian's, and other ancients', proscribed by the Church. One thing, however, I confess: that Fr. La Croix writes more cautiously than several other more recent writers. For he defends mental restrictions only in extreme cases. But he also confesses more sincerely that the same speech, in extreme necessity, is not a lie, but, outside the case of necessity, is a lie — which altogether signifies that, in extreme necessity, a lie is licit, but not so, necessity removed.